Non-linear, especially convex, objective functions have been extensively studied in recent years in which approaches relies crucially on the convexity property of cost functions. In this paper, we present primal-dual approaches based on configuration linear programs to design competitive online algorithms for problems with arbitrarily-grown objective. This approach is particularly appropriate for non-linear (non-convex) objectives in online setting. We first present a simple greedy algorithm for a general cost-minimization problem. The competitive ratio of the algorithm is characterized by the mean of a notion, called smoothness, which is inspired by a similar concept in the context of algorithmic game theory. The algorithm gives optimal (up to a constant factor) competitive ratios while applying to different contexts such as network routing, vector scheduling, energy-efficient scheduling and non-convex facility location. Next, we consider the online @math covering problems with non-convex objective. Building upon the resilient ideas from the primal-dual framework with configuration LPs, we derive a competitive algorithm for these problems. Our result generalizes the online primal-dual algorithm developed recently by for convex objectives with monotone gradients to non-convex objectives. The competitive ratio is now characterized by a new concept, called local smoothness --- a notion inspired by the smoothness. Our algorithm yields tight competitive ratio for the objectives such as the sum of @math -norms and gives competitive solutions for online problems of submodular minimization and some natural non-convex minimization under covering constraints.
In this paper, we systematically strengthen natural LPs by the construction of the configuration LPs presented in @cite_15 . propose a scheme that consists of solving the new LPs (with exponential number of variables) and rounding the fractional solutions to integer ones using decoupling inequalities. By this method, they derive approximation algorithms for several (offline) optimization problems which can formulated by linear constraints and objective function as a power of some constant @math . Specifically, the approximation ratio is proved to be the Bell number @math for several problems. In our approach, a crucial element to characterize the performance of an algorithm is the smoothness property of functions. The smooth argument is introduced by in the context of algorithmic game theory and it has successfully characterized the performance of equilibria (price of anarchy) in many classes of games such as congestion games, etc @cite_12 . This notion inspires the definition of smoothness in our paper.
@cite_15 @cite_12
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In a seminal paper, Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani show that a simple ranking algorithm achieves a competitive ratio of 1-1 e for the online bipartite matching problem in the standard adversarial model, where the ratio of 1-1 e is also shown to be optimal. Their result also implies that in the random arrivals model defined by Goel and Mehta, where the online nodes arrive in a random order, a simple greedy algorithm achieves a competitive ratio of 1-1 e. In this paper, we study the ranking algorithm in the random arrivals model, and show that it has a competitive ratio of at least 0.696, beating the 1-1 e ≈ 0.632 barrier in the adversarial model. Our result also extends to the i.i.d. distribution model of , removing the assumption that the distribution is known. Our analysis has two main steps. First, we exploit certain dominance and monotonicity properties of the ranking algorithm to derive a family of factor-revealing linear programs (LPs). In particular, by symmetry of the ranking algorithm in the random arrivals model, we have the monotonicity property on both sides of the bipartite graph, giving good "strength" to the LPs. Second, to obtain a good lower bound on the optimal values of all these LPs and hence on the competitive ratio of the algorithm, we introduce the technique of strongly factor-revealing LPs. In particular, we derive a family of modified LPs with similar strength such that the optimal value of any single one of these new LPs is a lower bound on the competitive ratio of the algorithm. This enables us to leverage the power of computer LP solvers to solve for large instances of the new LPs to establish bounds that would otherwise be difficult to attain by human analysis. The price of anarchy (POA) is a worst-case measure of the inefficiency of selfish behavior, defined as the ratio of the objective function value of a worst Nash equilibrium of a game and that of an optimal outcome. This measure implicitly assumes that players successfully reach some Nash equilibrium. This drawback motivates the search for inefficiency bounds that apply more generally to weaker notions of equilibria, such as mixed Nash and correlated equilibria; or to sequences of outcomes generated by natural experimentation strategies, such as successive best responses or simultaneous regret-minimization. We prove a general and fundamental connection between the price of anarchy and its seemingly stronger relatives in classes of games with a sum objective. First, we identify a "canonical sufficient condition" for an upper bound of the POA for pure Nash equilibria, which we call a smoothness argument. Second, we show that every bound derived via a smoothness argument extends automatically, with no quantitative degradation in the bound, to mixed Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and the average objective function value of regret-minimizing players (or "price of total anarchy"). Smoothness arguments also have automatic implications for the inefficiency of approximate and Bayesian-Nash equilibria and, under mild additional assumptions, for bicriteria bounds and for polynomial-length best-response sequences. We also identify classes of games --- most notably, congestion games with cost functions restricted to an arbitrary fixed set --- that are tight, in the sense that smoothness arguments are guaranteed to produce an optimal worst-case upper bound on the POA, even for the smallest set of interest (pure Nash equilibria). Byproducts of our proof of this result include the first tight bounds on the POA in congestion games with non-polynomial cost functions, and the first structural characterization of atomic congestion games that are universal worst-case examples for the POA. We study a natural generalization of the problem of minimizing makespan on unrelated machines in which jobs may be split into parts. The different parts of a job can be (simultaneously) processed on different machines, but each part requires a setup time before it can be processed. First we show that a natural adaptation of the seminal approximation algorithm for unrelated machine scheduling [11] yields a 3-approximation algorithm, equal to the integrality gap of the corresponding LP relaxation. Through a stronger LP relaxation, obtained by applying a lift-and-project procedure, we are able to improve both the integrality gap and the implied approximation factor to 1 + φ, where φ ≈ 1.618 is the golden ratio. This ratio decreases to 2 in the restricted assignment setting, matching the result for the classic version. Interestingly, we show that our problem cannot be approximated within a factor better than e e-1 ≈ 1.582 (unless P = NP). This provides some evidence that it is harder than the classic version, which is only known to be inapproximable within a factor 1.5 - e. Since our 1 + φ bound remains tight when considering the seemingly stronger machine configuration LP, we propose a new job based configuration LP that has an infinite number of variables, one for each possible way a job may be split and processed on the machines. Using convex duality we show that this infinite LP has a finite representation and can be solved in polynomial time to any accuracy, rendering it a promising relaxation for obtaining better algorithms. © 2014 Springer International Publishing Switzerland. Coalitional games allow subsets (coalitions) of players to cooperate to receive a collective payoff. This payoff is then distributed “fairly” among the members of that coalition according to some division scheme. Various solution concepts have been proposed as reasonable schemes for generating fair allocations. The Shapley value is one classic solution concept: player i’s share is precisely equal to i’s expected marginal contribution if the players join the coalition one at a time, in a uniformly random order. In this paper, we consider the class of supermodular games (sometimes called convex games), and give a fully polynomial-time randomized approximation scheme (FPRAS) to compute the Shapley value to within a (1 ±e) factor in monotone supermodular games. We show that this result is tight in several senses: no deterministic algorithm can approximate Shapley value as well, no randomized algorithm can do better, and both monotonicity and supermodularity are required for the existence of an efficient (1 ±e)-approximation algorithm. We also argue that, relative to supermodularity, monotonicity is a mild assumption, and we discuss how to transform supermodular games to be monotonic.