An online backup system should be quick and reliable in both saving and restoring users' data. To do so in a peer-to-peer implementation, data transfer scheduling and the amount of redundancy must be chosen wisely. We formalize the problem of exchanging multiple pieces of data with intermittently available peers, and we show that random scheduling completes transfers nearly optimally in terms of duration as long as the system is sufficiently large. Moreover, we propose an adaptive redundancy scheme that improves performance and decreases resource usage while keeping the risks of data loss low. Extensive simulations show that our techniques are effective in a realistic trace-driven scenario with heterogeneous bandwidth.
A recurrent problem for P2P applications is creating incentives to encourage nodes in contributing more resources. This can be done via reputation systems @cite_4 or virtual currency @cite_8 . Specifically for storage systems, an easy and efficient solution is segregating nodes in sub-networks with roughly homogeneous characteristics such as uptime and storage space @cite_11 @cite_1 .
@cite_1 @cite_11 @cite_4 @cite_8
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In this paper we model and study the performance of peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing systems in terms of their 'service capacity'. We identify two regimes of interest: the transient and stationary regimes. We show that in both regimes, the performance of P2P systems exhibits a favorable scaling with the offered load. P2P systems achieve this by efficiently leveraging the service capacity of other peers, who possibly are concurrently downloading the same file. Therefore to improve the performance, it is important to design mechanisms to give peers incentives for sharing cooperation. One approach is to introduce mechanisms for resource allocation that are 'fair', such that a peer's performance improves with his contributions. We find that some intuitive 'fairness' notions may unexpectedly lead to 'unfair' allocations, which do not provide the right incentives for peers. Thus, implementation of P2P systems may want to compromise the degree of 'fairness' in favor of maintaining system robustness and reducing overheads. An important issue in Peer-to-Peer networks is to encourage users to share with others as they use the resources of the network. However, some nodes may only consume from users without giving anything in return. To fix this problem, we can incorporate trust management systems with network infrastructures. Current trust managements are usually made for unstructured overlays and have several shortcomings. They are made to be very similar to e-commerce scoring websites which may not be the best design for fairness in P2P networks. Several problems may arise with their designs such as difficulties to provide a complete history of freeloaders or lack of an autonomous removal mechanism in case of severe attacks. In this paper, we argue that such systems can be deployed more efficiently by using a structured paradigm. For this purpose, we propose C-Trust, a trust management system which is focused on fairness for P2P networks. This is done by getting help from current circular structured designs. This method is able to mark freeloaders, identify their severity of abusion and punish them accordingly. We are also able to effectively protect both Seeder-to-Leecher and Leecher-to-Leecher transactions. This feature is specially important for fairness which other trust systems have not considered so far. Many large decentralized systems rely on information propagation to ensure their proper function. We examine a common scenario in which only participants that are aware of the information can compete for some reward, and thus informed participants have an incentive not to propagate information to others. One recent example in which such tension arises is the 2009 DARPA Network Challenge (finding red balloons). We focus on another prominent example: Bitcoin, a decentralized electronic currency system. Bitcoin represents a radical new approach to monetary systems. It has been getting a large amount of public attention over the last year, both in policy discussions and in the popular press. Its cryptographic fundamentals have largely held up even as its usage has become increasingly widespread. We find, however, that it exhibits a fundamental problem of a different nature, based on how its incentives are structured. We propose a modification to the protocol that can eliminate this problem. Bitcoin relies on a peer-to-peer network to track transactions that are performed with the currency. For this purpose, every transaction a node learns about should be transmitted to its neighbors in the network. As the protocol is currently defined and implemented, it does not provide an incentive for nodes to broadcast transactions they are aware of. In fact, it provides an incentive not to do so. Our solution is to augment the protocol with a scheme that rewards information propagation. Since clones are easy to create in the Bitcoin system, an important feature of our scheme is Sybil-proofness. We show that our proposed scheme succeeds in setting the correct incentives, that it is Sybil-proof, and that it requires only a small payment overhead, all this is achieved with iterated elimination of dominated strategies. We complement this result by showing that there are no reward schemes in which information propagation and no self-cloning is a dominant strategy. In an ad-hoc network, intermediate nodes on a communication path are expected to forward packets of other nodes so that the mobile nodes can communicate beyond their wireless transmission range. However, because wireless mobile nodes are usually constrained by limited power and computation resources, a selfish node may be unwilling to spend its resources in forwarding packets which are not of its direct interest, even though it expects other nodes to forward its packets to the destination. It has been shown that the presence of such selfish nodes degrades the overall performance of a non-cooperative ad hoc network. To address this problem, we propose a secure and objective reputation-based incentive (SORI) scheme to encourage packet forwarding and discipline selfish behavior. Different from the existing schemes, under our approach, the reputation of a node is quantified by objective measures, and the propagation of reputation is efficiently secured by a one-way-hash-chain-based authentication scheme. Armed with the reputation-based mechanism, we design a punishment scheme to penalize selfish nodes. The experimental results show that the proposed scheme can successfully identify selfish nodes and punish them accordingly.