We present PoWerStore, the first efficient robust storage protocol that achieves optimal latency without using digital signatures. PoWerStore's robustness comprises tolerating asynchrony, maximum number of Byzantine storage servers, any number of Byzantine readers and crash-faulty writers, and guaranteeing wait-freedom and linearizability of read write operations. PoWerStore's efficiency stems from combining lightweight authentication, erasure coding and metadata write-backs where readers write-back only metadata to achieve linearizability. At the heart of PoWerStore are Proofs of Writing (PoW): a novel storage technique based on lightweight cryptography. PoW enable reads and writes in the single-writer variant of PoWerStore to have latency of 2 rounds of communication between a client and storage servers in the worst-case (which we show optimal). We further present and implement a multi-writer PoWerStore variant featuring 3-round writes reads where the third read round is invoked only under active attacks, and show that it outperforms existing robust storage protocols, including crash-tolerant ones.
Clearly, there is a big gap between storage protocols that use self-verifying data and those that assume no authentication. Loft @cite_28 aims at bridging this gap and implements erasure-coded optimally resilient linearizable storage while optimizing the failure-free case. Loft uses homomorphic fingerprints and MACs; it features 3-round wait-free writes, but reads are based on data write-backs and are only obstruction-free @cite_20 , i.e., the number of read rounds is unbounded in case of read write concurrency. Similarly, our (PoW) incorporate lightweight authentication that is, however, sufficient to achieve optimal latency and to facilitate metadata write-backs. We find PoW to be a fundamental improvement in the light of BFT storage implementations that explicitly renounce linearizability in favor of weaker regularity due to the high cost of data write-backs @cite_39 .
@cite_28 @cite_20 @cite_39
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We study the time-complexity of robust atomic read write storage from fault-prone storage components in asynchronous message-passing systems. Robustness here means wait-free tolerating the largest possible number t of Byzantine storage component failures (optimal resilience) without relying on data authentication. We show that no single-writer multiple-reader (SWMR) robust atomic storage implementation exists if (a) read operations complete in less than four communication round-trips (rounds), and (b) the time complexity of write operations is constant. More precisely, we present two lower bounds. The first is a read lower bound stating that three rounds of communication are necessary to read from a SWMR robust atomic storage. The second is a write lower bound, showing that Ω(log(t)) write rounds are necessary to read in three rounds from such a storage. Applied to known results, our lower bounds close a fundamental gap: we show that time-optimal robust atomic storage can be obtained using well-known transformations from regular to atomic storage and existing time-optimal regular storage implementations. This paper describes a decentralized consistency protocol for survivable storage that exploits local data versioning within each storage-node. Such versioning enables the protocol to efficiently provide linearizability and wait-freedom of read and write operations to erasure-coded data in asynchronous environments with Byzantine failures of clients and servers. By exploiting versioning storage-nodes, the protocol shifts most work to clients and allows highly optimistic operation: reads occur in a single round-trip unless clients observe concurrency or write failures. Measurements of a storage system prototype using this protocol show that it scales well with the number of failures tolerated, and its performance compares favorably with an efficient implementation of Byzantine-tolerant state machine replication. Erasure codes such as Reed-Solomon (RS) codes are being extensively deployed in data centers since they offer significantly higher reliability than data replication methods at much lower storage overheads. These codes however mandate much higher resources with respect to network bandwidth and disk IO during reconstruction of data that is missing or otherwise unavailable. Existing solutions to this problem either demand additional storage space or severely limit the choice of the system parameters. In this paper, we present "Hitchhiker", a new erasure-coded storage system that reduces both network traffic and disk IO by around 25 to 45 during reconstruction of missing or otherwise unavailable data, with no additional storage, the same fault tolerance, and arbitrary flexibility in the choice of parameters, as compared to RS-based systems. Hitchhiker 'rides' on top of RS codes, and is based on novel encoding and decoding techniques that will be presented in this paper. We have implemented Hitchhiker in the Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS). When evaluating various metrics on the data-warehouse cluster in production at Facebook with real-time traffic and workloads, during reconstruction, we observe a 36 reduction in the computation time and a 32 reduction in the data read time, in addition to the 35 reduction in network traffic and disk IO. Hitchhiker can thus reduce the latency of degraded reads and perform faster recovery from failed or decommissioned machines. We present a novel approach to proving the absence of timing channels. The idea is to partition the programâ s execution traces in such a way that each partition component is checked for timing attack resilience by a time complexity analysis and that per-component resilience implies the resilience of the whole program. We construct a partition by splitting the program traces at secret-independent branches. This ensures that any pair of traces with the same public input has a component containing both traces. Crucially, the per-component checks can be normal safety properties expressed in terms of a single execution. Our approach is thus in contrast to prior approaches, such as self-composition, that aim to reason about multiple (kâ � 2) executions at once. We formalize the above as an approach called quotient partitioning, generalized to any k-safety property, and prove it to be sound. A key feature of our approach is a demand-driven partitioning strategy that uses a regex-like notion called trails to identify sets of execution traces, particularly those influenced by tainted (or secret) data. We have applied our technique in a prototype implementation tool called Blazer, based on WALA, PPL, and the brics automaton library. We have proved timing-channel freedom of (or synthesized an attack specification for) 24 programs written in Java bytecode, including 6 classic examples from the literature and 6 examples extracted from the DARPA STAC challenge problems.