In an information-rich world, people's time and attention must be divided among rapidly changing information sources and the diverse tasks demanded of them. How people decide which of the many sources, such as scientific articles or patents, to read and use in their own work affects dissemination of scholarly knowledge and adoption of innovation. We analyze the choices people make about what information to propagate on the citation networks of Physical Review journals, US patents and legal opinions. We observe regularities in behavior consistent with human bounded rationality: rather than evaluate all available choices, people rely on simply cognitive heuristics to decide what information to attend to. We demonstrate that these heuristics bias choices, so that people preferentially propagate information that is easier to discover, often because it is newer or more popular. However, we do not find evidence that popular sources help to amplify the spread of information beyond making it more salient. Our paper provides novel evidence of the critical role that bounded rationality plays in the decisions to allocate attention in social communication.
Bounded rationality is recognized as an important factor shaping human decisions and behavior @cite_3 , including consumer behavior @cite_43 @cite_1 @cite_36 . Computer scientists have begun to use attention, a concept related to bounded rationality, to explain social behavior online @cite_20 , including peer production of content in social media @cite_29 @cite_47 . Eye tracking studies @cite_9 @cite_12 and controlled online experiments @cite_14 demonstrated the importance of cognitive heuristics and biases in online behavior. Specifically, people pay more attention to content near the top of the page than to lower content, a cognitive bias known as position bias @cite_19 . Other studies examined how news articles, Web pages, and YouTube videos, compete for the limited collective attention @cite_39 @cite_26 @cite_13 @cite_51 .Such studies often reproduced the observed macroscopic phenomena, such as the extreme inequality of item popularity, but failed to note the link to individual's cognitive heuristics and biases.
@cite_14 @cite_26 @cite_36 @cite_29 @cite_9 @cite_1 @cite_3 @cite_39 @cite_43 @cite_19 @cite_51 @cite_47 @cite_13 @cite_12 @cite_20
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In a complex and uncertain world, humans and animals make decisions under the constraints of limited knowledge, resources, and time. Yet models of rational decision making in economics, cognitive science, biology, and other fields largely ignore these real constraints and instead assume agents with perfect information and unlimited time. About forty years ago, Herbert Simon challenged this view with his notion of "bounded rationality." Today, bounded rationality has become a fashionable term used for disparate views of reasoning. This book promotes bounded rationality as the key to understanding how real people make decisions. Using the concept of an "adaptive toolbox," a repertoire of fast and frugal rules for decision making under uncertainty, it attempts to impose more order and coherence on the idea of bounded rationality. The contributors view bounded rationality neither as optimization under constraints nor as the study of people's reasoning fallacies. The strategies in the adaptive toolbox dispense with optimization and, for the most part, with calculations of probabilities and utilities. The book extends the concept of bounded rationality from cognitive tools to emotions; it analyzes social norms, imitation, and other cultural tools as rational strategies; and it shows how smart heuristics can exploit the structure of environments. The paper explores the use of concepts in cognitive psychology to evaluate the spread of misinformation, disinformation and propaganda in online social networks. Analysing online social networks to identify metrics to infer cues of deception will enable us to measure diffusion of misinformation. The cognitive process involved in the decision to spread information involves answering four main questions viz consistency of message, coherency of message, credibility of source and general acceptability of message. We have used the cues of deception to analyse these questions to obtain solutions for preventing the spread of misinformation. We have proposed an algorithm to effectively detect deliberate spread of false information which would enable users to make informed decisions while spreading information in social networks. The computationally efficient algorithm uses the collaborative filtering property of social networks to measure the credibility of sources of information as well as quality of news items. The validation of the proposed methodology has been done on the online social network Twitter’. Collective intelligence is believed to underly the remarkable success of human society. The formation of accurate shared beliefs is one of the key components of human collective intelligence. How are accurate shared beliefs formed in groups of fallible individuals? Answering this question requires a multiscale analysis. We must understand both the individual decision mechanisms people use, and the properties and dynamics of those mechanisms in the aggregate. As of yet, mathematical tools for such an approach have been lacking. To address this gap, we introduce a new analytical framework: We propose that groups arrive at accurate shared beliefs via distributed Bayesian inference. Distributed inference occurs through information processing at the individual level, and yields rational belief formation at the group level. We instantiate this framework in a new model of human social decision-making, which we validate using a dataset we collected of over 50,000 users of an online social trading platform where investors mimic each others' trades using real money in foreign exchange and other asset markets. We find that in this setting people use a decision mechanism in which popularity is treated as a prior distribution for which decisions are best to make. This mechanism is boundedly rational at the individual level, but we prove that in the aggregate implements a type of approximate "Thompson sampling"---a well-known and highly effective single-agent Bayesian machine learning algorithm for sequential decision-making. The perspective of distributed Bayesian inference therefore reveals how collective rationality emerges from the boundedly rational decision mechanisms people use. One of the main findings of cognitive sciences is that automatic processes of which we are unaware shape, to a significant extent, our perception of the environment. The phenomenon applies not only to the real world, but also to multimedia data we consume every day. Whenever we look at pictures, watch a video or listen to audio recordings, our conscious attention efforts focus on the observable content, but our cognition spontaneously perceives intentions, beliefs, values, attitudes and other constructs that, while being outside of our conscious awareness, still shape our reactions and behavior. So far, multimedia technologies have neglected such a phenomenon to a large extent. This paper argues that taking into account cognitive effects is possible and it can also improve multimedia approaches. As a supporting proof-of-concept, the paper shows not only that there are visual patterns correlated with the personality traits of 300 Flickr users to a statistically significant extent, but also that the personality traits (both self-assessed and attributed by others) of those users can be inferred from the images these latter post as "favourite".