In the multi-agent path finding problem (MAPF) we are given a set of agents each with respective start and goal positions. The task is to find paths for all agents while avoiding collisions aiming to minimize an objective function. Two such common objective functions is the sum-of-costs and the makespan. Many optimal solvers were introduced in the past decade - two prominent categories of solvers can be distinguished: search-based solvers and compilation-based solvers. Search-based solvers were developed and tested for the sum-of-costs objective while the most prominent compilation-based solvers that are built around Boolean satisfiability (SAT) were designed for the makespan objective. Very little was known on the performance and relevance of the compilation-based approach on the sum-of-costs objective. In this paper we show how to close the gap between these cost functions in the compilation-based approach. Moreover we study applicability of various techniques developed for search-based solvers in the compilation-based approach. A part of this paper introduces a SAT-solver that is directly aimed to solve the sum-of-costs objective function. Using both a lower bound on the sum-of-costs and an upper bound on the makespan, we are able to have a reasonable number of variables in our SAT encoding. We then further improve the encoding by borrowing ideas from ICTS, a search-based solver. Experimental evaluation on several domains show that there are many scenarios where our new SAT-based methods outperforms the best variants of previous sum-of-costs search solvers - the ICTS, CBS algorithms, and ICBS algorithms.
A simple admissible heuristic that is used within A* for MAPF is to sum the individual heuristics of the single agents such as Manhattan distance for 4-connected grids or Euclidean distance for Euclidean graphs @cite_6 . A more-informed heuristic is called the sum of individual costs heuristic . For each agent @math we calculate its optimal path cost from its current state (position) @math to @math assuming that other agents do not exist. Then, we sum these costs over all agents. More-informed heuristics uses forms of pattern-databases @cite_23 @cite_49 .
@cite_23 @cite_6 @cite_49
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In this semi-tutorial paper, we first review the information-theoretic approach to account for the computational costs incurred during the search for optimal actions in a sequential decision-making problem. The traditional (MDP) framework ignores computational limitations while searching for optimal policies, essentially assuming that the acting agent is perfectly rational and aims for exact optimality. Using the free-energy, a variational principle is introduced that accounts not only for the value of a policy alone, but also considers the cost of finding this optimal policy. The solution of the variational equations arising from this formulation can be obtained using familiar Bellman-like value iterations from dynamic programming (DP) and the Blahut-Arimoto (BA) algorithm from rate distortion theory. Finally, we demonstrate the utility of the approach for generating hierarchies of state abstractions that can be used to best exploit the available computational resources. A numerical example showcases these concepts for a path-planning problem in a grid world environment. We study network design games where @math self-interested agents have to form a network by purchasing links from a given set of edges. We consider Shapley cost sharing mechanisms that split the cost of an edge in a fair manner among the agents using the edge. It is well known that the price of anarchy of these games is as high as @math . Another line of research has focused on evaluating the price of stability, i.e., the cost of the best Nash equilibrium relative to the social optimum. In this paper we investigate to which extent coordination among agents can improve the quality of solutions. We resort to the concept of strong Nash equilibria, which were introduced by Aumann and are resilient to deviations by coalitions of agents. We analyze the price of anarchy of strong Nash equilibria and develop lower and upper bounds for unweighted and weighted games in both directed and undirected graphs. These bounds are tight or nearly tight for many scenarios. It shows that, by using coordination, the price of anarchy drops from linear to logarithmic bounds. We complement these results by also proving the first superconstant lower bound on the price of stability of standard equilibria (without coordination) in undirected graphs. More specifically, we show a lower bound of @math for weighted games, where @math is the total weight of all the agents. This almost matches the known upper bound of @math . Our results imply that, for most settings, the worst-case performance ratios of strong coordinated equilibria are essentially always as good as the performance ratios of the best equilibria achievable without coordination. These settings include unweighted games in directed graphs as well as weighted games in both directed and undirected graphs. Two mobile agents starting at different nodes of an unknown network have to meet. This task is known in the literature as rendezvous. Each agent has a different label which is a positive integer known to it, but unknown to the other agent. Agents move in an asynchronous way: the speed of agents may vary and is controlled by an adversary. The cost of a rendezvous algorithm is the total number of edge traversals by both agents until their meeting. The only previous deterministic algorithm solving this problem has cost exponential in the size of the graph and in the larger label. In this paper we present a deterministic rendezvous algorithm with cost polynomial in the size of the graph and in the length of the smaller label. Hence we decrease the cost exponentially in the size of the graph and doubly exponentially in the labels of agents. As an application of our rendezvous algorithm we solve several fundamental problems involving teams of unknown size larger than 1 of labeled agents moving asynchronously in unknown networks. Among them are the following problems: team size, in which every agent has to find the total number of agents, leader election, in which all agents have to output the label of a single agent, perfect renaming in which all agents have to adopt new different labels from the set 1,...,k , where k is the number of agents, and gossiping, in which each agent has initially a piece of information (value) and all agents have to output all the values. Using our rendezvous algorithm we solve all these problems at cost polynomial in the size of the graph and in the smallest length of all labels of participating agents. We study the existence of allocations of indivisible goods that are envy-free up to one good (EF1), under the additional constraint that each bundle needs to be connected in an underlying item graph G. When the items are arranged in a path, we show that EF1 allocations are guaranteed to exist for arbitrary monotonic utility functions over bundles, provided that either there are at most four agents, or there are any number of agents but they all have identical utility functions. Our existence proofs are based on classical arguments from the divisible cake-cutting setting, and involve discrete analogues of cut-and-choose, of Stromquist's moving-knife protocol, and of the Su-Simmons argument based on Sperner's lemma. Sperner's lemma can also be used to show that on a path, an EF2 allocation exists for any number of agents. Except for the results using Sperner's lemma, all of our procedures can be implemented by efficient algorithms. Our positive results for paths imply the existence of connected EF1 or EF2 allocations whenever G is traceable, i.e., contains a Hamiltonian path. For the case of two agents, we completely characterize the class of graphs @math that guarantee the existence of EF1 allocations as the class of graphs whose biconnected components are arranged in a path. This class is strictly larger than the class of traceable graphs; one can be check in linear time whether a graph belongs to this class, and if so return an EF1 allocation.