We analyze the type of learned optimization that occurs when a learned model (such as a neural network) is itself an optimizer - a situation we refer to as mesa-optimization, a neologism we introduce in this paper. We believe that the possibility of mesa-optimization raises two important questions for the safety and transparency of advanced machine learning systems. First, under what circumstances will learned models be optimizers, including when they should not be? Second, when a learned model is an optimizer, what will its objective be - how will it differ from the loss function it was trained under - and how can it be aligned? In this paper, we provide an in-depth analysis of these two primary questions and provide an overview of topics for future research.
Furthermore, it has been noted in the inverse reinforcement learning literature that the reward function of an agent generally cannot be uniquely deduced from its behavior. @cite_9 In this context, the inner alignment problem can be seen as an extension of the value learning problem. In the value learning problem, the problem is to have enough information about an agent's behavior to infer its utility function, whereas in the inner alignment problem, the problem is to test the learned algorithm's behavior enough to ensure that it has a certain objective function.
@cite_9
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One obstacle to applying reinforcement learning algorithms to real-world problems is the lack of suitable reward functions. Designing such reward functions is difficult in part because the user only has an implicit understanding of the task objective. This gives rise to the agent alignment problem: how do we create agents that behave in accordance with the user's intentions? We outline a high-level research direction to solve the agent alignment problem centered around reward modeling: learning a reward function from interaction with the user and optimizing the learned reward function with reinforcement learning. We discuss the key challenges we expect to face when scaling reward modeling to complex and general domains, concrete approaches to mitigate these challenges, and ways to establish trust in the resulting agents. Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) attempts to infer human rewards or preferences from observed behavior. Since human planning systematically deviates from rationality, several approaches have been tried to account for specific human shortcomings. However, the general problem of inferring the reward function of an agent of unknown rationality has received little attention. Unlike the well-known ambiguity problems in IRL, this one is practically relevant but cannot be resolved by observing the agent's policy in enough environments. This paper shows (1) that a No Free Lunch result implies it is impossible to uniquely decompose a policy into a planning algorithm and reward function, and (2) that even with a reasonable simplicity prior Occam's razor on the set of decompositions, we cannot distinguish between the true decomposition and others that lead to high regret. To address this, we need simple normative' assumptions, which cannot be deduced exclusively from observations. Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) describes the problem of learning an unknown reward function of a Markov Decision Process (MDP) from observed behavior of an agent. Since the agent's behavior originates in its policy and MDP policies depend on both the stochastic system dynamics as well as the reward function, the solution of the inverse problem is significantly influenced by both. Current IRL approaches assume that if the transition model is unknown, additional samples from the system's dynamics are accessible, or the observed behavior provides enough samples of the system's dynamics to solve the inverse problem accurately. These assumptions are often not satisfied. To overcome this, we present a gradient-based IRL approach that simultaneously estimates the system's dynamics. By solving the combined optimization problem, our approach takes into account the bias of the demonstrations, which stems from the generating policy. The evaluation on a synthetic MDP and a transfer learning task shows improvements regarding the sample efficiency as well as the accuracy of the estimated reward functions and transition models. We introduce a novel repeated Inverse Reinforcement Learning problem: the agent has to act on behalf of a human in a sequence of tasks and wishes to minimize the number of tasks that it surprises the human by acting suboptimally with respect to how the human would have acted. Each time the human is surprised, the agent is provided a demonstration of the desired behavior by the human. We formalize this problem, including how the sequence of tasks is chosen, in a few different ways and provide some foundational results.