This paper considers physical layer security and the design of secure coset codes for wiretap channels, where information is not to be leaked to an eavesdropper having a degraded channel. The eavesdropper's bounds for correct decoding probability and information are first revisited, and a new variant of the information bound is derived. The new bound is valid for a general channel with any fading and Gaussian noise. From these bounds, it is explicit that both the information and probability are upper bounded by the average flatness factor, i.e., the expected theta function of the faded lattice related to the eavesdropper. Taking the minimization of the average flatness factor as a design criterion, simple geometric heuristics to minimize it in the low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) regime in Gaussian and Rayleigh fast fading channels are motivated. It is concluded that in the Gaussian channel, the security boils down to the sphere packing density of the eavesdropper's lattice, whereas in the Rayleigh fading channel a full-diversity well-rounded lattice with a dense sphere packing will provide the best secrecy. The proposed criteria are backed up by extensive numerical experiments.
The security of lattice coset codes can be quantized either by Eve's correct decision probability, or alternatively by the mutual information of the message and Eve's received signal. For the (AWGN) channel, upper bounds are known for both approaches @cite_3 @cite_27 . More importantly, both are increasing functions of the of the lattice @math , yielding its minimization as a design criterion. Sequences of lattice coset codes achieving security and reliability are also constructed in @cite_6 . For different fading channel models, various alternative design criteria based on probability and information bounds were derived in @cite_33 @cite_30 , and @cite_0 , respectively. Codes achieving security and reliability in the (MIMO) channel, and an information bound, were given in @cite_34 . However, to the best of our knowledge, practical low-dimensional code constructions are an open problem in the fading (SISO) channel.
@cite_30 @cite_33 @cite_6 @cite_3 @cite_0 @cite_27 @cite_34
1512015702 2217772850 2060644465 1626000505
We address an open question, regarding whether a lattice code with lattice decoding (as opposed to maximum-likelihood (ML) decoding) can achieve the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel capacity. We first demonstrate how minimum mean-square error (MMSE) scaling along with dithering (lattice randomization) techniques can transform the power-constrained AWGN channel into a modulo-lattice additive noise channel, whose effective noise is reduced by a factor of spl radic (1+SNR SNR). For the resulting channel, a uniform input maximizes mutual information, which in the limit of large lattice dimension becomes 1 2 log (1+SNR), i.e., the full capacity of the original power constrained AWGN channel. We then show that capacity may also be achieved using nested lattice codes, the coarse lattice serving for shaping via the modulo-lattice transformation, the fine lattice for channel coding. We show that such pairs exist for any desired nesting ratio, i.e., for any signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Furthermore, for the modulo-lattice additive noise channel lattice decoding is optimal. Finally, we show that the error exponent of the proposed scheme is lower bounded by the Poltyrev exponent. We consider the MIMO wiretap channel, where a legitimate transmitter (Alice) wishes to communicate a confidential message to the legitimate receiver (Bob) over a MIMO channel, while its messages are being eavesdropped by Eve through another MIMO channel. Supposing that Alice uses the nested lattice code proposed in [8], we characterize the expected value of amount of information leakage to Eve, and from minimizing this expected value, we derive a code design criterion for MIMO lattice wiretap codes. The special cases of block and fast fading channels are also studied. We also illustrate our lattice code design criterion using the Alamouti Code as the simplest MIMO code available in the literature. We consider MIMO (Multiple Input Multiple Output) wiretap channels, where a legitimate transmitter Alice is communicating with a legitimate receiver Bob in the presence of an eavesdropper Eve, and communication is done via MIMO channels. We suppose that Alice's strategy is to use an infinite lattice codebook, which then allows her to perform coset encoding. We analyze Eve's probability of correctly decoding the message Alice meant to Bob, and from minimizing this probability, we derive a code design criterion for MIMO lattice wiretap codes. The case of block fading channels is treated similarly, and fast fading channels are derived as a particular case. The Alamouti code is carefully studied as an illustration of the analysis provided. We consider the Gaussian wiretap channel, where two legitimate players Alice and Bob communicate over an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel, while Eve is eavesdropping, also through an AWGN channel. We propose a coding strategy based on lattice coset encoding. We define the secrecy gain as a design criterion for wiretap lattice codes, expressed in terms of the lattice theta series, which characterizes Eve’s confusion as a function of the channel parameters. The secrecy gain is studied for even unimodular lattices, and an asymptotic analysis shows that it grows exponentially in the dimension of the lattice. Examples of wiretap lattice codes are given.