As machine learning becomes widely used for automated decisions, attackers have strong incentives to manipulate the results and models generated by machine learning algorithms. In this paper, we perform the first systematic study of poisoning attacks and their countermeasures for linear regression models. In poisoning attacks, attackers deliberately influence the training data to manipulate the results of a predictive model. We propose a theoretically-grounded optimization framework specifically designed for linear regression and demonstrate its effectiveness on a range of datasets and models. We also introduce a fast statistical attack that requires limited knowledge of the training process. Finally, we design a new principled defense method that is highly resilient against all poisoning attacks. We provide formal guarantees about its convergence and an upper bound on the effect of poisoning attacks when the defense is deployed. We evaluate extensively our attacks and defenses on three realistic datasets from health care, loan assessment, and real estate domains.
In unsupervised settings, Rubinstein al @cite_17 examined how an attacker can systematically inject traffic to mislead a PCA anomaly detection system for DoS attacks. Kloft and Laskov @cite_12 demonstrated on centroid anomaly detection that involve incremental contamination of systems using retraining. Theoretical online centroid anomaly detection analysis has been discussed in @cite_12 . @cite_56 discuss sanitization methods against time-based anomaly detectors in which multiple micro-models are built and compared over time to identify poisoned data. The assumption in their system is that the attacker only controls data generated during a limited time window.
@cite_56 @cite_12 @cite_17
2134063365 2792169732 2007562169 2531279268
Security issues are crucial in a number of machine learning applications, especially in scenarios dealing with human activity rather than natural phenomena (e.g., information ranking, spam detection, malware detection, etc.). In such cases, learning algorithms may have to cope with manipulated data aimed at hampering decision making. Although some previous work addressed the issue of handling malicious data in the context of supervised learning, very little is known about the behavior of anomaly detection methods in such scenarios. In this contribution, we analyze the performance of a particular method--online centroid anomaly detection--in the presence of adversarial noise. Our analysis addresses the following security-related issues: formalization of learning and attack processes, derivation of an optimal attack, and analysis of attack efficiency and limitations. We derive bounds on the effectiveness of a poisoning attack against centroid anomaly detection under different conditions: attacker's full or limited control over the traffic and bounded false positive rate. Our bounds show that whereas a poisoning attack can be effectively staged in the unconstrained case, it can be made arbitrarily difficult (a strict upper bound on the attacker's gain) if external constraints are properly used. Our experimental evaluation, carried out on real traces of HTTP and exploit traffic, confirms the tightness of our theoretical bounds and the practicality of our protection mechanisms. In this paper, online detection of false data injection attacks and denial of service attacks in the smart grid is studied. The system is modeled as a discrete-time linear dynamic system and state estimation is performed using the Kalman filter. The generalized cumulative sum algorithm is employed for quickest detection of the cyber-attacks. Detectors are proposed in both centralized and distributed settings. The proposed detectors are robust to time-varying states, attacks, and set of attacked meters. Online estimates of the unknown attack variables are provided, that can be crucial for a quick system recovery. In the distributed setting, due to bandwidth constraints, local centers can only transmit quantized messages to the global center, and a novel event-based sampling scheme called level-crossing sampling with hysteresis is proposed that is shown to exhibit significant advantages compared with the conventional uniform-in-time sampling scheme. Moreover, a distributed dynamic state estimator is proposed based on information filters. Numerical examples illustrate the fast and accurate response of the proposed detectors in detecting both structured and random attacks and their advantages over existing methods. Statistical machine learning techniques have recently garnered increased popularity as a means to improve network design and security. For intrusion detection, such methods build a model for normal behavior from training data and detect attacks as deviations from that model. This process invites adversaries to manipulate the training data so that the learned model fails to detect subsequent attacks. We evaluate poisoning techniques and develop a defense, in the context of a particular anomaly detector - namely the PCA-subspace method for detecting anomalies in backbone networks. For three poisoning schemes, we show how attackers can substantially increase their chance of successfully evading detection by only adding moderate amounts of poisoned data. Moreover such poisoning throws off the balance between false positives and false negatives thereby dramatically reducing the efficacy of the detector. To combat these poisoning activities, we propose an antidote based on techniques from robust statistics and present a new robust PCA-based detector. Poisoning has little effect on the robust model, whereas it significantly distorts the model produced by the original PCA method. Our technique substantially reduces the effectiveness of poisoning for a variety of scenarios and indeed maintains a significantly better balance between false positives and false negatives than the original method when under attack. Anomaly detection is still a challenging task for video surveillance due to complex environments and unpredictable human behaviors. Most existing approaches train offline detectors using manually labeled data and predefined parameters, and are hard to model changing scenes. This paper introduces a neural network based model called online Growing Neural Gas (online GNG) to perform an unsupervised learning. Unlike a parameter-fixed GNG, our model updates learning parameters continuously, for which we propose several online neighbor-related strategies. Specific operations, namely neuron insertion, deletion, learning rate adaptation and stopping criteria selection, get upgraded to online modes. In the anomaly detection stage, the behavior patterns far away from our model are labeled as anomalous, for which far away is measured by a time-varying threshold. Experiments are implemented on three surveillance datasets, namely UMN, UCSD Ped1 Ped2 and Avenue dataset. All datasets have changing scenes due to mutable crowd density and behavior types. Anomaly detection results show that our model can adapt to the current scene rapidly and reduce false alarms while still detecting most anomalies. Quantitative comparisons with 12 recent approaches further confirm our superiority. HighlightsOnline GNG employs neighbor-related strategies to adjust dominant learning parameters in a fully automated way.Online GNG can estimate the learning efficiency and adjust the network size to fit the unstable data space dynamically.Online GNG effectively reduces the false alarms and leak detections caused by model aging which frequently happens in changing surveillance scenes.