The efficiency of a game is typically quantified by the price of anarchy (PoA), defined as the worst ratio of the objective function value of an equilibrium --- solution of the game --- and that of an optimal outcome. Given the tremendous impact of tools from mathematical programming in the design of algorithms and the similarity of the price of anarchy and different measures such as the approximation and competitive ratios, it is intriguing to develop a duality-based method to characterize the efficiency of games. In the paper, we present an approach based on linear programming duality to study the efficiency of games. We show that the approach provides a general recipe to analyze the efficiency of games and also to derive concepts leading to improvements. The approach is particularly appropriate to bound the PoA. Specifically, in our approach the dual programs naturally lead to competitive PoA bounds that are (almost) optimal for several classes of games. The approach indeed captures the smoothness framework and also some current non-smooth techniques concepts. We show the applicability to the wide variety of games and environments, from congestion games to Bayesian welfare, from full-information settings to incomplete-information ones.
Linear programming (and mathematical programming in general) has been a powerful tool in the development of game theory. There is a vast literature on this subject and we can only mention the most closely related to the paper. One of the most interesting recent treatments on the role of linear programming in game theory is the book @cite_9 . revisited fundamental results in mechanism design in an elegant manner by the means of linear programming and its duality. It is surprising to see that many results have been shaped nicely by LPs.
@cite_9
2061962896 1977846486 1567092208 2000508521
J. F. Benders devised a clever approach for exploiting the structure of mathematical programming problems withcomplicating variables (variables which, when temporarily fixed, render the remaining optimization problem considerably more tractable). For the class of problems specifically considered by Benders, fixing the values of the complicating variables reduces the given problem to an ordinary linear program, parameterized, of course, by the value of the complicating variables vector. The algorithm he proposed for finding the optimal value of this vector employs a cutting-plane approach for building up adequate representations of (i) the extremal value of the linear program as a function of the parameterizing vector and (ii) the set of values of the parameterizing vector for which the linear program is feasible. Linear programming duality theory was employed to derive the natural families ofcuts characterizing these representations, and the parameterized linear program itself is used to generate what are usuallydeepest cuts for building up the representations. The theory of linear inequalities and linear programming was recently applied to study the stable marriage problem which until then has been studied by mostly combinatorial methods. Here we extend the approach to the general stable matching problem in which the structure of matchable pairs need not be bipartite. New issues arise in the analysis and we combine linear algebra and graph theory to explore them. This text offers a systematic, rigorous, and unified presentation of evolutionary game theory, covering the core developments of the theory from its inception in biology in the 1970s through recent advances. Evolutionary game theory, which studies the behavior of large populations of strategically interacting agents, is used by economists to make predictions in settings where traditional assumptions about agents' rationality and knowledge may not be justified. Recently, computer scientists, transportation scientists, engineers, and control theorists have also turned to evolutionary game theory, seeking tools for modeling dynamics in multiagent systems. Population Games and Evolutionary Dynamics provides a point of entry into the field for researchers and students in all of these disciplines. The text first considers population games, which provide a simple, powerful model for studying strategic interactions among large numbers of anonymous agents. It then studies the dynamics of behavior in these games. By introducing a general model of myopic strategy revision by individual agents, the text provides foundations for two distinct approaches to aggregate behavior dynamics: the deterministic approach, based on differential equations, and the stochastic approach, based on Markov processes. Key results on local stability, global convergence, stochastic stability, and nonconvergence are developed in detail. Ten substantial appendixes present the mathematical tools needed to work in evolutionary game theory, offering a practical introduction to the methods of dynamic modeling. Accompanying the text are more than 200 color illustrations of the mathematics and theoretical results; many were created using the Dynamo software suite, which is freely available on the author's Web site. Readers are encouraged to use Dynamo to run quick numerical experiments and to create publishable figures for their own research. Stochastic programming provides a versatile framework for decision-making under uncertainty, but the resulting optimization problems can be computationally demanding. It has recently been shown that primal and dual linear decision rule approximations can yield tractable upper and lower bounds on the optimal value of a stochastic program. Unfortunately, linear decision rules often provide crude approximations that result in loose bounds. To address this problem, we propose a lifting technique that maps a given stochastic program to an equivalent problem on a higher-dimensional probability space. We prove that solving the lifted problem in primal and dual linear decision rules provides tighter bounds than those obtained from applying linear decision rules to the original problem. We also show that there is a one-to-one correspondence between linear decision rules in the lifted problem and families of nonlinear decision rules in the original problem. Finally, we identify structured liftings that give rise to highly flexible piecewise linear and nonlinear decision rules, and we assess their performance in the context of a dynamic production planning problem.