Underground online forums are platforms that enable trades of illicit services and stolen goods. Carding forums, in particular, are known for being focused on trading financial information. However, little evidence exists about the sellers that are present on carding forums, the precise types of products they advertise, and the prices buyers pay. Existing literature mainly focuses on the organisation and structure of the forums. Furthermore, studies on carding forums are usually based on literature review, expert interviews, or data from forums that have already been shut down. This paper provides first-of-its-kind empirical evidence on active forums where stolen financial data is traded. We monitored 5 out of 25 discovered forums, collected posts from the forums over a three-month period, and analysed them quantitatively and qualitatively. We focused our analyses on products, prices, seller prolificacy, seller specialisation, and seller reputation.
However, the effort to establish baseline reputation appears to be laborious. Before half of traders receive their first positive feedback, for example, they write approximately sixty posts @cite_0 . In this case, the reputation process is intrinsically peer-driven. Sellers are dependent on recommendations by buyers. Sometimes, forum administrators provide a vetting process, often in addition to the peer-driven process and often with intransparent criteria. In those cases, entry costs are relatively high and access to higher tiers is tight @cite_27 .
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Virtual marketplaces on the Web provide people with great facilities to buy and sell goods similar to conventional markets. In traditional business, reputation is subjectively built for known persons and companies as the deals are made in the course of time. As it is important to do business with trustful individuals and companies, there is a need to survive the reputation concept in virtual markets. Auction sites generally employ reputation systems based on feedbacks that provide a global view to a cyber dealer. In contrast to global trust, people usually infer their personal trust about someone whose reputation is completely or partially unknown by asking their trusted friends. Personal reputation is what makes a person trusted for some people and untrusted for others. There should be a facility for users in a virtual market to specify how much they trust a friend and also a mechanism that infers the trust of a user to another user who is not directly a friend of her. There are two main issues that should be addressed in trust inference. First, the trust modeling and aggregation problem needs to be challenged. Second, algorithms should be introduced to find and select the best paths among the existing trust paths from a source to a sink. First, as trust to a person can be stated more naturally using linguistic expressions, this work suggests employing linguistic terms for trust specification. To this end, corresponding fuzzy sets are defined for trust linguistic terms and a fuzzy trust aggregation method is also proposed. Comparing the fuzzy aggregation method to the existing aggregation methods shows superiority of fuzzy approach especially at aggregating contradictory information. Second, this paper proposes an incremental trust inference algorithm. The results show improvement in preciseness of inference for the proposed inference algorithm over the existing and recently proposed algorithm named TidalTrust. One of the earliest and best known Internet reputation systems is run by eBay, which gathers comments from buyers and sellers about each other after each transaction. Examination of a large data set from 1999 reveals several interesting features. First, despite incentives to free ride, feedback was provided more than half the time. Second, well beyond reasonable expectation, it was almost always positive. Third, reputation profiles were predictive of future performance, though eBay's net feedback statistic is far from the best predictor available. Fourth, there was a high correlation between buyer and seller feedback, suggesting that the players reciprocate and ret aliate. Online reputation systems are intended to facilitate the propagation of word of mouth as a credibility scoring mechanism for improved trust in electronic marketplaces. However, they experience two problems attributable to anonymity abuse-easy identity changes and reputation manipulation. In this study, we propose the use of stylometric analysis to help identify online traders based on the writing style traces inherent in their posted feedback comments. We incorporated a rich stylistic feature set and developed the Writeprint technique for detection of anonymous trader identities. The technique and extended feature set were evaluated on a test bed encompassing thousands of feedback comments posted by 200 eBay traders. Experiments conducted to assess the scalability (number of traders) and robustness (against intentional obfuscation) of the proposed approach found it to significantly outperform benchmark stylometric techniques. The results indicate that the proposed method may help militate against easy identity changes and reputation manipulation in electronic markets. We commonly use the experience of others when taking decisions. Reputation mechanisms aggregate in a formal way the feedback collected from peers and compute the reputation of products, services, or providers. The success of reputation mechanisms is however conditioned on obtaining true feedback. Side-payments (i.e. agents get paid for submitting feedback) can make honest reporting rational (i.e. Nash equilibrium). Unfortunately, known schemes also have other Nash equilibria that imply lying. In this paper we analyze the equilibria of two incentive-compatible reputation mechanisms and investigate how undesired equilibrium points can be eliminated by using trusted reports.