We develop a model of abduction in abstract argumentation, where changes to an argumentation framework act as hypotheses to explain the support of an observation. We present dialogical proof theories for the main decision problems (i.e., finding hypothe- ses that explain skeptical credulous support) and we show that our model can be instantiated on the basis of abductive logic programs.
We already discussed Sakama's @cite_1 model of abduction in argumentation and mentioned some differences. Our approach is more general because we consider a hypothesis to be a change to the AF that is applied as a whole, instead of a set of independently selectable abducible arguments. On the other hand, Sakama's method supports a larger range semantics, including (semi-)stable and skeptical preferred semantics. Furthermore, Sakama also considers observations leading to rejection of arguments, which we do not.
@cite_1
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Horn clause logic programming can be extended to include abduction with integrity constraints. In the resulting extension of logic programming, negation by failure can be simulated by making negative conditions abducible and by imposing appropriate denials and disjunctions as integrity constraints. This gives an alternative semantics for negation by failure, which generalises the stable model semantics of negation by failure. The abductive extension of logic programming extends negation by failure in three ways: (1) computation can be perfonned in alternative minimal models, (2) positive as well as negative conditions can be made abducible, and (3) other integrity constraints can also be accommodated. * This paper was written while the first author was at Imperial College. 235 Introduction The tenn "abduction" was introduced by the philosopher Charles Peirce [1931] to refer to a particular kind of hypothetical reasoning. In the simplest case, it has the fonn: From A and A fB infer B as a possible "explanation" of A. Abduction has been given prominence in Charniak and McDennot's [1985] "Introduction to Artificial Intelligence", where it has been applied to expert systems and story comprehension. Independently, several authors have developed deductive techniques to drive the generation of abductive hypotheses. Cox and Pietrzykowski [1986] construct hypotheses from the "dead ends" of linear resolution proofs. Finger and Genesereth [1985] generate "deductive solutions to design problems" using the "residue" left behind in resolution proofs. Poole, Goebel and Aleliunas [1987] also use linear resolution to generate hypotheses. All impose the restriction that hypotheses should be consistent with the "knowledge base". Abduction is a fonn of non-monotonic reasoning, because hypotheses which are consistent with one state of a knowledge base may become inconSistent when new knowledge is added. Poole [1988] argues that abduction is preferable to noh-monotonic logics for default reasoning. In this view, defaults are hypotheses fonnulated within classical logic rather than conclusions derived withln some fonn of non-monotonic logic. The similarity between abduction and default reasoning was also pointed out in [Kowalski, 1979]. In this paper we show how abduction can be integrated with logic programming, and we concentrate on the use of abduction to generalise negation by failure. Conditional Answers Compared with Abduction In the simplest case, a logic program consists of a set of Horn Clauses, which are used backward to_reduce goals to sub goals. The initial goal is solved when there are no subgollls left; This paper studies an abduction problem in formal argumentation frameworks. Given an argument, an agent verifies whether the argument is justified or not in its argumentation framework. If the argument is not justified, the agent seeks conditions to explain the argument in its argumentation framework. We formulate such abductive reasoning in argumentation semantics and provide its computation in logic programming. Next we apply abduction in argumentation frameworks to reasoning by players in debate games. In debate games, two players have their own argumentation frameworks and each player builds claims to refute the opponent. A player may provide false or inaccurate arguments as a tactic to win the game. We show that abduction is used not only for seeking counter-claims but also for building dishonest claims in debate games. We propose a model of abduction based on the revision of the epistemic state of an agent. Explanations must be sufficient to induce belief in the sentence to be explained (for instance, some observation), or ensure its consistency with other beliefs, in a manner that adequately accounts for factual and hypothetical sentences. Our model will generate explanations that nonmonotonically predict an observation, thus generalizing most current accounts, which require some deductive relationship between explanation and observation. It also provides a natural preference ordering on explanations, defined in terms of normality or plausibility. To illustrate the generality of our approach, we reconstruct two of the key paradigms for model-based diagnosis, abductive and consistency-based diagnosis, within our framework. This reconstruction provides an alternative semantics for both and extends these systems to accommodate our predictive explanations and semantic preferences on explanations. It also illustrates how more general information can be incorporated in a principled manner. We argue that Abduction is useful for the problem of Knowledge Assimilation and use it to study the problems of Belief Revision and Truth Maintenance (TM) associated with the task of assimilating a series of observations Q1,...Qn. The close connection between Abduction and TM shown in [Reiter&de Kleer87] is explored further to provide a non-monotonic extension of ATMS that incorporates a dependency-directed backtracking mechanism thus combining the capabilities of ATMS and Doyle's TMS. This TM system has a well-defined semantics inherited from the semantics for abduction which is defined through a generalization of stable models based on autoepistemic logic.