To enjoy more social network services, users nowadays are usually involved in multiple online social networks simultaneously. The shared users between different networks are called anchor users, while the remaining unshared users are named as non-anchor users. Connections between accounts of anchor users in different networks are defined as anchor links and networks partially aligned by anchor links can be represented as partially aligned networks. In this paper, we want to predict anchor links between partially aligned social networks, which is formally defined as the partial network alignment problem. The partial network alignment problem is very difficult to solve because of the following two challenges: (1) the lack of general features for anchor links, and (2) the "one-to-one @math " (one to at most one) constraint on anchor links. To address these two challenges, a new method PNA (Partial Network Aligner) is proposed in this paper. PNA (1) extracts a set of explicit anchor adjacency features and latent topological features for anchor links based on the anchor meta path concept and tensor decomposition techniques, and (2) utilizes the generic stable matching to identify the non-anchor users to prune the redundant anchor links attached to them. Extensive experiments conducted on two real-world partially aligned social networks demonstrate that PNA can solve the partial network alignment problem very well and outperform all the other comparison methods with significant advantages.
College admission problem @cite_33 and stable marriage problem @cite_40 have been studied for many years and lots of works have been done in the last century. In recent years, some new papers have come out in these areas. @cite_43 propose to analyze the stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules. Ma @cite_52 analyzes the truncation in stable matching and the small core in nash equilibrium in college admission problems. Flor ' e @cite_23 propose to study the almost stable matching by truncating the Gale-Shapley algorithm.
@cite_33 @cite_52 @cite_43 @cite_40 @cite_23
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Both rematching proof and strong equilibrium outcomes are stable with respect to the true preferences in the marriage problem. We show that not all rematching proof or strong equilibrium outcomes are stable in the college admissions problem. But we show that both rematching proof and strong equilibrium outcomes in truncations at the match point are all stable in the college admissions problem. Further, all true stable matchings can be achieved in both rematching proof and strong equilibrium in truncations at the match point. We show that any Nash equilibrium in truncations admits one and only one matching, stable or not. Therefore, the core at a Nash equilibrium in truncations must be small. But examples exist such that the set of stable matchings with respect to a Nash equilibrium may contain more than one matching. Nevertheless, each Nash equilibrium can only admit at most one true stable matching. If, indeed, there is a true stable matching at a Nash equilibrium, then the only possible equilibrium outcome will be the true stable matching, no matter how different are players' equilibrium strategies from the true preferences and how many other unstable matchings are there at that Nash equilibrium. Thus, we show that a necessary and sufficient condition for the stable matching rule to be implemented in a subset of Nash equilibria by the direct revelation game induced by a stable mechanism is that every Nash equilibrium profile in that subset admits one and only one true stable matching. We study strategic issues in the Gale-Shapley stable marriage model. In the first part of the paper, we derive the optimal cheating strategy and show that it is not always possible for a woman to recover her women-optimal stable partner from the men-optimal stable matching mechanism when she can only cheat by permuting her preferences. In fact, we show, using simulation, that the chances that a woman can benefit from cheating are slim. In the second part of the paper, we consider a two-sided matching market found in Singapore. We study the matching mechanism used by the Ministry of Education (MOE) in the placement of primary six students in secondary schools, and discuss why the current method has limited success in accommodating the preferences of the students, and the specific needs of the schools (in terms of the “mix” of admitted students). Using insights from the first part of the paper, we show that stable matching mechanisms are more appropriate in this matching market and explain why the strategic behavior of the students need not be a major concern. (Stable Marriage; Strategic Issues; Gale-Shapley Algorithm; Student Posting Exercise) The original work of Gale and Shapley on an assignment method using the stable marriage criterion has been extended to find all the stable marriage assignments. The algorithm derived for finding all the stable marriage assignments is proved to satisfy all the conditions of the problem. Algorithm 411 applies to this paper. Abstract Two-sided matching markets of the kind known as the “college admissions problem” have been widely thought to be virtually equivalent to the simpler “marriage problem” for which some striking results concerning agents' preferences and incentives have been recently obtained. It is shown here that some of these results do not generalize to the college admissions problem, contrary to a number of assertions in the recent literature. No stable matching procedure exists that makes it a dominant strategy for colleges to reveal their true preferences, and some outcomes may be preferred by all colleges to the college-optimal stable outcome.