With the rapid spread of various mobile terminals in our society, the importance of secure positioning is growing for wireless networks in adversarial settings. Recently, several authors have proposed a secure positioning mechanism of mobile terminals which is based on the geometric property of wireless node placement, and on the postulate of modern physics that a propagation speed of information never exceeds the velocity of light. In particular, they utilize the measurements of the round-trip time of radio signal propagation and bidirectional communication for variants of the challenge-and-response. In this paper, we propose a novel means to construct the above mechanism by use of unidirectional communication instead of bidirectional communication. Our proposal is based on the assumption that a mobile terminal incorporates a high-precision inner clock in a tamper-resistant protected area. In positioning, the mobile terminal uses its inner clock and the time and location information broadcasted by radio from trusted stations. Our proposal has a major advantage in protecting the location privacy of mobile terminal users, because the mobile terminal need not provide any information to the trusted stations through positioning procedures. Besides, our proposal is free from the positioning error due to claimant's processing-time fluctuations in the challenge-and-response, and is well-suited for mobile terminals in the open air, or on the move at high speed, in terms of practical usage. We analyze the security, the functionality, and the feasibility of our proposal in comparison to previous proposals.
The protocol called Temporal Leashes is proposed in @cite_0 for detection of the specific attack called the wormhole attack. The protocol detects the attack by checking the packet transmission time measured by tightly synchronized clocks of a sender and a receiver.
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As mobile ad hoc network applications are deployed, security emerges as a central requirement. In this paper, we introduce the wormhole attack, a severe attack in ad hoc networks that is particularly challenging to defend against. The wormhole attack is possible even if the attacker has not compromised any hosts, and even if all communication provides authenticity and confidentiality. In the wormhole attack, an attacker records packets (or bits) at one location in the network, tunnels them (possibly selectively) to another location, and retransmits them there into the network. The wormhole attack can form a serious threat in wireless networks, especially against many ad hoc network routing protocols and location-based wireless security systems. For example, most existing ad hoc network routing protocols, without some mechanism to defend against the wormhole attack, would be unable to find routes longer than one or two hops, severely disrupting communication. We present a general mechanism, called packet leashes, for detecting and, thus defending against wormhole attacks, and we present a specific protocol, called TIK, that implements leashes. We also discuss topology-based wormhole detection, and show that it is impossible for these approaches to detect some wormhole topologies. The increasing incidence of worm attacks in the Internet and the resulting instabilities in the global routing properties of the border gateway protocol (BGP) routers pose a serious threat to the connectivity and the ability of the Internet to deliver data correctly. In this paper we propose a mechanism to detect predict the onset of such instabilities which can then enable the timely execution of preventive strategies in order to minimize the damage caused by the worm. Our technique is based on online statistical methods relying on sequential change-point and persistence filter based detection algorithms. Our technique is validated using a year's worth of real traces collected from BGP routers in the Internet that we use to detect predict the global routing instabilities corresponding to the Code Red II, Nimda and SQL Slammer worms. The ability of a receiver to determine when a transmitter has changed location is important for energy conservation in wireless sensor networks, for physical security of radio-tagged objects, and for wireless network security in detection of replication attacks. In this paper, we propose using a measured temporal link signature to uniquely identify the link between a transmitter and a receiver. When the transmitter changes location, or if an attacker at a different location assumes the identity of the transmitter, the proposed link distinction algorithm reliably detects the change in the physical channel. This detection can be performed at a single receiver or collaboratively by multiple receivers. We record over 9,000 link signatures at different locations and over time to demonstrate that our method significantly increases the detection rate and reduces the false alarm rate, in comparison to existing methods. Network based intruders seldom attack directly from their own hosts, but rather stage their attacks through intermediate "stepping stones" to conceal their identity and origin. To identify attackers behind stepping stones, it is necessary to be able to correlate connections through stepping stones, even if those connections are encrypted or perturbed by the intruder to prevent traceability.The timing-based approach is the most capable and promising current method for correlating encrypted connections. However, previous timing-based approaches are vulnerable to packet timing perturbations introduced by the attacker at stepping stones. In this paper, we propose a novel watermark-based correlation scheme that is designed specifically to be robust against timing perturbations. The watermark is introduced by slightly adjusting the timing of selected packets of the flow. By utilizing redundancy techniques, we have developed a robust watermark correlation framework that reveals a rather surprising result on the inherent limits of independent and identically distributed (iid) random timing perturbations over sufficiently long flows. We also identify the tradeoffs between timing perturbation characteristics and achievable correlation effectiveness. Experiments show that the new method performs significantly better than existing, passive, timing-based correlation in the presence of random packet timing perturbations.