in this paper we describe a method which allows agents to dynamically select protocols and roles when they need to execute collaborative tasks
Protocols selection in agents interactions design is something generally done at design time. Indeed, most of the agent-oriented design methodologies ( @cite_3 and @cite_4 to quote a few) all make designers decide which role agents should play for each single interaction. However dynamic behaviours and openness in MAS demand greater flexibility.
@cite_4 @cite_3
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Despite all the research done in the last years on the development of methodologies for designing MAS, there is no methodology suitable for the specification and design of MAS in complex domains where both the agent view and the organizational view can be modeled. Current multiagent approaches either take a centralist, static approach to organizational design or take an emergent view in which agent interactions are not pre-determined, thus making it impossible to make any predictions on the behavior of the whole systems. Most of them also lack a model of the norms in the environment that should rule the (emergent) behavior of the agent society as a whole and or the actions of individuals. In this paper, we propose a framework for modeling agent organizations, Organizational Model for Normative Institutions (OMNI), that allows the balance of global organizational requirements with the autonomy of individual agents. It specifies global goals of the system independently from those of the specific agents that populate the system. Both the norms that regulate interaction between agents, as well as the contextual meaning of those interactions are important aspects when specifying the organizational structure. We consider stationary consensus protocols for networks of dynamic agents with fixed topologies. At each time instant, each agent knows only its and its neighbors’ state, but must reach consensus on a group decision value that is function of all the agents’ initial state. We show that the agents can reach consensus if the value of such a function is time-invariant when computed over the agents’ state trajectories. We use this basic result to introduce a non-linear protocol design rule allowing consensus on a quite general set of values. Such a set includes, e.g., any generalized mean of order p of the agents’ initial states. As a second contribution we show that our protocol design is the solution of individual optimizations performed by the agents. This notion suggests a game theoretic interpretation of consensus problems as mechanism design problems. Under this perspective a supervisor entails the agents to reach a consensus by imposing individual objectives. We prove that such objectives can be chosen so that rational agents have a unique optimal protocol, and asymptotically reach consensus on a desired group decision value. We use a Lyapunov approach to prove that the asymptotical consensus can be reached when the communication links between nearby agents define a time-invariant undirected network. Finally we perform a simulation study concerning the vertical alignment maneuver of a team of unmanned air vehicles. Interaction protocols are specific, often standard, constraints on the behaviors of autonomous agents in a multiagent system. Protocols are essential to the functioning of open systems, such as those that arise in most interesting web applications. A variety of common protocols in negotiation and electronic commerce are best treated as commitment protocols, which are defined, or at least analyzed, in terms of the creation, satisfaction, or manipulation of the commitments among the participating agents. When protocols are employed in open environments, such as the Internet, they must be executed by agents that behave more or less autonomously and whose internal designs are not known. In such settings, therefore, there is a risk that the participating agents may fail to comply with the given protocol. Without a rigorous means to verify compliance, the very idea of protocols for interoperation is subverted. We develop an approach for testing whether the behavior of an agent complies with a commitment protocol. Our approach requires the specification of commitment protocols in temporal logic, and involves a novel way of synthesizing and applying ideas from distributed computing and logics of program. This paper presents a framework that enables autonomous agents to dynamically select the mechanism they employ in order to coordinate their inter-related activities. Adopting this framework means coordination mechanisms move from the realm of being imposed upon the system at design time, to something that the agents select at run-time in order to fit their prevailing circumstances and their current coordination needs. Empirical analysis is used to evaluate the effect of various design alternatives for the agent's decision making mechanisms and for the coordination mechanisms themselves.