With the growing realization that current Internet protocols are reaching the limits of their senescence, a number of on-going research efforts aim to design potential next-generation Internet architectures. Although they vary in maturity and scope, in order to avoid past pitfalls, these efforts seek to treat security and privacy as fundamental requirements. Resilience to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks that plague today's Internet is a major issue for any new architecture and deserves full attention. In this paper, we focus on DoS in a specific candidate next-generation Internet architecture called Named-Data Networking (NDN) -- an instantiation of Information-Centric Networking approach. By stressing content dissemination, NDN appears to be attractive and viable approach to many types of current and emerging communication models. It also incorporates some basic security features that mitigate certain attacks. However, NDN's resilience to DoS attacks has not been analyzed to-date. This paper represents the first step towards assessment and possible mitigation of DoS in NDN. After identifying and analyzing several new types of attacks, it investigates their variations, effects and counter-measures. This paper also sheds some light on the long-standing debate about relative virtues of self-certifying, as opposed to human-readable, names.
NDN caching performance optimization has been recently investigated with respect to various metrics including energy impact @cite_34 @cite_31 @cite_28 . To the best of our knowledge, the work of Xie, et al @cite_3 is the first to address cache robustness in NDN. It introduces CacheShield, a mechanism that helps routers to prevent caching unpopular content and therefore maximizing the use of cache for popular content.
@cite_28 @cite_31 @cite_34 @cite_3
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We consider the problem of delivering content cached in a wireless network of n nodes randomly located on a square of area n. The network performance is described by the 2n × n-dimensional caching capacity region of the wireless network. We provide an inner bound on this caching capacity region, and, in the high path-loss regime, a matching (in the scaling sense) outer bound. For large path-loss exponent, this provides an information-theoretic scaling characterization of the entire caching capacity region. The proposed communication scheme achieving the inner bound shows that the problems of cache selection and channel coding can be solved separately without loss of order-optimality. On the other hand, our results show that the common architecture of nearest-neighbor cache selection can be arbitrarily bad, implying that cache selection and load balancing need to be performed jointly. With the advent of content-centric networking (CCN) where contents can be cached on each CCN router, cache robustness will soon emerge as a serious concern for CCN deployment. Previous studies on cache pollution attacks only focus on a single cache server. The question of how caching will behave over a general caching network such as CCN under cache pollution attacks has never been answered. In this paper, we propose a novel scheme called CacheShield for enhancing cache robustness. CacheShield is simple, easy-to-deploy, and applicable to any popular cache replacement policy. CacheShield can effectively improve cache performance under normal circumstances, and more importantly, shield CCN routers from cache pollution attacks. Extensive simulations including trace-driven simulations demonstrate that CacheShield is effective for both CCN and today's cache servers. We also study the impact of cache pollution attacks on CCN and reveal several new observations on how different attack scenarios can affect cache hit ratios unexpectedly. Named-Data Networking (NDN) is a candidate next-generation Internet architecture designed to address some limitations of the current IP-based Internet. NDN uses the pull model for content distribution, whereby content is first explicitly requested before being delivered. Efficiency is obtained via router- based aggregation of closely spaced requests for popular content and content caching in routers. Although it reduces latency and increases bandwidth utilization, router caching makes the network susceptible to new cache-centric attacks, such as content poisoning. In this paper, we propose a ranking algorithm for cached content that allows routers to distinguish good and (likely) bad content. This ranking is based on statistics collected from consumers' actions following delivery of content objects. Experimental results support our assertion that the proposed ranking algorithm can effectively mitigate content poisoning attacks. In this work, we study the caching performance of Content Centric Networking (CCN), with special emphasis on the size of individual CCN router caches. Specifically, we consider several graph-related centrality metrics (e.g., betweenness, closeness, stress, graph, eccentricity and degree centralities) to allocate content store space heterogeneously across the CCN network, and contrast the performance to that of an homogeneous allocation.