Work on "learning with rationales" shows that humans providing explanations to a machine learning system can improve the system's predictive accuracy. However, this work has not been connected to work in "explainable AI" which concerns machines explaining their reasoning to humans. In this work, we show that learning with rationales can also improve the quality of the machine's explanations as evaluated by human judges. Specifically, we present experiments showing that, for CNN- based text classification, explanations generated using "supervised attention" are judged superior to explanations generated using normal unsupervised attention.
There is a growing body of research on explainable AI @cite_11 @cite_5 @cite_19 @cite_6 , but it is not connected to work on learning with human rationales, which we review below.
@cite_19 @cite_5 @cite_6 @cite_11
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We characterize three notions of explainable AI that cut across research fields: opaque systems that offer no insight into its algo- rithmic mechanisms; interpretable systems where users can mathemat- ically analyze its algorithmic mechanisms; and comprehensible systems that emit symbols enabling user-driven explanations of how a conclusion is reached. The paper is motivated by a corpus analysis of NIPS, ACL, COGSCI, and ICCV ECCV paper titles showing differences in how work on explainable AI is positioned in various fields. We close by introducing a fourth notion: truly explainable systems, where automated reasoning is central to output crafted explanations without requiring human post processing as final step of the generative process. Existing visual explanation generating agents learn to fluently justify a class prediction. However, they may mention visual attributes which reflect a strong class prior, although the evidence may not actually be in the image. This is particularly concerning as ultimately such agents fail in building trust with human users. To overcome this limitation, we propose a phrase-critic model to refine generated candidate explanations augmented with flipped phrases which we use as negative examples while training. At inference time, our phrase-critic model takes an image and a candidate explanation as input and outputs a score indicating how well the candidate explanation is grounded in the image. Our explainable AI agent is capable of providing counter arguments for an alternative prediction, i.e. counterfactuals, along with explanations that justify the correct classification decisions. Our model improves the textual explanation quality of fine-grained classification decisions on the CUB dataset by mentioning phrases that are grounded in the image. Moreover, on the FOIL tasks, our agent detects when there is a mistake in the sentence, grounds the incorrect phrase and corrects it significantly better than other models. During the 60s and 70s, AI researchers explored intuitions about intelligence by writing programs that displayed intelligent behavior. Many good ideas came out from this work but programs written by hand were not robust or general. After the 80s, research increasingly shifted to the development of learners capable of inferring behavior and functions from experience and data, and solvers capable of tackling well-defined but intractable models like SAT, classical planning, Bayesian networks, and POMDPs. The learning approach has achieved considerable success but results in black boxes that do not have the flexibility, transparency, and generality of their model-based counterparts. Model-based approaches, on the other hand, require models and scalable algorithms. Model-free learners and model-based solvers have close parallels with Systems 1 and 2 in current theories of the human mind: the first, a fast, opaque, and inflexible intuitive mind; the second, a slow, transparent, and flexible analytical mind. In this paper, I review developments in AI and draw on these theories to discuss the gap between model-free learners and model-based solvers, a gap that needs to be bridged in order to have intelligent systems that are robust and general. When AI systems interact with humans in the loop, they are often called on to provide explanations for their plans and behavior. Past work on plan explanations primarily involved the AI system explaining the correctness of its plan and the rationale for its decision in terms of its own model. Such soliloquy is wholly inadequate in most realistic scenarios where the humans have domain and task models that differ significantly from that used by the AI system. We posit that the explanations are best studied in light of these differing models. In particular, we show how explanation can be seen as a "model reconciliation problem" (MRP), where the AI system in effect suggests changes to the human's model, so as to make its plan be optimal with respect to that changed human model. We will study the properties of such explanations, present algorithms for automatically computing them, and evaluate the performance of the algorithms.