In light of the rising demand for biometric-authentication systems, preventing face spoofing attacks is a critical issue for the safe deployment of face recognition systems. Here, we propose an efficient liveness detection algorithm that requires minimal hardware and only a small database, making it suitable for resource-constrained devices such as mobile phones. Utilizing one monocular visible light camera, the proposed algorithm takes two facial photos, one taken with a flash, the other without a flash. The proposed @math descriptor is constructed by leveraging two types of reflection: (i) specular reflections from the iris region that have a specific intensity distribution depending on liveness, and (ii) diffuse reflections from the entire face region that represents the 3D structure of a subject's face. Classifiers trained with @math descriptor outperforms other flash-based liveness detection algorithms on both an in-house database and on publicly available NUAA and Replay-Attack databases. Moreover, the proposed algorithm achieves comparable accuracy to that of an end-to-end, deep neural network classifier, while being approximately ten-times faster execution speed.
The current liveness detection technologies aimed against spoofing attacks are summarized below. Face spoofing attacks can be subdivided into two major categories: 2D attacks and 3D attacks. The former includes print-attacks and video-replay attacks, while the latter includes 3D spoofing mask attacks. Several publicly available face liveness databases simulate these attacks. To name a few, the NUAA @cite_20 and Print-Attack @cite_11 databases simulate photo attacks. The Replay-Attack @cite_28 and CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing @cite_26 datasets simulate replay attacks in addition to photo attacks. The 3D Mask Attack Database @cite_29 and HKBU-Mask Attack with Real World Variations @cite_14 simulate 3D mask attacks. Example countermeasures to each attack type are summarized below.
@cite_26 @cite_14 @cite_28 @cite_29 @cite_20 @cite_11
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Spoofing attacks mainly include printing artifacts, electronic screens and ultra-realistic face masks or models. In this paper, we propose a component-based face coding approach for liveness detection. The proposed method consists of four steps: (1) locating the components of face; (2) coding the low-level features respectively for all the components; (3) deriving the high-level face representation by pooling the codes with weights derived from Fisher criterion; (4) concatenating the histograms from all components into a classifier for identification. The proposed framework makes good use of micro differences between genuine faces and fake faces. Meanwhile, the inherent appearance differences among different components are retained. Extensive experiments on three published standard databases demonstrate that the method can achieve the best liveness detection performance in three databases. The problem of detecting face spoofing attacks (presentation attacks) has recently gained a well-deserved popularity. Mainly focusing on 2D attacks forged by displaying printed photos or replaying recorded videos on mobile devices, a significant portion of these studies ground their arguments on the flatness of the spoofing material in front of the sensor. In this paper, we inspect the spoofing potential of subject-specific 3D facial masks for 2D face recognition. Additionally, we analyze Local Binary Patterns based coun-termeasures using both color and depth data, obtained by Kinect. For this purpose, we introduce the 3D Mask Attack Database (3DMAD), the first publicly available 3D spoofing database, recorded with a low-cost depth camera. Extensive experiments on 3DMAD show that easily attainable facial masks can pose a serious threat to 2D face recognition systems and LBP is a powerful weapon to eliminate it. With the wide deployment of the face recognition systems in applications from deduplication to mobile device unlocking, security against the face spoofing attacks requires increased attention; such attacks can be easily launched via printed photos, video replays, and 3D masks of a face. We address the problem of face spoof detection against the print (photo) and replay (photo or video) attacks based on the analysis of image distortion ( e.g. , surface reflection, moire pattern, color distortion, and shape deformation) in spoof face images (or video frames). The application domain of interest is smartphone unlock, given that the growing number of smartphones have the face unlock and mobile payment capabilities. We build an unconstrained smartphone spoof attack database (MSU USSA) containing more than 1000 subjects. Both the print and replay attacks are captured using the front and rear cameras of a Nexus 5 smartphone. We analyze the image distortion of the print and replay attacks using different: 1) intensity channels (R, G, B, and grayscale); 2) image regions (entire image, detected face, and facial component between nose and chin); and 3) feature descriptors. We develop an efficient face spoof detection system on an Android smartphone. Experimental results on the public-domain Idiap Replay-Attack, CASIA FASD, and MSU-MFSD databases, and the MSU USSA database show that the proposed approach is effective in face spoof detection for both the cross-database and intra-database testing scenarios. User studies of our Android face spoof detection system involving 20 participants show that the proposed approach works very well in real application scenarios. There are several types of spoofing attacks to face recognition systems such as photograph, video or mask attacks. Recent studies show that face recognition systems are vulnerable to these attacks. In this paper, a countermeasure technique is proposed to protect face recognition systems against mask attacks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time a countermeasure is proposed to detect mask attacks. The reason for this delay is mainly due to the unavailability of public mask attacks databases. In this study, a 2D+3D face mask attacks database is used which is prepared for a research project in which the authors are all involved. The performance of the countermeasure is evaluated on both the texture images and the depth maps, separately. The results show that the proposed countermeasure gives satisfactory results using both the texture images and the depth maps. The performance of the countermeasure is observed to be slight better when the technique is applied on texture images instead of depth maps, which proves that face texture provides more information than 3D face shape characteristics using the proposed approach.