We consider a crowdsourcing data acquisition scenario, such as federated learning, where a Center collects data points from a set of rational Agents, with the aim of training a model. For linear regression models, we show how a payment structure can be designed to incentivize the agents to provide high-quality data as early as possible, based on a characterization of the influence that data points have on the loss function of the model. Our contributions can be summarized as follows: (a) we prove theoretically that this scheme ensures truthful data reporting as a game-theoretic equilibrium and further demonstrate its robustness against mixtures of truthful and heuristic data reports, (b) we design a procedure according to which the influence computation can be efficiently approximated and processed sequentially in batches over time, (c) we develop a theory that allows correcting the difference between the influence and the overall change in loss and (d) we evaluate our approach on real datasets, confirming our theoretical findings.
The topic of learning a model when the input data points are provided by strategic sources has been the focus of a growing literature at the intersection of machine learning and game theory. A significant amount of work has been devoted to the setting in which Agents are interested in the outcome of the estimation process itself, e.g., when they are trying to sway the learned model closer to their own data points @cite_21 @cite_14 @cite_5 @cite_9 @cite_15 . Our setting is concerned with the fundamental question of eliciting accurate data when data acquisition is costly for the agents, or when they are not willing to share their data without some form of monetary compensation. Another line of work considers settings in which the Agents have to be compensated for their loss of privacy @cite_2 @cite_19 .
@cite_14 @cite_9 @cite_21 @cite_19 @cite_2 @cite_5 @cite_15
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We initiate the study of incentives in a general machine learning framework. We focus on a game-theoretic regression learning setting where private information is elicited from multiple agents with different, possibly conflicting, views on how to label the points of an input space. This conflict potentially gives rise to untruthfulness on the part of the agents. In the restricted but important case when every agent cares about a single point, and under mild assumptions, we show that agents are motivated to tell the truth. In a more general setting, we study the power and limitations of mechanisms without payments. We finally establish that, in the general setting, the VCG mechanism goes a long way in guaranteeing truthfulness and economic efficiency. As machine learning (ML) applications become increasingly prevalent, protecting the confidentiality of ML models becomes paramount for two reasons: (a) models may constitute a business advantage to its owner, and (b) an adversary may use a stolen model to find transferable adversarial examples that can be used to evade classification by the original model. One way to protect model confidentiality is to limit access to the model only via well-defined prediction APIs. This is common not only in machine-learning-as-a-service (MLaaS) settings where the model is remote, but also in scenarios like autonomous driving where the model is local but direct access to it is protected, for example, by hardware security mechanisms. Nevertheless, prediction APIs still leak information so that it is possible to mount model extraction attacks by an adversary who repeatedly queries the model via the prediction API. In this paper, we describe a new model extraction attack by combining a novel approach for generating synthetic queries together with recent advances in training deep neural networks. This attack outperforms state-of-the-art model extraction techniques in terms of transferability of targeted adversarial examples generated using the extracted model (+15-30 percentage points, pp), and in prediction accuracy (+15-20 pp) on two datasets. We then propose the first generic approach to effectively detect model extraction attacks: PRADA. It analyzes how the distribution of consecutive queries to the model evolves over time and raises an alarm when there are abrupt deviations. We show that PRADA can detect all known model extraction attacks with a 100 success rate and no false positives. PRADA is particularly suited for detecting extraction attacks against local models. We propose a hybrid model for automatically acquiring a policy for a complex game, which combines online learning with mining knowledge from a corpus of human game play. Our hypothesis is that a player that learns its policies by combining (online) exploration with biases towards human behaviour that's attested in a corpus of humans playing the game will outperform any agent that uses only one of the knowledge sources. During game play, the agent extracts similar moves made by players in the corpus in similar situations, and approximates their utility alongside other possible options by performing simulations from its current state. We implement and assess our model in an agent playing the complex win-lose board game Settlers of Catan, which lacks an implementation that would challenge a human expert. The results from the preliminary set of experiments illustrate the potential of such a joint model. In order for robots to learn from people with no machine learning expertise, robots should learn from natural human instruction. Most machine learning techniques that incorporate explanations require people to use a limited vocabulary and provide state information, even if it is not intuitive. This paper discusses a software agent that learned to play the Mario Bros. game using explanations. Our goals to improve learning from explanations were twofold: 1) to filter explanations into advice and warnings and 2) to learn policies from sentences without state information. We used sentiment analysis to filter explanations into advice of what to do and warnings of what to avoid. We developed object-focused advice to represent what actions the agent should take when dealing with objects. A reinforcement learning agent used object-focused advice to learn policies that maximized its reward. After mitigating false negatives, using sentiment as a filter was approximately 85 accurate. object-focused advice performed better than when no advice was given, the agent learned where to apply the advice, and the agent could recover from adversarial advice. We also found the method of interaction should be designed to ease the cognitive load of the human teacher or the advice may be of poor quality.