Today people increasingly have the opportunity to opt-in to "usage-based" automotive insurance programs for reducing insurance premiums. In these programs, participants install devices in their vehicles that monitor their driving behavior, which raises some privacy concerns. Some devices collect fine-grained speed data to monitor driving habits. Companies that use these devices claim that their approach is privacy-preserving because speedometer measurements do not have physical locations. However, we show that with knowledge of the user's home location, as the insurance companies have, speed data is sufficient to discover driving routes and destinations when trip data is collected over a period of weeks. To demonstrate the real-world applicability of our approach we applied our algorithm, elastic pathing, to data collected over hundreds of driving trips occurring over several months. With this data and our approach, we were able to predict trip destinations to within 250 meters of ground truth in 10 of the traces and within 500 meters in 20 of the traces. This result, combined with the amount of speed data that is being collected by insurance companies, constitutes a substantial breach of privacy because a person's regular driving pattern can be deduced with repeated examples of the same paths with just a few weeks of monitoring.
A lot of work has concentrated on anonymizing or obfuscating @cite_5 @cite_15 @cite_29 @cite_10 @cite_16 location traces because location traces contain a great deal of behavioral information that people consider private @cite_10 @cite_35 @cite_8 @cite_33 . Krumm @cite_1 has written an overview of computational location privacy techniques, and Zang and Bolot @cite_24 have recently questioned the possibility of releasing privacy-preserving cell phone records while still maintaining research utility in those records. Accordingly, predicting future mobility patterns and paths from human mobility traces is a well-explored topic, including the following results.
@cite_35 @cite_33 @cite_8 @cite_29 @cite_1 @cite_24 @cite_5 @cite_15 @cite_16 @cite_10
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With billions of handsets in use worldwide, the quantity of mobility data is gigantic. When aggregated they can help understand complex processes, such as the spread viruses, and built better transportation systems, prevent traffic congestion. While the benefits provided by these datasets are indisputable, they unfortunately pose a considerable threat to location privacy. In this paper, we present a new anonymization scheme to release the spatio-temporal density of Paris, in France, i.e., the number of individuals in 989 different areas of the city released every hour over a whole week. The density is computed from a call-data-record (CDR) dataset, provided by the French Telecom operator Orange, containing the CDR of roughly 2 million users over one week. Our scheme is differential private, and hence, provides provable privacy guarantee to each individual in the dataset. Our main goal with this case study is to show that, even with large dimensional sensitive data, differential privacy can provide practical utility with meaningful privacy guarantee, if the anonymization scheme is carefully designed. This work is part of the national project XData (http: xdata.fr) that aims at combining large (anonymized) datasets provided by different service providers (telecom, electricity, water management, postal service, etc.). Due to the popularization of location based services (LBSs), preserving user's location privacy has become a significant issue. In this paper, we assume that users are traveling by car and propose a location anonymization method which mainly aims at reducing traceability of user's movement trajectory. Since the movement patterns of car-driving users have some special characteristics due to various factors such as traffic rules, generating dummies in an artificially-synthesized manner is not practical. Therefore, in our method, we use real car trace data which were obtained from probe cars to generate dummies so that the generated dummies look like real users. In doing so, our method tries to find real traces which can cross with the user or another dummy at an intersection in order to reduce the user's traceability. Through simulations, we confirm that our method can reduce the traceability of the user's trajectory compared with some naive approaches. We study the problem of protecting privacy in the publication of location sequences. Consider a database of trajectories, corresponding to movements of people, captured by their transactions when they use credit or RFID debit cards. We show that, if such trajectories are published exactly (by only hiding the identities of persons that followed them), there is a high risk of privacy breach by adversaries who hold partial information about them (e.g., shop owners). In particular, we show that one can use partial trajectory knowledge as a quasi-identifier for the remaining locations in the sequence. We device a data suppression technique, which prevents this type of breach, while keeping the posted data as accurate as possible. With the wide adoption of handheld devices (e.g., smartphones, tablets), a large number of location-based services (also called LBSs) have flourished providing mobile users with real-time and contextual information on the move. Accounting for the amount of location information they are given by users, these services are able to track users wherever they go and to learn sensitive information about them (e.g., their points of interest including home, work, religious or political places regularly visited). A number of solutions have been proposed in the past few years to protect users location information while still allowing them to enjoy geo-located services. Among the most robust solutions are those that apply the popular notion of differential privacy to location privacy (e.g., Geo-Indistinguishability), promising strong theoretical privacy guarantees with a bounded accuracy loss. While these theoretical guarantees are attracting, it might be difficult for end users or practitioners to assess their effectiveness in the wild. In this paper, we carry on a practical study using real mobility traces coming from two different datasets, to assess the ability of Geo-Indistinguishability to protect users' points of interest (POIs). We show that a curious LBS collecting obfuscated location information sent by mobile users is still able to infer most of the users POIs with a reasonable both geographic and semantic precision. This precision depends on the degree of obfuscation applied by Geo-Indistinguishability. Nevertheless, the latter also has an impact on the overhead incurred on mobile devices resulting in a privacy versus overhead trade-off. Finally, we show in our study that POIs constitute a quasi-identifier for mobile users and that obfuscating them using Geo-Indistinguishability is not sufficient as an attacker is able to re-identify at least 63 of them despite a high degree of obfuscation.