Knowing the reflection of game theory and ethics, we develop a mathematical representation to bridge the gap between the concepts in moral philosophy (e.g., Kantian and Utilitarian) and AI ethics industry technology standard (e.g., IEEE P7000 standard series for Ethical AI). As an application, we demonstrate how human value can be obtained from the experimental game theory (e.g., trust game experiment) so as to build an ethical AI. Moreover, an approach to test the ethics (rightness or wrongness) of a given AI algorithm by using an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Game experiment is discussed as an example. Compared with existing mathematical frameworks and testing method on AI ethics technology, the advantages of the proposed approach are analyzed.
For the technology of taking human value from experiment practically, we have illustrated an approach to take the human value (trust and trustworthy) from human subjects experiment. These parameters can be transit to AI in similar non-cooperation game condition, avoiding AI to be too tough. Though it is well known that there exists the human value(e.g., fairness, justices) in the experimental game theory @cite_0 @cite_21 @cite_4 , our approach is the first to take the human value quantitatively as AI ethics controlling parameter for AI design.
@cite_0 @cite_21 @cite_4
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We propose a hybrid model for automatically acquiring a policy for a complex game, which combines online learning with mining knowledge from a corpus of human game play. Our hypothesis is that a player that learns its policies by combining (online) exploration with biases towards human behaviour that's attested in a corpus of humans playing the game will outperform any agent that uses only one of the knowledge sources. During game play, the agent extracts similar moves made by players in the corpus in similar situations, and approximates their utility alongside other possible options by performing simulations from its current state. We implement and assess our model in an agent playing the complex win-lose board game Settlers of Catan, which lacks an implementation that would challenge a human expert. The results from the preliminary set of experiments illustrate the potential of such a joint model. We consider a task of scheduling with a common deadline on a single machine. Every player reports to a scheduler the length of his job and the scheduler needs to finish as many jobs as possible by the deadline. For this simple problem, there is a truthful mechanism that achieves maximum welfare in dominant strategies. The new aspect of our work is that in our setting players are uncertain about their own job lengths, and hence are incapable of providing truthful reports (in the strict sense of the word). For a probabilistic model for uncertainty we show that even with relatively little uncertainty, no mechanism can guarantee a constant fraction of the maximum welfare. To remedy this situation, we introduce a new measure of economic efficiency, based on a notion of a fair share of a player, and design mechanisms that are Ω(1)-fair. In addition to its intrinsic appeal, our notion of fairness implies good approximation of maximum welfare in several cases of interest. In our mechanisms the machine is sometimes left idle even though there are jobs that want to use it. We show that this unfavorable aspect is unavoidable, unless one gives up other favorable aspects (e.g., give up Ω(1)-fairness). We also consider a qualitative approach to uncertainty as an alternative to the probabilistic quantitative model. In the qualitative approach we break away from solution concepts such as dominant strategies (they are no longer well defined), and instead suggest an axiomatic approach, which amounts to listing desirable properties for mechanisms. We provide a mechanism that satisfies these properties. Cooperative games with partial observability are a challenging domain for AI research, especially when the AI should cooperate with a human player. In this paper we investigate one such game, the award-winning card game Hanabi, which has been studied by other researchers before. We present an agent designed to play better with a human cooperator than these previous results by basing it on communication theory and psychology research. To demonstrate that our agent performs better with a human cooperator we ran an experiment in which 224 participants played one or more games of Hanabi with different AIs, and will show that our AI scores higher than previously published work in such a setting. There is a long history in game theory on the topic of Bayesian or "rational" learning, in which each player maintains beliefs over a set of alternative behaviours, or types, for the other players. This idea has gained increasing interest in the artificial intelligence (AI) community, where it is used as a method to control a single agent in a system composed of multiple agents with unknown behaviours. The idea is to hypothesise a set of types, each specifying a possible behaviour for the other agents, and to plan our own actions with respect to those types which we believe are most likely, given the observed actions of the agents. The game theory literature studies this idea primarily in the context of equilibrium attainment. In contrast, many AI applications have a focus on task completion and payoff maximisation. With this perspective in mind, we identify and address a spectrum of questions pertaining to belief and truth in hypothesised types. We formulate three basic ways to incorporate evidence into posterior beliefs and show when the resulting beliefs are correct, and when they may fail to be correct. Moreover, we demonstrate that prior beliefs can have a significant impact on our ability to maximise payoffs in the long-term, and that they can be computed automatically with consistent performance effects. Furthermore, we analyse the conditions under which we are able complete our task optimally, despite inaccuracies in the hypothesised types. Finally, we show how the correctness of hypothesised types can be ascertained during the interaction via an automated statistical analysis.