The task of verifying the compatibility between interacting web services has traditionally been limited to checking the compatibility of the interaction protocol in terms of message sequences and the type of data being exchanged. Since web services are developed largely in an uncoordinated way, different services often use independently developed ontologies for the same domain instead of adhering to a single ontology as standard. In this work we investigate the approaches that can be taken by the server to verify the possibility to reach a state with semantically inconsistent results during the execution of a protocol with a client, if the client ontology is published. Often database is used to store the actual data along with the ontologies instead of storing the actual data as a part of the ontology description. It is important to observe that at the current state of the database the semantic conflict state may not be reached even if the verification done by the server indicates the possibility of reaching a conflict state. A relational algebra based decision procedure is also developed to incorporate the current state of the client and the server databases in the overall verification procedure.
Significant amount of research has been done towards the development of the protocol. In @cite_23 researchers proposed a methodology for developing protocols in a multi agent environment. They extend propositional dynamic logic to formally specify the protocol and also use an extension of state-charts for visual representation. In @cite_14 a step by step procedure is presented for the development of web service interaction protocols from the problem definition to the final specification. However these approaches are focused towards the development of protocol for multi agent environment. The semantics of the exchanged data is not addressed in these works.
@cite_14 @cite_23
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Assume we have a network of three or more players, each player in possession of some private input. The players want to compute some function of these private inputs, but in a way which protects the privacy of each participant's contribution. Not all of the players can be trusted to do as they are instructed. The resources the players are given to accomplish their goal are communication--the ability to privately send messages to one another, or to broadcast messages to the community as a whole--and local computation. Many insightful protocols have been proposed for solving this problem of multiparty secure function evaluation. Building on Yao's protocol for the case of two players (Ya86), Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson (GMW87) offered the first general protocol for this problem, and they provided the paradigm on which a large body of successive work was based. Despite enormous progress, research on secure function evaluation has suffered from some serious shortcomings. First, though many protocols have been devised for solving the problem, what, exactly, these protocols accomplish has not been fully understood. In fact, no rigorously specified and generally accepted definitions have been proposed in this field. Second, protocols for multiparty secure function evaluation could be extremely inefficient, the main cause being that they required an unbounded (and usually large) number of communication rounds. We address both of these points, carefully crafting definitions which satisfactorily deal with the myriad of issues lurking here, and offering a new protocol for multiparty secure function evaluation--one which categorically improves the complexity requirements for this task. The new protocol completely divorces the computational complexity of the function being collaboratively computed from the round complexity of the protocol that evaluates it. Using this approach, we show that a rigorously-specified and extremely strong notion of secure function evaluation can be achieved by a protocol which requires only a fixed constant number of rounds of interaction. This result assumes only the existence of a one-way function and that the majority of the participants to the protocol behave correctly. (Copies available exclusively from MIT Libraries, Rm. 14-0551, Cambridge, MA 02139-4307. Ph. 617-253-5668; Fax 617-253-1690.) Although interaction protocols are often part of multi-agent infrastructures, many of the published protocols are semi-formal, vague or contain errors. Formal presentations can counter such disadvantages since they are amenable to verification of correctness. On the other hand, a diagrammatic representation of system structure is easier to comprehend. To this end, this paper bridges the gap between formal specification and intuitive development by: (1) proposing an extended form of propositional dynamic logic for expressing protocols completely, with clear semantics, that can be converted to a programming language for interaction protocols and (2) developing extended statecharts as a diagrammatic counterpart. We are interested in the design of automated procedures for analyzing the (in)security of cryptographic protocols in the Dolev-Yao model for a bounded number of sessions when we take into account some algebraic properties satisfied by the operators involved in the protocol. This leads to a more realistic model in comparison to what we get under the perfect cryptography assumption, but it implies that protocol analysis deals with terms modulo some equational theory instead of terms in a free algebra. The main goal of this paper is to setup a general approach that works for a whole class of monoidal theories which contains many of the specific cases that have been considered so far in an ad-hoc way (e.g. exclusive or, Abelian groups, exclusive or in combination with the homomorphism axiom). We follow a classical schema for cryptographic protocol analysis which proves first a locality result and then reduces the insecurity problem to a symbolic constraint solving problem. This approach strongly relies on the correspondence between a monoidal theory E and a semiring S"E which we use to deal with the symbolic constraints. We show that the well-defined symbolic constraints that are generated by reasonable protocols can be solved provided that unification in the monoidal theory satisfies some additional properties. The resolution process boils down to solving particular quadratic Diophantine equations that are reduced to linear Diophantine equations, thanks to linear algebra results and the well-definedness of the problem. Examples of theories that do not satisfy our additional properties appear to be undecidable, which suggests that our characterization is reasonably tight. Interaction protocols are specific, often standard, constraints on the behaviors of autonomous agents in a multiagent system. Protocols are essential to the functioning of open systems, such as those that arise in most interesting web applications. A variety of common protocols in negotiation and electronic commerce are best treated as commitment protocols, which are defined, or at least analyzed, in terms of the creation, satisfaction, or manipulation of the commitments among the participating agents. When protocols are employed in open environments, such as the Internet, they must be executed by agents that behave more or less autonomously and whose internal designs are not known. In such settings, therefore, there is a risk that the participating agents may fail to comply with the given protocol. Without a rigorous means to verify compliance, the very idea of protocols for interoperation is subverted. We develop an approach for testing whether the behavior of an agent complies with a commitment protocol. Our approach requires the specification of commitment protocols in temporal logic, and involves a novel way of synthesizing and applying ideas from distributed computing and logics of program.