Online game involves a very large number of users who are interconnected and interact with each other via the Internet. We studied the characteristics of exchanging virtual goods with real money through processes called "real money trading (RMT)." This exchange might influence online game user behaviors and cause damage to the reputation of game companies. We examined in-game transactions to reveal RMT by constructing a social graph of virtual goods exchanges in an online game and identifying network communities of users. We analyzed approximately 6,000,000 transactions in a popular online game and inferred RMT transactions by comparing the RMT transactions crawled from an out-game market. Our findings are summarized as follows: (1) the size of the RMT market could be approximately estimated; (2) professional RMT providers typically form a specific network structure (either star-shape or chain) in the trading network, which can be used as a clue for tracing RMT transactions; and (3) the observed RMT market has evolved over time into a monopolized market with a small number of large-sized virtual goods providers.
The study about RMT was originally initiated in the field of Economics. Huhh @cite_13 viewed RMT in massively multi-online game in the perspective of network externality. Huhh pointed out that RMT has contributed to the commercial success of online games. Heeks @cite_3 analyzed GFG and RMT in a macroeconomic point. According to @cite_3 , RMT is essential to provide a channel to transfer assets between the virtual and real world.
@cite_13 @cite_3
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This paper is to provide a theoretical investigation on real-money trading (RMT) observed frequently in online games. To complement former studies focused much on irregularity of transaction itself, economic incentives behind RMT are modeled and identified by reconsidering related economic studies. First, RMT is analyzed by economic incentives of online game players. Second, economic impacts of RMT are explored in the context of network externalities. Third, welfare implication with respect to game servicing firm and players is addressed in a dynamic context. Fourth, two issues of RMT, gold farming and micro-payment, are shortly addressed as mini-cases for the analysis. Many online games have their own ecosystems, where players can purchase in-game assets using game money. Players can obtain game money through active participation or “real money trading” through official channels: converting real money into game money. The unofficial market for real money trading gave rise to gold farming groups (GFGs), a phenomenon with serious impact in the cyber and real worlds. GFGs in massively multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPGs) are some of the most interesting underground cyber economies because of the massive nature of the game. To detect GFGs, there have been various studies using behavioral traits. However, they can only detect gold farmers, not entire GFGs with internal hierarchies. Even worse, GFGs continuously develop techniques to hide, such as forming front organizations, concealing cyber-money, and changing trade patterns when online game service providers ban GFGs. In this paper, we analyze the characteristics of the ecosystem of a large-scale MMORPG, and devise a method for detecting GFGs. We build a graph that characterizes virtual economy transactions, and trace abnormal trades and activities. We derive features from the trading graph and physical networks used by GFGs to identify them in their entirety. Using their structure, we provide recommendations to defend effectively against GFGs while not affecting the existing virtual ecosystem. Game theoretic models have found widespread use in the analysis and design of radio resource management algorithms for a wide variety of systems such as cellular, ad hoc and sensor networks. The fundamental principle behind such models and much of game theory has been the reliance on expected utility theory (EUT). In this paper, we consider a simple wireless random access game where instead of following the precepts of EUT, the players follow the precepts of Prospect Theory (PT), a theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky to explain real-life decision making that often deviates from the behavior expected under EUT. Specifically, we consider a game where selfish players adjust their transmission probabilities over a collision channel according to rewards received for successful transmission while incurring energy and delay costs. We compare and contrast the Nash equilibria achieved under both EUT and PT and highlight the differences in them. We consider the restless multi-armed bandit (RMAB) problem with unknown dynamics. At each time, a player chooses K out of N (N > K) arms to play. The state of each arm determines the reward when the arm is played and transits according to Markovian rules no matter the arm is engaged or passive. The Markovian dynamics of the arms are unknown to the player. The objective is to maximize the long-term expected reward by designing an optimal arm selection policy. The performance of a policy is measured by regret, defined as the reward loss with respect to the case where the player knows which K arms are the most rewarding and always plays these K best arms. We construct a policy, referred to as Restless Upper Confidence Bound (RUCB), that achieves a regret with logarithmic order of time when an arbitrary nontrivial bound on certain system parameters is known. When no knowledge about the system is available, we extend the RUCB policy to achieve a regret arbitrarily close to the logarithmic order. In both cases, the system achieves the maximum average reward offered by the K best arms. Potential applications of these results include cognitive radio networks, opportunistic communications in unknown fading environments, and financial investment.