We show that a steady-state stock-flow consistent macro-economic model can be represented as a Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP). The set of solutions is a polytope, which volume depends on the constraints applied and reveals the potential fragility of the economic circuit, with no need to study the dynamics. Several methods to compute the volume are compared, inspired by operations research methods and the analysis of metabolic networks, both exact and approximate. We also introduce a random transaction matrix, and study the particular case of linear flows with respect to money stocks.
The importance of the organization of interactions, embodied by networks, has been stressed in economics @cite_8 . Theoretical works have studied their generic properties (supply chain @cite_32 , interbank network @cite_9 , trade credit @cite_0 ). Empirical studies have laid emphasis upon the topology of real economic networks, such as goods market, national inter-firm trading @cite_21 , world trade @cite_19 , global corporate control among transnational corporations @cite_34 , firm ownership networks. They must sometime be reconstructed, starting from limited information (of equity investments in the stock market @cite_52 , the interbank market @cite_60 ). At the level of individuals, detailed topological information about banking, employment, or consumption seems to be lacking.
@cite_8 @cite_60 @cite_9 @cite_21 @cite_32 @cite_52 @cite_0 @cite_19 @cite_34
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0 Introduction.- I Themes and Problems.- 1.0 Introduction.- 1.1 The theory of finance capital.- 1.2 Interlocking directorates and economic power.- 1.3 Financial groups.- 1.4 Corporate elite and capitalist class.- 1.5 Summary.- II Between Market and Hierarchy.- 2.0 Introduction.- 2.1 The organization of firms and markets: a neo-classical explanation.- 2.2 Some definitions of firms.- 2.3 Power and control.- 2.4 Ownership and control.- 2.5 Competition, cooperation and control.- 2.5.1 Concentration and centralization.- 2.5.2 The level-of-analysis problem.- 2.6 Summary.- III Imperialism in the Seventies: two models.- 3.0 Introduction.- 3.1 Theories of imperialism.- 3.1.1 Their origins.- 3.1.2 After World War II.- 3.2 Two models.- 3.3 Research design.- 3.4 Summary.- IV The International Corporate Elite.- 4.0 Introduction.- 4.1 The organization of the supervising and executive function in different countries.- 4.2 Selection of the international corporate elite.- 4.3 Network characteristics of the international corporate elite.- 4.3.0 Introduction.- 4.3.1 The finance capitalists.- 4.3.2 The big linkers.- 4.4 Types of interlocking directorates.- 4.4.0 Introduction.- 4.4.1 Multiple interlocks.- 4.5 Summary.- V National Versus International Integration.- 5.0 Introduction to some graph-theoretical concepts.- 5.1 General patterns in the international network.- 5.1.1 Compactness of the international network.- 5.1.2 International integration of national networks.- 5.2 The international network of Western firms.- 5.2.0 Introduction.- 5.2.1 Local centrality.- 5.2.2 Global centrality.- 5.2.3 Overall centrality.- 5.3 Industrial concentration versus economic centralization.- 5.4 Summary.- VI Domination and Control.- 6.0 Introduction.- 6.1 Clusters of heavily interlocked firms.- 6.1.1 The network at multiplicity-level two.- 6.1.2 The network at multiplicity-level three.- 6.1.3 Conclusions.- 6.2 The network of officer-interlocks.- 6.2.0 Introduction.- 6.2.1 Domination and control.- 6.2.1.1 The network of all officer-interlocks.- 6.2.1.2 The network of control.- 6.2.2 Financial groups.- 6.2.3 Constellations of interests.- 6.3 Summary.- VII Competition and Cooperation: the role of banks.- 7.0 Introduction.- 7.1 Interlocks among banks.- 7.2 Overlapping spheres of interests.- 7.3 International bank consortia.- 7.4 The American banks.- 7.5 Summary.- VIII The Impact of World Crisis: changes in the network.- 8.0 Introduction.- 8.1 A new economic world order?.- 8.2 Selection of the 1976 sample.- 8.3 The international corporate elite.- 8.3.1 Finance capitalists.- 8.3.2 Big linkers.- 8.4 International versus national integration.- 8.5 Centrality in the nested networks (1976).- 8.6 Domination and control in the 1976 network.- 8.7 Summary.- IX Summary and Conclusions.- 9.1 Introduction.- 9.2 The structure of the international corporate elite.- 9.3 Conflict or cooperation.- 9.4 The meaning of interlocking directorates.- 9.5 The international corporate elite.- References.- Authors Index.- Firms Index.- Appendix A. We investigate the community structure of the global ownership network of transnational corporations. We find a pronounced organization in communities that cannot be explained by randomness. Despite the global character of this network, communities reflect first of all the geographical location of firms, while the industrial sector plays only a marginal role. We also analyze the network in which the nodes are the communities and the links are obtained by aggregating the links among firms belonging to pairs of communities. We analyze the network centrality of the top 50 communities and we provide the first quantitative assessment of the financial sector role in connecting the global economy. The structure of the control network of transnational corporations affects global market competition and financial stability. So far, only small national samples were studied and there was no appropriate methodology to assess control globally. We present the first investigation of the architecture of the international ownership network, along with the computation of the control held by each global player. We find that transnational corporations form a giant bow-tie structure and that a large portion of control flows to a small tightly-knit core of financial institutions. This core can be seen as an economic “super-entity” that raises new important issues both for researchers and policy makers. We present a simple model of a production network in which firms are linked by supplier–customer relationships involving extension of trade–credit. Our aim is to identify the minimal set of mechanisms which reproduce qualitatively the main stylized facts of industrial demography, such as firms’ size distribution, and, at the same time, the correlation, over time and across firms, of output, growth and bankruptcies. The behavior of aggregate variables can be traced back to the direct firm–firm interdependence. In this paper, we assume that the number of firms is constant and the network has a periodic static structure. But the framework allows further extensions to investigate which network structures are more robust against domino effects and, if the network is let to evolve in time, which structures emerge spontaneously, depending on the individual strategies for orders and delivery. r 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.