Web applications require access to the file-system for many different tasks. When analyzing the security of a web application, secu- rity analysts should thus consider the impact that file-system operations have on the security of the whole application. Moreover, the analysis should take into consideration how file-system vulnerabilities might in- teract with other vulnerabilities leading an attacker to breach into the web application. In this paper, we first propose a classification of file- system vulnerabilities, and then, based on this classification, we present a formal approach that allows one to exploit file-system vulnerabilities. We give a formal representation of web applications, databases and file- systems, and show how to reason about file-system vulnerabilities. We also show how to combine file-system vulnerabilities and SQL-Injection vulnerabilities for the identification of complex, multi-stage attacks. We have developed an automatic tool that implements our approach and we show its efficiency by discussing several real-world case studies, which are witness to the fact that our tool can generate, and exploit, complex attacks that, to the best of our knowledge, no other state-of-the-art-tool for the security of web applications can find.
@cite_8 , presented a methodology for modeling web applications and considered five case studies modeled in the Alloy @cite_3 language. The idea is similar to our approach, but they defined three different attacker models that should find web attacks, whereas we have shown how the standard DY attacker can be used. They also represent a number of HTTP details that we do not require that eases the modeling phave. Finally, and most importantly, they don't take combination of attacks into consideration.
@cite_3 @cite_8
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We present the Chained Attacks approach, an automated model-based approach to test the security of web applications that does not require a background in formal methods. Starting from a set of HTTP conversations and a configuration file providing the testing surface and purpose, a model of the System Under Test (SUT) is generated and input, along with the web attacker model we defined, to a model checker acting as test oracle. The HTTP conversations, payload libraries, and a mapping created while generating the model aid the concretization of the test cases, allowing for their execution on the SUT's implementation. We applied our approach to a real-life case study and we were able to find a combination of different attacks representing the concrete chained attack performed by a bug bounty hunter. We propose a formal model of web security based on an abstraction of the web platform and use this model to analyze the security of several sample web mechanisms and applications. We identify three distinct threat models that can be used to analyze web applications, ranging from a web attacker who controls malicious web sites and clients, to stronger attackers who can control the network and or leverage sites designed to display user-supplied content. We propose two broadly applicable security goals and study five security mechanisms. In our case studies, which include HTML5 forms, Referer validation, and a single sign-on solution, we use a SAT-based model-checking tool to find two previously known vulnerabilities and three new vulnerabilities. Our case study of a Kerberos-based single sign-on system illustrates the differences between a secure network protocol using custom client software and a similar but vulnerable web protocol that uses cookies, redirects, and embedded links instead. The Alloy Annotation Language (AAL) is a language (under development) for annotating Java code based on the Alloy modeling language. It offers a syntax similar to the Java Modeling Language (JML), and the same opportunities for generation of run-time assertions. In addition, however, AAL offers the possibility of fully automatic compile-time analysis. Several kinds of analysis are supported, including: checking the code of a method against its specification; checking that the specification of a method in a subclass is compatible with the specification in the superclass; and checking properties relating method calls on different objects, such as that the equals methods of a class (and its overridings) induce an equivalence. Using partial models in place of code, it is also possible to analyze object-oriented designs in the abstract: investigating, for example, a view relationship amongst objects.The paper gives examples of annotations and such analyses. It presents (informally) a systematic translation of annotations into Alloy, a simple first-order logic with relational operators. By doing so, it makes Alloy's automatic analysis, which is based on state-of-the-art SAT solvers, applicable to the analysis of object-oriented programs, and demonstrates the power of a simple logic as the basis for an annotation language. Web applications are a major target of attackers. The increasing complexity of such applications and the subtlety of today's attacks make it very hard for developers to manually secure their web applications. Penetration testing is considered an art, the success of a penetration tester in detecting vulnerabilities mainly depends on his skills. Recently, model-checkers dedicated to security analysis have proved their ability to identify complex attacks on web-based security protocols. However, bridging the gap between an abstract attack trace output by a model-checker and a penetration test on the real web application is still an open issue. We present here a methodology for testing web applications starting from a secure model. First, we mutate the model to introduce specific vulnerabilities present in web applications. Then, a model-checker outputs attack traces that exploit those vulnerabilities. Next, the attack traces are translated into concrete test cases by using a 2-step mapping. Finally, the tests are executed on the real system using an automatic procedure that may request the help of a test expert from time to time. A prototype has been implemented and evaluated on Web Goat, an insecure web application maintained by OWASP. It successfully reproduced Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) and Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks.