In this paper, we provide a systematic analysis of the Twitter discussion on the 2016 Austrian presidential elections. In particular, we extracted and analyzed a data-set consisting of 343645 Twitter messages related to the 2016 Austrian presidential elections. Our analysis combines methods from network science, sentiment analysis, as well as bot detection. Among other things, we found that: a) the winner of the election (Alexander Van der Bellen) was considerably more popular and influential on Twitter than his opponent, b) the Twitter followers of Van der Bellen substantially participated in the spread of misinformation about him, c) there was a clear polarization in terms of the sentiments spread by Twitter followers of the two presidential candidates, d) the in-degree and out-degree distributions of the underlying communication network are heavy-tailed, and e) compared to other recent events, such as the 2016 Brexit referendum or the 2016 US presidential elections, only a very small number of bots participated in the Twitter discussion on the 2016 Austrian presidential election.
In the light of recent events (such as the 2016 US presidential elections and the 2016 Brexit referendum), numerous authors reported on the misuse of social media channels aiming to manipulate the voters' opinions (cf. @cite_31 @cite_22 @cite_62 ). However, such a misuse has already been reported much earlier. For example, in @cite_47 discuss the issue of political abuse by studying the spread of misinformation. The authors consider mood scores based on Google's Profile of Mood States (calm, alert, sure, vital, kind, happy) (see @cite_20 ) and basic properties of the hashtag network and user-mention (i.e. ) network topology to automatically classify messages as truthful or fake. Another study by @cite_68 investigates the characteristics of the spread of misinformation concerning Ebola by applying epidemiological modeling (see also @cite_27 ). Moreover, in @cite_57 Howard and Kollanyi report that bots have been used to amplify messages by raising their re-tweet count in order to influence the 2016 Brexit referendum. Even though Howard and Kollanyi identified only a small amount of bots participating in discussions about Brexit, those bots created a comparatively large amount of the overall content (about one third of all messages).
@cite_31 @cite_62 @cite_22 @cite_57 @cite_27 @cite_47 @cite_68 @cite_20
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The massive spread of fake news has been identified as a major global risk and has been alleged to influence elections and threaten democracies. Communication, cognitive, social, and computer scientists are engaged in efforts to study the complex causes for the viral diffusion of digital misinformation and to develop solutions, while search and social media platforms are beginning to deploy countermeasures. However, to date, these efforts have been mainly informed by anecdotal evidence rather than systematic data. Here we analyze 14 million messages spreading 400 thousand claims on Twitter during and following the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign and election. We find evidence that social bots play a key role in the spread of fake news. Accounts that actively spread misinformation are significantly more likely to be bots. Automated accounts are particularly active in the early spreading phases of viral claims, and tend to target influential users. Humans are vulnerable to this manipulation, retweeting bots who post false news. Successful sources of false and biased claims are heavily supported by social bots. These results suggests that curbing social bots may be an effective strategy for mitigating the spread of online misinformation. In 2010, a paper entitled "From Obscurity to Prominence in Minutes: Political Speech and Real-time search" won the Best Paper Prize of the WebSci'10 conference. Among its findings were the discovery and documentation of what was labeled a "Twitter bomb", an organized effort to spread misinformation about the democratic candidate Martha Coakley through anonymous Twitter accounts. In this paper, after summarizing the details of that event, we outline the recipe of how social networks are used to spread misinformation. One of the most important steps in such a recipe is the "infiltration" of a community of users who are already engaged in conversations about a topic, to use them as organic spreaders of misinformation in their extended subnetworks. Then, we take this misinformation spreading recipe and indicate how it was successfully used to spread fake news during the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election. The main differences between the scenarios are the use of Facebook instead of Twitter, and the respective motivations (in 2010: political influence; in 2016: financial benefit through online advertising). After situating these events in the broader context of exploiting the Web, we seize this opportunity to address limitations of the reach of research findings and to start a conversation about how communities of researchers can in- crease their impact on real-world societ al issues. Recent accounts from researchers, journalists, as well as federal investigators, reached a unanimous conclusion: social media are systematically exploited to manipulate and alter public opinion. Some disinformation campaigns have been coordinated by means of bots, social media accounts controlled by computer scripts that try to disguise themselves as legitimate human users. In this study, we describe one such operation that occurred in the run up to the 2017 French presidential election. We collected a massive Twitter dataset of nearly 17 million posts, posted between 27 April and 7 May 2017 (Election Day). We then set to study the MacronLeaks disinformation campaign: By leveraging a mix of machine learning and cognitive behavioral modeling techniques, we separated humans from bots, and then studied the activities of the two groups independently, as well as their interplay. We provide a characterization of both the bots and the users who engaged with them, and oppose it to those users who didn’t. Prior interests of disinformation adopters pinpoint to the reasons of scarce success of this campaign: the users who engaged with MacronLeaks are mostly foreigners with pre-existing interest in alt-right topics and alternative news media, rather than French users with diverse political views. Concluding, anomalous account usage patterns suggest the possible existence of a black market for reusable political disinformation bots. The massive spread of digital misinformation has been identified as a major threat to democracies. Communication, cognitive, social, and computer scientists are studying the complex causes for the viral diffusion of misinformation, while online platforms are beginning to deploy countermeasures. Little systematic, data-based evidence has been published to guide these efforts. Here we analyze 14 million messages spreading 400 thousand articles on Twitter during ten months in 2016 and 2017. We find evidence that social bots played a disproportionate role in spreading articles from low-credibility sources. Bots amplify such content in the early spreading moments, before an article goes viral. They also target users with many followers through replies and mentions. Humans are vulnerable to this manipulation, resharing content posted by bots. Successful low-credibility sources are heavily supported by social bots. These results suggest that curbing social bots may be an effective strategy for mitigating the spread of online misinformation.