We present an evolutionary game theoretic approach to study node cooperation behavior in wireless ad hoc networks. Evolutionary game theory (EGT) has been used to study the conditions governing the growth of cooperation behavior in biological and social networks. We propose a model of node cooperation behavior in dynamic wireless networks such as vehicular networks. Our work is motivated by the fact that, similar to existing EGT studies, node behavior in dynamic wireless networks is characterized by decision making that only depends on the immediate neighborhood. We adapt our model to study cooperation behavior in the context of information dissemination in wireless networks. We obtain conditions that determine whether a network evolves to a state of complete cooperation from all nodes. Finally, we use our model to study the evolution of cooperation behavior and its impact on content downloading in vehicular networks, taking into consideration realistic network conditions.
Sharing a similar motivation as ours, existing research on wireless networks has seen some focus on algorithm design and analysis based on evolutionary game theory. In @cite_32 , used evolutionary dynamics to analyze node behavior over time in the context of two problems, namely channel access in slotted ALOHA systems and decentralized power control. Evolutionary coalition games were used to study the problem of network formation in @cite_33 and @cite_19 while dynamic routing games were studied in @cite_18 . In their work in @cite_31 , studied the evolution of misbehavior among secondary users in a cognitive radio network.
@cite_18 @cite_33 @cite_32 @cite_19 @cite_31
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Next-generation wireless networks will integrate multiple wireless access technologies to provide seamless mobility to mobile users with high-speed wireless connectivity. This will give rise to a heterogeneous wireless access environment where network selection becomes crucial for load balancing to avoid network congestion and performance degradation. We study the dynamics of network selection in a heterogeneous wireless network using the theory of evolutionary games. The competition among groups of users in different service areas to share the limited amount of bandwidth in the available wireless access networks is formulated as a dynamic evolutionary game, and the evolutionary equilibrium is considered to be the solution to this game. We present two algorithms, namely, population evolution and reinforcement-learning algorithms for network selection. Although the network-selection algorithm based on population evolution can reach the evolutionary equilibrium faster, it requires a centralized controller to gather, process, and broadcast information about the users in the corresponding service area. In contrast, with reinforcement learning, a user can gradually learn (by interacting with the service provider) and adapt the decision on network selection to reach evolutionary equilibrium without any interaction with other users. Performance of the dynamic evolutionary game-based network-selection algorithms is empirically investigated. The accuracy of the numerical results obtained from the game model is evaluated by using simulations. We consider a noncooperative interaction among a large population of mobiles that interfere with each other through many local interactions. The first objective of this paper is to extend the evolutionary game framework to allow an arbitrary number of mobiles that are involved in a local interaction. We allow for interactions between mobiles that are not necessarily reciprocal. We study 1) multiple-access control in a slotted Aloha-based wireless network and 2) power control in wideband code-division multiple-access wireless networks. We define and characterize the equilibrium (called evolutionarily stable strategy) for these games and study the influence of wireless channels and pricing on the evolution of dynamics and the equilibrium. "Cognitive radio" is an emerging technique to improve the utilization of radio frequency spectrum in wireless networks. In this paper, we consider the problem of spectrum sharing among a primary user and multiple secondary users. We formulate this problem as an oligopoly market competition and use a noncooperative game to obtain the spectrum allocation for secondary users. Nash equilibrium is considered as the solution of this game. We first present the formulation of a static game for the case where all secondary users have the current information of the adopted strategies and the payoff of each other. However, this assumption may not be realistic in some cognitive radio systems. Therefore, we consider the case of bounded rationality in which the secondary users gradually and iteratively adjust their strategies based on the observations on their previous strategies. The speed of adjustment of the strategies is controlled by the learning rate. The stability condition of the dynamic behavior for this spectrum sharing scheme is investigated. The numerical results reveal the dynamics of distributed dynamic adaptation of spectrum sharing strategies. We develop an evolutionary approach for analyzing network formation between selfish users and collective users (coalition) who mutually adapt their membership. A dynamic process of coalition formation is described by coupled evolutionary game dynamics. We apply them to packet forwarding problem in multi-hop heterogeneous networks and opportunistic spectrum sensing in cognitive radio networks.