Motivated by the difficulty of effecting fundamental change in the architecture of the Internet, in this paper, we study from a theoretical perspective the question of how individuals can join forces toward collective ventures. To that end, we draw on an elementary concept in Internet systems engineering, namely, that of incremental deployability, which we study mathematically and computationally. For example, we show that incremental deployability is at least as general a concept as the Nash equilibrium (in that the latter can be derived from the former). We then draw on this foundation to design and analyze institutional mechanisms that are not only promising to bootstrap emerging Internet architectures but they also have broader applications in social organization beyond its predominant market (and finance)-based character.
For example, @cite_39 show that the deployment of Secure-BGP can be facilitated by a pair of mechanisms, namely, (i) routing policies that prefer Internet paths safeguarded by Secure-BGP in partial deployment and (ii) offloading cryptography from autonomous systems without a customer (known as stub autonomous systems) to their providers. These techniques improve the incremental deployability of Secure-BGP, however, the incentive structure these techniques induce remains akin to the stag hunt, and, in fact, Gill propose concentrating peer pressure and regulatory efforts to a small fraction of core autonomous systems for their techniques to be effective in driving the growth of Secure-BGP. Our point, therefore, that, although such line of effort is certainly helpful to the adoption of emerging technologies it is not in general conclusive, remains.
@cite_39
2087039608 2160565743 202035697 2546603560
With a cryptographic root-of-trust for Internet routing(RPKI [17]) on the horizon, we can finally start planning the deployment of one of the secure interdomain routing protocols proposed over a decade ago (Secure BGP [22], secure origin BGP [37]). However, if experience with IPv6 is any indicator, this will be no easy task. Security concerns alone seem unlikely to provide sufficient local incentive to drive the deployment process forward. Worse yet, the security benefits provided by the S*BGP protocols do not even kick in until a large number of ASes have deployed them. Instead, we appeal to ISPs' interest in increasing revenue-generating traffic. We propose a strategy that governments and industry groups can use to harness ISPs' local business objectives and drive global S*BGP deployment. We evaluate our deployment strategy using theoretical analysis and large-scale simulations on empirical data. Our results give evidence that the market dynamics created by our proposal can transition the majority of the Internet to S*BGP. The delivery of IP traffic through the Internet depends on the complex interactions between thousands of autonomous systems (AS) that exchange routing information using the border gateway protocol (BGP). This paper investigates the topological structure of the Internet in terms of customer-provider and peer-peer relationships between autonomous systems, as manifested in BGP routing policies. We describe a technique for inferring AS relationships by exploiting partial views of the AS graph available from different vantage points. Next we apply the technique to a collection of ten BGP routing tables to infer the relationships between neighboring autonomous systems. Based on these results, we analyze the hierarchical structure of the Internet and propose a five-level classification of AS. Our characterization differs from previous studies by focusing on the commercial relationships between autonomous systems rather than simply the connectivity between the nodes. The ubiquity of the Internet has led to increased resource sharing between large numbers of users in widely-disparate administrative domains. Unfortunately, traditional identity-based solutions to the authorization problem do not allow for the dynamic establishment of trust, and thus cannot be used to facilitate interactions between previously-unacquainted parties. Furthermore, the management of identity-based systems becomes burdensome as the number of users in the system increases. To address this gap between the needs of open computing systems and existing authorization infrastructures, researchers have begun to investigate novel attribute-based access control (ABAC) systems based on techniques such as trust negotiation and other forms of distributed proving. To date, research in these areas has been largely theoretical and has produced many important foundational results. However, if these techniques are to be safely deployed in practice, the systems-level barriers hindering their adoption must be overcome. In this thesis, we show that safely and securely adopting decentralized ABAC approaches to authorization is not simply a matter of implementation and deployment, but requires careful consideration of both formal properties and practical issues. To this end, we investigate a progression of important questions regarding the safety analysis, deployment, implementation, and optimization of these types of systems. We first show that existing ABAC theory does not properly account for the asynchronous nature of open systems, which allows attackers to subvert these systems by forcing decisions to be made using inconsistent system states. To address this, we develop provably-secure and lightweight consistency enforcement mechanisms suitable for use in trust negotiation and distributed proof systems. We next focus on deployment issues, and investigate how user interactions can be audited in the absence of concrete user identities. We develop the technique of virtual fingerprinting, which can be used to accomplish this task without adversely affecting the scalability of audit systems. Lastly, we present TrustBuilder2, which is the first fully-configurable framework for trust negotiation. Within this framework, we examine availability problems associated with the trust negotiation process and develop a novel approach to policy compliance checking that leverages an efficient pattern-matching approach to outperform existing techniques by orders of magnitude. Existing security mechanisms for managing the Internet infrastructural resources like IP addresses, AS numbers, BGP advertisements and DNS mappings rely on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that can be potentially compromised by state actors and Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs). Ideally the Internet infrastructure needs a distributed and tamper-resistant resource management framework which cannot be subverted by any single entity. A secure, distributed ledger enables such a mechanism and the blockchain is the best known example of distributed ledgers. In this paper, we propose the use of a blockchain based mechanism to secure the Internet BGP and DNS infrastructure. While the blockchain has scaling issues to be overcome, the key advantages of such an approach include the elimination of any PKI-like root of trust, a verifiable and distributed transaction history log, multi-signature based authorizations for enhanced security, easy extensibility and scriptable programmability to secure new types of Internet resources and potential for a built in cryptocurrency. A tamper resistant DNS infrastructure also ensures that it is not possible for the application level PKI to spoof HTTPS traffic.