Semidefinite programming can be considered over any real closed field, including fields of Puiseux series equipped with their nonarchimedean valuation. Nonarchimedean semidefinite programs encode parametric families of classical semidefinite programs, for sufficiently large values of the parameter. Recently, a correspondence has been established between nonarchimedean semidefinite programs and stochastic mean payoff games with perfect information. This correspondence relies on tropical geometry. It allows one to solve generic nonarchimedean semidefinite feasibility problems, of large scale, by means of stochastic game algorithms. In this paper, we show that the mean payoff of these games can be interpreted as a condition number for the corresponding nonarchimedean feasibility problems. This number measures how close a feasible instance is from being infeasible, and vice versa. We show that it coincides with the maximal radius of a ball in Hilbert's projective metric, that is included in the feasible set. The geometric interpretation of the condition number relies in particular on a duality theorem for tropical semidefinite feasibility programs. Then, we bound the complexity of the feasibility problem in terms of the condition number. We finally give explicit bounds for this condition number, in terms of the characteristics of the stochastic game. As a consequence, we show that the simplest algorithm to decide whether a stochastic mean payoff game is winning, namely value iteration, has a pseudopolynomial complexity when the number of random positions is fixed.
When specialized to stochastic mean payoff games with perfect information, our bounds should be compared with the one of Boros, Elbassioni, Gurvich, and Makino @cite_15 . The authors of @cite_15 generalize the pumping'' algorithm, developed for deterministic games by Gurvich, Karzanov, and Khachiyan @cite_9 , to the case of stochastic games. The resulting algorithm is also pseudopolynomial if the number of random positions is fixed. The algorithm of Ibsen-Jensen and Miltersen @cite_16 yields a stronger bound in the case of simple stochastic games, still assuming that the number of random positions is fixed.
@cite_9 @cite_15 @cite_16
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The multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem features the classical tradeoff between exploration and exploitation. The input specifies several stochastic arms which evolve with each pull, and the goal is to maximize the expected reward after a fixed budget of pulls. The celebrated work of , surveyed in [8], presumes a condition on the arms called the martingale assumption. In [9], A. obtained an LP-based 1 48-approximation for the problem with the martingale assumption removed. We improve the algorithm to a 4 27-approximation, with simpler analysis. Our algorithm also generalizes to the case of MAB superprocesses with (stochastic) multi-period actions. This generalization captures the framework introduced by Guha and Munagala in [11], and yields new results for their budgeted learning problems. Also, we obtain a (1 2 -- e)-approximation for the variant of MAB where preemption (playing an arm, switching to another arm, then coming back to the first arm) is not allowed. This contains the stochastic knapsack problem of Dean, Goemans, and Vondrak in [6] with correlated rewards, where we are given a knapsack of fixed size, and a set of jobs each with a joint distribution for its size and reward. The actual size and reward of a job can only be discovered in real-time as it is being scheduled, and the objective is to maximize expected reward before the knapsack size is exhausted. Our (1 2 -- e)-approximation improves the 1 16 and 1 8 approximations in [9] for correlated stochastic knapsack with cancellation and no cancellation, respectively, providing to our knowledge the first tight algorithm for these problems that matches the integrality gap of 2. We sample probabilities from an exponential-sized dynamic programming solution, whose existence is guaranteed by an LP projection argument. We hope this technique can also be applied to other dynamic programming problems which can be projected down onto a small LP. This paper deals with the design of efficiently computable incentive-compatible mechanisms for combinatorial optimization problems with single-minded agents each possibly having multiple private parameters. We focus on approximation algorithms for NP-hard mechanism design problems. These algorithms need to satisfy certain monotonicity properties to ensure truthfulness. Since most of the known approximation techniques do not fulfill these properties, we study alternative techniques. Our first contribution is a quite general method to transform a pseudopolynomial algorithm into a monotone fully polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS). This can be applied to various problems like, e.g., knapsack, constrained shortest path, or job scheduling with deadlines. For example, the monotone FPTAS for the knapsack problem gives a very efficient, truthful mechanism for single-minded multiunit auctions. The best previous result for such auctions was a 2-appro-xi-ma-tion. In addition, we present a monotone PTAS for the generalized assignment problem with any constant number of private parameters per agent. The most efficient way to solve packing integer programs (PIPs) is linear programming-based randomized rounding, which also is in general not monotone. We show that primal-dual greedy algorithms achieve almost the same approximation ratios for PIPs as randomized rounding. The advantage is that these algorithms are inherently monotone. This way, we can significantly improve the approximation ratios of truthful mechanisms for various fundamental mechanism design problems like single-minded combinatorial auctions (CAs), unsplittable flow routing, and multicast routing. Our primal-dual approximation algorithms can also be used for the winner determination in CAs with general bidders specifying their bids through an oracle. This paper deals with the design of efficiently computable incentive compatible, or truthful, mechanisms for combinatorial optimization problems with multi-parameter agents. We focus on approximation algorithms for NP-hard mechanism design problems. These algorithms need to satisfy certain monotonicity properties to ensure truthfulness. Since most of the known approximation techniques do not fulfill these properties, we study alternative techniques.Our first contribution is a quite general method to transform a pseudopolynomial algorithm into a monotone FPTAS. This can be applied to various problems like, e.g., knapsack, constrained shortest path, or job scheduling with deadlines. For example, the monotone FPTAS for the knapsack problem gives a very efficient, truthful mechanism for single-minded multi-unit auctions. The best previous result for such auctions was a 2-approximation. In addition, we present a monotone PTAS for the generalized assignment problem with any bounded number of parameters per agent.The most efficient way to solve packing integer programs (PIPs) is LP-based randomized rounding, which also is in general not monotone. We show that primal-dual greedy algorithms achieve almost the same approximation ratios for PIPs as randomized rounding. The advantage is that these algorithms are inherently monotone. This way, we can significantly improve the approximation ratios of truthful mechanisms for various fundamental mechanism design problems like single-minded combinatorial auctions (CAs), unsplittable flow routing and multicast routing. Our approximation algorithms can also be used for the winner determination in CAs with general bidders specifying their bids through an oracle. Pseudo-random number generation on the Atari 2600 was commonly accomplished using a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR). One drawback was that the initial seed for the LFSR had to be hard-coded into the ROM. To overcome this constraint, programmers sampled from the LFSR once per frame, including title and end screens. Since a human player will have some random amount of delay between seeing the title screen and starting to play, the LFSR state was effectively randomized at the beginning of the game despite the hard-coded seed. Other games used the player’s actions as a source of randomness. Notable pseudo-random games include Adventure in which a bat randomly steals and hides items around the game world and River Raid which used randomness to make enemy movements less predictable. Relying on the player to provide a source of randomness is not sufficient for computer controlled agents which are capable of memorizing and repeating pre-determined sequences of actions. Ideally, the games themselves would provide stochasticity generated from an external source such as the CPU clock. In practice, this was not an option presented by the hardware. Atari games are deterministic given a fixed policy leading to a set sequence of actions. This article discusses different approaches for adding stochasticity to Atari games and examines how effective each approach is at derailing an agent known to memorize action sequences. Additionally it is the authors’ hope that this article will spark discussion in the community over the following questions: