Voting is a simple mechanism to aggregate the preferences of agents. Many voting rules have been shown to be NP-hard to manipulate. However, a number of recent theoretical results suggest that this complexity may only be in the worst-case since manipulation is often easy in practice. In this paper, we show that empirical studies are useful in improving our understanding of this issue. We demonstrate that there is a smooth transition in the probability that a coalition can elect a desired candidate using the veto rule as the size of the manipulating coalition increases. We show that a rescaled probability curve displays a simple and universal form independent of the size of the problem. We argue that manipulation of the veto rule is asymptotically easy for many independent and identically distributed votes even when the coalition of manipulators is critical in size. Based on this argument, we identify a situation in which manipulation is computationally hard. This is when votes are highly correlated and the election is "hung". We show, however, that even a single uncorrelated voter is enough to make manipulation easy again.
Coleman and Teague provide polynomial algorithms to compute a manipulation for the STV rule when either the number of voters or the number of candidates is fixed @cite_7 . They also conducted an empirical study which demonstrates that only relatively small coalitions are needed to change the elimination order of the STV rule. They observe that most uniform and random elections are not trivially manipulable using a simple greedy heuristic.
@cite_7
1618180659 1972375916 1644339822 2123942784
We study the manipulation of voting schemes, where a voter lies about their preferences in the hope of improving the election's outcome. All voting schemes are potentially manipulable. However, some, such as the Single Transferable Vote (STV) scheme used in Australian elections, are resistant to manipulation because it is NP-hard to compute the manipulating vote(s). We concentrate on STV and some natural generalisations of it called Scoring Elimination Protocols. We show that the hardness result for STV is true only if both the number of voters and the number of candidates are unbounded---we provide algorithms for a manipulation if either of these is fixed. This means that manipulation would not be hard in practice when either number is small. Next we show that the weighted version of the manipulation problem is NP-hard for all Scoring Elimination Protocols except one, which we provide an algorithm for manipulating. Finally we experimentally test a heuristic for solving the manipulation problem and conclude that it would not usually be effective. In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal results have shown that all general voting protocols are manipulable. One could try to avoid manipulation by using protocols where determining a beneficial manipulation is hard. Especially among computational agents, it is reasonable to measure this hardness by computational complexity. Some earlier work has been done in this area, but it was assumed that the number of voters and candidates is unbounded. Such hardness results lose relevance when the number of candidates is small, because manipulation algorithms that are exponential only in the number of candidates (and only slightly so) might be available. We give such an algorithm for an individual agent to manipulate the Single Transferable Vote (STV) protocol, which has been shown hard to manipulate in the above sense. This motivates the core of this article, which derives hardness results for realistic elections where the number of candidates is a small constant (but the number of voters can be large). The main manipulation question we study is that of coalitional manipulation by weighted voters. (We show that for simpler manipulation problems, manipulation cannot be hard with few candidates.) We study both constructive manipulation (making a given candidate win) and destructive manipulation (making a given candidate not win). We characterize the exact number of candidates for which manipulation becomes hard for the plurality, Borda, STV, Copeland, maximin, veto, plurality with runoff, regular cup, and randomized cup protocols. We also show that hardness of manipulation in this setting implies hardness of manipulation by an individual in unweighted settings when there is uncertainty about the others' votes (but not vice-versa). To our knowledge, these are the first results on the hardness of manipulation when there is uncertainty about the others' votes. In this paper, we propose a framework to study a general class of strategic behavior in voting, which we call vote operations. We prove the following theorem: if we fix the number of alternatives, generate @math votes i.i.d. according to a distribution @math , and let @math go to infinity, then for any @math , with probability at least @math , the minimum number of operations that are needed for the strategic individual to achieve her goal falls into one of the following four categories: (1) 0, (2) @math , (3) @math , and (4) @math . This theorem holds for any set of vote operations, any individual vote distribution @math , and any integer generalized scoring rule, which includes (but is not limited to) almost all commonly studied voting rules, e.g., approval voting, all positional scoring rules (including Borda, plurality, and veto), plurality with runoff, Bucklin, Copeland, maximin, STV, and ranked pairs. We also show that many well-studied types of strategic behavior fall under our framework, including (but not limited to) constructive destructive manipulation, bribery, and control by adding deleting votes, margin of victory, and minimum manipulation coalition size. Therefore, our main theorem naturally applies to these problems. In 1992, Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick opened the study of control attacks on elections-- attempts to improve the election outcome by such actions as adding deleting candidates or voters. That work has led to many results on how algorithms can be used to find attacks on elections and how complexity-theoretic hardness results can be used as shields against attacks. However, all the work in this line has assumed that the attacker employs just a single type of attack. In this paper, we model and study the case in which the attacker launches a multipronged (i.e., multimode) attack. We do so to more realistically capture the richness of real-life settings. For example, an attacker might simultaneously try to suppress some voters, attract new voters into the election, and introduce a spoiler candidate. Our model provides a unified framework for such varied attacks. By constructing polynomialtime multiprong attack algorithms we prove that for various election systems even such concerted, flexible attacks can be perfectly planned in deterministic polynomial time.