We are tackling the problem of trading real-world private information using only cryptographic protocols and a public blockchain to guarantee honest transactions. In this project, we consider three types of agents --buyers, sellers and notaries-- interacting in a decentralized privacy-preserving data marketplace (dPDM) such as the Wibson data marketplace. This framework offers infrastructure and financial incentives for individuals to securely sell personal information while preserving personal privacy. Here we provide an efficient cryptographic primitive for the secure exchange of data in a dPDM, which occurs as an atomic operation wherein the data buyer gets access to the data and the data seller gets paid simultaneously.
Challenges (1) and (2) are known as the problem of , which has been studied for decades. Study @cite_8 showed that fairness is unachievable without the aid of a trusted third party. However, the blockchain can fill the role of the trusted party, and essentially eliminates the trust problem.
@cite_8
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We consider a task of scheduling with a common deadline on a single machine. Every player reports to a scheduler the length of his job and the scheduler needs to finish as many jobs as possible by the deadline. For this simple problem, there is a truthful mechanism that achieves maximum welfare in dominant strategies. The new aspect of our work is that in our setting players are uncertain about their own job lengths, and hence are incapable of providing truthful reports (in the strict sense of the word). For a probabilistic model for uncertainty we show that even with relatively little uncertainty, no mechanism can guarantee a constant fraction of the maximum welfare. To remedy this situation, we introduce a new measure of economic efficiency, based on a notion of a fair share of a player, and design mechanisms that are Ω(1)-fair. In addition to its intrinsic appeal, our notion of fairness implies good approximation of maximum welfare in several cases of interest. In our mechanisms the machine is sometimes left idle even though there are jobs that want to use it. We show that this unfavorable aspect is unavoidable, unless one gives up other favorable aspects (e.g., give up Ω(1)-fairness). We also consider a qualitative approach to uncertainty as an alternative to the probabilistic quantitative model. In the qualitative approach we break away from solution concepts such as dominant strategies (they are no longer well defined), and instead suggest an axiomatic approach, which amounts to listing desirable properties for mechanisms. We provide a mechanism that satisfies these properties. An important issue in Peer-to-Peer networks is to encourage users to share with others as they use the resources of the network. However, some nodes may only consume from users without giving anything in return. To fix this problem, we can incorporate trust management systems with network infrastructures. Current trust managements are usually made for unstructured overlays and have several shortcomings. They are made to be very similar to e-commerce scoring websites which may not be the best design for fairness in P2P networks. Several problems may arise with their designs such as difficulties to provide a complete history of freeloaders or lack of an autonomous removal mechanism in case of severe attacks. In this paper, we argue that such systems can be deployed more efficiently by using a structured paradigm. For this purpose, we propose C-Trust, a trust management system which is focused on fairness for P2P networks. This is done by getting help from current circular structured designs. This method is able to mark freeloaders, identify their severity of abusion and punish them accordingly. We are also able to effectively protect both Seeder-to-Leecher and Leecher-to-Leecher transactions. This feature is specially important for fairness which other trust systems have not considered so far. In the Internet of Things (IoT) scenario, the block-chain and, in general, Peer-to-Peer approaches could play an important role in the development of decentralized and dataintensive applications running on billion of devices, preserving the privacy of the users. Our research goal is to understand whether the blockchain and Peer-to-Peer approaches can be employed to foster a decentralized and private-by-design IoT. As a first step in our research process, we conducted a Systematic Literature Review on the blockchain to gather knowledge on the current uses of this technology and to document its current degree of integrity, anonymity and adaptability. We found 18 use cases of blockchain in the literature. Four of these use cases are explicitly designed for IoT. We also found some use cases that are designed for a private-by-design data management. We also found several issues in the integrity, anonymity and adaptability. Regarding anonymity, we found that in the blockchain only pseudonymity is guaranteed. Regarding adaptability and integrity, we discovered that the integrity of the blockchain largely depends on the high difficulty of the Proof-of-Work and on the large number of honest miners, but at the same time a difficult Proof-of-Work limits the adaptability. We documented and categorized the current uses of the blockchain, and provided a few recommendations for future work to address the above-mentioned issues. Most popular blockchain solutions, like Bitcoin, rely on proof-of-work, guaranteeing that the output of the consensus is agreed upon with high probability. However, this probability depends on the delivery of messages and that the computational power of the system is sufficiently scattered among pools of nodes in the network so that no pool can mine more blocks faster than the crowd. New approaches, like Ethereum, generalise the proof-of-work approach by letting individuals deploy their own private blockchain with high transaction throughput. As companies are starting to deploy private chains, it has become crucial to better understand the guarantees blockchains offer in such a small and controlled environment. In this paper, we present the , an execution that we experienced when building our private chain at NICTA Data61. Even though this anomaly has never been acknowledged before, it may translate into dramatic consequences for the user of blockchains. Named after the infamous Paxos anomaly, this anomaly makes dependent transactions, like "Bob sends money to Carole after he received money from Alice" impossible. This anomaly relies on the fact that existing blockchains do not ensure consensus safety deterministically: there is no way for Bob to make sure that Alice actually sent him coins without Bob using an external mechanism, like converting these coins into a fiat currency that allows him to withdraw. We also explore smart contracts as a potential alternative to transactions in order to freeze coins, and show implementations of smart contract that can suffer from the Blockchain anomaly and others that may cope with it.