Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) ad-hoc network is a significant contingency plan for communication after a natural disaster, such as typhoon and earthquake. To achieve efficient and rapid networks deployment, we employ noncooperative game theory and amended binary log-linear algorithm (BLLA) seeking for the Nash equilibrium which achieves the optimal network performance. We not only take channel overlap and power control into account but also consider coverage and the complexity of interference. However, extensive UAV game theoretical models show limitations in post-disaster scenarios which require large-scale UAV network deployments. Besides, the highly dynamic post-disaster scenarios cause strategies updating constraint and strategy-deciding error on UAV ad-hoc networks. To handle these problems, we employ aggregative game which could capture and cover those characteristics. Moreover, we propose a novel synchronous payoff-based binary log-linear learning algorithm (SPBLLA) to lessen information exchange and reduce time consumption. Ultimately, the experiments indicate that, under the same strategy-deciding error rate, SPBLLA's learning rate is manifestly faster than that of the revised BLLA. Hence, the new model and algorithm are more suitable and promising for large-scale highly dynamic scenarios.
Game theory provides an efficient tool for the cooperation through resource allocation and sharing @cite_11 @cite_15 . A computation offloading game has been designed in order to balance the UAV's tradeoff between execution time and energy consumption @cite_34 . A sub-modular game is adopted in the scheduling of beaconing periods for the purpose of less energy consumption @cite_0 . applied the Bayesian game-theoretic methodology in UAV's intrusion detection and attacker ejection @cite_31 . However, most existing models focus on common scenarios with less number of UAVs, which are not compatible with large-scale scenarios with large numbers of UAVs @cite_21 . Aggregative game is a characteristic game model which treats other agents' strategies as a whole influence, thus avoids overwhelming strategies information from every single agent @cite_25 @cite_16 . Inspired by this, our model is built upon the aggregative game theory which suits for large-scale scenarios.
@cite_31 @cite_21 @cite_16 @cite_0 @cite_15 @cite_34 @cite_25 @cite_11
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Game theoretic models have found widespread use in the analysis and design of radio resource management algorithms for a wide variety of systems such as cellular, ad hoc and sensor networks. The fundamental principle behind such models and much of game theory has been the reliance on expected utility theory (EUT). In this paper, we consider a simple wireless random access game where instead of following the precepts of EUT, the players follow the precepts of Prospect Theory (PT), a theory developed by Kahneman and Tversky to explain real-life decision making that often deviates from the behavior expected under EUT. Specifically, we consider a game where selfish players adjust their transmission probabilities over a collision channel according to rewards received for successful transmission while incurring energy and delay costs. We compare and contrast the Nash equilibria achieved under both EUT and PT and highlight the differences in them. We propose a hybrid model for automatically acquiring a policy for a complex game, which combines online learning with mining knowledge from a corpus of human game play. Our hypothesis is that a player that learns its policies by combining (online) exploration with biases towards human behaviour that's attested in a corpus of humans playing the game will outperform any agent that uses only one of the knowledge sources. During game play, the agent extracts similar moves made by players in the corpus in similar situations, and approximates their utility alongside other possible options by performing simulations from its current state. We implement and assess our model in an agent playing the complex win-lose board game Settlers of Catan, which lacks an implementation that would challenge a human expert. The results from the preliminary set of experiments illustrate the potential of such a joint model. We consider the problem of having a team of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) pursue a second team of evaders while concurrently building a map in an unknown environment. We cast the problem in a probabilistic game theoretical framework, and consider two computationally feasible greedy pursuit policies: local-mar and global-max. To implement this scenario on real UAVs and UGVs, we propose a distributed hierarchical hybrid system architecture which emphasizes the autonomy of each agent, yet allows for coordinated team efforts. We describe the implementation of the architecture on a fleet of UAVs and UGVs, detailing components such as high-level pursuit policy computation, map building and interagent communication, and low-level navigation, sensing, and control. We present both simulation and experimental results of real pursuit-evasion games involving our fleet of UAVs and UGVs, and evaluate the pursuit policies relating expected capture times to the speed and intelligence of the evaders and the sensing capabilities of the pursuers. Game theory has been used for decades in fields of science such as economics and biology, but recently it was used to model routing and packet forwarding in wireless ad-hoc and sensor networks. However, the clustering problem, related to self-organization of nodes into large groups, has not been studied under this framework. In this work our objective is to provide a game theoretical modeling of clustering for ad-hoc and sensor networks. The analysis is based on a non-cooperative game approach where each sensor behaves selfishly in order to conserve its energy and thus maximize its lifespan. We prove the Nash Equilibria of the game for pure and mixed strategies, the expected payoffs and the price of anarchy corresponding to these equilibria. Then, we use this analysis to formulate a clustering mechanism (which we called Clustered Routing for Selfish Sensors--CROSS), that can be applied to sensor networks in practice. Comparing this mechanism to a popular clustering technique, we show via simulations that CROSS achieves a performance similar to that of a very popular clustering algorithm.