By expanding the connection of objects to the Internet and their entry to human life, the issue of security and privacy has become important. In order to enhance security and privacy on the Internet, many security protocols have been developed. Unfortunately, the security analyzes that have been carried out on these protocols show that they are vulnerable to one or few attacks, which eliminates the use of these protocols. Therefore, the need for a security protocol on the Internet of Things (IoT) has not yet been resolved. Recently, Khor and Sidorov cryptanalyzed the protocol and presented an improved version of it. In this paper, at first, we show that this protocol also does not have sufficient security and so it is not recommended to be used in any application. More precisely, we present a full secret disclosure attack against this protocol, which extracted the whole secrets of the protocol by two communication with the target tag. In addition, recently proposed an ultralightweight mutual authentication RFID protocol for blockchain enabled supply chains, supported by formal and informal security proofs. However, we present a full secret disclosure attack against this protocol as well.
In the line of designing ultralightweight protocols, in @cite_7 , Tewari and Gupta proposed a new ultralightweight authentication protocol for IoT and claimed that their protocol satisfies all security requirements. However, in @cite_19 , an efficient passive secret disclosure attack is applied to this protocol. Moreover, in @cite_4 , Wang cryptanalyzed the Tewari and Gupta protocol and also proposed an improved version of it. This protocol later analysed by Khor and Sidorov @cite_16 , where they also proposed an improved protocol following the same designing paradigm. In this paper, we consider the security of this improved protocol which has been proposed by Khor and Sidorov, and for simplicity, we call it KSP (stands for Khor and Sidorov protocol) and show that KSP is vulnerable to desynchronization attack and also against secret disclosure attack.
@cite_19 @cite_16 @cite_4 @cite_7
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proposed a novel ultralightweight RFID mutual authentication protocol [1] that has recently been analyzed in several articles. In this letter, we first propose a desynchronization attack that succeeds with probability almost 1, which improves upon the 0.25 given in a previous analysis by We also show that the bad properties of the proposed permutation function can be exploited to disclose several bits of the tag's secret rather than just 1bit as previously shown by , which increases the power of a traceability attack. Finally, we show how to extend the aforementioned attack to run a full disclosure attack, which requires to eavesdrop less protocol runs than the proposed attack by i.e., 192<<2 30. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Recently, Tewari and Gupta proposed a ultra-lightweight mutual authentication protocol in IoT environments for RFID tags. Their protocol aims to provide secure communication with least cost in both storage and computation. Unfortunately, in this paper, we exploit the vulnerability of this protocol. In this attack, an attacker can obtain the key shared between a back-end database server and a tag. We also explore the possibility in patching the system with some modifications. One of the key problems in RFID is security and privacy. The implementation of authentication protocols is a flexible and effective way to solve this problem. This letter proposes a new ultralightweight RFID authentication protocol with permutation (RAPP). RAPP avoids using unbalanced OR and AND operations and introduces a new operation named permutation. The tags only involve three operations: bitwise XOR, left rotation and permutation. In addition, unlike other existing ultralightweight protocols, the last messages exchanged in RAPP are sent by the reader so as to resist de-synchronization attacks. Security analysis shows that RAPP achieves the functionalities of the authentication protocol and is resistant to various attacks. Performance evaluation illustrates that RAPP uses fewer resources on tags in terms of computation operation, storage requirement and communication cost. RAPP (RFID Authentication Protocol with Permutation) is a recently proposed and efficient ultralightweight authentication protocol. Although it maintains the structure of the other existing ultralightweight protocols, the operation used in it is totally different due to the use of new introduced data dependent permutations and avoidance of modular arithmetic operations and biased logical operations such as AND and OR. The designers of RAPP claimed that this protocol resists against desynchronization attacks since the last messages of the protocol is sent by the reader and not by the tag. This letter challenges this assumption and shows that RAPP is vulnerable against desynchronization attack. This attack has a reasonable probability of success and is effective whether Hamming weight-based or modular-based rotations are used by the protocol.