This paper proposes a definition of system health in the context of multiple agents optimizing a joint reward function. We use this definition as a credit assignment term in a policy gradient algorithm to distinguish the contributions of individual agents to the global reward. The health-informed credit assignment is then extended to a multi-agent variant of the proximal policy optimization algorithm and demonstrated on simple particle environments that have elements of system health, risk-taking, semi-expendable agents, and partial observability. We show significant improvement in learning performance compared to policy gradient methods that do not perform multi-agent credit assignment.
partially address the non-stationary problem by employing whereby groups of homogeneous agents use identical copies of parameters for their local policies @cite_4 . Parameter sharing techniques can give rise to the second fundamental challenge of multi-agent learning: ---i.e. the challenge of identifying which actions from which agent at which time were most responsible for the overall performance (returns) of the system. avoid explicit treatment of this problem by focusing on environments where the joint rewards can be decomposed into local rewards. However, in general, such local reward structures are not guaranteed to optimize joint returns @cite_27 .
@cite_27 @cite_4
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In the framework of fully cooperative multi-agent systems, independent (non-communicative) agents that learn by reinforcement must overcome several difficulties to manage to coordinate. This paper identifies several challenges responsible for the non-coordination of independent agents: Pareto-selection, non-stationarity, stochasticity, alter-exploration and shadowed equilibria. A selection of multi-agent domains is classified according to those challenges: matrix games, Boutilier's coordination game, predators pursuit domains and a special multi-state game. Moreover, the performance of a range of algorithms for independent reinforcement learners is evaluated empirically. Those algorithms are Q-learning variants: decentralized Q-learning, distributed Q-learning, hysteretic Q-learning, recursive frequency maximum Q-value and win-or-learn fast policy hill climbing. An overview of the learning algorithms' strengths and weaknesses against each challenge concludes the paper and can serve as a basis for choosing the appropriate algorithm for a new domain. Furthermore, the distilled challenges may assist in the design of new learning algorithms that overcome these problems and achieve higher performance in multi-agent applications. Fully cooperative multiagent systems--those in which agents share a joint utility model--is of special interest in AI. A key problem is that of ensuring that the actions of individual agents are coordinated, especially in settings where the agents are autonomous decision makers. We investigate approaches to learning coordinated strategies in stochastic domains where an agent's actions are not directly observable by others. Much recent work in game theory has adopted a Bayesian learning perspective to the more general problem of equilibrium selection, but tends to assume that actions can be observed. We discuss the special problems that arise when actions are not observable, including effects on rates of convergence, and the effect of action failure probabilities and asymmetries. We also use likelihood estimates as a means of generalizing fictitious play learning models in our setting. Finally, we propose the use of maximum likelihood as a means of removing strategies from consideration, with the aim of convergence to a conventional equilibrium, at which point learning and deliberation can cease. Many real-world tasks involve multiple agents with partial observability and limited communication. Learning is challenging in these settings due to local viewpoints of agents, which perceive the world as non-stationary due to concurrently-exploring teammates. Approaches that learn specialized policies for individual tasks face problems when applied to the real world: not only do agents have to learn and store distinct policies for each task, but in practice identities of tasks are often non-observable, making these approaches inapplicable. This paper formalizes and addresses the problem of multi-task multi-agent reinforcement learning under partial observability. We introduce a decentralized single-task learning approach that is robust to concurrent interactions of teammates, and present an approach for distilling single-task policies into a unified policy that performs well across multiple related tasks, without explicit provision of task identity. Consider a multi-agent system in a dynamic and uncertain environment. Each agent's local decision problem is modeled as a Markov decision process (MDP) and agents must coordinate on a joint action in each period, which provides a reward to each agent and causes local state transitions. A social planner knows the model of every agent's MDP and wants to implement the optimal joint policy, but agents are self-interested and have private local state. We provide an incentive-compatible mechanism for eliciting state information that achieves the optimal joint plan in a Markov perfect equilibrium of the induced stochastic game. In the special case in which local problems are Markov chains and agents compete to take a single action in each period, we leverage Gittins allocation indices to provide an efficient factored algorithm and distribute computation of the optimal policy among the agents. Distributed, optimal coordinated learning in a multi-agent variant of the multi-armed bandit problem is obtained as a special case.