We show that the ratio of matched individuals to blocking pairs grows linearly with the number of propose–accept rounds executed by the Gale–Shapley algorithm for the stable marriage problem. Consequently, the participants can arrive at an almost stable matching even without full information about the problem instance; for each participant, knowing only its local neighbourhood is enough. In distributed-systems parlance, this means that if each person has only a constant number of acceptable partners, an almost stable matching emerges after a constant number of synchronous communication rounds. We apply our results to give a distributed (2+e)-approximation algorithm for maximum-weight matching in bicoloured graphs and a centralised randomised constant-time approximation scheme for estimating the size of a stable matching.
From a theory perspective, apparently only a few papers address decentralised implementations of the Gale--Shapley algorithm and or stability after early termination of a stable matching algorithm. In a recent paper @cite_18 it is claimed that little theory exists concerning instability.'' @cite_32 give bounds on the performance of a simple online algorithm. Feder al @cite_29 show that a stable matching can be found on a polynomial number of processors in sublinear time; their algorithm is not local. Other work on parallel stable matching include Tseng and Lee @cite_22 , Tseng @cite_20 , and Hull @cite_3 . Eriksson and H " a ggstr " o m @cite_18 prove that a simple heuristic works well for random inputs. Our Theorem shows that the Gale--Shapley algorithm works well for an arbitrary input.
@cite_18 @cite_22 @cite_29 @cite_32 @cite_3 @cite_20
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We show that the ratio of matched individuals to blocking pairs grows linearly with the number of propose–accept rounds executed by the Gale–Shapley algorithm for the stable marriage problem. Consequently, the participants can arrive at an almost stable matching even without full information about the problem instance; for each participant, knowing only its local neighbourhood is enough. In distributed-systems parlance, this means that if each person has only a constant number of acceptable partners, an almost stable matching emerges after a constant number of synchronous communication rounds. We apply our results to give a distributed (2+e)-approximation algorithm for maximum-weight matching in bicoloured graphs and a centralised randomised constant-time approximation scheme for estimating the size of a stable matching. We analyze the Gale-Shapley matching problem within the context of Rawlsian justice. Defining a fair matching algorithm by a set of 4 axioms (Gender Indifference, Peer Indifference, Maximin Optimality, and Stability), we show that not all preference profiles admit a fair matching algorithm, the reason being that even this set of minimal axioms is too strong in a sense. Because of conflict between Stability and Maximin Optimality, even the algorithm which generates the mutual agreement match, paradoxically, has no chance to be fair. This paper addresses strategies for the stable marriage problem. For the Gale-Shapley algorithm with men proposing, a classical theorem states that it is impossible for every cheating man to get a better partner than the one he gets if everyone is truthful. We study how to circumvent this theorem and incite men to cheat. First we devise coalitions in which a nonempty subset of the liars get better partners and no man is worse off than before. This strategy is limited in that not everyone in the coalition has the incentive to falsify his list. In an attempt to rectify this situation we introduce the element of randomness, but the theorem shows surprising robustness: it is impossible that every liar has a chance to improve the rank of his partner while no one gets hurt. To overcome the problem that some men lack the motivation to lie, we exhibit another randomized lying strategy in which every liar can expect to get a better partner on average, though with a chance of getting a worse one. Finally, we consider a variant scenario: instead of using the Gale-Shapley algorithm, suppose the stable matching is chosen at random. We present a modified form of the coalition strategy ensuring that every man in the coalition has a new probability distribution over partners which majorizes the original one. We describe a fixed-point based approach to the theory of bipartite stable matchings. By this, we provide a common framework that links together seemingly distant results, like the stable marriage theorem of Gale and Shapley, the Mendelsohn-Dulmage theorem, the Kundu-Lawler theorem, Tarski's fixed-point theorem, the Cantor-Bernstein theorem, Pym's linking theorem, or the monochromatic path theorem of In this framework, we formulate a matroid-generalization of the stable marriage theorem and study the lattice structure of generalized stable matchings. Based on the theory of lattice polyhedra and blocking polyhedra, we extend results of Vande Vate and Rothblum on the bipartite stable matching polytope.