Finding regions for which there is higher controversy among different classifiers is insightful with regards to the domain and our models. Such evaluation can falsify assumptions, assert some, or also, bring to the attention unknown phenomena. The present work describes an algorithm, which is based on the Exceptional Model Mining framework, and enables that kind of investigations. We explore several public datasets and show the usefulness of this approach in classification tasks. We show in this paper a few interesting observations about those well explored datasets, some of which are general knowledge, and other that as far as we know, were not reported before.
Black box auditing, or discrimination aware approach, is described in @cite_17 . GoldenEye GoldenEye++ @cite_7 @cite_13 is highlighting the feature importance feature interaction by shuffling the values in columns of specific features within a predicted label, and measuring the label changes. EXPLAIN @cite_16 @cite_23 checks the effect of blinding the model with respect to values of a specific attribute. SHAP @cite_21 divides the contribution to a classification among the features of a case. LIME @cite_0 attempts to describe the model in a locality of a case under scrutiny using an interpretable proxy. Also interesting approaches for interpretability explore regions of uncertainty @cite_3 , attention given a case under test @cite_11 , or cognitive psychology traits of the model @cite_20 . Some works extract rules, or provide a simplified model @cite_5 @cite_24 @cite_22 .
@cite_11 @cite_22 @cite_7 @cite_21 @cite_3 @cite_0 @cite_24 @cite_23 @cite_5 @cite_16 @cite_13 @cite_20 @cite_17
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Black-box risk scoring models permeate our lives, yet are typically proprietary or opaque. We propose Distill-and-Compare, an approach to audit such models without probing the black-box model API or pre-defining features to audit. To gain insight into black-box models, we treat them as teachers, training transparent student models to mimic the risk scores assigned by the black-box models. We compare the mimic model trained with distillation to a second, un-distilled transparent model trained on ground truth outcomes, and use differences between the two models to gain insight into the black-box model. We demonstrate the approach on four data sets: COMPAS, Stop-and-Frisk, Chicago Police, and Lending Club. We also propose a statistical test to determine if a data set is missing key features used to train the black-box model. Our test finds that the ProPublica data is likely missing key feature(s) used in COMPAS. Data-trained predictive models see widespread use, but for the most part they are used as black boxes which output a prediction or score. It is therefore hard to acquire a deeper understanding of model behavior, and in particular how different features influence the model prediction. This is important when interpreting the behavior of complex models, or asserting that certain problematic attributes (like race or gender) are not unduly influencing decisions. In this paper, we present a technique for auditing black-box models, which lets us study the extent to which existing models take advantage of particular features in the dataset, without knowing how the models work. Our work focuses on the problem of indirect influence: how some features might indirectly influence outcomes via other, related features. As a result, we can find attribute influences even in cases where, upon further direct examination of the model, the attribute is not referred to by the model at all. Our approach does not require the black-box model to be retrained. This is important if (for example) the model is only accessible via an API, and contrasts our work with other methods that investigate feature influence like feature selection. We present experimental evidence for the effectiveness of our procedure using a variety of publicly available datasets and models. We also validate our procedure using techniques from interpretable learning and feature selection, as well as against other black-box auditing procedures. Deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples, even in the black-box setting, where the attacker is restricted solely to query access. Existing black-box approaches to generating adversarial examples typically require a significant number of queries, either for training a substitute network or performing gradient estimation. We introduce GenAttack, a gradient-free optimization technique that uses genetic algorithms for synthesizing adversarial examples in the black-box setting. Our experiments on different datasets (MNIST, CIFAR-10, and ImageNet) show that GenAttack can successfully generate visually imperceptible adversarial examples against state-of-the-art image recognition models with orders of magnitude fewer queries than previous approaches. Against MNIST and CIFAR-10 models, GenAttack required roughly 2,126 and 2,568 times fewer queries respectively, than ZOO, the prior state-of-the-art black-box attack. In order to scale up the attack to large-scale high-dimensional ImageNet models, we perform a series of optimizations that further improve the query efficiency of our attack leading to 237 times fewer queries against the Inception-v3 model than ZOO. Furthermore, we show that GenAttack can successfully attack some state-of-the-art ImageNet defenses, including ensemble adversarial training and non-differentiable or randomized input transformations. Our results suggest that evolutionary algorithms open up a promising area of research into effective black-box attacks. We consider adversarial examples in the black-box decision-based scenario. Here, an attacker has access to the final classification of a model, but not its parameters or softmax outputs. Most attacks for this scenario are based either on transferability, which is unreliable, or random sampling, which is often slow. Focusing on the latter, we propose to improve the efficiency of sampling-based attacks with prior beliefs about the target domain. We identify two such priors, image frequency and surrogate gradients, and discuss how to integrate them into a unified sampling procedure. We then formulate the Biased Boundary Attack, which achieves a drastic speedup over the original Boundary Attack. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach against an ImageNet classifier. We also showcase a targeted attack for the Google Cloud Vision API, where we craft convincing examples with just a few hundred queries. Finally, we demonstrate that our approach outperforms the state of the art when facing strong defenses: Our attack scored second place in the targeted attack track of the NeurIPS 2018 Adversarial Vision Challenge.