As the Internet struggles to cope with scalability, mobility, and security issues, new network architectures are being proposed to better accommodate the needs of modern systems and applications. In particular, Content-Oriented Networking (CON) has emerged as a promising next-generation Internet architecture: it sets to decouple content from hosts, at the network layer, by naming data rather than hosts. CON comes with a potential for a wide range of benefits, including reduced congestion and improved delivery speed by means of content caching, simpler configuration of network devices, and security at the data level. However, it remains an interesting open question whether or not, and to what extent, this emerging networking paradigm bears new privacy challenges. In this paper, we provide a systematic privacy analysis of CON and the common building blocks among its various architectural instances in order to highlight emerging privacy threats, and analyze a few potential countermeasures. Finally, we present a comparison between CON and today's Internet in the context of a few privacy concepts, such as, anonymity, censoring, traceability, and confidentiality.
Our work extends that in @cite_48 @cite_37 by encompassing all privacy aspects: caching, naming, signature, and content. Also, it is more general as it does not only consider CCN @cite_27 , but CON in general, independently of the specific instantiation. Furthermore, when suggesting countermeasures, we only propose techniques that can be applied with a minimal change to the architecture.
@cite_48 @cite_37 @cite_27
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Content-Centric Networking (CCN) is an emerging paradigm being considered as a possible replacement for the current IP-based host-centric Internet infrastructure. In CCN, named content - rather than addressable hosts - becomes a first-class entity. Content is therefore decoupled from its location. This allows, among other things, the implementation of ubiquitous caching. Named-Data Networking (NDN) is a prominent example of CCN. In NDN, all nodes (i.e., hosts, routers) are allowed to have a local cache, used to satisfy incoming requests for content. This makes NDN a good architecture for efficient large scale content distribution. However, reliance on caching allows an adversary to perform attacks that are very effective and relatively easy to implement. Such attacks include cache poisoning (i.e., introducing malicious content into caches) and cache pollution (i.e., disrupting cache locality). This paper focuses on cache pollution attacks, where the adversary's goal is to disrupt cache locality to increase link utilization and cache misses for honest consumers. We show, via simulations, that such attacks can be implemented in NDN using limited resources, and that their effectiveness is not limited to small topologies. We then illustrate that existing proactive countermeasures are ineffective against realistic adversaries. Finally, we introduce a new technique for detecting pollution attacks. Our technique detects high and low rate attacks on different topologies with high accuracy. Named Data Networking architectures have been proposed to improve various shortcomings of the current Internet architecture. A key part of these proposals is the capability of caching arbitrary content in arbitrary network locations. While caching has the potential to improve network performance, the data stored in caches can be seen as transient traces of past communication that attackers can exploit to compromise the users' privacy. With this editorial note, we aim to raise awareness of privacy attacks as an intrinsic and relevant issue in Named Data Networking architectures. Countermeasures against privacy attacks are subject to a trade-off between performance and privacy. We discuss several approaches to countermeasures representing different incarnations of this tradeoff, along with open issues to be looked at by the research community. Caching scheme will change the original feature of the network in Content Centric Networking (CCN). So it becomes a challenge to describe the caching node importance according to network traffic and user behavior. In this work, a new metric named Request Influence Degree (RID) is defined to reflect the degree of node importance. Then the caching performance of CCN has been addressed with specially focusing on the size of individual CCN router caches. Finally, a newly content store space heterogeneous allocation scheme based on the metric RID across the CCN network has been proposed. Numerical experiments reveal that the new scheme can decrease the routing stretch and the source server load contrasting that of the homogeneous assignment and several graph-related centrality metrics allocations. The fast-growing Internet traffic is increasingly becoming content-based and driven by mobile users, with users more interested in data rather than its source. This has precipitated the need for an information-centric Internet architecture. Research in information-centric networks (ICNs) have resulted in novel architectures, e.g., CCN NDN, DONA, and PSIRP PURSUIT; all agree on named data based addressing and pervasive caching as integral design components. With network-wide content caching, enforcement of content access control policies become non-trivial. Each caching node in the network needs to enforce access control policies with the help of the content provider. This becomes inefficient and prone to unbounded latencies especially during provider outages. In this paper, we propose an efficient access control framework for ICN, which allows legitimate users to access and use the cached content directly, and does not require verification authentication by an online provider authentication server or the content serving router. This framework would help reduce the impact of system down-time from server outages and reduce delivery latency by leveraging caching while guaranteeing access only to legitimate users. Experimental simulation results demonstrate the suitability of this scheme for all users, but particularly for mobile users, especially in terms of the security and latency overheads.