We consider a smart-grid connecting several agents, modeled as stochastic dynamical systems, who may be electricity consumers producers. At each discrete time instant, which may represent a 15 minute interval, each agent may consume generate some quantity of electrical energy. The Independent System Operator (ISO) is given the task of assigning consumptions generations to the agents so as to maximize the sum of the utilities accrued to the agents, subject to the constraint that energy generation equals consumption at each time. This task of coordinating generation and demand has to be accomplished by the ISO without the agents revealing their system states, dynamics, or utility cost functions. We show how and when a simple iterative procedure converges to the optimal solution. The ISO iteratively obtains electricity bids by the agents, and declares the tentative market clearing prices. In response to these prices, the agents submit new bids. On the demand side, the solution yields an optimal demand response for dynamic and stochastic loads. On the generation side, it provides the optimal utilization of stochastically varying renewables such as solar wind, and generation with fossil fuel based generation with dynamic constraints such as ramping rates. Thereby we solve a decentralized stochastic control problem, without agents sharing any information about their system models, states or utility functions.
Viewed from the power system end, there have been many efforts since the deregulation of the electricity sector on a market-based framework to clear the system. @cite_7 have proposed a two-layered approach that internalizes individual constraints of market participants while allowing the ISO to manage the spatial complexity. The approximated MPC algorithm is shown to perform well in many realistic applications. In order to analyze the strategic interactions between the ISO and market participants, game theoretical approaches have been proposed, e.g., @cite_10 uses a Stackelberg game framework for studying economic dispatch with demand response. @cite_1 pose the problem as a noncooperative game, and prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium under some assumtpions.
@cite_1 @cite_10 @cite_7
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In this paper, we study resource allocation for a multicarrier-based cognitive radio (CR) network. More specifically, we investigate the problem of secondary users’ energy-efficiency (EE) maximization problem under secondary total power and primary interference constraints. First, assuming cooperation among the secondary base stations (BSs), a centralized approach is considered to solve the EE optimization problem for the CR network where the primary and secondary users are using either orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) or filter bank based multicarrier (FBMC) modulations. We propose an alternating-based approach to solve the joint power-subcarrier allocation problem. More importantly, in the first place, subcarriers are allocated using a heuristic method for a given feasible power allocation. Then, we conservatively approximate the nonconvex power control problem and propose a joint successive convex approximation-Dinkelbach algorithm (SCADA) to efficiently obtain a solution to the nonconvex power control problem. The proposed algorithm is shown to converge to a solution that coincides with the stationary point of the original nonconvex power control subproblem. Moreover, we propose a dual decomposition-based decentralized version of the SCADA. Second, under the assumption of no cooperation among the secondary BSs, we propose a fully distributed power control algorithm from the perspective of game theory. The proposed algorithm is shown to converge to a Nash-equilibrium (NE) point. Moreover, we propose a sufficient condition that guarantees the uniqueness of the achieved NE. Extensive simulation analyses are further provided to highlight the advantages and demonstrate the efficiency of our proposed schemes. In this paper, the problem of energy trading between smart grid prosumers, who can simultaneously consume and produce energy, and a grid power company is studied. The problem is formulated as a single-leader, multiple-follower Stackelberg game between the power company and multiple prosumers. In this game, the power company acts as a leader who determines the pricing strategy that maximizes its profits, while the prosumers act as followers who react by choosing the amount of energy to buy or sell so as to optimize their current and future profits. The proposed game accounts for each prosumer’s subjective decision when faced with the uncertainty of profits, induced by the random future price. In particular, the framing effect, from the framework of prospect theory (PT), is used to account for each prosumer’s valuation of its gains and losses with respect to an individual utility reference point. The reference point changes between prosumers and stems from their past experience and future aspirations of profits. The followers’ noncooperative game is shown to admit a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) under classical game theory which is obtained using a fully distributed algorithm. The results are extended to account for the case of PT using algorithmic solutions that can achieve an NE under certain conditions. Simulation results show that the total grid load varies significantly with the prosumers’ reference point and their loss-aversion level. In addition, it is shown that the power company’s profits considerably decrease when it fails to account for the prosumers’ subjective perceptions under PT. This paper presents two different approaches to model expansion planning in electricity markets under imperfect competitive conditions. Both approaches consider a market in which firms compete in quantity as in the Nash-Cournot game. However, the two models differ from each other in how each firm makes its expansion-planning decisions. In the first model, the key assumption that permits its formulation as a Mixed Linear Complementarity Problem (LCP) is that firms not only decide their output in a Cournot manner but also their new generating capacity. In contrast, in the second model, there is a leader firm that anticipates the reaction of the follower firms as in the Stackelberg game. The latter model is formulated as a Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC), wherein the leader firm decides its optimal new capacity subject to a set of market equilibrium constraints. Both models have been implemented in GAMS. A simple example is also presented to illustrate their comparison and application. This paper describes a Benders decomposition-based framework for solving the large scale energy management problem that was posed for the ROADEF 2010 challenge. The problem was taken from the power industry and entailed scheduling the outage dates for a set of nuclear power plants, which need to be regularly taken down for refueling and maintenance, in such a way that the expected cost of meeting the power demand in a number of potential scenarios is minimized. We show that the problem structure naturally lends itself to Benders decomposition; however, not all constraints can be included in the mixed integer programming model. We present a two phase approach that first uses Benders decomposition to solve the linear programming relaxation of a relaxed version of the problem. In the second phase, integer solutions are enumerated and a procedure is applied to make them satisfy constraints not included in the relaxed problem. To cope with the size of the formulations arising in our approach we describe efficient preprocessing techniques to reduce the problem size and show how aggregation can be applied to each of the subproblems. Computational results on the test instances show that the procedure competes well on small instances of the problem, but runs into difficulty on larger ones. Unlike heuristic approaches, however, this methodology can be used to provide lower bounds on solution quality.