The Domain Name System (DNS) does not provide query privacy. Query obfuscation schemes have been proposed to overcome this limitation, but, so far, they have not been evaluated in a realistic setting. In this paper we evaluate the security of a random set range query scheme in a real-world web surfing scenario. We demonstrate that the scheme does not sufficiently obfuscate characteristic query patterns, which can be used by an adversary to determine the visited websites. We also illustrate how to thwart the attack and discuss practical challenges. Our results suggest that previously published evaluations of range queries may give a false sense of the attainable security, because they do not account for any interdependencies between queries.
The aforementioned publications study the security of range queries for singular queries issued independently from each other. In contrast, @cite_0 observes that consecutively issued queries that are dependent on each other have implications for security. They describe a timing attack that allows an adversary to determine the actually desired website and show that consecutive queries have to be serialized in order to prevent the attack.
@cite_0
2021931360 2052388228 2169731081 2010149990
In this work, we study information leakage in timing side channels that arise in the context of shared event schedulers. Consider two processes, one of them an innocuous process (referred to as Alice) and the other a malicious one (referred to as Bob), using a common scheduler to process their jobs. Based on when his jobs get processed, Bob wishes to learn about the pattern (size and timing) of jobs of Alice. Depending on the context, knowledge of this pattern could have serious implications on Alice's privacy and security. For instance, shared routers can reveal traffic patterns, shared memory access can reveal cloud usage patterns, and suchlike. We present a formal framework to study the information leakage in shared resource schedulers using the pattern estimation error as a performance metric. In this framework, a uniform upper bound is derived to benchmark different scheduling policies. The first-come-first-serve scheduling policy is analyzed, and shown to leak significant information when the scheduler is loaded heavily. To mitigate the timing information leakage, we propose an “Accumulate-and-Serve” policy which trades in privacy for a higher delay. The policy is analyzed under the proposed framework and is shown to leak minimum information to the attacker, and is shown to have comparatively lower delay than a fixed scheduler that preemptively assigns service times irrespective of traffic patterns. In data publishing, the owner delegates the role of satisfying user queries to a third-party publisher. As the publisher may be untrusted or susceptible to attacks, it could produce incorrect query results. In this paper, we introduce a scheme for users to verify that their query results are complete (i.e., no qualifying tuples are omitted) and authentic (i.e., all the result values originated from the owner). The scheme supports range selection on key and non-key attributes, project as well as join queries on relational databases. Moreover, the proposed scheme complies with access control policies, is computationally secure, and can be implemented efficiently. Query answers from on-line databases can easily be corrupted by hackers or malicious database publishers. Thus it is important to provide mechanisms which allow clients to trust the results from on-line queries. Authentic publication allows untrusted publishers to answer securely queries from clients on behalf of trusted off-line data owners. Publishers validate answers using hard-to-forge verification objects VOs), which clients can check efficiently. This approach provides greater scalability, by making it easy to add more publishers, and better security, since on-line publishers do not need to be trusted.To make authentic publication attractive, it is important for the VOs to be small, efficient to compute, and efficient to verify. This has lead researchers to develop independently several different schemes for efficient VO computation based on specific data structures. Our goal is to develop a unifying framework for these disparate results, leading to a generalized security result. In this paper we characterize a broad class of data structures which we call Search DAGs, and we develop a generalized algorithm for the construction of VOs for Search DAGs. We prove that the VOs thus constructed are secure, and that they are efficient to compute and verify. We demonstrate how this approach easily captures existing work on simple structures such as binary trees, multi-dimensional range trees, tries, and skip lists. Once these are shown to be Search DAGs, the requisite security and efficiency results immediately follow from our general theorems. Going further, we also use Search DAGs to produce and prove the security of authenticated versions of two complex data models for efficient multi-dimensional range searches. This allows efficient VOs to be computed (size O(log N + T)) for typical one- and two-dimensional range queries, where the query answer is of size T and the database is of size N. We also show I O-efficient schemes to construct the VOs. For a system with disk blocks of size B, we answer one-dimensional and three-sided range queries and compute the VOs with O(logB N + T B) I O operations using linear size data structures. Current trends in data management systems, such as cloud and multi-tenant databases, are leading to data processing environments that concurrently execute heterogeneous query workloads. At the same time, these systems need to satisfy diverse performance expectations. In these newly-emerging settings, avoiding potential Quality-of-Service (QoS) violations heavily relies on performance predictability, i.e., the ability to estimate the impact of concurrent query execution on the performance of individual queries in a continuously evolving workload. This paper presents a modeling approach to estimate the impact of concurrency on query performance for analytical workloads. Our solution relies on the analysis of query behavior in isolation, pairwise query interactions and sampling techniques to predict resource contention under various query mixes and concurrency levels. We introduce a simple yet powerful metric that accurately captures the joint effects of disk and memory contention on query performance in a single value. We also discuss predicting the execution behavior of a time-varying query workload through query-interaction timelines, i.e., a fine-grained estimation of the time segments during which discrete mixes will be executed concurrently. Our experimental evaluation on top of PostgreSQL TPC-H demonstrates that our models can provide query latency predictions within approximately 20 of the actual values in the average case.