Early detection of cyber-attacks is crucial for a safe and reliable operation of the smart grid. In the literature, outlier detection schemes making sample-by-sample decisions and online detection schemes requiring perfect attack models have been proposed. In this paper, we formulate the online attack anomaly detection problem as a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) problem and propose a universal robust online detection algorithm using the framework of model-free reinforcement learning (RL) for POMDPs. Numerical studies illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed RL-based algorithm in timely and accurate detection of cyber-attacks targeting the smart grid.
Extension of single-agent RL to multiple agents is the multi-agent RL framework that quite involves game theory since in this case, the optimal policies of agents depend both on the environment and the policies of the other agents. Moreover, stochastic games extend the Markov decision processes to multi-agent case where the game is sequential and consists of multiple states, and the transition from one state to another and also the payoffs (rewards costs) depend on joint actions of all agents. Several RL-based solution approaches have been proposed for stochastic games, see e.g., @cite_24 @cite_37 @cite_22 @cite_2 @cite_17 . Further, if the game (the underlying state of the environment, actions and payoffs of other agents, etc.) is partially observed, then it is called a partially observable stochastic game, for which finding a solution is more difficult in general.
@cite_37 @cite_22 @cite_24 @cite_2 @cite_17
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In the Markov decision process (MDP) formalization of reinforcement learning, a single adaptive agent interacts with an environment defined by a probabilistic transition function. In this solipsis-tic view, secondary agents can only be part of the environment and are therefore fixed in their behavior. The framework of Markov games allows us to widen this view to include multiple adaptive agents with interacting or competing goals. This paper considers a step in this direction in which exactly two agents with diametrically opposed goals share an environment. It describes a Q-learning-like algorithm for finding optimal policies and demonstrates its application to a simple two-player game in which the optimal policy is probabilistic. The single-agent multi-armed bandit problem can be solved by an agent that learns the values of each action using reinforcement learning. However, the multi-agent version of the problem, the iterated normal form game, presents a more complex challenge, since the rewards available to each agent depend on the strategies of the others. We consider the behavior of value-based learning agents in this situation, and show that such agents cannot generally play at a Nash equilibrium, although if smooth best responses are used, a Nash distribution can be reached. We introduce a particular value-based learning algorithm, which we call individual Q-learning, and use stochastic approximation to study the asymptotic behavior, showing that strategies will converge to Nash distribution almost surely in 2-player zero-sum games and 2-player partnership games. Player-dependent learning rates are then considered, and it is shown that this extension converges in some games for which many algorithms, including the basic algorithm initially considered, fail to converge. Abstract Learning to act in a multiagent environment is a difficult problem since the normal definition of an optimal policy no longer applies. The optimal policy at any moment depends on the policies of the other agents. This creates a situation of learning a moving target. Previous learning algorithms have one of two shortcomings depending on their approach. They either converge to a policy that may not be optimal against the specific opponents' policies, or they may not converge at all. In this article we examine this learning problem in the framework of stochastic games. We look at a number of previous learning algorithms showing how they fail at one of the above criteria. We then contribute a new reinforcement learning technique using a variable learning rate to overcome these shortcomings. Specifically, we introduce the WoLF principle, “Win or Learn Fast”, for varying the learning rate. We examine this technique theoretically, proving convergence in self-play on a restricted class of iterated matrix games. We also present empirical results on a variety of more general stochastic games, in situations of self-play and otherwise, demonstrating the wide applicability of this method. The classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism ensures incentive compatibility, i.e., that truth-telling of all agents is a dominant strategy, for a static one-shot game. However, in a dynamic environment that unfolds over time, the agents' intertemporal payoffs depend on the expected future controls and payments, and a direct extension of the VCG mechanism is not sufficient to guarantee incentive compatibility. In fact, it does not appear to be feasible to construct mechanisms that ensure the dominance of dynamic truth-telling for agents comprised of general stochastic dynamic systems. The contribution of this paper is to show that such a dynamic stochastic extension does exist for the special case of Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) agents with a careful construction of a sequence of layered payments over time. We propose a layered version of a modified VCG mechanism for payments that decouples the intertemporal effect of current bids on future payoffs, and prove that truth-telling of dynamic states forms a dominant strategy if system parameters are known and agents are rational. An important example of a problem needing such optimal dynamic coordination of stochastic agents arises in power systems where an Independent System Operator (ISO) has to ensure balance of generation and consumption at all time instants, while ensuring social optimality (maximization of the sum of the utilities of all agents). Addressing strategic behavior is critical as the price-taking assumption on market participants may not hold in an electricity market. Agents, can lie or otherwise game the bidding system. The challenge is to determine a bidding scheme between all agents and the ISO that maximizes social welfare, while taking into account the stochastic dynamic models of agents, since renewable energy resources such as solar wind are stochastic and dynamic in nature, as are consumptions by loads which are influenced by factors such as local temperatures and thermal inertias of facilities.