It is well known that sequential decision making may lead to information cascades. That is, when agents make decisions based on their private information, as well as observing the actions of those before them, then it might be rational to ignore their private signal and imitate the action of previous individuals. If the individuals are choosing between a right and a wrong state, and the initial actions are wrong, then the whole cascade will be wrong. This issue is due to the fact that cascades can be based on very little information. We show that if agents occasionally disregard the actions of others and base their action only on their private information, then wrong cascades can be avoided. Moreover, we study the optimal asymptotic rate at which the error probability at time @math can go to zero. The optimal policy is for the player at time @math to follow their private information with probability @math , leading to a learning rate of @math , where the constants @math and @math are explicit.
The special case of the model described in the previous subsection where every agent is Bayesian (i.e., with @math for every @math ) is identical to the model described in the exposition of Easley and Kleinberg [Chapter 16] easley2010networks . The original model of Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch @cite_11 differs only in its tie-breaking rule (breaking ties by flipping a fair coin), while that of Banerjee @cite_15 differs in the signal distribution (false signals are drawn from a continuous distribution). Despite these minor differences, these models all share the same phenomenological behavior as described in the introductory paragraphs.
@cite_15 @cite_11
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Chakrabarti.- A discussion on Econophysics by Hideaki Aoyama. We study the problem of eliciting and aggregating probabilistic information from multiple agents. In order to successfully aggregate the predictions of agents, the principal needs to elicit some notion of confidence from agents, capturing how much experience or knowledge led to their predictions. To formalize this, we consider a principal who wishes to elicit predictions about a random variable from a group of Bayesian agents, each of whom have privately observed some independent samples of the random variable, and hopes to aggregate the predictions as if she had directly observed the samples of all agents. Leveraging techniques from Bayesian statistics, we represent confidence as the number of samples an agent has observed, which is quantified by a hyperparameter from a conjugate family of prior distributions. This then allows us to show that if the principal has access to a few samples, she can achieve her aggregation goal by eliciting predictions from agents using proper scoring rules. In particular, if she has access to one sample, she can successfully aggregate the agents' predictions if and only if every posterior predictive distribution corresponds to a unique value of the hyperparameter. Furthermore, this uniqueness holds for many common distributions of interest. When this uniqueness property does not hold, we construct a novel and intuitive mechanism where a principal with two samples can elicit and optimally aggregate the agents' predictions. We consider the CEO problem for non-regular source distributions (such as uniform or truncated Gaussian). A group of agents observe independently corrupted versions of data and transmit coded versions over rate-limited links to a CEO. The CEO then estimates the underlying data based on the received coded observations. Agents are not allowed to convene before transmitting their observations. This formulation is motivated by the practical problem of a firm’s CEO estimating (non-regular) beliefs about a sequence of events, before acting on them. Agents’ observations are modeled as jointly distributed with the underlying data through a given conditional probability density function. We study the asymptotic behavior of the minimum achievable mean squared error distortion at the CEO in the limit when the number of agents @math and the sum rate @math tend to infinity. We establish a @math convergence of the distortion, an intermediate regime of performance between the exponential behavior in discrete CEO problems [Berger, Zhang, and Viswanathan (1996)], and the @math behavior in Gaussian CEO problems [Viswanathan and Berger (1997)]. Achievability is proved by a layered architecture with scalar quantization, distributed entropy coding, and midrange estimation. The converse is proved using the Bayesian Chazan–Zakai–Ziv bound. 1. Summary In Part I, four ostensibly different theoretical models of induction are presented, in which the problem dealt with is the extrapolation of a very long sequence of symbols—presumably containing all of the information to be used in the induction. Almost all, if not all problems in induction can be put in this form. Some strong heuristic arguments have been obtained for the equivalence of the last three models. One of these models is equivalent to a Bayes formulation, in which a priori probabilities are assigned to sequences of symbols on the basis of the lengths of inputs to a universal Turing machine that are required to produce the sequence of interest as output. Though it seems likely, it is not certain whether the first of the four models is equivalent to the other three. Few rigorous results are presented. Informal investigations are made of the properties of these models. There are discussions of their consistency and meaningfulness, of their degree of independence of the exact nature of the Turing machine used, and of the accuracy of their predictions in comparison to those of other induction methods. In Part II these models are applied to the solution of three problems—prediction of the Bernoulli sequence, extrapolation of a certain kind of Markov chain, and the use of phrase structure grammars for induction. Though some approximations are used, the first of these problems is treated most rigorously. The result is Laplace's rule of succession. The solution to the second problem uses less certain approximations, but the properties of the solution that are discussed, are fairly independent of these approximations. The third application, using phrase structure grammars, is least exact of the three. First a formal solution is presented. Though it appears to have certain deficiencies, it is hoped that presentation of this admittedly inadequate model will suggest acceptable improvements in it. This formal solution is then applied in an approximate way to the determination of the “optimum” phrase structure grammar for a given set of strings. The results that are obtained are plausible, but subject to the uncertainties of the approximation used.