Privacy policies often place requirements on the purposes for which a governed entity may use personal information. For example, regulations, such as HIPAA, require that hospital employees use medical information for only certain purposes, such as treatment. Thus, using formal or automated methods for enforcing privacy policies requires a semantics of purpose requirements to determine whether an action is for a purpose or not. We provide such a semantics using a formalism based on planning. We model planning using a modified version of Markov Decision Processes, which exclude redundant actions for a formal definition of redundant. We use the model to formalize when a sequence of actions is only for or not for a purpose. This semantics enables us to provide an algorithm for automating auditing, and to describe formally and compare rigorously previous enforcement methods.
We borrow the notion of from Mackie's work on formalizing using counterfactual reasoning @cite_38 . In particular, Mackie defines a to be a non-redundant part of a sufficient explanation of an effect. Roughly speaking, we replace the causes with actions and the effect with a purpose. The extension to our semantics proposed in , may be seen as another instance of non-redundancy. This time, we replace the causes with purposes and the effect with an action. This suggests that for an action to be for a purpose, we expect both that the action was non-redundant for improving that purpose and that the purpose was non-redundant in motivating the action. That is, we expect planning to be parsimonious.
@cite_38
1983914828 176609766 2138162238 2156092566
In this paper we recast the classical Darondeau---Degano's causal semantics of concurrency in a coalgebraic setting, where we derive a compact model. Our construction is inspired by the one of Montanari and Pistore yielding causal automata, but we show that it is instance of an existing categorical framework for modeling the semantics of nominal calculi, whose relevance is further demonstrated. The key idea is to represent events as names, and the occurrence of a new event as name generation. We model causal semantics as a coalgebra over a presheaf, along the lines of the Fiore---Turi approach to the semantics of nominal calculi. More specifically, we take a suitable category of finite posets, representing causal relations over events, and we equip it with an endofunctor that allocates new events and relates them to their causes. Presheaves over this category express the relationship between processes and causal relations among the processes' events. We use the allocation operator to define a category of well-behaved coalgebras: it models the occurrence of a new event along each transition. Then we turn the causal transition relation into a coalgebra in this category, where labels only exhibit maximal events with respect to the source states' poset, and we show that its bisimilarity is essentially Darondeau---Degano's strong causal bisimilarity. This coalgebra is still infinite-state, but we exploit the equivalence between coalgebras over a class of presheaves and History Dependent automata to derive a compact representation, where states only retain the poset of the most recent events for each atomic subprocess, and are isomorphic up to order-preserving permutations. Remarkably, this reduction of states is automatically performed along the equivalence. Horn clause logic programming can be extended to include abduction with integrity constraints. In the resulting extension of logic programming, negation by failure can be simulated by making negative conditions abducible and by imposing appropriate denials and disjunctions as integrity constraints. This gives an alternative semantics for negation by failure, which generalises the stable model semantics of negation by failure. The abductive extension of logic programming extends negation by failure in three ways: (1) computation can be perfonned in alternative minimal models, (2) positive as well as negative conditions can be made abducible, and (3) other integrity constraints can also be accommodated. * This paper was written while the first author was at Imperial College. 235 Introduction The tenn "abduction" was introduced by the philosopher Charles Peirce [1931] to refer to a particular kind of hypothetical reasoning. In the simplest case, it has the fonn: From A and A fB infer B as a possible "explanation" of A. Abduction has been given prominence in Charniak and McDennot's [1985] "Introduction to Artificial Intelligence", where it has been applied to expert systems and story comprehension. Independently, several authors have developed deductive techniques to drive the generation of abductive hypotheses. Cox and Pietrzykowski [1986] construct hypotheses from the "dead ends" of linear resolution proofs. Finger and Genesereth [1985] generate "deductive solutions to design problems" using the "residue" left behind in resolution proofs. Poole, Goebel and Aleliunas [1987] also use linear resolution to generate hypotheses. All impose the restriction that hypotheses should be consistent with the "knowledge base". Abduction is a fonn of non-monotonic reasoning, because hypotheses which are consistent with one state of a knowledge base may become inconSistent when new knowledge is added. Poole [1988] argues that abduction is preferable to noh-monotonic logics for default reasoning. In this view, defaults are hypotheses fonnulated within classical logic rather than conclusions derived withln some fonn of non-monotonic logic. The similarity between abduction and default reasoning was also pointed out in [Kowalski, 1979]. In this paper we show how abduction can be integrated with logic programming, and we concentrate on the use of abduction to generalise negation by failure. Conditional Answers Compared with Abduction In the simplest case, a logic program consists of a set of Horn Clauses, which are used backward to_reduce goals to sub goals. The initial goal is solved when there are no subgollls left; Abstract A computer program capable of acting intelligently in the world must have a general representation of the world in terms of which its inputs are interpreted. Designing such a program requires commitments about what knowledge is and how it is obtained. Thus, some of the major traditional problems of philosophy arise in artificial intelligence. More specifically, we want a computer program that decides what to do by inferring in a formal language that a certain strategy will achieve its assigned goal. This requires formalizing concepts of causality, ability, and knowledge. Such formalisms are also considered in philosophical logic. The first part of the paper begins with a philosophical point of view that seems to arise naturally once we take seriously the idea of actually making an intelligent machine. We go on to the notions of metaphysically and epistemo-logically adequate representations of the world and then to an explanation of can, causes , and knows in terms of a representation of the world by a system of interacting automata. A proposed resolution of the problem of freewill in a deterministic universe and of counterfactual conditional sentences is presented. The second part is mainly concerned with formalisms within which it can be proved that a strategy will achieve a goal. Concepts of situation, fluent, future operator, action, strategy, result of a strategy and knowledge are formalized. A method is given of constructing a sentence of first-order logic which will be true in all models of certain axioms if and only if a certain strategy will achieve a certain goal. The formalism of this paper represents an advance over McCarthy (1963) and Green (1969) in that it permits proof of the correctness of strategies that contain loops and strategies that involve the acquisition of knowledge; and it is also somewhat more concise. The third part discusses open problems in extending the formalism of part 2. The fourth part is a review of work in philosophical logic in relation to problems of artificial intelligence and a discussion of previous efforts to program ‘general intelligence’ from the point of view of this paper. In this dissertation I present a formal approach to defeasible reasoning. This mathematical approach is based on the notion of specificity introduced by Poole and the general theory of warrant as presented by Pollock. General background information on the subject of Nonmonotonic Reasoning is presented and some of the shortcomings of existing systems are analyzed. We believe that the approach presented here represents a definite improvement over past systems. The main contribution of this thesis is a formally precise, elegant, clean, well-defined system which exhibits a correct behavior when applied to the benchmark examples in the literature. Model-theoretic semantical issues have been addressed. The investigation on the theoretical issues has aided the study of how this kind of reasoner can be realized on a computer. An interpreter of a restricted language, an extension of Horn clauses with defeasible rules, has been implemented. Finally, the implementation details are discussed.