Abstract In this paper we introduce a capacity allocation game which models the problem of maximizing network utility from the perspective of distributed noncooperative agents. Motivated by the idea of self-managed networks, in the developed framework the decision-making entities are associated with individual transmission links, deciding on the way they split capacity among concurrent flows. An efficient decentralized algorithm is given for computing a strongly Pareto-optimal strategies, constituting a pure Nash equilibrium. Subsequently, we discuss the properties of the introduced game related to the Price of Anarchy and Price of Stability. The paper is concluded with an experimental study.
Currently, the game-theoretical framework is also extensively studied in the context of wireless networks @cite_13 . For instance, in @cite_48 bandwidth allocation problem for a class of wireless networks is investigated. The uniqueness of Nash equilibrium for some particular network topologies is shown. It is also stated that some of the presented results may be also generalized for different cases. In @cite_56 the problem of choosing an access point by a mobile user is considered from the perspective of this approach. Similar frameworks for issues in wireless networks categorized under corresponding OSI Layers (namely: physical, data link, network and transport layers) are presented in @cite_72 . The VCG auctions were also applied to the wireless networks, e.g. in @cite_11 it is proposed for the resource allocation problem in multimedia wireless networks.
@cite_48 @cite_56 @cite_72 @cite_13 @cite_11
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In this paper, a novel framework is proposed for optimizing the operation and performance of a large-scale multi-hop millimeter wave (mmW) backhaul within a wireless small cell network having multiple mobile network operators (MNOs). The proposed framework enables the small base stations to jointly decide on forming the multi-hop, mmW links over backhaul infrastructure that belongs to multiple, independent MNOs, while properly allocating resources across those links. In this regard, the problem is addressed using a novel framework based on matching theory composed of two, highly inter-related stages: a multi-hop network formation stage and a resource management stage. One unique feature of this framework is that it jointly accounts for both wireless channel characteristics and economic factors during both network formation and resource management. The multi-hop network formation stage is formulated as a one-to-many matching game, which is solved using a novel algorithm, that builds on the so-called deferred acceptance algorithm and is shown to yield a stable and Pareto optimal multi-hop mmW backhaul network. Then, a one-to-many matching game is formulated to enable proper resource allocation across the formed multi-hop network. This game is then shown to exhibit peer effects and, as such, a novel algorithm is developed to find a stable and optimal resource management solution that can properly cope with these peer effects. Simulation results show that, with manageable complexity, the proposed framework yields substantial gains, in terms of the average sum rate, reaching up to 27 and 54 , respectively, compared with a non-cooperative scheme in which inter-operator sharing is not allowed and a random allocation approach. The results also show that our framework improves the statistics of the backhaul sum rate and provides insights on how to manage pricing and the cost of the cooperative mmW backhaul network for the MNOs. We study the dynamics of network selection in heterogeneous wireless networks (HetNets). Users in such networks selfishly select the best radio access technology (RAT) with the objective of maximizing their own throughputs. We propose two general classes of throughput models that capture the basic properties of random access (e.g., Wi-Fi) and scheduled access (e.g., WiMAX, LTE, 3G) networks. Next, we formulate the problem as a non-cooperative game, and study its convergence, efficiency, and practicality. Our results reveal that: (i) Singleclass RAT selection games converge to Nash equilibria, while an improvement path can be repeated infinitely with a mixture of classes. We next introduce a hysteresis mechanism in RAT selection games, and prove that with appropriate hysteresis policies, convergence can still be guaranteed; (ii) We analyze the Pareto-efficiency of the Nash equilibria of these games. We derive the conditions under which Nash equilibria are Paretooptimal, and we quantify the distance of Nash equilibria with respect to the set of Pareto-dominant points when the conditions are not satisfied; (iii) Finally, with extensive measurement-driven simulations we show that RAT selection games converge to Nash equilibria in a small number of steps, and hence are amenable to practical implementation. We also investigate the impact of noisy throughput measurements, and propose solutions to handle them. We study competition between wireless devices with incomplete information about their opponents. We model such interactions as Bayesian interference games. Each wireless device selects a power profile over the entire available bandwidth to maximize its data rate. Such competitive models represent situations in which several wireless devices share spectrum without any central authority or coordinated protocol. In contrast to games where devices have complete information about their opponents, we consider scenarios where the devices are unaware of the interference they cause to other devices. Such games, which are modeled as Bayesian games, can exhibit significantly different equilibria. We first consider a simple scenario of simultaneous move games, where we show that the unique Bayes-Nash equilibrium is where both devices spread their power equally across the entire bandwidth. We then extend this model to a two-tiered spectrum sharing case where users act sequentially. Here one of the devices, called the primary user, is the owner of the spectrum and it selects its power profile first. The second device (called the secondary user) then responds by choosing a power profile to maximize its Shannon capacity. In such sequential move games, we show that there exist equilibria in which the primary user obtains a higher data rate by using only a part of the bandwidth. In a repeated Bayesian interference game, we show the existence of reputation effects: an informed primary user can bluff to prevent spectrum usage by a secondary user who suffers from lack of information about the channel gains. The resulting equilibrium can be highly inefficient, suggesting that competitive spectrum sharing is highly suboptimal. We propose to add a new dimension to existing wireless multimedia communications systems by enabling competing stations to proactively engage in the resource management game by adapting their cross-layer transmission strategies. For this, we model wireless stations (WSTAs) as rational and selfish players competing for available wireless resources in a dynamic game. We focus on polling-based wireless LAN (WLAN) networks, where developing an efficient solution for managing the available transmission opportunities is of paramount importance. The resource allocation game is coordinated by a network moderator, which deploys a novel resource management based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to determine a) the amount of time to be allocated to the various users and b) the transmission cost associated to the allocated resources. The transmission cost is referred to in the VCG mechanism as "transfer" and depends not on the used resources, but rather on the inconvenience (in terms of utility impact) that it causes to other WSTAs. The transfer is introduced in order to discourage WSTAs from lying about their resource requirements. Importantly, this proposed dynamic resource management approach for wireless multimedia applications changes the passive way stations are currently adapting their cross-layer strategies by enabling them to selfishly influence the wireless systems dynamics by proactively adapting their packet scheduling strategies, error protection strategies, etc. Hence, each wireless station can play the resource management game by adapting its multimedia transmission strategy depending on the experienced channel conditions, derived video quality, attitude towards risk, willingness to pay for resources and available information about the wireless network. Our simulations show that using the VCG mechanism the WSTAs do not have any incentives to lie about their resource requirements as otherwise they will be severely penalized by a high transfer. We also show that deploying advanced cross-layer strategies for playing the resource management game significantly benefit the WSTAs' received video quality. The willingness-to-pay for resources is introduced to provide WSTAs a tool to gather additional resources whenever they need to transmit an important (part of a) video sequence by agreeing to pay for resources an increased cost. A novel risk-aware scheduling scheme is also proposed that provides WSTAs the ability to dynamically avoid network congestion and hence, reduce their incurred transfer