Suppose that an @math -simplex is partitioned into @math convex regions having disjoint interiors and distinct labels, and we may learn the label of any point by querying it. The learning objective is to know, for any point in the simplex, a label that occurs within some distance @math from that point. We present two algorithms for this task: Constant-Dimension Generalised Binary Search (CD-GBS), which for constant @math uses @math queries, and Constant-Region Generalised Binary Search (CR-GBS), which uses CD-GBS as a subroutine and for constant @math uses @math queries. We show via Kakutani's fixed-point theorem that these algorithms provide bounds on the best-response query complexity of computing approximate well-supported equilibria of bimatrix games in which one of the players has a constant number of pure strategies. We also partially extend our results to games with multiple players, establishing further query complexity bounds for computing approximate well-supported equilibria in this setting.
Separately, we note that the present paper is possibly relevant to the search for a price equilibrium in certain markets. Baldwin and Klemperer study markets consisting of strong-substitutes demand functions for @math different goods available in multiple discrete units @cite_7 . These markets are a generalisation of the product-mix auction of @cite_4 ; a basic task is to identify prices at which some desired bundle of the goods is demanded. Consider the space @math of all price vectors. As analysed in @cite_7 , a strong-substitutes demand function partitions this price space into convex polytopes, each of which comprises the prices at which some particular bundle of goods is demanded. So, the present paper relates to a setting where price vectors may be queried, and responses consist of demand bundles. The connection is imperfect, since the main objective in the context of @cite_7 would be to learn a price at which some target bundle is demanded, rather than the entire demand function. The ideas here may be useful for learning the values that the market has for various bundles.
@cite_4 @cite_7
2095954749 2170344325 2035518103 1964207488
We consider markets in the classical Arrow-Debreu model. There are n agents and m goods. Each buyer has a concave utility function (of the bundle of goods he she buys) and an initial bundle. At an ldquoequilibriumrdquo set of prices for goods, if each individual buyer separately ex-changes the initial bundle for an optimal bundle at the set prices, the market clears, i.e., all goods are exactly consumed. Classical theorems guarantee the existence of equilibria, but computing them has been the subject of much recent research. In the related area of Multi-Agent Games,much attention has been paid to the complexity as well as algorithms. While most general problems are hard, polynomial time algorithms have been developed for restricted classes of games, when one assumes the number of strategies is constant.For the Market Equilibrium problem, several important special cases of utility functions have been tackled. Here we begin a program for this problem similar to that for multi-agent games, where general utilities are considered. We begin by showing that if the utilities are separable piece-wise linear concave (PLC) functions, and the number of goods(or alternatively the number of buyers) is constant, then we can compute an exact equilibrium in polynomial time.Our technique for the constant number of goods is to de-compose the space of price vectors into cells using certain hyperplanes, so that in each cell, each buyerpsilas threshold marginal utility is known. Still, one needs to solve a linear optimization problem in each cell. We then show the main result - that for general (non-separable) PLC utilities, an exact equilibrium can be found in polynomial time provided the number of goods is constant. The starting point of the algorithm is a ldquocell-decompositionrdquo of the space of price vectors using polynomial surfaces (instead of hyperplanes).We use results from computational algebraic geometry to bound the number of such cells. For solving the problem inside each cell, we introduce and use a novel LP-duality based method. We note that if the number of buyers and agents both can vary, the problem is PPAD hard even for the very special case of PLC utilities - namely Leontief utilities. We consider requests for capacity in a given tree network T e (V, E) where each edge e of the tree has some integer capacity ue. Each request f is a node pair with an integer demand df and a profit wf which is obtained if the request is satisfied. The objective is to find a set of demands that can be feasibly routed in the tree and which provides a maximum profit. This generalizes well-known problems, including the knapsack and b-matching problems. When all demands are 1, we have the integer multicommodity flow problem. [1997] had shown that this problem is NP-hard and gave a 2-approximation algorithm for the cardinality case (all profits are 1) via a primal-dual algorithm. Our main result establishes that the integrality gap of the natural linear programming relaxation is at most 4 for the case of arbitrary profits. Our proof is based on coloring paths on trees and this has other applications for wavelength assignment in optical network routing. We then consider the problem with arbitrary demands. When the maximum demand dmax is at most the minimum edge capacity umin, we show that the integrality gap of the LP is at most 48. This result is obtained by showing that the integrality gap for the demand version of such a problem is at most 11.542 times that for the unit-demand case. We use techniques of Kolliopoulos and Stein [2004, 2001] to obtain this. We also obtain, via this method, improved algorithms for line and ring networks. Applications and connections to other combinatorial problems are discussed. In many industries, managers face the problem of selling a given stock of items by a deadline. We investigate the problem of dynamically pricing such inventories when demand is price sensitive and stochastic and the firm's objective is to maximize expected revenues. Examples that fit this framework include retailers selling fashion and seasonal goods and the travel and leisure industry, which markets space such as seats on airline flights, cabins on vacation cruises, and rooms in hotels that become worthless if not sold by a specific time. We formulate this problem using intensity control and obtain structural monotonicity results for the optimal intensity resp., price as a function of the stock level and the length of the horizon. For a particular exponential family of demand functions, we find the optimal pricing policy in closed form. For general demand functions, we find an upper bound on the expected revenue based on analyzing the deterministic version of the problem and use this bound to prove that simple, fixed price policies are asymptotically optimal as the volume of expected sales tends to infinity. Finally, we extend our results to the case where demand is compound Poisson; only a finite number of prices is allowed; the demand rate is time varying; holding costs are incurred and cash flows are discounted; the initial stock is a decision variable; and reordering, overbooking, and random cancellations are allowed. We investigate nonparametric multiproduct pricing problems, in which we want to find revenue maximizing prices for products @math based on a set of customer samples @math . We mostly focus on the unit-demand case, in which products constitute strict substitutes and each customer aims to purchase a single product. In this setting a customer sample consists of a number of nonzero values for different products and possibly an additional product ranking. Once prices are fixed, each customer chooses to buy one of the products she can afford based on some predefined selection rule. We distinguish between the min-buying, max-buying, and rank-buying models. Some of our results also extend to single-minded pricing, in which case products are strict complements and every customer seeks to buy a single set of products, which she purchases if the sum of prices is below her valuation for that set. For the min-buying model we show that the revenue maximization problem is not approximable within factor @math for some constant @math , unless @math , thereby almost closing the gap between the known algorithmic results and previous lower bounds. We also prove inapproximability within @math , @math being an upper bound on the number of nonzero values per customer, and @math under slightly stronger assumptions and provide matching upper bounds. Surprisingly, these hardness results hold even if a price ladder constraint, i.e., a predefined order on the prices of all products, is given. Without the price ladder constraint we obtain similar hardness results for the special case of uniform valuations, i.e., the case that every customer has identical values for all the products she is interested in, assuming specific hardness of the balanced bipartite independent set problem in constant degree graphs or hardness of refuting random 3CNF formulas. Introducing a slightly more general problem definition in which customers are given as an explicit probability distribution, we obtain inapproximability within @math assuming @math . These results apply to single-minded pricing as well. For the max-buying model a polynomial-time approximation scheme exists if a price ladder is given. We give a matching lower bound by proving strong NP-hardness. Assuming limited product supply, we analyze a generic local search algorithm and prove that it is 2-approximate. Finally, we discuss implications for the rank-buying model.