If you recommend a product to me and I buy it, how much should you be paid by the seller? And if your sole interest is to maximize the amount paid to you by the seller for a sequence of recommendations, how should you recommend optimally if I become more inclined to ignore you with each irrelevant recommendation you make? Finding an answer to these questions is a key challenge in all forms of marketing that rely on and explore social ties; ranging from personal recommendations to viral marketing. In the first part of this paper, we show that there can be no pricing mechanism that is “truthful” with respect to the seller, and we use solution concepts from coalitional game theory, namely the Core, the Shapley Value, and the Nash Bargaining Solution, to derive provably “fair” prices for settings with one or multiple recommenders. We then investigate pricing mechanisms for the setting where recommenders have different “purchase arguments”. Here we show that it might be beneficial for the recommenders to withhold some of their arguments, unless anonymity-proof solution concepts, such as the anonymity-proof Shapley value, are used. In the second part of this paper, we analyze the setting where the recommendee loses trust in the recommender for each irrelevant recommendation. Here we prove that even if the recommendee regains her initial trust on each successful recommendation, the expected total profit the recommender can make over an infinite period is bounded. This can only be overcome when the recommendee also incrementally regains trust during periods without any recommendation. Here, we see an interesting connection to “banner blindness”, suggesting that showing fewer ads can lead to a higher long-term profit.
We are also addressing the topic of how rumors spread through social networks, or how to identify the best nodes to target for a viral marketing campaign @cite_0 @cite_28 . Our work focuses on a single atomic link in the corresponding cascades of conversions and, in the first part, we ask what a fair price should be to pay a node for activating one of her neighbors. In answering this question we limit our attention to the immediate profit of the seller due to the individual sale, and we do consider the additional value due to recommendation cascades caused by the newly activated node. However, given any algorithm to compute this higher order'' profit, it can trivially be incorporated into our results. The question whether a selfish node should actually try to activate her neighbors at all is addressed in .
@cite_0 @cite_28
2068322213 2170002160 167256694 2952466854
In this paper, we study the question of how efficiently a collection of interconnected nodes can perform a global computation in the GOSSIP model of communication. In this model, nodes do not know the global topology of the network, and they may only initiate contact with a single neighbor in each round. This model contrasts with the much less restrictive LOCAL model, where a node may simultaneously communicate with all of its neighbors in a single round. A basic question in this setting is how many rounds of communication are required for the information dissemination problem, in which each node has some piece of information and is required to collect all others. In the LOCAL model, this is quite simple: each node broadcasts all of its information in each round, and the number of rounds required will be equal to the diameter of the underlying communication graph. In the GOSSIP model, each node must independently choose a single neighbor to contact, and the lack of global information makes it difficult to make any sort of principled choice. As such, researchers have focused on the uniform gossip algorithm, in which each node independently selects a neighbor uniformly at random. When the graph is well-connected, this works quite well. In a string of beautiful papers, researchers proved a sequence of successively stronger bounds on the number of rounds required in terms of the conductance φ and graph size n, culminating in a bound of O(φ-1 log n). In this paper, we show that a fairly simple modification of the protocol gives an algorithm that solves the information dissemination problem in at most O(D + polylog (n)) rounds in a network of diameter D, with no dependence on the conductance. This is at most an additive polylogarithmic factor from the trivial lower bound of D, which applies even in the LOCAL model. In fact, we prove that something stronger is true: any algorithm that requires T rounds in the LOCAL model can be simulated in O(T + polylog(n)) rounds in the GOSSIP model. We thus prove that these two models of distributed computation are essentially equivalent. In this paper we consider a fundamental problem in the area of viral marketing, called T ARGET S ET S ELECTION problem. In a a viral marketing setting, social networks are modeled by graphs with potential customers of a new product as vertices and friend relationships as edges, where each vertex @math is assigned a threshold value @math . The thresholds represent the different latent tendencies of customers (vertices) to buy the new product when their friend (neighbors) do. Consider a repetitive process on social network @math where each vertex @math is associated with two states, active and inactive, which indicate whether @math is persuaded into buying the new product. Suppose we are given a target set @math . Initially, all vertices in @math are inactive. At time step 0, we choose all vertices in @math to become active. Then, at every time step @math , all vertices that were active in time step @math remain active, and we activate any vertex @math if at least @math of its neighbors were active at time step @math . The activation process terminates when no more vertices can get activated. We are interested in the following optimization problem, called T ARGET S ET S ELECTION : Finding a target set @math of smallest possible size that activates all vertices of @math . There is an important and well-studied threshold called strict majority threshold, where for every vertex @math in @math we have @math and @math is the degree of @math in @math . In this paper, we consider the T ARGET S ET S ELECTION problem under strict majority thresholds and focus on three popular regular network structures: cycle permutation graphs, generalized Petersen graphs and torus cordalis. We analyze the popular push-pull protocol for spreading a rumor in networks. Initially, a single node knows of a rumor. In each succeeding round, every node chooses a random neighbor, and the two nodes share the rumor if one of them is already aware of it. We present the first theoretical analysis of this protocol on random graphs that have a power law degree distribution with an arbitrary exponent β > 2. Our main findings reveal a striking dichotomy in the performance of the protocol that depends on the exponent of the power law. More specifically, we show that if 2 3, then Ω(log n) rounds are necessary. We also investigate the asynchronous version of the push-pull protocol, where the nodes do not operate in rounds, but exchange information according to a Poisson process with rate 1. Surprisingly, we are able to show that, if 2 < β < 3, the rumor spreads even in constant time, which is much smaller than the typical distance of two nodes. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first result that establishes a gap between the synchronous and the asynchronous protocol. We study the use of viral marketing strategies on social networks to maximize revenue from the sale of a single product. We propose a model in which the decision of a buyer to buy the product is influenced by friends that own the product and the price at which the product is offered. The influence model we analyze is quite general, naturally extending both the Linear Threshold model and the Independent Cascade model, while also incorporating price information. We consider sales proceeding in a cascading manner through the network, i.e. a buyer is offered the product via recommendations from its neighbors who own the product. In this setting, the seller influences events by offering a cashback to recommenders and by setting prices (via coupons or discounts) for each buyer in the social network. Finding a seller strategy which maximizes the expected revenue in this setting turns out to be NP-hard. However, we propose a seller strategy that generates revenue guaranteed to be within a constant factor of the optimal strategy in a wide variety of models. The strategy is based on an influence-and-exploit idea, and it consists of finding the right trade-off at each time step between: generating revenue from the current user versus offering the product for free and using the influence generated from this sale later in the process. We also show how local search can be used to improve the performance of this technique in practice.