We are tackling the problem of trading real-world private information using only cryptographic protocols and a public blockchain to guarantee honest transactions. In this project, we consider three types of agents --buyers, sellers and notaries-- interacting in a decentralized privacy-preserving data marketplace (dPDM) such as the Wibson data marketplace. This framework offers infrastructure and financial incentives for individuals to securely sell personal information while preserving personal privacy. Here we provide an efficient cryptographic primitive for the secure exchange of data in a dPDM, which occurs as an atomic operation wherein the data buyer gets access to the data and the data seller gets paid simultaneously.
We assume that the Data Seller @math and Data Buyer @math are participating in a Data Exchange protocol, such as the Wibson protocol @cite_1 , and have already completed the following steps: The Buyer @math has verified that the Seller @math belongs to the Buyer’s audience of interest. The Data requested is available. Buyer @math and Seller @math have agreed on a price that is acceptable to both parties.
@cite_1
2906266612 2963017858 2950397526 2591036807
Our aim is for Wibson to be a blockchain-based, decentralized data marketplace that provides individuals a way to securely and anonymously sell information in a trusted environment. The combination of the Wibson token and blockchain-enabled smart contracts hopes to allow Data Sellers and Data Buyers to transact with each other directly while providing individuals the ability to maintain anonymity as desired. Wibson intends that its data marketplace will provide infrastructure and financial incentives for individuals to securely sell personal information without sacrificing personal privacy. Data Buyers receive information from willing and actively participating individuals with the benefit of knowing that the personal information should be accurate and current. Multiple parties observing correlated data seek to recover each other’s data and attain omniscience. To that end, they communicate interactively over a noiseless broadcast channel - each bit transmitted over this channel is received by all the parties. We give a universal interactive communication protocol, termed the recursive data exchange protocol (RDE), which attains omniscience for any sequence of data observed by the parties and provide an individual sequence guarantee of performance. As a by-product, for observations of length @math , we show the universal rate optimality of RDE up to an @math term in a generative setting where the data sequence is independent and identically distributed (in time). Furthermore, drawing on the duality between omniscience and secret key agreement due to Csiszar and Narayan, we obtain a universal protocol for generating a multiparty secret key of rate at most @math less than the maximum rate possible. A key feature of RDE is its recursive structure whereby when a subset @math of parties recover each-other’s data, the rates appear as if the parties have been executing the protocol in an alternative model where the parties in @math are collocated. For Bayesian combinatorial auctions, we present a general framework for approximately reducing the mechanism design problem for multiple buyers to single buyer sub-problems. Our framework can be applied to any setting which roughly satisfies the following assumptions: (i) buyers' types must be distributed independently (not necessarily identically), (ii) objective function must be linearly separable over the buyers, and (iii) except for the supply constraints, there should be no other inter-buyer constraints. Our framework is general in the sense that it makes no explicit assumption about buyers' valuations, type distributions, and single buyer constraints (e.g., budget, incentive compatibility, etc). We present two generic multi buyer mechanisms which use single buyer mechanisms as black boxes; if an @math -approximate single buyer mechanism can be constructed for each buyer, and if no buyer requires more than @math of all units of each item, then our generic multi buyer mechanisms are @math -approximation of the optimal multi buyer mechanism, where @math is a constant which is at least @math . Observe that @math is at least 1 2 (for @math ) and approaches 1 as @math . As a byproduct of our construction, we present a generalization of prophet inequalities. Furthermore, as applications of our framework, we present multi buyer mechanisms with improved approximation factor for several settings from the literature. We consider distributed plurality consensus in a complete graph of size @math with @math initial opinions. We design an efficient and simple protocol in the asynchronous communication model that ensures that all nodes eventually agree on the initially most frequent opinion. In this model, each node is equipped with a random Poisson clock with parameter @math . Whenever a node's clock ticks, it samples some neighbors, uniformly at random and with replacement, and adjusts its opinion according to the sample. A prominent example is the so-called two-choices algorithm in the synchronous model, where in each round, every node chooses two neighbors uniformly at random, and if the two sampled opinions coincide, then that opinion is adopted. This protocol is very efficient and well-studied when @math . If @math for some small @math , we show that it converges to the initial plurality opinion within @math rounds, w.h.p., as long as the initial difference between the largest and second largest opinion is @math . On the other side, we show that there are cases in which @math rounds are needed, w.h.p. One can beat this lower bound in the synchronous model by combining the two-choices protocol with randomized broadcasting. Our main contribution is a non-trivial adaptation of this approach to the asynchronous model. If the support of the most frequent opinion is at least @math times that of the second-most frequent one and @math , then our protocol achieves the best possible run time of @math , w.h.p. We relax full synchronicity by allowing @math nodes to be poorly synchronized, and the well synchronized nodes are only required to be within a certain time difference from one another. We enforce this synchronicity by introducing a novel gadget into the protocol.