For many years, the pay-TV system has attracted a lot of users. Users have recently expressed the desire to use mobile TV or mobile payment via anonymous protocols. The mobile users have also received their services over cellular communications networks. Each mobile device receives services from each head end systems. With increasing numbers of users and the expansion of Internet, user’s privacy has become crucial important. When a device leaves the head end system’s range, it must receive services from another head end system. In this paper, we review ’s scheme and we highlight some weaknesses, including privilege insider attack and user traceability attack. Finally, we alleviate the scheme and analyze the alleviated scheme using both heuristic and formal methods.
A user's connection with banks is another payment method that can be mentioned. Blind signature is another method for anonymization. In this method, a legitimate party signs the blinded message of users. After signing, other people can see the original message along with the valid signatures of the legal party. In 1996, Camenisch presented a communication scheme in an anonymous way in which a blind signature was used @cite_2 . Subsequently, authors have tried to provide more efficient schemes for mobile-pay systems. Customers in this scheme have to open an anonymous account and there is no need for the bank to identify the customers. In 2009 Bakhtiari presented the @math scheme based on the blind signature and the customer's relationship with the bank @cite_24 . Its blind signature is based on @math crypto system. In @math , Wu proposed an efficient scheme @cite_29 . Their scheme is a powerful scheme based on user signature. The user who wants to uses TV, must register as legal user via proposed scheme and creates session key to watch the TV. The user signs its message and sends it to server. Server verifies the received message with @math which is proposed in this scheme.
@cite_24 @cite_29 @cite_2
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In traditional television (TV) systems, users have to pay for all of the channels provided by the TV service server. However, usually, users are not interested in all of the channels, so they waste money by paying for all of the channels. For this reason, the concept of “pay-TV” has been developed. A pay-TV system allows the subscribers to pay for the specific channels they want to watch. If we consider that m users subscribe to n channels in traditional schemes for pay-TV, the time complexity will be O(mn). It is lower efficiency for user on the pay-TV system. But, in this paper, we proposed a novel authentication scheme for pay-TV systems based on Chebyshev chaotic maps, and the time complexity only needs O(m). The purpose of our scheme is focus on efficiency and security. The security and performance analyses showed that our proposed scheme satisfies the essential functionality requirements, withstands potential attacks, and is suitable for real-world practical implementation. Furthermore, the Burrows–Abadi–Needham logic model was used to prove the correctness of our proposed scheme for the mutual authentication between users and the server. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Summary A mobile pay-TV service is one of the ongoing services of multimedia systems. Designing an efficient mechanism for authentication and key distribution is an important security requirement in mobile pay-TV systems. Until now, many security protocols have been proposed for mobile pay-TV systems. However, the existing protocols for mobile pay-TV systems are vulnerable to various security attacks. Recently, Wang and Qin proposed an authentication scheme for mobile pay-TV systems using bilinear pairing on elliptic curve cryptography. They claimed that their scheme could withstand various attacks. In this paper, we demonstrate that Wang and Qin's scheme is vulnerable to replay attacks and impersonation attacks. Furthermore, we propose a novel security protocol for mobile pay-TV systems using the elliptic curve cryptosystem to overcome the weaknesses of Wang and Qin's scheme. In order to improve the efficiency, the proposed scheme is designed in such a way that needs fewer scalar multiplication operations and does not use bilinear pairing, which is an expensive cryptographic operation. Detailed analyses, including verification using the Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications tool and implementation on FPGA, demonstrate that the proposed scheme not only withstands active and passive attacks and provides user anonymity but also has a better performance than Wang and Qin's scheme. Mutual authentication is important in a mobile pay-TV system. Traditional authentication schemes make use of one-to-one delivery, that is, one authentication message per request is delivered from a head-end system to subscriber. This delivery occupies too much bandwidth and therefore is inefficient and costly. One-to-many authentication scheme for access control in mobile pay-TV systems was proposed by in 2009. In one-to-many authentication scheme, only one authentication message for multiple requests is broadcasted from the head-end system (HES) to subscribers. claimed that their scheme is secure and provides anonymous authentication for protecting user privacy. However, the authors demonstrate that their scheme has a critical weakness. An attacker without any secret information can not only successfully impersonate mobile set (MS) to cheat the HES but also impersonate HES to cheat MS. The authors result is important for security engineers who design and develop user authentication systems. Afterwards, the authors design a novel one-to-many authentication scheme from bilinear pairings. They give the formal security proof in the random oracle model. In addition, they present the performance analysis of our scheme. The analysis results showed that their novel authentication scheme has shorter transmission message and can be applied in the environment which has limited bandwidth. At the same time, their scheme is also the first secure one-to-many authentication scheme for access control in pay-TV systems. Initiating and bootstrapping secure, yet low-cost, ad-hoc transactions is an important challenge that needs to be overcome if the promise of mobile and pervasive computing is to be fulfilled. For example, mobile payment applications would benefit from the ability to pair devices securely without resorting to conventional mechanisms such as shared secrets, a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), or trusted third parties. A number of methods have been proposed for doing this based on the use of a secondary out-of-band (OOB) channel that either authenticates information passed over the normal communication channel or otherwise establishes an authenticated shared secret which can be used for subsequent secure communication. A key element of the success of these methods is dependent on the performance and effectiveness of the OOB channel, which usually depends on people performing certain critical tasks correctly. In this paper, we present the results of a comparative usability study on methods that propose using humans to implement the OOB channel and argue that most of these proposals fail to take into account factors that may seriously harm the security and usability of a protocol. Our work builds on previous research in the usability of pairing methods and the accompanying recommendations for designing user interfaces that minimise human mistakes. Our findings show that the traditional methods of comparing and typing short strings into mobile devices are still preferable despite claims that new methods are more usable and secure, and that user interface design alone is not sufficient in mitigating human mistakes in OOB channels.