Before executing an attack, adversaries usually explore the victim's network in an attempt to infer the network topology and identify vulnerabilities in the victim's servers and personal computers. Falsifying the information collected by the adversary post penetration may significantly slower lateral movement and increase the amount of noise generated within the victim's network. We investigate the effect of fake vulnerabilities within a real enterprise network on the attacker performance. We use the attack graphs to model the path of an attacker making its way towards a target in a given network. We use combinatorial optimization in order to find the optimal assignments of fake vulnerabilities. We demonstrate the feasibility of our deception-based defense by presenting results of experiments with a large scale real network. We show that adding fake vulnerabilities forces the adversary to invest a significant amount of effort, in terms of time and exploitability cost.
In cyber security, deception is often used to create a controlled path for attackers to follow starting from the the initial reconnaissance phase. For example, Cohen and Koike @cite_19 @cite_51 showed how deception can control the path of an attack using red teams in experiments attacking a computer network. Repik @cite_22 makes a strong argument in favor of planned actions taken to mislead hackers. If the deception is obvious to the adversary, even unintentionally, the attacker can avoid, bypass, and even overcome the deceptive traps. We aim to avoid this situation and make the deception hard to identify by an adversary. RP Move to intro
@cite_19 @cite_51 @cite_22
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This paper describes a series of experiments in which specific deceptions were created in order to induce red teams attacking computer networks to attack network elements in sequence. It demonstrates the ability to control the path of an attacker through the use of deceptions and allows us to associate metrics with paths and their traversal. Our physical and digital worlds are converging at a rapid pace, putting a lot of our valuable information in digital formats. Currently, most computer systems’ predictable responses provide attackers with valuable information on how to infiltrate them. In this chapter, we discuss how the use of deception can play a prominent role in enhancing the security of current computer systems. We show how deceptive techniques have been used in many successful computer breaches. Phishing, social engineering, and drive-by-downloads are some prime examples. We discuss why deception has only been used haphazardly in computer security. Additionally, we discuss some of the unique advantages deception-based security mechanisms bring to computer security. Finally, we present a framework where deception can be planned and integrated into computer defenses. An important way cyber adversaries find vulnerabilities in modern networks is through reconnaissance, in which they attempt to identify configuration specifics of network hosts. To increase uncertainty of adversarial reconnaissance, the network administrator (henceforth, defender) can introduce deception into responses to network scans, such as obscuring certain system characteristics. We introduce a novel game theoretic model of deceptive interactions of this kind between a defender and a cyber attacker, which we call the Cyber Deception Game. We consider both a powerful (rational) attacker, who is aware of the defender's exact deception strategy, and a naive attacker who is not. We show that computing the optimal deception strategy is NP-hard for both types of attackers. For the case with a powerful attacker, we provide a mixed-integer linear program solution as well as a fast and effective greedy algorithm. Similarly, we provide complexity results and propose exact and heuristic approaches when the attacker is naive. Our extensive experimental analysis demonstrates the effectiveness of our approaches. Deceptive techniques played a prominent role in many human conflicts throughout history. Digital conflicts are no different as the use of deception has found its way to computing since at least the 1980s. However, many computer defenses that use deception were ad-hoc attempts to incorporate deceptive elements. In this paper, we present a model that can be used to plan and integrate deception in computer security defenses. We present an overview of fundamental reasons why deception works and the essential principles involved in using such techniques. We investigate the unique advantages deception-based mechanisms bring to traditional computer security defenses. Furthermore, we show how our model can be used to incorporate deception in many part of computer systems and discuss how we can use such techniques effectively. A successful deception should present plausible alternative(s) to the truth and these should be designed to exploit specific adversaries' biases. We investigate these biases and discuss how can they be used by presenting a number of examples.