Cybercrime markets support the development and diffusion of new attack technologies, vulnerability exploits, and malware. Whereas the revenue streams of cyber attackers have been studied multiple times in the literature, no quantitative account currently exists on the economics of attack acquisition and deployment. Yet, this understanding is critical to characterize the production of (traded) exploits, the economy that drives it, and its effects on the overall attack scenario. In this paper we provide an empirical investigation of the economics of vulnerability exploitation, and the effects of market factors on likelihood of exploit. Our data is collected first-handedly from a prominent Russian cybercrime market where the trading of the most active attack tools reported by the security industry happens. Our findings reveal that exploits in the underground are priced similarly or above vulnerabilities in legitimate bug-hunting programs, and that the refresh cycle of exploits is slower than currently often assumed. On the other hand, cybercriminals are becoming faster at introducing selected vulnerabilities, and the market is in clear expansion both in terms of players, traded exploits, and exploit pricing. We then evaluate the effects of these market variables on likelihood of attack realization, and find strong evidence of the correlation between market activity and exploit deployment. We discuss implications on vulnerability metrics, economics, and exploit measurement.
The economics and development of underground markets have perhaps been first tackled by @cite_75 . On the other hand, @cite_65 showed that cybercrime economics are distinctively problematic in that the lack of effective rule enforcement mechanisms may hinder fair trading, and as a consequence the existence of the market itself. A few studies analyzed the evolution of cybercrime markets @cite_35 @cite_51 @cite_16 @cite_43 @cite_0 @cite_42 , and provided estimates of malware development @cite_22 and attack likelihood @cite_32 , but no quantitative account of economic factors such as exploit pricing and adoption are currently reported in the literature @cite_36 @cite_22 . In this paper we provide the first empirical quantification of these economic aspects by analyzing data collected first-handedly from a prominent cybercrime market.
@cite_35 @cite_22 @cite_36 @cite_42 @cite_65 @cite_32 @cite_0 @cite_43 @cite_51 @cite_16 @cite_75
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Over the last decade, the nature of cybercrime has transformed from naive vandalism to profit-driven, leading to the emergence of a global underground economy. A noticeable trend which has surfaced in this economy is the repeated use of forums to operate online stolen data markets. Using interaction data from three prominent carding forums: Shadowcrew, Cardersmarket and Darkmarket, this study sets out to understand why forums are repeatedly chosen to operate online stolen data markets despite numerous successful infiltrations by law enforcement in the past. Drawing on theories from criminology, social psychology, economics and network science, this study has identified four fundamental socio-economic mechanisms offered by carding forums: (1) formal control and coordination; (2) social networking; (3) identity uncertainty mitigation; (4) quality uncertainty mitigation. Together, they give rise to a sophisticated underground market regulatory system that facilitates underground trading over the Internet and thus drives the expansion of the underground economy. Cybercrime activities are supported by infrastructures and services originating from an underground economy. The current understanding of this phenomenon is that the cybercrime economy ought to be fraught with information asymmetry and adverse selection problems. They should make the effects that we observe every day impossible to sustain. In this paper, we show that the market structure and design used by cyber criminals have evolved toward a market design that is similar to legitimate, thriving, online forum markets such as eBay. We illustrate this evolution by comparing the market regulatory mechanisms of two underground forum markets: 1) a failed market for credit cards and other illegal goods and 2) another, extremely active marketplace for vulnerabilities, exploits, and cyber attacks in general. The comparison shows that cybercrime markets evolved from unruly, scam for scammers market mechanisms to mature, regulated mechanisms that greatly favors trade efficiency. The rise of cybercrime in the last decade is an economic case of individuals responding to monetary and psychological incentives. Two main drivers for cybercrime can be identi fied: the potential gains from cyberattacks are increasing with the growth of importance of the Internet, and malefactors' expected costs (e.g., the penalties and the likelihood of being apprehended and prosecuted) are frequently lower compared with traditional crimes. In short, computer-mediated crimes are more convenient, and pro table, and less expensive and risky than crimes not mediated by the Internet. The increase in cybercriminal activities, coupled with ineff ective legislation and ineffective law enforcement pose critical challenges for maintaining the trust and security of ourcomputer infrastructures.Modern computer attacks encompass a broad spectrum of economic activity, where various malfeasants specialize in developing speci c goods (exploits, botnets, mailers) and services (distributing malware, monetizing stolen credentials, providing web hosting, etc.). A typical Internet fraud involves the actions of many of these individuals, such as malware writers, botnet herders, spammers, data brokers, and money launderers.Assessing the relationships among various malfeasants is an essential piece of information for discussing economic, technical, and legal proposals to address cybercrime. This paper presents a framework for understanding the interactions between these individuals and how they operate. We follow three steps.First, we present the general architecture of common computer attacks, and discuss the flow of goods and services that supports the underground economy. We discuss the general flow of resources between criminal groups and victims, and the interactions between diff erent specialized cybercriminals.Second, we describe the need to estimate the social costs of cybercrime and the profi ts of cybercriminals in order to identify optimal levels of protection. One of the main problems in quantifying the precise impact of cybercrime is that computer attacks are not always detected, or reported. Therefore we propose the need to develop a more systematic and transparent way of reporting computer breaches and their eff ects.Finally, we propose some possible countermeasures against criminal activities. In particular, we analyze the role private and public protection, and the incentives of multiple stake holders. This paper studies an active underground economy which specializes in the commoditization of activities such as credit car d fraud, identity theft, spamming, phishing, online credential the ft, and the sale of compromised hosts. Using a seven month trace of logs collected from an active underground market operating on public Internet chat networks, we measure how the shift from “hacking for fun” to “hacking for profit” has given birth to a societ al subs trate mature enough to steal wealth into the millions of dollars in less than one year.