The research of influence propagation in social networks via word-of-mouth processes has been given considerable attention in recent years. Arguably, the most fundamental problem in this domain is influence maximization, where the goal is to identify a seed set of individuals that can trigger a large cascade of influence in the network. While there has been significant progress regarding this problem and its variants, one basic shortcoming of the models is that they lack the flexibility in the way the budget is allocated to individuals. Indeed, budget allocation is a critical issue in advertising and viral marketing. Taking the other point of view, known models allowing flexible budget allocation do not take into account the influence spread in the network. We introduce a generalized model that captures both budgets and influence propagation simultaneously. For the offline setting, we identify a large family of budget-based propagation functions that admit tight approximation guarantee. This family extends most of the previously studied influence models, including the well-known Triggering model. We establish that any function in this family implies an instance of a monotone submodular function maximization over the integer lattice subject to a knapsack constraint. This problem is known to admit an optimal (1-1 e)-approximation. We also study the price of anarchy of the multi-player game that extends the model and establish tight results. For the online setting, in which an unknown subset of agents arrive in a random order and the algorithm needs to make an irrevocable budget allocation in each step, we develop a 1 (15e)-competitive algorithm. This setting extends the secretary problem, and its variant, the submodular knapsack secretary problem. Notably, our algorithm improves over the best known approximation for the latter problem, even though it applies to a more general setting.
The classical secretary problem was introduced more than 50 years ago (e.g., @cite_33 ). Since its introduction, many variants and extension of that problem have been proposed and analyzed @cite_1 @cite_6 @cite_35 @cite_9 . The problem that is closest to the problem implied from our online model is the submodular knapsack secretary problem @cite_31 @cite_18 @cite_29 . An instance of this problem consists of a set of @math secretaries that arrive in a random order, each of which has some intrinsic cost. An additional ingredient of the input is a monotone submodular set function that quantifies the value gained from any subset of secretaries. The objective is to select a set of secretaries of maximum value under the constraint that their overall cost is no more than a given budget parameter. Note that our model extends this setting by having a more general influence function that is submodular over the integer lattice. Essentially, this adds another layer of complexity to the problem as we are not only required to decide which secretaries to select, but we also need to assign them budgets.
@cite_35 @cite_18 @cite_33 @cite_9 @cite_29 @cite_1 @cite_6 @cite_31
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The Classical Secretary Problem was introduced during the 60's of the 20th century, nobody is sure exactly when. Since its introduction, many variants of the problem have been proposed and researched. In the classical secretary problem, and many of its variant, the input (which is a set of secretaries, or elements) arrives in a random order. In this paper we apply to the secretary problem a simple observation which states that the random order of the input can be generated by independently choosing a random continuous arrival time for each secretary. Surprisingly, this simple observation enables us to improve the competitive ratio of several known and studied variants of the secretary problem. In addition, in some cases the proofs we provide assuming random arrival times are shorter and simpler in comparison to existing proofs. In this work we consider three variants of the secretary problem, all of which have the same objective of maximizing the value of the chosen set of secretaries given a monotone submodular function f. In the first variant we are allowed to hire a set of secretaries only if it is an independent set of a given partition matroid. The second variant allows us to choose any set of up to k secretaries. In the last and third variant, we can hire any set of secretaries satisfying a given knapsack constraint. Online auction is the essence of many modern markets, particularly networked markets, in which information about goods, agents, and outcomes is revealed over a period of time, and the agents must make irrevocable decisions without knowing future information. Optimal stopping theory, especially the classic secretary problem, is a powerful tool for analyzing such online scenarios which generally require optimizing an objective function over the input. The secretary problem and its generalization the multiple-choice secretary problem were under a thorough study in the literature. In this article, we consider a very general setting of the latter problem called the submodular secretary problem, in which the goal is to select k secretaries so as to maximize the expectation of a (not necessarily monotone) submodular function which defines efficiency of the selected secretarial group based on their overlapping skills. We present the first constant-competitive algorithm for this case. In a more general setting in which selected secretaries should form an independent (feasible) set in each of l given matroids as well, we obtain an O(l log2 r)-competitive algorithm generalizing several previous results, where r is the maximum rank of the matroids. Another generalization is to consider l knapsack constraints (i.e., a knapsack constraint assigns a nonnegative cost to each secretary, and requires that the total cost of all the secretaries employed be no more than a budget value) instead of the matroid constraints, for which we present an O(l)-competitive algorithm. In a sharp contrast, we show for a more general setting of subadditive secretary problem, there is no o(√n)-competitive algorithm and thus submodular functions are the most general functions to consider for constant-competitiveness in our setting. We complement this result by giving a matching O(√n)-competitive algorithm for the subadditive case. At the end, we consider some special cases of our general setting as well. We consider situations in which a decision-maker with a fixed budget faces a sequence of options, each with a cost and a value, and must select a subset of them online so as to maximize the total value. Such situations arise in many contexts, e.g., hiring workers, scheduling jobs, and bidding in sponsored search auctions. This problem, often called the online knapsack problem, is known to be inapproximable. Therefore, we make the enabling assumption that elements arrive in a randomorder. Hence our problem can be thought of as a weighted version of the classical secretary problem, which we call the knapsack secretary problem. Using the random-order assumption, we design a constant-competitive algorithm for arbitrary weights and values, as well as a e-competitive algorithm for the special case when all weights are equal (i.e., the multiple-choice secretary problem). In contrast to previous work on online knapsack problems, we do not assume any knowledge regarding the distribution of weights and values beyond the fact that the order is random. The classical secretary problem studies the problem of hiring the best secretary from among the secretaries who arrive in random order by making immediate and irrevocable decisions. After the interesting connection to online mechanism design was found [19, 20], the random order input assumption has been studied for a variety of problems. [4] formalized a general version of the secretary problem, namely the matroid secretary problem. In the problem, a secretary corresponds to an element in the universe U. The goal is to select the maximum weight independent set. They conjectured that the matroid secretary problem, for any matroid, allows a constant competitive algorithm. The conjecture remains open. Some constant approximation algorithms are currently known for some special cases of matroids. Another interesting type of secretary problem was studied where elements have non-uniform sizes, as is the case in the knapsack secretary problem [3, 6]. In this paper, we consider two interesting secretary problems. One is when the matroid is a laminar matroid, which generalizes uniform partition truncated partition matroids. For the laminar matroid secretary problem, using a novel replacement rule which we call "kick next," we give the first constant-competitive algorithm. The other is the interval scheduling secretary problem, which generalizes the knapsack secretary problem. In this problem, each job Ji arrives with interval Ii, processing time pi and weight wi. If Ji is accepted, then it must be scheduled during Ii, not necessarily continuously. The goal is to accept the jobs of the maximum total weight which are schedulable. We give a simple O(log D)-competitive algorithm and a nearly matching lower bound on the competitive ratio of any randomized algorithm, where D is the maximum interval length of any job.