Comparing to well protected data frames, Wi-Fi management frames (MFs) are extremely vulnerable to various attacks. Since MFs are transmitted without encryption, attackers can forge them easily. Such attacks can be detected in cooperative environment such as Wireless Intrusion Detection System (WIDS). However, in non-cooperative environment it is difficult for a single station to identify these spoofing attacks using Received Signal Strength (RSS)-based detection, due to the strong correlation of RSS to both the transmission power (Txpower) and the location of the sender. By exploiting some unique characteristics (i.e., rapid spatial decorrelation, independence of Txpower, and much richer dimensions) of the Channel State Information (CSI), a standard feature in 802.11n Specification, we design a prototype, called CSITE, to authenticate the Wi-Fi management frames by a single station without external support. Our design CSITE, built upon off-the-shelf hardware, achieves precise spoofing detection without collaboration and in-advance finger-print. Several novel techniques are designed to address the challenges caused by user mobility and channel dynamics. To verify the performances of our solution, we implement a prototype of our design and conduct extensive evaluations in various scenarios. Our test results show that our design significantly outperforms the RSS-based method in terms of accuracy, robustness, and efficiency: we observe about 8 times improvement by CSITE over RSS-based method on the falsely accepted attacking frames.
A new attack against PHY-layer authentication called was identified in @cite_19 . However, such attack is neither easy to launch due to the existence of , and it is not likely to succeed due to the MIMO configuration which introduces richer channel information.
@cite_19
2776818420 2149510322 1524013832 2509004749
Physical (PHY)-layer authentication systems can exploit channel state information of radio transmitters to detect spoofing attacks in wireless networks. The use of multiple landmarks each with multiple antennas enhances the spatial resolution of radio transmitters, and thus improves the spoofing detection accuracy of PHY-layer authentication. Unlike most existing PHY-layer authentication schemes that apply hypothesis tests and rely on the known radio channel model, we propose a logistic regression-based authentication to remove the assumption on the known channel model, and thus be applicable to more generic wireless networks. The Frank–Wolfe algorithm is used to estimate the parameters of the logistic regression model, in which the convex problem under a @math -norm constraint is solved for weight sparsity to avoid over-fitting in the learning process. We design a distributed Frank–Wolfe-based PHY-layer authentication to further reduce the communication overhead between the landmarks and the security agent. Then, we construct an incremental aggregated gradient-based scheme to provide online authentication with a higher accuracy and lower computation overhead. Simulation and experimental results validate the accuracy of the proposed authentication schemes, and show the reduced communication and computation overheads. We propose a PHY-authentication protocol to detect spoofing attacks in wireless networks, exploiting the rapid-decorrelation property of radio channels with distance. In this protocol, a PHY-authentication scheme that exploits channel estimations that already exist in most wireless systems, cooperates with any existing---either simple or advanced---higher-layer process, such as IEEE 802.11i. With little additional system overhead, our scheme reduces the workload of the higher-layer process, or provides some degree of spoofing protection for naked" wireless systems, such as some sensor networks. We describe the performance of our approach as a function of the spoofing pattern and the snapshot performance that can be easily measured through field tests. We discuss the implementation issues of the authentication protocol on 802.11 testbeds and verify its performance via field tests in a typical office building. We consider physical layer security of massive MIMO systems in TDD mode. We show that with massive MIMO a passive eavesdropper is not very dangerous and must therefore be active and attack the training phase. An attack on the training phase is potentially very harmful to the physical layer security, and we therefore investigate three different schemes for detecting the presence of an active eavesdropper. The three schemes differ in the location where the detection is done (base station, intended user, or jointly), and also in the level of system parameters that are assumed known to the base station and or intended user. Physical layer security (PHY-security) takes the advantages of channel randomness nature of transmission media to achieve communication confidentiality and authentication. Wiretap coding and signal processing technologies are expected to play vital roles in this new security mechanism. PHY-security has attracted a lot of attention due to its unique features and the fact that our daily life relies heavily on wireless communications for sensitive and private information transmissions. Compared to conventional cryptography that works to ensure all involved entities to load proper and authenticated cryptographic information, PHY-security technologies perform security functions without considering about how those security protocols are executed. In other words, it does not require to implement any extra security schemes or algorithms on other layers above the physical layer. This survey introduces the fundamental theories of PHY-security, covering confidentiality and authentication, and provides an overview on the state-of-the-art works on PHY-security technologies that can provide secure communications in wireless systems, along with the discussions on challenges and their proposed solutions. Furthermore, at the end of this paper, the open issues are identified as our future research directions.