Abstract We introduce a game-theoretic model to investigate the strategic interaction between a cyber insurance policyholder whose premium depends on her self-reported security level and an insurer with the power to audit the security level upon receiving an indemnity claim. Audits can reveal fraudulent (or simply careless) policyholders not following reported security procedures, in which case the insurer can refuse to indemnify the policyholder. However, the insurer has to bear an audit cost even when the policyholders have followed the prescribed security procedures. As audits can be expensive, a key problem insurers face is to devise an auditing strategy to deter policyholders from misrepresenting their security levels to gain a premium discount. This decision-making problem was motivated by conducting interviews with underwriters and reviewing regulatory filings in the US; we discovered that premiums are determined by security posture, yet this is often self-reported and insurers are concerned by whether security procedures are practised as reported by the policyholders. To address this problem, we model this interaction as a Bayesian game of incomplete information and devise optimal auditing strategies for the insurers considering the possibility that the policyholder may misrepresent her security level. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first theoretical consideration of post-incident claims management in cyber security. Our model captures the trade-off between the incentive to exaggerate security posture during the application process and the possibility of punishment for non-compliance with reported security policies. Simulations demonstrate that common sense techniques are not as efficient at providing effective cyber insurance audit decisions as the ones computed using game theory.
The timing of the insurer's intervention plays is an important strategic aspect. Ex-ante interventions for the insurer include risk assessments and security investments before the policy term begins. @cite_6 investigated an insurer who could assess security levels perfectly or not at all, concluding that the latter cannot support a functioning market. @cite_7 showed that ex-ante assessments in combination with discounts for adopting security controls can lead to an increase in social welfare. A more recent model introduces stochastic uncertainty about the policyholder's security level @cite_16 .
@cite_16 @cite_7 @cite_6
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We consider arbitrary risk-averse users, whose costs of improving security are given by an arbitrary convex function. In our model, user probability to incur damage (from an attack) depends on both his own security and network security: thus, security is interdependent. We introduce two user types (normal and malicious), and allow one user type (malicious users) to subvert insurer monitoring, even if insurers perfectly enforce (at zero cost) security levels of normal users. We prove that with malicious users present, equilibrium contract that specifies user security fails to exist. We demonstrate, in a general setting, a failure of cyber-insurers to underwrite contracts conditioning the premiums on security. We consider arbitrary risk-averse users, whose costs of improving security are given by an arbitrary convex function. In our model, user probability to incur damage (from an attack) depends on both his own security and network security: thus, security is interdependent. We introduce two user types (normal and malicious), and allow one user type (malicious users) to subvert insurer monitoring, even if insurers perfectly enforce (at zero cost) security levels of normal users. We prove that with malicious users present, equilibrium contract that specifies user security fails to exist. We demonstrate, in a general setting, a failure of cyber-insurers to underwrite contracts conditioning the premiums on security. Abstract This paper characterizes the equilibrium of an insurance market where opportunist policyholders may file fraudulent claims. We assume that insurance policies are traded in a competitive market where insurers cannot distinguish honest policyholders from opportunists. The insurer-policyholder relationship is modelled as an incomplete information game, in which the insurer decides to audit or not. The market equilibrium depends on whether insurers can credibly commit or not to their audit strategies. We show that a no commitment equilibrium results in a welfare loss for honest individuals, which may even be so large that the insurance market completely shuts down. We also show that transferring monitoring costs to a budget-balanced common agency would mitigate the commitment problem. An insurer has to know the risks faced by a potential client to accurately determine an insurance premium offer. However, while the potential client might have a good understanding of its own security practices, it may also have an incentive not to disclose them honestly since the resulting information asymmetry could work in its favor. This information asymmetry engenders adverse selection, which can result in unfair premiums and reduced adoption of cyber-insurance. To overcome information asymmetry, insurers often require potential clients to self-report their risks. Still, clients do not have any incentive to perform thorough self-audits or to provide comprehensive reports. As a result, insurers have to complement self-reporting with external security audits to verify the clients’ reports. Since these audits can be very expensive, a key problem faced by insurers is to devise an auditing strategy that deters clients from dishonest reporting using a minimal number of audits. To solve this problem, we model the interactions between a potential client and an insurer as a two-player signaling game. One player represents the client, who knows its actual security-investment level, but may report any level to the insurer. The other player represents the insurer, who knows only the random distribution from which the security level was drawn, but may discover the actual level using an expensive audit. We study the players’ equilibrium strategies and provide numerical illustrations. Managing security risks in the Internet has so far mostly involved methods to reduce the risks and the severity of the damages. Those methods (such as firewalls, intrusion detection and prevention, etc) reduce but do not eliminate risk, and the question remains on how to handle the residual risk. In this paper, we take a new approach to the problem of Internet security and advocate managing this residual risk by buying insurance against it. Using insurance in the Internet raises several questions because entities in the Internet face correlated risks, which means that insurance claims will likely be correlated, making those entities less attractive to insurance companies. Furthermore, risks are interdependent, meaning that the decision by an entity to invest in security and self-protect affects the risk faced by others. We analyze the impact of these externalities on the security investments of users using a simple 2-agent model. Our key results are that there are sound economic reasons for agents to not invest much in self-protection, and that insurance is a desirable incentive mechanism which pushes agents over a threshold into a desirable state where they all invest in self-protection. In other words, insurance increases the level of self-protection, and therefore the level of security, in the Internet. Therefore, we believe that insurance should become an important component of risk management in the Internet.