We study security in partial repair in wireless caching networks where parts of the stored packets in the caching nodes are susceptible to be erased. Let us denote a caching node that has lost parts of its stored packets as a sick caching node and a caching node that has not lost any packet as a healthy caching node. In partial repair, a set of caching nodes (among sick and healthy caching nodes) broadcast information to other sick caching nodes to recover the erased packets. The broadcast information from a caching node is assumed to be received without any error by all other caching nodes. All the sick caching nodes then are able to recover their erased packets, while using the broadcast information and the nonerased packets in their storage as side information. In this setting, if an eavesdropper overhears the broadcast channels, it might obtain some information about the stored file. We thus study secure partial repair in the senses of information-theoretically strong and weak security. In both senses, we investigate the secrecy caching capacity, namely, the maximum amount of information which can be stored in the caching network such that there is no leakage of information during a partial repair process. We then deduce the strong and weak secrecy caching capacities, and also derive the sufficient finite field sizes for achieving the capacities. Finally, we propose optimal secure codes for exact partial repair, in which the recovered packets are exactly the same as erased packets.
More related works to our study are in @cite_27 @cite_26 @cite_11 @cite_12 where security in the repair problem of distributed storage systems has been studied. @cite_27 the repair problem in the presence of a passive eavesdropper (who can only intercept the data in a network) and in presence of an active eavesdropper (who can change the data in a network) has been studied and the strong secure codes have been suggested. @cite_12 , the secure regenerating codes using product matrix codes are suggested. Weak secure regenerating codes have been recently studied in @cite_11 . The previous studies of the repair problem in distributed storage systems assume a node or several nodes fail and all their stored packets are lost @cite_2 @cite_17 @cite_15 @cite_10 @cite_24 . Same assumption is also followed in the previous studies of the security in the repair problem @cite_27 @cite_26 @cite_11 @cite_12 . In a recent work, the authors in @cite_14 studied (partial) repair when parts of the packets in storage node are lost.
@cite_26 @cite_14 @cite_17 @cite_24 @cite_27 @cite_2 @cite_15 @cite_10 @cite_12 @cite_11
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We address the problem of securing distributed storage systems against passive eavesdroppers that can observe a limited number of storage nodes. An important aspect of these systems is node failures over time, which demand a repair mechanism aimed at maintaining a targeted high level of system reliability. If an eavesdropper observes a node that is added to the system to replace a failed node, it will have access to all the data downloaded during repair, which can potentially compromise the entire information in the system.We are interested in determining the secrecy capacity of distributed storage systems under repair dynamics, i.e., the maximum amount of data that can be securely stored and made available to a legitimate user without revealing any information to any eavesdropper. We derive a general upper bound on the secrecy capacity and show that this bound is tight for the bandwidth-limited regime which is of importance in scenarios such as peer-to-peer distributed storage systems. We also provide a simple explicit code construction that achieves the capacity for this regime. This paper addresses the issue of securing information stored on a distributed storage system from a passive eavesdropping attack. The security notion is perfect secrecy, i.e., the system is said to be secure only if the mutual information between the stored information and the observations at the adversary is zero. The paper summarizes state of the art on securing repair-efficient distributed storage systems. Then, storage systems that employ locally repairable codes with minimum bandwidth regenerating codes as local codes (MBR-LRCs) are investigated. A secure file size upper bound and a construction of secure MBR-LRCs are provided. These two are shown to match under special cases, establishing the secrecy capacity of these systems. This paper aims to go beyond resilience into the study of security and local-repairability for distributed storage systems (DSSs). Security and local-repairability are both important as features of an efficient storage system, and this paper aims to understand the trade-offs between resilience, security, and local-repairability in these systems. In particular, this paper first investigates security in the presence of colluding eavesdroppers, where eavesdroppers are assumed to work together in decoding the stored information. Second, this paper focuses on coding schemes that enable optimal local repairs. It further brings these two concepts together to develop locally repairable coding schemes for DSS that are secure against eavesdroppers. The main results of this paper include: 1) an improved bound on the secrecy capacity for minimum storage regenerating codes; 2) secure coding schemes that achieve the bound for some special cases; 3) a new bound on minimum distance for locally repairable codes; 4) code construction for locally repairable codes that attain the minimum distance bound; and 5) repair-bandwidth-efficient locally repairable codes with and without security constraints. In this paper, we consider the security of exact-repair regenerating codes operating at the minimum-storage-regenerating (MSR) point. The security requirement (introduced in Shah et. al.) is that no information about the stored data file must be leaked in the presence of an eavesdropper who has access to the contents of l 1 nodes as well as all the repair traffic entering a second disjoint set of l 2 nodes. We derive an upper bound on the size of a data file that can be securely stored that holds whenever l 2 ≤ d - k + 1. This upper bound proves the optimality of the product-matrix-based construction of secure MSR regenerating codes by Shah et. al.