This paper presents a new privacy-preserving smart metering system. Our scheme is private under the differential privacy model and therefore provides strong and provable guarantees. With our scheme, an (electricity) supplier can periodically collect data from smart meters and derive aggregated statistics while learning only limited information about the activities of individual households. For example, a supplier cannot tell from a user's trace when he watched TV or turned on heating. Our scheme is simple, efficient and practical. Processing cost is very limited: smart meters only have to add noise to their data and encrypt the results with an efficient stream cipher.
The notion of differential privacy was first proposed in @cite_6 . The main advantage of differential privacy over other privacy models is that it does not specify the prior knowledge of the adversary and provides rigorous privacy guarantee if each users' data is statistically independent @cite_10 . Initial works on differential privacy focused on the problem how a trusted curator (aggregator), who collects all data from users, can differential privately release statistics. By contrast, our scheme ensures differential privacy even if the curator is untrusted. Although @cite_5 describes protocols for generating shares of random noise which is secure against malicious participants, it requires communication between users and it uses expensive secret sharing techniques resulting in high overhead in case of large number of users. Similarly, traditional Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC) techniques @cite_17 @cite_3 also require interactions between users. All these solutions are impractical for resource constrained smart meters where all the computation is done by the aggregator and users are not supposed to communicate with each other.
@cite_3 @cite_6 @cite_5 @cite_10 @cite_17
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A mechanism for releasing information about a statistical database with sensitive data must resolve a trade-off between utility and privacy. Publishing fully accurate information maximizes utility while minimizing privacy, while publishing random noise accomplishes the opposite. Privacy can be rigorously quantified using the framework of differential privacy, which requires that a mechanism's output distribution is nearly the same whether or not a given database row is included or excluded. The goal of this paper is strong and general utility guarantees, subject to differential privacy. We pursue mechanisms that guarantee near-optimal utility to every potential user, independent of its side information (modeled as a prior distribution over query results) and preferences (modeled via a loss function). Our main result is: for each fixed count query and differential privacy level, there is a geometric mechanism M* -- a discrete variant of the simple and well-studied Laplace mechanism -- that is simultaneously expected loss-minimizing for every possible user, subject to the differential privacy constraint. This is an extremely strong utility guarantee: every potential user u, no matter what its side information and preferences, derives as much utility from M* as from interacting with a differentially private mechanism Mu that is optimally tailored to u. More precisely, for every user u there is an optimal mechanism Mu for it that factors into a user-independent part (the geometric mechanism M*) followed by user-specific post-processing that can be delegated to the user itself. The first part of our proof of this result characterizes the optimal differentially private mechanism for a fixed but arbitrary user in terms of a certain basic feasible solution to a linear program with constraints that encode differential privacy. The second part shows that all of the relevant vertices of this polytope (ranging over all possible users) are derivable from the geometric mechanism via suitable remappings of its range. Differential privacy has emerged as the main definition for private data analysis and machine learning. The global model of differential privacy, which assumes that users trust the data collector, provides strong privacy guarantees and introduces small errors in the output. In contrast, applications of differential privacy in commercial systems by Apple, Google, and Microsoft, use the local model. Here, users do not trust the data collector, and hence randomize their data before sending it to the data collector. Unfortunately, local model is too strong for several important applications and hence is limited in its applicability. In this work, we propose a framework based on trusted processors and a new definition of differential privacy called Oblivious Differential Privacy, which combines the best of both local and global models. The algorithms we design in this framework show interesting interplay of ideas from the streaming algorithms, oblivious algorithms, and differential privacy. Privacy-preserving data publishing addresses the problem of disclosing sensitive data when mining for useful information. Among the existing privacy models, ∈-differential privacy provides one of the strongest privacy guarantees and has no assumptions about an adversary's background knowledge. Most of the existing solutions that ensure ∈-differential privacy are based on an interactive model, where the data miner is only allowed to pose aggregate queries to the database. In this paper, we propose the first anonymization algorithm for the non-interactive setting based on the generalization technique. The proposed solution first probabilistically generalizes the raw data and then adds noise to guarantee ∈-differential privacy. As a sample application, we show that the anonymized data can be used effectively to build a decision tree induction classifier. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed non-interactive anonymization algorithm is scalable and performs better than the existing solutions for classification analysis. Differential privacy is a notion of privacy that has become very popular in the database community. Roughly, the idea is that a randomized query mechanism provides sufficient privacy protection if the ratio between the probabilities of two different entries to originate a certain answer is bound by e^e. In the fields of anonymity and information flow there is a similar concern for controlling information leakage, i.e. limiting the possibility of inferring the secret information from the observables. In recent years, researchers have proposed to quantify the leakage in terms of the information-theoretic notion of mutual information. There are two main approaches that fall in this category: One based on Shannon entropy, and one based on Renyi's min entropy. The latter has connection with the so-called Bayes risk, which expresses the probability of guessing the secret. In this paper, we show how to model the query system in terms of an information-theoretic channel, and we compare the notion of differential privacy with that of mutual information. We show that the notion of differential privacy is strictly stronger, in the sense that it implies a bound on the mutual information, but not viceversa.