A cryptocurrency is a decentralized digital currency that is designed for secure and private asset transfer and storage. As a currency, it should be difficult to counterfeit and double-spend. In this paper, we review and analyze the major security and privacy issues of Bitcoin. In particular, we focus on its underlying foundation, blockchain technology. First, we present a comprehensive background of Bitcoin and the preliminary on security. Second, the major security threats and countermeasures of Bitcoin are investigated. We analyze the risk of double-spending attacks, evaluate the probability of success in performing the attacks and derive the profitability for the attacker to perform such attacks. Third, we analyze the underlying Bitcoin peer-to-peer network security risks and Bitcoin storage security. We compare three types of Bitcoin wallets in terms of security, type of services and their trade-offs. Finally, we discuss the security and privacy features of alternative cryptocurrencies and present an overview of emerging technologies today. Our results can help Bitcoin users to determine a trade-off between the risk of double-spending attempts and the transaction time delay or confidence before accepting transactions. These results can also assist miners to develop suitable strategies to get involved in the mining process and maximize their profits.
Research in digital cash dates back to the early 1980s @cite_18 . In 1990, DigiCash Inc., an electronic cash corporation, made an initial attempt to provide a cryptocurrency system @cite_75 . DigiCash transactions involved cryptographic protocols and aimed at providing its users with anonymity. However,it failed in 2000 as the Internet bubble popped despite being attractive initially. David Chaum, its founder, believes the failure of DigiCash to succeed was tied to its technology which preceded the e-commerce maturation within the Internet. Other reasons which led to its failure included the cooperation of banks to process a transaction, making DigiCash a centralized system.
@cite_18 @cite_75
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Bit coin has emerged as the most successful cryptographic currency in history. Within two years of its quiet launch in 2009, Bit coin grew to comprise billions of dollars of economic value despite only cursory analysis of the system's design. Since then a growing literature has identified hidden-but-important properties of the system, discovered attacks, proposed promising alternatives, and singled out difficult future challenges. Meanwhile a large and vibrant open-source community has proposed and deployed numerous modifications and extensions. We provide the first systematic exposition Bit coin and the many related crypto currencies or 'altcoins.' Drawing from a scattered body of knowledge, we identify three key components of Bit coin's design that can be decoupled. This enables a more insightful analysis of Bit coin's properties and future stability. We map the design space for numerous proposed modifications, providing comparative analyses for alternative consensus mechanisms, currency allocation mechanisms, computational puzzles, and key management tools. We survey anonymity issues in Bit coin and provide an evaluation framework for analyzing a variety of privacy-enhancing proposals. Finally we provide new insights on what we term disinter mediation protocols, which absolve the need for trusted intermediaries in an interesting set of applications. We identify three general disinter mediation strategies and provide a detailed comparison. The emerging wireless and mobile networks have extended electronic commerce to another research and application subject: mobile commerce. This creates new opportunities for customers to conduct business from any location at any time. One of the important uses of mobile applications is transforming the mobile phone into a mobile wallet with digital cash that supports both anonymity (as real cash) and security [3]. Hence, in this article we propose a scheme to support m-commerce transactions and provide fully anonymity for mobile users. Our scheme is based on 160 bit ECC, Whose security intensity is equal to 1024 bit RSA. The paper describes the model, infrastructure and details of the protocol. It also discusses the applying ECC on protocol, some implementation issues and restrictions in mobile payment systems. Bitcoin is the first e-cash system to see widespread adoption. While Bitcoin offers the potential for new types of financial interaction, it has significant limitations regarding privacy. Specifically, because the Bitcoin transaction log is completely public, users' privacy is protected only through the use of pseudonyms. In this paper we propose Zerocoin, a cryptographic extension to Bitcoin that augments the protocol to allow for fully anonymous currency transactions. Our system uses standard cryptographic assumptions and does not introduce new trusted parties or otherwise change the security model of Bitcoin. We detail Zerocoin's cryptographic construction, its integration into Bitcoin, and examine its performance both in terms of computation and impact on the Bitcoin protocol. Many large decentralized systems rely on information propagation to ensure their proper function. We examine a common scenario in which only participants that are aware of the information can compete for some reward, and thus informed participants have an incentive not to propagate information to others. One recent example in which such tension arises is the 2009 DARPA Network Challenge (finding red balloons). We focus on another prominent example: Bitcoin, a decentralized electronic currency system. Bitcoin represents a radical new approach to monetary systems. It has been getting a large amount of public attention over the last year, both in policy discussions and in the popular press. Its cryptographic fundamentals have largely held up even as its usage has become increasingly widespread. We find, however, that it exhibits a fundamental problem of a different nature, based on how its incentives are structured. We propose a modification to the protocol that can eliminate this problem. Bitcoin relies on a peer-to-peer network to track transactions that are performed with the currency. For this purpose, every transaction a node learns about should be transmitted to its neighbors in the network. As the protocol is currently defined and implemented, it does not provide an incentive for nodes to broadcast transactions they are aware of. In fact, it provides an incentive not to do so. Our solution is to augment the protocol with a scheme that rewards information propagation. Since clones are easy to create in the Bitcoin system, an important feature of our scheme is Sybil-proofness. We show that our proposed scheme succeeds in setting the correct incentives, that it is Sybil-proof, and that it requires only a small payment overhead, all this is achieved with iterated elimination of dominated strategies. We complement this result by showing that there are no reward schemes in which information propagation and no self-cloning is a dominant strategy.