Efficient transfers to many recipients present a host of issues on Ethereum. First, accounts are identified by long and incompressible constants. Second, these constants have to be stored and communicated for each payment. Third, the standard interface for token transfers does not support lists of recipients, adding repeated communication to the overhead. Since Ethereum charges resource usage, even small optimizations translate to cost savings. Airdrops, a popular marketing tool used to boost coin uptake, present a relevant example for the value of optimizing bulk transfers. Therefore, we review technical solutions for airdrops of Ethereum-based tokens, discuss features and prerequisites, and compare the operational costs by simulating 35 scenarios. We find that cost savings of factor two are possible, but require specific provisions in the smart contract implementing the token system. Pull-based approaches, which use on-chain interaction with the recipients, promise moderate savings for the distributor while imposing a disproportional cost on each recipient. Total costs are broadly linear in the number of recipients independent of the technical approach. We publish the code of the simulation framework for reproducibility, to support future airdrop decisions, and to benchmark innovative bulk payment solutions.
Airdrops are a rather new topic. We are aware of one academic paper only. Harrigan @cite_18 raises awareness for privacy implications of airdrops when identifiers of one chain () are reused to distribute coins on another chain (). Sharing identifiers between chains in general gives additional clues for address clustering.
@cite_18
2891594175 2249121382 2104261947 2124071994
Airdrops are a popular method of distributing cryptocurrencies and tokens. While often considered risk-free from the point of view of recipients, their impact on privacy is easily overlooked. We examine the Clam airdrop of 2014, a forerunner to many of today's airdrops, that distributed a new cryptocurrency to every address with a non-dust balance on the Bitcoin, Litecoin and Dogecoin blockchains. Specifically, we use address clustering to try to construct the one-to-many mappings from entities to addresses on the blockchains, individually and in combination. We show that the sharing of addresses between the blockchains is a privacy risk. We identify instances where an entity has disclosed information about their address ownership on the Bitcoin, Litecoin and Dogecoin blockchains, exclusively via their activity on the Clam blockchain. We introduce autonomous gossiping (A G), a new genre epidemic algorithm for selective dissemination of information in contrast to previous usage of epidemic algorithms which flood the whole network. A G is a paradigm which suits well in a mobile ad-hoc networking (MANET) environment because it does not require any infrastructure or middleware like multicast tree and (un)subscription maintenance for publish subscribe, but uses ecological and economic principles in a self-organizing manner in order to achieve any arbitrary selectivity (flexible casting). The trade-off of using a stateless self-organizing mechanism like A G is that it does not guarantee completeness deterministically as is one of the original objectives of alternate selective dissemination schemes like publish subscribe. We argue that such incompleteness is not a problem in many non-critical real-life civilian application scenarios and realistic node mobility patterns, where the overhead of infrastructure maintenance may outweigh the benefits of completeness, more over, at present there exists no mechanism to realize publish subscribe or other paradigms for selective dissemination in MANET environments. Recent web-based applications offer users free service in exchange for access to personal communication, such as on-line email services and instant messaging. The inspection and retention of user communication is generally intended to enable targeted marketing. However, unless specifically stated otherwise by the collecting service's privacy policy, such records have an indefinite lifetime and may be later used or sold without restriction. In this paper, we show that it is possible to protect a user's privacy from these risks by exploiting mutually oblivious, competing communication channels. We create virtual channels over online services (e.g., Google's Gmail, Microsoft's Hotmail) through which messages and cryptographic keys are delivered. The message recipient uses a shared secret to identify the shares and ultimately recover the original plaintext. In so doing, we create a wired “spread-spectrum” mechanism for protecting the privacy of web-based communication. We discuss the design and implementation of our open-source Java applet, Aquinas, and consider ways that the myriad of communication channels present on the Internet can be exploited to preserve privacy. Secure communications can be impeded by eavesdroppers in conventional relay systems. This paper proposes cooperative jamming strategies for two-hop relay networks where the eavesdropper can wiretap the relay channels in both hops. In these approaches, the normally inactive nodes in the relay network can be used as cooperative jamming sources to confuse the eavesdropper. Linear precoding schemes are investigated for two scenarios where single or multiple data streams are transmitted via a decode-and-forward (DF) relay, under the assumption that global channel state information (CSI) is available. For the case of single data stream transmission, we derive closed-form jamming beamformers and the corresponding optimal power allocation. Generalized singular value decomposition (GSVD)-based secure relaying schemes are proposed for the transmission of multiple data streams. The optimal power allocation is found for the GSVD relaying scheme via geometric programming. Based on this result, a GSVD-based cooperative jamming scheme is proposed that shows significant improvement in terms of secrecy rate compared to the approach without jamming. Furthermore, the case involving an eavesdropper with unknown CSI is also investigated in this paper. Simulation results show that the secrecy rate is dramatically increased when inactive nodes in the relay network participate in cooperative jamming.