Driverless vehicles are expected to form the foundation of future connected transport infrastructure. A key weakness of connected vehicles is their vulnerability to physical-proximity attacks such as sensor saturation attacks. It is natural to study whether such attacks can be used to disrupt swarms of autonomous vehicles used as part of a large fleet providing taxi and courier delivery services. In this paper, we start to examine the strategic options available to attackers and defenders (autonomous-fleet operators) in such conflicts. We find that attackers have the upper hand in most cases and are able to carry out crippling denial-of-service attacks on fleets, by leveraging the inherent deficiencies of road networks identified by techniques from graph analysis. Experimental results on ten cities using real-world courier traces shows that most cities will require upgraded infrastructure to defend driverless vehicles against denial-of-service attacks. We found several hidden costs that impact equipment designers and operators of driverless vehicles - not least, that road-networks need to be redesigned for robustness against attacks thus raising some fundamental questions about the benefits.
A particular form of hider-seeker game called an interdiction game @cite_21 which was originally developed to understand and intercept drug smuggling in the 90s. In an interdiction game, one or more smugglers (hiders) attempt to traverse a path between two nodes on a network while the police (seeker) patrol certain routes intensively to interdict smugglers. Both the players are intelligent and adapt to eachother to avoid being predictable. Our work uses Wood's game formulation as the starting point.
@cite_21
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In a pursuit-evasion game, a team of pursuers attempt to capture an evader. The players alternate turns, move with equal speed, and have full information about the state of the game. We consider the most restrictive capture condition: a pursuer must become colocated with the evader to win the game. We prove two general results about this adversarial motion planning problem in geometric spaces. First, we show that one pursuer has a winning strategy in any compact CAT(0) space. This complements a result of Alexander, Bishop and Ghrist, who provide a winning strategy for a game with positive capture radius. Second, we consider the game played in a compact domain in Euclidean two-space with piecewise analytic boundary and arbitrary Euler characteristic. We show that three pursuers always have a winning strategy by extending recent work of Bhadauria, Klein, Isler and Suri from polygonal environments to our more general setting. We consider search games in which the searcher moves along a continuous trajectory in a set Q until he captures the hider, where Q is either a network or a two (or more) dimensional region. We distinguish between two types of games; in the first type which is considered in the first part of the paper, the hider is immobile while in the second type of games which is considered in the rest of the paper, the hider is mobile. A complete solution is presented for some of the games, while for others only upper and lower bounds are given and some open problems associated with those games are presented for further research. In this paper, we present a game-theoretic analysis of a visibility-based pursuit-evasion game in a planar environment containing obstacles. The pursuer and the evader are holonomic having bounded speeds. Both players have a complete map of the environment. Both players have omnidirectional vision and have knowledge about each other's current position as long as they are visible to each other. The pursuer wants to maintain visibility of the evader for the maximum possible time and the evader wants to escape the pursuer's sight as soon as possible. Under this information structure, we present necessary and sufficient conditions for surveillance and escape. We present strategies for the players that are in Nash equilibrium. The strategies are a function of the value of the game. Using these strategies, we construct a value function by integrating the adjoint equations backward in time from the termination situations provided by the corners in the environment. From these value functions we recompute the control strategies for the players to obtain optimal trajectories for the players near the termination situation. This is the first work that presents the necessary and sufficient conditions for tracking for a visibility based pursuit-evasion game and presents the equilibrium strategies for the players. In the (zero-sum) search game Γ(G, x) proposed by Isaacs, the Hider picks a point H in the network G and the Searcher picks a unit speed path S(t) in G with S(0) = x. The payoff to the maximizing Hider is the time T = T(S, H) = min t : S(t) = H required for the Searcher to find the Hider. An extensive theory of such games has been developed in the literature. This paper considers the related games Γ(G), where the requirement S(0) = x is dropped, and the Searcher is allowed to choose his starting point. This game has been solved by Dagan and Gal for the important case where G is a tree, and by Alpern for trees with Eulerian networks attached. Here, we extend those results to a wider class of networks, employing theory initiated by Reijnierse and Potters and completed by Gal, for the fixed-start games Γ(G, x). Our results may be more easily interpreted as determining the best worst-case method of searching a network from an arbitrary starting point.