This paper, by comparing three potential energy trading systems, studies the feasibility of integrating a community energy storage (CES) device with consumer-owned photovoltaic (PV) systems for demand-side management of a residential neighborhood area network. We consider a fully-competitive CES operator in a non-cooperative Stackelberg game, a benevolent CES operator that has socially favorable regulations with competitive users, and a centralized cooperative CES operator that minimizes the total community energy cost. The former two game-theoretic systems consider that the CES operator first maximizes their revenue by setting a price signal and trading energy with the grid. Then the users with PV panels play a non-cooperative repeated game following the actions of the CES operator to trade energy with the CES device and the grid to minimize energy costs. The centralized CES operator cooperates with the users to minimize the total community energy cost without appropriate incentives. The non-cooperative Stackelberg game with the fully-competitive CES operator has a unique Stackelberg equilibrium at which the CES operator maximizes revenue and users obtain unique Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium CES energy trading strategies. Extensive simulations show that the fully-competitive CES model gives the best trade-off of operating environment between the CES operator and the users.
There is a rich literature on demand-side management that exploits user demand flexibility to achieve economic power system improvements. For example, dynamic pricing for consumption scheduling @cite_13 , load shifting methods @cite_20 @cite_28 @cite_11 , and incentive-based demand response programs @cite_6 @cite_35 have been investigated. We study demand-side management with a CES device to utilize household-distributed PV power generation without modifying users' energy demands.
@cite_35 @cite_28 @cite_6 @cite_13 @cite_20 @cite_11
2026647281 2014891227 2042454807 2068060907
This paper mainly focuses on demand side management and demand response, including drivers and benefits, shiftable load scheduling methods and peak shaving techniques. Demand side management techniques found in literature are overviewed and a novel electricity demand control technique using real-time pricing is proposed. Currently users have no means to change their power consumption to benefit the whole system. The proposed method consists of modern system identification and control that would enable user side load control. This would potentially balance demand side with supply side more effectively and would also reduce peak demand and make the whole system more efficient. Demand-side energy management improves robustness and efficiency in Smart Grids. Load-adjustment and load-shifting are performed to match demand to available supply. These operations come at a discomfort cost for consumers as their lifestyle is influenced when they adjust or shift in time their demand. Performance of demand-side energy management mainly concerns how robustness is maximized or discomfort is minimized. However, measuring and controlling the distribution of discomfort as perceived between different consumers provides an enriched notion of fairness in demand-side energy management that is missing in current approaches. This paper defines unfairness in demand-side energy management and shows how unfairness is measurable and controllable by software agents that plan energy demand in a decentralized fashion. Experimental evaluation using real demand and survey data from two operational Smart Grid projects confirms these findings. © 2014 IEEE. Demand side management will be a key component of future smart grid that can help reduce peak load and adapt elastic demand to fluctuating generations. In this paper, we consider households that operate different appliances including PHEVs and batteries and propose a demand response approach based on utility maximization. Each appliance provides a certain benefit depending on the pattern or volume of power it consumes. Each household wishes to optimally schedule its power consumption so as to maximize its individual net benefit subject to various consumption and power flow constraints. We show that there exist time-varying prices that can align individual optimality with social optimality, i.e., under such prices, when the households selfishly optimize their own benefits, they automatically also maximize the social welfare. The utility company can thus use dynamic pricing to coordinate demand responses to the benefit of the overall system. We propose a distributed algorithm for the utility company and the customers to jointly compute this optimal prices and demand schedules. Finally, we present simulation results that illustrate several interesting properties of the proposed scheme. Most of the existing demand-side management programs focus primarily on the interactions between a utility company and its customers users. In this paper, we present an autonomous and distributed demand-side energy management system among users that takes advantage of a two-way digital communication infrastructure which is envisioned in the future smart grid. We use game theory and formulate an energy consumption scheduling game, where the players are the users and their strategies are the daily schedules of their household appliances and loads. It is assumed that the utility company can adopt adequate pricing tariffs that differentiate the energy usage in time and level. We show that for a common scenario, with a single utility company serving multiple customers, the global optimal performance in terms of minimizing the energy costs is achieved at the Nash equilibrium of the formulated energy consumption scheduling game. The proposed distributed demand-side energy management strategy requires each user to simply apply its best response strategy to the current total load and tariffs in the power distribution system. The users can maintain privacy and do not need to reveal the details on their energy consumption schedules to other users. We also show that users will have the incentives to participate in the energy consumption scheduling game and subscribing to such services. Simulation results confirm that the proposed approach can reduce the peak-to-average ratio of the total energy demand, the total energy costs, as well as each user's individual daily electricity charges.