Infrastructure networks are vulnerable to both cyber and physical attacks. Building a secure and resilient networked system is essential for providing reliable and dependable services. To this end, we establish a two-player three-stage game framework to capture the dynamics in the infrastructure protection and recovery phases. Specifically, the goal of the infrastructure network designer is to keep the network connected before and after the attack, while the adversary aims to disconnect the network by compromising a set of links. With costs for creating and removing links, the two players aim to maximize their utilities while minimizing the costs. In this paper, we use the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) to characterize the optimal strategies of the network defender and attacker. We derive the SPE explicitly in terms of system parameters. We further investigate the resilience planning of the defender and the strategic timing of attack of the adversary. Finally, we use case studies of UAV-enabled communication networks for disaster recovery to corroborate the obtained analytical results.
The adopted method and framework in our infrastructure network design are relevant to the recent advances in adversarial networks @cite_4 @cite_29 @cite_10 @cite_12 and strategic network formation games @cite_21 @cite_2 @cite_35 . Furthermore, the current work extends our previous one @cite_13 in multiple aspects. First, our goal in this work is to design the optimal protection, resilience planning and recovery strategies for infrastructure networks in a holistic manner which differs from @cite_13 in which the critical resilience planning factor is not considered. Second, we investigate the new topic of network resilience and the strategic behavior of attacker in Section . Third, we provide the detailed proofs of all theoretical results which were omitted in @cite_13 . Fourth, we extensively expand the introduction and related work sections as well as the case studies section with more examples to explicitly illustrate the newly obtained analytical results.
@cite_13 @cite_35 @cite_4 @cite_29 @cite_21 @cite_2 @cite_10 @cite_12
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Infrastructure networks are vulnerable to both cyber and physical attacks. Building a secure and resilient networked system is essential for providing reliable and dependable services. To this end, we establish a two-player three-stage game framework to capture the dynamics in the infrastructure protection and recovery phases. Specifically, the goal of the infrastructure network designer is to keep the network connected before and after the attack, while the adversary aims to disconnect the network by compromising a set of links. With costs for creating and removing links, the two players aim to maximize their utilities while minimizing the costs. In this paper, we use the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) to characterize the optimal strategies of the network defender and attacker. We derive the SPE explicitly in terms of system parameters. Finally, we use a case study of UAV-enabled communication networks for disaster recovery to corroborate the obtained analytical results. The complex interconnections between various critical infrastructure sectors make the system of systems (SoS) vulnerable to failures and highlight the importance of robustness and resilience. To this end, we first establish holistic probabilistic networks to model the interdependencies between infrastructure components. To capture the underlying failure and recovery dynamics, we further propose a Markov decision processes (MDP) model in which the response policy determines a long-term performance. To address the challenge of a large dimensionality, we exploit the sparsity of the network interconnections and solve an approximate linear program by the variable elimination, which leads to a distributed control policy under mild assumptions. Finally, we use a case study of the interdependent power and subway systems to corroborate the results and show that the optimal resilience resource planning and allocation can reduce the failure probability and mitigate the impact of failures caused by natural or artificial disasters. Network protection against natural and human-caused hazards has become a topical research theme in engineering and social sciences. This paper focuses on the problem of allocating limited retrofit resources over multiple highway bridges to improve the resilience and robustness of the entire transportation system in question. The main modeling challenges in network retrofit problems are to capture the interdependencies among individual transportation facilities and to cope with the extremely high uncertainty in the decision environment. In this paper, we model the network retrofit problem as a two-stage stochastic programming problem that optimizes a mean-risk objective of the system loss. This formulation hedges well against uncertainty, but also imposes computational challenges due to involvement of integer decision variables and increased dimension of the problem. An efficient algorithm is developed, via extending the well-known L-shaped method using generalized benders decomposition, to efficiently handle the binary integer variables in the first stage and the nonlinear recourse in the second stage of the model formulation. The proposed modeling and solution methods are general and can be applied to other network design problems as well. Despite much research on probabilistic key predistribution schemes for wireless sensor networks over the past decade, few formal analyses exist that define schemes’ resilience to node-capture attacks precisely and under realistic conditions. In this paper, we analyze the resilience of the @math -composite key predistribution scheme, which mitigates the node capture vulnerability of the Eschenauer-Gligor scheme in the neighbor discovery phase. We derive scheme parameters to have a desired level of resiliency, and obtain optimal parameters that defend against different adversaries as much as possible. We also show that this scheme can be easily enhanced to achieve the same “perfect resilience” property as in the random pairwise key predistribution for attacks launched after neighbor discovery. Despite considerable attention to this scheme, much prior work explicitly or implicitly uses an incorrect computation for the probability of link compromise under node-capture attacks and ignores the real-world transmission constraints of sensor nodes. Moreover, we derive the critical network parameters to ensure connectivity in both the absence and presence of node-capture attacks. We also investigate node replication attacks by analyzing the adversary’s optimal strategy.