The Tardos scheme is a well-known traitor tracing scheme to protect copyrighted content against collusion attacks. The original scheme contained some suboptimal design choices, such as the score function and the distribution function used for generating the biases. previously showed that a symbol-symmetric score function leads to shorter codes, while obtained the optimal distribution functions for arbitrary coalition sizes. Later, showed that combining these results leads to even shorter codes when the coalition size is small. We extend their analysis to the case of large coalitions and prove that these optimal distributions converge to the arcsine distribution, thus showing that the arcsine distribution is asymptotically optimal in the symmetric Tardos scheme. We also present a new, practical alternative to the discrete distributions of and give a comparison of the estimated lengths of the fingerprinting codes for each of these distributions.
Besides practical constructions of traitor tracing schemes, some papers have also studied absolute lower bounds on the asymptotic code lengths that any secure traitor tracing scheme must satisfy. Huang and Moulin @cite_8 and Amiri and Tardos @cite_2 showed that for large @math , the code length constant of any scheme must satisfy @math , but no practical constructions of schemes achieving this lower bound are known. Huang and Moulin did show that this lower bound is tight, and that in the related min-max game between the traitors and the tracer, the optimal pirate strategy is to use the interleaving attack, and the optimal tracing strategy is to use a Tardos-like code with biases distributed according to the arcsine distribution. Note that this does not say anything about specific schemes such as the Tardos scheme, for which the related min-max games are different and may lead to a completely different optimal pirate strategy and tracing strategy.
@cite_2 @cite_8
1991439166 2145102561 2039632567 2083594366
We give a generic divide-and-conquer approach for constructing collusion-resistant probabilistic dynamic traitor tracing schemes with larger alphabets from schemes with smaller alphabets. This construction offers a linear tradeoff between the alphabet size and the codelength. In particular, we show that applying our results to the binary dynamic Tardos scheme of leads to schemes that are shorter by a factor equal to half the alphabet size. Asymptotically, these codelengths correspond, up to a constant factor, to the fingerprinting capacity for static probabilistic schemes. This gives a hierarchy of probabilistic dynamic traitor tracing schemes, and bridges the gap between the low bandwidth, high codelength scheme of and the high bandwidth, low codelength scheme of Fiat and Tassa. For the Tardos traitor tracing scheme, we show that by combining the symbol-symmetric accusation function of ? with the improved analysis of Blayer and Tassa we get further improvements. Our construction gives codes that are up to four times shorter than Blayer and Tassa's, and up to two times shorter than the codes from ? Asymptotically, we achieve the theoretical optimal codelength for Tardos' distribution function and the symmetric score function. For large coalitions, our codelengths are asymptotically about 4.93 of Tardos' original codelengths, which also improves upon results from We construct binary dynamic traitor tracing schemes, where the number of watermark bits needed to trace and disconnect any coalition of pirates is quadratic in the number of pirates, and logarithmic in the total number of users and the error probability. Our results improve upon results of Tassa, and our schemes have several other advantages, such as being able to generate all codewords in advance, a simple accusation method, and flexibility when the feedback from the pirate network is delayed. We study a fingerprinting game in which the number of colluders and the collusion channel are unknown. The encoder embeds fingerprints into a host sequence and provides the decoder with the capability to trace back pirated copies to the colluders. Fingerprinting capacity has recently been derived as the limit value of a sequence of maximin games with mutual information as their payoff functions. However, these games generally do not admit saddle-point solutions and are very hard to solve numerically. Here under the so-called Boneh-Shaw marking assumption, we reformulate the capacity as the value of a single two-person zero-sum game, and show that it is achieved by a saddle-point solution. If the maximal coalition size is k and the fingerprinting alphabet is binary, we show that capacity decays quadratically with k. Furthermore, we prove rigorously that the asymptotic capacity is 1 (k221n2) and we confirm our earlier conjecture that Tardos' choice of the arcsine distribution asymptotically maximizes the mutual information payoff function while the interleaving attack minimizes it. Along with the asymptotics, numerical solutions to the game for small k are also presented.