We study the use of viral marketing strategies on social networks to maximize revenue from the sale of a single product. We propose a model in which the decision of a buyer to buy the product is influenced by friends that own the product and the price at which the product is offered. The influence model we analyze is quite general, naturally extending both the Linear Threshold model and the Independent Cascade model, while also incorporating price information. We consider sales proceeding in a cascading manner through the network, i.e. a buyer is offered the product via recommendations from its neighbors who own the product. In this setting, the seller influences events by offering a cashback to recommenders and by setting prices (via coupons or discounts) for each buyer in the social network. Finding a seller strategy which maximizes the expected revenue in this setting turns out to be NP-hard. However, we propose a seller strategy that generates revenue guaranteed to be within a constant factor of the optimal strategy in a wide variety of models. The strategy is based on an influence-and-exploit idea, and it consists of finding the right trade-off at each time step between: generating revenue from the current user versus offering the product for free and using the influence generated from this sale later in the process. We also show how local search can be used to improve the performance of this technique in practice.
A recent work by Hartline, Mirrokni and Sundararajan @cite_4 is similar in flavor to our work, and also considers extending social contagion ideas with pricing information, but the model they examine differs from our model in a several aspects. The main difference is that they assume that the seller is allowed to approach arbitrary nodes in the network at any time and offer their product at a price chosen by the seller, while in our model the cascade of recommendations determines the timing of an offer and this cannot be directly manipulated. In essence, the model proposed in @cite_4 is akin to advertising the product to arbitrary nodes, bypassing the network structure to encourage a desired set of early adopters. Our model restricts such direct advertising as it is likely to be much less effective than a direct recommendation from a friend, especially when the recommender has an incentive to convince the potential buyer to purchase the product (for instance, the recommender might personalize the recommendation, increasing its effectiveness). Despite the different models, the algorithms proposed by us and @cite_4 are similar in spirit and are based on an influence-and-exploit strategy.
@cite_4
2952466854 2015290529 2115890216 2112351105
We study the use of viral marketing strategies on social networks to maximize revenue from the sale of a single product. We propose a model in which the decision of a buyer to buy the product is influenced by friends that own the product and the price at which the product is offered. The influence model we analyze is quite general, naturally extending both the Linear Threshold model and the Independent Cascade model, while also incorporating price information. We consider sales proceeding in a cascading manner through the network, i.e. a buyer is offered the product via recommendations from its neighbors who own the product. In this setting, the seller influences events by offering a cashback to recommenders and by setting prices (via coupons or discounts) for each buyer in the social network. Finding a seller strategy which maximizes the expected revenue in this setting turns out to be NP-hard. However, we propose a seller strategy that generates revenue guaranteed to be within a constant factor of the optimal strategy in a wide variety of models. The strategy is based on an influence-and-exploit idea, and it consists of finding the right trade-off at each time step between: generating revenue from the current user versus offering the product for free and using the influence generated from this sale later in the process. We also show how local search can be used to improve the performance of this technique in practice. Most of existing e-commerce recommender systems aim to recommend the right product to a user, based on whether the user is likely to purchase or like a product. On the other hand, the effectiveness of recommendations also depends on the time of the recommendation. Let us take a user who just purchased a laptop as an example. She may purchase a replacement battery in 2 years (assuming that the laptop's original battery often fails to work around that time) and purchase a new laptop in another 2 years. In this case, it is not a good idea to recommend a new laptop or a replacement battery right after the user purchased the new laptop. It could hurt the user's satisfaction of the recommender system if she receives a potentially right product recommendation at the wrong time. We argue that a system should not only recommend the most relevant item, but also recommend at the right time. This paper studies the new problem: how to recommend the right product at the right time? We adapt the proportional hazards modeling approach in survival analysis to the recommendation research field and propose a new opportunity model to explicitly incorporate time in an e-commerce recommender system. The new model estimates the joint probability of a user making a follow-up purchase of a particular product at a particular time. This joint purchase probability can be leveraged by recommender systems in various scenarios, including the zero-query pull-based recommendation scenario (e.g. recommendation on an e-commerce web site) and a proactive push-based promotion scenario (e.g. email or text message based marketing). We evaluate the opportunity modeling approach with multiple metrics. Experimental results on a data collected by a real-world e-commerce website(shop.com) show that it can predict a user's follow-up purchase behavior at a particular time with descent accuracy. In addition, the opportunity model significantly improves the conversion rate in pull-based systems and the user satisfaction utility in push-based systems. We study the use of viral marketing strategies on social networks that seek to maximize revenue from the sale of a single product. We propose a model in which the decision of a buyer to buy the product is influenced by friends that own the product and the price at which the product is offered. The influence model we analyze is quite general, naturally extending both the Linear Threshold model and the Independent Cascade model, while also incorporating price information. We consider sales proceeding in a cascading manner through the network, i.e. a buyer is offered the product via recommendations from its neighbors who own the product. In this setting, the seller influences events by offering a cashback to recommenders and by setting prices (via coupons or discounts) for each buyer in the social network. This choice of prices for the buyers is termed as the seller's strategy. Finding a seller strategy which maximizes the expected revenue in this setting turns out to be NP-hard. However, we propose a seller strategy that generates revenue guaranteed to be within a constant factor of the optimal strategy in a wide variety of models. The strategy is based on an influence-and-exploit idea, and it consists of finding the right trade-off at each time step between: generating revenue from the current user versus offering the product for free and using the influence generated from this sale later in the process. In this paper, we propose the amphibious influence maximization (AIM) model that combines traditional marketing via content providers and viral marketing to consumers in social networks in a single framework. In AIM, a set of content providers and consumers form a bipartite network while consumers also form their social network, and influence propagates from the content providers to consumers and among consumers in the social network following the independent cascade model. An advertiser needs to select a subset of seed content providers and a subset of seed consumers, such that the influence from the seed providers passing through the seed consumers could reach a large number of consumers in the social network in expectation. We prove that the AIM problem is NP-hard to approximate to within any constant factor via a reduction from Feige's k-prover proof system for 3-SAT5. We also give evidence that even when the social network graph is trivial (i.e. has no edges), a polynomial time constant factor approximation for AIM is unlikely. However, when we assume that the weighted bi-adjacency matrix that describes the influence of content providers on consumers is of constant rank, a common assumption often used in recommender systems, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm that achieves approximation ratio of (1-1 e-e)3 for any (polynomially small) e > 0. Our algorithmic results still hold for a more general model where cascades in social network follow a general monotone and submodular function.