We develop new voting mechanisms for the case when voters and candidates are located in an arbitrary unknown metric space, and the goal is to choose a candidate minimizing social cost: the total distance from the voters to this candidate. Previous work has often assumed that only ordinal preferences of the voters are known (instead of their true costs), and focused on minimizing distortion: the quality of the chosen candidate as compared with the best possible candidate. In this paper, we instead assume that a (very small) amount of information is known about the voter preference strengths, not just about their ordinal preferences. We provide mechanisms with much better distortion when this extra information is known as compared to mechanisms which use only ordinal information. We quantify tradeoffs between the amount of information known about preference strengths and the achievable distortion. We further provide advice about which type of information about preference strengths seems to be the most useful. Finally, we conclude by quantifying the ideal candidate distortion, which compares the quality of the chosen outcome with the best possible candidate that could ever exist, instead of only the best candidate that is actually in the running.
Attempts to exploit preference strength information have led to various approaches for modeling, eliciting, measuring, and aggregating people's preference intensities in a variety of fields, including Likert scales, semantic differential scales, sliders, constant sum paired comparisons, graded pair comparisons, response times, willingness to pay, vote buying, and many others (see @cite_26 @cite_21 @cite_12 for summaries). In our work we specifically consider only a small amount of coarse information about preference strengths, since obtaining detailed information is extremely difficult. Intuitively, any rule used to aggregate preference strengths must ask under what circumstances an apathetic majority' should win over a more passionate minority @cite_10 , and we provide a partial answer to this question when the objective is to minimize distortion.
@cite_26 @cite_10 @cite_21 @cite_12
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Stated preference elicitation techniques, such as discrete choice experiments and best-worst scaling, are now widely used in health research to explore the public’s choices and preferences. In this paper, we propose an alternative stated preference elicitation technique, which we refer to as ‘trio-wise’. We explain this new technique, its relative advantages, modeling framework, and how it compares to the best-worst scaling method. To better illustrate the differences and similarities, we utilize best-worst scaling Case 2, where individuals make best and worst (most and least) choices for the attribute levels that describe a single profile. We demonstrate this new preference elicitation technique using an empirical case study that explores preferences among the general public for ways to involve them in decisions concerning the health care system. Our findings show that the best-worst scaling and trio-wise preference elicitation techniques both retrieve similar preferences. However, the capability of our trio-wise method to provide additional information on the strength of rank preferences and its ability to accommodate indifferent preferences lead us to prefer it over the standard best-worst scaling technique. We consider how to combine the preferences of multiple agents despite the presence of incompleteness and incomparability in their preference orderings. An agent's preference ordering may be incomplete because, for example, there is an ongoing preference elicitation process. It may also contain incomparability as this is useful, for example, in multi-criteria scenarios. We focus on the problem of computing the possible and necessary winners, that is, those outcomes which can be or always are the most preferred for the agents. Possible and necessary winners are useful in many scenarios including preference elicitation. First we show that computing the sets of possible and necessary winners is in general a difficult problem as is providing a good approximation of such sets. Then we identify general properties of the preference aggregation function which are sufficient for such sets to be computed in polynomial time. Finally, we show how possible and necessary winners can be used to focus preference elicitation. To help their users to discover important items at a particular time, major websites like Twitter, Yelp, TripAdvisor or NYTimes provide Top-K recommendations (e.g., 10 Trending Topics, Top 5 Hotels in Paris or 10 Most Viewed News Stories), which rely on crowdsourced popularity signals to select the items. However, different sections of a crowd may have different preferences, and there is a large silent majority who do not explicitly express their opinion. Also, the crowd often consists of actors like bots, spammers, or people running orchestrated campaigns. Recommendation algorithms today largely do not consider such nuances, hence are vulnerable to strategic manipulation by small but hyper-active user groups. To fairly aggregate the preferences of all users while recommending top-K items, we borrow ideas from prior research on social choice theory, and identify a voting mechanism called Single Transferable Vote (STV) as having many of the fairness properties we desire in top-K item (s)elections. We develop an innovative mechanism to attribute preferences of silent majority which also make STV completely operational. We show the generalizability of our approach by implementing it on two different real-world datasets. Through extensive experimentation and comparison with state-of-the-art techniques, we show that our proposed approach provides maximum user satisfaction, and cuts down drastically on items disliked by most but hyper-actively promoted by a few users. In this paper we present a general treatment of the preference aggregation problem, in which multiple preferences over objects must be combined into a single consensus ranking. We consider two instances of this problem: unsupervised aggregation where no information about a target ranking is available, and supervised aggregation where ground truth preferences are provided. For each problem class we develop novel learning methods that are applicable to a wide range of preference types. Specifically, for unsupervised aggregation we introduce the Multinomial Preference model (MPM) which uses a multinomial generative process to model the observed preferences. For the supervised problem we develop a supervised extension for MPM and then propose two fully supervised models. The first model employs SVD factorization to derive effective item features, transforming the aggregation problems into a learning-to-rank one. The second model aims to eliminate the costly SVD factorization and instantiates a probabilistic CRF framework, deriving unary and pairwise potentials directly from the observed preferences. Using a probabilistic framework allows us to directly optimize the expectation of any target metric, such as NDCG or ERR. All the proposed models operate on pairwise preferences and can thus be applied to a wide range of preference types. We empirically validate the models on rank aggregation and collaborative filtering data sets and demonstrate superior empirical accuracy.