Fog computing is transforming the network edge into an intelligent platform by bringing storage, computing, control, and networking functions closer to end-users, things, and sensors. How to allocate multiple resource types (e.g., CPU, memory, bandwidth) of capacity-limited heterogeneous fog nodes to competing services with diverse requirements and preferences in a fair and efficient manner is a challenging task. To this end, we propose a novel market-based resource allocation framework in which the services act as buyers and fog resources act as divisible goods in the market. The proposed framework aims to compute a market equilibrium (ME) solution at which every service obtains its favorite resource bundle under the budget constraint while the system achieves high resource utilization. This work extends the General Equilibrium literature by considering a practical case of satiated utility functions. Also, we introduce the notions of non-wastefulness and frugality for equilibrium selection, and rigorously demonstrate that all the non-wasteful and frugal ME are the optimal solutions to a convex program. Furthermore, the proposed equilibrium is shown to possess salient fairness properties including envy-freeness, sharing-incentive, and proportionality. Another major contribution of this work is to develop a privacy-preserving distributed algorithm, which is of independent interest, for computing an ME while allowing market participants to obfuscate their private information. Finally, extensive performance evaluation is conducted to verify our theoretical analyses.
This work is also closely related to the MRA literature, which has received considerable attention recently. The state-of-the-art research on MRA for data centers is surveyed in @cite_25 . Noticeably, (DRF) @cite_34 is the most prominent approach to MRA fairness in data centers. In a nutshell, DRF is a generalization of max-min fairness for multiple resources, which aims to maximize the minimum dominant resource share across all the users. For the simplistic setting where all resources are pooled together in a single location and with some strong assumptions @cite_34 , DRF offers many compelling properties. This approach has been extended in the follow-up works @cite_14 @cite_46 @cite_13 @cite_27 to address more realistic assumptions such as user demands are finite and resources are distributed over multiple nodes. Both of these aspects are captured in our work. To the best of our knowledge, this is the problem in a general setting with , each of which has multiple resource types, and multiple users with . While similar market-based approaches have been examined in @cite_13 @cite_32 , they consider simpler settings (e.g., a single resource pool, a single resource type, and or infinite demands).
@cite_14 @cite_32 @cite_27 @cite_46 @cite_34 @cite_13 @cite_25
2129996460 2155053108 1890643295 1996998821
Spectral efficiency, fairness and user satisfaction are crucial aspects for resource allocation in multi-user Orthog- onal Frequency Division Multiplexing (OFDM)-based cellular networks. Classical Radio Resource Allocation (RRA) strategies, such as Max-Rate (MR), Proportional Fairness (PF) and Max- Min Fairness (MMF), show different performances regarding the three aforementioned aspects. In this work, we present an adap- tive RRA framework that joins the criteria of the three classical strategies in a unified manner and can be dynamically configured according to the cellular operator's objectives. We exemplify the flexible use of this general framework by proposing two adaptive RRA algorithms that provide strict fairness among users and maximizes the users' satisfaction, respectively. Simulation results show that the two proposed algorithms can efficiently achieve their respective objectives by means of the adaptation of the general RRA framework. We study the problem of allocating multiple resources to agents with heterogeneous demands. Technological advances such as cloud computing and data centers provide a new impetus for investigating this problem under the assumption that agents demand the resources in fixed proportions, known in economics as Leontief preferences. In a recent paper, [2011] introduced the dominant resource fairness (DRF) mechanism, which was shown to possess highly desirable theoretical properties under Leontief preferences. We extend their results in three directions. First, we show that DRF generalizes to more expressive settings, and leverage a new technical framework to formally extend its guarantees. Second, we study the relation between social welfare and properties such as truthfulness; DRF performs poorly in terms of social welfare, but we show that this is an unavoidable shortcoming that is shared by every mechanism that satisfies one of three basic properties. Third, and most importantly, we study a realistic setting that involves indivisibilities. We chart the boundaries of the possible in this setting, contributing a new relaxed notion of fairness and providing both possibility and impossibility results. We consider the problem of fair resource allocation in a system containing different resource types, where each user may have different demands for each resource. To address this problem, we propose Dominant Resource Fairness (DRF), a generalization of max-min fairness to multiple resource types. We show that DRF, unlike other possible policies, satisfies several highly desirable properties. First, DRF incentivizes users to share resources, by ensuring that no user is better off if resources are equally partitioned among them. Second, DRF is strategy-proof, as a user cannot increase her allocation by lying about her requirements. Third, DRF is envy-free, as no user would want to trade her allocation with that of another user. Finally, DRF allocations are Pareto efficient, as it is not possible to improve the allocation of a user without decreasing the allocation of another user. We have implemented DRF in the Mesos cluster resource manager, and show that it leads to better throughput and fairness than the slot-based fair sharing schemes in current cluster schedulers. We present a model for fair strategyproof allocations in a realistic model of cloud computing centers. This model has the standard Leontief preferences but also captures a key property of virtualization, the use of containers to isolate jobs. We first present several impossibility results for deterministic mechanisms in this setting. We then construct an extension of the well known dominant resource fairness mechanism (DRF), which somewhat surprisingly does not involve the notion of a dominant resource. Our mechanism relies on the connection between the DRF mechanism and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution; by computing a weighted max-min over the convex hull of the feasible region we can obtain an ex-ante fair, efficient and strategyproof randomized allocation. This randomized mechanism can be used to construct other mechanisms which do not rely on users' being expected (ex-ante) utility maximizers, in several ways. First, for the case of @math identical machines one can use the convex structure of the mechanism to get a simple mechanism which is approximately ex-post fair, efficient and strategyproof. Second, we present a more subtle construction for an arbitrary set of machines, using the Shapley-Folkman-Starr theorem to show the existence of an allocation which is approximately ex-post fair, efficient and strategyproof. This paper provides both a rigorous foundation for developing protocols that explicitly utilize the detailed structure of the modern cloud computing hardware and software, and a general method for extending the dominant resource fairness mechanism to more complex settings.