Security exploits can include cyber threats such as computer programs that can disturb the normal behavior of computer systems (viruses), unsolicited e-mail (spam), malicious software (malware), monitoring software (spyware), attempting to make computer resources unavailable to their intended users (Distributed Denial-of-Service or DDoS attack), the social engineering, and online identity theft (phishing). One such cyber threat, which is particularly dangerous to computer users is phishing. Phishing is well known as online identity theft, which targets to steal victims' sensitive information such as username, password and online banking details. This paper focuses on designing an innovative and gamified approach to educate individuals about phishing attacks. The study asks how one can integrate self-efficacy, which has a co-relation with the user's knowledge, into an anti-phishing educational game to thwart phishing attacks? One of the main reasons would appear to be a lack of user knowledge to prevent from phishing attacks. Therefore, this research investigates the elements that influence (in this case, either conceptual or procedural knowledge or their interaction effect) and then integrate them into an anti-phishing educational game to enhance people's phishing prevention behaviour through their motivation.
Another reason for ineffectiveness of current security education for phishing prevention is because security education providers assume that users are keen to avoid risks and thus likely to adopt behaviours that might protect them. Kirlappos and Sasse @cite_32 claimed that security education should consider the drivers of end user behaviour rather than warning users of dangers. Therefore, well-designed security education (i.e. user-centred security education) should develop threat perception where users are aware that such a threat is present in the cyberspace. It should also encourage users to enhance avoidance behaviour through motivation to protect them from malicious IT threats.
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Game based education is becoming more and more popular. This is because game based education provides an opportunity for learning in a natural environment. Phishing is an online identity theft, which attempts to steal sensitive information such as username, password, and online banking details from its victims. To prevent this, phishing awareness needs to be considered. This research aims to develop a game design framework, which enhances user avoidance behaviour through motivation to protect users from phishing attacks. In order to do this, a theoretical model derived from Technology Thread Avoidance Theory (TTAT) was developed and used in the game design framework (Liang & Xue, 2010). A survey study was undertaken with 150 regular computer users to elicit feedback through a questionnaire. The study findings revealed that perceived threat, safeguard effectiveness, safeguard cost, self-efficacy, perceived severity, and perceived susceptibility elements should be addressed in the game design framework for computer users to avoid phishing attacks. Furthermore, we argue that this game design framework can be used not only for preventing phishing attacks but also for preventing other malicious IT attacks such as viruses, malware, botnets and spyware. Phishing is an online identity theft, which aims to steal confidential information such as username, password and online banking details from its victims. To prevent this, anti-phishing education needs to be considered. Therefore, the research reported in this paper examines whether conceptual knowledge or procedural knowledge has a positive effect on computer users' self-efficacy to thwart phishing threats. In order to accomplish this, a theoretical model based on Liang and Xue's (2010) Technology Threat Avoidance Theory (TTAT) has been proposed and evaluated. Data was collected from 161 regular computer users to elicit their feedback through an online questionnaire. The study findings revealed that the interaction effect of conceptual and procedural knowledge positively impacts on computer users' self-efficacy, which enhances their phishing threat avoidance behaviour. It can therefore be argued that well-designed end-user security education contributes to thwart phishing threats. Phishing attacks, in which criminals lure Internet users to Web sites that spoof legitimate Web sites, are occurring with increasing frequency and are causing considerable harm to victims. While a great deal of effort has been devoted to solving the phishing problem by prevention and detection of phishing emails and phishing Web sites, little research has been done in the area of training users to recognize those attacks. Our research focuses on educating users about phishing and helping them make better trust decisions. We identified a number of challenges for end-user security education in general and anti-phishing education in particular: users are not motivated to learn about security; for most users, security is a secondary task; it is difficult to teach people to identify security threats without also increasing their tendency to misjudge nonthreats as threats. Keeping these challenges in mind, we developed an email-based anti-phishing education system called “PhishGuru” and an online game called “Anti-Phishing Phil” that teaches users how to use cues in URLs to avoid falling for phishing attacks. We applied learning science instructional principles in the design of PhishGuru and Anti-Phishing Phil. In this article we present the results of PhishGuru and Anti-Phishing Phil user studies that demonstrate the effectiveness of these tools. Our results suggest that, while automated detection systems should be used as the first line of defense against phishing attacks, user education offers a complementary approach to help people better recognize fraudulent emails and websites. To build systems shielding users from fraudulent (or phishing) websites, designers need to know which attack strategies work and why. This paper provides the first empirical evidence about which malicious strategies are successful at deceiving general users. We first analyzed a large set of captured phishing attacks and developed a set of hypotheses about why these strategies might work. We then assessed these hypotheses with a usability study in which 22 participants were shown 20 web sites and asked to determine which ones were fraudulent. We found that 23 of the participants did not look at browser-based cues such as the address bar, status bar and the security indicators, leading to incorrect choices 40 of the time. We also found that some visual deception attacks can fool even the most sophisticated users. These results illustrate that standard security indicators are not effective for a substantial fraction of users, and suggest that alternative approaches are needed.