We study the complexity of deciding the existence of mixed equilibria for minimization games where players use valuations other than expectation to evaluate their costs. We consider risk-averse players seeking to minimize the sum @math of expectation @math and a risk valuation @math of their costs; @math is non-negative and vanishes exactly when the cost incurred to a player is constant over all choices of strategies by the other players. In a @math -equilibrium, no player could unilaterally reduce her cost. Say that @math has the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property if all strategies supported in a player's best-response mixed strategy incur the same conditional expectation of her cost. We introduce @math -strict concavity and observe that every @math -strictly concave valuation has the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property. We focus on a broad class of valuations shown to have the Weak-Equilibrium-for-Expectation property, which we exploit to prove two main complexity results, the first of their kind, for the two simplest cases of the problem: games with two strategies, or games with two players. For each case, we show that deciding the existence of a @math -equilibrium is strongly @math -hard for certain choices of significant valuations (including variance and standard deviation).
Fiat and Papadimitriou [Section 2] FP10 coined a notion termed as strict concavity, denoted here as @math -strict concavity, which is similar to but different than @math -strict concavity. It turns out that their difference is essential since @math is not @math -strictly concave while it is @math -strictly concave. See the Appendix for the definition of @math -strict concavity and a proof that @math is not @math -strictly concave. In fact, no concrete example of an @math -strictly concave valuation was given in @cite_7 . Fiat and Papadimitriou [Theorem 3 & Observation 4] FP10 proved the sparsity of mixed @math -equilibria, when @math is @math -strictly concave: games with a mixed @math -equilibrium have measure @math . The sparsity of mixed @math -equilibria follows from [Theorem 1] BKS10 where it is established that @math is a Mean-Variance Preference Function [Claim 1] BKS10 . See for the definition of Mean-Variance Preference Functions and their relation to this work. Contrary to their sparsity, this work establishes that deciding the existence of mixed @math -equilibria is strongly @math -hard (Theorems and ).
@cite_7
2179146913 2108444537 1514218977 2109706083
We consider strategic games in which each player seeks a mixed strategy to minimize her cost evaluated by a concave valuationV (mapping probability distributions to reals); such valuations are used to model risk. In contrast to games with expectation-optimizer players where mixed equilibria always exist (Nash 1950; Nash Ann. Math. 54, 286---295, 1951), a mixed equilibrium for such games, called a V-equilibrium, may fail to exist, even though pure equilibria (if any) transfer over. What is the exact impact of such valuations on the existence, structure and complexity of mixed equilibria? We address this fundamental question in the context of expectation plus variance, a particular concave valuation denoted as RA, which stands for risk-averse; so, variance enters as a measure of risk and it is used as an additive adjustment to expectation. We obtain the following results about RA-equilibria: A collection of general structural properties of RA-equilibria connecting to (i)E-equilibria and Var-equilibria, which correspond to the expectation and variance valuations E and Var, respectively, and to (ii) other weaker or incomparable properties such as Weak Equilibrium and Strong Equilibrium. Some of these structural properties imply quantitative constraints on the existence of mixed RA-equilibria.A second collection of (i) existence, (ii) equivalence and separation (with respect to E-equilibria), and (iii) characterization results for RA-equilibria in the new class of player-specific scheduling games. We provide suitable examples with a mixed RA-equilibrium that is not an E-equilibrium and vice versa.A purification technique to transform a player-specific scheduling game on two identical links into a player-specific scheduling game on two links so that all non-pureRA-equilibria are eliminated while no new pure equilibria are created; so, a particular player-specific scheduling game on two identical links with no pure equilibrium yields a player-specific scheduling game with noRA-equilibrium (whether mixed or pure). As a by-product, the first ?????-completeness result for the computation of RA-equilibria follows. We consider structural and algorithmic questions related to the Nash dynamics of weighted congestion games. In weighted congestion games with linear latency functions, the existence of pure Nash equilibria is guaranteed by a potential function argument. Unfortunately, this proof of existence is inefficient and computing pure Nash equilibria in such games is a PLS-hard problem even when all players have unit weights. The situation gets worse when superlinear (e.g., quadratic) latency functions come into play; in this case, the Nash dynamics of the game may contain cycles and pure Nash equilibria may not even exist. Given these obstacles, we consider approximate pure Nash equilibria as alternative solution concepts. A ρ--approximate pure Nash equilibrium is a state of a (weighted congestion) game from which no player has any incentive to deviate in order to improve her cost by a multiplicative factor higher than ρ. Do such equilibria exist for small values of ρ? And if so, can we compute them efficiently? We provide positive answers to both questions for weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions by exploiting an “approximation” of such games by a new class of potential games that we call Ψ-games. This allows us to show that these games have d!