We investigate the problem of multi-agent coordination under rationality constraints. Specifically, role allocation, task assignment, resource allocation, etc. Inspired by human behavior, we propose a framework (CA^3NONY) that enables fast convergence to efficient and fair allocations based on a simple convention of courtesy. We prove that following such convention induces a strategy which constitutes an @math -subgame-perfect equilibrium of the repeated allocation game with discounting. Simulation results highlight the effectiveness of CA^3NONY as compared to state-of-the-art bandit algorithms, since it achieves more than two orders of magnitude faster convergence, higher efficiency, fairness, and average payoff.
In ad-hoc multi-agent (anti-)coordination the goal is to design autonomous agents that achieve high flexibility and efficiency in a setting that admits no prior coordination between the participants @cite_25 . Typical scenarios include the use of Monte Carlo algorithms @cite_8 , Bayesian learning @cite_26 , or bandit algorithms @cite_35 , @cite_19 . Traditionally, pure ad-hoc approaches suffer from slow learning @cite_1 , which makes pure ad-hoc coordination a very ambitious goal for real-life applications. In this paper we propose a middle-ground approach. Inspired by human ad-hoc coordination, we incorporate prior knowledge in the form of simple . The coordination can still be considered ad-hoc as it is not pre-programmed, rather it involves learning. This allows for faster convergence compared to pure ad-hoc approaches.
@cite_35 @cite_26 @cite_8 @cite_1 @cite_19 @cite_25
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The ad hoc coordination problem is to design an autonomous agent which is able to achieve optimal flexibility and efficiency in a multiagent system with no mechanisms for prior coordination. We conceptualise this problem formally using a game-theoretic model, called the stochastic Bayesian game, in which the behaviour of a player is determined by its private information, or type. Based on this model, we derive a solution, called Harsanyi-Bellman Ad Hoc Coordination (HBA), which utilises the concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium in a planning procedure to find optimal actions in the sense of Bellman optimal control. We evaluate HBA in a multiagent logistics domain called level-based foraging, showing that it achieves higher flexibility and efficiency than several alternative algorithms. We also report on a human-machine experiment at a public science exhibition in which the human participants played repeated Prisoner's Dilemma and Rock-Paper-Scissors against HBA and alternative algorithms, showing that HBA achieves equal efficiency and a significantly higher welfare and winning rate. As autonomous agents proliferate in the real world, both in software and robotic settings, they will increasingly need to band together for cooperative activities with previously unfamiliar teammates. In such ad hoc team settings, team strategies cannot be developed a priori. Rather, an agent must be prepared to cooperate with many types of teammates: it must collaborate without pre-coordination. This paper challenges the AI community to develop theory and to implement prototypes of ad hoc team agents. It defines the concept of ad hoc team agents, specifies an evaluation paradigm, and provides examples of possible theoretical and empirical approaches to challenge. The goal is to encourage progress towards this ambitious, newly realistic, and increasingly important research goal. The concept of creating autonomous agents capable of exhibiting ad hoc teamwork was recently introduced as a challenge to the AI, and specifically to the multiagent systems community. An agent capable of ad hoc teamwork is one that can effectively cooperate with multiple potential teammates on a set of collaborative tasks. Previous research has investigated theoretically optimal ad hoc teamwork strategies in restrictive settings. This paper presents the first empirical study of ad hoc teamwork in a more open, complex teamwork domain. Specifically, we evaluate a range of effective algorithms for on-line behavior generation on the part of a single ad hoc team agent that must collaborate with a range of possible teammates in the pursuit domain. The paper presents a knowledge representation formalism, in the form of a high-level Action Description Language (ADL) for multi-agent systems, where autonomous agents reason and act in a shared environment. Agents are autonomously pursuing individual goals, but are capable of interacting through a shared knowledge repository. In their interactions through shared portions of the world, the agents deal with problems of synchronization and concurrency; the action language allows the description of strategies to ensure a consistent global execution of the agents’ autonomously derived plans. A distributed planning problem is formalized by providing the declarative specications of the portion of the problem pertaining a single agent. Each of these specications is executable by a stand-alone CLP-based planner. The coordination among agents exploits a Linda infrastructure. The proposal is validated in a prototype implementation developed in SICStus Prolog. To appear in Theory and Practice of Logic Programming (TPLP). Research partially funded by GNCS-INdAM projects, MUR-PRIN: Innovative and multidisciplinary approaches for constraint and preference reasoning project; NSF grants IIS-0812267 and HRD-0420407; and grants 2009.010.0336 and 2010.011.0403.