Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have gained much attention in recent years for both commercial and military applications. The progress in this field has gained much popularity and the research has encompassed various fields of scientific domain. Cyber securing a UAV communication has been one of the active research field since the attack on Predator UAV video stream hijacking in 2009. Since UAVs rely heavily on on-board autopilot to function, it is important to develop an autopilot system that is robust to possible cyber attacks. In this work, we present a biometric system to encrypt the UAV communication by generating a key which is derived from Beta component of the EEG signal of a user. We have developed a safety mechanism that would be activated in case the communication of the UAV from the ground control station gets attacked. This system has been validated on a commercial UAV under malicious attack conditions during which we implement a procedure where the UAV return safely to a "home" position.
An interesting perspective which attempts to solve the cyber-security aspect of UAVs considers the whole scenario of vendor and an attacker as a zero-sum network interdiction game. It is represented as a game where the vendor, also assumed an evader, seeks to choose the optimal path strategy for its UAV, from a source location to a destination location, to evade attacks along the way and minimize its expected delivery time. On the other hand, the attacker or interdictor, aims at choosing the optimal attack locations along the paths traversed by the UAV to interdict the UAV, causing cyber or physical damage, with the goal of maximizing the travel time. Later on it is shown that this network interdiction game is equivalent to a zero-sum matrix game whose Nash equilibrium (NE) can be derived by solving two linear programming (LP) problems. Solving the LP's would give the expected delivery time under different conditions @cite_19 .
@cite_19
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The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as delivery systems of online goods is rapidly becoming a global norm, as corroborated by Amazon's “Prime Air” and Google's “Project Wing” projects. However, the real-world deployment of such drone delivery systems faces many cyber-physical security challenges. In this paper, a novel mathematical framework for analyzing and enhancing the security of drone delivery systems is introduced. In this regard, a zero-sum network interdiction game is formulated between a vendor, operating a drone delivery system, and a malicious attacker. In this game, the vendor seeks to find the optimal path that its UAV should follow, to deliver a purchase from the vendor's warehouse to a customer location, to minimize the delivery time. Meanwhile, an attacker seeks to choose an optimal location to interdict the potential paths of the UAVs, so as to inflict cyber or physical damage to it, thus, maximizing its delivery time. First, the Nash equilibrium point of this game is characterized. Then, to capture the subjective behavior of both the vendor and attacker, new notions from prospect theory are incorporated into the game. These notions allow capturing the vendor's and attacker's i) subjective perception of attack success probabilities, and ii) their disparate subjective valuations of the achieved delivery times relative to a certain target delivery time. Simulation results have shown that the subjective decision making of the vendor and attacker leads to adopting risky path selection strategies which inflict delays to the delivery, thus, yielding unexpected delivery times which surpass the target delivery time set by the vendor. This paper addresses the control of a team of autonomous agents pursuing a smart evader in a non-accurately mapped terrain. By describing the problem as a partial information Markov game, we are able to integrate map-learning and pursuit. We propose receding horizon control policies, in which the pursuers and the evader try to respectively maximize and minimize the probability of capture at the next time instant. Since this probability is conditioned to distinct observations for each team, the resulting game is nonzero-sum. When the evader has access to the pursuers' information, we show that a Nash solution to the one-step nonzero-sum game always exists. Moreover, we propose a method to compute the Nash equilibrium policies by solving an equivalent zero-sum matrix game. A simulation example shows the feasibility of the proposed approach. We consider the problem of having a team of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) pursue a second team of evaders while concurrently building a map in an unknown environment. We cast the problem in a probabilistic game theoretical framework, and consider two computationally feasible greedy pursuit policies: local-mar and global-max. To implement this scenario on real UAVs and UGVs, we propose a distributed hierarchical hybrid system architecture which emphasizes the autonomy of each agent, yet allows for coordinated team efforts. We describe the implementation of the architecture on a fleet of UAVs and UGVs, detailing components such as high-level pursuit policy computation, map building and interagent communication, and low-level navigation, sensing, and control. We present both simulation and experimental results of real pursuit-evasion games involving our fleet of UAVs and UGVs, and evaluate the pursuit policies relating expected capture times to the speed and intelligence of the evaders and the sensing capabilities of the pursuers. This paper studies an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)-enabled multicasting system, where a UAV is dispatched to disseminate a common file to a number of geographically distributed ground terminals (GTs). Our objective is to design the UAV trajectory to minimize its mission completion time, while ensuring that each GT is able to successfully recover the file with a high probability required. We consider the use of practical random linear network coding (RLNC) for UAV multicasting, so that each GT is able to recover the file as long as it receives a sufficiently large number of coded packets. However, the formulated UAV trajectory optimization problem is non-convex and difficult to be directly solved. To tackle this issue, we first derive an analytical lower bound for the success probability of each GT's file recovery. Based on this result, we then reformulate the problem into a more tractable form, where the UAV trajectory only needs to be designed to meet a set of constraints each on the minimum connection time with a GT, during which their distance is below a designed threshold. We show that the optimal UAV trajectory only needs to constitute connected line segments, thus it can be obtained by determining first the optimal set of waypoints and then UAV speed along the lines connecting the waypoints. We propose practical schemes for the waypoints design based on a novel concept of virtual base station (VBS) placement and by applying convex optimization techniques. Furthermore, for given set of waypoints, we obtain the optimal UAV speed over the resulting path efficiently by solving a linear programming (LP) problem. Numerical results show that the proposed UAV-enabled multicasting with optimized trajectory design achieves significant performance gains as compared to benchmark schemes.