Abstract Maximizing resource utilization by performing an efficient resource provisioning is a key factor for any cloud provider: commercial actors can maximize their revenues, whereas scientific and non-commercial providers can maximize their infrastructure utilization. Traditionally, batch systems have allowed data centers to fill their resources as much as possible by using backfilling and similar techniques. However, in an IaaS cloud, where virtual machines are supposed to live indefinitely, or at least as long as the user is able to pay for them, these policies are not easily implementable. In this work we present a new scheduling algorithm for IaaS providers that is able to support preemptible instances, that can be stopped by higher priority requests without introducing large modifications in the current cloud schedulers. This scheduler enables the implementation of new cloud usage and payment models that allow more efficient usage of the resources and potential new revenue sources for commercial providers. We also study the correctness and the performance overhead of the proposed scheduler against existing solutions.
However, some users require for a queuing system ---or some more advanced features like advance reservations--- for running virtual machines. In those cases, there are some external services such as Haizea @cite_34 for OpenNebula or Blazar https: launchpad.net blazar for OpenStack. Those systems lay between the CMF and the users, intercepting their requests and interacting with the cloud system on their behalf, implementing the required functionality.
@cite_34
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One of the key enablers of a cloud provider competitiveness is ability to over-commit shared infrastructure at ratios that are higher than those of other competitors, without compromising non-functional requirements, such as performance. A widely recognized impediment to achieving this goal is so called "Virtual Machines sprawl", a phenomenon referring to the situation when customers order Virtual Machines (VM) on the cloud, use them extensively and then leave them inactive for prolonged periods of time. Since a typical cloud provisioning system treats new VM provision requests according to the nominal virtual hardware specification, an often occurring situation is that the nominal resources of a cloud pool become exhausted fast while the physical hosts utilization remains low.We present a novel cloud resources scheduler called Pulsar that extends OpenStack Nova Filter Scheduler. The key design principle of Pulsar is adaptivity. It recognises that effective safely attainable over-commit ratio varies with time due to workloads' variability and dynamically adapts the effective over-commit ratio to these changes. We evaluate Pulsar via extensive simulations and demonstrate its performance on the actual OpenStack based testbed running popular workloads. Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) cloud platforms rent resources, in the form of virtual machines (VMs), under a variety of contract terms that offer different levels of risk and cost. For example, users may acquire VMs in the spot market that are often cheap but entail significant risk, since their price varies over time based on market supply and demand and they may terminate at any time if the price rises too high. Currently, users must manage all the risks associated with using spot servers. As a result, conventional wisdom holds that spot servers are only appropriate for delay-tolerant batch applications. In this paper, we propose a derivative cloud platform, called SpotCheck, that transparently manages the risks associated with using spot servers for users. SpotCheck provides the illusion of an IaaS platform that offers always-available VMs on demand for a cost near that of spot servers, and supports all types of applications, including interactive ones. SpotCheck's design combines the use of nested VMs with live bounded-time migration and novel server pool management policies to maximize availability, while balancing risk and cost. We implement SpotCheck on Amazon's EC2 and show that it i) provides nested VMs to users that are 99.9989 available, ii) achieves nearly 5x cost savings compared to using equivalent types of on-demand VMs, and iii) eliminates any risk of losing VM state. Applications with a dynamic workload demand need access to a flexible infrastructure to meet performance guarantees and minimize resource costs. While cloud computing provides the elasticity to scale the infrastructure on demand, cloud service providers lack control and visibility of user space applications, making it difficult to accurately scale the underlying infrastructure. Thus, the burden of scaling falls on the user. In this paper, we propose a new cloud service, Dependable Compute Cloud (DC2), that automatically scales the infrastructure to meet the user-specified performance requirements. DC2 employs Kalman filtering to automatically learn the (possibly changing) system parameters for each application, allowing it to proactively scale the infrastructure to meet performance guarantees. DC2 is designed for the cloud it is application-agnostic and does not require any offline application profiling or benchmarking. Our implementation results on OpenStack using a multi-tier application under a range of workload traces demonstrate the robustness and superiority of DC2 over existing rule-based approaches. The cloud computing infrastructure relies on virtualized servers that provide isolation across guest OS's through sand boxing. This isolation was demonstrated to be imperfect in past work which exploited hardware level information leakages to gain access to sensitive information across co-located virtual machines (VMs). In response virtualization companies and cloud services providers have disabled features such as deduplication to prevent such attacks. In this work, we introduce a fine-grain cross-core cache attack that exploits access time variations on the last level cache. The attack exploits huge pages to work across VM boundaries without requiring deduplication. No configuration changes on the victim OS are needed, making the attack quite viable. Furthermore, only machine co-location is required, while the target and victim OS can still reside on different cores of the machine. Our new attack is a variation of the prime and probe cache attack whose applicability at the time is limited to L1 cache. In contrast, our attack works in the spirit of the flush and reload attack targeting the shared L3 cache instead. Indeed, by adjusting the huge page size our attack can be customized to work virtually at any cache level size. We demonstrate the viability of the attack by targeting an Open SSL1.0.1f implementation of AES. The attack recovers AES keys in the cross-VM setting on Xen 4.1 with deduplication disabled, being only slightly less efficient than the flush and reload attack. Given that huge pages are a standard feature enabled in the memory management unit of OS's and that besides co-location no additional assumptions are needed, the attack we present poses a significant risk to existing cloud servers.