In this paper, we design a new quantum key distribution protocol, allowing two limited semi-quantum or "classical" users to establish a shared secret key with the help of a fully quantum server. A semi-quantum user can only prepare and measure qubits in the computational basis and so must rely on this quantum server to produce qubits in alternative bases and also to perform alternative measurements. However, we assume that the sever is untrusted and we prove the unconditional security of our protocol even in the worst case: when this quantum server is an all-powerful adversary. We also compute a lower bound of the key rate of our protocol, in the asymptotic scenario, as a function of the observed error rate in the channel allowing us to compute the maximally tolerated error of our protocol. Our results show that a semi-quantum protocol may hold similar security to a fully quantum one.
In @cite_12 , a system was described whereby @math and @math send particles, prepared in one of the states @math , or @math , to a quantum center who must then store them in a quantum memory until such future time when a secret key is desired. The protocols of @cite_17 @cite_25 @cite_15 @cite_26 required the users to measure in both @math and @math bases, while the protocols of @cite_25 @cite_29 require @math and @math to apply various unitary operators to the qubits arriving to them from the center.
@cite_26 @cite_29 @cite_15 @cite_25 @cite_12 @cite_17
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Standard security proofs of quantum-key-distribution (QKD) protocols often rely on symmetry arguments. In this paper, we prove the security of a three-state protocol that does not possess rotational symmetry. The three-state QKD protocol we consider involves three qubit states, where the first two states @math and @math can contribute to key generation, and the third state @math is for channel estimation. This protocol has been proposed and implemented experimentally in some frequency-based QKD systems where the three states can be prepared easily. Thus, by founding on the security of this three-state protocol, we prove that these QKD schemes are, in fact, unconditionally secure against any attacks allowed by quantum mechanics. The main task in our proof is to upper bound the phase error rate of the qubits given the bit error rates observed. Unconditional security can then be proved not only for the ideal case of a single-photon source and perfect detectors, but also for the realistic case of a phase-randomized weak coherent light source and imperfect threshold detectors. Our result in the phase error rate upper bound is independent of the loss in the channel. Also, we compare the three-state protocol with the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol. For the single-photon source case, our result proves that the BB84 protocol strictly tolerates a higher quantum bit error rate than the three-state protocol, while for the coherent-source case, the BB84 protocol achieves a higher key generation rate and secure distance than the three-state protocol when a decoy-state method is used. It is a fundamental problem to decide how many copies of an unknown mixed quantum state are necessary and sufficient to determine the state. Previously, it was known only that estimating states to error @math in trace distance required @math copies for a @math -dimensional density matrix of rank @math . Here, we give a theoretical measurement scheme (POVM) that requires @math copies to estimate @math to error @math in infidelity, and a matching lower bound up to logarithmic factors. This implies @math copies suffice to achieve error @math in trace distance. We also prove that for independent (product) measurements, @math copies are necessary in order to achieve error @math in infidelity. For fixed @math , our measurement can be implemented on a quantum computer in time polynomial in @math . We investigate a general class of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols using one-way classical communication. We show that full security can be proven by considering only collective attacks. We derive computable lower and upper bounds on the secret-key rate of those QKD protocols involving only entropies of two-qubit density operators. As an illustration of our results, we determine new bounds for the Bennett-Brassard 1984, the 6-state, and the Bennett 1992 protocols. We show that in all these cases the first classical processing that the legitimate partners should apply consists in adding noise. Recently, presented a novel semiquantum key distribution protocol [Phys. Rev. Lett. 99 (2007) 140501] by using four quantum states, each of which is randomly prepared in the Z or X basis. Here we present a semi-quantum key distribution protocol by using maximally entangled states in which quantum Alice shares a secret key with classical Bob. Quantum Alice has the ability to prepare Bell states and perform Bell basis or computational basis measurement. Classical Bob is restricted to measuring, preparing a particle in the computational basis, reflecting or reordering the particles. The qubit efficiency of the protocol improves to 50 and the protocol can be modified to a measure-resend protocol or a protocol without quantum memory. We also show that the protocol is secure against eavesdropping.