Since the discovery of adversarial examples in machine learning, researchers have designed several techniques to train neural networks that are robust against different types of attacks (most notably @math and @math based attacks). However, it has been observed that the defense mechanisms designed to protect against one type of attack often offer poor performance against the other. In this paper, we introduce Randomized Adversarial Training (RAT), a technique that is efficient both against @math and @math attacks. To obtain this result, we build upon adversarial training, a technique that is efficient against @math attacks, and demonstrate that adding random noise at training and inference time further improves performance against attacks. We then show that RAT is as efficient as adversarial training against @math attacks while being robust against strong @math attacks. Our final comparative experiments demonstrate that RAT outperforms all state-of-the-art approaches against @math and @math attacks.
An important idea to better protect models against strong attacks is to add noise at inference. The presence of noise complicates the design of adversarial examples because the precise outcome of the model is not known by the attacker. The first method explicitly using this kind of technique was introduced by and a number of alternative noise based protection methods have been proposed @cite_12 @cite_4 offers some protection. However, have remarked that randomization based protection mechanisms should be evaluated against attacks in expectation. Most existing noise-based protection mechanisms are weak under this evaluation methodology. Nevertheless, randomization remains the only viable mechanism against attacks.
@cite_4 @cite_12
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Recent development in the field of Deep Learning have exposed the underlying vulnerability of Deep Neural Network (DNN) against adversarial examples. In image classification, an adversarial example is a carefully modified image that is visually imperceptible to the original image but can cause DNN model to misclassify it. Training the network with Gaussian noise is an effective technique to perform model regularization, thus improving model robustness against input variation. Inspired by this classical method, we explore to utilize the regularization characteristic of noise injection to improve DNN's robustness against adversarial attack. In this work, we propose Parametric-Noise-Injection (PNI) which involves trainable Gaussian noise injection at each layer on either activation or weights through solving the min-max optimization problem, embedded with adversarial training. These parameters are trained explicitly to achieve improved robustness. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that uses trainable noise injection to improve network robustness against adversarial attacks, rather than manually configuring the injected noise level through cross-validation. The extensive results show that our proposed PNI technique effectively improves the robustness against a variety of powerful white-box and black-box attacks such as PGD, C & W, FGSM, transferable attack and ZOO attack. Last but not the least, PNI method improves both clean- and perturbed-data accuracy in comparison to the state-of-the-art defense methods, which outperforms current unbroken PGD defense by 1.1 and 6.8 on clean test data and perturbed test data respectively using Resnet-20 architecture. Convolutional neural networks have demonstrated high accuracy on various tasks in recent years. However, they are extremely vulnerable to adversarial examples. For example, imperceptible perturbations added to clean images can cause convolutional neural networks to fail. In this paper, we propose to utilize randomization at inference time to mitigate adversarial effects. Specifically, we use two randomization operations: random resizing, which resizes the input images to a random size, and random padding, which pads zeros around the input images in a random manner. Extensive experiments demonstrate that the proposed randomization method is very effective at defending against both single-step and iterative attacks. Our method provides the following advantages: 1) no additional training or fine-tuning, 2) very few additional computations, 3) compatible with other adversarial defense methods. By combining the proposed randomization method with an adversarially trained model, it achieves a normalized score of 0.924 (ranked No.2 among 107 defense teams) in the NIPS 2017 adversarial examples defense challenge, which is far better than using adversarial training alone with a normalized score of 0.773 (ranked No.56). The code is public available at this https URL. This paper focuses on a combination of two disclosure limitation techniques, additive noise and multiplicative bias, and studies their efficacy in protecting confidentiality of continuous microdata. A Bayesian intruder model is extensively simulated in order to assess the performance of these disclosure limitation techniques as a function of key parameters like the variability amongst profiles in the original data, the amount of users prior information, the amount of bias and noise introduced in the data. The results of the simulation offer insight into the degree of vulnerability of data on continuous random variables and suggests some guidelines for effective protection measures. As machine learning (ML) applications become increasingly prevalent, protecting the confidentiality of ML models becomes paramount for two reasons: (a) models may constitute a business advantage to its owner, and (b) an adversary may use a stolen model to find transferable adversarial examples that can be used to evade classification by the original model. One way to protect model confidentiality is to limit access to the model only via well-defined prediction APIs. This is common not only in machine-learning-as-a-service (MLaaS) settings where the model is remote, but also in scenarios like autonomous driving where the model is local but direct access to it is protected, for example, by hardware security mechanisms. Nevertheless, prediction APIs still leak information so that it is possible to mount model extraction attacks by an adversary who repeatedly queries the model via the prediction API. In this paper, we describe a new model extraction attack by combining a novel approach for generating synthetic queries together with recent advances in training deep neural networks. This attack outperforms state-of-the-art model extraction techniques in terms of transferability of targeted adversarial examples generated using the extracted model (+15-30 percentage points, pp), and in prediction accuracy (+15-20 pp) on two datasets. We then propose the first generic approach to effectively detect model extraction attacks: PRADA. It analyzes how the distribution of consecutive queries to the model evolves over time and raises an alarm when there are abrupt deviations. We show that PRADA can detect all known model extraction attacks with a 100 success rate and no false positives. PRADA is particularly suited for detecting extraction attacks against local models.