Dynamic security analysis is an important problem of power systems on ensuring safe operation and stable power supply even when certain faults occur. No matter if such faults are caused by vulnerabilities of system components, physical attacks, or cyber-attacks that are more related to cyber-security, they eventually affect the physical stability of a power system. Examples of the loss of physical stability include the Northeast Blackout of 2003 in North America and the 2015 system-wide blackout in Ukraine. The nonlinear hybrid nature, that is, nonlinear continuous dynamics integrated with discrete switching, and the high degree of freedom property of power system dynamics make it challenging to conduct the dynamic security analysis. In this article, we use the hybrid automaton model to describe the dynamics of a power system and mainly deal with the index-1 differential-algebraic equation models regarding the continuous dynamics in different discrete states. The analysis problem is formulated as a reachability problem of the associated hybrid model. A sampling-based algorithm is then proposed by integrating modeling and randomized simulation of the hybrid dynamics to search for a feasible execution connecting an initial state of the post-fault system and a target set in the desired operation mode. The proposed method enables the use of existing power system simulators for the synthesis of discrete switching and control strategies through randomized simulation. The effectiveness and performance of the proposed approach are demonstrated with an application to the dynamic security analysis of the New England 39-bus benchmark power system exhibiting hybrid dynamics. In addition to evaluating the dynamic security, the proposed method searches for a feasible strategy to ensure the dynamic security of the system in the face of disruptions.
The threat model of power systems has been studied in the context of CPS security under a unified framework @cite_58 , which consists the threats, vulnerabilities, attacks and controls from the security perspective and the cyber-, physical and cyber-physical components from the CPS components perspective. Cyber-security of power systems @cite_66 plays a significant role in managing power grid operations, due to the integration of information and communication technologies in power systems. The mechanism of typical cyber-attacks, such as false data injection attacks, data integrity attacks and DoS attacks, etc., has been studied using different models for power systems, together with detection and prevention strategies. In addition, testbeds @cite_42 have been established to evaluate vulnerabilities of smart grids.
@cite_58 @cite_42 @cite_66
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Abstract Estimating the possible impacts of security attacks on physical processes can help to rank the critical assets based on their sensitivity to performed attacks and predict their attractiveness from the attacker’s point of view. To address this challenge, this paper proposes a new method for assessing the direct and indirect impacts of attacks on cyber–physical systems (CPSs). The proposed method studies the dynamic behavior of systems in normal situation and under security attacks and evaluates the consequence propagation of attacks. The inputs to the model are control parameters including sensor readings and controller signals. The output of the model is evaluating the consequence propagation of attacks, ranking the important assets of systems based on their sensitivity to conducted attacks, and prioritizing the attacks based on their impacts on the behavior of system. The validation phase of the proposed method is performed by modeling and evaluating the consequence propagation of attacks against a boiling water power plant (BWPP). Cyber-physical systems (CPS) consist of sensors, actuators, and controllers all communicating over a network; if any subset becomes compromised, an attacker could cause significant damage. With access to data logs and a model of the CPS, the physical effects of an attack could potentially be detected before any damage is done. Manually building a model that is accurate enough in practice, however, is extremely difficult. In this paper, we propose a novel approach for constructing models of CPS automatically, by applying supervised machine learning to data traces obtained after systematically seeding their software components with faults ("mutants"). We demonstrate the efficacy of this approach on the simulator of a real-world water purification plant, presenting a framework that automatically generates mutants, collects data traces, and learns an SVM-based model. Using cross-validation and statistical model checking, we show that the learnt model characterises an invariant physical property of the system. Furthermore, we demonstrate the usefulness of the invariant by subjecting the system to 55 network and code-modification attacks, and showing that it can detect 85 of them from the data logs generated at runtime. Future power networks will be characterized by safe and reliable functionality against physical and cyber attacks. This paper proposes a unified framework and advanced monitoring procedures to detect and identify network components malfunction or measurements corruption caused by an omniscient adversary. We model a power system under cyber-physical attack as a linear time-invariant descriptor system with unknown inputs. Our attack model generalizes the prototypical stealth, (dynamic) false-data injection and replay attacks. We characterize the fundamental limitations of both static and dynamic procedures for attack detection and identification. Additionally, we design provably-correct (dynamic) detection and identification procedures based on tools from geometric control theory. Finally, we illustrate the effectiveness of our method through a comparison with existing (static) detection algorithms, and through a numerical study. Future power networks will be characterized by safe and reliable functionality against physical malfunctions and cyber attacks. This paper proposes a unified framework and advanced monitoring procedures to detect and identify network components malfunction or measurements corruption caused by an omniscient adversary. We model a power system under cyber-physical attack as a linear time-invariant descriptor system with unknown inputs. Our attack model generalizes the prototypical stealth, (dynamic) false-data injection and replay attacks. We characterize the fundamental limitations of both static and dynamic procedures for attack detection and identification. Additionally, we design provably-correct (dynamic) detection and identification procedures based on tools from geometric control theory. Finally, we illustrate the effectiveness of our method through a comparison with existing (static) detection algorithms, and through a numerical study.