Several different "hat games" have recently received a fair amount of attention. Typically, in a hat game, one or more players are required to correctly guess their hat colour when given some information about other players' hat colours. Some versions of these games have been motivated by research in complexity theory and have ties to well-known research problems in coding theory, and some variations have led to interesting new research. In this paper, we review Ebert's Hat Game, which garnered a considerable amount of publicity in the late 90's and early 00's, and the Hats-on-a-line Game. Then we introduce a new hat game which is a "hybrid" of these two games and provide an optimal strategy for playing the new game. The optimal strategy is quite simple, but the proof involves an interesting combinatorial argument.
A few years prior to the introduction of Ebert's Hat Game, in 1994, a similar game was described by Aspnes, Beigel, Furst and Rudich @cite_7 . In their version of the game, players are not allowed to pass, and the objective is for a majority of the players to guess correctly. For the three-player game, it is easy to describe a strategy that will succeed with probability @math , just as in Ebert's game: Alice votes the opposite of Bob's hat colour; Bob votes the opposite of Charlie's hat colour; and Charlie votes the opposite of Alice's hat colour.
@cite_7
1596450573 2135737379 2141368734 2010404638
In the generalized Russian cards problem, we have a card deck @math of @math cards and three participants, Alice, Bob, and Cathy, dealt @math , @math , and @math cards, respectively. Once the cards are dealt, Alice and Bob wish to privately communicate their hands to each other via public announcements, without the advantage of a shared secret or public key infrastructure. Cathy should remain ignorant of all but her own cards after Alice and Bob have made their announcements. Notions for Cathy's ignorance in the literature range from Cathy not learning the fate of any individual card with certainty (weak @math -security) to not gaining any probabilistic advantage in guessing the fate of some set of @math cards (perfect @math -security). As we demonstrate, the generalized Russian cards problem has close ties to the field of combinatorial designs, on which we rely heavily, particularly for perfect security notions. Our main result establishes an equivalence between perfectly @math -secure strategies and @math -designs on @math points with block size @math , when announcements are chosen uniformly at random from the set of possible announcements. We also provide construction methods and example solutions, including a construction that yields perfect @math -security against Cathy when @math . We leverage a known combinatorial design to construct a strategy with @math , @math , and @math that is perfectly @math -secure. Finally, we consider a variant of the problem that yields solutions that are easy to construct and optimal with respect to both the number of announcements and level of security achieved. Moreover, this is the first method obtaining weak @math -security that allows Alice to hold an arbitrary number of cards and Cathy to hold a set of @math cards. Alternatively, the construction yields solutions for arbitrary @math , @math and any @math . We study the following one-person game against a random graph process: the Player's goal is to @math -colour a random sequence of edges @math of a complete graph on @math vertices, avoiding a monochromatic triangle for as long as possible. The game is over when a monochromatic triangle is created. The online version of the game requires that the Player should colour each edge as it comes, before looking at the next edge.While it is not hard to prove that the expected length of this game is about @math , the proof of the upper bound suggests the following relaxation: instead of colouring online, the random graph is generated in only two rounds, and the Player colours the edges of the first round before the edges of the second round are thrown in. Given the size of the first round, how many edges can there be in the second round for the Player to be likely to win? In the extreme case, when the first round consists of a random graph with @math edges, where @math is a positive constant, we show that the Player can win with high probability only if constantly many edges are generated in the second round. We present the first formal mathematical presentation of the generalized Russian cards problem, and provide rigorous security definitions that capture both basic and extended versions of weak and perfect security notions. In the generalized Russian cards problem, three players, Alice, Bob, and Cathy, are dealt a deck of @math cards, each given @math , @math , and @math cards, respectively. The goal is for Alice and Bob to learn each other's hands via public communication, without Cathy learning the fate of any particular card. The basic idea is that Alice announces a set of possible hands she might hold, and Bob, using knowledge of his own hand, should be able to learn Alice's cards from this announcement, but Cathy should not. Using a combinatorial approach, we are able to give a nice characterization of informative strategies (i.e., strategies allowing Bob to learn Alice's hand), having optimal communication complexity, namely the set of possible hands Alice announces must be equivalent to a large set of @math -designs, where @math . We also provide some interesting necessary conditions for certain types of deals to be simultaneously informative and secure. That is, for deals satisfying @math for some @math , where @math and the strategy is assumed to satisfy a strong version of security (namely perfect @math -security), we show that @math and hence @math . We also give a precise characterization of informative and perfectly @math -secure deals of the form @math satisfying @math involving @math -designs. In the generalized Russian cards problem, the three players Alice, Bob and Cath draw @math a , b and @math c cards, respectively, from a deck of @math a + b + c cards. Players only know their own cards and what the deck of cards is. Alice and Bob are then required to communicate their hand of cards to each other by way of public messages. For a natural number @math k , the communication is said to be @math k -safe if Cath does not learn whether or not Alice holds any given set of at most @math k cards that are not Cath's, a notion originally introduced as weak @math k -security by Swanson and Stinson. An elegant solution by Atkinson views the cards as points in a finite projective plane. We propose a general solution in the spirit of Atkinson's, although based on finite vector spaces rather than projective planes, and call it the geometric protocol'. Given arbitrary @math c , k > 0 , this protocol gives an informative and @math k -safe solution to the generalized Russian cards problem for infinitely many values of @math ( a , b , c ) with @math b = O ( a c ) . This improves on the collection of parameters for which solutions are known. In particular, it is the first solution which guarantees @math k -safety when Cath has more than one card.