In this paper, we propose and evaluate the application of unsupervised machine learning to anomaly detection for a Cyber-Physical System (CPS). We compare two methods: Deep Neural Networks (DNN) adapted to time series data generated by a CPS, and one-class Support Vector Machines (SVM). These methods are evaluated against data from the Secure Water Treatment (SWaT) testbed, a scaled-down but fully operational raw water purification plant. For both methods, we first train detectors using a log generated by SWaT operating under normal conditions. Then, we evaluate the performance of both methods using a log generated by SWaT operating under 36 different attack scenarios. We find that our DNN generates fewer false positives than our one-class SVM while our SVM detects slightly more anomalies. Overall, our DNN has a slightly better F measure than our SVM. We discuss the characteristics of the DNN and one-class SVM used in this experiment, and compare the advantages and disadvantages of the two methods.
There is a large body of work on simulation and model-based anomaly detection for CPSs, e.g. @cite_11 @cite_5 @cite_7 @cite_0 @cite_4 @cite_9 @cite_17 . However, these approaches require prior knowledge of the system's configuration, in addition to operation logs.
@cite_4 @cite_7 @cite_9 @cite_17 @cite_0 @cite_5 @cite_11
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Today's Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are large, complex, and affixed with networked sensors and actuators that are targets for cyber-attacks. Conventional detection techniques are unable to deal with the increasingly dynamic and complex nature of the CPSs. On the other hand, the networked sensors and actuators generate large amounts of data streams that can be continuously monitored for intrusion events. Unsupervised machine learning techniques can be used to model the system behaviour and classify deviant behaviours as possible attacks. In this work, we proposed a novel Generative Adversarial Networks-based Anomaly Detection (GAN-AD) method for such complex networked CPSs. We used LSTM-RNN in our GAN to capture the distribution of the multivariate time series of the sensors and actuators under normal working conditions of a CPS. Instead of treating each sensor's and actuator's time series independently, we model the time series of multiple sensors and actuators in the CPS concurrently to take into account of potential latent interactions between them. To exploit both the generator and the discriminator of our GAN, we deployed the GAN-trained discriminator together with the residuals between generator-reconstructed data and the actual samples to detect possible anomalies in the complex CPS. We used our GAN-AD to distinguish abnormal attacked situations from normal working conditions for a complex six-stage Secure Water Treatment (SWaT) system. Experimental results showed that the proposed strategy is effective in identifying anomalies caused by various attacks with high detection rate and low false positive rate as compared to existing methods. Detecting anomalies of a cyber physical system (CPS), which is a complex system consisting of both physical and software parts, is important because a CPS often operates autonomously in an unpredictable environment. However, because of the ever-changing nature and lack of a precise model for a CPS, detecting anomalies is still a challenging task. To address this problem, we propose applying an outlier detection method to a CPS log. By using a log obtained from an actual aquarium management system, we evaluated the effectiveness of our proposed method by analyzing outliers that it detected. By investigating the outliers with the developer of the system, we confirmed that some outliers indicate actual faults in the system. For example, our method detected failures of mutual exclusion in the control system that were unknown to the developer. Our method also detected transient losses of functionalities and unexpected reboots. On the other hand, our method did not detect anomalies that were too many and similar. In addition, our method reported rare but unproblematic concurrent combinations of operations as anomalies. Thus, our approach is effective at finding anomalies, but there is still room for improvement. Anomaly detection plays an important role in managementof modern large-scale distributed systems. Logs, whichrecord system runtime information, are widely used for anomalydetection. Traditionally, developers (or operators) often inspectthe logs manually with keyword search and rule matching. Theincreasing scale and complexity of modern systems, however, make the volume of logs explode, which renders the infeasibilityof manual inspection. To reduce manual effort, many anomalydetection methods based on automated log analysis are proposed. However, developers may still have no idea which anomalydetection methods they should adopt, because there is a lackof a review and comparison among these anomaly detectionmethods. Moreover, even if developers decide to employ ananomaly detection method, re-implementation requires a nontrivialeffort. To address these problems, we provide a detailedreview and evaluation of six state-of-the-art log-based anomalydetection methods, including three supervised methods and threeunsupervised methods, and also release an open-source toolkitallowing ease of reuse. These methods have been evaluated ontwo publicly-available production log datasets, with a total of15,923,592 log messages and 365,298 anomaly instances. Webelieve that our work, with the evaluation results as well asthe corresponding findings, can provide guidelines for adoptionof these methods and provide references for future development. In this paper, we propose and evaluate the application of unsupervised machine learning to anomaly detection for a Cyber-Physical System (CPS). We compare two methods: Deep Neural Networks (DNN) adapted to time series data generated by a CPS, and one-class Support Vector Machines (SVM). These methods are evaluated against data from the Secure Water Treatment (SWaT) testbed, a scaled-down but fully operational raw water purification plant. For both methods, we first train detectors using a log generated by SWaT operating under normal conditions. Then, we evaluate the performance of both methods using a log generated by SWaT operating under 36 different attack scenarios. We find that our DNN generates fewer false positives than our one-class SVM while our SVM detects slightly more anomalies. Overall, our DNN has a slightly better F measure than our SVM. We discuss the characteristics of the DNN and one-class SVM used in this experiment, and compare the advantages and disadvantages of the two methods.