In this paper, we present a link between preference-based and multiobjective sequential decision-making. While transforming a multiobjective problem to a preference-based one is quite natural, the other direction is a bit less obvious. We present how this transformation (from preference-based to multiobjective) can be done under the classic condition that preferences over histories can be represented by additively decomposable utilities and that the decision criterion to evaluate policies in a state is based on expectation. This link yields a new source of multiobjective sequential decision-making problems (i.e., when reward values are unknown) and justifies the use of solving methods developed in one setting in the other one.
Another approach related to the first one is to consider refinements of Pareto dominance, such as Lorenz dominance (which models a certain notion of fairness) or lexicographic order @cite_2 @cite_5 . In fact, with Lorenz dominance, the set of optimal value functions may still be exponential in the size of the state and action spaces. Again, one may therefore prefer to determine its @math -cover @cite_22 in practice.
@cite_5 @cite_22 @cite_2
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This paper deals with fair assignment problems in decision contexts involving multiple agents. In such problems, each agent has its own evaluation of costs and we want to find a fair compromise solution between individual point of views. Lorenz dominance is a standard decision model used in Economics to refine Pareto dominance while favoring solutions that fairly share happiness among agents. In order to enhance the discrimination possibilities offered by Lorenz dominance, we introduce here a new model called infinite order Lorenz dominance. We establish a representation result for this model using an ordered weighted average with decreasing weights. Hence we exhibit some properties of infinite order Lorenz dominance that explain how fairness is achieved in the aggregation of individual preferences. Then we explain how to solve fair assignment problems of m items to n agents, using infinite order Lorenz dominance and other models used for measuring inequalities. We show that this problem can be reformulated as a 0--1 non-linear optimization problems that can be solved, after a linearization step, by standard LP solvers. We provide numerical results showing the efficiency of the proposed approach on various instances of the paper assignment problem. This paper is devoted to fair optimization in Multiobjective Markov Decision Processes (MOMDPs). A MOMDP is an extension of the MDP model for planning under uncertainty while trying to optimize several reward functions simultaneously. This applies to multiagent problems when rewards define individual utility functions, or in multicriteria problems when rewards refer to different features. In this setting, we study the determination of policies leading to Lorenz-non-dominated tradeoffs. Lorenz dominance is a refinement of Pareto dominance that was introduced in Social Choice for the measurement of inequalities. In this paper, we introduce methods to efficiently approximate the sets of Lorenz-non-dominated solutions of infinite-horizon, discounted MOMDPs. The approximations are polynomial-sized subsets of those solutions. We consider a task of scheduling with a common deadline on a single machine. Every player reports to a scheduler the length of his job and the scheduler needs to finish as many jobs as possible by the deadline. For this simple problem, there is a truthful mechanism that achieves maximum welfare in dominant strategies. The new aspect of our work is that in our setting players are uncertain about their own job lengths, and hence are incapable of providing truthful reports (in the strict sense of the word). For a probabilistic model for uncertainty we show that even with relatively little uncertainty, no mechanism can guarantee a constant fraction of the maximum welfare. To remedy this situation, we introduce a new measure of economic efficiency, based on a notion of a fair share of a player, and design mechanisms that are Ω(1)-fair. In addition to its intrinsic appeal, our notion of fairness implies good approximation of maximum welfare in several cases of interest. In our mechanisms the machine is sometimes left idle even though there are jobs that want to use it. We show that this unfavorable aspect is unavoidable, unless one gives up other favorable aspects (e.g., give up Ω(1)-fairness). We also consider a qualitative approach to uncertainty as an alternative to the probabilistic quantitative model. In the qualitative approach we break away from solution concepts such as dominant strategies (they are no longer well defined), and instead suggest an axiomatic approach, which amounts to listing desirable properties for mechanisms. We provide a mechanism that satisfies these properties. Top-k dominating queries combine the natural idea of selecting the k best items with a comprehensive “goodness” criterion based on dominance. A point p1 dominates p2 if p1 is as good as p2 in all attributes and is strictly better in at least one. Existing works address the problem in settings where data objects are multidimensional points. However, there are domains where we only have access to the distance between two objects. In cases like these, attributes reflect distances from a set of input objects and are dynamically generated as the input objects change. Consequently, prior works from the literature cannot be applied, despite the fact that the dominance relation is still meaningful and valid. For this reason, in this work, we present the first study for processing top-k dominating queries over distance-based dynamic attribute vectors, defined over a metric space. We propose four progressive algorithms that utilize the properties of the underlying metric space to efficiently solve the problem and present an extensive, comparative evaluation on both synthetic and real-world datasets.