Suppose we have a virus or one competing idea product that propagates over a multiple profile (e.g., social) network. Can we predict what proportion of the network will actually get "infected" (e.g., spread the idea or buy the competing product), when the nodes of the network appear to have different sensitivity based on their profile? For example, if there are two profiles @math and @math in a network and the nodes of profile @math and profile @math are susceptible to a highly spreading virus with probabilities @math and @math respectively, what percentage of both profiles will actually get infected from the virus at the end? To reverse the question, what are the necessary conditions so that a predefined percentage of the network is infected? We assume that nodes of different profiles can infect one another and we prove that under realistic conditions, apart from the weak profile (great sensitivity), the stronger profile (low sensitivity) will get infected as well. First, we focus on cliques with the goal to provide exact theoretical results as well as to get some intuition as to how a virus affects such a multiple profile network. Then, we move to the theoretical analysis of arbitrary networks. We provide bounds on certain properties of the network based on the probabilities of infection of each node in it when it reaches the steady state. Finally, we provide extensive experimental results that verify our theoretical results and at the same time provide more insight on the problem.
The majority of the presented models have studied a single epidemic in a single topology whereas in later work @cite_6 , multiple virus models are introduced. All of them require that the network is fair-play, which means that all nodes have exactly the same behavior towards the viruses. In @cite_6 , an @math model was used with two competing viruses that infect nodes of arbitrary topologies where the nodes are mutually immune. The main result is that for any topology the stronger virus (above threshold) survives and wipes out the weaker one ("winner takes all"). In later work, the condition for mutual immunity is removed and the focus is on the conditions where nodes are infected from both viruses @cite_12 . In both cases, the model used is SIS-like whereas in @cite_8 the authors provide a generalized model that includes the majority of known epidemiological models with appropriate parameter definition in discrete time. All the aforementioned models, are applied to simple networks whereas recent work @cite_20 , refers to competing viruses in a composite network and conjectures that the stronger one will prevail over the weaker. Once again, the problem is formulated by a non-linear dynamical system.
@cite_20 @cite_12 @cite_6 @cite_8
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The spread of epidemics and malware is commonly modeled by diffusion processes on networks. Protective interventions such as vaccinations or installing anti-virus software are used to contain their spread. Typically, each node in the network has to decide its own strategy of securing itself, and its benefit depends on which other nodes are secure, making this a natural game-theoretic setting. There has been a lot of work on network security game models, but most of the focus has been either on simplified epidemic models or homogeneous network structure. We develop a new formulation for an epidemic containment game, which relies on the characterization of the SIS model in terms of the spectral radius of the network. We show in this model that pure Nash equilibria (NE) always exist, and can be found by a best response strategy. We analyze the complexity of finding NE, and derive rigorous bounds on their costs and the Price of Anarchy or PoA (the ratio of the cost of the worst NE to the optimum social cost) in general graphs as well as in random graph models. In particular, for arbitrary power-law graphs with exponent β > 2, we show that the PoA is bounded by O(T2(β -1))), where T = γ α is the ratio of the recovery rate to the transmission rate in the SIS model. We prove that this bound is tight up to a constant factor for the Chung-Lu random power-law graph model. We study the characteristics of Nash equilibria empirically in different real communication and infrastructure networks, and find that our analytical results can help explain some of the empirical observations. Given a contact network that changes over time (say, day vs night connectivity), and the SIS (susceptible infected susceptible, flu like) virus propagation model, what can we say about its epidemic threshold? That is, can we determine when a small infection will "take-off" and create an epidemic? Consequently then, which nodes should we immunize to prevent an epidemic? This is a very real problem, since, e.g. people have different connections during the day at work, and during the night at home. Static graphs have been studied for a long time, with numerous analytical results. Time-evolving networks are so hard to analyze, that most existing works are simulation studies [5]. Specifically, our contributions in this paper are: (a) we formulate the problem by approximating it by a Non-linear Dynamical system (NLDS), (b) we derive the first closed formula for the epidemic threshold of time-varying graphs under the SIS model, and finally (c) we show the usefulness of our threshold by presenting efficient heuristics and evaluate the effectiveness of our methods on synthetic and real data like the MIT reality mining graphs. The strong analogy between biological viruses and their computational counterparts has motivated the authors to adapt the techniques of mathematical epidemiology to the study of computer virus propagation. In order to allow for the most general patterns of program sharing, a standard epidemiological model is extended by placing it on a directed graph and a combination of analysis and simulation is used to study its behavior. The conditions under which epidemics are likely to occur are determined, and, in cases where they do, the dynamics of the expected number of infected individuals are examined as a function of time. It is concluded that an imperfect defense against computer viruses can still be highly effective in preventing their widespread proliferation, provided that the infection rate does not exceed a well-defined critical epidemic threshold. > Suppose we have two competing ideas products viruses, that propagate over a social or other network. Suppose that they are strong virulent enough, so that each, if left alone, could lead to an epidemic. What will happen when both operate on the network? Earlier models assume that there is perfect competition: if a user buys product 'A' (or gets infected with virus 'X'), she will never buy product 'B' (or virus 'Y'). This is not always true: for example, a user could install and use both Firefox and Google Chrome as browsers. Similarly, one type of flu may give partial immunity against some other similar disease. In the case of full competition, it is known that 'winner takes all,' that is the weaker virus product will become extinct. In the case of no competition, both viruses survive, ignoring each other. What happens in-between these two extremes? We show that there is a phase transition: if the competition is harsher than a critical level, then 'winner takes all;' otherwise, the weaker virus survives. These are the contributions of this paper (a) the problem definition, which is novel even in epidemiology literature (b) the phase-transition result and (c) experiments on real data, illustrating the suitability of our results.