We consider incentive compatible mechanisms for a domain that is very close to the domain of scheduling @math unrelated machines: the single exception is that the valuation of just one machine is submodular. For the scheduling problem with such cost functions, we give a lower bound of @math on the approximation ratio of incentive compatible deterministic mechanisms. This is a strong information-theoretic impossibility result on the approximation ratio of mechanisms on relatively simple domains. The lower bound of the current work assumes no restriction on the mechanism side, but an expanded class of valuations, in contrast to previous general results on the Nisan-Ronen conjecture that hold for only special classes of mechanisms such as local, strongly monotone, and anonymous mechanisms. Our approach is based on a novel characterization of appropriately selected smaller instances that allows us to focus on particular type of algorithms (linear mechanisms), from which we extract a locality property that gives the lower bound.
Lavi and Swamy @cite_4 proposed an interesting approach to attack the Nisan-Ronen question, by restricting the input domain, but still keep the multi-dimensional flavour of the setting. They assumed that each entry in the input matrix can take only two possible values low'' and high'', that are publicly known to the designer. In this case, they showed an elegant deterministic mechanism with an approximation factor of 2. Surprisingly, even for this special case there is a lower bound of @math . Yu @cite_25 extended the results for a range of values, and @cite_5 studied multi-dimensional domains where the private information of the machines is a single bit.
@cite_5 @cite_4 @cite_25
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We consider the makespan-minimization problem on unrelated machines in the context of algorithmic mechanism design. No truthful mechanisms with non-trivial approximation guarantees are known for this multidimensional domain. We study a well-motivated special case (also a multidimensional domain), where the processing time of a job on each machine is either "low" or "high." We give a general technique to convert any c-approximation algorithm (in a black-box fashion) to a 3c-approximation truthful-in-expectation mechanism. Our construction uses fractional truthful mechanisms as a building block, and builds upon a technique of Lavi and Swamy [Lavi, R., Swamy, C., 2005. Truthful and near-optimal mechanism design via linear programming. In: Proc. 46th FOCS, pp. 595-604]. When all jobs have identical low and high values, we devise a deterministic 2-approximation truthful mechanism. The chief novelty of our results is that we do not utilize explicit price definitions to prove truthfulness. Instead we design algorithms that satisfy cycle monotonicity [Rochet, J., 1987. A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context. J. Math. Econ. 16, 191-200], a necessary and sufficient condition for truthfulness in multidimensional settings; this is the first work that leverages this characterization. We consider the problem of makespan minimization on m unrelated machines in the context of algorithmic mechanism design, where the machines are the strategic players. This is a multidimensional scheduling domain, and the only known positive results for makespan minimization in such a domain are O(m)-approximation truthful mechanisms [22, 20]. We study a well-motivated special case of this problem, where the processing time of a job on each machine may either be "low" or "high", and the low and high values are public and job-dependent. This preserves the multidimensionality of the domain, and generalizes the restricted-machines (i.e., pj,∞ ) setting in scheduling. We give a general technique to convert any c-approximation algorithm to a 3c-approximation truthful-in-expectation mechanism. This is one of the few known results that shows how to export approximation algorithms for a multidimensional problem into truthful mechanisms in a black-box fashion. When the low and high values are the same for all jobs, we devise a deterministic 2-approximation truthful mechanism. These are the first truthful mechanisms with non-trivial performance guarantees for a multidimensional scheduling domain. Our constructions are novel in two respects. First, we do not utilize or rely on explicit price definitions to prove truthfulness; instead we design algorithms that satisfy cycle monotonicity. Cycle monotonicity [23] is a necessary and sufficient condition for truthfulness, is a generalization of value monotonicity for multidimensional domains. However, whereas value monotonicity has been used extensively and successfully to design truthful mechanisms in single-dimensional domains, ours is the first work that leverages cycle monotonicity in the multidimensional setting. Second, our randomized mechanisms are obtained by first constructing a fractional truthful mechanism for a fractional relaxation of the problem, and then converting it into a truthful-in-expectation mechanism. This builds upon a technique of [16], and shows the usefulness of fractional mechanisms in truthful mechanism design. This paper is concerned with the problem of recovering an unknown matrix from a small fraction of its entries. This is known as the matrix completion problem, and comes up in a great number of applications, including the famous Netflix Prize and other similar questions in collaborative filtering. In general, accurate recovery of a matrix from a small number of entries is impossible, but the knowledge that the unknown matrix has low rank radically changes this premise, making the search for solutions meaningful. This paper presents optimality results quantifying the minimum number of entries needed to recover a matrix of rank r exactly by any method whatsoever (the information theoretic limit). More importantly, the paper shows that, under certain incoherence assumptions on the singular vectors of the matrix, recovery is possible by solving a convenient convex program as soon as the number of entries is on the order of the information theoretic limit (up to logarithmic factors). This convex program simply finds, among all matrices consistent with the observed entries, that with minimum nuclear norm. As an example, we show that on the order of nr log(n) samples are needed to recover a random n x n matrix of rank r by any method, and to be sure, nuclear norm minimization succeeds as soon as the number of entries is of the form nr polylog(n). This paper is concerned with the problem of recovering an unknown matrix from a small fraction of its entries. This is known as the matrix completion problem, and comes up in a great number of applications, including the famous Netflix Prize and other similar questions in collaborative filtering. In general, accurate recovery of a matrix from a small number of entries is impossible; but the knowledge that the unknown matrix has low rank radically changes this premise, making the search for solutions meaningful. This paper presents optimality results quantifying the minimum number of entries needed to recover a matrix of rank r exactly by any method whatsoever (the information theoretic limit). More importantly, the paper shows that, under certain incoherence assumptions on the singular vectors of the matrix, recovery is possible by solving a convenient convex program as soon as the number of entries is on the order of the information theoretic limit (up to logarithmic factors). This convex program simply finds, among all matrices consistent with the observed entries, that with minimum nuclear norm. As an example, we show that on the order of nr log(n) samples are needed to recover a random n x n matrix of rank r by any method, and to be sure, nuclear norm minimization succeeds as soon as the number of entries is of the form nr polylog(n).