Crowdsourcing can be applied to the Internet-of-Things (IoT) systems to provide more scalable and efficient services to support various tasks. As the driving force of crowdsourcing is the interaction among participants, various incentive mechanisms have been proposed to attract and retain a sufficient number of participants to provide a sustainable crowdsourcing service. However, there exist some gaps between the modeled entities or markets in the existing works and those in reality: 1) task valuation and workers' punctuality, and 2) crowdsourcing service market by a platform. To bridge those gaps of such impractical assumption, we model workers' heterogeneous punctuality behavior and task depreciation over time. Based on those models, we propose an Expected Social Welfare Maximizing (ESWM) mechanism that aims to maximize the expected social welfare by attracting and retaining more participants in the long-term, i.e., multiple rounds of crowdsourcing. In the evaluation, we modeled the continuous competition between the ESWM and one of the existing works in both short-term and long-term scenarios. Simulation results show that the ESWM mechanism achieves higher expected social welfare and platform utility than the benchmark by attracting and retaining more participants. Moreover, we prove that the ESWM mechanism achieves the desirable economic properties: individual rationality, budget-balance, computational efficiency, and truthfulness.
However, the heterogeneity of task depreciation over time has not been addressed in the literature. Task depreciation models over time in the existing works are as the value of tasks immediately drop to zero after the given deadline. In other words, there can be only two kinds of task valuation, either full or null. Such dichotomous model overlooks the cases where task valuation remains valid even after the deadline, though depreciating in proportion to the amount of time past the deadline, which can be observed in practice and the literature @cite_26 .
@cite_26
2127508398 2398690976 2951767300 2009357368
We consider a task of scheduling with a common deadline on a single machine. Every player reports to a scheduler the length of his job and the scheduler needs to finish as many jobs as possible by the deadline. For this simple problem, there is a truthful mechanism that achieves maximum welfare in dominant strategies. The new aspect of our work is that in our setting players are uncertain about their own job lengths, and hence are incapable of providing truthful reports (in the strict sense of the word). For a probabilistic model for uncertainty we show that even with relatively little uncertainty, no mechanism can guarantee a constant fraction of the maximum welfare. To remedy this situation, we introduce a new measure of economic efficiency, based on a notion of a fair share of a player, and design mechanisms that are Ω(1)-fair. In addition to its intrinsic appeal, our notion of fairness implies good approximation of maximum welfare in several cases of interest. In our mechanisms the machine is sometimes left idle even though there are jobs that want to use it. We show that this unfavorable aspect is unavoidable, unless one gives up other favorable aspects (e.g., give up Ω(1)-fairness). We also consider a qualitative approach to uncertainty as an alternative to the probabilistic quantitative model. In the qualitative approach we break away from solution concepts such as dominant strategies (they are no longer well defined), and instead suggest an axiomatic approach, which amounts to listing desirable properties for mechanisms. We provide a mechanism that satisfies these properties. We explore the problem of assigning heterogeneous tasks to workers with different, unknown skill sets in crowdsourcing markets such as Amazon Mechanical Turk. We first formalize the online task assignment problem, in which a requester has a fixed set of tasks and a budget that specifies how many times he would like each task completed. Workers arrive one at a time (with the same worker potentially arriving multiple times), and must be assigned to a task upon arrival. The goal is to allocate workers to tasks in a way that maximizes the total benefit that the requester obtains from the completed work. Inspired by recent research on the online adwords problem, we present a two-phase exploration-exploitation assignment algorithm and prove that it is competitive with respect to the optimal offline algorithm which has access to the unknown skill levels of each worker. We empirically evaluate this algorithm using data collected on Mechanical Turk and show that it performs better than random assignment or greedy algorithms. To our knowledge, this is the first work to extend the online primal-dual technique used in the online adwords problem to a scenario with unknown parameters, and the first to offer an empirical validation of an online primal-dual algorithm. We study the revenue maximization problem of a seller with n heterogeneous items for sale to a single buyer whose valuation function for sets of items is unknown and drawn from some distribution D. We show that if D is a distribution over subadditive valuations with independent items, then the better of pricing each item separately or pricing only the grand bundle achieves a constant-factor approximation to the revenue of the optimal mechanism. This includes buyers who are k-demand, additive up to a matroid constraint, or additive up to constraints of any downwards-closed set system (and whose values for the individual items are sampled independently), as well as buyers who are fractionally subadditive with item multipliers drawn independently. Our proof makes use of the core-tail decomposition framework developed in prior work showing similar results for the significantly simpler class of additive buyers [LY13, BILW14]. In the second part of the paper, we develop a connection between approximately optimal simple mechanisms and approximate revenue monotonicity with respect to buyers' valuations. Revenue non-monotonicity is the phenomenon that sometimes strictly increasing buyers' values for every set can strictly decrease the revenue of the optimal mechanism [HR12]. Using our main result, we derive a bound on how bad this degradation can be (and dub such a bound a proof of approximate revenue monotonicity); we further show that better bounds on approximate monotonicity imply a better analysis of our simple mechanisms. This paper investigates the single-machine multiple common due dates assignment and scheduling problems in which the processing time of a job depends on its position in a job sequence and its resource allocation. We examine the general position-dependent deterioration effect and two models of resource allocation. The objective function is to minimize a total penalty function containing earliness, tardiness, due date, and resource consumption costs. We introduce two polynomial time algorithms to solve the considered problems. Since the two algorithms solve the problems in polynomial time, they can solve large-scale instances of the problem under study in little time.