It is a common narrative that blockchains are immutable and so it is technically impossible to erase data stored on them. For legal and ethical reasons, however, individuals and organizations might be compelled to erase locally stored data, be it encoded on a blockchain or not. The common assumption for blockchain networks like Bitcoin is that forcing nodes to erase data contained on the blockchain is equal to permanently restricting them from participating in the system in a full-node role. Challenging this belief, in this paper, we propose and demonstrate a pragmatic approach towards functionality-preserving local erasure (FPLE). FPLE enables full nodes to erase infringing or undesirable data while continuing to store and validate most of the blockchain. We describe a general FPLE approach for UTXO-based (i.e., Bitcoin-like) cryptocurrencies and present a lightweight proof-of-concept tool for safely erasing transaction data from the local storage of Bitcoin Core nodes. Erasing nodes continue to operate in tune with the network even when erased transaction outputs become relevant for validating subsequent blocks. Using only our basic proof-of-concept implementation, we are already able to safely comply with a significantly larger range of erasure requests than, to the best of our knowledge, any other full node operator so far.
@cite_9 , discuss various approaches for preventing the insertion of arbitrary, potentially unwanted data onto cryptocurrency blockchains. Their proposals include content detectors, which filter transactions based on heuristics and knowledge about commonly used data insertion methods, as well as protocol modifications that would greatly increase the costs of including arbitrary data. Approaches along these lines have also surfaced in the non-academic cryptocurrency community See, e. ,g.: http: comments.gmane.org gmane.comp.bitcoin.devel 1996 . Approaches for avoiding the insertion of unwanted data depend on global adoption, for an effective filtering, and in some cases also on protocol changes when applied to existing networks. In contrast, FPLE requires only a node-local decision and is in this way both more practical and enables the incorporation of a wider range of individual preferences and constraints. Lastly, as can be seen in related application domains such as malware detection or digital rights protection via upload filtering, content-based filtering is never completely circumvention-proof. Once something "slips through", an erasure possibility again becomes necessary.
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Since the introduction of Bitcoin in 2008, blockchain systems have seen an enormous increase in adoption. By providing a persistent, distributed, and append-only ledger, blockchains enable numerous applications such as distributed consensus, robustness against equivocation, and smart contracts. However, recent studies show that blockchain systems such as Bitcoin can be (mis) used to store arbitrary content. This has already been used to store arguably objectionable content on Bitcoin's blockchain. Already single instances of clearly objectionable or even illegal content can put the whole system at risk by making its node operators culpable. To overcome this imminent risk, we survey and discuss the design space of countermeasures against the insertion of such objectionable content. Our analysis shows a wide spectrum of potential countermeasures, which are often combinable for increased efficiency. First, we investigate special-purpose content detectors as an ad hoc mitigation. As they turn out to be easily evadable, we also investigate content-agnostic countermeasures. We find that mandatory minimum fees as well as mitigation of transaction manipulability via identifier commitments significantly raise the bar for inserting harmful content into a blockchain. In this paper, online detection of false data injection attacks and denial of service attacks in the smart grid is studied. The system is modeled as a discrete-time linear dynamic system and state estimation is performed using the Kalman filter. The generalized cumulative sum algorithm is employed for quickest detection of the cyber-attacks. Detectors are proposed in both centralized and distributed settings. The proposed detectors are robust to time-varying states, attacks, and set of attacked meters. Online estimates of the unknown attack variables are provided, that can be crucial for a quick system recovery. In the distributed setting, due to bandwidth constraints, local centers can only transmit quantized messages to the global center, and a novel event-based sampling scheme called level-crossing sampling with hysteresis is proposed that is shown to exhibit significant advantages compared with the conventional uniform-in-time sampling scheme. Moreover, a distributed dynamic state estimator is proposed based on information filters. Numerical examples illustrate the fast and accurate response of the proposed detectors in detecting both structured and random attacks and their advantages over existing methods. There has been increasing interest in the problem of building accurate data mining models over aggregate data, while protecting privacy at the level of individual records. One approach for this problem is to randomize the values in individual records, and only disclose the randomized values. The model is then built over the randomized data, after first compensating for the randomization (at the aggregate level). This approach is potentially vulnerable to privacy breaches: based on the distribution of the data, one may be able to learn with high confidence that some of the randomized records satisfy a specified property, even though privacy is preserved on average.In this paper, we present a new formulation of privacy breaches, together with a methodology, "amplification", for limiting them. Unlike earlier approaches, amplification makes it is possible to guarantee limits on privacy breaches without any knowledge of the distribution of the original data. We instantiate this methodology for the problem of mining association rules, and modify the algorithm from [9] to limit privacy breaches without knowledge of the data distribution. Next, we address the problem that the amount of randomization required to avoid privacy breaches (when mining association rules) results in very long transactions. By using pseudorandom generators and carefully choosing seeds such that the desired items from the original transaction are present in the randomized transaction, we can send just the seed instead of the transaction, resulting in a dramatic drop in communication and storage cost. Finally, we define new information measures that take privacy breaches into account when quantifying the amount of privacy preserved by randomization. It is well known that at low-bit-rate block discrete cosine transform compressed image exhibits visually annoying blocking and ringing artifacts. In this paper, we propose a noniterative, wavelet-based deblocking algorithm to reduce both types of artifacts. The algorithm exploits the fact that block discontinuities are constrained by the dc quantization interval of the quantization table, as well as the behavior of wavelet modulus maxima evolution across wavelet scales to derive appropriate threshold maps at different wavelet scales. Since ringing artifacts occur near strong edges, which can be located either along block boundaries or within blocks, suppression of block discontinuities does not always reduce ringing artifacts. By exploiting the behavior of ringing artifacts in the wavelet domain, we propose a simple yet effective method for the suppression of such artifacts. The proposed algorithm can suppress both block discontinuities and ringing artifacts effectively while preserving true edges and textural information. Simulation results and extensive comparative study with both iterative and noniterative methods reported in the literature have shown the effectiveness of our algorithm.