We present a method to secure the complete path between a server and the local human user at a network node. This is useful for scenarios like internet banking, electronic signatures, or online voting. Protection of input authenticity and output integrity and authenticity is accomplished by a combination of traditional and novel technologies, e.g., SSL, ActiveX, and DirectX. Our approach does not require administrative privileges to deploy and is hence suitable for consumer applications. Results are based on the implementation of a proof-of-concept application for the Windows platform.
This problem is encountered by local security applications such as electronic signature software @cite_10 , virus scanners, personal fire walls etc. In @cite_28 a dilemma is pointed out when notifying users about security events. Users are notified about presence of a possibly malicious program that could hide that very notification immediately. Some improvements to dialog-based security are shown in @cite_8 . Application output should be defended against hiding. Actions should be delayed so that users could interfere when a program is controlled by simulated input or scripting. can be used to achieve undisturbed output instead of the co-operative Windows GDI. @cite_20 , @cite_21 , @cite_7 Modifying the web browser to convey meta-information to the user about which window can be trusted is advocated by @cite_6 .
@cite_7 @cite_8 @cite_28 @cite_21 @cite_6 @cite_10 @cite_20
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The ability to introspect into the behavior of software at runtime is crucial for many security-related tasks, such as virtual machine-based intrusion detection and low-artifact malware analysis. Although some progress has been made in this task by automatically creating programs that can passively retrieve kernel-level information, two key challenges remain. First, it is currently difficult to extract useful information from user-level applications, such as web browsers. Second, discovering points within the OS and applications to hook for active monitoring is still an entirely manual process. In this paper we propose a set of techniques to mine the memory accesses made by an operating system and its applications to locate useful places to deploy active monitoring, which we call tap points. We demonstrate the efficacy of our techniques by finding tap points for useful introspection tasks such as finding SSL keys and monitoring web browser activity on five different operating systems (Windows 7, Linux, FreeBSD, Minix and Haiku) and two processor architectures (ARM and x86). One aspect of security in mobile code is privacy: private (or secret) data should not be leaked to unauthorised agents. Most of the work on secure information flow has until recently only been concerned with detecting direct and indirect flows. Secret information can however be leaked to the attacker also through covert channels. It is very reasonable to assume that the attacker, even as an external observer, can monitor the timing (including termination) behaviour of the program. Thus to claim a program secure, the security analysis must take also these into account. In this work we present a surprisingly simple solution to the problem of detecting timing leakages to external observers. Our system consists of a type system in which well-typed programs do not leak secret information directly, indirectly or through timing, and a transformation for removing timing leakages. For any program that is well typed according to Volpano and Smith [VS97a], our transformation generates a program that is also free of timing leaks. Eavesdropping on electronic communication is usually prevented by using cryptography-based mechanisms. However, these mechanisms do not prevent one from obtaining private information through side channels, such as the electromagnetic emissions of monitors or the sound produced by keyboards. While extracting the same information by watching somebody typing on a keyboard might seem to be an easy task, it becomes extremely challenging if it has to be automated. However, an automated tool is needed in the case of long-lasting surveillance procedures or long user activity, as a human being is able to reconstruct only a few characters per minute. This paper presents a novel approach to automatically recovering the text being typed on a keyboard, based solely on a video of the user typing. As part of the approach, we developed a number of novel techniques for motion tracking, sentence reconstruction, and error correction. The approach has been implemented in a tool, called ClearShot, which has been tested in a number of realistic settings where it was able to reconstruct a substantial part of the typed information. It is an interesting problem how a human can prove its identity to a trustworthy (local or remote) computer with untrustworthy input devices and via an insecure channel controlled by adversaries. Any input devices and auxiliary devices are untrustworthy under the following assumptions: the adversaries can record humans’ operations on the devices, and can access the devices to replay the recorded operations. Strictly, only the common brain intelligence is available for the human. In this paper, such an identication system is called SecHCI as the abbreviation Secure Human-Computer Identication (or Interface). In the real world, SecHCI means the peeping attacks to widely-used xed passwords: an adversary can observe your password via his own eyes or some hidden device (such as min-camera) when your input them on your keyboard or with your mouse. Compared with human-computer identications with the aid of trustworthy hardware devices, only a few contributions have devoted to the design and analysis of SecHCI. The most systematic works are made by N. J. Hopper & M. Blum recently: some formal denitions are given and the feasibility is shown by several SecHCI protocols with acceptable security (but usability is not very good because of their inherent limitations). In this paper, we give comprehensive investigations on SecHCI, from both theoretical and practical viewpoint, and with both system-oriented and usercentered methods. A user study is made to show problems of xed passwords, the signicance of peeping attack and some design principles of human-computer identications. All currently known SecHCI protocols and some related works (such as visual graphical passwords and CAPTCHAs) are surveyed in detail. In addition, we also give our opinions on future research and suggest a new prototype protocol as a possible solution to this problem.