Systems exploiting network coding to increase their throughput suffer greatly from pollution attacks which consist of injecting malicious packets in the network. The pollution attacks are amplified by the network coding process, resulting in a greater damage than under traditional routing. In this paper, we address this issue by designing an unconditionally secure authentication code suitable for multicast network coding. The proposed scheme is robust against pollution attacks from outsiders, as well as coalitions of malicious insiders. Intermediate nodes can verify the integrity and origin of the packets received without having to decode, and thus detect and discard the malicious messages in-transit that fail the verification. This way, the pollution is canceled out before reaching the destinations. We analyze the performance of the scheme in terms of both multicast throughput and goodput, and show the goodput gains. We also discuss applications to file distribution.
The signature scheme proposed in @cite_5 uses a standard signature scheme based on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem. The blocks of data are considered as vectors spanning a subspace. The signature is not performed on vectors containing data blocks, but on vectors orthogonal to all data vectors in the given subspace. The signature verification allows to check if the received vector belongs to the data subspace. The security of their scheme holds in that no adversary knowing a signature on a given subspace of data vectors is able to forge a valid signature for any vector not in this given subspace. This scheme requires also fresh keys for every file. Finally, the signature schemes given in @cite_6 follow the approach given in @cite_5 with improvements in terms of public key size and per-packet overhead. The signature schemes proposed are designed to authenticate a linear subspace formed by the vectors containing data blocks. Signatures on a linear subspace are sufficient to authenticate all the vectors in this same subspace. With these schemes, a single public key can be used to verify multiple files.
@cite_5 @cite_6
1743877615 1888254701 2093804096 2090942449
Network coding offers increased throughput and improved robustness to random faults in completely decentralized networks. In contrast to traditional routing schemes, however, network coding requires intermediate nodes to modify data packets en route ; for this reason, standard signature schemes are inapplicable and it is a challenge to provide resilience to tampering by malicious nodes. We propose two signature schemes that can be used in conjunction with network coding to prevent malicious modification of data. Our schemes can be viewed as signing linear subspaces in the sense that a signature *** on a subspace V authenticates exactly those vectors in V . Our first scheme is (suitably) homomorphic and has constant public-key size and per-packet overhead. Our second scheme does not rely on random oracles and is based on weaker assumptions. We also prove a lower bound on the length of signatures for linear subspaces showing that our schemes are essentially optimal in this regard. We propose a new and efficient signature scheme that is provably secure in the plain model. The security of our scheme is based on a discrete-logarithm-based assumption put forth by Lysyanskaya, Rivest, Sahai, and Wolf (LRSW) who also showed that it holds for generic groups and is independent of the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption. We prove security of our scheme under the LRSW assumption for groups with bilinear maps. We then show how our scheme can be used to construct efficient anonymous credential systems as well as group signature and identity escrow schemes. To this end, we provide efficient protocols that allow one to prove in zero-knowledge the knowledge of a signature on a committed (or encrypted) message and to obtain a signature on a committed message. The limited number of writers and genuine signatures constitutes the main problem for designing a robust Handwritten Signature Verification System (HSVS). We propose, in this paper, the use of One-Class Support Vector Machine (OC-SVM) based on writer-independent parameters, which takes into consideration only genuine signatures and when forgery signatures are lack as counterexamples for designing the HSVS. The OC-SVM is effective when large samples are available for providing an accurate classification. However, available handwritten signature samples are often reduced and therefore the OC-SVM generates an inaccurate training and the classification is not well performed. In order to reduce the misclassification, we propose a modification of decision function used in the OC-SVM by adjusting carefully the optimal threshold through combining different distances used into the OC-SVM kernel. Experimental results conducted on CEDAR and GPDS handwritten signature datasets show the effective use of the proposed system comparatively to the state of the art. We propose handwritten signature verification for writer independent parameters.We propose to design HSVS system using only genuine signatures using OC-SVM.Applying a soft threshold in order to reduce the misclassification of the OC-SVM.Combination scheme is proposed through versus distances used into the OC-SVM kernel.Competitive results are obtained comparatively to the state of the art. Sequential aggregate signature schemes allow n signers, in order, to sign a message each, at a lower total cost than the cost of n individual signatures. We present a sequential aggregate signature scheme based on trapdoor permutations (e.g., RSA). Unlike prior such proposals, our scheme does not require a signer to retrieve the keys of other signers and verify the aggregate-so-far before adding its own signature. Indeed, we do not even require a signer to know the public keys of other signers!Moreover, for applications that require signers to verify the aggregate anyway, our schemes support lazy verification: a signer can add its own signature to an unverified aggregate and forward it along immediately, postponing verification until load permits or the necessary public keys are obtained. This is especially important for applications where signers must access a large, secure, and current cache of public keys in order to verify messages. The price we pay is that our signature grows slightly with the number of signers.We report a technical analysis of our scheme (which is provably secure in the random oracle model), a detailed implementation-level specification, and implementation results based on RSA and OpenSSL. To evaluate the performance of our scheme, we focus on the target application of BGPsec (formerly known as Secure BGP), a protocol designed for securing the global Internet routing system. There is a particular need for lazy verification with BGPsec, since it is run on routers that must process signatures extremely quickly, while being able to access tens of thousands of public keys. We compare our scheme to the algorithms currently proposed for use in BGPsec, and find that our signatures are considerably shorter than nonaggregate RSA (with the same sign and verify times) and have an order of magnitude faster verification than nonaggregate ECDSA, although ECDSA has shorter signatures when the number of signers is small.