The 802.11e standard enables user configuration of several MAC parameters, making WLANs vulnerable to users that selfishly configure these parameters to gain throughput. In this paper we propose a novel distributed algorithm to thwart such selfish behavior. The key idea of the algorithm is for honest stations to react, upon detecting a selfish station, by using a more aggressive configuration that penalizes this station. We show that the proposed algorithm guarantees global stability while providing good response times. By conducting a game theoretic analysis of the algorithm based on repeated games, we also show its effectiveness against selfish stations. Simulation results confirm that the proposed algorithm optimizes throughput performance while discouraging selfish behavior. We also present an experimental prototype of the proposed algorithm demonstrating that it can be implemented on commodity hardware.
The approach proposed by @cite_7 does not suffer from the above drawback but addresses only two types of misbehaving stations: the so-called selfish stations, with @math , and the so-called greedy stations, with @math . While the scheme proposed is effective when dealing with these two particular configurations, other @math configurations that may greatly benefit selfish stations are neither detected nor punished by this mechanism, as we show in the simulation results of . Additionally, the algorithm of @cite_7 is based on heuristics that do not guarantee quick convergence, and indeed we show in a further simulation result in that this approach may suffer from convergence issues.
@cite_7
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Distributed opportunistic scheduling (DOS) is inherently more difficult than conventional opportunistic scheduling due to the absence of a central entity that knows the channel state of all stations. With DOS, stations use random access to contend for the channel and, upon winning a contention, they measure the channel conditions. After measuring the channel conditions, a station only transmits if the channel quality is good; otherwise, it gives up the transmission opportunity. The distributed nature of DOS makes it vulnerable to selfish users: By deviating from the protocol and using more transmission opportunities, a selfish user can gain a greater share of wireless resources at the expense of "well-behaved" users. In this paper, we address the problem of selfishness in DOS from a game-theoretic standpoint. We propose an algorithm that satisfies the following properties: 1) When all stations implement the algorithm, the wireless network is driven to the optimal point of operation; and 2) one or more selfish stations cannot obtain any gain by deviating from the algorithm. The key idea of the algorithm is to react to a selfish station by using a more aggressive configuration that (indirectly) punishes this station. We build on multivariable control theory to design a mechanism for punishment that is sufficiently severe to prevent selfish behavior, yet not so severe as to render the system unstable. We conduct a game-theoretic analysis based on repeated games to show the algorithm's effectiveness against selfish stations. These results are confirmed by extensive simulations. CSMA CA, the contention mechanism of the IEEE 802.11 DCF medium access protocol, has recently been found vulnerable to selfish backoff attacks consisting in nonstandard configuration of the constituent backoff scheme. Such attacks can greatly increase a selfish station's bandwidth share at the expense of honest stations applying a standard configuration. The paper investigates the distribution of bandwidth among anonymous network stations, some of which are selfish. A station's obtained bandwidth share is regarded as a payoff in a noncooperative CSMA CA game. Regardless of the IEEE 802.11 parameter setting, the payoff function is found similar to a multiplayer Prisoners' Dilemma; moreover, the number (though not the identities) of selfish stations can be inferred by observation of successful transmission attempts. Further, a repeated CSMA CA game is defined, where a station can toggle between standard and nonstandard backoff configurations with a view of maximizing a long-term utility. It is argued that a desirable station strategy should yield a fair, Pareto efficient, and subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. One such strategy, called CRISP, is described and evaluated. In this paper, we study resource allocation for a multicarrier-based cognitive radio (CR) network. More specifically, we investigate the problem of secondary users’ energy-efficiency (EE) maximization problem under secondary total power and primary interference constraints. First, assuming cooperation among the secondary base stations (BSs), a centralized approach is considered to solve the EE optimization problem for the CR network where the primary and secondary users are using either orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) or filter bank based multicarrier (FBMC) modulations. We propose an alternating-based approach to solve the joint power-subcarrier allocation problem. More importantly, in the first place, subcarriers are allocated using a heuristic method for a given feasible power allocation. Then, we conservatively approximate the nonconvex power control problem and propose a joint successive convex approximation-Dinkelbach algorithm (SCADA) to efficiently obtain a solution to the nonconvex power control problem. The proposed algorithm is shown to converge to a solution that coincides with the stationary point of the original nonconvex power control subproblem. Moreover, we propose a dual decomposition-based decentralized version of the SCADA. Second, under the assumption of no cooperation among the secondary BSs, we propose a fully distributed power control algorithm from the perspective of game theory. The proposed algorithm is shown to converge to a Nash-equilibrium (NE) point. Moreover, we propose a sufficient condition that guarantees the uniqueness of the achieved NE. Extensive simulation analyses are further provided to highlight the advantages and demonstrate the efficiency of our proposed schemes. The greedy sequential algorithm for maximal independent set (MIS) loops over the vertices in an arbitrary order adding a vertex to the resulting set if and only if no previous neighboring vertex has been added. In this loop, as in many sequential loops, each iterate will only depend on a subset of the previous iterates (i.e. knowing that any one of a vertex's previous neighbors is in the MIS, or knowing that it has no previous neighbors, is sufficient to decide its fate one way or the other). This leads to a dependence structure among the iterates. If this structure is shallow then running the iterates in parallel while respecting the dependencies can lead to an efficient parallel implementation mimicking the sequential algorithm. In this paper, we show that for any graph, and for a random ordering of the vertices, the dependence length of the sequential greedy MIS algorithm is polylogarithmic (O(log^2 n) with high probability). Our results extend previous results that show polylogarithmic bounds only for random graphs. We show similar results for greedy maximal matching (MM). For both problems we describe simple linear-work parallel algorithms based on the approach. The algorithms allow for a smooth tradeoff between more parallelism and reduced work, but always return the same result as the sequential greedy algorithms. We present experimental results that demonstrate efficiency and the tradeoff between work and parallelism.