Unconstrained submodular maximization captures many NP-hard combinatorial optimization problems, including Max-Cut, Max-Di-Cut, and variants of facility location problems. Recently, presented a surprisingly simple linear time randomized greedy-like online algorithm that achieves a constant approximation ratio of 1 2, matching optimally the hardness result of . Motivated by the algorithm of , we introduce a precise algorithmic model called double-sided myopic algorithms. We show that while the algorithm of can be realized as a randomized online double-sided myopic algorithm, no such deterministic algorithm, even with adaptive ordering, can achieve the same approximation ratio. With respect to the Max-Di-Cut problem, we relate the algorithm and our myopic framework to the online algorithm and inapproximation of Bar-Noy and Lampis.
Our motivation is the double-sided greedy algorithms of Buchbinder that we wish to formalize. Independently, Bar-Noy and Lampis @cite_45 gave a @math deterministic online greedy algorithm for the Max-Di-Cut problem matching the deterministic approximation obtained by Buchbinder for all unconstrained non-monotone submodular maximization problems. Interestingly, their algorithm is shown to be the de-randomization of the simple @math random-cut algorithm! Bar-Noy and Lampis give an improved @math approximation for Max-Di-Cut when restricted to DAGs. Furthermore, they provide a precise online model with respect to which this approximation bound is essentially optimal.
@cite_45
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We consider the Unconstrained Submodular Maximization problem in which we are given a nonnegative submodular function @math , and the objective is to find a subset @math maximizing @math . This is one of the most basic submodular optimization problems, having a wide range of applications. Some well-known problems captured by Unconstrained Submodular Maximization include Max-Cut, Max-DiCut, and variants of Max-SAT and maximum facility location. We present a simple randomized linear time algorithm achieving a tight approximation guarantee of 1 2, thus matching the known hardness result of Feige, Mirrokni, and Vondrak [SIAM J. Comput., 40 (2011), pp. 1133--1153]. Our algorithm is based on an adaptation of the greedy approach which exploits certain symmetry properties of the problem. We investigate a natural online version of the well-known Maximum Directed Cut problem on DAGs. We propose a deterministic algorithm and show that it achieves a competitive ratio of @math . We then give a lower bound argument to show that no deterministic algorithm can achieve a ratio of @math for any ?>0 thus showing that our algorithm is essentially optimal. Then, we extend our technique to improve upon the analysis of an old result: we show that greedily derandomizing the trivial randomized algorithm for MaxDiCut in general graphs improves the competitive ratio from 4 to 3, and also provide a tight example. This paper deals with the design of efficiently computable incentive compatible, or truthful, mechanisms for combinatorial optimization problems with multi-parameter agents. We focus on approximation algorithms for NP-hard mechanism design problems. These algorithms need to satisfy certain monotonicity properties to ensure truthfulness. Since most of the known approximation techniques do not fulfill these properties, we study alternative techniques.Our first contribution is a quite general method to transform a pseudopolynomial algorithm into a monotone FPTAS. This can be applied to various problems like, e.g., knapsack, constrained shortest path, or job scheduling with deadlines. For example, the monotone FPTAS for the knapsack problem gives a very efficient, truthful mechanism for single-minded multi-unit auctions. The best previous result for such auctions was a 2-approximation. In addition, we present a monotone PTAS for the generalized assignment problem with any bounded number of parameters per agent.The most efficient way to solve packing integer programs (PIPs) is LP-based randomized rounding, which also is in general not monotone. We show that primal-dual greedy algorithms achieve almost the same approximation ratios for PIPs as randomized rounding. The advantage is that these algorithms are inherently monotone. This way, we can significantly improve the approximation ratios of truthful mechanisms for various fundamental mechanism design problems like single-minded combinatorial auctions (CAs), unsplittable flow routing and multicast routing. Our approximation algorithms can also be used for the winner determination in CAs with general bidders specifying their bids through an oracle. This paper deals with the design of efficiently computable incentive-compatible mechanisms for combinatorial optimization problems with single-minded agents each possibly having multiple private parameters. We focus on approximation algorithms for NP-hard mechanism design problems. These algorithms need to satisfy certain monotonicity properties to ensure truthfulness. Since most of the known approximation techniques do not fulfill these properties, we study alternative techniques. Our first contribution is a quite general method to transform a pseudopolynomial algorithm into a monotone fully polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS). This can be applied to various problems like, e.g., knapsack, constrained shortest path, or job scheduling with deadlines. For example, the monotone FPTAS for the knapsack problem gives a very efficient, truthful mechanism for single-minded multiunit auctions. The best previous result for such auctions was a 2-appro-xi-ma-tion. In addition, we present a monotone PTAS for the generalized assignment problem with any constant number of private parameters per agent. The most efficient way to solve packing integer programs (PIPs) is linear programming-based randomized rounding, which also is in general not monotone. We show that primal-dual greedy algorithms achieve almost the same approximation ratios for PIPs as randomized rounding. The advantage is that these algorithms are inherently monotone. This way, we can significantly improve the approximation ratios of truthful mechanisms for various fundamental mechanism design problems like single-minded combinatorial auctions (CAs), unsplittable flow routing, and multicast routing. Our primal-dual approximation algorithms can also be used for the winner determination in CAs with general bidders specifying their bids through an oracle.