This paper presents a novel leaderless protocol (FPC-BI: Fast Probabilistic Consensus within Byzantine Infrastructures) with a low communicational complexity and which allows a set of nodes to come to a consensus on a value of a single bit. The paper makes the assumption that part of the nodes are , and are thus controlled by an adversary who intends to either delay the consensus, or break it. This defines that at least a couple of honest nodes come to different conclusions. We prove that, nevertheless, the protocol works with high probability when its parameters are suitably chosen. Along this the paper also provides explicit estimates on the probability that the protocol finalizes in the consensus state in a given time. This protocol could be applied to reaching consensus in decentralized cryptocurrency systems. A special feature of it is that it makes use of a sequence of random numbers which are either provided by a trusted source or generated by the nodes themselves using some decentralized random number generating protocol. This increases the overall trustworthiness of the infrastructure. A core contribution of the paper is that it uses a consensus to obtain a consensus on the value of a bit, and which can relate to the validity of a transaction.
There has also been much research on the probabilistic models where, in each round, a node only contacts a small number of other nodes in order to learn their opinions, and possibly change its own. This type of models is usually called , and which were introduced in the 70s by Holley and Liggett @cite_20 and Clifford and Sudbury @cite_7 . A very important observation is that, in most cases, voter models have only two external invariant measures: one concentrated on the all- @math '' configuration, and the other one concentrated on the all- @math '' -- we can naturally call these two configurations consensus states''. Since then, there has been a range of work on voter models; in particular, let us cite @cite_5 @cite_9 @cite_8 @cite_26 @cite_13 @cite_19 which are specifically aimed at reaching consensus and have low communicational complexity (typically, @math ). However, in these works, the presence of adversarial nodes is usually either not allowed, or is supposed to be very minimal.
@cite_26 @cite_7 @cite_8 @cite_9 @cite_19 @cite_5 @cite_13 @cite_20
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We consider the following distributed consensus problem: Each node in a complete communication network of size n initially holds an opinion, which is chosen arbitrarily from a finite set Σ. The system must converge toward a consensus state in which all, or almost all nodes, hold the same opinion. Moreover, this opinion should be valid, i.e., it should be one among those initially present in the system. This condition should be met even in the presence of a malicious adversary who can modify the opinions of a bounded subset of nodes, adaptively chosen in every round. We consider the 3-majority dynamics: At every round, every node pulls the opinion from three random neighbors and sets his new opinion to the majority one (ties are broken arbitrarily). Let k be the number of valid opinions. We show that, if k ≤ nα, where α is a suitable positive constant, the 3-majority dynamics converges in time polynomial in k and log n with high probability even in the presence of an adversary who can affect up to o([EQUATION]) nodes at each round. Previously, the convergence of the 3-majority protocol was known for |Σ| = 2 only, with an argument that is robust to adversarial errors. On the other hand, no anonymous, uniform-gossip protocol that is robust to adversarial errors was known for |Σ| > 2. We consider distributed plurality consensus in a complete graph of size @math with @math initial opinions. We design an efficient and simple protocol in the asynchronous communication model that ensures that all nodes eventually agree on the initially most frequent opinion. In this model, each node is equipped with a random Poisson clock with parameter @math . Whenever a node's clock ticks, it samples some neighbors, uniformly at random and with replacement, and adjusts its opinion according to the sample. A prominent example is the so-called two-choices algorithm in the synchronous model, where in each round, every node chooses two neighbors uniformly at random, and if the two sampled opinions coincide, then that opinion is adopted. This protocol is very efficient and well-studied when @math . If @math for some small @math , we show that it converges to the initial plurality opinion within @math rounds, w.h.p., as long as the initial difference between the largest and second largest opinion is @math . On the other side, we show that there are cases in which @math rounds are needed, w.h.p. One can beat this lower bound in the synchronous model by combining the two-choices protocol with randomized broadcasting. Our main contribution is a non-trivial adaptation of this approach to the asynchronous model. If the support of the most frequent opinion is at least @math times that of the second-most frequent one and @math , then our protocol achieves the best possible run time of @math , w.h.p. We relax full synchronicity by allowing @math nodes to be poorly synchronized, and the well synchronized nodes are only required to be within a certain time difference from one another. We enforce this synchronicity by introducing a novel gadget into the protocol. In computational social choice, one important problem is to take the votes of a subelectorate (subset of the voters), and summarize them using a small number of bits. This needs to be done in such a way that, if all that we know is the summary, as well as the votes of voters outside the subelectorate, we can conclude which of the m alternatives wins. This corresponds to the notion of compilation complexity, the minimum number of bits required to summarize the votes for a particular rule, which was introduced by [IJCAI-09]. We study three different types of compilation complexity. The first, studied by , depends on the size of the subelectorate but not on the size of the complement (the voters outside the subelectorate). The second depends on the size of the complement but not on the size of the subelectorate. The third depends on both. We first investigate the relations among the three types of compilation complexity. Then, we give upper and lower bounds on all three types of compilation complexity for the most prominent voting rules. We show that for l-approval (when l ≤ m 2), Borda, and Bucklin, the bounds for all three types are asymptotically tight, up to a multiplicative constant; for l-approval (when l > m 2), plurality with runoff, all Condorcet consistent rules that are based on unweighted majority graphs (including Copeland and voting trees), and all Condorcet consistent rules that are based on the order of pairwise elections (including ranked pairs and maximin), the bounds for all three types are asymptotically tight up to a multiplicative constant when the sizes of the subelectorate and its complement are both larger than m1+∊ for some ∊ > 0. In this paper, we propose a framework to study a general class of strategic behavior in voting, which we call vote operations. We prove the following theorem: if we fix the number of alternatives, generate @math votes i.i.d. according to a distribution @math , and let @math go to infinity, then for any @math , with probability at least @math , the minimum number of operations that are needed for the strategic individual to achieve her goal falls into one of the following four categories: (1) 0, (2) @math , (3) @math , and (4) @math . This theorem holds for any set of vote operations, any individual vote distribution @math , and any integer generalized scoring rule, which includes (but is not limited to) almost all commonly studied voting rules, e.g., approval voting, all positional scoring rules (including Borda, plurality, and veto), plurality with runoff, Bucklin, Copeland, maximin, STV, and ranked pairs. We also show that many well-studied types of strategic behavior fall under our framework, including (but not limited to) constructive destructive manipulation, bribery, and control by adding deleting votes, margin of victory, and minimum manipulation coalition size. Therefore, our main theorem naturally applies to these problems.