Scarf's lemma is one of the fundamental results in combinatorics, originally introduced to study the core of an N-person game. Over the last four decades, the usefulness of Scarf's lemma has been demonstrated in several important combinatorial problems seeking "stable" solutions. However, the complexity of the computational version of Scarf's lemma (SCARF) remained open. In this paper, we prove that SCARF is complete for the complexity class PPAD. This proves that SCARF is as hard as the computational versions of Brouwer's fixed point theorem and Sperner's lemma. Hence, there is no polynomial-time algorithm for SCARF unless PPAD P. We also show that fractional stable paths problem and finding strong fractional kernels in digraphs are PPAD-hard.
Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou @cite_6 proved that 3-Dimensional Brouwer is PPAD-complete. They reduced 3-dimensional Brouwer to 3-Graphical Nash to prove that 3-Graphical Nash is PPAD-complete. These results together with the reductions of Goldberg and Papadimitriou @cite_2 imply that computing Nash equilibrium in games with 4 players ( 4-Nash ) is PPAD-complete. Chen and Deng @cite_22 , Daskalakis and Papadimitriou @cite_18 independently proved that 3-Nash is PPAD-complete. Chen and Deng @cite_19 proved that 2-Nash is also PPAD-complete. Chen, Deng and Teng @cite_4 showed that approximating Nash equilibrium is also hard. For a list results on the complexity of finding equilibria we refer the reader to a recent book on algorithmic game theory @cite_3 .
@cite_18 @cite_4 @cite_22 @cite_6 @cite_3 @cite_19 @cite_2
2002373723 2057913812 2140790422 2170677670
In 1951, John F. Nash proved that every game has a Nash equilibrium [Ann. of Math. (2), 54 (1951), pp. 286-295]. His proof is nonconstructive, relying on Brouwer's fixed point theorem, thus leaving open the questions, Is there a polynomial-time algorithm for computing Nash equilibria? And is this reliance on Brouwer inherent? Many algorithms have since been proposed for finding Nash equilibria, but none known to run in polynomial time. In 1991 the complexity class PPAD (polynomial parity arguments on directed graphs), for which Brouwer's problem is complete, was introduced [C. Papadimitriou, J. Comput. System Sci., 48 (1994), pp. 489-532], motivated largely by the classification problem for Nash equilibria; but whether the Nash problem is complete for this class remained open. In this paper we resolve these questions: We show that finding a Nash equilibrium in three-player games is indeed PPAD-complete; and we do so by a reduction from Brouwer's problem, thus establishing that the two problems are computationally equivalent. Our reduction simulates a (stylized) Brouwer function by a graphical game [M. Kearns, M. Littman, and S. Singh, Graphical model for game theory, in 17th Conference in Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence (UAI), 2001], relying on “gadgets,” graphical games performing various arithmetic and logical operations. We then show how to simulate this graphical game by a three-player game, where each of the three players is essentially a color class in a coloring of the underlying graph. Subsequent work [X. Chen and X. Deng, Setting the complexity of 2-player Nash-equilibrium, in 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2006] established, by improving our construction, that even two-player games are PPAD-complete; here we show that this result follows easily from our proof. We prove that Bimatrix, the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a two-player game, is complete for the complexity class PPAD (Polynomial Parity Argument, Directed version) introduced by Papadimitriou in 1991. Our result, building upon the work of [2006a] on the complexity of four-player Nash equilibria, settles a long standing open problem in algorithmic game theory. It also serves as a starting point for a series of results concerning the complexity of two-player Nash equilibria. In particular, we prove the following theorems: —Bimatrix does not have a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme unless every problem in PPAD is solvable in polynomial time. —The smoothed complexity of the classic Lemke-Howson algorithm and, in fact, of any algorithm for Bimatrix is not polynomial unless every problem in PPAD is solvable in randomized polynomial time. Our results also have a complexity implication in mathematical economics: —Arrow-Debreu market equilibria are PPAD-hard to compute. We resolve the question of the complexity of Nash equilibrium by showing that the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium in a game with 4 or more players is complete for the complexity class PPAD. Our proof uses ideas from the recently-established equivalence between polynomial time solvability of normal form games and graphical games, establishing that these kinds of games can simulate a PPAD-complete class of Brouwer functions. We prove that computing a Nash equilibrium in a 3-player game is PPAD-complete, solving a problem left open in (2).