Nowadays, the use of agile software development methods like Scrum is common in industry and academia. Considering the current attacking landscape, it is clear that developing secure software should be a main concern in all software development projects. In traditional software projects, security issues require detailed planning in an initial planning phase, typically resulting in a detailed security analysis (e.g., threat and risk analysis), a security architecture, and instructions for security implementation (e.g., specification of key sizes and cryptographic algorithms to use). Agile software development methods like Scrum are known for reducing the initial planning phases (e.g., sprint 0 in Scrum) and for focusing more on producing running code. Scrum is also known for allowing fast adaption of the emerging software to changes of customer wishes. For security, this means that it is likely that there are no detailed security architecture or security implementation instructions from the start of the project. It also means that a lot of design decisions will be made during the runtime of the project. Hence, to address security in Scrum, it is necessary to consider security issues throughout the whole software development process. Secure Scrum is a variation of the Scrum framework with special focus on the development of secure software throughout the whole software development process. It puts emphasis on implementation of security related issues without the need of changing the underlying Scrum process or influencing team dynamics. Secure Scrum allows even non- security experts to spot security issues, to implement security features, and to verify implementations. A field test of Secure Scrum shows that the security level of software developed using Secure Scrum is higher then the security level of software developed using standard Scrum.
In @cite_16 an informal game (Protection Poker) is used to estimate security risks to explain security requirements to the developer team. The related case study shows that this is a possible way to integrate security awareness into Scrum. It solves the problem of requirements engineering with focus on . However, it does not provide a solution for the implementation and verification phase of software development, hence it is incomplete. Secure Scrum in contrast provides a solution for all phases of software development.
@cite_16
2028813279 2087542257 1614607847 2294444471
Without infinite resources, software development teams must prioritize security fortification efforts to prevent the most damaging attacks. The Protection Poker "game" is a collaborative means for guiding this prioritization and has the potential to improve software security practices and team software security knowledge. The rapid development of software nowadays requires the high speed software product delivery by development teams. In order to deliver the product faster, the development teams make a transformation to their conventional software development lifecycle to agile development method which can enable them towards speedy delivery of software coping with the requirements-change phenomenon. In this scenario, one of the most popular techniques in Agile development is the Scrum methodology which has been criticised in term of its security aspect cycle that ignores the security risk management activity. However, the current practices suggest that security should be considered during all stages of the software development life cycle. In order to address the aforementioned issue, this paper proposes the integration of security principles in development phases using scrum and suggests the element of security backlog that can be used as security features analysis and implementation in scrum phases. Ward Cunningham in his experience report presented at the OOPSLA'92 conference introduced the metaphor of technical debt. This metaphor is related to immature, incomplete or inadequate artifacts in the software development cycle that cause higher costs and lower quality. A strategy for the technical debt management is still a challenge because its definition is not yet part of the software development process. Carolyn Seaman and Yuepu Guo proposed a technical debt management framework based on three stages. First, debts are identified and listed. After that, debts are measured by their payment efforts and then debts are selected to be considered in the software development cycle. This study evaluates the application of this framework in the real context of software projects adopting Scrum. Action research is conducted in two companies where their projects have significant technical debt. We performed three action research cycles based on the three stages of the framework for both companies. The main contribution of this paper is to provide real experiences and improvements for projects using Scrum and that may adopt the technical debt management framework proposed by Seaman and Guo. Both teams recognized that the proposed approach is feasible for being considered in the software development process after some modifications. Because of projects time constraints and ease of use, we reduced the use of the proposed metrics to two: Principal and the Current Amount of Interest. In consequence, decision-making was benefitted by the early consideration of the debts that really need to be paid. Instead of using probabilities to find the interest, these are registered every time the technical debt occurs. During the first phase, the debts identification was improved when all Scrum roles participated, while measurement and decision-making were improved when the team was responsible for these phases. The Product Owner role in both companies understood the importance of Technical Debt monitoring and prioritization during a development cycle. With these changes, the two teams mentioned they would remain using the resulting approach. The security game is a basic model for resource allocation in adversarial environments. Here there are two players, a defender and an attacker. The defender wants to allocate her limited resources to defend critical targets and the attacker seeks his most favorable target to attack. In the past decade, there has been a surge of research interest in analyzing and solving security games that are motivated by applications from various domains. Remarkably, these models and their game-theoretic solutions have led to real-world deployments in use by major security agencies like the LAX airport, the US Coast Guard and Federal Air Marshal Service, as well as non-governmental organizations. Among all these research and applications, equilibrium computation serves as a foundation. This paper examines security games from a theoretical perspective and provides a unified view of various security game models. In particular, each security game can be characterized by a set system E which consists of the defender's pure strategies; The defender's best response problem can be viewed as a combinatorial optimization problem over E. Our framework captures most of the basic security game models in the literature, including all the deployed systems; The set system E arising from various domains encodes standard combinatorial problems like bipartite matching, maximum coverage, min-cost flow, packing problems, etc. Our main result shows that equilibrium computation in security games is essentially a combinatorial problem. In particular, we prove that, for any set system @math , the following problems can be reduced to each other in polynomial time: (0) combinatorial optimization over E; (1) computing the minimax equilibrium for zero-sum security games over E; (2) computing the strong Stackelberg equilibrium for security games over E; (3) computing the best or worst (for the defender) Nash equilibrium for security games over E. Therefore, the hardness [polynomial solvability] of any of these problems implies the hardness [polynomial solvability] of all the others. Here, by "games over E" we mean the class of security games with arbitrary payoff structures, but a fixed set E of defender pure strategies. This shows that the complexity of a security game is essentially determined by the set system E. We view drawing these connections as an important conceptual contribution of this paper.