While page views are often sold instantly through real-time auctions when users visit websites, they can also be sold in advance via guaranteed contracts. In this paper, we present a dynamic programming model to study how an online publisher should optimally allocate and price page views between guaranteed and spot markets. The problem is challenging because the allocation and pricing of guaranteed contracts affect advertisers' purchase between the two markets, and the terminal value of the model is endogenously determined by the updated dual force of supply and demand in auctions. We take the advertisers' purchasing behaviour into consideration, i.e., risk aversion and stochastic demand arrivals, and present a scalable and efficient algorithm for the optimal solution. The model is also empirically validated with a commercial dataset. The experimental results show that selling page views via both guaranteed contracts and auctions can increase the publisher's expected total revenue, and the optimal pricing and allocation strategies are robust to different market and advertiser types.
Our paper is also related to the literature in revenue management , in which many studies focus on how a seller uses dynamic pricing models to produce or offer a menu of products or services to its customers. For example, @cite_17 used intensity control to sell a given stock of products by a deadline when demand is price sensitive and stochastic and the seller s objective is to maximise his expected revenue. Their model fits many applications such as single-route flight tickets selling and hotel rooms booking. @cite_15 @cite_6 proposed a dynamic pricing framework for selling flight tickets under the assumption of static demand. Our problem setting for PG is similar to the existing literature, however, the terminal value in our case is uncertain because the remaining impressions are auctioned off in RTB.
@cite_15 @cite_6 @cite_17
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In many industries, managers face the problem of selling a given stock of items by a deadline. We investigate the problem of dynamically pricing such inventories when demand is price sensitive and stochastic and the firm's objective is to maximize expected revenues. Examples that fit this framework include retailers selling fashion and seasonal goods and the travel and leisure industry, which markets space such as seats on airline flights, cabins on vacation cruises, and rooms in hotels that become worthless if not sold by a specific time. We formulate this problem using intensity control and obtain structural monotonicity results for the optimal intensity resp., price as a function of the stock level and the length of the horizon. For a particular exponential family of demand functions, we find the optimal pricing policy in closed form. For general demand functions, we find an upper bound on the expected revenue based on analyzing the deterministic version of the problem and use this bound to prove that simple, fixed price policies are asymptotically optimal as the volume of expected sales tends to infinity. Finally, we extend our results to the case where demand is compound Poisson; only a finite number of prices is allowed; the demand rate is time varying; holding costs are incurred and cash flows are discounted; the initial stock is a decision variable; and reordering, overbooking, and random cancellations are allowed. In this paper, we examine the research and results of dynamic pricing policies and their relation to revenue management. The survey is based on a generic revenue management problem in which a perishable and nonrenewable set of resources satisfy stochastic price sensitive demand processes over a finite period of time. In this class of problems, the owner (or the seller) of these resources uses them to produce and offer a menu of final products to the end customers. Within this context, we formulate the stochastic control problem of capacity that the seller faces: How to dynamically set the menu and the quantity of products and their corresponding prices to maximize the total revenue over the selling horizon. We consider a dynamic pricing model for selling a given stock of a perishable product over a finite time horizon. Customers, whose reservation price distribution changes over time, arrive according to a nonhomogeneous Poisson process. We show that at any given time, the optimal price decreases with inventory. We also identify a sufficient condition under which the optimal price decreases over time for a given inventory level. This sufficient condition requires that the willingness of a customer to pay a premium for the product does not increase over time. In addition to shedding managerial insight, these structural properties enable efficient computation of the optimal policy.Numerical studies are conducted to show the revenue impact of dynamic price policies. Price changes are set to compensate for statistical fluctuations of demand and to respond to shifts of the reservation price. For the former, our examples show that using optimal dynamic optimal policies achieves 2.4--7.3 revenue improvement over the optimal single price policy. For the latter, the revenue increase can be as high as 100 . These results explain why yield management has become so essential to fashion retailing and travel service industries. We analyze a revenue management problem in which a seller facing a Poisson arrival stream of consumers operates an online multiunit auction. Consumers can get the product from an alternative list price channel. We consider two variants of this problem: In the first variant, the list price is an external channel run by another firm. In the second one, the seller manages both the auction and the list price channels. Each consumer, trying to maximize his own surplus, must decide either to buy at the posted price and get the item at no risk, or to join the auction and wait until its end, when the winners are revealed and the auction price is disclosed. Our approach consists of two parts. First, we study structural properties of the problem, and show that the equilibrium strategy for both versions of this game is of the threshold type, meaning that a consumer will join the auction only if his arrival time is above a function of his own valuation. This consumer's strategy can be computed using an iterative algorithm in a function space, provably convergent under some conditions. Unfortunately, this procedure is computationally intensive. Second, and to overcome this limitation, we formulate an asymptotic version of the problem, in which the demand rate and the initial number of units grow proportionally large. We obtain a simple closed-form expression for the equilibrium strategy in this regime, which is then used as an approximate solution to the original problem. Numerical computations show that this heuristic is very accurate. The asymptotic solution culminates in simple and precise recipes of how bidders should behave, as well as how the seller should structure the auction, and price the product in the dual-channel case.