proposed a Brain-Computer-Interface (BCI) -based attack in which an adversary is able to infer private information about a user, such as their bank or area-of-living, by analyzing the user's brain activities. However, a key limitation of the above attack is that it is intrusive, requiring user cooperation, and is thus easily detectable and can be reported to other users. In this paper, we identify and analyze a more serious threat for users of BCI devices. We propose a it subliminal attack in which the victim is attacked at the levels below his cognitive perception. Our attack involves exposing the victim to visual stimuli for a duration of 13.3 milliseconds -- a duration usually not sufficient for conscious perception. The attacker analyzes subliminal brain activity in response to these short visual stimuli to infer private information about the user. If carried out carefully, for example by hiding the visual stimuli within screen content that the user expects to see, the attack may remain undetected. As a consequence, the attacker can scale it to many victims and expose them to the attack for a long time. We experimentally demonstrate the feasibility of our subliminal attack via a proof-of-concept study carried out with 27 subjects. We conducted experiments on users wearing Electroencephalography-based BCI devices, and used portrait pictures of people as visual stimuli which were embedded within the background of an innocuous video for a time duration not exceeding 13.3 milliseconds. Our experimental results show that it is feasible for an attacker to learn relevant private information about the user, such as whether the user knows the identity of the person for which the attacker is probing.
An interesting aspect about facial stimuli is that different facial expressions can produce very different ERPs. When expressions of fear are subconsciously exposed to the viewer, there is a large N200 ERP amplitude which seems to be associated with more primal pathways, allowing faster reactions to potentially dangerous stimuli @cite_27 . Conscious exposure to the same fearful stimuli, however, have a stronger p300 amplitude, which is associated with more higher level processing of emotion. This can be important in choosing which stimuli to present to the user, and what information to use for training the classifier. For instance, training on a face with a fearful expression will yield a very different combination of ERP amplitudes, which would lead to inaccuracies if testing on happier expressions.
@cite_27
2092623161 2006217447 2103472153 2043464897
Current theories of emotion suggest that threat-related stimuli are first processed via an automatically engaged neural mechanism, which occurs outside conscious awareness. This mechanism operates in conjunction with a slower and more comprehensive process that allows a detailed evaluation of the potentially harmful stimulus (LeDoux, 1998). We drew on the Halgren and Marinkovic (1995) model to examine these processes using event-related potentials (ERPs) within a backward masking paradigm. Stimuli used were faces with fear and neutral (as baseline control) expressions, presented above (supraliminal) and below (subliminal) the threshold for conscious detection. ERP data revealed a double dissociation for the supraliminal versus subliminal perception of fear. In the subliminal condition, responses to the perception of fear stimuli were enhanced relative to neutral for the N2 "excitatory" component, which is thought to represent orienting and automatic aspects of face processing. By contrast, supraliminal perception of fear was associated with relatively enhanced responses for the late P3 "inhibitory" component, implicated in the integration of emotional processes. These findings provide evidence in support of Halgren and Marinkovic's temporal model of emotion processing, and indicate that the neural mechanisms for appraising signals of threat may be initiated, not only automatically, but also without the need for conscious detection of these signals. Facial expression is widely used to evaluate emotional impairment in neuropsychiatric disorders. Ekman and Friesen's Facial Action Coding System (FACS) encodes movements of individual facial muscles from distinct momentary changes in facial appearance. Unlike facial expression ratings based on categorization of expressions into prototypical emotions (happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust, etc.), FACS can encode ambiguous and subtle expressions, and therefore is potentially more suitable for analyzing the small differences in facial affect. However, FACS rating requires extensive training, and is time consuming and subjective thus prone to bias. To overcome these limitations, we developed an automated FACS based on advanced computer science technology. The system automatically tracks faces in a video, extracts geometric and texture features, and produces temporal profiles of each facial muscle movement. These profiles are quantified to compute frequencies of single and combined Action Units (AUs) in videos, and they can facilitate a statistical study of large populations in disorders known to impact facial expression. We derived quantitative measures of flat and inappropriate facial affect automatically from temporal AU profiles. Applicability of the automated FACS was illustrated in a pilot study, by applying it to data of videos from eight schizophrenia patients and controls. We created temporal AU profiles that provided rich information on the dynamics of facial muscle movements for each subject. The quantitative measures of flatness and inappropriateness showed clear differences between patients and the controls, highlighting their potential in automatic and objective quantification of symptom severity. This experiment provides brain event-related potential (ERP) evidence for differential processing of visually presented pleasant and unpleasant affectively valent words (mood adjectives) for both supraliminal (40 ms) and subliminal (unmasked, 1 ms) stimulus durations. Unpleasant words elicited a more positive amplitude than pleasant words in both durations. ERP components (P1, N1, P2, P3, and a late positive potential; LP) were measured at six electrode sites (F3, F4, P3, P4, CzPz, Oz). ERPs to subliminal stimuli demonstrated differences between pleasant and unpleasant words in the left hemisphere across all measured components. Supraliminal processing showed similar differences in the left hemisphere for early components (P1 and N1), but bilateral differences for late components (P3 and LP). Activity in the P2 time window was associated with the divergence between supraliminal and subliminal affective responses. Implications for the study of affect and consciousness are discussed. Abstract In this study, we investigated the spatio-temporal patterns of category-specific cortical activation elicited by the visual presentation of words whose meaning relates to a color or to a visual form or shape. We recorded the event-related potentials (ERPs) of ten healthy, right-handed volunteers while they passively read words presented tachistoscopically. As early as 150 ms after stimulus onset, the ERPs revealed significant neurophysiological differences between words and strings of hash marks. Around 200 ms after stimulus onset, we found significant differences in the ERPs elicited by color- and form-related words. We used minimum norm current estimates to investigate the spatial location of these differences. This revealed that, at the 150 ms peak, the activation advantage of words over sequences of hash marks was located in a left posterior area, proximal to what has previously been called the visual word form area. At the 200 ms peak, the advantage of words related to colors over words related to forms seemed to reside in temporal cortical areas, whereas the form-related words elicited greater activation in frontal areas than color-related words. These results provide evidence for early access to detailed category-specific representations of word meaning, with subtle differences in meaning being reflected in the activation of different cortical areas, as early as 200 ms after stimulus presentation. In line with previous studies, these differences can be related to the areas involved in the conceptual processing of sensory (visual) and action-related information.