[Context.] The success of deep learning makes its usage more and more tempting in safety-critical applications. However such applications have historical standards (e.g., DO178, ISO26262) which typically do not envision the usage of machine learning. We focus in particular on of software artifacts, i.e., code modules, functions, or statements (depending on the desired granularity). [Problem.] Both code and requirements are a problem when dealing with deep neural networks: code constituting the network is not comparable to classical code; furthermore, requirements for applications where neural networks are required are typically very hard to specify: even though high-level requirements can be defined, it is very hard to make such requirements concrete enough, that one can qualify them of low-level requirements. An additional problem is that deep learning is in practice very much based on trial-and-error, which makes the final result hard to explain without the previous iterations. [Proposed solution.] We investigate which artifacts could play a similar role to code or low-level requirements in neural network development and propose various traces which one could possibly consider as a replacement for classical notions. We also propose a form of traceability (and new artifacts) in order to deal with the particular trial-and-error development process for deep learning.
There has been attempts to set grounds for a rigorous science'' of machine learning @cite_13 , again very useful, but not related to traceability. Finally, many safety-related problems have been identified for AI, especially for reinforcement learning @cite_31 . The identified challenges are relevant and the paper proposes a few attempts of solutions. Most of them are a source of inspiration to identify sources of problem and to analyze whether those sources can be tackled with traceability (even though it turns out not to be really the case for solutions identified in the present paper).
@cite_31 @cite_13
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We present a suite of reinforcement learning environments illustrating various safety properties of intelligent agents. These problems include safe interruptibility, avoiding side effects, absent supervisor, reward gaming, safe exploration, as well as robustness to self-modification, distributional shift, and adversaries. To measure compliance with the intended safe behavior, we equip each environment with a performance function that is hidden from the agent. This allows us to categorize AI safety problems into robustness and specification problems, depending on whether the performance function corresponds to the observed reward function. We evaluate A2C and Rainbow, two recent deep reinforcement learning agents, on our environments and show that they are not able to solve them satisfactorily. This paper addresses the general problem of reinforcement learning (RL) in partially observable environments. In 2013, our large RL recurrent neural networks (RNNs) learned from scratch to drive simulated cars from high-dimensional video input. However, real brains are more powerful in many ways. In particular, they learn a predictive model of their initially unknown environment, and somehow use it for abstract (e.g., hierarchical) planning and reasoning. Guided by algorithmic information theory, we describe RNN-based AIs (RNNAIs) designed to do the same. Such an RNNAI can be trained on never-ending sequences of tasks, some of them provided by the user, others invented by the RNNAI itself in a curious, playful fashion, to improve its RNN-based world model. Unlike our previous model-building RNN-based RL machines dating back to 1990, the RNNAI learns to actively query its model for abstract reasoning and planning and decision making, essentially "learning to think." The basic ideas of this report can be applied to many other cases where one RNN-like system exploits the algorithmic information content of another. They are taken from a grant proposal submitted in Fall 2014, and also explain concepts such as "mirror neurons." Experimental results will be described in separate papers. Rapid progress in machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) has brought increasing attention to the potential impacts of AI technologies on society. In this paper we discuss one such potential impact: the problem of accidents in machine learning systems, defined as unintended and harmful behavior that may emerge from poor design of real-world AI systems. We present a list of five practical research problems related to accident risk, categorized according to whether the problem originates from having the wrong objective function ("avoiding side effects" and "avoiding reward hacking"), an objective function that is too expensive to evaluate frequently ("scalable supervision"), or undesirable behavior during the learning process ("safe exploration" and "distributional shift"). We review previous work in these areas as well as suggesting research directions with a focus on relevance to cutting-edge AI systems. Finally, we consider the high-level question of how to think most productively about the safety of forward-looking applications of AI. Recent successes in reinforcement learning have lead to the development of complex controllers for realworld robots. As these robots are deployed in safety-critical applications and interact with humans, it becomes critical to ensure safety in order to avoid causing harm. A first step in this direction is to test the controllers in simulation. To be able to do this, we need to capture what we mean by safety and then efficiently search the space of all behaviors to see if they are safe. In this paper, we present an active-testing framework based on Bayesian Optimization. We specify safety constraints using logic and exploit structure in the problem in order to test the system for adversarial counter examples that violate the safety specifications. These specifications are defined as complex boolean combinations of smooth functions on the trajectories and, unlike reward functions in reinforcement learning, are expressive and impose hard constraints on the system. In our framework, we exploit regularity assumptions on individual functions in form of a Gaussian Process (GP) prior. We combine these into a coherent optimization framework using problem structure. The resulting algorithm is able to provably verify complex safety specifications or alternatively find counter examples. Experimental results show that the proposed method is able to find adversarial examples quickly.