The proliferation of ubiquitous computing requires energy-efficient as well as secure operation of modern processors. Side channel attacks are becoming a critical threat to security and privacy of devices embedded in modern computing infrastructures. Unintended information leakage via physical signatures such as power consumption, electromagnetic emission (EM) and execution time have emerged as a key security consideration for SoCs. Also, information published on purpose at user privilege level accessible through software interfaces results in software only attacks. In this paper, we used a supervised learning based approach for inferring applications executing on android platform based on features extracted from EM side-channel emissions and software exposed dynamic voltage frequency scaling(DVFS) states. We highlight the importance of machine learning based approach in utilizing these multi-dimensional features on a complex SoC, against profiling-based approaches. We also show that learning the instantaneous frequency states polled from onboard frequency driver (cpufreq) is adequate to identify a known application and flag potentially malicious unknown application. The experimental results on benchmarking applications running on ARMv8 processor in Snapdragon 820 board demonstrates early detection of these apps, and atleast 85 accuracy in detecting unknown applications. Overall, the highlight is to utilize a low-complexity path to application inference attacks through learning instantaneous frequency states pattern of CPU core.
Both profiling based and ML based techniques have been utilized for application inferencing. For instance, to protect the devices against malwares, authors have demonstrated malware detection based on HPCs by selectively choosing application specific hardware and software events @cite_15 . Similar approach, is shown by R. Spritzer et.al. using selective information from process logs that form a strong correlation for same application in order to form templates and utilizing dynamic time warping(DTW) for application inference. They have shown upto 96 exposed information can be used to mount inference attacks. Using proc @math pid @math statm along with number of context switches, is shown to infer a visited-webpages by a user @cite_12 . Similarly, size of the memory footprint of specific applications in proc @math pid @math statm is used to infer the user interface. More recently, activity transitions of an application are inferred using runtime memory statistics. @cite_2 Moreover, identifying which application is running can help in launching specific attacks. For instance, an app running in the background to identify application which require login credentials, can execute phishing-based attacks @cite_2 to steal login credentials.
@cite_15 @cite_12 @cite_2
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As the failure frequency is increasing with the components count in modern and future supercomputers, resilience is becoming critical for extreme scale systems. The association of failure prediction with proactive checkpointing seeks to reduce the effect of failures in the execution time of parallel applications. Unfortunately, proactive checkpointing does not systematically avoid restarting from scratch. To mitigate this issue, failure prediction and proactive checkpointing can be coupled with periodic checkpointing. However, blind use of these techniques does not always improves system efficiency, because everyone of them comes with a mix of overheads and benefits. In order to study and understand the combination of these techniques and their improvement in the system's efficiency, we developed: (i) a prototype combining state of the art failure prediction, fast proactive checkpointing and preventive checkpointing; (ii) a mathematical model that reflects the expected computing efficiency of the combination and computes the optimal checkpointing interval in this context; (iii) a discrete event simulator to evaluate the computing efficiency of the combination for system parameters corresponding to the current and projected large scale HPC systems. We evaluate our proposed technique on a large supercomputer (i.e. TSUBAME2) with production-level HPC applications and we show that failure prediction, proactive and preventive checkpointing can be coupled successfully, imposing only about 2 to 6 of overhead in comparison with preventive checkpointing only. Moreover, our model-based simulations show that the optimal solution improves the computing efficiency up to 30 in comparison with classic periodic checkpointing. We show that the prediction recall has a much higher impact on execution efficiency than the prediction precision. This result suggests that researchers on failure prediction algorithms should focus on improving the recall. We also show that the combination of these techniques can significantly improve (by a factor 2, for a particular configuration) the mean time between failures (MTBF) perceived by the application. Highly targeted spear phishing attacks are increasingly common, and have been implicated in many major security breeches. Email filtering systems are the first line of defense against such attacks. These filters are typically configured with uniform thresholds for deciding whether or not to allow a message to be delivered to a user. However, users have very significant differences in both their susceptibility to phishing attacks as well as their access to critical information and credentials that can cause damage. Recent work has considered setting personalized thresholds for individual users based on a Stackelberg game model. We consider two important extensions of the previous model. First, in our model user values can be substitutable, modeling cases where multiple users provide access to the same information or credential. Second, we consider attackers who make sequential attack plans based on the outcome of previous attacks. Our analysis starts from scenarios where there is only one credential and then extends to more general scenarios with multiple credentials. For single-credential scenarios, we demonstrate that the optimal defense strategy can be found by solving a binary combinatorial optimization problem called PEDS. For multiple-credential scenarios, we formulate it as a bilevel optimization problem for finding the optimal defense strategy and then reduce it to a single level optimization problem called PEMS using complementary slackness conditions. Experimental results show that both PEDS and PEMS lead to significant higher defender utilities than two existing benchmarks in different parameter settings. Also, both PEDS and PEMS are more robust than the existing benchmarks considering uncertainties. Prefetching data ahead of use has the potential to tolerate the grow ing processor-memory performance gap by overlapping long latency memory accesses with useful computation. While sophisti cated prefetching techniques have been automated for limited domains, such as scientific codes that access dense arrays in loop nests, a similar level of success has eluded general-purpose pro grams, especially pointer-chasing codes written in languages such as C and C++. We address this problem by describing, implementing and evaluating a dynamic prefetching scheme. Our technique runs on stock hardware, is completely automatic, and works for general-purpose programs, including pointer-chasing codes written in weakly-typed languages, such as C and C++. It operates in three phases. First, the profiling phase gathers a temporal data reference profile from a running program with low-overhead. Next, the profiling is turned off and a fast analysis algorithm extracts hot data streams, which are data reference sequences that frequently repeat in the same order, from the temporal profile. Then, the system dynamically injects code at appropriate program points to detect and prefetch these hot data streams. Finally, the process enters the hibernation phase where no profiling or analysis is performed, and the program continues to execute with the added prefetch instructions. At the end of the hibernation phase, the program is de-optimized to remove the inserted checks and prefetch instructions, and control returns to the profiling phase. For long-running programs, this profile, analyze and optimize, hibernate, cycle will repeat multiple times. Our initial results from applying dynamic prefetching are promising, indicating overall execution time improvements of 5.19 for several memory-performance-limited SPECint2000 benchmarks running their largest (ref) inputs. As machine learning (ML) applications become increasingly prevalent, protecting the confidentiality of ML models becomes paramount for two reasons: (a) models may constitute a business advantage to its owner, and (b) an adversary may use a stolen model to find transferable adversarial examples that can be used to evade classification by the original model. One way to protect model confidentiality is to limit access to the model only via well-defined prediction APIs. This is common not only in machine-learning-as-a-service (MLaaS) settings where the model is remote, but also in scenarios like autonomous driving where the model is local but direct access to it is protected, for example, by hardware security mechanisms. Nevertheless, prediction APIs still leak information so that it is possible to mount model extraction attacks by an adversary who repeatedly queries the model via the prediction API. In this paper, we describe a new model extraction attack by combining a novel approach for generating synthetic queries together with recent advances in training deep neural networks. This attack outperforms state-of-the-art model extraction techniques in terms of transferability of targeted adversarial examples generated using the extracted model (+15-30 percentage points, pp), and in prediction accuracy (+15-20 pp) on two datasets. We then propose the first generic approach to effectively detect model extraction attacks: PRADA. It analyzes how the distribution of consecutive queries to the model evolves over time and raises an alarm when there are abrupt deviations. We show that PRADA can detect all known model extraction attacks with a 100 success rate and no false positives. PRADA is particularly suited for detecting extraction attacks against local models.