Privacy-preserving data splitting is a technique that aims to protect data privacy by storing different fragments of data in different locations. In this work we give a new combinatorial formulation to the data splitting problem. We see the data splitting problem as a purely combinatorial problem, in which we have to split data attributes into different fragments in a way that satisfies certain combinatorial properties derived from processing and privacy constraints. Using this formulation, we develop new combinatorial and algebraic techniques to obtain solutions to the data splitting problem. We present an algebraic method which builds an optimal data splitting solution by using Gr " o bner bases. Since this method is not efficient in general, we also develop a greedy algorithm for finding solutions that are not necessarily minimal sized.
The solution presented in @cite_38 uses both encryption and data splitting, but it allows the CSPs to communicate between each other. Because of this assumption, in order to ensure unlinkability between attributes, no attribute must appear in the clear in more that one fragment. In their solution, data is split into possibly more than two different fragments. This lowers the complexity of the problem with respect to @cite_8 and @cite_30 . The optimization problem is then to find a partition that minimizes the number of fragments and maximizes the number of attributes stored in the clear. Also, in this case, the problem of finding a partition of the attribute set is NP-complete. Hence, they present two heuristic methods with time complexity @math and @math , where @math is the number of privacy constraints and @math is the number of attributes. The first one is based on the definition of vector minimality, and the second one works with an affinity matrix that expresses the advantage of having pairs of attributes in the same fragment.
@cite_30 @cite_38 @cite_8
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An @math maximum distance separable (MDS) array code of length @math , dimension @math , and sub-packetization @math is formed of @math matrices over a finite field @math , with every column of the matrix stored on a separate node in the distributed storage system and viewed as a coordinate of the codeword. Repair of a failed node (recovery of one erased column) can be performed by accessing a set of @math surviving (helper) nodes. The code is said to have the optimal access property if the amount of data accessed at each of the helper nodes meets a lower bound on this quantity. For optimal-access MDS codes with @math , the sub-packetization @math satisfies the bound @math . In our previous work (IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 63, no. 4, 2017), for any @math and @math , we presented an explicit construction of optimal-access MDS codes with sub-packetization @math . In this paper, we take up the question of reducing the sub-packetization value @math to make it to approach the lower bound. We construct an explicit family of optimal-access codes with @math , which differs from the optimal value by at most a factor of @math . These codes can be constructed over any finite field @math as long as @math , and afford low-complexity encoding and decoding procedures. We also define a version of the repair problem that bridges the context of regenerating codes and codes with locality constraints (LRC codes), which we call group repair with optimal access . In this variation, we assume that the set of @math nodes is partitioned into @math repair groups of size @math , and require that the amount of accessed data for repair is the smallest possible whenever the @math helper nodes include all the other @math nodes from the same group as the failed node. For this problem, we construct a family of codes with the group optimal access property. These codes can be constructed over any field @math of size @math , and also afford low-complexity encoding and decoding procedures. The impact of privacy requirements in the development of modern applications is increasing very quickly. Many commercial and legal regulations are driving the need to develop reliable solutions for protecting sensitive information whenever it is stored, processed, or communicated to external parties. To this purpose, encryption techniques are currently used in many scenarios where data protection is required since they provide a layer of protection against the disclosure of personal information, which safeguards companies from the costs that may arise from exposing their data to privacy breaches. However, dealing with encrypted data may make query processing more expensive. In this article, we address these issues by proposing a solution to enforce the privacy of data collections that combines data fragmentation with encryption. We model privacy requirements as confidentiality constraints expressing the sensitivity of attributes and their associations. We then use encryption as an underlying (conveniently available) measure for making data unintelligible while exploiting fragmentation as a way to break sensitive associations among attributes. We formalize the problem of minimizing the impact of fragmentation in terms of number of fragments and their affinity and present two heuristic algorithms for solving such problems. We also discuss experimental results, comparing the solutions returned by our heuristics with respect to optimal solutions, which show that the heuristics, while guaranteeing a polynomial-time computation cost are able to retrieve solutions close to optimum. In this paper, we address compressed sensing of a low-rank matrix posing the inverse problem as an approximation problem with a specified target rank of the solution. A simple search over the target rank then provides the minimum rank solution satisfying a prescribed data approximation bound. We propose an atomic decomposition providing an analogy between parsimonious representations of a sparse vector and a low-rank matrix and extending efficient greedy algorithms from the vector to the matrix case. In particular, we propose an efficient and guaranteed algorithm named atomic decomposition for minimum rank approximation (ADMiRA) that extends Needell and Tropp's compressive sampling matching pursuit (CoSaMP) algorithm from the sparse vector to the low-rank matrix case. The performance guarantee is given in terms of the rank-restricted isometry property (R-RIP) and bounds both the number of iterations and the error in the approximate solution for the general case of noisy measurements and approximately low-rank solution. With a sparse measurement operator as in the matrix completion problem, the computation in ADMiRA is linear in the number of measurements. Numerical experiments for the matrix completion problem show that, although the R-RIP is not satisfied in this case, ADMiRA is a competitive algorithm for matrix completion. We present a novel approach to proving the absence of timing channels. The idea is to partition the programâ s execution traces in such a way that each partition component is checked for timing attack resilience by a time complexity analysis and that per-component resilience implies the resilience of the whole program. We construct a partition by splitting the program traces at secret-independent branches. This ensures that any pair of traces with the same public input has a component containing both traces. Crucially, the per-component checks can be normal safety properties expressed in terms of a single execution. Our approach is thus in contrast to prior approaches, such as self-composition, that aim to reason about multiple (kâ � 2) executions at once. We formalize the above as an approach called quotient partitioning, generalized to any k-safety property, and prove it to be sound. A key feature of our approach is a demand-driven partitioning strategy that uses a regex-like notion called trails to identify sets of execution traces, particularly those influenced by tainted (or secret) data. We have applied our technique in a prototype implementation tool called Blazer, based on WALA, PPL, and the brics automaton library. We have proved timing-channel freedom of (or synthesized an attack specification for) 24 programs written in Java bytecode, including 6 classic examples from the literature and 6 examples extracted from the DARPA STAC challenge problems.