Network management protocols often require timely and meaningful insight about per flow network traffic. This paper introduces Randomized Admission Policy (RAP) - a novel algorithm for the frequency and top-k estimation problems, which are fundamental in network monitoring. We demonstrate space reductions compared to the alternatives by a factor of up to 32 on real packet traces and up to 128 on heavy-tailed workloads. For top-k identification, RAP exhibits memory savings by a factor of between 4 and 64 depending on the skew of the workload. These empirical results are backed by formal analysis, indicating the asymptotic space improvement of our probabilistic admission approach. Additionally, we present d-Way RAP, a hardware friendly variant of RAP that empirically maintains its space and accuracy benefits.
Counter based algorithms are usually designed for software implementations and maintain a table of monitored items. The differences between these algorithms lie in the question of admission and eviction of entries to and from the table. From a networking perspective, counter based algorithms maintain an explicit flow to counter mapping for monitored items. For a stream of @math events and an accuracy parameter @math , the goal is to approximate a given flow's frequency to within an additive error of @math . For this task, @math counters are required @cite_17 , and this is achieved by some of the algorithms below.
@cite_17
2059739152 1523041988 2886207505 2085174050
Fine-grained network measurement requires routers and switches to update large arrays of counters at very high link speed (e.g. 40 Gbps). A naive algorithm needs an infeasible amount of SRAM to store both the counters and a flow-to-counter association rule, so that arriving packets can update corresponding counters at link speed. This has made accurate per-flow measurement complex and expensive, and motivated approximate methods that detect and measure only the large flows. This paper revisits the problem of accurate per-flow measurement. We present a counter architecture, called Counter Braids, inspired by sparse random graph codes. In a nutshell, Counter Braids "compresses while counting". It solves the central problems (counter space and flow-to-counter association) of per-flow measurement by "braiding" a hierarchy of counters with random graphs. Braiding results in drastic space reduction by sharing counters among flows; and using random graphs generated on-the-fly with hash functions avoids the storage of flow-to-counter association. The Counter Braids architecture is optimal (albeit with a complex decoder) as it achieves the maximum compression rate asymptotically. For implementation, we present a low-complexity message passing decoding algorithm, which can recover flow sizes with essentially zero error. Evaluation on Internet traces demonstrates that almost all flow sizes are recovered exactly with only a few bits of counter space per flow. A traditional counterexample to a linear-time safety property shows the values of all signals at all times prior to the error. However, some signals may not be critical to causing the failure. A succinct explanation may help human understanding as well as speed up algorithms that have to analyze many such traces. In Bounded Model Checking (BMC), a counterexample is constructed from a satisfying assignment to a Boolean formula, typically in CNF. Modern SAT solvers usually assign values to all variables when the input formula is satisfiable. Deriving minimal satisfying assignments from such complete assignments does not lead to concise explanations of counterexamples because of how CNF formulae are derived from the models. Hence, we formulate the extraction of a succinct counterexample as the problem of finding a minimal assignment that, together with the Boolean formula describing the model, implies an objective. We present a two-stage algorithm for this problem, such that the result of each stage contributes to identify the “interesting” events that cause the failure. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach with an example and with experimental results. Software-based countermeasures provide effective mitigation against side-channel attacks, often with minimal efficiency and deployment overheads. Their effectiveness is often amenable to rigorous analysis: specifically, several popular countermeasures can be formalized as information flow policies, and correct implementation of the countermeasures can be verified with state-of-the-art analysis and verification techniques. However, in absence of further justification, the guarantees only hold for the language (source, target, or intermediate representation) on which the analysis is performed. We consider the problem of preserving side-channel counter-measures by compilation for cryptographic “constant-time”, a popular countermeasure against cache-based timing attacks. We present a general method, based on the notion of constant-time-simulation, for proving that a compilation pass preserves the constant-time countermeasure. Using the Coq proof assistant, we verify the correctness of our method and of several representative instantiations. Network management applications require large numbers of counters in order to collect traffic characteristics for each network flow. However, these counters often barely fit into on-chip SRAM memories. Past papers have proposed using counter estimators instead, thus trading off counter precision for a lower number of bits. But these estimators do not achieve optimal estimation error, and cannot always scale to arbitrary counter values.