In order for cooperative robots ("co-robots") to respond to human behaviors accurately and efficiently in human-robot collaboration, interpretation of human actions, awareness of new situations, and appropriate decision making are all crucial abilities for co-robots. For this purpose, the human behaviors should be interpreted by co-robots in the same manner as human peers. To address this issue, a novel interpretability indicator is introduced so that robot actions are appropriate to the current human behaviors. In addition, the complete consideration of all potential situations of a robot's environment is nearly impossible in real-world applications, making it difficult for the co-robot to act appropriately and safely in new scenarios. This is true even when the pretrained model is highly accurate in a known situation. For effective and safe teaming with humans, we introduce a new generalizability indicator that allows a co-robot to self-reflect and reason about when an observation falls outside the co-robot's learned model. Based on topic modeling and two novel indicators, we propose a new Self-reflective Risk-aware Artificial Cognitive (SRAC) model. The co-robots are able to consider action risks and identify new situations so that better decisions can be made. Experiments both using real-world datasets and on physical robots suggest that our SRAC model significantly outperforms the traditional methodology and enables better decision making in response to human activities.
Artificial cognition has its origin in cybernetics with the intention to create a science of mind based on logic @cite_41 . Among other cognitive paradigms, cognitivism has undoubtedly been predominant to date @cite_47 . Within the cognitivism paradigm, several cognitive architectures were developed, including Soar @cite_34 , ACT-R @cite_49 (and its extensions ACT-R E @cite_17 , ACT-R @math @cite_35 , etc), C4 @cite_30 , and architectures for robotics @cite_54 , which are relatively independent of applications @cite_23 . Because architectures represent the mechanism for cognition but lack the relevant information for using that mechanism, they cannot accomplish anything in their own right and need to be provided with knowledge to conduct a specific task. The combination of a cognitive architecture and a particular knowledge set is generally referred to as a @cite_47 . The knowledge incorporated in cognitive models is typically determined by human designers @cite_47 . The knowledge can be also learned and adapted using machine learning techniques.
@cite_30 @cite_35 @cite_41 @cite_54 @cite_49 @cite_23 @cite_47 @cite_34 @cite_17
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Humans are adept at inferring the mental states underlying other agents’ actions, such as goals, beliefs, desires, emotions and other thoughts. We propose a computational framework based on Bayesian inverse planning for modeling human action understanding. The framework represents an intuitive theory of intentional agents’ behavior based on the principle of rationality: the expectation that agents will plan approximately rationally to achieve their goals, given their beliefs about the world. The mental states that caused an agent’s behavior are inferred by inverting this model of rational planning using Bayesian inference, integrating the likelihood of the observed actions with the prior over mental states. This approach formalizes in precise probabilistic terms the essence of previous qualitative approaches to action understanding based on an ‘‘intentional stance” [Dennett, D. C. (1987). The intentional stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press] or a ‘‘teleological stance” [Gergely, G., Nadasdy, Z., Csibra, G., & Biro, S. (1995). Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age. Cognition, 56, 165–193]. In three psychophysical experiments using animated stimuli of agents moving in simple mazes, we assess how well different inverse planning models based on different goal priors can predict human goal inferences. The results provide quantitative evidence for an approximately rational inference mechanism in human goal inference within our simplified stimulus paradigm, and for the flexible nature of goal representations that human observers can adopt. We discuss the implications of our experimental results for human action understanding in real-world contexts, and suggest how our framework might be extended to capture other kinds of mental state inferences, such as inferences about beliefs, or inferring whether an entity is an intentional agent. This paper addresses the general problem of reinforcement learning (RL) in partially observable environments. In 2013, our large RL recurrent neural networks (RNNs) learned from scratch to drive simulated cars from high-dimensional video input. However, real brains are more powerful in many ways. In particular, they learn a predictive model of their initially unknown environment, and somehow use it for abstract (e.g., hierarchical) planning and reasoning. Guided by algorithmic information theory, we describe RNN-based AIs (RNNAIs) designed to do the same. Such an RNNAI can be trained on never-ending sequences of tasks, some of them provided by the user, others invented by the RNNAI itself in a curious, playful fashion, to improve its RNN-based world model. Unlike our previous model-building RNN-based RL machines dating back to 1990, the RNNAI learns to actively query its model for abstract reasoning and planning and decision making, essentially "learning to think." The basic ideas of this report can be applied to many other cases where one RNN-like system exploits the algorithmic information content of another. They are taken from a grant proposal submitted in Fall 2014, and also explain concepts such as "mirror neurons." Experimental results will be described in separate papers. We present ACT-R E (Adaptive Character of Thought-Rational Embodied), a cognitive architecture for human-robot interaction. Our reason for using ACT-R E is two-fold. First, ACT-R E enables researchers to build good embodied models of people to understand how and why people think the way they do. Then, we leverage that knowledge of people by using it to predict what a person will do in different situations; e.g., that a person may forget something and may need to be reminded or that a person cannot see everything the robot sees. We also discuss methods of how to evaluate a cognitive architecture and show numerous empirically validated examples of ACT-R E models. This survey presents an overview of the autonomous development of mental capabilities in computational agents. It does so based on a characterization of cognitive systems as systems which exhibit adaptive, anticipatory, and purposive goal-directed behavior. We present a broad survey of the various paradigms of cognition, addressing cognitivist (physical symbol systems) approaches, emergent systems approaches, encompassing connectionist, dynamical, and enactive systems, and also efforts to combine the two in hybrid systems. We then review several cognitive architectures drawn from these paradigms. In each of these areas, we highlight the implications and attendant problems of adopting a developmental approach, both from phylogenetic and ontogenetic points of view. We conclude with a summary of the key architectural features that systems capable of autonomous development of mental capabilities should exhibit