We give a brief account of the modal logic of the generic multiverse, which is a bimodal logic with operators corresponding to the relations "is a forcing extension of" and "is a ground model of". The fragment of the first relation is called the modal logic of forcing and was studied by us in earlier work. The fragment of the second relation is called the modal logic of grounds and will be studied here for the first time. In addition, we discuss which combinations of modal logics are possible for the two fragments.
In our previous paper @cite_0 , we introduced the modal logic of forcing and proved that the -provably valid principles of forcing were exactly those in the modal theory known as S4.2 . The modal logic of forcing corresponds to the monomodal fragment of the modal logic discussed in , that only uses the relation @math ; or to the part of the generic multiverse that is generated only by the operation of taking forcing extensions and not ground models. In @cite_0 , we not only consider the @math -provable modal logic of forcing, but also the modal logic of forcing of particular universes @math . We show that this modal logic always lies between @math and @math and that the two extreme values are realized (for more details, cf. ,). Various other aspects of the modal logic of forcing are considered in @cite_15 @cite_7 @cite_2 @cite_9 @cite_10 @cite_11 @cite_8 @cite_12 @cite_1 . The paper @cite_4 presented at ICLA 2009 gives an overview of the status of research and creates a connection between the modal logic of forcing and set-theoretic geology'', i.e., going down from a universe to its ground models. This connection is further developed in this paper.
@cite_4 @cite_7 @cite_8 @cite_9 @cite_1 @cite_0 @cite_2 @cite_15 @cite_10 @cite_12 @cite_11
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The modal logic of forcing arises when one considers a model of set theory in the context of all its forcing extensions, interpreting necessity as "in all forcing extensions" and possibility as "in some forcing extension". In this modal language one may easily express sweeping general forcing principles, such as the assertion that every possibly necessary statement is necessarily possible, which is valid for forcing, or the assertion that every possibly necessary statement is true, which is the maximality principle, a forcing axiom independent of but equiconsistent with ZFC (Stavi-V "a "an "anen, Hamkins). Every definable forcing class similarly gives rise to the corresponding forcing modalities, for which one considers extensions only by forcing notions in that class. In previous work, we proved that if ZFC is consistent, then the ZFC-provably valid principles of the class of all forcing are precisely the assertions of the modal theory S4.2. In this article, we prove that the provably valid principles of collapse forcing, Cohen forcing and other classes are in each case exactly S4.3; the provably valid principles of c.c.c. forcing, proper forcing, and others are each contained within S4.3 and do not contain S4.2; the provably valid principles of countably closed forcing, CH-preserving forcing and others are each exactly S4.2; and the provably valid principles of @math -preserving forcing are contained within S4.tBA. All these results arise from general structural connections we have identified between a forcing class and the modal logic of forcing to which it gives rise, including the connection between various control statements, such as buttons, switches and ratchets, and their corresponding forcing validities. These structural connections therefore support a forcing-only analysis of other diverse forcing classes. Hamkins and Lowe proved that the modal logic of forcing is S4.2. In this paper, we consider its modal companion, the intermediate logic KC and relate it to the fatal Heyting algebra H ZFC of forcing persistent sentences. This Heyting algebra is equationally generic for the class of fatal Heyting algebras. Motivated by these results, we further analyse the class of fatal Heyting algebras. This article surveys two recent developments in set theory sharing an essential second-order nature, namely, the modal logic of forcing, oriented upward from the universe of set theory to its forcing extensions; and set-theoretic geology, oriented downward from the universe to the inner models over which it arises by forcing. The research is a mixture of ideas from several parts of logic, including, of course, set theory and forcing, but also modal logic, finite combinatorics and the philosophy of mathematics, for it invites a mathematical engagement with various philosophical views on the nature of mathematical existence. The problem of deciding the satisfiability of a quantifier-free formula with respect to a background theory, also known as Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT), is gaining increasing relevance in verification: representation capabilities beyond propositional logic allow for a natural modeling of real-world problems (e.g., pipeline and RTL circuits verification, proof obligations in software systems). In this paper, we focus on the case where the background theory is the combination T1∪T2 of two simpler theories. Many SMT procedures combine a boolean model enumeration with a decision procedure for T1∪T2, where conjunctions of literals can be decided by an integration schema such as Nelson-Oppen, via a structured exchange of interface formulae (e.g., equalities in the case of convex theories, disjunctions of equalities otherwise). We propose a new approach for SMT(T1∪T2), called Delayed Theory Combination, which does not require a decision procedure for T1∪T2, but only individual decision procedures for T1 and T2, which are directly integrated into the boolean model enumerator. This approach is much simpler and natural, allows each of the solvers to be implemented and optimized without taking into account the others, and it nicely encompasses the case of non-convex theories. We show the effectiveness of the approach by a thorough experimental comparison.