We present a new and practical framework for security verification of secure architectures. Specifically, we break the verification task into external verification and internal verification. External verification considers the external protocols, i.e. interactions between users, compute servers, network entities, etc. Meanwhile, internal verification considers the interactions between hardware and software components within each server. This verification framework is general-purpose and can be applied to a stand-alone server, or a large-scale distributed system. We evaluate our verification method on the CloudMonatt and HyperWall architectures as examples.
Secure architecture verification. Of the different secure architectures, XOM @cite_30 and SecVisor @cite_25 have received the benefit of security verification using model-checking. In industry, e.g., the IBM 4758 cryptographic co-processor's design included security verification @cite_8 . These works, however, have not focused on external and internal protocols and interactions as we do.
@cite_30 @cite_25 @cite_8
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Software-based fault isolation (SFI), as used in Google's Native Client (NaCl), relies upon a conceptually simple machine-code analysis to enforce a security policy. But for complicated architectures such as the x86, it is all too easy to get the details of the analysis wrong. We have built a new checker that is smaller, faster, and has a much reduced trusted computing base when compared to Google's original analysis. The key to our approach is automatically generating the bulk of the analysis from a declarative description which we relate to a formal model of a subset of the x86 instruction set architecture. The x86 model, developed in Coq, is of independent interest and should be usable for a wide range of machine-level verification tasks. We provide a method for deciding the insecurity of cryptographic protocols in presence of the standard Dolev-Yao intruder (with a finite number of sessions) extended with so-called oracle rules, i.e., deduction rules that satisfy certain conditions. As an instance of this general framework, we ascertain that protocol insecurity is in NP for an intruder that can exploit the properties of the XOR operator. This operator is frequently used in cryptographic protocols but cannot be handled in most protocol models. An immediate consequence of our proof is that checking whether a message can be derived by an intruder (using XOR) is in P. We also apply our framework to an intruder that exploits properties of certain encryption modes such as cipher block chaining (CBC). We address the verification problem of finite-state concurrent programs running under weak memory models. These models capture the reordering of program (read and write) operations done by modern multi-processor architectures for performance. The verification problem we study is crucial for the correctness of concurrency libraries and other performance-critical system services employing lock-free synchronization, as well as for the correctness of compiler backends that generate code targeted to run on such architectures. We consider in this paper combinations of three well-known program order relaxations. We consider first the "write to read" relaxation, which corresponds to the TSO (Total Store Ordering) model. This relaxation is used in most hardware architectures available today. Then, we consider models obtained by adding either (1) the "write to write" relaxation, leading to a model which is essentially PSO (Partial Store Ordering), or (2) the "read to read write" relaxation, or (3) both of them, as it is done in the RMO (Relaxed Memory Ordering) model for instance. We define abstract operational models for these weak memory models based on state machines with (potentially unbounded) FIFO buffers, and we investigate the decidability of their reachability and their repeated reachability problems. We prove that the reachability problem is decidable for the TSO model, as well as for its extension with "write to write" relaxation (PSO). Furthermore, we prove that the reachability problem becomes undecidable when the "read to read write" relaxation is added to either of these two memory models, and we give a condition under which this addition preserves the decidability of the reachability problem. We show also that the repeated reachability problem is undecidable for all the considered memory models. Although there have been attempts to develop code transformations that yield tamper-resistant software, no reliable software-only methods are know. This paper studies the hardware implementation of a form of execute-only memory (XOM) that allows instructions stored in memory to be executed but not otherwise manipulated. To support XOM code we use a machine that supports internal compartments---a process in one compartment cannot read data from another compartment. All data that leaves the machine is encrypted, since we assume external memory is not secure. The design of this machine poses some interesting trade-offs between security, efficiency, and flexibility. We explore some of the potential security issues as one pushes the machine to become more efficient and flexible. Although security carries a performance penalty, our analysis indicates that it is possible to create a normal multi-tasking machine where nearly all applications can be run in XOM mode. While a virtual XOM machine is possible, the underlying hardware needs to support a unique private key, private memory, and traps on cache misses. For efficient operation, hardware assist to provide fast symmetric ciphers is also required.