This paper is focused on privacy issues related to the prefix part of IPv6 addresses. Long-lived prefixes may introduce additional tracking opportunities for communication partners and third parties. We outline a number of prefix alteration schemes that may be deployed to maintain the unlinkability of users' activities. While none of the schemes will solve all privacy problems on the Internet on their own, we argue that the development of practical prefix alteration techniques constitutes a worthwile avenue to pursue: They would allow Internet Service Providers to increase the attainable privacy level well above the status quo in today's IPv4 networks.
Lindqvist and Tapio @cite_6 propose to implement a technique in the operating system of networked clients. Instead of only changing IP addresses, their solution takes into account that identifiers on other layers of the network stack can also be used to track users (e. ,g., MAC addresses and port numbers). The design requires a locally installed translation daemon that replaces all identifiers on all layers at once for every new outbound flow of the client, which ensures that consecutive as well as concurrent activities remain unlinkable. A prototypical implementation of the system is shown to be compatible with several well-known Linux applications. As it solely operates on the client side, protocol stack virtualisation cannot influence the provider-controlled address prefixes, though.
@cite_6
2093480120 2115367411 2103376620 2017648294
Previously proposed host-based privacy protection mechanisms use pseudorandom or disposable identifiers on some or all layers of the protocol stack. These approaches either require changes to all hosts participating in the communication or do not provide privacy for the whole protocol stack or the system. Building on previous work, we propose a relatively simple approach: protocol stack virtualization. The key idea is to provide isolation for traffic sent to the network. The granularity of the isolation can be, for example, flow or process based. With process based granularity, every application uses a distinct identifier space on all layers of the protocol stack. This approach does not need any infrastructure support from the network and requires only minor changes to the single host that implements the privacy protection mechanism. To show that no changes to typical applications are required, we implemented the protocol stack virtualization as a user space daemon and tested it with various legacy applications. We present a new distributed checkpoint-restart mechanism, Cruz, that works without requiring application, library, or base kernel modifications. This mechanism provides comprehensive support for checkpointing and restoring application state, both at user level and within the OS. Our implementation builds on Zap, a process migration mechanism, implemented as a Linux kernel module, which operates by interposing a thin layer between applications and the OS. In particular, we enable support for networked applications by adding migratable IP and MAC addresses, and checkpoint-restart of socket buffer state, socket options, and TCP state. We leverage this capability to devise a novel method for coordinated checkpoint-restart that is simpler than prior approaches. For instance, it eliminates the need to flush communication channels by exploiting the packet re-transmission behavior of TCP and existing OS support for packet filtering. Our experiments show that the overhead of coordinating checkpoint-restart is negligible, demonstrating the scalability of this approach. Internet services run on multiple servers in different locations, serving clients that are often mobile and multihomed. This does not match well with today's network stack, designed for communication between fixed hosts with topology-dependent addresses. As a result, online service providers resort to clumsy and management-intensive work-arounds--forfeiting the scalability of hierarchical addressing to support virtual server migration, directing all client traffic through dedicated load balancers, restarting connections when hosts move, and so on. In this paper, we revisit the design of the network stack to meet the needs of online services. The centerpiece of our Serval architecture is a new Service Access Layer (SAL) that sits above an unmodified network layer, and enables applications to communicate directly on service names. The SAL provides a clean service-level control data plane split, enabling policy, control, and in-stack name-based routing that connects clients to services via diverse discovery techniques. By tying active sockets to the control plane, applications trigger updates to service routing state upon invoking socket calls, ensuring up-to-date service resolution. With Serval, end-points can seamlessly change network addresses, migrate flows across interfaces, or establish additional flows for efficient and uninterrupted service access. Experiments with our high-performance in-kernel prototype, and several example applications, demonstrate the value of a unified networking solution for online services. In this paper, we model Probabilistic Packet Marking (PPM) schemes for IP traceback as an identification problem of a large number of markers. Each potential marker is associated with a distribution on tags, which are short binary strings. To mark a packet, a marker follows its associated distribution in choosing the tag to write in the IP header. Since there are a large number of (for example, over 4,000) markers, what the victim receives are samples from a mixture of distributions. Essentially, traceback aims to identify individual distribution contributing to the mixture. Guided by this model, we propose Random Packet Marking (RPM), a scheme that uses a simple but effective approach. RPM does not require sophisticated structure relationship among the tags, and employs a hop-by-hop reconstruction similar to AMS [16]. Simulations show improved scalability and traceback accuracy over prior works. For example, in a large network with over 100K nodes, 4,650 markers induce 63 of false positives in terms of edges identification using the AMS marking scheme; while RPM lowers it to 2 . The effectiveness of RPM demonstrates that with prior knowledge of neighboring nodes, a simple and properly designed marking scheme suffices in identifying large number of markers with high accuracy.