According to the recent rulings of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), TV white spaces (TVWS) can now be accessed by secondary users (SUs) after a list of vacant TV channels is obtained via a geo-location database. Proper business models are therefore essential for database operators to manage geo-location databases. Database access can be simultaneously priced under two different schemes: the registration scheme and the service plan scheme. In the registration scheme, the database reserves part of the TV bandwidth for registered White Space Devices (WSDs). In the service plan scheme, the WSDs are charged according to their queries. In this paper, we investigate the business model for the TVWS database under a hybrid pricing scheme. We consider the scenario where a database operator employs both the registration scheme and the service plan scheme to serve the SUs. The SUs' choices of different pricing schemes are modeled as a non-cooperative game and we derive distributed algorithms to achieve Nash Equilibrium (NE). Considering the NE of the SUs, the database operator optimally determines pricing parameters for both pricing schemes in terms of bandwidth reservation, registration fee and query plans.
Many works also focus on the economic issue of dynamic spectrum sharing. In @cite_16 , the pricing-based spectrum access control is investigated under secondary users competitions. In @cite_10 , spectrum pricing with spatial reuse is considered. Contract theory is utilized in the scenarios where the spectrum buyers have hidden information. In @cite_19 , leveraged contract theory to analyze the spectrum trading between primary operator and SUs. In @cite_22 , contract theory is applied to the cooperative communication scenario. In this paper, we also model the service plan design with contract theory. However, due to the co-existence of hybrid pricing schemes, there is uncertainty about the number of SUs choosing the contract items, which is different from existing works.
@cite_19 @cite_16 @cite_10 @cite_22
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Market-based mechanisms offer promising approaches for spectrum access in cognitive radio networks. In this paper, we focus on two market models, one with a monopoly primary user (PU) market and the other with a multiple PU market, where each PU sells its temporarily unused spectrum to secondary users (SUs). We propose a pricing-based spectrum trading mechanism that enables SUs to contend for channel usage by random access, in a distributed manner, which naturally mitigates the complexity and time overhead associated with centralized scheduling. For the monopoly PU market model, we first consider SUs contending via slotted Aloha. The revenue maximization problems here are nonconvex. We first characterize the Pareto optimal region, and then obtain a Pareto optimal solution that maximizes the SUs' throughput subject to the SUs' budget constraints. To mitigate the spectrum underutilization due to the “price of contention,” we revisit the problem where SUs contend via CSMA, and show that spectrum utilization is enhanced, resulting in higher revenue. When the PU's unused spectrum is a control parameter, we study further the tradeoff between the PU's utility and its revenue. For the multiple PU market model, we cast the competition among PUs as a three-stage Stackelberg game, where each SU selects a PU's channel to maximize its throughput. We characterize the Nash equilibria, in terms of access prices and the spectrum offered to SUs. Our findings reveal that the number of equilibria exhibits a phase transition phenomenon, in the sense that when the number of PUs is greater than a threshold, there exist infinitely many equilibria; otherwise, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, where the access prices and spectrum opportunities are determined by the budgets elasticity of SUs and the utility level of PUs. Dynamic spectrum access is a new paradigm of secondary spectrum utilization and sharing. It allows unlicensed secondary users (SUs) to exploit the opportunistically underutilized licensed spectrum. Market mechanism is a widely used promising means to regulate the consuming behaviours of users and, hence, achieve the efficient allocation and consumption of limited resources. In this paper, we propose and study a hybrid secondary spectrum market consisting of both the futures market and the spot market, in which SUs (buyers) purchase underutilized licensed spectrum from a spectrum regulator (SR), either through predefined contracts via the futures market, or through spot transactions via the spot market. We focus on the optimal spectrum allocation among SUs in an exogenous hybrid market that maximizes the secondary spectrum utilization efficiency. The problem is challenging because of the stochasticity and asymmetry of network information. To solve this problem, we first derive an off-line optimal allocatio... The dynamic spectrum market (DSM) is a key economic vehicle for realizing the opportunistic spectrum access that will mitigate the anticipated spectrum-scarcity problem. DSM allows legacy spectrum owners to lease their channels to unlicensed spectrum consumers (or secondary users) in order to increase their revenue and improve spectrum utilization. In DSM, determining the optimal spectrum leasing price is an important yet challenging problem that requires a comprehensive understanding of market participants' interests and interactions. In this paper, we study spectrum pricing competition in a duopoly DSM, where two wireless service providers (WSPs) lease spectrum access rights, and secondary users (SUs) purchase the spectrum use to maximize their utility. We identify two essential, but previously overlooked, properties of DSM: 1) heterogeneous spectrum resources at WSPs and 2) spectrum sharing among SUs. We demonstrate the impact of spectrum heterogeneity via an in-depth measurement study using a software-defined radio (SDR) testbed. We then study the impacts of spectrum heterogeneity on WSPs' optimal pricing and SUs' WSP selection strategies using a systematic three-step approach. First, we study how spectrum sharing among SUs subscribed to the same WSP affects the SUs' achievable utility. Then, we derive the SUs' optimal WSP selection strategy that maximizes their payoff, given the heterogeneous spectrum propagation characteristics and prices. We analyze how individual SU preferences affect market evolution and prove the market convergence to a mean-field limit, even though SUs make local decisions. Finally, given the market evolution, we formulate the WSPs' pricing strategies in a duopoly DSM as a noncooperative game and identify its Nash equilibrium points. We find that the equilibrium price and its uniqueness depend on the SUs' geographical density and spectrum propagation characteristics. Our analytical framework reveals the impact of spectrum heterogeneity in a real-world DSM, and can be used as a guideline for the WSPs' pricing strategies. Providing proper economic incentives is essential for the success of dynamic spectrum sharing. Cooperative spectrum sharing is one effective way to achieve this goal. In cooperative spectrum sharing, secondary users (SUs) relay traffics for primary users (PUs), in exchange for dedicated transmission time for the SUs' own communication needs. In this paper, we study the cooperative spectrum sharing under incomplete information, where SUs' types (which capture the relay channel gains and the SUs' power costs) are private information and are not known to the PU. Inspired by the contract theory, we model the network as a labor market. The PU is an employer who offers a contract to the SUs. The contract consists of a set of items representing combinations of spectrum access time (i.e., reward) and relay power (i.e., contribution). The SUs are employees, and each of them selects the best contract item to maximize its payoff. We study the optimal contract design for both weakly and strongly incomplete information scenarios. First, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for feasible contracts in both scenarios. In the weakly incomplete information scenario, we further derive the optimal contract that achieves the same maximum PU's utility as in the complete information benchmark. In the strongly incomplete information scenario, we propose a Decompose-and-Compare algorithm that achieves a close-to-optimal contract. We further show that the PU's expected utility loss due to the suboptimal algorithm and the strongly incomplete information are both relatively small (less than 2 and 1.3 , respectively, in our numerical results with two SU types).