Peer grading systems work well only if users have incentives to grade truthfully. An example of non-truthful grading, that we observed in classrooms, consists in students assigning the maximum grade to all submissions. With a naive grading scheme, such as averaging the assigned grades, all students would receive the maximum grade. In this paper, we develop three grading schemes that provide incentives for truthful peer grading. In the first scheme, the instructor grades a fraction p of the submissions, and penalizes students whose grade deviates from the instructor grade. We provide lower bounds on p to ensure truthfulness, and conclude that these schemes work only for moderate class sizes, up to a few hundred students. To overcome this limitation, we propose a hierarchical extension of this supervised scheme, and we show that it can handle classes of any size with bounded (and little) instructor work, and is therefore applicable to Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs). Finally, we propose unsupervised incentive schemes, in which the student incentive is based on statistical properties of the grade distribution, without any grading required by the instructor. We show that the proposed unsupervised schemes provide incentives to truthful grading, at the price of being possibly unfair to individual students.
The PeerRank method proposed in @cite_19 obtains the final grades of students using a fixed point equation similar to the PageRank method. However, while it encourages precision, it does not provide a strategyproof method for the scenario that students collude to game the system without making the effort to grade truthfully.
@cite_19
1925706653 2950051380 2122588206 2088700588
We propose the PeerRank method for peer assessment. This constructs a grade for an agent based on the grades proposed by the agents evaluating the agent. Since the grade of an agent is a measure of their ability to grade correctly, the PeerRank method weights grades by the grades of the grading agent. The PeerRank method also provides an incentive for agents to grade correctly. As the grades of an agent depend on the grades of the grading agents, and as these grades themselves depend on the grades of other agents, we define the PeerRank method by a fixed point equation similar to the PageRank method for ranking web-pages. We identify some formal properties of the PeerRank method (for example, it satisfies axioms of unanimity, no dummy, no discrimination and symmetry), discuss some examples, compare with related work and evaluate the performance on some synthetic data. Our results show considerable promise, reducing the error in grade predictions by a factor of 2 or more in many cases over the natural baseline of averaging peer grades. We propose the PeerRank method for peer assessment. This constructs a grade for an agent based on the grades proposed by the agents evaluating the agent. Since the grade of an agent is a measure of their ability to grade correctly, the PeerRank method weights grades by the grades of the grading agent. The PeerRank method also provides an incentive for agents to grade correctly. As the grades of an agent depend on the grades of the grading agents, and as these grades themselves depend on the grades of other agents, we define the PeerRank method by a fixed point equation similar to the PageRank method for ranking web-pages. We identify some formal properties of the PeerRank method (for example, it satisfies axioms of unanimity, no dummy, no discrimination and symmetry), discuss some examples, compare with related work and evaluate the performance on some synthetic data. Our results show considerable promise, reducing the error in grade predictions by a factor of 2 or more in many cases over the natural baseline of averaging peer grades. In massive open online courses (MOOCs), peer grading serves as a critical tool for scaling the grading of complex, open-ended assignments to courses with tens or hundreds of thousands of students. But despite promising initial trials, it does not always deliver accurate results compared to human experts. In this paper, we develop algorithms for estimating and correcting for grader biases and reliabilities, showing significant improvement in peer grading accuracy on real data with 63,199 peer grades from Coursera's HCI course offerings --- the largest peer grading networks analysed to date. We relate grader biases and reliabilities to other student factors such as student engagement, performance as well as commenting style. We also show that our model can lead to more intelligent assignment of graders to gradees. Peer and self-assessment offer an opportunity to scale both assessment and learning to global classrooms. This article reports our experiences with two iterations of the first large online class to use peer and self-assessment. In this class, peer grades correlated highly with staff-assigned grades. The second iteration had 42.9p of students’ grades within 5p of the staff grade, and 65.5p within 10p. On average, students assessed their work 7p higher than staff did. Students also rated peers’ work from their own country 3.6p higher than those from elsewhere. We performed three experiments to improve grading accuracy. We found that giving students feedback about their grading bias increased subsequent accuracy. We introduce short, customizable feedback snippets that cover common issues with assignments, providing students more qualitative peer feedback. Finally, we introduce a data-driven approach that highlights high-variance items for improvement. We find that rubrics that use a parallel sentence structure, unambiguous wording, and well-specified dimensions have lower variance. After revising rubrics, median grading error decreased from 12.4p to 9.9p.