In this paper, we propose a unified framework and an algorithm for the problem of group recommendation where a fixed number of items or alternatives can be recommended to a group of users. The problem of group recommendation arises naturally in many real world contexts, and is closely related to the budgeted social choice problem studied in economics. We frame the group recommendation problem as choosing a subgraph with the largest group consensus score in a completely connected graph defined over the item affinity matrix. We propose a fast greedy algorithm with strong theoretical guarantees, and show that the proposed algorithm compares favorably to the state-of-the-art group recommendation algorithms according to commonly used relevance and coverage performance measures on benchmark dataset.
In economics, group recommendation is studied as a special case of the budgeted social choice problem @cite_1 @cite_19 . The budgeted consensus recommendation is often considered as a trade-off between pure personalized recommendation and pure consensus recommendation. In group recommendation, the budget is specified as a function of the recommendation size, keeping the other cost components constant. Most of the work on budgeted social choice theory assumes that user preferences for the items are strict, i.e. every user derives benefit from at most one item that has the highest preference score (utility score), and preference scores are often derived using positional scoring rules like Borda count. lu2011budgeted ( lu2011budgeted ) proposed a greedy algorithm using knapsack heuristics, but it worked very poorly on group recommendation tasks with positional scoring rules. piotr15_collect ( piotr15_collect ) extended the theoretical framework for limited choice models with positional scoring rules using the ordered weighted average (OWA) operators.
@cite_19 @cite_1
1238745702 2901662176 2963204789 2103850933
We develop a general framework for social choice problems in which a limited number of alternatives can be recommended to an agent population. In our budgeted social choice model, this limit is determined by a budget, capturing problems that arise naturally in a variety of contexts, and spanning the continuum from pure consensus decision making (i.e., standard social choice) to fully personalized recommendation. Our approach applies a form of segmentation to social choice problems-- requiring the selection of diverse options tailored to different agent types--and generalizes certain multiwinner election schemes. We show that standard rank aggregation methods perform poorly, and that optimization in our model is NP-complete; but we develop fast greedy algorithms with some theoretical guarantees. Experiments on real-world datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithms. To help their users to discover important items at a particular time, major websites like Twitter, Yelp, TripAdvisor or NYTimes provide Top-K recommendations (e.g., 10 Trending Topics, Top 5 Hotels in Paris or 10 Most Viewed News Stories), which rely on crowdsourced popularity signals to select the items. However, different sections of a crowd may have different preferences, and there is a large silent majority who do not explicitly express their opinion. Also, the crowd often consists of actors like bots, spammers, or people running orchestrated campaigns. Recommendation algorithms today largely do not consider such nuances, hence are vulnerable to strategic manipulation by small but hyper-active user groups. To fairly aggregate the preferences of all users while recommending top-K items, we borrow ideas from prior research on social choice theory, and identify a voting mechanism called Single Transferable Vote (STV) as having many of the fairness properties we desire in top-K item (s)elections. We develop an innovative mechanism to attribute preferences of silent majority which also make STV completely operational. We show the generalizability of our approach by implementing it on two different real-world datasets. Through extensive experimentation and comparison with state-of-the-art techniques, we show that our proposed approach provides maximum user satisfaction, and cuts down drastically on items disliked by most but hyper-actively promoted by a few users. We present theoretical and empirical results demonstrating the usefulness of social choice functions in crowdsourcing for participatory democracies. First, we demonstrate the scalability of social choice functions by defining a natural notion of epsilon-approximation, and giving algorithms which efficiently elicit such approximations for two prominent social choice functions: the Borda rule and the Condorcet winner. This result circumvents previous prohibitive lower bounds and is surprisingly strong: even if the number of ideas is as large as the number of participants, each participant will only have to make a logarithmic number of comparisons, an exponential improvement over the linear number of comparisons previously needed. Second, we apply these ideas to Finland's recent off-road traffic law reform, an experiment on participatory democracy in real life. This allows us to verify the scaling predicted in our theory and show that the constant involved is also not large. In addition, by collecting data on the time that users take to complete rankings of varying sizes, we observe that eliciting partial rankings can further decrease elicitation time as compared to the common method of eliciting pairwise comparisons. In this paper we present a general treatment of the preference aggregation problem, in which multiple preferences over objects must be combined into a single consensus ranking. We consider two instances of this problem: unsupervised aggregation where no information about a target ranking is available, and supervised aggregation where ground truth preferences are provided. For each problem class we develop novel learning methods that are applicable to a wide range of preference types. Specifically, for unsupervised aggregation we introduce the Multinomial Preference model (MPM) which uses a multinomial generative process to model the observed preferences. For the supervised problem we develop a supervised extension for MPM and then propose two fully supervised models. The first model employs SVD factorization to derive effective item features, transforming the aggregation problems into a learning-to-rank one. The second model aims to eliminate the costly SVD factorization and instantiates a probabilistic CRF framework, deriving unary and pairwise potentials directly from the observed preferences. Using a probabilistic framework allows us to directly optimize the expectation of any target metric, such as NDCG or ERR. All the proposed models operate on pairwise preferences and can thus be applied to a wide range of preference types. We empirically validate the models on rank aggregation and collaborative filtering data sets and demonstrate superior empirical accuracy.