The paper considers the complexity of verifying that a finite state system satisfies a number of definitions of information flow security. The systems model considered is one in which agents operate synchronously with awareness of the global clock. This enables timing based attacks to be captured, whereas previous work on this topic has dealt primarily with asynchronous systems. Versions of the notions of nondeducibility on inputs, nondeducibility on strategies, and an unwinding based notion are formulated for this model. All three notions are shown to be decidable, and their computational complexity is characterised.
A number of works have defined notions of security for synchronous or timed systems, but fewer complexity results are known. K "o pf and Basin @cite_23 define a notion similar to @math and show it is PTIME decidable. Similar definitions are also used in the literature on language-based security @cite_15 @cite_12 .
@cite_15 @cite_12 @cite_23
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When formalizing security protocols, different specification languages support very different reasoning methodologies, whose results are not directly or easily comparable. Therefore, establishing clear mappings among different frameworks is highly desirable, as it permits various methodologies to cooperate by interpreting theoretical and practical results of one system in another. In this paper, we examine the non-trivial relationship between two general verification frameworks: multiset rewriting (MSR) and a process algebra (PA) inspired to CCS and the π-calculus. Although defining a simple and general bijection between MSR and PA appears difficult, we show that the sublanguages needed to specify a large class of cryptographic protocols (immediate decryption protocols) admits an effective translation that is not only bijective and trace-preserving, but also induces a weak form of bisimulation across the two languages. In particular, the correspondence sketched in this abstract permits transferring several important trace-based properties such as secrecy and many forms of authentication. We present decidability results for the verification of cryptographic protocols in the presence of equational theories corresponding to xor and Abelian groups. Since the perfect cryptography assumption is unrealistic for cryptographic primitives with visible algebraic properties such as xor, we extend the conventional Dolev-Yao model by permitting the intruder to exploit these properties. We show that the ground reachability problem in NP for the extended intruder theories in the cases of xor and Abelian groups. This result follows from a normal proof theorem. Then, we show how to lift this result in the xor case: we consider a symbolic constraint system expressing the reachability (e.g., secrecy) problem for a finite number of sessions. We prove that such a constraint system is decidable, relying in particular on an extension of combination algorithms for unification procedures. As a corollary, this enables automatic symbolic verification of cryptographic protocols employing xor for a fixed number of sessions. The notions of serializability, linearizability, and sequential consistency are used in the specification of concurrent systems. We show that the model checking problem for each of these properties can be cast in terms of the containment of one regular language in another regular language shuffled using a semicommutative alphabet. The three model checking problems are shown to be, respectively, in Pspace, in Expspace, and undecidable. With the proliferation of communication networks and mobile devices, the privacy and security concerns on their information flow are raised. Given a critical system that may leak confidential information, the problem consists of verifying and also enforcing opacity by designing supervisors, to conceal confidential information from unauthorized persons. To find out what the intruder sees, it is required to construct an observer of the system. In this paper, we consider incremental observer generation of modular systems, for verification and enforcement of current state opacity. The synchronization of the subsystems generate a large state space. Moreover, the observer generation with exponential complexity adds even larger state space. To tackle the complexity problem, we prove that observer generation can be done locally before synchronizing the subsystems. The incremental local observer generation along with an abstraction method lead to a significant state space reduction compared to traditional monolithic methods. The existence of shared unobservable events is also considered in the incremental approach. Moreover, we present an illustrative example, where the results of verification and enforcement of current state opacity are shown on a modular multiple floor elevator building with an intruder. Furthermore, we extend the current state opacity, current state anonymity, and language based opacity formulations for verification of modular systems.