This paper considers a class of reinforcement-learning that belongs to the family of Learning Automata and provides a stochastic-stability analysis in strategic-form games. For this class of dynamics, convergence to pure Nash equilibria has been demonstrated only for the fine class of potential games. Prior work primarily provides convergence properties of the dynamics through stochastic approximations, where the asymptotic behavior can be associated with the limit points of an ordinary-differential equation (ODE). However, analyzing global convergence through the ODE-approximation requires the existence of a Lyapunov or a potential function, which naturally restricts the applicabity of these algorithms to a fine class of games. To overcome these limitations, this paper introduces an alternative framework for analyzing stochastic-stability that is based upon an explicit characterization of the (unique) invariant probability measure of the induced Markov chain.
Similar questions of convergence to Nash equilibria also appear in alternative reinforcement learning formulations, such as approximate dynamic programming methodologies and @math -learning. However, this is usually accomplished under a stronger set of assumptions, which increases the computational complexity of the dynamics. For example, the Nash-Q learning algorithm of @cite_3 addresses the problem of maximizing the discounted expected rewards for each agent by updating an approximation of the cost-to-go function (or @math -values). Alternative objectives may be used, such as the minimax criterion of @cite_9 . However, it is indirectly assumed that agents need to have full access to the joint action space and the rewards received by the other agents.
@cite_9 @cite_3
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We extend Q-learning to a noncooperative multiagent context, using the framework of general-sum stochastic games. A learning agent maintains Q-functions over joint actions, and performs updates based on assuming Nash equilibrium behavior over the current Q-values. This learning protocol provably converges given certain restrictions on the stage games (defined by Q-values) that arise during learning. Experiments with a pair of two-player grid games suggest that such restrictions on the game structure are not necessarily required. Stage games encountered during learning in both grid environments violate the conditions. However, learning consistently converges in the first grid game, which has a unique equilibrium Q-function, but sometimes fails to converge in the second, which has three different equilibrium Q-functions. In a comparison of offline learning performance in both games, we find agents are more likely to reach a joint optimal path with Nash Q-learning than with a single-agent Q-learning method. When at least one agent adopts Nash Q-learning, the performance of both agents is better than using single-agent Q-learning. We have also implemented an online version of Nash Q-learning that balances exploration with exploitation, yielding improved performance. Reinforcement learning can provide a robust and natural means for agents to learn how to coordinate their action choices in multi agent systems. We examine some of the factors that can influence the dynamics of the learning process in such a setting. We first distinguish reinforcement learners that are unaware of (or ignore) the presence of other agents from those that explicitly attempt to learn the value of joint actions and the strategies of their counterparts. We study (a simple form of) Q-leaming in cooperative multi agent systems under these two perspectives, focusing on the influence of that game structure and exploration strategies on convergence to (optimal and suboptimal) Nash equilibria. We then propose alternative optimistic exploration strategies that increase the likelihood of convergence to an optimal equilibrium. Model-free reinforcement learning algorithms, such as Q-learning, perform poorly in the early stages of learning in noisy environments, because much effort is spent unlearning biased estimates of the state-action value function. The bias results from selecting, among several noisy estimates, the apparent optimum, which may actually be suboptimal. We propose G-learning, a new off-policy learning algorithm that regularizes the value estimates by penalizing deterministic policies in the beginning of the learning process. We show that this method reduces the bias of the value-function estimation, leading to faster convergence to the optimal value and the optimal policy. Moreover, G-learning enables the natural incorporation of prior domain knowledge, when available. The stochastic nature of G-learning also makes it avoid some exploration costs, a property usually attributed only to on-policy algorithms. We illustrate these ideas in several examples, where G-learning results in significant improvements of the convergence rate and the cost of the learning process. The single-agent multi-armed bandit problem can be solved by an agent that learns the values of each action using reinforcement learning. However, the multi-agent version of the problem, the iterated normal form game, presents a more complex challenge, since the rewards available to each agent depend on the strategies of the others. We consider the behavior of value-based learning agents in this situation, and show that such agents cannot generally play at a Nash equilibrium, although if smooth best responses are used, a Nash distribution can be reached. We introduce a particular value-based learning algorithm, which we call individual Q-learning, and use stochastic approximation to study the asymptotic behavior, showing that strategies will converge to Nash distribution almost surely in 2-player zero-sum games and 2-player partnership games. Player-dependent learning rates are then considered, and it is shown that this extension converges in some games for which many algorithms, including the basic algorithm initially considered, fail to converge.