With the increasing connectivity enabled by the Internet of Things (IoT), security becomes a critical concern, and users should invest to secure their IoT applications. Due to the massive devices in the IoT network, users cannot be aware of the security policies taken by all its connected neighbors. Instead, a user makes security decisions based on the cyber risks that he perceives by observing a selected number of nodes. To this end, we propose a model which incorporates the limited attention or bounded rationality nature of players in the IoT. Specifically, each individual builds a sparse cognitive network of nodes to respond to. Based on this simplified cognitive network representation, each user then determines his security management policy by minimizing his own real-world security cost. The bounded rational decision-makings of players and their cognitive network formations are interdependent and thus should be addressed in a holistic manner. We establish a games-in-games framework and propose a Gestalt Nash equilibrium (GNE) solution concept to characterize the decisions of agents and quantify their risk of bounded perception due to the limited attention. In addition, we design a proximal-based iterative algorithm to compute the GNE. With case studies of smart communities, the designed algorithm can successfully identify the critical users whose decisions need to be taken into account by the other users during the security management.
Games over networks have caught a lot of attention recently especially from the economics perspective @cite_7 @cite_43 @cite_27 . The couplings between players in the network can be either in a strategic exclusive or strategic complement manner. Based on the features of security management in IoT, our problem falls into the latter class. For the engineering applications, the authors in @cite_22 @cite_35 have studied the resource allocation game over interdependent critical infrastructures where both players aim to increase the connectivity of the network. Huang @cite_28 @cite_20 @cite_17 @cite_30 have adopted a stochastic Markov game model to design resilient operating strategies for multilayer networks. Zhu @cite_9 have proposed a game-theoretic framework for collaborative intrusion detection systems through resource management to mitigate network cyber threats. Our work differs from @cite_9 in that we take into account the cognitive factors of human behaviors during decision making.
@cite_30 @cite_35 @cite_22 @cite_7 @cite_28 @cite_9 @cite_43 @cite_27 @cite_20 @cite_17
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Due to the dynamic, distributed, and heterogeneous nature of today's networks, intrusion detection systems (IDSs) have become a necessary addition to the security infrastructure and are widely deployed as a complementary line of defense to classical security approaches. In this paper, we address the intrusion detection problem in heterogeneous networks consisting of nodes with different noncorrelated security assets. In our study, two crucial questions are: What are the expected behaviors of rational attackers? What is the optimal strategy of the defenders (IDSs)? We answer the questions by formulating the network intrusion detection as a noncooperative game and performing an in-depth analysis on the Nash equilibrium and the engineering implications behind. Based on our game theoretical analysis, we derive the expected behaviors of rational attackers, the minimum monitor resource requirement, and the optimal strategy of the defenders. We then provide guidelines for IDS design and deployment. We also show how our game theoretical framework can be applied to configure the intrusion detection strategies in realistic scenarios via a case study. Finally, we evaluate the proposed game theoretical framework via simulations. The simulation results show both the correctness of the analytical results and the effectiveness of the proposed guidelines. With the increasing connectivity enabled by the Internet of Things (IoT), security becomes a critical concern, and users should invest to secure their IoT applications. Due to the massive devices in the IoT network, users cannot be aware of the security policies taken by all its connected neighbors. Instead, a user makes security decisions based on the cyber risks that he perceives by observing a selected number of nodes. To this end, we propose a model which incorporates the limited attention or bounded rationality nature of players in the IoT. Specifically, each individual builds a sparse cognitive network of nodes to respond to. Based on this simplified cognitive network representation, each user then determines his security management policy by minimizing his own real-world security cost. The bounded rational decision-makings of players and their cognitive network formations are interdependent and thus should be addressed in a holistic manner. We establish a games-in-games framework and propose a Gestalt Nash equilibrium (GNE) solution concept to characterize the decisions of agents and quantify their risk of bounded perception due to the limited attention. In addition, we design a proximal-based iterative algorithm to compute the GNE. With case studies of smart communities, the designed algorithm can successfully identify the critical users whose decisions need to be taken into account by the other users during the security management. We study the dynamics of network selection in heterogeneous wireless networks (HetNets). Users in such networks selfishly select the best radio access technology (RAT) with the objective of maximizing their own throughputs. We propose two general classes of throughput models that capture the basic properties of random access (e.g., Wi-Fi) and scheduled access (e.g., WiMAX, LTE, 3G) networks. Next, we formulate the problem as a non-cooperative game, and study its convergence, efficiency, and practicality. Our results reveal that: (i) Singleclass RAT selection games converge to Nash equilibria, while an improvement path can be repeated infinitely with a mixture of classes. We next introduce a hysteresis mechanism in RAT selection games, and prove that with appropriate hysteresis policies, convergence can still be guaranteed; (ii) We analyze the Pareto-efficiency of the Nash equilibria of these games. We derive the conditions under which Nash equilibria are Paretooptimal, and we quantify the distance of Nash equilibria with respect to the set of Pareto-dominant points when the conditions are not satisfied; (iii) Finally, with extensive measurement-driven simulations we show that RAT selection games converge to Nash equilibria in a small number of steps, and hence are amenable to practical implementation. We also investigate the impact of noisy throughput measurements, and propose solutions to handle them. In this paper, a novel framework is proposed for optimizing the operation and performance of a large-scale multi-hop millimeter wave (mmW) backhaul within a wireless small cell network having multiple mobile network operators (MNOs). The proposed framework enables the small base stations to jointly decide on forming the multi-hop, mmW links over backhaul infrastructure that belongs to multiple, independent MNOs, while properly allocating resources across those links. In this regard, the problem is addressed using a novel framework based on matching theory composed of two, highly inter-related stages: a multi-hop network formation stage and a resource management stage. One unique feature of this framework is that it jointly accounts for both wireless channel characteristics and economic factors during both network formation and resource management. The multi-hop network formation stage is formulated as a one-to-many matching game, which is solved using a novel algorithm, that builds on the so-called deferred acceptance algorithm and is shown to yield a stable and Pareto optimal multi-hop mmW backhaul network. Then, a one-to-many matching game is formulated to enable proper resource allocation across the formed multi-hop network. This game is then shown to exhibit peer effects and, as such, a novel algorithm is developed to find a stable and optimal resource management solution that can properly cope with these peer effects. Simulation results show that, with manageable complexity, the proposed framework yields substantial gains, in terms of the average sum rate, reaching up to 27 and 54 , respectively, compared with a non-cooperative scheme in which inter-operator sharing is not allowed and a random allocation approach. The results also show that our framework improves the statistics of the backhaul sum rate and provides insights on how to manage pricing and the cost of the cooperative mmW backhaul network for the MNOs.