Software-defined networking is considered a promising new paradigm, enabling more reliable and formally verifiable communication networks. However, this paper shows that the separation of the control plane from the data plane, which lies at the heart of Software-Defined Networks (SDNs), introduces a new vulnerability which we call teleportation. An attacker (e.g., a malicious switch in the data plane or a host connected to the network) can use teleportation to transmit information via the control plane and bypass critical network functions in the data plane (e.g., a firewall), and to violate security policies as well as logical and even physical separations. This paper characterizes the design space for teleportation attacks theoretically, and then identifies four different teleportation techniques. We demonstrate and discuss how these techniques can be exploited for different attacks (e.g., exfiltrating confidential data at high rates), and also initiate the discussion of possible countermeasures. Generally, and given today's trend toward more intent-based networking, we believe that our findings are relevant beyond the use cases considered in this paper.
Sphinx @cite_4 can alert on the path update teleportation. However, it cannot detect the path reset as the flow graph remains the same. Additionally, Sphinx assumes that switches cannot use the same DPIDs, therefore, we believe that our switch identification teleportation will not be detected by Sphinx. Also, our out-of-band forwarding relies on and messages, while s are not considered by Sphinx Unfortunately, the source code of Sphinx is not available. . Therefore the suggested out-of-band forwarding teleportation can evade Sphinx, until topology altering flows are installed.
@cite_4
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Software-defined networks (SDNs) allow greater control over network entities by centralizing the control plane, but place great burden on the administrator to manually ensure security and correct functioning of the entire network. We list several attacks on SDN controllers that violate network topology and data plane forwarding, and can be mounted by compromised network entities, such as end hosts and soft switches. We further demonstrate their feasibility on four popular SDN controllers. We propose SPHINX to detect both known and potentially unknown attacks on network topology and data plane forwarding originating within an SDN. SPHINX leverages the novel abstraction of flow graphs, which closely approximate the actual network operations, to enable incremental validation of all network updates and constraints. SPHINX dynamically learns new network behavior and raises alerts when it detects suspicious changes to existing network control plane behavior. Our evaluation shows that SPHINX is capable of detecting attacks in SDNs in realtime with low performance overheads, and requires no changes to the controllers for deployment. Production datacenters operate under various uncertainties such as traffic dynamics, topology asymmetry, and failures. Therefore, datacenter load balancing schemes must be resilient to these uncertainties; i.e., they should accurately sense path conditions and timely react to mitigate the fallouts. Despite significant efforts, prior solutions have important drawbacks. On the one hand, solutions such as Presto and DRB are oblivious to path conditions and blindly reroute at fixed granularity. On the other hand, solutions such as CONGA and CLOVE can sense congestion, but they can only reroute when flowlets emerge; thus, they cannot always react timely to uncertainties. To make things worse, these solutions fail to detect handle failures such as blackholes and random packet drops, which greatly degrades their performance. In this paper, we introduce Hermes, a datacenter load balancer that is resilient to the aforementioned uncertainties. At its heart, Hermes leverages comprehensive sensing to detect path conditions including failures unattended before, and it reacts using timely yet cautious rerouting. Hermes is a practical edge-based solution with no switch modification. We have implemented Hermes with commodity switches and evaluated it through both testbed experiments and large-scale simulations. Our results show that Hermes achieves comparable performance to CONGA and Presto in normal cases, and well handles uncertainties: under asymmetries, Hermes achieves up to 10 and 20 better flow completion time (FCT) than CONGA and CLOVE; under switch failures, it outperforms all other schemes by over 32 . Protecting the customer's SSL private key is the paramount issue to persuade the website owners to migrate their contents onto the cloud infrastructure, besides the advantages of cloud infrastructure in terms of flexibility, efficiency, scalability and elasticity. The emerging Keyless SSL solution retains on-premise custody of customers' SSL private keys on their own servers. However, it suffers from significant performance degradation and limited scalability, caused by the long distance connection to Key Server for each new coming end-user request. The performance improvements using persistent session and key caching onto cloud will degrade the key invulnerability and discourage the website owners because of the cloud's security bugs. In this paper, the challenges of secured key protection and distribution are addressed in philosophy of "Storing the trusted DATA on untrusted platform and transmitting through untrusted channel". To this end, a three-phase hierarchical key management scheme, called STYX1 is proposed to provide the secured key protection together with hardware assisted service acceleration for cloud-based content delivery network (CCDN) applications. The STYX is implemented based on Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX), Intel QuickAssist Technology (QAT) and SIGMA (SIGn-and-MAc) protocol. STYX can provide the tight key security guarantee by SGX based key distribution with a light overhead, and it can further significantly enhance the system performance with QAT based acceleration. The comprehensive evaluations show that the STYX not only guarantees the absolute security but also outperforms the direct HTTPS server deployed CDN without QAT by up to 5x throughput with significant latency reduction at the same time. In the wireless sensor networks (WSNs), sensor nodes may be deployed in the hostile areas. The eavesdropper can intercept the messages in the public channel and the communication between the nodes is easily monitored. Furthermore, any malicious intermediate node can act as a legal receiver to alter the passing messages. Hence, message protection and sensor node identification become important issues in WSN. In this paper, we propose a novel scheme providing unconditional secure communication based on the quantum characteristics, including no-cloning and teleportation. We present a random EPR-pair allocation scheme that is designed to overcome the vulnerability caused by possible compromised nodes. EPR pairs are pre-assigned to sensor nodes randomly and the entangled qubits are used by the nodes with the quantum teleportation scheme to form a secure link. We also show a scheme on how to resist the man-in-the-middle attack. In the framework, the qubits are allocated to each node before deployment and the adversary is unable to create the duplicated nodes. Even if the malicious nodes are added to the network to falsify the messages transmitting in the public channel, the legal nodes can easily detect the fake nodes that have no entangled qubits and verify the counterfeit messages. In addition, we prove that one node sharing EPR pairs with a certain amount of neighbor nodes can teleport information to any node in the sensor network if there are sufficient EPR pairs in the qubits pool. The proposal shows that the distributed quantum wireless sensor network gains better security than classical wireless sensor network and centralized quantum wireless network.