It has been shown that for a general-valued constraint language Γ the following statements are equivalent: (1) any instance of VCSP(Γ) can be solved to optimality using a constant level of the Sherali-Adams LP hierarchy; (2) any instance of VCSP(Γ) can be solved to optimality using the third level of the Sherali-Adams LP hierarchy; (3) the support of Γ satisfies the "bounded width condition", i.e., it contains weak near-unanimity operations of all arities. We show that if the support of Γ violates the bounded with condition then not only is VCSP(Γ) not solved by a constant level of the Sherali-Adams LP hierarchy but it is also not solved by Ω(n) levels of the Lasserre SDP hierarchy (also known as the sum-of-squares SDP hierarchy). For Γ corresponding to linear equations in an Abelian group, this result follows from existing work on inapproximability of Max-CSPs. By a breakthrough result of Lee, Raghavendra, and Steurer [STOC'15], our result implies that for any Γ whose support violates the bounded width condition no SDP relaxation of polynomial-size solves VCSP(Γ). We establish our result by proving that various reductions preserve exact solvability by the Lasserre SDP hierarchy (up to a constant factor in the level of the hierarchy). Our results hold for general-valued constraint languages, i.e., sets of functions on a fixed finite domain that take on rational or infinite values, and thus also hold in notable special cases of 0, ∞ -valued languages (CSPs), 0, 1 -valued languages (Min-CSPs Max-CSPs), and Q-valued languages (finite-valued CSPs).
In our main result, Theorem , the BWC is required to hold, as in @cite_53 , for the support of the fractional polymorphisms @cite_49 of the general-valued CSPs. Intuitively, fractional polymorphisms of a general-valued CSP instance @math are probability distributions over polymorphisms of @math with some desirable properties. (A formal definition is given in .) This is a natural requirement since polymorphisms do not capture the complexity of general-valued CSPs but the fractional polymorphisms do so @cite_49 @cite_25 .
@cite_53 @cite_25 @cite_49
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Let @math be a nontrivial @math -ary predicate. Consider a random instance of the constraint satisfaction problem @math on @math variables with @math constraints, each being @math applied to @math randomly chosen literals. Provided the constraint density satisfies @math , such an instance is unsatisfiable with high probability. The problem is to efficiently find a proof of unsatisfiability. We show that whenever the predicate @math supports a @math - probability distribution on its satisfying assignments, the sum of squares (SOS) algorithm of degree @math (which runs in time @math ) refute a random instance of @math . In particular, the polynomial-time SOS algorithm requires @math constraints to refute random instances of CSP @math when @math supports a @math -wise uniform distribution on its satisfying assignments. Together with recent work of [LRS15], our result also implies that polynomial-size semidefinite programming relaxation for refutation requires at least @math constraints. Our results (which also extend with no change to CSPs over larger alphabets) subsume all previously known lower bounds for semialgebraic refutation of random CSPs. For every constraint predicate @math , they give a three-way hardness tradeoff between the density of constraints, the SOS degree (hence running time), and the strength of the refutation. By recent algorithmic results of [AOW15] and [RRS16], this full three-way tradeoff is , up to lower-order factors. We initiate a study of when the value of mathematical relaxations such as linear and semi-definite programs for constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs) is approximately preserved when restricting the instance to a sub-instance induced by a small random subsample of the variables. Let C be a family of CSPs such as 3SAT, Max-Cut, etc., and let Π be a mathematical program that is a relaxation for C, in the sense that for every instance P ∈ C, Π(P) is a number in [0, 1] upper bounding the maximum fraction of satisfiable constraints of P. Loosely speaking, we say that subsampling holds for C and Π if for every sufficiently dense instance P ∈ C and every e > 0, if we let P' be the instance obtained by restricting P to a sufficiently large constant number of variables, then Π(P') ∈ (1 ± e)Π(P). We say that weak subsampling holds if the above guarantee is replaced with Π(P') = 1 − θ(γ) whenever Π(P) = 1 − γ, where θ hides only absolute constants. We obtain both positive and negative results, showing that: 1. Subsampling holds for the BasicLP and BasicSDP programs. BasicSDP is a variant of the semi-definite program considered by Raghavendra (2008), who showed it gives an optimal approximation factor for every constraint-satisfaction problem under the unique games conjecture. BasicLP is the linear programming analog of BasicSDP. 2. For tighter versions of BasicSDP obtained by adding additional constraints from the Lasserre hierarchy, weak subsampling holds for CSPs of unique games type. 3. There are non-unique CSPs for which even weak subsampling fails for the above tighter semi-definite programs. Also there are unique CSPs for which (even weak) subsampling fails for the Sherali-Adams linear programming hierarchy. As a corollary of our weak subsampling for strong semi-definite programs, we obtain a polynomial-time algorithm to certify that random geometric graphs (of the type considered by Feige and Schechtman, 2002) of max-cut value 1 − γ have a cut value at most 1 − γ 10. More generally, our results give an approach to obtaining average-case algorithms for CSPs using semi-definite programming hierarchies. Random constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs) are known to exhibit threshold phenomena: given a uniformly random instance of a CSP with @math variables and @math clauses, there is a value of @math beyond which the CSP will be unsatisfiable with high probability. Strong refutation is the problem of certifying that no variable assignment satisfies more than a constant fraction of clauses; this is the natural algorithmic problem in the unsatisfiable regime (when @math ). Intuitively, strong refutation should become easier as the clause density @math grows, because the contradictions introduced by the random clauses become more locally apparent. For CSPs such as @math -SAT and @math -XOR, there is a long-standing gap between the clause density at which efficient strong refutation algorithms are known, @math , and the clause density at which instances become unsatisfiable with high probability, @math . In this paper, we give spectral and sum-of-squares algorithms for strongly refuting random @math -XOR instances with clause density @math in time @math or in @math rounds of the sum-of-squares hierarchy, for any @math and any integer @math . Our algorithms provide a smooth transition between the clause density at which polynomial-time algorithms are known at @math , and brute-force refutation at the satisfiability threshold when @math . We also leverage our @math -XOR results to obtain strong refutation algorithms for SAT (or any other Boolean CSP) at similar clause densities. Our algorithms match the known sum-of-squares lower bounds due to Grigoriev and Schonebeck, up to logarithmic factors. Additionally, we extend our techniques to give new results for certifying upper bounds on the injective tensor norm of random tensors. In this paper, we propose a framework to study a general class of strategic behavior in voting, which we call vote operations. We prove the following theorem: if we fix the number of alternatives, generate @math votes i.i.d. according to a distribution @math , and let @math go to infinity, then for any @math , with probability at least @math , the minimum number of operations that are needed for the strategic individual to achieve her goal falls into one of the following four categories: (1) 0, (2) @math , (3) @math , and (4) @math . This theorem holds for any set of vote operations, any individual vote distribution @math , and any integer generalized scoring rule, which includes (but is not limited to) almost all commonly studied voting rules, e.g., approval voting, all positional scoring rules (including Borda, plurality, and veto), plurality with runoff, Bucklin, Copeland, maximin, STV, and ranked pairs. We also show that many well-studied types of strategic behavior fall under our framework, including (but not limited to) constructive destructive manipulation, bribery, and control by adding deleting votes, margin of victory, and minimum manipulation coalition size. Therefore, our main theorem naturally applies to these problems.