The rise of artificial intelligence (A.I.) based systems has the potential to benefit adopters and society as a whole. However, these systems may also enclose potential conflicts and unintended consequences. Notably, people will only adopt an A.I. system if it confers them an advantage, at which point non-adopters might push for a strong regulation if that advantage for adopters is at a cost for them. Here we propose a stochastic game theoretical model for these conflicts. We frame our results under the current discussion on ethical A.I. and the conflict between individual and societ al gains, the societ al value alignment problem. We test the arising equilibria in the adoption of A.I. technology under different norms followed by artificial agents, their ensuing benefits, and the emergent levels of wealth inequality. We show that without any regulation, purely selfish A.I. systems will have the strongest advantage, even when a utilitarian A.I. provides a more significant benefit for the individual and the society. Nevertheless, we show that it is possible to develop human conscious A.I. systems that reach an equilibrium where the gains for the adopters are not at a cost for non-adopters while increasing the overall fitness and lowering inequality. However, as shown, a self-organized adoption of such policies would require external regulation.
However, some argue that having an ethical framework or even A.I. systems that pass the comparative moral Turing test is not enough @cite_6 . Roman Yampolskiy defends that it is insufficient to have a human-like morality on A.I. systems with super-human intelligence. On such agents, small moral mistakes, common in humans, could lead to the extinction of humanity. Furthermore, a moral A.I. system with super-human intelligence will be able to recursively self-improve, with no provided guarantees that the resulting improvements remain moral. Instead of an ethical approach, Yampolskiy proposes a safety engineering approach, able to provide proofs that developed A.I. systems will remain safe, even under recursive self-improvement @cite_23 . Yampolskiy also proposes A.I. confinement as a possible approach while no safety guarantees are in place @cite_12 @cite_8 . This approach would consist in ensuring that an A.I. system could help humanity while having no ability to negatively influence the world around it. This idea of A.I. confinement had been first presented in @cite_32 , and discussed by Bostrom @cite_31 and Chalmers @cite_7 . This is, however, more of a preventive measure than a perfect solution, as limiting the negative A.I. influence will also limit the possible positive influence.
@cite_7 @cite_8 @cite_32 @cite_6 @cite_23 @cite_31 @cite_12
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Abstract Several competing human behavior models have been proposed to model boundedly rational adversaries in repeated Stackelberg Security Games (SSG). However, these existing models fail to address three main issues which are detrimental to defender performance. First, while they attempt to learn adversary behavior models from adversaries' past actions (“attacks on targets”), they fail to take into account adversaries' future adaptation based on successes or failures of these past actions. Second, existing algorithms fail to learn a reliable model of the adversary unless there exists sufficient data collected by exposing enough of the attack surface – a situation that often arises in initial rounds of the repeated SSG. Third, current leading models have failed to include probability weighting functions, even though it is well known that human beings' weighting of probability is typically nonlinear. To address these limitations of existing models, this article provides three main contributions. Our first contribution is a new human behavior model, SHARP, which mitigates these three limitations as follows: (i) SHARP reasons based on success or failure of the adversary's past actions on exposed portions of the attack surface to model adversary adaptivity; (ii) SHARP reasons about similarity between exposed and unexposed areas of the attack surface, and also incorporates a discounting parameter to mitigate adversary's lack of exposure to enough of the attack surface; and (iii) SHARP integrates a non-linear probability weighting function to capture the adversary's true weighting of probability. Our second contribution is a first “repeated measures study” – at least in the context of SSGs – of competing human behavior models. This study, where each experiment lasted a period of multiple weeks with individual sets of human subjects on the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform, illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of different models and shows the advantages of SHARP. Our third major contribution is to demonstrate SHARP's superiority by conducting real-world human subjects experiments at the Bukit Barisan Seletan National Park in Indonesia against wildlife security experts. Our researches on adaptive systems are inspired by their ability of building by themselves a representation of their surrounding world. Using cooperation as a local criterion of self-organization, we study in a network of neuro-agents the evolution of the system and in the same way, the emergence of a functioning coherent with the environmental feed-back. In this paper we expose the abilities of the neuro-agents that give them the autonomy required to build an ab nihilo topology. And finally we want to emphasize the dynamic of the network organization that is basically its best property of adaptation to a changing environment. The work presented here concerns our approach to self-organization in a dynamic neural network. We present some experiments of emergent learning based on our knowledge of complex systems through multi-agent systems technology and cellular biology. In fact we are most interested in the mechanisms involved in the construction of a network able to stabilize its structure in a given environment, than in the efficiency of the learning supported by this structure. Obviously those two ontogenetic processes are strongly coupled and appear simultaneously as mutual consequences. Under those conditions, we conceive artificial systems presenting an inherent complexity close to biological systems as they are open and as their structure evolves from nothing (at least an empty shell) up to an organized, stable and functional network of neuro-agents. Our working hypothesis tells minimal entities of such a system can be built and given with sufficient behavioral potentialities in order to organize themselves to satisfy the whole system activity. In this study, we want to show that a coherent and useful system can emerge without any global model for its functioning, solely from activity and organizational rules of its sub-parts; only agents are designed, not the topology of the network they will belong to. Our thought process supposes four distinct steps that description will be formerly extended. Firstly the neuro-agent unit has to be designed, their properties, their abilities (calculus, communication) and their knowledge. Secondly, initial system is constituted of a minimal number of unlinked neuro-agents. Those pre-built neuro-agents are only receptors (inputs) and actuators (outputs) of the network. Thirdly the global system has to be plunged in a dynamic and open environment in which it will have to adapt to; regarding neuromimetic systems, this phase suppose As artificial intelligence moves ever closer to the goal of producing fully autonomous agents, the question of how to design and implement an artificial moral agent (AMA) becomes increasingly pressing. Robots possessing autonomous capacities to do things that are useful to humans will also have the capacity to do things that are harmful to humans and other sentient beings. Theoretical challenges to developing artificial moral agents result both from controversies among ethicists about moral theory itself, and from computational limits to the implementation of such theories. In this paper the ethical disputes are surveyed, the possibility of a ‘moral Turing Test’ is considered and the computational difficulties accompanying the different types of approach are assessed. Human-like performance, which is prone to include immoral actions, may not be acceptable in machines, but moral perfection may be computationally unattainable. The risks posed by autonomous machines ignorantly or deliberately harming people ... Consider a setting where robots must visit sites represented as nodes in a graph, but each robot may fail when traversing an edge. The goal is to find a set of paths for a team of robots which maximizes the expected number of nodes collectively visited, while guaranteeing that the paths satisfy a notion of “independence” formalized by a matroid (e.g. limits on team size, number of visits to regions), and that the probabilities that each robot survives to its destination are above a given threshold. We call this problem the Matroid Team Surviving Orienteers (MTSO) problem, which has broad applications such as environmental monitoring in risky regions and search and rescue in dangerous conditions. We present the MTSO formally and detail numerous examples of matroids in a path planning context. We then propose an approximate greedy algorithm for selecting a feasible set of paths and prove that the value of the output is within a factor p s p s + λ of the optimum, where p s is the per-robot survival probability threshold and 1 λ ≤ 1 is the approximation factor of an oracle routine for the well known orienteering problem. We demonstrate the efficiency of our approach by applying it to a scenario where a team of robots must gather information while avoiding pirates in the Coral Triangle.