If you recommend a product to me and I buy it, how much should you be paid by the seller? And if your sole interest is to maximize the amount paid to you by the seller for a sequence of recommendations, how should you recommend optimally if I become more inclined to ignore you with each irrelevant recommendation you make? Finding an answer to these questions is a key challenge in all forms of marketing that rely on and explore social ties; ranging from personal recommendations to viral marketing. In the first part of this paper, we show that there can be no pricing mechanism that is “truthful” with respect to the seller, and we use solution concepts from coalitional game theory, namely the Core, the Shapley Value, and the Nash Bargaining Solution, to derive provably “fair” prices for settings with one or multiple recommenders. We then investigate pricing mechanisms for the setting where recommenders have different “purchase arguments”. Here we show that it might be beneficial for the recommenders to withhold some of their arguments, unless anonymity-proof solution concepts, such as the anonymity-proof Shapley value, are used. In the second part of this paper, we analyze the setting where the recommendee loses trust in the recommender for each irrelevant recommendation. Here we prove that even if the recommendee regains her initial trust on each successful recommendation, the expected total profit the recommender can make over an infinite period is bounded. This can only be overcome when the recommendee also incrementally regains trust during periods without any recommendation. Here, we see an interesting connection to “banner blindness”, suggesting that showing fewer ads can lead to a higher long-term profit.
More generally, in the second part we look at a model where the recommendee loses trust in the recommender, i.e. for each unsuccessful recommendation she becomes less and less inclined to listen to any further suggestion. This is most likely to appear when the recommendee has the feeling that the recommendations are dishonest''. How honest recommendations can be ensured when there are several recommenders is studied in @cite_22 . The approach suggested by the authors involves evaluating ranking recommenders based on the rating given to their recommended items by other people. This motivates recommenders to give good recommendations in a similar way that Ebay's rating system gives incentives for both buyers and sellers to behave''. This approach, however, requires a public market where potential buyers can look for recommendations. This is not the setting of personal recommendations considered here.
@cite_22
2015290529 2093219534 1224564842 1632591701
Most of existing e-commerce recommender systems aim to recommend the right product to a user, based on whether the user is likely to purchase or like a product. On the other hand, the effectiveness of recommendations also depends on the time of the recommendation. Let us take a user who just purchased a laptop as an example. She may purchase a replacement battery in 2 years (assuming that the laptop's original battery often fails to work around that time) and purchase a new laptop in another 2 years. In this case, it is not a good idea to recommend a new laptop or a replacement battery right after the user purchased the new laptop. It could hurt the user's satisfaction of the recommender system if she receives a potentially right product recommendation at the wrong time. We argue that a system should not only recommend the most relevant item, but also recommend at the right time. This paper studies the new problem: how to recommend the right product at the right time? We adapt the proportional hazards modeling approach in survival analysis to the recommendation research field and propose a new opportunity model to explicitly incorporate time in an e-commerce recommender system. The new model estimates the joint probability of a user making a follow-up purchase of a particular product at a particular time. This joint purchase probability can be leveraged by recommender systems in various scenarios, including the zero-query pull-based recommendation scenario (e.g. recommendation on an e-commerce web site) and a proactive push-based promotion scenario (e.g. email or text message based marketing). We evaluate the opportunity modeling approach with multiple metrics. Experimental results on a data collected by a real-world e-commerce website(shop.com) show that it can predict a user's follow-up purchase behavior at a particular time with descent accuracy. In addition, the opportunity model significantly improves the conversion rate in pull-based systems and the user satisfaction utility in push-based systems. As an indispensable technique in the field of Information Filtering, Recommender System has been well studied and developed both in academia and in industry recently. However, most of current recommender systems suffer the following problems: (1) The large-scale and sparse data of the user-item matrix seriously affect the recommendation quality. As a result, most of the recommender systems cannot easily deal with users who have made very few ratings. (2) The traditional recommender systems assume that all the users are independent and identically distributed; this assumption ignores the connections among users, which is not consistent with the real world recommendations. Aiming at modeling recommender systems more accurately and realistically, we propose a novel probabilistic factor analysis framework, which naturally fuses the users' tastes and their trusted friends' favors together. In this framework, we coin the term Social Trust Ensemble to represent the formulation of the social trust restrictions on the recommender systems. The complexity analysis indicates that our approach can be applied to very large datasets since it scales linearly with the number of observations, while the experimental results show that our method performs better than the state-of-the-art approaches. Most real-world recommender systems are deployed in a commercial context or designed to represent a value-adding service, e.g., on shopping or Social Web platforms, and typical success indicators for such systems include conversion rates, customer loyalty or sales numbers. In academic research, in contrast, the evaluation and comparison of different recommendation algorithms is mostly based on offline experimental designs and accuracy or rank measures which are used as proxies to assess an algorithm's recommendation quality. In this paper, we show that popular recommendation techniques--despite often being similar when compared with the help of accuracy measures--can be quite different with respect to which items they recommend. We report the results of an in-depth analysis in which we compare several recommendations strategies from different perspectives, including accuracy, catalog coverage and their bias to recommend popular items. Our analyses reveal that some recent techniques that perform well with respect to accuracy measures focus their recommendations on a tiny fraction of the item spectrum or recommend mostly top sellers. We analyze the reasons for some of these biases in terms of algorithmic design and parameterization and show how the characteristics of the recommendations can be altered by hyperparameter tuning. Finally, we propose two novel algorithmic schemes to counter these popularity biases. Recommender Systems based on Collaborative Filtering suggest to users items they might like, such as movies, songs, scientific papers, or jokes. Based on the ratings Based on the ratings provided by users about items, they first find users similar to the users receiving the recommendations and then suggest to her items appreciated in past by those like-minded users. However, given the ratable items are many and the ratings provided by each users only a tiny fraction, the step of finding similar users often fails. We propose to replace this step with the use of a trust metric, an algorithm able to propagate trust over the trust network in order to find users that can be trusted by the active user. Items appreciated by these trustworthy users can then be recommended to the active user. An empirical evaluation on a large dataset crawled from Epinions.com shows that Recommender Systems that make use of trust information are the most effective in term of accuracy while preserving a good coverage. This is especially evident on users who provided few ratings, so that trust is able to alleviate the cold start problem and other weaknesses that beset Collaborative Filtering Recommender Systems.