There is an ever growing number of users with accounts on multiple social media and networking sites. Consequently, there is increasing interest in matching user accounts and profiles across different social networks in order to create aggregate profiles of users. In this paper, we present models for Digital Stylometry, which is a method for matching users through stylometry inspired techniques. We experimented with linguistic, temporal, and combined temporal-linguistic models for matching user accounts, using standard and novel techniques. Using publicly available data, our best model, a combined temporal-linguistic one, was able to correctly match the accounts of 31 of 5,612 distinct users across Twitter and Facebook.
Several methods have been proposed for matching user profiles using public data @cite_24 @cite_15 @cite_6 @cite_3 @cite_12 @cite_23 @cite_25 @cite_10 . These works differ from ours in two main aspects. First, in some of these works, the ground truth data is collected by assuming that all profiles that have the same screen name are from the same users @cite_25 @cite_10 . This is not a valid assumption. In fact, it has been suggested that close to $20
@cite_3 @cite_6 @cite_24 @cite_23 @cite_15 @cite_10 @cite_25 @cite_12
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The analysis of multiple datasets on users’ behaviors opens interesting information fusion possibilities and, at the same time, creates a potential for re-identification and de-anonymization of users’ data. On the one hand, this kind of approaches can breach users’ privacy despite anonymization. On the other hand, combining different datasets is a key enabler for advanced context-awareness in that information from multiple sources can complement and enrich each other. In this work we analyze different anonymized mobility datasets in the direction of highlighting re-identification and information fusion possibilities. In particular we focus on call detail record (CDR) datasets released by mobile telecom operators and datasets comprising geo-localized messages released by social network sites. Results shows that: (1) in line with previous findings, few (about 4) data points are enough to uniquely pin point the majority (90 ) of the users, (2) more than 20 of CDR users have a single social network user exhibiting a number of matching data points. We speculate that these two users might be the same person. (3) We derive an estimate of the probability of two users begin the same person given the number of data points they have in common, and estimate that for 3 of the social network users we can find a CDR user very likely (>90 probability) to be the same person. Matching the profiles of a user across multiple online social networks brings opportunities for new services and applications as well as new insights on user online behavior, yet it raises serious privacy concerns. Prior literature has showed that it is possible to accurately match profiles, but their evaluation focused only on sampled datasets. In this paper, we study the extent to which we can reliably match profiles in practice, across real-world social networks, by exploiting public attributes, i.e., information users publicly provide about themselves. Today's social networks have hundreds of millions of users, which brings completely new challenges as a reliable matching scheme must identify the correct matching profile out of the millions of possible profiles. We first define a set of properties for profile attributes--Availability, Consistency, non-Impersonability, and Discriminability (ACID)--that are both necessary and sufficient to determine the reliability of a matching scheme. Using these properties, we propose a method to evaluate the accuracy of matching schemes in real practical cases. Our results show that the accuracy in practice is significantly lower than the one reported in prior literature. When considering entire social networks, there is a non-negligible number of profiles that belong to different users but have similar attributes, which leads to many false matches. Our paper sheds light on the limits of matching profiles in the real world and illustrates the correct methodology to evaluate matching schemes in realistic scenarios. With the growing popularity and usage of online social media services, people now have accounts (some times several) on multiple and diverse services like Facebook, Linked In, Twitter and You Tube. Publicly available information can be used to create a digital footprint of any user using these social media services. Generating such digital footprints can be very useful for personalization, profile management, detecting malicious behavior of users. A very important application of analyzing users' online digital footprints is to protect users from potential privacy and security risks arising from the huge publicly available user information. We extracted information about user identities on different social networks through Social Graph API, Friend Feed, and Profilactic, we collated our own dataset to create the digital footprints of the users. We used username, display name, description, location, profile image, and number of connections to generate the digital footprints of the user. We applied context specific techniques (e.g. Jaro Winkler similarity, Word net based ontologies) to measure the similarity of the user profiles on different social networks. We specifically focused on Twitter and Linked In. In this paper, we present the analysis and results from applying automated classifiers for disambiguating profiles belonging to the same user from different social networks. User ID and Name were found to be the most discriminative features for disambiguating user profiles. Using the most promising set of features and similarity metrics, we achieved accuracy, precision and recall of 98 , 99 , and 96 , respectively. In today's data-rich networked world, people express many aspects of their lives online. It is common to segregate different aspects in different places: you might write opinionated rants about movies in your blog under a pseudonym while participating in a forum or web site for scholarly discussion of medical ethics under your real name. However, it may be possible to link these separate identities, because the movies, journal articles, or authors you mention are from a sparse relation space whose properties (e.g., many items related to by only a few users) allow re-identification. This re-identification violates people's intentions to separate aspects of their life and can have negative consequences; it also may allow other privacy violations, such as obtaining a stronger identifier like name and address.This paper examines this general problem in a specific setting: re-identification of users from a public web movie forum in a private movie ratings dataset. We present three major results. First, we develop algorithms that can re-identify a large proportion of public users in a sparse relation space. Second, we evaluate whether private dataset owners can protect user privacy by hiding data; we show that this requires extensive and undesirable changes to the dataset, making it impractical. Third, we evaluate two methods for users in a public forum to protect their own privacy, suppression and misdirection. Suppression doesn't work here either. However, we show that a simple misdirection strategy works well: mention a few popular items that you haven't rated.