Abstract Ad exchanges are kind of the most popular online advertising marketplaces for trading ad spaces over the Internet. Ad exchanges run auctions to sell diverse ad spaces on the publishers’ web-pages to advertisers, who want to display ads on ad spaces. However, the parties in an ad auction cannot verify whether the auction is carried out correctly or not. Furthermore, the advertisers are usually unwilling to reveal their sensitive bids and identities. In this paper, we jointly consider the auction verifiability and the advertisers’ privacy preservation, and thus propose ERA, which is an E fficient, p R ivacy-preserving, and verifi A ble online auction mechanism for ad exchanges. ERA exploits an order preserving encryption scheme to guarantee privacy preservation, and achieves verifiability by constructing a novel protocol of privacy preserving integer comparison, which is built on the Paillier homomorphic encryption scheme. We extensively evaluate the performance of ERA, and our evaluation results show that ERA satisfies several desirable properties with low computation, communication, and storage overheads, so ERA can be easily deployed in today's ad exchanges.
The most relevant work is paper @cite_45 , in which an online verifiable auction mechanism for ad exchanges was proposed. However, the bid protection was not considered, and the interactions between the ad exchange and the ad bidders are too frequent. Therefore, jointly considering both security and efficiency requirements, ERA is the first efficient, privacy preserving, and verifiable online auction mechanism for ad exchanges.
@cite_45
2096270679 1823461189 2950920780 2055445578
This paper treats a critical component of the Web ecosystem that has so far received little attention in our community: ad exchanges. Ad exchanges run auctions to sell publishers' inventory-space on Web pages-to advertisers who want to display ads in those spaces. Unfortunately, under the status quo, the parties to an auction cannot check that the auction was carried out correctly, which raises the following more general question: how can we create verifiability in low-latency, high-frequency auctions where the parties do not know each other? We address this question with the design, prototype implementation, and experimental evaluation of VEX. VEX introduces a technique for efficient, privacy-preserving integer comparisons; couples these with careful protocol design; and adds little latency and tolerable overhead. Ads on the Internet are increasingly sold via ad exchanges such as RightMedia, AdECN and Doubleclick Ad Exchange. These exchanges allow real-time bidding, that is, each time the publisher contacts the exchange, the exchange "calls out" to solicit bids from ad networks. This solicitation introduces a novel aspect, in contrast to existing literature. This suggests developing a joint optimization framework which optimizes over the allocation and well as solicitation. We model this selective call out as an online recurrent Bayesian decision framework with bandwidth type constraints. We obtain natural algorithms with bounded performance guarantees for several natural optimization criteria. We show that these results hold under different call out constraint models, and different arrival processes. Interestingly, the paper shows that under MHR assumptions, the expected revenue of generalized second price auction with reserve is constant factor of the expected welfare. Also the analysis herein allow us prove adaptivity gap type results for the adwords problem. We study the communication complexity of combinatorial auctions via interpolation mechanisms that interpolate between non-truthful and truthful protocols. Specifically, an interpolation mechanism has two phases. In the first phase, the bidders participate in some non-truthful protocol whose output is itself a truthful protocol. In the second phase, the bidders participate in the truthful protocol selected during phase one. Note that virtually all existing auctions have either a non-existent first phase (and are therefore truthful mechanisms), or a non-existent second phase (and are therefore just traditional protocols, analyzed via the Price of Anarchy Stability). The goal of this paper is to understand the benefits of interpolation mechanisms versus truthful mechanisms or traditional protocols, and develop the necessary tools to formally study them. Interestingly, we exhibit settings where interpolation mechanisms greatly outperform the optimal traditional and truthful protocols. Yet, we also exhibit settings where interpolation mechanisms are provably no better than truthful ones. Finally, we apply our new machinery to prove that the recent single-bid mechanism of Devanur et. al. DevanurMSW15 (the only pre-existing interpolation mechanism in the literature) achieves the optimal price of anarchy among a wide class of protocols, a claim that simply can't be addressed by appealing just to machinery from communication complexity or the study of truthful mechanisms. Describes a novel Internet auction model achieving verifiable fairness, a requirement aimed at enhancing the trust of bidders in auctioneers. Distrust in remote auctioneers prevents bidders from participating in Internet auctioning. According to proposed survey reports, this study presents four characteristics that render the Internet untrustworthy for bidders. These intrinsic properties suggest that auction sites not only follow auction policies, but provide customers with evidence validating that the policies are applied fairly. Evidence of verifiable fairness provides bidders with a basis for confidence in Internet auctions. Cryptographic techniques are also applied herein to establish a novel auction model with evidence to manifest and verify every step of the auctioneer. Analysis results demonstrate that the proposed model satisfies various requirements regarding fairness and privacy. Moreover, in the proposed model, the losing bids remain sealed.