We introduce a new random key predistribution scheme for securing heterogeneous wireless sensor networks. Each of the @math sensors in the network is classified into @math classes according to some probability distribution @math . Before deployment, a class- @math sensor is assigned @math cryptographic keys that are selected uniformly at random from a common pool of @math keys. Once deployed, a pair of sensors can communicate securely if and only if they have a key in common. We model the communication topology of this network by a newly defined inhomogeneous random key graph. We establish scaling conditions on the parameters @math and @math so that this graph: 1) has no isolated nodes and 2) is connected, both with high probability. The results are given in the form of zero-one laws with the number of sensors @math growing unboundedly large; critical scalings are identified and shown to coincide for both graph properties. Our results are shown to complement and improve those given by and for the same model, therein referred to as the general random intersection graph.
We now focus on Theorem , where the major problem arises from the assumption For the model to be deemed as inhomogeneous random key graph, the variance of the key ring size should be non-zero. In fact, given that key ring sizes are integer-valued, the simplest possible case would be that @math and @math for some @math and positive integer @math . This would amount to assigning either @math or @math keys to each node with probabilities @math and @math , respectively. In this case, we can easily see that @math as long as @math . Therefore, for an inhomogeneous random key graph, the condition ) implies that @math , or, equivalently that Put differently, Theorem enforces mean key ring size to be much larger than @math . However, a typical wireless sensor network will consist of a very large number of sensors, each with very limited memory and computational capability @cite_15 @cite_10 . As a result, key rings with size @math are unlikely to be implementable in most practical network deployments. In fact, it was suggested by Di @cite_10 that key rings with size @math are acceptable for sensor networks.
@cite_15 @cite_10
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We introduce a new random key predistribution scheme for securing heterogeneous wireless sensor networks. Each of the @math sensors in the network is classified into @math classes according to some probability distribution @math . Before deployment, a class- @math sensor is assigned @math cryptographic keys that are selected uniformly at random from a common pool of @math keys. Once deployed, a pair of sensors can communicate securely if and only if they have a key in common. We model the communication topology of this network by a newly defined inhomogeneous random key graph. We establish scaling conditions on the parameters @math and @math so that this graph: 1) has no isolated nodes and 2) is connected, both with high probability. The results are given in the form of zero-one laws with the number of sensors @math growing unboundedly large; critical scalings are identified and shown to coincide for both graph properties. Our results are shown to complement and improve those given by and for the same model, therein referred to as the general random intersection graph. We investigate the connectivity of a wireless sensor network (WSN) secured by the heterogeneous key predistribution scheme under an independent on off channel model. The heterogeneous scheme induces an inhomogeneous random key graph, denoted by @math and the on off channel model induces an Erdős-Renyi graph, denoted by @math . Hence, the overall random graph modeling the WSN is obtained by the intersection of @math and @math . We present conditions on how to scale the parameters of the intersecting graph with respect to the network size @math such that the graph i) has no isolated nodes and ii) is connected, both with high probability (whp) as the number of nodes gets large. Our results are supported by a simulation study demonstrating that i) despite their asymptotic nature, our results can in fact be useful in designing finite -node WSNs so that they achieve secure connectivity whp; and ii) despite the simplicity of the on off communication model, the probability of connectivity in the resulting WSN approximates very well the case where the disk model is used. We consider secure and reliable connectivity in wireless sensor networks that utilize the heterogeneous random key predistribution scheme. We model the unreliability of wireless links by an on off channel model that induces an Erdős-Renyi graph, while the heterogeneous scheme induces an inhomogeneous random key graph. The overall network can thus be modeled by the intersection of both graphs. We present conditions (in the form of zero-one laws) on how to scale the parameters of the intersection model, so that with high probability: i) all of its nodes are connected to at least @math other nodes, i.e., the minimum node degree of the graph is no less than @math , and ii) the graph is @math -connected, i.e., the graph remains connected even if any @math nodes leave the network. These results are shown to complement and generalize several previous results in the literature. We also present numerical results to support our findings in the finite-node regime. Finally, we demonstrate via simulations that our results are also useful when the on off channel model is replaced with the more realistic disk communication model . We consider the network reliability problem in secure wireless sensor networks that employ a heterogeneous random key predistribution scheme. This scheme is introduced recently, as a generalization of the Eschenauer-Gligor scheme, to account for the cases when the network comprises sensors with varying level of resources or connectivity requirements; e.g., regular nodes vs. cluster heads. The scheme induces the inhomogeneous random key graph, denoted G(n;μ,K, P ), where each of the n nodes are independently assigned to one of r classes according to a probability distribution μ = (μ1, . . . , μr) and then a class-i node is assigned Ki keys uniformly at random from a pool of size P ; two nodes that share a key are then connected by an edge. We analyze the reliability of G(n;μ,K, P ) against random link failures. Namely, we consider G(n;μ,K, P, α) formed by deleting each edge of G(n;μ,K, P ) independently with probability 1 − α, and study the probability that the resulting graph i) has no isolated node; and ii) is connected. We present scaling conditions on K , P , and α such that both events take place with probability zero or one, respectively, as the number of nodes gets large. We also present numerical results to support these zero-one laws in the finite-node regime.