This paper presents a novel technique for the automatic type identification of arbitrary memory objects from a memory dump. Our motivating application is debugging memory corruption problems in optimized, production systems — a problem domain largely unserved by extant methodologies. We describe our algorithm as applicable to any typed language, and we discuss it with respect to the formidable obstacles posed by C. We describe the heuristics that we have developed to overcome these difficulties and achieve effective type identification on C-based systems. We further describe the implementation of our heuristics on one Cbased system — the Solaris operating system kernel — and describe the extensions that we have added to the Solaris postmortem debugger to allow for postmortem type identification. We show that our implementation yields a sufficiently high rate of type identification to be useful for debugging memory corruption problems. Finally, we discuss some of the novel automated debugging mechanisms that can be layered upon postmortem type identification.
The problem of debugging memory corruption problems in production was explicitly identified by Patil and Fischer in @cite_2 , in which they describe using idle processors to absorb their technique's substantial performance impact. Unfortunately, this is not practical in a general-purpose system: idle processors cannot be relied upon to be available for extraneous processing. Indeed, in performance critical systems any performance impact is often unacceptable.
@cite_2
2005139304 2098809490 2091921136 2233814931
By studying the behavior of several programs that crash due to memory errors, we observed that locating the errors can be challenging because significant propagation of corrupt memory values can occur prior to the point of the crash. In this article, we present an automated approach for locating memory errors in the presence of memory corruption propagation. Our approach leverages the information revealed by a program crash: when a crash occurs, this reveals a subset of the memory corruption that exists in the execution. By suppressing (nullifying) the effect of this known corruption during execution, the crash is avoided and any remaining (hidden) corruption may then be exposed by subsequent crashes. The newly exposed corruption can then be suppressed in turn. By iterating this process until no further crashes occur, the first point of memory corruption—and the likely root cause of the program failure—can be identified. However, this iterative approach may terminate prematurely, since programs may not crash even when memory corruption is present during execution. To address this, we show how crashes can be exposed in an execution by manipulating the relative ordering of particular variables within memory. By revealing crashes through this variable re-ordering, the effectiveness and applicability of the execution suppression approach can be improved. We describe a set of experiments illustrating the effectiveness of our approach in consistently and precisely identifying the first points of memory corruption in executions that fail due to memory errors. We also discuss a baseline software implementation of execution suppression that incurs an average overhead of 7.2x, and describe how to reduce this overhead to 1.8x through hardware support. Memory leaks and memory corruption are two major forms of software bugs that severely threaten system availability and security. According to the US-CERT vulnerability notes database, 68 of all reported vulnerabilities in 2003 were caused by memory leaks or memory corruption. Dynamic monitoring tools, such as the state-of-the-art Purify, are commonly used to detect memory leaks and memory corruption. However, most of these tools suffer from high overhead, with up to a 20 times slowdown, making them infeasible to be used for production-runs. This paper proposes a tool called SafeMem to detect memory leaks and memory corruption on-the-fly during production-runs. This tool does not rely on any new hardware support. Instead, it makes a novel use of existing ECC memory technology and exploits intelligent dynamic memory usage behavior analysis to detect memory leaks and corruption. We have evaluated SafeMem with seven real-world applications that contain memory leak or memory corruption bugs. SafeMem detects all tested bugs with low overhead (only 1.6 -14.4 ), 2-3 orders of magnitudes smaller than Purify. Our results also show that ECC-protection is effective in pruning false positives for memory leak detection, and in reducing the amount of memory waste (by a factor of 64-74) used for memory monitoring in memory corruption detection compared to page-protection. In this paper, we consider processors which provide an idle instruction to the user for powering down processor units which are not required during portions of program execution. We describe algorithms which can be implemented in an energy-aware compiler to make efficient use of such an instruction. These algorithms are based on program static analysis and a combinatorial optimization formulation of the problem. We assume as input an assembly language program of the processor in question. The problem is to insert the idle instruction at different places in the assembly language program such that energy saving is maximized and the execution time of the resulting program is not increased beyond a user-specified value. Memory errors are a common cause of incorrect software execution and security vulnerabilities. We have developed two new techniques that help software continue to execute successfully through memory errors: failure-oblivious computing and boundless memory blocks. The foundation of both techniques is a compiler that generates code that checks accesses via pointers to detect out of bounds accesses. Instead of terminating or throwing an exception, the generated code takes another action that keeps the program executing without memory corruption. Failure-oblivious code simply discards invalid writes and manufactures values to return for invalid reads, enabling the program to continue its normal execution path. Code that implements boundless memory blocks stores invalid writes away in a hash table to return as the values for corresponding out of bounds reads. The net effect is to (conceptually) give each allocated memory block unbounded size and to eliminate out of bounds accesses as a programming error. We have implemented both techniques and acquired several widely used open source servers (Apache, Sendmail, Pine, Mutt, and Midnight Commander). With standard compilers, all of these servers are vulnerable to buffer overflow attacks as documented at security tracking web sites. Both failure-oblivious computing and boundless memory blocks eliminate these security vulnerabilities (as well as other memory errors). Our results show that our compiler enables the servers to execute successfully through buffer overflow attacks to continue to correctly service user requests without security vulnerabilities.