Tournament solutions provide methods for selecting the "best" alternatives from a tournament and have found applications in a wide range of areas. Previous work has shown that several well-known tournament solutions almost never rule out any alternative in large random tournaments. Nevertheless, all analytical results thus far have assumed a rigid probabilistic model, in which either a tournament is chosen uniformly at random, or there is a linear order of alternatives and the orientation of all edges in the tournament is chosen with the same probabilities according to the linear order. In this work, we consider a significantly more general model where the orientation of different edges can be chosen with different probabilities. We show that a number of common tournament solutions, including the top cycle and the uncovered set, are still unlikely to rule out any alternative under this model. This corresponds to natural graph-theoretic conditions such as irreducibility of the tournament. In addition, we provide tight asymptotic bounds on the boundary of the probability range for which the tournament solutions select all alternatives with high probability.
The discriminative power of tournament solutions has also been investigated empirically by @cite_12 . Building on the observation that the distributions of real-world tournaments are typically far from uniform, these authors examined the behavior of eleven common tournament solutions on tournaments generated according to stochastic preference models and empirical data. The stochastic models that they used include the impartial culture model, the Mallows mixtures model, and the P ' o lya-Eggenberger urn model. They reported that under these more realistic models, most tournament solutions are in fact much more discriminating than the analytical results for uniform random tournaments suggest.
@cite_12
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Tournament solutions constitute an important class of social choice functions that only depend on the pairwise majority comparisons between alternatives. Recent analytical results have shown that several concepts with appealing axiomatic properties tend to not discriminate at all when the tournaments are chosen from the uniform distribution. This is in sharp contrast to empirical studies which have found that real-world preference profiles often exhibit Condorcet winners, i.e., alternatives that all tournament solutions select as the unique winner. In this work, we aim to fill the gap between these extremes by examining the distribution of the number of alternatives returned by common tournament solutions for empirical data as well as data generated according to stochastic preference models. In standard generative adversarial network (SGAN), the discriminator estimates the probability that the input data is real. The generator is trained to increase the probability that fake data is real. We argue that it should also simultaneously decrease the probability that real data is real because 1) this would account for a priori knowledge that half of the data in the mini-batch is fake, 2) this would be observed with divergence minimization, and 3) in optimal settings, SGAN would be equivalent to integral probability metric (IPM) GANs. We show that this property can be induced by using a relativistic discriminator which estimate the probability that the given real data is more realistic than a randomly sampled fake data. We also present a variant in which the discriminator estimate the probability that the given real data is more realistic than fake data, on average. We generalize both approaches to non-standard GAN loss functions and we refer to them respectively as Relativistic GANs (RGANs) and Relativistic average GANs (RaGANs). We show that IPM-based GANs are a subset of RGANs which use the identity function. Empirically, we observe that 1) RGANs and RaGANs are significantly more stable and generate higher quality data samples than their non-relativistic counterparts, 2) Standard RaGAN with gradient penalty generate data of better quality than WGAN-GP while only requiring a single discriminator update per generator update (reducing the time taken for reaching the state-of-the-art by 400 ), and 3) RaGANs are able to generate plausible high resolutions images (256x256) from a very small sample (N=2011), while GAN and LSGAN cannot; these images are of significantly better quality than the ones generated by WGAN-GP and SGAN with spectral normalization. In a seminal paper, Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani show that a simple ranking algorithm achieves a competitive ratio of 1-1 e for the online bipartite matching problem in the standard adversarial model, where the ratio of 1-1 e is also shown to be optimal. Their result also implies that in the random arrivals model defined by Goel and Mehta, where the online nodes arrive in a random order, a simple greedy algorithm achieves a competitive ratio of 1-1 e. In this paper, we study the ranking algorithm in the random arrivals model, and show that it has a competitive ratio of at least 0.696, beating the 1-1 e ≈ 0.632 barrier in the adversarial model. Our result also extends to the i.i.d. distribution model of , removing the assumption that the distribution is known. Our analysis has two main steps. First, we exploit certain dominance and monotonicity properties of the ranking algorithm to derive a family of factor-revealing linear programs (LPs). In particular, by symmetry of the ranking algorithm in the random arrivals model, we have the monotonicity property on both sides of the bipartite graph, giving good "strength" to the LPs. Second, to obtain a good lower bound on the optimal values of all these LPs and hence on the competitive ratio of the algorithm, we introduce the technique of strongly factor-revealing LPs. In particular, we derive a family of modified LPs with similar strength such that the optimal value of any single one of these new LPs is a lower bound on the competitive ratio of the algorithm. This enables us to leverage the power of computer LP solvers to solve for large instances of the new LPs to establish bounds that would otherwise be difficult to attain by human analysis. We investigate the problem of resource block (RB) and power allocation jointly and in a distributed manner using game theoretic learning solutions, in an underlay device-to-device network where device pairs communicate directly with each other by reusing the spectrum allocated to the cellular users. We formulate the joint RB and power allocation as multi-agent learning problems with discrete strategy sets; and suggest partially distributed and fully distributed learning algorithms to determine the RB and power level to be used by each device pair. The partially distributed algorithms, viz., Fictitious Play and its variant Fading Memory Joint Strategy Fictitious Play with Inertia, achieve Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the sum-rate maximization game in a static wireless environment. The completely distributed and uncoupled Stochastic Learning Algorithm converges to pure strategy NE of the interference mitigation game in a time-varying radio environment. We provide proofs for the existence of NE and convergence of the learning algorithms to the NE. Performance of the proposed schemes are evaluated in log-normal, Rayleigh and Nakagami fading environments and compared with an existing hybrid scheme and a centralized scheme. The simulation results show that the partially distributed schemes give the same performance as the centralized scheme, and the fully distributed scheme gives similar performance as the hybrid scheme but with much reduced signaling and computation overhead.