Modeling social interactions based on individual behavior has always been an area of interest, but prior literature generally presumes rational behavior. Thus, such models may miss out on capturing the effects of biases humans are susceptible to. This work presents a method to model egocentric bias, the real-life tendency to emphasize one's own opinion heavily when presented with multiple opinions. We use a symmetric distribution centered at an agent's own opinion, as opposed to the Bounded Confidence (BC) model used in prior work. We consider a game of iterated interactions where an agent cooperates based on its opinion about an opponent. Our model also includes the concept of domain-based self-doubt, which varies as the interaction succeeds or not. An increase in doubt makes an agent reduce its egocentricity in subsequent interactions, thus enabling the agent to learn reactively. The agent system is modeled with factions not having a single leader, to overcome some of the issues associated with leader-follower factions. We find that agents belonging to factions perform better than individual agents. We observe that an intermediate level of egocentricity helps the agent perform at its best, which concurs with conventional wisdom that neither overconfidence nor low self-esteem brings benefits.
Factions have been broadly considered to be specific sets of agents. However, a faction has been modeled in different ways. Some factions have been modeled as a leader-follower group, where the leader determines the group dynamics @cite_67 . Even if the group does not have an assigned leader to start with, it has been suggested that an agent with high cognitive capacity eventually emerges as a leader @cite_55 . Such a leader eventually impacts the performance of the entire group. Factions can also be modeled as a selfish herd, where each agent is a member for its own gain @cite_21 . However, this structure does not have a single leader and such models have proved useful in modeling certain group behaviors @cite_31 @cite_4 .
@cite_67 @cite_4 @cite_55 @cite_21 @cite_31
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All agents being informed and the virtual leader traveling at a constant velocity are the two critical assumptions seen in the recent literature on flocking in multi-agent systems. Under these assumptions, Olfati-Saber in a recent IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control paper proposed a flocking algorithm which by incorporating a navigational feedback enables a group of agents to track a virtual leader. This paper revisits the problem of multi-agent flocking in the absence of the above two assumptions. We first show that, even when only a fraction of agents are informed, the Olfati-Saber flocking algorithm still enables all the informed agents to move with the desired constant velocity, and an uninformed agent to also move with the same desired velocity if it can be influenced by the informed agents from time to time during the evolution. Numerical simulation demonstrates that a very small group of the informed agents can cause most of the agents to move with the desired velocity and the larger the informed group is the bigger portion of agents will move with the desired velocity. In the situation where the virtual leader travels with a varying velocity, we propose modification to the Olfati-Saber algorithm and show that the resulting algorithm enables the asymptotic tracking of the virtual leader. That is, the position and velocity of the center of mass of all agents will converge exponentially to those of the virtual leader. The convergent rate is also given. It is not uncommon for certain social networks to divide into two opposing camps in response to stress. This happens, for example, in networks of political parties during winner-takes-all elections, in networks of companies competing to establish technical standards, and in networks of nations faced with mounting threats of war. A simple model for these two-sided separations is the dynamical system dX dt = X2, where X is a matrix of the friendliness or unfriendliness between pairs of nodes in the network. Previous simulations suggested that only two types of behavior were possible for this system: Either all relationships become friendly or two hostile factions emerge. Here we prove that for generic initial conditions, these are indeed the only possible outcomes. Our analysis yields a closed-form expression for faction membership as a function of the initial conditions and implies that the initial amount of friendliness in large social networks (started from random initial conditions) determines whether they will end up in intractable conflict or global harmony. This paper presents a synthetic approach for generating role playing simulation games intended to support analysts (and trainees) interested in testing alternative competing courses of action (operations) and discovering what effects they are likely to precipitate in potential ethno-political conflict situations. Simulated leaders and followers capable of playing these games are implemented in a cognitive modeling framework, called PMFserv, which covers value systems, personality and cultural factors, emotions, relationships, perception, stress coping style and decision making. Of direct interest, as Sect. 1.1 explains, is mathematical representation and synthesis of best-of-breed behavioral science models within this framework to reduce dimensionality and to improve the realism and internal validity of the agent implementations. Sections 2 and 3 present this for leader profiling instruments and group membership decision-making, respectively. Section 4 serves as an existence proof that the framework has generated several training and analysis tools, and Sect. 5 concludes with lessons learned. Part II turns to the question of assessment of the synthesis and its usage in course of action studies. Coalition formation is the process of bringing together two or more agents so as to achieve goals that individuals on their own cannot, or to achieve them more efficiently. Typically, in such situations, the agents have conflicting preferences over the set of possible joint goals. Thus, before the agents realize the benefits of cooperation, they must find a way of resolving these conflicts and reaching a consensus. In this context, cooperative game theory offers the voting game as a mechanism for agents to reach a consensus. It also offers the Shapley value as a way of measuring the influence or power a player has in determining the outcome of a voting game. Given this, the designer of a voting game wants to construct a game such that a player's Shapley value is equal to some desired value. This is called the inverse Shapley value problem. Solving this problem is necessary, for instance, to ensure fairness in the players' voting powers. However, from a computational perspective, finding a player's Shapley value for a given game is #P-complete. Consequently, the problem of verifying that a voting game does indeed yield the required powers to the agents is also #P-complete. Therefore, in order to overcome this problem we present a computationally efficient approximation algorithm for solving the inverse problem. This method is based on the technique of 'successive approximations'; it starts with some initial approximate solution and iteratively updates it such that after each iteration, the approximate gets closer to the required solution. This is an anytime algorithm and has time complexity polynomial in the number of players. We also analyze the performance of this method in terms of its approximation error and the rate of convergence of an initial solution to the required one. Specifically, we show that the former decreases after each iteration, and that the latter increases with the number of players and also with the initial approximation error.