We provide a framework for the assignment of multiple robots to goal locations, when robot travel times are uncertain. Our premise is that time is the most valuable asset in the system. Hence, we make use of redundant robots to counter the effect of uncertainty and minimize the average waiting time at destinations. We apply our framework to transport networks represented as graphs, and consider uncertainty in the edge costs (i.e., travel time). Since solving the redundant assignment problem is strongly NP-hard, we exploit structural properties of our problem to propose a polynomial-time solution with provable sub-optimality bounds. Our method uses distributive aggregate functions, which allow us to efficiently (i.e., incrementally) compute the effective cost of assigning redundant robots. Experimental results on random graphs show that the deployment of redundant robots through our method reduces waiting times at goal locations, when edge traversals are uncertain.
Our problem is related to the general class of submodular welfare problems @cite_16 @cite_9 , which stems from the field of combinatorial auctions. The welfare problem considers a set of items and a set of players, and seeks a partition of the items into disjoint sets assigned to players in order maximize the total welfare over the players. The is equivalent to the sum of utilities over all sets. The utility functions satisfy the property of diminishing returns, and hence, the problem can be formulated as one of submodular maximization. In contrast to our work, the welfare problem does not prescribe any explicit form for the submodular function. Instead, it assumes a , which is a black-box that returns the utility for any given set. In this sense, our problem is a specialization of the general submodular welfare problem. We consider a specific objective function, where the submodularity (or, in our case, the supermodularity) arises due to the redundancy of assigned robots with uncertain travel times. Furthermore, we also provide a specialization of the matroid constraint, which, in our case, relates to the constraint on maximum possible robot deployment sizes.
@cite_9 @cite_16
1989453388 2059527251 1995275762 2126307323
In the Submodular Welfare Problem, m items are to be distributed among n players with utility functions wi: 2[m] → R+. The utility functions are assumed to be monotone and submodular. Assuming that player i receives a set of items Si, we wish to maximize the total utility ∑i=1n wi(Si). In this paper, we work in the value oracle model where the only access to the utility functions is through a black box returning wi(S) for a given set S. Submodular Welfare is in fact a special case of the more general problem of submodular maximization subject to a matroid constraint: max f(S): S ∈ I , where f is monotone submodular and I is the collection of independent sets in some matroid. For both problems, a greedy algorithm is known to yield a 1 2-approximation [21, 16]. In special cases where the matroid is uniform (I = S: |S| ≤ k) [20] or the submodular function is of a special type [4, 2], a (1-1 e)-approximation has been achieved and this is optimal for these problems in the value oracle model [22, 6, 15]. A (1-1 e)-approximation for the general Submodular Welfare Problem has been known only in a stronger demand oracle model [4], where in fact 1-1 e can be improved [9]. In this paper, we develop a randomized continuous greedy algorithm which achieves a (1-1 e)-approximation for the Submodular Welfare Problem in the value oracle model. We also show that the special case of n equal players is approximation resistant, in the sense that the optimal (1-1 e)-approximation is achieved by a uniformly random solution. Using the pipage rounding technique [1, 2], we obtain a (1-1 e)-approximation for submodular maximization subject to any matroid constraint. The continuous greedy algorithm has a potential of wider applicability, which we demonstrate on the examples of the Generalized Assignment Problem and the AdWords Assignment Problem. We provide tight information-theoretic lower bounds for the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions. In this problem, the goal is to partition m items among k bidders in a way that maximizes the sum of bidders' values for their allocated items. Bidders have complex preferences over items expressed by valuation functions that assign values to all subsets of items. We study the "black box" setting in which the auctioneer has oracle access to the valuation functions of the bidders. In particular, we explore the well-known value query model in which the permitted query to a valuation function is in the form of a subset of items, and the reply is the value assigned to that subset of items by the valuation function. We consider different classes of valuation functions: submodular,subadditive, and superadditive. For these classes, it has been shown that one can achieve approximation ratios of 1 -- 1 e, 1 √m, and √ m m, respectively, via a polynomial (in k and m) number of value queries. We prove that these approximation factors are essentially the best possible: For any fixed e > 0, a (1--1 e + e)-approximation for submodular valuations or an 1 m1 2-e-approximation for subadditive valuations would require exponentially many value queries, and a log1+e m m-approximation for superadditive valuations would require a superpolynomial number of value queries. We consider the problem of maximizing welfare when allocating m items to n players with subadditive utility functions. Our main result is a way of rounding any fractional solution to a linear programming relaxation to this problem so as to give a feasible solution of welfare at least half that of the value of the fractional solution. This approximation ratio of 1 2 improves over an Ω(1 log m) ratio of Dobzinski, Nisan and Schapira [STOC 2005]. We also show an approximation ratio of 1 - 1 e when utility functions are fractionally subadditive. A result similar to this last result was previously obtained by Dobzinski and Schapira [Soda 2006], but via a different rounding technique that requires the use of a so called "XOS oracle".The randomized rounding techniques that we use are oblivious in the sense that they only use the primal solution to the linear program relaxation, but have no access to the actual utility functions of the players. This allows us to suggest new incentive compatible mechanisms for combinatorial auctions, extending previous work of Lavi and Swamy [FOCS 2005]. Combinatorial allocation problems require allocating items to players in a way that maximizes the total utility. Two such problems received attention recently, and were addressed using the same linear programming (LP) relaxation. In the Maximum Submodular Welfare (SMW) problem, utility functions of players are submodular, and for this case Dobzinski and Schapira [SODA 2006] showed an approximation ratio of 1 - 1 e. In the Generalized Assignment Problem (GAP) utility functions are linear but players also have capacity constraints. GAP admits a (1 - 1 e)- approximation as well, as shown by Fleischer, Goemans, Mirrokni and Sviridenko [SODA 2006]. In both cases, the approximation ratio was in fact shown for a more general version of the problem, for which improving 1 - 1 e is NPhard. In this paper, we show how to improve the 1 - 1 e approximation ratio, both for SMW and for GAP. A common theme in both improvements is the use of a new and optimal Fair Contention Resolution technique. However, each of the improvements involves a different rounding procedure for the above mentioned LP. In addition, we prove APX-hardness results for SMW (such results were known for GAP). An important feature of our hardness results is that they apply even in very restricted settings, e.g. when every player has nonzero utility only for a constant number of items.