Using formal tools in computer science to describe games is an interesting problem. We give games, exactly two person games, an axiomatical foundation based on the process algebra ACP (Algebra of Communicating Process). A fresh operator called opponent's alternative composition operator (OA) is introduced into ACP to describe game trees and game strategies, called GameACP. And its sound and complete axiomatical system is naturally established. To model the outcomes of games (the co-action of the player and the opponent), correspondingly in GameACP, the execution of GameACP processes, another operator called playing operator (PO) is extended into GameACP. We also establish a sound and complete axiomatical system for PO. Finally, we give the correctness theorem between the outcomes of games and the deductions of GameACP processes.
More like Game-CTR @cite_0 and Chatzikokolakis's work @cite_20 , we introduce games into ACP, or we use ACP to give games an interpretation. Unlike @cite_0 and @cite_20 , our work GameACP is an attempt to do axiomatization with an extension of process algebra ACP for games. It has the following characteristics:
@cite_0 @cite_20
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We present an approach to software model checking based on game semantics and the CSP process algebra. Open program fragments (i.e. terms-in-context) are compositionally modelled as CSP processes which represent their game semantics. This translation is performed by a prototype compiler. Observational equivalence and regular properties are checked by traces refinement using the FDR tool. We also present theorems for parameterised verification of polymorphic terms and properties. The effectiveness of the approach is evaluated on several examples. Game-playing is an approach to write security proofs that are easy to verify. In this approach, security definitions and intractable problems are written as programs called games and reductionist security proofs are sequences of game transformations. This bias towards programming languages suggests the implementation of a tool based on compiler techniques (syntactic program transformations) to build security proofs, but it also raises the question of the soundness of such a tool. In this paper, we advocate the formalization of game-playing in a proof assistant as a tool to build security proofs. In a proof assistant, starting from just the formal definition of a probabilistic programming language, all the properties required in game-based security proofs can be proved internally as lemmas whose soundness is ensured by proof theory. Concretely, we show how to formalize the game-playing framework of Bellare and Rogaway in the Coq proof assistant, how to prove formally reusable lemmas such as the fundamental lemma of game-playing, and how to use them to formally prove the PRP PRF Switching Lemma. We propose a hybrid model for automatically acquiring a policy for a complex game, which combines online learning with mining knowledge from a corpus of human game play. Our hypothesis is that a player that learns its policies by combining (online) exploration with biases towards human behaviour that's attested in a corpus of humans playing the game will outperform any agent that uses only one of the knowledge sources. During game play, the agent extracts similar moves made by players in the corpus in similar situations, and approximates their utility alongside other possible options by performing simulations from its current state. We implement and assess our model in an agent playing the complex win-lose board game Settlers of Catan, which lacks an implementation that would challenge a human expert. The results from the preliminary set of experiments illustrate the potential of such a joint model. We develop a game semantics for process algebra with two interacting agents. The purpose of our semantics is to make manifest the role of knowledge and information flow in the interactions between agents and to control the information available to interacting agents. We define games and strategies on process algebras, so that two agents interacting according to their strategies determine the execution of the process, replacing the traditional scheduler. We show that different restrictions on strategies represent different amounts of information being available to a scheduler. We also show that a certain class of strategies corresponds to the syntactic schedulers of Chatzikokolakis and Palamidessi, which were developed to overcome problems with traditional schedulers modelling interaction. The restrictions on these strategies have an explicit epistemic flavour.