Public transit systems in urban areas usually require large state subsidies, primarily due to high fare evasion rates. In this paper, we study new models for optimizing fare inspection strategies in transit networks based on bilevel programming. In the first level, the leader (the network operator) determines probabilities for inspecting passengers at different locations, while in the second level, the followers (the fare-evading passengers) respond by optimizing their routes given the inspection probabilities and travel times. To model the followers' behavior we study both a non-adaptive variant, in which passengers select a path a priori and continue along it throughout their journey, and an adaptive variant, in which they gain information along the way and use it to update their route. For these problems, which are interesting in their own right, we design exact and approximation algorithms and we prove a tight bound of 3 4 on the ratio of the optimal cost between adaptive and non-adaptive strategies. For the leader's optimization problem, we study a fixed-fare and a flexible-fare variant, where ticket prices may or may not be set at the operator's will. For the latter variant, we design an LP based approximation algorithm. Finally, using a local search procedure that shifts inspection probabilities within an initially determined support set, we perform an extensive computational study for all variants of the problem on instances of the Dutch railway and the Amsterdam subway network. This study reveals that our solutions are within 95 of theoretical upper bounds drawn from the LP relaxation.
Bilevel network pricing problems have been considered extensively in the literature; see @cite_14 @cite_4 @cite_5 . In these works, the leader prices edges of some subgraph and the followers choose shortest paths with respect to edge costs defined as the sum of travel costs and prices. This problem has been proved to be NP-hard; see @cite_5 and @cite_17 @cite_18 @cite_20 for further hardness and approximability results.
@cite_18 @cite_14 @cite_4 @cite_5 @cite_20 @cite_17
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We consider a bilevel model where the leader wants to maximize revenues from a taxation scheme, while the follower rationally reacts to those tax levels. We focus our attention on the special case of a toll-setting problem defined on a multicommodity transportation network. We show that the general problem is NP-complete, while particular instances are polynomially solvable. Numerical examples are given. In this paper, we consider the problem of network design for hazardous material transportation where the government designates a network, and the carriers choose the routes on the network. We model the problem as a bilevel network flow formulation and analyze the bilevel design problem by comparing it to three other decision scenarios. The bilevel model is difficult to solve and may be ill-posed. We propose a heuristic solution method that always finds a stable solution. The heuristic exploits the network flow structure at both levels to overcome the difficulty and instability of the bilevel integer programming model. Testing on real data shows that the linearization of the bilevel model fails to find stable solutions and that the heuristic finds lower risk networks in less time. Further testing on random instances shows that the heuristically designed networks achieve significant risk reduction over single-level models. The risk is very close to the least risk possible. However, this reduction in risk comes with a significant increase in cost. We extend the bilevel model to account for the cost risk trade-off by including cost in the first-level objective. The biobjective-bilevel model is a rich decision-support tool that allows for the generation of many good solutions to the design problem. We consider the problem of determining a set of optimal tolls on the arcs of a multicommodity transportation network. The problem is formulated as a bilevel mathematical program where the upper level consists in a firm that raises revenues from tolls set on arcs of the network, while the lower level is represented by a group of users travelling on shortest paths with respect to a generalized travel cost. We consider a pricing problem in directed, uncapacitated networks. Tariffs must be defined by an operator, the leader, for a subset of @math arcs, the tariff arcs. Costs of all other arcs in the network are assumed to be given. There are @math clients, the followers, and after the tariffs have been determined, the clients route their demands independent of each other on paths with minimal total cost. The problem is to find tariffs that maximize the operator's revenue. Motivated by applications in telecommunication networks, we consider a restricted version of this problem, assuming that each client utilizes at most one of the operator's tariff arcs. The problem is equivalent to pricing bridges that clients can use in order to cross a river. We prove that this problem is APX-hard. Moreover, we analyze the effect of uniform pricing, proving that it yields both an @math approximation and a @math -approximation. Here, @math is upper bounded by the total demand of all clients. In addition, we consider the problem under the additional restriction that the operator must not reject any of the clients. We prove that this problem does not admit approximation algorithms with any reasonable performance guarantee, unless P = NP, and we prove the existence of an @math -approximation algorithm.