Federations among sets of Cloud Providers (CPs), whereby a set of CPs agree to mutually use their own resources to run the VMs of other CPs, are considered a promising solution to the problem of reducing the energy cost. In this paper, we address the problem of federation formation for a set of CPs, whose solution is necessary to exploit the potential of cloud federations for the reduction of the energy bill. We devise a distributed algorithm, based on cooperative game theory, that allows a set of CPs to cooperatively set up their federations in such a way that their individual profit is increased with respect to the case in which they work in isolation, and we show that, by using our algorithm and the proposed CPs' utility function, they are able to self-organize into Nash-stable federations and, by means of iterated executions, to adapt themselves to environmental changes. Numerical results are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm.
In @cite_0 , a profit-maximizing game-based mechanism to enable dynamic cloud federation formation is proposed. The dynamic federation formation problem is modeled as a hedonic game (like our approach), and the federations are computed by means of a merge-split algorithm. There are several important differences between this and our works: (1) we focus on the stability of individuals rather than of groups, (2) we propose a decentralized algorithm, (3) we demonstrate the stability of the obtained federations, and (4) we use the Shapley value instead of the normalized Banzhaf value (as in @cite_0 ), since the latter does not satisfy some important properties @cite_3 .
@cite_0 @cite_3
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We model the cloud federation formation problem using concepts from coalitional game theory by considering the cooperation of the cloud providers in providing the requested VM instances. We design a mechanism that enables the cloud providers to dynamically form a cloud federation maximizing their profit. Furthermore, the mechanism guarantees that the cloud federation structure is stable, that is, the cloud providers do not have incentives to break away from the current federation and join some other federation. An important aspect of mechanism design in social choice protocols and multiagent systems is to discourage insincere and manipulative behaviour. We examine the computational complexity of false-name manipulation in weighted voting games which are an important class of coalitional voting games. Weighted voting games have received increased interest in the multiagent community due to their compact representation and ability to model coalitional formation scenarios. Bachrach and Elkind in their AAMAS 2008 paper examined divide and conquer false-name manipulation in weighted voting games from the point of view of Shapley-Shubik index. We analyse the corresponding case of the Banzhaf index and check how much the Banzhaf index of a player increases or decreases if it splits up into sub-players. A pseudo-polynomial algorithm to find the optimal split is also provided. Bachrach and Elkind also mentioned manipulation via merging as an open problem. In the paper, we examine the cases where a player annexes other players or merges with them to increase their Banzhaf index or Shapley-Shubik index payoff. We characterize the computational complexity of such manipulations and provide limits to the manipulation. The annexation non-monotonicity paradox is also discovered in the case of the Banzhaf index. The results give insight into coalition formation and manipulation. In this paper, we introduce a game-theoretic framework to address the community detection problem based on the structures of social networks. We formulate the dynamics of community formation as a strategic game called community formation game: Given an underlying social graph, we assume that each node is a selfish agent who selects communities to join or leave based on her own utility measurement. A community structure can be interpreted as an equilibrium of this game. We formulate the agents' utility by the combination of a gain function and a loss function. We allow each agent to select multiple communities, which naturally captures the concept of "overlapping communities". We propose a gain function based on the modularity concept introduced by Newman (Proc Natl Acad Sci 103(23):8577---8582, 2006), and a simple loss function that reflects the intrinsic costs incurred when people join the communities. We conduct extensive experiments under this framework, and our results show that our algorithm is effective in identifying overlapping communities, and are often better then other algorithms we evaluated especially when many people belong to multiple communities. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time the community detection problem is addressed by a game-theoretic framework that considers community formation as the result of individual agents' rational behaviors. Procuring multiple agents with different ability levels to independently solve the same task is common in labor markets, crowdsourcing environments and research and development projects due to two reasons: some agents may fail to provide a satisfactory solution, and the redundancy increases the quality of the best solution found. However, incentivizing large number of agents to compete for one task is difficult; agents need fair ex-ante guaranteed payoffs that consider their ability levels and failure rates to exert efforts. We model such domains as a cooperative game called the Max-Game, where each agent has a weight representing its ability level, and the value of an agent coalition is the maximal weight of the agents in the coalition. When agents may fail, we redefine the value of a coalition as the expected maximal weight of its surviving members. We analyze the core, the Shapley value, and the Banzhaf index as methods of payoff division. Surprisingly, the latter two, which are usually computationally hard, can be computed in polynomial time. Finally, we initiate the study of a new form of sabotage where agents may be incentivized to influence the failure probabilities of their peers, and show that no such incentive is present in a restricted case of Max-Games.