We consider crowdsourcing problems where the users are asked to provide evaluations for items; the user evaluations are then used directly, or aggregated into a consensus value. Lacking an incentive scheme, users have no motive in making effort in completing the evaluations, providing inaccurate answers instead. We propose incentive schemes that are truthful and cheap: truthful as the optimal user behavior consists in providing accurate evaluations, and cheap because the truthfulness is achieved with little overhead cost. We consider both discrete evaluation tasks, where an evaluation can be done either correctly, or incorrectly, with no degrees of approximation in between, and quantitative evaluation tasks, where evaluations are real numbers, and the error is measured as distance from the correct value. For both types of tasks, we propose hierarchical incentive schemes that can be effected with a small amount of additional evaluations, and that scale to arbitrarily large crowd sizes: they have the property that the strength of the incentive does not weaken with increasing hierarchy depth. Interestingly, we show that for these schemes to work, the only requisite is that workers know their place in the hierarchy in advance.
The PeerRank method proposed in @cite_32 obtains the final grades of students using a fixed point equation similar to the PageRank method. However, while it encourages precision, it does not provide a strategyproof method for the scenario that students collude to game the system without making the effort to grade truthfully.
@cite_32
1925706653 2950051380 2122588206 2088700588
We propose the PeerRank method for peer assessment. This constructs a grade for an agent based on the grades proposed by the agents evaluating the agent. Since the grade of an agent is a measure of their ability to grade correctly, the PeerRank method weights grades by the grades of the grading agent. The PeerRank method also provides an incentive for agents to grade correctly. As the grades of an agent depend on the grades of the grading agents, and as these grades themselves depend on the grades of other agents, we define the PeerRank method by a fixed point equation similar to the PageRank method for ranking web-pages. We identify some formal properties of the PeerRank method (for example, it satisfies axioms of unanimity, no dummy, no discrimination and symmetry), discuss some examples, compare with related work and evaluate the performance on some synthetic data. Our results show considerable promise, reducing the error in grade predictions by a factor of 2 or more in many cases over the natural baseline of averaging peer grades. We propose the PeerRank method for peer assessment. This constructs a grade for an agent based on the grades proposed by the agents evaluating the agent. Since the grade of an agent is a measure of their ability to grade correctly, the PeerRank method weights grades by the grades of the grading agent. The PeerRank method also provides an incentive for agents to grade correctly. As the grades of an agent depend on the grades of the grading agents, and as these grades themselves depend on the grades of other agents, we define the PeerRank method by a fixed point equation similar to the PageRank method for ranking web-pages. We identify some formal properties of the PeerRank method (for example, it satisfies axioms of unanimity, no dummy, no discrimination and symmetry), discuss some examples, compare with related work and evaluate the performance on some synthetic data. Our results show considerable promise, reducing the error in grade predictions by a factor of 2 or more in many cases over the natural baseline of averaging peer grades. In massive open online courses (MOOCs), peer grading serves as a critical tool for scaling the grading of complex, open-ended assignments to courses with tens or hundreds of thousands of students. But despite promising initial trials, it does not always deliver accurate results compared to human experts. In this paper, we develop algorithms for estimating and correcting for grader biases and reliabilities, showing significant improvement in peer grading accuracy on real data with 63,199 peer grades from Coursera's HCI course offerings --- the largest peer grading networks analysed to date. We relate grader biases and reliabilities to other student factors such as student engagement, performance as well as commenting style. We also show that our model can lead to more intelligent assignment of graders to gradees. Peer and self-assessment offer an opportunity to scale both assessment and learning to global classrooms. This article reports our experiences with two iterations of the first large online class to use peer and self-assessment. In this class, peer grades correlated highly with staff-assigned grades. The second iteration had 42.9p of students’ grades within 5p of the staff grade, and 65.5p within 10p. On average, students assessed their work 7p higher than staff did. Students also rated peers’ work from their own country 3.6p higher than those from elsewhere. We performed three experiments to improve grading accuracy. We found that giving students feedback about their grading bias increased subsequent accuracy. We introduce short, customizable feedback snippets that cover common issues with assignments, providing students more qualitative peer feedback. Finally, we introduce a data-driven approach that highlights high-variance items for improvement. We find that rubrics that use a parallel sentence structure, unambiguous wording, and well-specified dimensions have lower variance. After revising rubrics, median grading error decreased from 12.4p to 9.9p.