Deep learning is currently the subject of intensive study. However, fundamental concepts such as representations are not formally defined -- researchers "know them when they see them" -- and there is no common language for describing and analyzing algorithms. This essay proposes an abstract framework that identifies the essential features of current practice and may provide a foundation for future developments. The backbone of almost all deep learning algorithms is backpropagation, which is simply a gradient computation distributed over a neural network. The main ingredients of the framework are thus, unsurprisingly: (i) game theory, to formalize distributed optimization; and (ii) communication protocols, to track the flow of zeroth and first-order information. The framework allows natural definitions of semantics (as the meaning encoded in functions), representations (as functions whose semantics is chosen to optimized a criterion) and grammars (as communication protocols equipped with first-order convergence guarantees). Much of the essay is spent discussing examples taken from the literature. The ultimate aim is to develop a graphical language for describing the structure of deep learning algorithms that backgrounds the details of the optimization procedure and foregrounds how the components interact. Inspiration is taken from probabilistic graphical models and factor graphs, which capture the essential structural features of multivariate distributions.
Although game theory was originally developed to model human interactions @cite_84 , it has been pointed out that it may be more directly applicable to interacting populations of algorithms, so-called @cite_79 @cite_5 @cite_71 @cite_104 @cite_89 @cite_68 . This paper goes one step further to propose that games played over first-order communication protocols are a key component of the foundations of deep learning.
@cite_84 @cite_104 @cite_89 @cite_79 @cite_71 @cite_5 @cite_68
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This paper introduces a novel framework for modeling interacting humans in a multi-stage game environment by combining concepts from game theory and reinforcement learning. The proposed model has the following desirable characteristics: (1) Bounded rational players, (2) strategic (i.e., players account for one another’s reward functions), and (3) is computationally feasible even on moderately large real-world systems. To do this we extend level-K reasoning to policy space to, for the first time, be able to handle multiple time steps. This allows us to decompose the problem into a series of smaller ones where we can apply standard reinforcement learning algorithms. We investigate these ideas in a cyber-battle scenario over a smart power grid and discuss the relationship between the behavior predicted by our model and what one might expect of real human defenders and attackers. Predicting human behavior from a small amount of training examples is a challenging machine learning problem. In this thesis, we introduce the principle of maximum causal entropy, a general technique for applying information theory to decision-theoretic, game-theoretic, and control settings where relevant information is sequentially revealed over time. This approach guarantees decision-theoretic performance by matching purposeful measures of behavior (Abbeel & Ng, 2004), and or enforces game-theoretic rationality constraints (Aumann, 1974), while otherwise being as uncertain as possible, which minimizes worst-case predictive log-loss (Grunwald & Dawid, 2003). We derive probabilistic models for decision, control, and multi-player game settings using this approach. We then develop corresponding algorithms for efficient inference that include relaxations of the Bellman equation (Bellman, 1957), and simple learning algorithms based on convex optimization. We apply the models and algorithms to a number of behavior prediction tasks. Specifically, we present empirical evaluations of the approach in the domains of vehicle route preference modeling using over 100,000 miles of collected taxi driving data, pedestrian motion modeling from weeks of indoor movement data, and robust prediction of game play in stochastic multi-player games. We propose a hybrid model for automatically acquiring a policy for a complex game, which combines online learning with mining knowledge from a corpus of human game play. Our hypothesis is that a player that learns its policies by combining (online) exploration with biases towards human behaviour that's attested in a corpus of humans playing the game will outperform any agent that uses only one of the knowledge sources. During game play, the agent extracts similar moves made by players in the corpus in similar situations, and approximates their utility alongside other possible options by performing simulations from its current state. We implement and assess our model in an agent playing the complex win-lose board game Settlers of Catan, which lacks an implementation that would challenge a human expert. The results from the preliminary set of experiments illustrate the potential of such a joint model. How do we build multiagent algorithms for agent interactions with human adversaries? Stackelberg games are natural models for many important applications that involve human interaction, such as oligopolistic markets and security domains. In Stackelberg games, one player, the leader, commits to a strategy and the follower makes their decision with knowledge of the leader's commitment. Existing algorithms for Stackelberg games efficiently find optimal solutions (leader strategy), but they critically assume that the follower plays optimally. Unfortunately, in real-world applications, agents face human followers (adversaries) who --- because of their bounded rationality and limited observation of the leader strategy --- may deviate from their expected optimal response. Not taking into account these likely deviations when dealing with human adversaries can cause an unacceptable degradation in the leader's reward, particularly in security applications where these algorithms have seen real-world deployment. To address this crucial problem, this paper introduces three new mixed-integer linear programs (MILPs) for Stackelberg games to consider human adversaries, incorporating: (i) novel anchoring theories on human perception of probability distributions and (ii) robustness approaches for MILPs to address human imprecision. Since these new approaches consider human adversaries, traditional proofs of correctness or optimality are insufficient; instead, it is necessary to rely on empirical validation. To that end, this paper considers two settings based on real deployed security systems, and compares 6 different approaches (three new with three previous approaches), in 4 different observability conditions, involving 98 human subjects playing 1360 games in total. The final conclusion was that a model which incorporates both the ideas of robustness and anchoring achieves statistically significant better rewards and also maintains equivalent or faster solution speeds compared to existing approaches.