Due to the expectedly higher density of mobile devices and exhaust of radio resources, the fifth generation (5G) mobile networks introduce small cell concept in the radio access technologies, so-called Small Cell Networks (SCNs), to improve radio spectrum utilization. However, this increases the chance of handover due to smaller coverage of a micro base station, i.e., home eNodeB (HeNB) in 5G. Subsequently, the latency will increase as the costs of authenticated key exchange protocol, which ensures entity authentication and communication confidentiality for secure handover, also increase totally. Thus, this work presents a secure region-based handover scheme (ReHand) with user anonymity and fast revocation for SCNs in 5G. ReHand greatly reduces the communication costs when UEs roam between small cells within the region of a macro base station, i.e., eNB in 5G, and the computation costs due to the employment of symmetry-based cryptographic operations. Compared to the three elaborated related works, ReHand dramatically reduces the costs from 82.92 to 99.99 . Nevertheless, this work demonstrates the security of ReHand by theoretically formal proofs.
A notable amount of roaming-based AKE protocols have been proposed and user anonymity has been carefully deliberated in @cite_25 @cite_32 @cite_17 @cite_16 @cite_3 @cite_6 @cite_26 @cite_37 @cite_54 @cite_27 @cite_18 @cite_46 . In mobile networks, an UE should complete authentication for identity identification prior to requesting for services when roaming to the coverage of a new visiting foreign network (FN). The user anonymous authentication prevents eavesdroppers or and FN from exposing the real identities of UEs in every authentication session such that the footprints of communications of UEs are concealed.
@cite_37 @cite_26 @cite_18 @cite_54 @cite_32 @cite_3 @cite_6 @cite_27 @cite_46 @cite_16 @cite_25 @cite_17
2151648452 2099803980 2316444051 2001135236
Two novel mutual authentication and key exchange protocols with anonymity are proposed for different roaming scenarios in the global mobility network. The new features in the proposed protocols include identity anonymity and one-time session key renewal. Identity anonymity protects mobile users privacy in the roaming network environment. One-time session key progression frequently renews the session key for mobile users and reduces the risk of using a compromised session key to communicate with visited networks. It has demonstrated that the computation complexity of the proposed protocols is similar to the existing ones, while the security has been significantly improved A secure roaming protocol allows a roaming user U to visit a foreign server V and establish a session key in an authenticated way such that U authenticates V and at the same time convinces V that it is a legitimate subscriber of some server H, called the home server of U. The conventional approach requires the involvement of all the three parties. In this paper, we propose a new approach which requires only two parties, U and V, to get involved. We propose two protocols: one provides better efficiency and supports user anonymity to an extent comparable to that provided by current mobile systems; and the other one achieves strong user anonymity that protects U's identity against both eavesdroppers and foreign servers and is currently the strongest notion of user anonymity defined for secure roaming. Both protocols are universal in the sense that the same protocol and signaling flows are used regardless of the domain (home or foreign) that U is visiting. This helps reducing the system complexity in practice. We also propose a practical user revocation mechanism, which is one of the most challenging problems for two-party roaming supporting strong user anonymity. Our solutions can be applied in various kinds of roaming networks such as cellular networks and interconnected wireless local area networks. User authentication is an imperative security mechanism for recognizing legal roaming users. However, designing an expeditious anonymous-user authentication scheme in the global mobility networking (GLOMONET) environment is always a challenging task. Because, due to the broadcast nature of the wireless channels, wireless networks are often susceptible to various attacks and mobile devices powered by batteries that have limited communication, processing, and storage capabilities. In this paper, we propose a lightweight, secure, and an expeditious authentication scheme, which can preserve the user anonymity for roaming services in GLOMONET. In this regard, we use the low-cost cryptographic primitives such as one-way hash functions and exclusive-or operations to accomplish goals, which is more suitable for battery-powered mobile devices. Although some authentication protocols for GLOMONET security have already been proposed, however, they are unable to achieve the desired imperative security properties, such as anonymity, privacy against eavesdroppers, communication security, etc. As a consequence of that, they are vulnerable to various security issues. Security and performance analyses show that our proposed scheme is secure and even more efficient, as compared with other related authentication schemes in GLOMONET. In this paper we propose a way to enhance the identity privacy in LTE LTE-Advanced systems. This is achieved while minimizing the impact on the existing E-UTRAN system. This is important since proposals to modify a widely deployed infrastructure must be cost effective, both in terms of design changes and in terms of deployment cost. In our proposal, the user equipment (UE) identifies itself with a dummy identity, consisting only of the mobile nation code and the mobile network code. We use the existing signalling mechanisms in a novel way to request a special encrypted identity information element. This element is protected using identity-based encryption (IBE), with the home network (HPLMN) as the private key generator (PKG) and the visited network (VPLMN) and the private key owner. This allows the UE to protect the identity (IMSI) from external parties. To avoid tracking the “encrypted IMSI” also include a random element. We use this as an opportunity to let the UE include as subscriber-side random challenge to the network. The challenge will be bounded to the EPS authentication vector (EPS AV) and will allow use to construct an online 3-way security context. To complete our proposal we also strengthen the requirements on the use of the temporary identifier (M-TMSI).