Ad hoc networks rely on the cooperation of the nodes participating in the network to forward packets for each other. A node may decide not to cooperate to save its resources while still using the network to relay its traffic. If too many nodes exhibit this behavior, network performance degrades and cooperating nodes may find themselves unfairly loaded. Most previous efforts to counter this behavior have relied on further cooperation between nodes to exchange reputation information about other nodes. If a node observes another node not participating correctly, it reports this observation to other nodes who then take action to avoid being affected and potentially punish the bad node by refusing to forward its traffic. Unfortunately, such second-hand reputation information is subject to false accusations and requires maintaining trust relationships with other nodes. The objective of OCEAN is to avoid this trust-management machinery and see how far we can get simply by using direct first-hand observations of other nodes' behavior. We find that, in many scenarios, OCEAN can do as well as, or even better than, schemes requiring second-hand reputation exchanges. This encouraging result could possibly help obviate solutions requiring trust-management for some contexts.
Researchers have also investigated means of discouraging selfish routing behavior in ad hoc networks, generally through payment schemes @cite_4 , @cite_0 , @cite_9 . These approaches either require the use of tamper-proof hardware modules or central bankers to do the accounting securely, both of which may not be appropriate in some truly ad hoc network scenarios. In the per-hop payment scheme proposed by Buttyan and Hubaux @cite_0 , the payment units are called nuglets and reside in a secure tamper-proof module in each node. They find that given such a module, increased cooperation is beneficial not only for the entire network but also for individual nodes. We rely on much of their work and likewise use a payment scheme. In our simple chipcount'' mechanism, further described in , each node keeps track of the number of packets it has forwarded for its direct neighbors and expects corresponding willingness from those neighbors to carry its traffic. The scheme can result in unfairness to some hosts, but its simplicity and performance may be appropriate in some scenarios.
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In an ad-hoc network, intermediate nodes on a communication path are expected to forward packets of other nodes so that the mobile nodes can communicate beyond their wireless transmission range. However, because wireless mobile nodes are usually constrained by limited power and computation resources, a selfish node may be unwilling to spend its resources in forwarding packets which are not of its direct interest, even though it expects other nodes to forward its packets to the destination. It has been shown that the presence of such selfish nodes degrades the overall performance of a non-cooperative ad hoc network. To address this problem, we propose a secure and objective reputation-based incentive (SORI) scheme to encourage packet forwarding and discipline selfish behavior. Different from the existing schemes, under our approach, the reputation of a node is quantified by objective measures, and the propagation of reputation is efficiently secured by a one-way-hash-chain-based authentication scheme. Armed with the reputation-based mechanism, we design a punishment scheme to penalize selfish nodes. The experimental results show that the proposed scheme can successfully identify selfish nodes and punish them accordingly. This paper addresses the problem of fairness in wireless ad-hoc networks. Usually, the problem of fairness in wireless ad-hoc networks is addressed in a classic approach inherited from wired networks. The common assumption is that nodes flows have pre-assigned fair shares. The task becomes then to modify wired networks' fair queueing algorithms to address wireless network nature. Wired networks have efficient means of allocating fiar shares through admission control and additionally, the fair shares remain constant throughout the session duration due to the static nature of the nodes. In ad-hoc networks, it is meaningless to assume statically pre-assigned fair shares, since on one hand, not only the nodes move, but also the routers are mobile, and on the other hand, contention is location dependent, such that in terms of absolute guarantees, fairness would at most mean "avoiding starvation": thus applying rate proportional fiar queueing algorithms is beyond the original goal of such algorithm, viz. flow isolation protection and bandwidth guarantee. In this work we argue in favor of multi-level scheduling for wireless ad-hoc networks with max-min fair allocation of the fair shares at the lower-most layer (MAC layer). This paper, mainly lays down the theoretical framework by which one can calculate the fair shares that would achieve max-min fairness in an ad-hoc network. We design distributed algorithms that allow each node to determine its max-min per-link fair share in a global ad-hoc network without knowledge of the global topology of the network. The results are then used in conjunction with a novel practical scheduling algorithm for IEEE 802.11 to show how fairness is achieved Mobile ad-hoc networking works properly only if the participating nodes cooperate in routing and forwarding. However, it may be advantageous for individual nodes not to cooperate. We propose a protocol, called CONFIDANT, for making misbehavior unattractive; it is based on selective altruism and utilitarianism. It aims at detecting and isolating misbehaving nodes, thus making it unattractive to deny cooperation. Trust relationships and routing decisions are based on experienced, observed, or reported routing and forwarding behavior of other nodes. The detailed implementation of CONFIDANT in this paper assumes that the network layer is based on the Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) protocol. We present a performance analysis of DSR fortified by CONFIDANT and compare it to regular defenseless DSR. It shows that a network with CONFIDANT and up to 60 of misbehaving nodes behaves almost as well as a benign network, in sharp contrast to a defenseless network. All simulations have been implemented and performed in GloMoSim. Existing position-based unicast routing algorithms which forward packets in the geographic direction of the destination require that the forwarding node knows the positions of all neighbors in its transmission range. This information on direct neighbors is gained by observing beacon messages each node sends out periodically. Due to mobility, the information that a node receives about its neighbors becomes outdated, leading either to a significant decrease in the packet delivery rate or to a steep increase in load on the wireless channel as node mobility increases. In this paper, we propose a mechanism to perform position-based unicast forwarding without the help of beacons. In our contention-based forwarding scheme (CBF) the next hop is selected through a distributed contention process based on the actual positions of all current neighbors. For the contention process, CBF makes use of biased timers. To avoid packet duplication, the first node that is selected suppresses the selection of further nodes. We propose three suppression strategies which vary with respect to forwarding efficiency and suppression characteristics. We analyze the behavior of CBF with all three suppression strategies and compare it to an existing greedy position-based routing approach by means of simulation with ns-2. Our results show that CBF significantly reduces the load on the wireless channel required to achieve a specific delivery rate compared to the load a beacon-based greedy forwarding strategy generates.