Peer grading systems work well only if users have incentives to grade truthfully. An example of non-truthful grading, that we observed in classrooms, consists in students assigning the maximum grade to all submissions. With a naive grading scheme, such as averaging the assigned grades, all students would receive the maximum grade. In this paper, we develop three grading schemes that provide incentives for truthful peer grading. In the first scheme, the instructor grades a fraction p of the submissions, and penalizes students whose grade deviates from the instructor grade. We provide lower bounds on p to ensure truthfulness, and conclude that these schemes work only for moderate class sizes, up to a few hundred students. To overcome this limitation, we propose a hierarchical extension of this supervised scheme, and we show that it can handle classes of any size with bounded (and little) instructor work, and is therefore applicable to Massive Open Online Courses (MOOCs). Finally, we propose unsupervised incentive schemes, in which the student incentive is based on statistical properties of the grade distribution, without any grading required by the instructor. We show that the proposed unsupervised schemes provide incentives to truthful grading, at the price of being possibly unfair to individual students.
The model presented in @cite_4 relaxes this assumption. The proposed scoring rule evaluates experts by comparing them to each other. The model assigns a higher score for an expert if her predictions are in agreement with predictions of other experts.
@cite_4
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From doctors diagnosing patients to judges setting bail, experts often base their decisions on experience and intuition rather than on statistical models. While understandable, relying on intuition over models has often been found to result in inferior outcomes. Here we present a new method, select-regress-and-round, for constructing simple rules that perform well for complex decisions. These rules take the form of a weighted checklist, can be applied mentally, and nonetheless rival the performance of modern machine learning algorithms. Our method for creating these rules is itself simple, and can be carried out by practitioners with basic statistics knowledge. We demonstrate this technique with a detailed case study of judicial decisions to release or detain defendants while they await trial. In this application, as in many policy settings, the effects of proposed decision rules cannot be directly observed from historical data: if a rule recommends releasing a defendant that the judge in reality detained, we do not observe what would have happened under the proposed action. We address this key counterfactual estimation problem by drawing on tools from causal inference. We find that simple rules significantly outperform judges and are on par with decisions derived from random forests trained on all available features. Generalizing to 22 varied decision-making domains, we find this basic result replicates. We conclude with an analytical framework that helps explain why these simple decision rules perform as well as they do. When eliciting opinions from a group of experts, traditional devices used to promote honest reporting assume that there is an observable future outcome. In practice, however, this assumption is not always reasonable. In this paper, we propose a scoring method built on strictly proper scoring rules to induce honest reporting without assuming observable outcomes. Our method provides scores based on pairwise comparisons between the reports made by each pair of experts in the group. For ease of exposition, we introduce our scoring method by illustrating its application to the peer-review process. In order to do so, we start by modeling the peer-review process using a Bayesian model where the uncertainty regarding the quality of the manuscript is taken into account. Thereafter, we introduce our scoring method to evaluate the reported reviews. Under the assumptions that reviewers are Bayesian decision-makers and that they cannot influence the reviews of other reviewers, we show that risk-neutral reviewers strictly maximize their expected scores by honestly disclosing their reviews. We also show how the group's scores can be used to find a consensual review. Experimental results show that encouraging honest reporting through the proposed scoring method creates more accurate reviews than the traditional peer-review process. One of the aims of credit scoring models is to predict the probability of repayment of any applicant and yet such models are usually parameterised using a sample of accepted applicants only. This may lead to biased estimates of the parameters. In this paper we examine two issues. First, we compare the classification accuracy of a model based only on accepted applicants, relative to one based on a sample of all applicants. We find only a minimal difference, given the cutoff scores for the old model used by the data supplier. Using a simulated model we examine the predictive performance of models estimated from bands of applicants, ranked by predicted creditworthiness. We find that the lower the risk band of the training sample, the less accurate the predictions for all applicants. We also find that the lower the risk band of the training sample, the greater the overestimate of the true performance of the model, when tested on a sample of applicants within the same risk band — as a financial institution would do. The overestimation may be very large. Second, we examine the predictive accuracy of a bivariate probit model with selection (BVP). This parameterises the accept–reject model allowing for (unknown) omitted variables to be correlated with those of the original good–bad model. The BVP model may improve accuracy if the loan officer has overridden a scoring rule. We find that a small improvement when using the BVP model is sometimes possible. In this paper, we provide a simple game-theoretic model of an online question and answer forum. We focus on factual questions in which user responses aggregate while a question remains open. Each user has a unique piece of information and can decide when to report this information. The asker prefers to receive information sooner rather than later, and will stop the process when satisfied with the cumulative value of the posted information. We consider two distinct cases: a complements case, in which each successive piece of information is worth more to the asker than the previous one; and a substitutes case, in which each successive piece of information is worth less than the previous one. A best-answer scoring rule is adopted to model Yahoo! Answers, and is effective for substitutes information, where it isolates an equilibrium in which all users respond in the first round. But we find that this rule is ineffective for complements information, isolating instead an equilibrium in which all users respond in the final round. In addressing this, we demonstrate that an approval-voting scoring rule and a proportional-share scoring rule can enable the most efficient equilibrium with complements information, under certain conditions, by providing incentives for early responders as well as the user who submits the final answer.