Online game involves a very large number of users who are interconnected and interact with each other via the Internet. We studied the characteristics of exchanging virtual goods with real money through processes called "real money trading (RMT)." This exchange might influence online game user behaviors and cause damage to the reputation of game companies. We examined in-game transactions to reveal RMT by constructing a social graph of virtual goods exchanges in an online game and identifying network communities of users. We analyzed approximately 6,000,000 transactions in a popular online game and inferred RMT transactions by comparing the RMT transactions crawled from an out-game market. Our findings are summarized as follows: (1) the size of the RMT market could be approximately estimated; (2) professional RMT providers typically form a specific network structure (either star-shape or chain) in the trading network, which can be used as a clue for tracing RMT transactions; and (3) the observed RMT market has evolved over time into a monopolized market with a small number of large-sized virtual goods providers.
@cite_1 particularly explored the behaviors of GFGs using a network analysis. They showed similarities between a GFG network and real world drug trafficking network. This is proof that analyzing a community network in an online game can assist in understanding a real world community structure. @cite_6 analyzed the free money trade referring that people only give game money without getting any goods in return for GFG detection. @cite_9 proposed a RMT detection method based on the observation that RMT traders tend to form dense relationships with each other. Although their works and our work had similar approaches in terms of analyzing trading network, we improved the RMT detection method by considering community network structures and member characteristics in a community while previous studies analyzed only trade activities.
@cite_9 @cite_1 @cite_6
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Many online games have their own ecosystems, where players can purchase in-game assets using game money. Players can obtain game money through active participation or “real money trading” through official channels: converting real money into game money. The unofficial market for real money trading gave rise to gold farming groups (GFGs), a phenomenon with serious impact in the cyber and real worlds. GFGs in massively multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPGs) are some of the most interesting underground cyber economies because of the massive nature of the game. To detect GFGs, there have been various studies using behavioral traits. However, they can only detect gold farmers, not entire GFGs with internal hierarchies. Even worse, GFGs continuously develop techniques to hide, such as forming front organizations, concealing cyber-money, and changing trade patterns when online game service providers ban GFGs. In this paper, we analyze the characteristics of the ecosystem of a large-scale MMORPG, and devise a method for detecting GFGs. We build a graph that characterizes virtual economy transactions, and trace abnormal trades and activities. We derive features from the trading graph and physical networks used by GFGs to identify them in their entirety. Using their structure, we provide recommendations to defend effectively against GFGs while not affecting the existing virtual ecosystem. A common data mining task on networks is community detection, which seeks an unsupervised decomposition of a network into structural groups based on statistical regularities in the network's connectivity. Although many methods exist, the No Free Lunch theorem for community detection implies that each makes some kind of tradeoff, and no algorithm can be optimal on all inputs. Thus, different algorithms will over or underfit on different inputs, finding more, fewer, or just different communities than is optimal, and evaluation methods that use a metadata partition as a ground truth will produce misleading conclusions about general accuracy. Here, we present a broad evaluation of over and underfitting in community detection, comparing the behavior of 16 state-of-the-art community detection algorithms on a novel and structurally diverse corpus of 406 real-world networks. We find that (i) algorithms vary widely both in the number of communities they find and in their corresponding composition, given the same input, (ii) algorithms can be clustered into distinct high-level groups based on similarities of their outputs on real-world networks, and (iii) these differences induce wide variation in accuracy on link prediction and link description tasks. We introduce a new diagnostic for evaluating overfitting and underfitting in practice, and use it to roughly divide community detection methods into general and specialized learning algorithms. Across methods and inputs, Bayesian techniques based on the stochastic block model and a minimum description length approach to regularization represent the best general learning approach, but can be outperformed under specific circumstances. These results introduce both a theoretically principled approach to evaluate over and underfitting in models of network community structure and a realistic benchmark by which new methods may be evaluated and compared. Detecting hidden communities from observed interactions is a classical problem. Theoretical analysis of community detection has so far been mostly limited to models with non-overlapping communities such as the stochastic block model. In this paper, we provide guaranteed community detection for a family of probabilistic network models with overlapping communities, termed as the mixed membership Dirichlet model, first introduced in (2008). This model allows for nodes to have fractional memberships in multiple communities and assumes that the community memberships are drawn from a Dirichlet distribution. Moreover, it contains the stochastic block model as a special case. We propose a unified approach to learning communities in these models via a tensor spectral decomposition approach. Our estimator uses low-order moment tensor of the observed network, consisting of 3-star counts. Our learning method is based on simple linear algebraic operations such as singular value decomposition and tensor power iterations. We provide guaranteed recovery of community memberships and model parameters, and present a careful finite sample analysis of our learning method. Additionally, our results match the best known scaling requirements for the special case of the (homogeneous) stochastic block model. In this paper, we introduce a game-theoretic framework to address the community detection problem based on the structures of social networks. We formulate the dynamics of community formation as a strategic game called community formation game: Given an underlying social graph, we assume that each node is a selfish agent who selects communities to join or leave based on her own utility measurement. A community structure can be interpreted as an equilibrium of this game. We formulate the agents' utility by the combination of a gain function and a loss function. We allow each agent to select multiple communities, which naturally captures the concept of "overlapping communities". We propose a gain function based on the modularity concept introduced by Newman (Proc Natl Acad Sci 103(23):8577---8582, 2006), and a simple loss function that reflects the intrinsic costs incurred when people join the communities. We conduct extensive experiments under this framework, and our results show that our algorithm is effective in identifying overlapping communities, and are often better then other algorithms we evaluated especially when many people belong to multiple communities. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time the community detection problem is addressed by a game-theoretic framework that considers community formation as the result of individual agents' rational behaviors.