Moral responsibility is a major concern in automated decision-making, with applications ranging from self-driving cars to kidney exchanges. From the viewpoint of automated systems, the urgent questions are: (a) How can models of moral scenarios and blameworthiness be extracted and learnt automatically from data? (b) How can judgements be computed tractably, given the split-second decision points faced by the system? By building on deep tractable probabilistic learning, we propose a learning regime for inducing models of such scenarios automatically from data and reasoning tractably from them. We report on experiments that compare our system with human judgement in three illustrative domains: lung cancer staging, teamwork management, and trolley problems.
As mentioned before, we do not motivate new definitions for moral responsibility here, but draw on HK, which, in turn, is based upon @cite_20 and the work on causality in @cite_7 . Their framework is also related to the intentions model in @cite_6 which considers predictions about the moral permissibility of actions via influence diagrams, though there is no emphasis on learning or tractability. In fact, the use of tractable architectures for decision-making itself is recent (see, e.g. @cite_10 @cite_17 ). The authors in @cite_4 learn PSDDs over preference rankings (as opposed to decision-making scenarios more generally), though their approach does not take account of different preferences in different contexts.
@cite_4 @cite_7 @cite_6 @cite_10 @cite_20 @cite_17
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We introduce a computational framework for understanding the structure and dynamics of moral learning, with a focus on how people learn to trade off the interests and welfare of different individuals in their social groups and the larger society. We posit a minimal set of cognitive capacities that together can solve this learning problem: (1) an abstract and recursive utility calculus to quantitatively represent welfare trade-offs; (2) hierarchical Bayesian inference to understand the actions and judgments of others; and (3) meta-values for learning by value alignment both externally to the values of others and internally to make moral theories consistent with one’s own attachments and feelings. Our model explains how children can build from sparse noisy observations of how a small set of individuals make moral decisions to a broad moral competence, able to support an infinite range of judgments and decisions that generalizes even to people they have never met and situations they have not been in or observed. It also provides insight into the causes and dynamics of moral change across time, including cases when moral change can be rapidly progressive, changing values significantly in just a few generations, and cases when it is likely to move more slowly. In this lecture I shall focus on situations involving repeated decisions with time inconsistent behavior. Although each choice may be close to maximizing and therefore result in only small losses, the cumulative effect of a series of repeated errors may be quite large. Thus, in my examples, decision makers are quite close to the intelligent, well-informed individuals usually assumed in economic analysis, but cumulatively they make seriously wrong decisions that do not occur in standard textbook economics. This lecture discusses and illustrates several "pathological" modes of individual and group behavior: procrastination in decision making, undue obedience to authority, membership of seemingly normal individuals in deviant cult groups, and escalation of commitment to courses of action that are clearly unwise. In each case, individuals choose a series of current actions without fully appreciating how those actions will affect future perceptions and behavior. The standard assumption of rational, forwardlooking, utility maximizing is violated. The nonindependence of errors in decision making in the series of decisions can be explained with the concept from cognitive psychology of undue salience or vividness. For example, present benefits and costs may have undue salience relative to future costs Decision making usually involves choosing among different courses of action over a broad range of time scales. For instance, a person planning a trip to a distant location makes high-level decisions regarding what means of transportation to use, but also chooses low-level actions, such as the movements for getting into a car. The problem of picking an appropriate time scale for reasoning and learning has been explored in artificial intelligence, control theory and robotics. In this dissertation we develop a framework that allows novel solutions to this problem, in the context of Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) and reinforcement learning. In this dissertation, we present a general framework for prediction, control and learning at multiple temporal scales. In this framework, temporally extended actions are represented by a way of behaving (a policy) together with a termination condition. An action represented in this way is called an option. Options can be easily incorporated in MDPs, allowing an agent to use existing controllers, heuristics for picking actions, or learned courses of action. The effects of behaving according to an option can be predicted using multi-time models, learned by interacting with the environment. In this dissertation we develop multi-time models, and we illustrate the way in which they can be used to produce plans of behavior very quickly, using classical dynamic programming or reinforcement learning techniques. The most interesting feature of our framework is that it allows an agent to work simultaneously with high-level and low-level temporal representations. The interplay of these levels can be exploited in order to learn and plan more efficiently and more accurately. We develop new algorithms that take advantage of this structure to improve the quality of plans, and to learn in parallel about the effects of many different options. When modeling a decision problem using the influence diagram framework, the quantitative part rests on two principal components: probabilities for representing the decision maker's uncertainty about the domain and utilities for representing preferences. Over the last decade, several methods have been developed for learning the probabilities from a database. However, methods for learning the utilities have only received limited attention in the computer science community.A promising approach for learning a decision maker's utility function is to take outset in the decision maker's observed behavioral patterns, and then find a utility function which (together with a domain model) can explain this behavior. That is, it is assumed that decision maker's preferences are reflected in the behavior. Standard learning algorithms also assume that the decision maker is behavioral consistent, i.e., given a model of the decision problem, there exists a utility function which can account for all the observed behavior. Unfortunately, this assumption is rarely valid in real-world decision problems, and in these situations existing learning methods may only identify a trivial utility function. In this paper we relax this consistency assumption, and propose two algorithms for learning a decision maker's utility function from possibly inconsistent behavior; inconsistent behavior is interpreted as random deviations from an underlying (true) utility function. The main difference between the two algorithms is that the first facilitates a form of batch learning whereas the second focuses on adaptation and is particularly well-suited for scenarios where the DM's preferences change over time. Empirical results demonstrate the tractability of the algorithms, and they also show that the algorithms converge toward the true utility function for even very small sets of observations.