With the rapid spread of various mobile terminals in our society, the importance of secure positioning is growing for wireless networks in adversarial settings. Recently, several authors have proposed a secure positioning mechanism of mobile terminals which is based on the geometric property of wireless node placement, and on the postulate of modern physics that a propagation speed of information never exceeds the velocity of light. In particular, they utilize the measurements of the round-trip time of radio signal propagation and bidirectional communication for variants of the challenge-and-response. In this paper, we propose a novel means to construct the above mechanism by use of unidirectional communication instead of bidirectional communication. Our proposal is based on the assumption that a mobile terminal incorporates a high-precision inner clock in a tamper-resistant protected area. In positioning, the mobile terminal uses its inner clock and the time and location information broadcasted by radio from trusted stations. Our proposal has a major advantage in protecting the location privacy of mobile terminal users, because the mobile terminal need not provide any information to the trusted stations through positioning procedures. Besides, our proposal is free from the positioning error due to claimant's processing-time fluctuations in the challenge-and-response, and is well-suited for mobile terminals in the open air, or on the move at high speed, in terms of practical usage. We analyze the security, the functionality, and the feasibility of our proposal in comparison to previous proposals.
On the other hand, there are location verification protocols which substantially make use of the physical properties of broadcasted radio waves @cite_8 @cite_15 . In @cite_8 , their proposal depends on the intensity and the directivity of broadcasted radio waves for location verification. In @cite_15 , their proposal with duplex radio communication assumes spatial isotropic propagation of radio waves by use of mobile terminal's omni-directional antenna, and uses its particular geometric relation for location verification. But both proposals have a security vulnerability to malicious modification of the assumed physical properties of radio waves. There are many possible ways, especially for a mobile terminal user, to carry out the physical modification of radio waves, e.g., by fraudulently using a directional antenna for the mobile terminal, or by surrounding the mobile terminal with carefully chosen mediums or materials.
@cite_15 @cite_8
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We propose and investigate a compressive architecture for estimation and tracking of sparse spatial channels in millimeter (mm) wave picocellular networks. The base stations are equipped with antenna arrays with a large number of elements (which can fit within compact form factors because of the small carrier wavelength) and employ radio frequency (RF) beamforming, so that standard least squares adaptation techniques (which require access to individual antenna elements) are not applicable. We focus on the downlink, and show that “compressive beacons,” transmitted using pseudorandom phase settings at the base station array, and compressively processed using pseudorandom phase settings at the mobile array, provide information sufficient for accurate estimation of the two-dimensional (2D) spatial frequencies associated with the directions of departure of the dominant rays from the base station, and the associated complex gains. This compressive approach is compatible with coarse phase-only control, and is based on a near-optimal sequential algorithm for frequency estimation which approaches the Cramer Rao Lower Bound. The algorithm exploits the geometric continuity of the channel across successive beaconing intervals to reduce the overhead to less than 1 even for very large ( @math ) arrays. Compressive beaconing is essentially omnidirectional, and hence does not enjoy the SNR and spatial reuse benefits of beamforming obtained during data transmission. We therefore discuss system level design considerations for ensuring that the beacon SNR is sufficient for accurate channel estimation, and that inter-cell beacon interference is controlled by an appropriate reuse scheme. The wireless medium contains domain-specific information that can be used to complement and enhance traditional security mechanisms. In this paper we propose ways to exploit the spatial variability of the radio channel response in a rich scattering environment, as is typical of indoor environments. Specifically, we describe a physical-layer authentication algorithm that utilizes channel probing and hypothesis testing to determine whether current and prior communication attempts are made by the same transmit terminal. In this way, legitimate users can be reliably authenticated and false users can be reliably detected. We analyze the ability of a receiver to discriminate between transmitters (users) according to their channel frequency responses. This work is based on a generalized channel response with both spatial and temporal variability, and considers correlations among the time, frequency and spatial domains. Simulation results, using the ray-tracing tool WiSE to generate the time-averaged response, verify the efficacy of the approach under realistic channel conditions, as well as its capability to work under unknown channel variations. Secure location verification is a recently stated problem that has a number of practical applications. The problem requires a wireless sensor network to confirm that a potentially malicious prover is located in a designated area. The original solution to the problem, as well as solutions to related problems, exploits the difference between propagation speeds of radio and sound waves to estimate the position of the prover. In this paper, we propose a solution that leverages the broadcast nature of the radio signal emitted by the prover and the distributed topology of the network. The idea is to separate the functions of the sensors. Some sensors are placed such that they receive the signal from the prover if it is inside the protected area. The others are positioned so that they can only receive the signal from the prover outside the area. Hence, the latter sensors reject the prover if they hear its signal. Our solution is versatile and it deals with provers using either omni-directional or directional propagation of radio signals without requiring any special hardware besides a radio transceiver. We estimate the bounds on the number of sensors required to protect the areas of various shapes and extend our solution to handle complex radio signal propagation, optimize sensor placement, and operate without precise topology information The acute disparity between increasing bandwidth demand and available spectrum has brought millimeter wave (mmWave) bands to the forefront of candidate solutions for the next-generation cellular networks. Highly directional transmissions are essential for cellular communication in these frequencies to compensate for higher isotropic path loss. This reliance on directional beamforming, however, complicates initial cell search since mobiles and base stations must jointly search over a potentially large angular directional space to locate a suitable path to initiate communication. To address this problem, this paper proposes a directional cell discovery procedure where base stations periodically transmit synchronization signals, potentially in time-varying random directions, to scan the angular space. Detectors for these signals are derived based on a Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test (GLRT) under various signal and receiver assumptions. The detectors are then simulated under realistic design parameters and channels based on actual experimental measurements at 28 GHz in New York City. The study reveals two key findings: 1) digital beamforming can significantly outperform analog beamforming even when digital beamforming uses very low quantization to compensate for the additional power requirements and 2) omnidirectional transmissions of the synchronization signals from the base station generally outperform random directional scanning.