Future electricity distribution grids will host a considerable share of the renewable energy sources needed for enforcing the energy transition. Demand side management mechanisms play a key role in the integration of such renewable energy resources by exploiting the flexibility of elastic loads, generation or electricity storage technologies. In particular, local energy markets enable households to exchange energy with each other while increasing the amount of renewable energy that is consumed locally. Nevertheless, as most ex-ante mechanisms, local market schedules rely on hour-ahead forecasts whose accuracy may be low. In this paper we cope with forecast errors by proposing a game theory approach to model the interactions among prosumers and distribution system operators for the control of electricity flows in real-time. The presented game has an aggregative equilibrium which can be attained in a semi-distributed manner, driving prosumers towards a final exchange of energy with the grid that benefits both households and operators, favoring the enforcement of prosumers' local market commitments while respecting the constraints defined by the operator. The proposed mechanism requires only one-to-all broadcast of price signals, which do not depend either on the amount of players or their local objective function and constraints, making the approach highly scalable. Its impact on distribution grid quality of supply was evaluated through load flow analysis and realistic load profiles, demonstrating the capacity of the mechanism ensure that voltage deviation and thermal limit constraints are respected.
Game theory has been applied mainly to day-ahead energy scheduling rather than to real-time control, and particularly to modeling the interactions between the electricity supplier and its clients, with the goal of minimizing energy costs rather than enforcing DSO constraints @cite_19 @cite_21 @cite_22 @cite_6 @cite_26 . In @cite_21 they propose a Stackelberg game model that allows electricity suppliers to define prices leading to an equilibrium that minimizes Peak to Average Ratio. In @cite_22 they follow the same approach from @cite_21 , but with a strictly convex cost function. In @cite_23 , an online version of a scheduling mechanism for flexible appliances is proposed, which copes with price prediction errors. The literature related to real-time control of electricity flows on distribution grids does not consider RES and storage resources or does not take particular care of voltage deviations or thermal constraints.
@cite_26 @cite_22 @cite_21 @cite_6 @cite_19 @cite_23
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This paper proposes a Stackelberg game approach to deal with demand response (DR) scheduling under load uncertainty based on real-time pricing (RTP) in a residential setup. We formulate the optimization problems for the service provider that acts as the leader and for the users who are the multiple followers, respectively. We derive the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) consisting of the optimal real-time electricity price and each user's optimal power consumption. Simulation results show the proposed DR scheduling not only can control the total power consumption, but also is beneficial to the service provider's revenue. Moreover, the load uncertainty increases the service provider's revenue and decreases each user's payoff. We study the demand side management (DSM) problem when customers are equipped with energy storage devices. Two games are discussed: the first is a non-cooperative one played between the residential energy consumers, while the second is a Stackelberg game played between the utility provider and the energy consumers. We introduce a new cost function applicable to the case of users selling back stored energy. The non-cooperative energy consumption game is played between users who schedule their energy use to minimize energy cost. The game is shown to have a unique Nash equilibrium, that is also the global system optimal point. In the Stackelberg game, the utility provider sets the prices to maximize its profit knowing that users will respond by minimizing their cost. We provide existence and uniqueness results for the Stackelberg equilibrium. The Stackelberg game is shown to be the general case of the minimum Peak-to-Average power ratio (PAR) problem. Two algorithms, centralized and distributed, are presented to solve the Stackelberg game. We present results that elucidate the interplay between storage capacity, energy requirements, number of users and system performance measured in total cost and peak-to-average power ratio (PAR). Abstract This paper proposes a stochastic and dynamic mixed-integer linear program (SD-MILP) for optimal coordinated bidding of a risk-averse profit-maximizing hydropower producer. The day-ahead, intra-day, and real-time markets are considered. To model and predict day-ahead, intra-day, and real-time prices, the Holt–Winter (HW) and the Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedastic (GARCH) predictors are combined using a proposed Markov switch. The discrete behavior of intra-day and real-time prices is modeled as different Markov states. The proposed Markov-based HW–GARCH model with a standard scenario generation-reduction technique is used to capture the uncertainty in day-ahead, intra-day, and real-time prices. The time-dependent conditional value at risk (T-CVaR) is proposed to model the risk of trading in different considered markets. The convex combination of the expected profit and T-CVaR is used as the objective of SD-MILP. The Markov-based HW–GARCH is modeled in Matlab and the SD-MILP is coded in GAMS. The Markov-based HW–GARCH predictor and the SD-MILP are used to develop the bidding curve of a three-reservoir hydropower producer using the electricity prices from the Nordic power market. To further examine the developed models a seven-reservoir hydropower producer is also studied. For these two cases, the coordinated bidding curves are derived and discussed. This paper proposes a real-time price (RTP)-based demand-response (DR) algorithm for achieving optimal load control of devices in a facility by forming a virtual electricity-trading process, where the energy management center of the facility is the virtual retailer (leader) offering virtual retail prices, from which devices (followers) are supposed to purchase energy. A one-leader, @math -follower Stackelberg game is formulated to capture the interactions between them, and optimization problems are formed for each player to help in selecting the optimal strategy. The existence of a unique Stackelberg equilibrium that provides optimal energy demands for each device was demonstrated. The simulation analysis showed that the Stackelberg game-based DR algorithm is effective for achieving the optimal load control of devices in response to RTP changes with a trivial computation burden.