This paper investigates the energy-efficient power allocation for a two-tier, underlaid femtocell network. The behaviors of the Macrocell Base Station (MBS) and the Femtocell Users (FUs) are modeled hierarchically as a Stackelberg game. The MBS guarantees its own QoS requirement by charging the FUs individually according to the cross-tier interference, and the FUs responds by controlling the local transmit power non-cooperatively. Due to the limit of information exchange in intra- and inter-tiers, a self-learning based strategy-updating mechanism is proposed for each user to learn the equilibrium strategies. In the same Stackelberg-game framework, two different scenarios based on the continuous and discrete power profiles for the FUs are studied, respectively. The self-learning schemes in the two scenarios are designed based on the local best response. By studying the properties of the proposed game in the two situations, the convergence property of the learning schemes is provided. The simulation results are provided to support the theoretical finding in different situations of the proposed game, and the efficiency of the learning schemes is validated.
When it comes to the resource allocation in hierarchical networks, such as the femtocell networks and cognitive radio networks, the Stackelberg game @cite_7 based modeling is widely preferred since it is able to reflect the features of hierarchy and ad-hoc topology in the network @cite_17 @cite_4 . the Stackelberg game is characterized by the sequential decision making manner (namely, the follower-leader strategy updating), and hence suitable for modeling the heterogeneous user behaviors in the network. Due to the computational intensity for obtaining the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE), most of the existing studies @cite_8 @cite_18 @cite_5 adopt a utility model that favors the derivation of a closed-form SE, and solve for the SEs through transforming the games as hierarchical optimization problems.
@cite_18 @cite_4 @cite_7 @cite_8 @cite_5 @cite_17
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This paper tackles the problem of joint users’ uplink transmission power and data rate allocation in multi-service two-tier femtocell networks. Each user—either macrocell (MUE) or femtocell user equipment (FUE)—is associated with a two-variable utility function that represents his perceived satisfaction with respect to his allocated resources (i.e., power and rate). User's utility function is differentiated based both on the tier that the user belongs to and the service he requests. The joint resource allocation problem is directly confronted as a two-variable optimization problem and formulated as a non-cooperative game. The theory of supermodular games is utilized towards treating the two-variable optimization problem and the inherent multidimensional competition that arises among the users. The existence of proposed game's Nash Equilibrium (NE) point is analytically shown, while game's convergence to its NE point is proven. A distributed and iterative algorithm for computing the desired NE is introduced, where the optimal values of each user's uplink transmission power and data rate are simultaneously updated at the same step. The performance of the proposed approach is evaluated via modeling and simulation and its superiority compared to other state of the art approaches is illustrated. How do we build multiagent algorithms for agent interactions with human adversaries? Stackelberg games are natural models for many important applications that involve human interaction, such as oligopolistic markets and security domains. In Stackelberg games, one player, the leader, commits to a strategy and the follower makes their decision with knowledge of the leader's commitment. Existing algorithms for Stackelberg games efficiently find optimal solutions (leader strategy), but they critically assume that the follower plays optimally. Unfortunately, in real-world applications, agents face human followers (adversaries) who --- because of their bounded rationality and limited observation of the leader strategy --- may deviate from their expected optimal response. Not taking into account these likely deviations when dealing with human adversaries can cause an unacceptable degradation in the leader's reward, particularly in security applications where these algorithms have seen real-world deployment. To address this crucial problem, this paper introduces three new mixed-integer linear programs (MILPs) for Stackelberg games to consider human adversaries, incorporating: (i) novel anchoring theories on human perception of probability distributions and (ii) robustness approaches for MILPs to address human imprecision. Since these new approaches consider human adversaries, traditional proofs of correctness or optimality are insufficient; instead, it is necessary to rely on empirical validation. To that end, this paper considers two settings based on real deployed security systems, and compares 6 different approaches (three new with three previous approaches), in 4 different observability conditions, involving 98 human subjects playing 1360 games in total. The final conclusion was that a model which incorporates both the ideas of robustness and anchoring achieves statistically significant better rewards and also maintains equivalent or faster solution speeds compared to existing approaches. This paper investigates price-based resource allocation strategies for two-tier femtocell networks, in which a central macrocell is underlaid with distributed femtocells, all operating over the same frequency band. Assuming that the macrocell base station (MBS) protects itself by pricing the interference from femtocell users, a Stackelberg game is formulated to study the joint utility maximization of the macrocell and femtocells subject to a maximum tolerable interference power constraint at the MBS. Two practical femtocell network models are investigated: sparsely deployed scenario for rural areas and densely deployed scenario for urban areas. For each scenario, two pricing schemes: uniform pricing and non-uniform pricing, are proposed. The Stackelberg equilibriums for the proposed games are characterized, and an effective distributed interference price bargaining algorithm with guaranteed convergence is proposed for the uniform-pricing case. Numerical examples are presented to verify the proposed studies. It is shown that the proposed schemes are effective in resource allocation and macrocell protection for both the uplink and downlink transmissions in spectrum-sharing femtocell networks. In this paper, we study resource allocation for a multicarrier-based cognitive radio (CR) network. More specifically, we investigate the problem of secondary users’ energy-efficiency (EE) maximization problem under secondary total power and primary interference constraints. First, assuming cooperation among the secondary base stations (BSs), a centralized approach is considered to solve the EE optimization problem for the CR network where the primary and secondary users are using either orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) or filter bank based multicarrier (FBMC) modulations. We propose an alternating-based approach to solve the joint power-subcarrier allocation problem. More importantly, in the first place, subcarriers are allocated using a heuristic method for a given feasible power allocation. Then, we conservatively approximate the nonconvex power control problem and propose a joint successive convex approximation-Dinkelbach algorithm (SCADA) to efficiently obtain a solution to the nonconvex power control problem. The proposed algorithm is shown to converge to a solution that coincides with the stationary point of the original nonconvex power control subproblem. Moreover, we propose a dual decomposition-based decentralized version of the SCADA. Second, under the assumption of no cooperation among the secondary BSs, we propose a fully distributed power control algorithm from the perspective of game theory. The proposed algorithm is shown to converge to a Nash-equilibrium (NE) point. Moreover, we propose a sufficient condition that guarantees the uniqueness of the achieved NE. Extensive simulation analyses are further provided to highlight the advantages and demonstrate the efficiency of our proposed schemes.