-approximate pure Nash equilibria, where d is the maximum degree of the latency functions. Our main technical contribution is an efficient algorithm for computing O(1)-approximate pure Nash equilibria when d is a constant. For games with linear latency functions, the approximation guarantee is 3+√5 2 + Oγ for arbitrarily small γ > 0; for latency functions with maximum degree d≥ 2, it is d2d+o(d). The running time is polynomial in the number of bits in the representation of the game and 1 γ. As a byproduct of our techniques, we also show the following interesting structural statement for weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions of maximum degree d ≥ 2: polynomially-long sequences of best-response moves from any initial state to a dO(d2)-approximate pure Nash equilibrium exist and can be efficiently identified in such games as long as d is a constant. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first positive algorithmic results for approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games. Our techniques significantly extend our recent work on unweighted congestion games through the use of Ψ-games. The concept of approximating nonpotential games by potential ones is interesting in itself and might have further applications. 0. Background Notes.- 1. Continuous Partitions of Unity.- 2. Absolutely Continuous Functions.- 3. Some Compactness Theorems.- 4. Weak Convergence and Asymptotic Center of Bounded Sequences.- 5. Closed Convex Hulls and the Mean-Value Theorem.- 6. Lower Semicontinuous Convex Functions and Projections of Best Approximation.- 7. A Concise Introduction to Convex Analysis.- 1. Set-Valued Maps.- 1. Set-Valued Maps and Continuity Concepts.- 2. Examples of Set-Valued Maps.- 3. Continuity Properties of Maps with Closed Convex Graph.- 4. Upper Hemicontinuous Maps and the Convergence Theorem.- 5. Hausdorff Topology.- 6. The Selection Problem.- 7. The Minimal Selection.- 8. Chebishev Selection.- 9. The Barycentric Selection.- 10. Selection Theorems for Locally Selectionable Maps.- 11. Michael's Selection Theorem.- 12. The Approximate Selection Theorem and Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem.- 13. (7-Selectionable Maps.- 14. Measurable Selections.- 2. Existence of Solutions to Differential Inclusions.- 1. Convex Valued Differential Inclusions.- 2. Qualitative Properties of the Set of Trajectories of Convex-Valued Differential Inclusions.- 3. Nonconvex-Valued Differential Inclusions.- 4. Differential Inclusions with Lipschitzean Maps and the Relaxation Theorem.- 5. The Fixed-Point Approach.- 6. The Lower Semicontinuous Case.- 3. Differential Inclusions with Maximal Monotone Maps.- 1. Maximal Monotone Maps.- 2. Existence and Uniqueness of Solutions to Differential Inclusions with Maximal Monotone Maps.- 3. Asymptotic Behavior of Trajectories and the Ergodic Theorem.- 4. Gradient Inclusions.- 5. Application: Gradient Methods for Constrained Minimization Problems.- 4. Viability Theory: The Nonconvex Case.- 1. Bouligand's Contingent Cone.- 2. Viable and Monotone Trajectories.- 3. Contingent Derivative of a Set-Valued Map.- 4. The Time Dependent Case.- 5. A Continuous Version of Newton's Method.- 6. A Viability Theorem for Continuous Maps with Nonconvex Images..- 7. Differential Inclusions with Memory.- 5. Viability Theory and Regulation of Controled Systems: The Convex Case.- 1. Tangent Cones and Normal Cones to Convex Sets.- 2. Viability Implies the Existence of an Equilibrium.- 3. Viability Implies the Existence of Periodic Trajectories.- 4. Regulation of Controled Systems Through Viability.- 5. Walras Equilibria and Dynamical Price Decentralization.- 6. Differential Variational Inequalities.- 7. Rate Equations and Inclusions.- 6. Liapunov Functions.- 1. Upper Contingent Derivative of a Real-Valued Function.- 2. Liapunov Functions and Existence of Equilibria.- 3. Monotone Trajectories of a Differential Inclusion.- 4. Construction of Liapunov Functions.- 5. Stability and Asymptotic Behavior of Trajectories.- Comments. The problem of maximizing a concave function f(x) in the unit simplex Δ can be solved approximately by a simple greedy algorithm. For given k, the algorithm can find a point x(k) on a k-dimensional face of Δ, such that f(x(k) ≥ f(x*) − O(1 k). Here f(x*) is the maximum value of f in Δ, and the constant factor depends on f. This algorithm and analysis were known before, and related to problems of statistics and machine learning, such as boosting, regression, and density mixture estimation. In other work, coming from computational geometry, the existence of e-coresets was shown for the minimum enclosing ball problem by means of a simple greedy algorithm. Similar greedy algorithms, which are special cases of the Frank-Wolfe algorithm, were described for other enclosure problems. Here these results are tied together, stronger convergence results are reviewed, and several coreset bounds are generalized or strengthened.