We design an expected polynomial-time, truthful-in-expectation, (1-1 e)-approximation mechanism for welfare maximization in a fundamental class of combinatorial auctions. Our results apply to bidders with valuations that are m matroid rank sums (MRS), which encompass most concrete examples of submodular functions studied in this context, including coverage functions, matroid weighted-rank functions, and convex combinations thereof. Our approximation factor is the best possible, even for known and explicitly given coverage valuations, assuming P != NP. Ours is the first truthful-in-expectation and polynomial-time mechanism to achieve a constant-factor approximation for an NP-hard welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions with heterogeneous goods and restricted valuations. Our mechanism is an instantiation of a new framework for designing approximation mechanisms based on randomized rounding algorithms. A typical such algorithm first optimizes over a fractional relaxation of the original problem, and then randomly rounds the fractional solution to an integral one. With rare exceptions, such algorithms cannot be converted into truthful mechanisms. The high-level idea of our mechanism design framework is to optimize directly over the (random) output of the rounding algorithm, rather than over the input to the rounding algorithm. This approach leads to truthful-in-expectation mechanisms, and these mechanisms can be implemented efficiently when the corresponding objective function is concave. For bidders with MRS valuations, we give a novel randomized rounding algorithm that leads to both a concave objective function and a (1-1 e)-approximation of the optimal welfare.
The aforementioned works @cite_15 @cite_9 are precursors to our general design framework that optimizes directly over the output of a randomized rounding algorithm. In the framework of Lavi and Swamy @cite_9 , the input to and output of the rounding algorithm are assumed to coincide up to a scaling factor, so optimizing over its input (as they do) is equivalent to optimizing over its output (as we do). In the result of @cite_15 , optimizing with respect to their proxy bidders'' is equivalent to optimizing over the output of a particular randomized rounding algorithm.
@cite_9 @cite_15
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We design an expected polynomial time, truthful in expectation, (1-1 e)-approximation mechanism for welfare maximization in a fundamental class of combinatorial auctions. Our results apply to bidders with valuations that are matroid rank sums (MRS), which encompass most concrete examples of submodular functions studied in this context, including coverage functions and matroid weighted-rank functions. Our approximation factor is the best possible, even for known and explicitly given coverage valuations, assuming P ≠ NP. Ours is the first truthful-in-expectation and polynomial-time mechanism to achieve a constant-factor approximation for an NP-hard welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions with heterogeneous goods and restricted valuations. Our mechanism is an instantiation of a new framework for designing approximation mechanisms based on randomized rounding algorithms. A typical such algorithm first optimizes over a fractional relaxation of the original problem, and then randomly rounds the fractional solution to an integral one. With rare exceptions, such algorithms cannot be converted into truthful mechanisms. The high-level idea of our mechanism design framework is to optimize directly over the (random) output of the rounding algorithm, rather than over the input to the rounding algorithm. This approach leads to truthful-in-expectation mechanisms, and these mechanisms can be implemented efficiently when the corresponding objective function is concave. For bidders with MRS valuations, we give a novel randomized rounding algorithm that leads to both a concave objective function and a (1-1 e)-approximation of the optimal welfare. We study a generic framework that provides a unified view on two important classes of problems: (i) extensions of the k-median problem where clients are interested in having multiple facilities in their vicinity (e.g., due to the fact that, with some small probability, the closest facility might be malfunctioning and so might not be available for using), and (ii) finding winners according to some appealing multiwinner election rules, i.e., election system aimed for choosing representatives bodies, such as parliaments, based on preferences of a population of voters over individual candidates. Each problem in our framework is associated with a vector of weights: we show that the approximability of the problem depends on structural properties of these vectors. We specifically focus on the harmonic sequence of weights for which the objective function interpreted in a multiwinner election setup reflects to the well-known Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) rule. Our main result is that, due to the specific (harmonic) structure of weights, the problem allows constant factor approximation. This is surprising since the problem can be interpreted as a variant of the k-median problem where we do not assume that the connection costs satisfy the triangle inequality. The algorithm we propose is based on dependent rounding [Srinivasan, FOCS'01] applied to the solution of a natural LP-relaxation of the problem. The rounding process is well known to produce distributions over integral solutions satisfying Negative Correlation (NC), which is usually sufficient for the analysis of approximation guarantees offered by rounding procedures. In our analysis, however, we need to use the fact that the carefully implemented rounding process satisfies a stronger property, called Negative Association (NA), which allows us to apply standard concentration bounds for conditional random variables. The Lova´sz local lemma due to Erdods and Lova´sz (Infinite and Finite Sets, Colloq. Math. Soc. J. Bolyai 11, 1975, pp. 609-627) is a powerful tool in proving the existence of rare events. We present an extension of this lemma, which works well when the event to be shown to exist is a conjunction of individual events, each of which asserts that a random variable does not deviate much from its mean. As applications, we consider two classes of NP-hard integer programs: minimax and covering integer programs. A key technique, randomized rounding of linear relaxations, was developed by Raghavan and Thompson (Combinatorica, 7 (1987), pp. 365-374) to derive good approximation algorithms for such problems. We use our extension of the local lemma to prove that randomized rounding produces, with nonzero probability, much better feasible solutions than known before, if the constraint matrices of these integer programs are column-sparse (e.g., routing using short paths, problems on hypergraphs with small dimension degree). This complements certain well-known results from discrepancy theory. We also generalize the method of pessimistic estimators due to Raghavan (J. Comput. System Sci., 37 (1988), pp. 130-143), to obtain constructive (algorithmic) versions of our results for covering integer programs. Several important NP-hard combinatorial optimization problems can be posed as packing covering integer programs; the randomized rounding technique of Raghavan and Thompson is a powerful tool with which to approximate them well. We present one elementary unifying property of all these integer linear programs and use the FKG correlation inequality to derive an improved analysis of randomized rounding on them. This yields a pessimistic estimator, thus presenting deterministic polynomial-time algorithms for them with approximation guarantees that are significantly better than those known.