Many electoral bribery, control, and manipulation problems (which we will refer to in general as "manipulative actions" problems) are NP-hard in the general case. It has recently been noted that many of these problems fall into polynomial time if the electorate is single-peaked (i.e., is polarized along some axis issue). However, real-world electorates are not truly single-peaked. There are usually some mavericks, and so real-world electorates tend to merely be nearly single-peaked. This paper studies the complexity of manipulative-action algorithms for elections over nearly single-peaked electorates, for various notions of nearness and various election systems. We provide instances where even one maverick jumps the manipulative-action complexity up to @math -hardness, but we also provide many instances where a reasonable number of mavericks can be tolerated without increasing the manipulative-action complexity.
The four papers most related to the present one are the following. insightfully raised the idea that general complexity results may change in single-peaked societies. His manipulative-action example (STV) actually provides a case where single-peakedness fails to lower manipulation complexity, but in a different context he did find a lowering of complexity for single-peakedness. The papers , the first of which was in the TARK conference, then broadly explored the effect of single-peakedness on manipulative actions. These three papers are all in the model of (perfect) single-peakedness. , in the context of preference elicitation, raised and experimentally studied the issue of single-peaked societies. also discussed nearness to single-peakedness, and the papers @cite_3 @cite_2 both raise as open issues whether shield-evaporation (complexity) results for single-peakedness will withstand near-single-peakedness. The present paper seeks to bring the nearly single-peaked'' lens to the study of manipulative actions.
@cite_3 @cite_2
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Manipulation, bribery, and control are well-studied ways of changing the outcome of an election. Many voting systems are, in the general case, computationally resistant to some of these manipulative actions. However when restricted to single-peaked electorates, these systems suddenly become easy to manipulate. Recently, Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra (2011b) studied the complexity of dishonest behavior in nearly single-peaked electorates. These are electorates that are not single-peaked but close to it according to some distance measure. In this paper we introduce several new distance measures regarding single-peakedness. We prove that determining whether a given profile is nearly single-peaked is NP-complete in many cases. For one case we present a polynomial-time algorithm. Furthermore, we explore the relations between several notions of nearly single-peakedness. For many election systems, bribery (and related) attacks have been shown NP-hard using constructions on combinatorially rich structures such as partitions and covers. This paper shows that for voters who follow the most central political-science model of electorates-- single-peaked preferences--those hardness protections vanish. By using single-peaked preferences to simplify combinatorial covering challenges, we for the first time show that NP-hard bribery problems--including those for Kemeny and Llull elections--fall to polynomial time for single-peaked electorates. By using single-peaked preferences to simplify combinatorial partition challenges, we for the first time show that NP-hard partition-of-voters problems fall to polynomial time for single-peaked electorates. We show that for single-peaked electorates, the winner problems for Dodgson and Kemeny elections, though Θ2p-complete in the general case, fall to polynomial time. And we completely classify the complexity of weighted coalition manipulation for scoring protocols in single-peaked electorates. Many electoral control and manipulation problems-which we will refer to in general as ''manipulative actions'' problems-are NP-hard in the general case. It has recently been noted that many of these problems fall into polynomial time if the electorate is single-peaked, i.e., is polarized along some axis issue. However, real-world electorates are not truly single-peaked. There are usually some mavericks, and so real-world electorates tend merely to be nearly single-peaked. This paper studies the complexity of manipulative-action algorithms for elections over nearly single-peaked electorates. We do this for many notions of nearness and for a broad range of election systems. We provide instances where even one maverick jumps the manipulative-action complexity up to NP-hardness, but we also provide many instances where some number of mavericks can be tolerated without increasing the manipulative-action complexity. Random graph models with limited choice have been studied extensively with the goal of understanding the mechanism of the emergence of the giant component. One of the standard models are the Achlioptas random graph processes on a fixed set of (n ) vertices. Here at each step, one chooses two edges uniformly at random and then decides which one to add to the existing configuration according to some criterion. An important class of such rules are the bounded-size rules where for a fixed (K 1 ), all components of size greater than (K ) are treated equally. While a great deal of work has gone into analyzing the subcritical and supercritical regimes, the nature of the critical scaling window, the size and complexity (deviation from trees) of the components in the critical regime and nature of the merging dynamics has not been well understood. In this work we study such questions for general bounded-size rules. Our first main contribution is the construction of an extension of Aldous’s standard multiplicative coalescent process which describes the asymptotic evolution of the vector of sizes and surplus of all components. We show that this process, referred to as the standard augmented multiplicative coalescent (AMC) is ‘nearly’ Feller with a suitable topology on the state space. Our second main result proves the convergence of suitably scaled component size and surplus vector, for any bounded-size rule, to the standard AMC. This result is new even for the classical Erdős–Renyi setting. The key ingredients here are a precise analysis of the asymptotic behavior of various susceptibility functions near criticality and certain bounds from (The barely subcritical regime. Arxiv preprint, 2012) on the size of the largest component in the barely subcritical regime.