Motivated by the difficulty of effecting fundamental change in the architecture of the Internet, in this paper, we study from a theoretical perspective the question of how individuals can join forces toward collective ventures. To that end, we draw on an elementary concept in Internet systems engineering, namely, that of incremental deployability, which we study mathematically and computationally. For example, we show that incremental deployability is at least as general a concept as the Nash equilibrium (in that the latter can be derived from the former). We then draw on this foundation to design and analyze institutional mechanisms that are not only promising to bootstrap emerging Internet architectures but they also have broader applications in social organization beyond its predominant market (and finance)-based character.
The problem of diffusing innovation in social systems has been the subject of extensive scrutiny primarily by social scientists. The study of diffusion of technology falls squarely in the ballpark of social science: Quoting @cite_7 , The people who have thought hardest about the general questions of technology have mostly been social scientists and philosophers, and understandably they have tended to view technology from the outside as stand-alone objects. 0.2 mm Seeing technology this way, from the outside, works well enough if we want to know how technologies enter the economy and spread within it.'' But computer scientists have also been involved with the diffusion of innovation from an algorithmic perspective. The term innovation assumes various interpretations in the literature from agricultural practices, social norms (such as which hand to extent in a handshake), medical drugs, commercial products (such as fax machines and cellphones), to networking technologies such as secure versions of BGP and quality-of-service capabilities in IP networks.
@cite_7
2155796078 1512602432 2206697650 1654194294
Social norms and institutions are mechanisms that facilitate coordination between individuals. A social innovation is a novel mechanism that increases the welfare of the individuals who adopt it compared with the status quo. We model the dynamics of social innovation as a coordination game played on a network. Individuals experiment with a novel strategy that would increase their payoffs provided that it is also adopted by their neighbors. The rate at which a social innovation spreads depends on three factors: the topology of the network and in particular the extent to which agents interact in small local clusters, the payoff gain of the innovation relative to the status quo, and the amount of noise in the best response process. The analysis shows that local clustering greatly enhances the speed with which social innovations spread. It also suggests that the welfare gains from innovation are more likely to occur in large jumps than in a series of small incremental improvements. Social networks often serve as a medium for the diffusion of ideas or innovations. An individual's decision whether to adopt a product or innovation will be highly dependent on the choices made by the individual's peers or neighbors in the social network. In this work, we study the game of innovation diffusion with multiple competing innovations such as when multiple companies market competing products using viral marketing. Our first contribution is a natural and mathematically tractable model for the diffusion of multiple innovations in a network. We give a (1-1 e) approximation algorithm for computing the best response to an opponent's strategy, and prove that the "price of competition" of this game is at most 2. We also discuss "first mover" strategies which try to maximize the expected diffusion against perfect competition. Finally, we give an FPTAS for the problem of maximizing the influence of a single player when the underlying graph is a tree. The emergence and wide-spread use of online social networks has led to a dramatic increase on the availability of social activity data. Importantly, this data can be exploited to investigate, at a microscopic level, some of the problems that have captured the attention of economists, marketers and sociologists for decades, such as, e.g., product adoption, usage and competition. In this paper, we propose a continuous-time probabilistic model, based on temporal point processes, for the adoption and frequency of use of competing products, where the frequency of use of one product can be modulated by those of others. This model allows us to efficiently simulate the adoption and recurrent usages of competing products, and generate traces in which we can easily recognize the effect of social influence, recency and competition. We then develop an inference method to efficiently fit the model parameters by solving a convex program. The problem decouples into a collection of smaller subproblems, thus scaling easily to networks with hundred of thousands of nodes. We validate our model over synthetic and real diffusion data gathered from Twitter, and show that the proposed model does not only provides a good fit to the data and more accurate predictions than alternatives but also provides interpretable model parameters, which allow us to gain insights into some of the factors driving product adoption and frequency of use. We study the problem of maximizing the expected spread of an innovation or behavior within a social network, in the presence of “word-of-mouth” referral. Our work builds on the observation that individuals’ decisions to purchase a product or adopt an innovation are strongly influenced by recommendations from their friends and acquaintances. Understanding and leveraging this influence may thus lead to a much larger spread of the innovation than the traditional view of marketing to individuals in isolation. In this paper, we define a natural and general model of influence propagation that we term the decreasing cascade model, generalizing models used in the sociology and economics communities. In this model, as in related ones, a behavior spreads in a cascading fashion according to a probabilistic rule, beginning with a set of initially “active” nodes. We study the target set selection problem: we wish to choose a set of individuals to target for initial activation, such that the cascade beginning with this active set is as large as possible in expectation. We show that in the decreasing cascade model, a natural greedy algorithm is a 1-1 e-e approximation for selecting a target set of size k.