With the recent advances in solving large, zero-sum extensive form games, there is a growing interest in the inverse problem of inferring underlying game parameters given only access to agent actions. Although a recent work provides a powerful differentiable end-to-end learning frameworks which embed a game solver within a deep-learning framework, allowing unknown game parameters to be learned via backpropagation, this framework faces significant limitations when applied to boundedly rational human agents and large scale problems, leading to poor practicality. In this paper, we address these limitations and propose a framework that is applicable for more practical settings. First, seeking to learn the rationality of human agents in complex two-player zero-sum games, we draw upon well-known ideas in decision theory to obtain a concise and interpretable agent behavior model, and derive solvers and gradients for end-to-end learning. Second, to scale up to large, real-world scenarios, we propose an efficient first-order primal-dual method which exploits the structure of extensive-form games, yielding significantly faster computation for both game solving and gradient computation. When tested on randomly generated games, we report speedups of orders of magnitude over previous approaches. We also demonstrate the effectiveness of our model on both real-world one-player settings and synthetic data.
For a two-player extensive form game characterized by a game tree with information sets @math and @math for the min and max player respectively, ling2018game show that when @math , the QRE in reduced normal form of the game is equivalent to the solution of the following regularized min-max problem, where @math and @math are the players' strategies in @cite_15 . In the above, @math is the sequence form payoff matrix and @math and @math are the sequence form constraint matrices. @math denotes the possible actions at information set @math , while @math is the action (from the same player) preceding @math . In the sequence form, one works with @math as opposed to probability vectors. These realization plans represent probabilities of choosing a given sequence, while the constraint matrices @math are matrices containing @math and contain parent-child relationships in the game tree. The sequence form is significantly more compact than the normal form while retaining virtually all of its strategic elements.
@cite_15
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We propose thesequence formas a new strategic description for an extensive game with perfect recall. It is similar to the normal form but has linear instead of exponential complexity and allows a direct representation and efficient computation of behavior strategies. Pure strategies and their mixed strategy probabilities are replaced by sequences of consecutive choices and their realization probabilities. A zero-sum game is solved by a corresponding linear program that has linear size in the size of the game tree. General two-person games are studied in the paper by Kolleret al, 1996 (Games Econ. Behav.14, 247–259).Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C72. We present the first formal mathematical presentation of the generalized Russian cards problem, and provide rigorous security definitions that capture both basic and extended versions of weak and perfect security notions. In the generalized Russian cards problem, three players, Alice, Bob, and Cathy, are dealt a deck of @math cards, each given @math , @math , and @math cards, respectively. The goal is for Alice and Bob to learn each other's hands via public communication, without Cathy learning the fate of any particular card. The basic idea is that Alice announces a set of possible hands she might hold, and Bob, using knowledge of his own hand, should be able to learn Alice's cards from this announcement, but Cathy should not. Using a combinatorial approach, we are able to give a nice characterization of informative strategies (i.e., strategies allowing Bob to learn Alice's hand), having optimal communication complexity, namely the set of possible hands Alice announces must be equivalent to a large set of @math -designs, where @math . We also provide some interesting necessary conditions for certain types of deals to be simultaneously informative and secure. That is, for deals satisfying @math for some @math , where @math and the strategy is assumed to satisfy a strong version of security (namely perfect @math -security), we show that @math and hence @math . We also give a precise characterization of informative and perfectly @math -secure deals of the form @math satisfying @math involving @math -designs. This paper investigates a zero-sum game played on a weighted connected graph @math between two players, the tree player and the edge player. At each play, the tree player chooses a spanning tree @math and the edge player chooses an edge @math . The payoff to the edge player is @math , defined as follows: If @math lies in the tree @math then @math ; if @math does not lie in the tree then @math , where @math is the weight of edge @math and @math is the weight of the unique cycle formed when edge @math is added to the tree @math . The main result is that the value of the game on any @math -vertex graph is bounded above by @math . It is conjectured that the value of the game is @math . The game arises in connection with the @math -server problem on a road network; i.e., a metric space that can be represented as a multigraph @math in which each edge @math represents a road of length @math . It is shown that, if the value of the game on @math is @math , then there is a randomized strategy that achieves a competitive ratio of @math against any oblivious adversary. Thus, on any @math -vertex road network, there is a randomized algorithm for the @math -server problem that is @math competitive against oblivious adversaries. At the heart of the analysis of the game is an algorithm that provides an approximate solution for the simple network design problem. Specifically, for any @math -vertex weighted, connected multigraph, the algorithm constructs a spanning tree @math such that the average, over all edges @math , of @math is less than or equal to @math . This result has potential application to the design of communication networks. It also improves substantially known estimates concerning the existence of a sparse basis for the cycle space of a graph. Let @math be a ground set of @math elements, and let @math be a family of subsets of @math , @math , with a positive cost @math associated with each @math . Consider the following online version of the set cover problem, described as a game between an algorithm and an adversary. An adversary gives elements to the algorithm from @math one by one. Once a new element is given, the algorithm has to cover it by some set of @math containing it. We assume that the elements of @math and the members of @math are known in advance to the algorithm; however, the set @math of elements given by the adversary is not known in advance to the algorithm. (In general, @math may be a strict subset of @math .) The objective is to minimize the total cost of the sets chosen by the algorithm. Let @math denote the family of sets in @math that the algorithm chooses. At the end of the game the adversary also produces (offline) a family of sets @math that covers @math . The performance of the algorithm is the ratio between the cost of @math and the cost of @math . The maximum ratio, taken over all input sequences, is the competitive ratio of the algorithm. We present an @math competitive deterministic algorithm for the problem and establish a nearly matching @math lower bound for all interesting values of @math and @math . The techniques used are motivated by similar techniques developed in computational learning theory for online prediction (e.g., the WINNOW algorithm) together with a novel way of converting a fractional solution into a deterministic online algorithm.