The operation of the power grid is becoming more stressed, due to the addition of new large loads represented by electric vehicles (EVs) and a more intermittent supply due to the incorporation of renewable sources. As a consequence, the coordination and control of projected EV demand in a network of fast charging stations becomes a critical and challenging problem. In this paper, we introduce a game theoretic based decentralized control mechanism to alleviate negative impacts from the EV demand. The proposed mechanism takes into consideration the nonuniform spatial distribution of EVs that induces uneven power demand at each charging facility, and aims to: 1) avoid straining grid resources by offering price incentives, so that customers accept being routed to less busy stations; 2) maximize total revenue by serving more customers with the same amount of grid resources; and 3) provide charging service to customers with a certain level of quality-of-service (QoS), the latter defined as the long term customer blocking probability. We examine three scenarios of increased complexity that gradually approximate real world settings. The obtained results show that the proposed framework leads to substantial performance improvements in terms of the aforementioned goals when compared to current state of affairs.
In decentralized control, individuals choose their own service patterns based on cost minimization principles. In this case, utilities aim to shape demand profiles by incentivizing customers via pricing-based control mechanisms. The work presented in @cite_8 proposes a game theoretic framework to optimally control the demand of a large scale stationary EV population. Further, the authors of decentralized5 and @cite_16 present decentralized control mechanisms for EVs and a detailed survey can be found in @cite_10 . Note that decentralized control eliminates the need for advanced monitoring tools, whereas centralized control leads to better utilization of charging resources.
@cite_16 @cite_10 @cite_8
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The paper develops and illustrates a novel decentralized charging control algorithm for large populations of plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs). The proposed algorithm is an application of the so-called Nash certainty equivalence principle (or mean-field games.) The control scheme seeks to achieve social optimality by establishing a PEV charging schedule that fills the overnight demand valley. The paper discusses implementation issues and computational complexity, and illustrates concepts with various numerical examples. Efficient and reliable demand side management techniques for community charging of plug-in hybrid electrical vehicles (PHEVs) and plug-in electrical vehicles (PEVs) are needed, as large numbers of these vehicles are being introduced to the power grid. To avoid overloads and maximize customer preferences in terms of time and cost of charging, a constrained nonlinear optimization problem can be formulated. In this paper, we have developed a novel cooperative distributed algorithm for charging control of PHEVs PEVs that solves the constrained nonlinear optimization problem using Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions and consensus networks in a distributed fashion. In our design, the global optimal power allocation under all local and global constraints is reached through peer-to-peer coordination of charging stations. Therefore, the need for a central control unit is eliminated. In this way, single-node congestion is avoided when the size of the problem is increased and the system gains robustness against single-link node failures. Furthermore, via Monte Carlo simulations, we have demonstrated that the proposed distributed method is scalable with the number of charging points and returns solutions, which are comparable to centralized optimization algorithms with a maximum of 2 sub-optimality. Thus, the main advantages of our approach are eliminating the need for a central energy management coordination unit, gaining robustness against single-link node failures, and being scalable in terms of single-node computations. While electric vehicles (EVs) are expected to provide environmental and economical benefit, judicious coordination of EV charging is necessary to prevent overloading of the distribution grid. Leveraging the smart grid infrastructure, the utility company can adjust the electricity price intelligently for individual customers to elicit desirable load curves. In this context, this paper addresses the problem of predicting the EV charging behavior of the consumers at different prices, which is a prerequisite for optimal price adjustment. The dependencies on price responsiveness among consumers are captured by a conditional random field (CRF) model. To account for temporal dynamics potentially in a strategic setting, the framework of online convex optimization is adopted to develop an efficient online algorithm for tracking the CRF parameters. The proposed model is then used as an input to a stochastic profit maximization module for real-time price setting. Numerical tests using simulated and semi-real data verify the effectiveness of the proposed approach. Smart grids (SG) energy management system and electric vehicle (EV) have gained considerable reputation in recent years. This has been enabled by the high growth of EVs on roads; however, this may lead to a significant impact on the power grids. In order to keep EVs far from causing peaks in power demand and to manage building energy during the day, it is important to perform an intelligent scheduling for EVs charging and discharging service and buildings areas by including different metrics, such as real-time price and demand–supply curve. In this paper, we propose a real-time dynamic pricing model for EVs charging and discharging service and building energy management, in order to reduce the peak loads. Our proposed approach uses a decentralized cloud computing architecture based on software define networking (SDN) technology and network function virtualization (NFV). We aim to schedule user's requests in a real-time way and to supervise communications between microgrids controllers, SG and user entities (i.e., EVs, electric vehicles public supply stations, advance metering infrastructure, smart meters, etc.). We formulate the problem as a linear optimization problem for EV and a global optimization problem for all microgrids. We solve the problems by using different decentralized decision algorithms. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that proposes a pricing model based on decentralized Cloud-SDN architecture in order to solve all the aforementioned issues. The extensive simulations and comparisons with related works proved that our proposed pricing model optimizes the energy load during peak hours, maximizes EVs utility, and maintains the microgrid stability. The simulation is based on real electric load of the city of Toronto.