Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is the most successful algorithm for finding approximate Nash equilibria in imperfect information games. However, CFR's reliance on full game-tree traversals limits its scalability. For this reason, the game's state- and action-space is often abstracted (i.e. simplified) for CFR, and the resulting strategy is then translated back to the full game, which requires extensive expert-knowledge and often converges to highly exploitable policies. A recently proposed method, Deep CFR, applies deep learning directly to CFR, allowing the agent to intrinsically abstract and generalize over the state-space from samples, without requiring expert knowledge. In this paper, we introduce Single Deep CFR (SD-CFR), a simplified variant of Deep CFR that has a lower overall approximation error by avoiding the training of an average strategy network. We show that SD-CFR is more attractive from a theoretical perspective and empirically outperforms Deep CFR with respect to exploitability and one-on-one play in poker.
was not the first algorithm that used deep learning with the goal of solving large games efficiently. @cite_23 applies function approximation to estimate regret values in CFR and CFR @math . Unfortunately, despite promising expectations, recent work failed to apply R-CFR in combination with sampling @cite_2 . @cite_9 is similar to R-CFR but was only applied to single-player environments. Nevertheless, ARM did show that regret-based methods can be of interest in multi-agent imperfect information games much bigger, less structured, and more chaotic than poker, thereby opening up interesting lines of research in multi-agent reinforcement learning.
@cite_9 @cite_23 @cite_2
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In this thesis, we investigate the problem of decision-making in large two-player zero-sum games using Monte Carlo sampling and regret minimization methods. We demonstrate four major contributions. The first is Monte Carlo Counterfactual Regret Minimization (MC-CFR): a generic family of sample-based algorithms that compute near-optimal equilibrium strategies. Secondly, we develop a theory for applying counterfactual regret minimization to a generic subset of imperfect recall games as well as a lossy abstraction mechanism for reducing the size of very large games. Thirdly, we describe Monte Carlo Minimax Search (MCMS): an adversarial search algorithm based on *-Minimax that uses sparse sampling. We then present variance reduction techniques that can be used in these settings, with a focused application to Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS). We thoroughly evaluate our algorithms in practice using several different domains and sampling strategies. In two-player zero-sum games, if both players minimize their average external regret, then the average of the strategy profiles converges to a Nash equilibrium. For n-player general-sum games, however, theoretical guarantees for regret minimization are less understood. Nonetheless, Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR), a popular regret minimization algorithm for extensive-form games, has generated winning three-player Texas Hold'em agents in the Annual Computer Poker Competition (ACPC). In this paper, we provide the first set of theoretical properties for regret minimization algorithms in non-zero-sum games by proving that solutions eliminate iterative strict domination. We formally define in extensive-form games, show that CFR avoids iteratively strictly dominated actions and strategies, and demonstrate that removing iteratively dominated actions is enough to win a mock tournament in a small poker game. In addition, for two-player non-zero-sum games, we bound the worst case performance and show that in practice, regret minimization can yield strategies very close to equilibrium. Our theoretical advancements lead us to a new modification of CFR for games with more than two players that is more efficient and may be used to generate stronger strategies than previously possible. Furthermore, we present a new three-player Texas Hold'em poker agent that was built using CFR and a novel game decomposition method. Our new agent wins the three-player events of the 2012 ACPC and defeats the winning three-player programs from previous competitions while requiring less resources to generate than the 2011 winner. Finally, we show that our CFR modification computes a strategy of equal quality to our new agent in a quarter of the time of standard CFR using half the memory. We consider a class of restless multi-armed bandit (RMAB) problems with unknown arm dynamics. At each time, a player chooses an arm out of @math arms to play, referred to as an active arm, and receives a random reward from a finite set of reward states. The reward state of the active arm transits according to an unknown Markovian dynamic. The reward state of passive arms (which are not chosen to play at time t) evolves according to an arbitrary unknown random process. The objective is an arm-selection policy that minimizes the regret, defined as the reward loss with respect to a player that always plays the most rewarding arm. This class of RMAB problems has been studied recently in the context of communication networks and financial investment applications. We develop a strategy that selects arms to be played in a consecutive manner in which the selection sequencing rules are adaptively updated controlled by the current sample reward means, referred to as Adaptive Sequencing Rules (ASR) algorithm. By designing judiciously the adaptive sequencing rules of the chosen arms, we show that ASR algorithm achieves a logarithmic regret order with time and a finite-sample bound on the regret is established. Although existing methods have shown a logarithmic regret order with time in this RMAB setting, the theoretical analysis presents significant improvement in the regret scaling with respect to the system parameters under ASR. Extensive simulation results support the theoretical study and demonstrate strong performance of the algorithm as compared to existing methods. We discuss a multiple-play multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem in which several arms are selected at each round. Recently, Thompson sampling (TS), a randomized algorithm with a Bayesian spirit, has attracted much attention for its empirically excellent performance, and it is revealed to have an optimal regret bound in the standard single-play MAB problem. In this paper, we propose the multiple-play Thompson sampling (MP-TS) algorithm, an extension of TS to the multiple-play MAB problem, and discuss its regret analysis. We prove that MP-TS for binary rewards has the optimal regret upper bound that matches the regret lower bound provided by (1987). Therefore, MP-TS is the first computationally efficient algorithm with optimal regret. A set of computer simulations was also conducted, which compared MP-TS with state-of-the-art algorithms. We also propose a modification of MP-TS, which is shown to have better empirical performance.