Solitude verification is arguably one of the simplest fundamental problems in distributed computing, where the goal is to verify that there is a unique contender in a network. This paper devises a quantum algorithm that exactly solves the problem on an anonymous network, which is known as a network model with minimal assumptions [Angluin, STOC'80]. The algorithm runs in @math rounds if every party initially has the common knowledge of an upper bound @math on the number of parties. This implies that all solvable problems can be solved in @math rounds on average without error (i.e., with zero-sided error) on the network. As a generalization, a quantum algorithm that works in @math rounds is obtained for the problem of exactly computing any symmetric Boolean function, over @math distributed input bits, which is constant over all the @math bits whose sum is larger than @math for @math . All these algorithms work with the bit complexities bounded by a polynomial in @math .
See the surveys @cite_25 @cite_0 @cite_10 and the references therein for more work on distributed quantum computing.
@cite_0 @cite_10 @cite_25
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We present a brief survey of results where quantum information processing is useful to solve distributed computation tasks. We describe problems that are impossible to solve using classical resources but that become feasible with the help of quantum mechanics. We also give examples where the use of quantum information significantly reduces the need for communication. The main focus of the survey is on communication complexity but we also address other distributed tasks. We investigate a general class of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols using one-way classical communication. We show that full security can be proven by considering only collective attacks. We derive computable lower and upper bounds on the secret-key rate of those QKD protocols involving only entropies of two-qubit density operators. As an illustration of our results, we determine new bounds for the Bennett-Brassard 1984, the 6-state, and the Bennett 1992 protocols. We show that in all these cases the first classical processing that the legitimate partners should apply consists in adding noise. Algorithms such as quantum factoring1 and quantum search2 illustrate the great theoretical promise of quantum computers; but the practical implementation of such devices will require careful consideration of the minimum resource requirements, together with the development of procedures to overcome inevitable residual imperfections in physical systems3,4,5. Many designs have been proposed, but none allow a large quantum computer to be built in the near future6. Moreover, the known protocols for constructing reliable quantum computers from unreliable components can be complicated, often requiring many operations to produce a desired transformation3,4,5,7,8. Here we show how a single technique—a generalization of quantum teleportation9—reduces resource requirements for quantum computers and unifies known protocols for fault-tolerant quantum computation. We show that single quantum bit (qubit) operations, Bell-basis measurements and certain entangled quantum states such as Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger (GHZ) states10—all of which are within the reach of current technology—are sufficient to construct a universal quantum computer. We also present systematic constructions for an infinite class of reliable quantum gates that make the design of fault-tolerant quantum computers much more straightforward and methodical. We present a technique for proving the security of quantum-key-distribution (QKD) protocols. It is based on direct information-theoretic arguments and thus also applies if no equivalent entanglement purification scheme can be found. Using this technique, we investigate a general class of QKD protocols with one-way classical post-processing. We show that, in order to analyze the full security of these protocols, it suffices to consider collective attacks. Indeed, we give new lower and upper bounds on the secret-key rate which only involve entropies of two-qubit density operators and which are thus easy to compute. As an illustration of our results, we analyze the Bennett-Brassard 1984, the six-state, and the Bennett 1992 protocols with one-way error correction and privacy amplification. Surprisingly, the performance of these protocols is increased if one of the parties adds noise to the measurement data before the error correction. In particular, this additional noise makes the protocols more robust against noise in the quantum channel.