Automatic speaker verification (ASV) systems use a playback detector to filter out playback attacks and ensure verification reliability. Since current playback detection models are almost always trained using genuine and played-back speech, it may be possible to degrade their performance by transforming the acoustic characteristics of the played-back speech close to that of the genuine speech. One way to do this is to enhance speech "stolen" from the target speaker before playback. We tested the effectiveness of a playback attack using this method by using the speech enhancement generative adversarial network to transform acoustic characteristics. Experimental results showed that use of this "enhanced stolen speech" method significantly increases the equal error rates for the baseline used in the ASVspoof 2017 challenge and for a light convolutional neural network-based method. The results also showed that its use degrades the performance of a Gaussian mixture model-universal background model-based ASV system. This type of attack is thus an urgent problem needing to be solved.
Pioneering work on playback attacks was reported by Lindberg and Blomberg in 1999 @cite_8 . They pre-recorded the numbers one to ten of two speakers and then concatenated various combinations of them to attack a hidden Markov model (HMM) @cite_13 -based text-dependent ASV system. They demonstrated considerable increase in both the EER and false acceptance rate (FAR) compared to verification without attacks. More recently, investigated the effect of playback attacks against ASV systems and also achieved a large increase in FAR @cite_14 . Compared to these conventional playback attacks, our method further degrades the performance of playback spoofing CMs by enhancing the speech.
@cite_14 @cite_13 @cite_8
1638038541 1966993810 2592641653 2591404214
Automatic speaker verification (ASV) systems are subject to various kinds of malicious attacks. Replay, voice conversion and speech synthesis attacks drastically degrade the performance of a standard ASV system by increasing its false acceptance rates. This issue raised a high level of interest in the speech research community where the possible voice spoofing attacks and their related countermeasures have been investigated. However, much less effort has been devoted in creating realistic and diverse spoofing attack databases that foster researchers to correctly evaluate their countermeasures against attacks. The existing studies are not complete in terms of types of attacks, and often difficult to reproduce because of unavailability of public databases. In this paper we introduce the voice spoofing data-set of AVspoof, a public audio-visual spoofing database. AVspoof includes ten realistic spoofing threats generated using replay, speech synthesis and voice conversion. In addition, we provide a set of experimental results that show the effect of such attacks on current state-of-the-art ASV systems. The potential for biometric systems to be manipulated through some form of subversion is well acknowledged. One such approach known as spoofing relates to the provocation of false accepts in authentication applications. Another approach referred to as obfuscation relates to the provocation of missed detections in surveillance applications. While the automatic speaker verification research community is now addressing spoofing and countermeasures, vulnerabilities to obfuscation remain largely unknown. This paper reports the first study. Our work with standard NIST datasets and protocols shows that the equal error rate of a standard GMM-UBM system is increased from 9 to 48 through obfuscation, whereas that of a state-of-the-art i-vector system increases from 3 to 20 . We also present a generalised approach to obfuscation detection which succeeds in detecting almost all attempts to evade detection. Albeit recent progress in speaker verification generates powerful models, malicious attacks in the form of spoofed speech, are generally not coped with. Recent results in ASVSpoof2015 and BTAS2016 challenges indicate that spoof-aware features are a possible solution to this problem. Most successful methods in both challenges focus on spoof-aware features, rather than focusing on a powerful classifier. In this paper we present a novel raw waveform based deep model for spoofing detection, which jointly acts as a feature extractor and classifier, thus allowing it to directly classify speech signals. This approach can be considered as an end-to-end classifier, which removes the need for any pre- or post-processing on the data, making training and evaluation a streamlined process, consuming less time than other neural-network based approaches. The experiments on the BTAS2016 dataset show that the system performance is significantly improved by the proposed raw waveform convolutional long short term neural network (CLDNN), from the previous best published 1.26 half total error rate (HTER) to the current 0.82 HTER. Moreover it shows that the proposed system also performs well under the unknown (RE-PH2-PH3,RE-LPPH2-PH3) conditions. State-of-the-art speaker verification systems are vulnerable to spoofing attacks. To address the issue, high-performance synthetic speech detectors (SSDs) for existing spoofing methods have been proposed. Phase-based SSDs that exploit the fact that most of the parametric speech coders use minimum-phase filters are particularly successful when synthetic speech is generated with a parametric vocoder. Here, we propose a new attack strategy to spoof phase-based SSDs with the objective of increasing the security of voice verification systems by enabling the development of more generalized SSDs. As opposed to other parametric vocoders, the complex cepstrum approach uses mixed-phase filters, which makes it an ideal candidate for spoofing the phase-based SSDs. We propose using a complex cepstrum vocoder as a postprocessor to existing techniques to spoof the speaker verification system as well as the phase-based SSDs. Once synthetic speech is generated with a speech synthesis or a voice conversion technique, for each synthetic speech frame, a natural frame is selected from a training database using a spectral distance measure. Then, complex cepstrum parameters of the natural frame are used for resynthesizing the synthetic frame. In the proposed method, complex cepstrum-based resynthesis is used as a postprocessor. Hence, it can be used in tandem with any synthetic speech generator. Experimental results showed that the approach is successful at spoofing four phase-based SSDs across nine parametric attack algorithms. Moreover, performance at spoofing the speaker verification system did not substantially degrade compared to the case when no postprocessor is employed.