This paper is concerned with voting processes on graphs where each vertex holds one of two different opinions. In particular, we study the and the . Here at each synchronous and discrete time step, each vertex updates its opinion to match the majority among the opinions of two random neighbors and itself (the Best-of-two) or the opinions of three random neighbors (the Best-of-three). Previous studies have explored these processes on complete graphs and expander graphs, but we understand significantly less about their properties on graphs with more complicated structures. In this paper, we study the Best-of-two and the Best-of-three on the stochastic block model @math , which is a random graph consisting of two distinct Erdős-Renyi graphs @math joined by random edges with density @math . We obtain two main results. First, if @math and @math is a constant, we show that there is a phase transition in @math with threshold @math (specifically, @math for the Best-of-two, and @math for the Best-of-three). If @math , the process reaches consensus within @math steps for any initial opinion configuration with a bias of @math . By contrast, if @math , we show that, for any initial opinion configuration, the process reaches consensus within @math steps. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first result concerning multiple-choice voting for arbitrary initial opinion configurations on non-complete graphs.
Other studies have focused on voting processes with more general updating rules. Cooper and Rivera @cite_5 studied the linear voting model , whose updating rule is characterized by a set of @math binary matrices. This model covers the synchronous pull and the asynchronous push pull voting processes. However, it does not cover the Best-of-two and the Best-of-three. Schoenebeck and Yu @cite_0 studied asynchronous voting processes whose updating functions are majority-like (including the asynchronous Best-of- @math voting processes). They gave upper bounds on the consensus times of such models on dense Erd o s-R 'enyi random graphs using a potential technique.
@cite_0 @cite_5
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We study voting models on graphs. In the beginning, the vertices of a given graph have some initial opinion. Over time, the opinions on the vertices change by interactions between graph neighbours. Under suitable conditions the system evolves to a state in which all vertices have the same opinion. In this work, we consider a new model of voting, called the Linear Voting Model. This model can be seen as a generalization of several models of voting, including among others, pull voting and push voting. One advantage of our model is that, even though it is very general, it has a rich structure making the analysis tractable. In particular we are able to solve the basic question about voting, the probability that certain opinion wins the poll, and furthermore, given appropriate conditions, we are able to bound the expected time until some opinion wins. We introduce and study the reverse voter model, a dynamics for spin variables similar to the well‐known voter dynamics. The difference is in the way neighbors influence each other: once a node is selected and one among its neighbors chosen, the neighbor is made equal to the selected node, while in the usual voter dynamics the update goes in the opposite direction. The reverse voter dynamics is studied analytically, showing that on networks with degree distribution decaying as k−v, the time to reach consensus is linear in the system size N for all v > 2. The consensus time for link‐update voter dynamics is computed as well. We verify the results numerically on a class of uncorrelated scale‐free graphs. We study convergence properties of iterative voting procedures. Such procedures are defined by a voting rule and a (restricted) iterative process, where at each step one agent can modify his vote towards a better outcome for himself. It is already known that if the iteration dynamics (the manner in which voters are allowed to modify their votes) are unrestricted, then the voting process may not converge. For most common voting rules this may be observed even under the best response dynamics limitation. It is therefore important to investigate whether and which natural restrictions on the dynamics of iterative voting procedures can guarantee convergence. To this end, we provide two general conditions on the dynamics based on iterative myopic improvements, each of which is sufficient for convergence. We then identify several classes of voting rules (including Positional Scoring Rules, Maximin, Copeland and Bucklin), along with their corresponding iterative processes, for which at least one of these conditions hold. Distributed voting is a fundamental topic in distributed computing. In the standard model of pull voting, at each step every vertex chooses a neighbour uniformly at random and adopts its opinion. The voting is completed when all vertices hold the same opinion. In the simplest case, each vertex initially holds one of two different opinions. This partitions the vertices into arbitrary sets A and B. For many graphs, including regular graphs and irrespective of their expansion properties, if both A and B are sufficiently large sets, then pull voting requires @math expected steps, where n is the number of vertices of the graph. In this paper we consider a related class of voting processes based on sampling two opinions. In the simplest case, every vertex v chooses two random neighbours at each step. If both these neighbours have the same opinion, then v adopts this opinion. Otherwise, v keeps its own opinion. Let G be a connected graph with n vertices and m edges. Let P be the transition matrix of a simple random walk on G with second largest eigenvalue @math . We show that if the initial imbalance in degree between the two opinions satisfies @math , then with high probability voting completes in @math steps, and the opinion with the larger initial degree wins. The condition that @math , or only a bound on the conductance of the graph is known, the sampling process can be modified so that voting still provably completes in @math steps with high probability. The modification uses two sampling based on probing to a fixed depth @math from any vertex. In its most general form our voting process allows vertices to bias their sampling of opinions among their neighbours to achieve a desired outcome. This is done by allocating weights to edges.