Twitter is an extremely popular social networking platform. Most Twitter users do not disclose their locations due to privacy concerns. Although inferring the location of an individual Twitter user has been extensively studied, it is still missing to effectively find the majority of the users in a specific geographical area without scanning the whole Twittersphere, and obtaining these users will result in both positive and negative significance. In this paper, we propose LocInfer, a novel and lightweight system to tackle this problem. LocInfer explores the fact that user communications in Twitter exhibit strong geographic locality, which we validate through large-scale datasets. Based on the experiments from four representative metropolitan areas in U.S., LocInfer can discover on average 86.6 of the users with 73.2 accuracy in each area by only checking a small set of candidate users. We also present a countermeasure to the users highly sensitive to location privacy and show its efficacy by simulations.
This paper is also related to privacy disclosure and protection in OSNs in general. Li @cite_7 used the neighbors' locations to infer the location in the emerging location-based social networks. Sun @cite_16 protected the location privacy on the social crowdsourcing networks. Mao @cite_6 used the tweets to detect the Twitter users' situational leak such as vacation status, drunk status, and medical conditions. Dey @cite_2 leveraged the information from neighbors to estimate the age of Facebook users. Mislove @cite_20 also used the local connections around the Facebook users to infer their hidden attributes such as major, college, and political view. Our paper is complementary to these work and also highlights that current OSNs have emerged as an arguable threat to users' privacy.
@cite_7 @cite_6 @cite_2 @cite_16 @cite_20
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User interaction in social networks, such as Twitter and Facebook, is increasingly becoming a source of useful information on daily events. The online monitoring of short messages posted in such networks often provides insight on the repercussions of events of several different natures, such as (in the recent past) the earthquake and tsunami in Japan, the royal wedding in Britain and the death of Osama bin Laden. Studying the origins and the propagation of messages regarding such topics helps social scientists in their quest for improving the current understanding of human relationships and interactions. However, the actual location associated to a tweet or to a Facebook message can be rather uncertain. Some tweets are posted with an automatically determined location (from an IP address), or with a user-informed location, both in text form, usually the name of a city. We observe that most Twitter users opt not to publish their location, and many do so in a cryptic way, mentioning non-existing places or providing less specific place names (such as “Brazil”). In this article, we focus on the problem of enriching the location of tweets using alternative data, particularly the social relationships between Twitter users. Our strategy involves recursively expanding the network of locatable users using following-follower relationships. Verification is achieved using cross-validation techniques, in which the location of a fraction of the users with known locations is used to determine the location of the others, thus allowing us to compare the actual location to the inferred one and verify the quality of the estimation. With an estimate of the precision of the method, it can then be applied to locationless tweets. Our intention is to infer the location of as many users as possible, in order to increase the number of tweets that can be used in spatial analyses of social phenomena. The article demonstrates the feasibility of our approach using a dataset comprising tweets that mention keywords related to dengue fever, increasing by 45 the number of locatable tweets. Due to the amount of personally identiable information shared by users of online social networks (OSNs) and the often not adequately adjusted privacy settings, it is possible to identify a user’s several OSN proles. In this paper, we illustrate that third parties just have to take a small step to link OSN proles of a user and, consequently, to aggregate various pieces of information shared in several OSNs. Particularly, based on statistical results we illustrate how the often publicly available friends lists can be exploited to link several OSN proles of a single natural person. The results presented in this paper show that proles can be linked even at low cost, i.e., without complex correlation techniques or high computational power. To assess the risk of privacy leakage by prole linking, we, additionally, report how often specic pieces of information are made publicly available by users in four of the most popular OSNs. We show that users tend to publish dierent pieces of information in dierent OSNs and, thereby, demonstrate that by linking friends lists more information about a user can be gained than the user shared in a single OSN. For the study we analyzed more than 180,000 user proles and compared more than seven million pairs of proles to investigate prole linkability. Building on the popularity of online social networks (OSNs) such as Facebook, social content-sharing applications allow users to form communities around shared interests. Millions of users worldwide use them to share recommendations on everything from music and books to resources on the web. However, their increasing popularity is beginning to attract the attention of malicious attackers. As social network credentials become valued targets of phishing attacks and social worms, attackers look to leverage compromised accounts for further financial gain. In this paper, we analyze the state of privacy protection in social content-sharing applications, describe effective privacy attacks against today's social networks, and propose anonymization techniques to protect users. We show that simple protection mechanisms such as anonymizing shared data can still leave users open to social intersection attacks, where a small number of compromised users can identify the originators of shared content. Modeling this as a graph anonymization problem, we propose to provide users with k-anonymity privacy guarantees by augmenting the social graph with "latent edges." We identify StarClique, a locally minimal graph structure required for users to attain k-anonymity, where at worst, a user is identified as one of k possible contributors of a data object. We prove the correctness of our approach using analysis. Finally, using experiments driven by traces from the del.icio.us social bookmark site, we demonstrate the practicality and effectiveness of our approach on real-world systems. Online Social Networks (OSNs) have recently emerged as one of the most effective channels for information sharing and discovery due to their ability of allowing users to read and create new content simultaneously. While this advantage provides users more rooms to decide which content to follow, it also makes OSNs fertile grounds for the wide spread of misinformation which can lead to undesirable consequences. In order to guarantee the trustworthiness of content sharing in OSNs, it is thus essential to have a strategic investigation on the first and foremost concern: the sources of misinformation. In this paper, we study k-Suspector problem which aims to identify the top k most suspected sources of misinformation. We propose two effective approaches namely ranking-based and optimization-based algorithms. We further extend our solutions to cope with the incompleteness of collected data as well as multiple attacks, which mostly occur in reality. Experimental results on real-world datasets show that our approaches achieve competitive detection ratios in a timely manner in comparison with available methods.