Two of the most intriguing features of quantum physics are the uncertainty principle and the occurrence of nonlocal correlations. The uncertainty principle states that there exist pairs of incompatible measurements on quantum systems such that their outcomes cannot both be predicted. On the other hand, nonlocal correlations of measurement outcomes at different locations cannot be explained by classical physics, but appear in the presence of entanglement. Here, we show that these two fundamental quantum effects are quantitatively related. Namely, we provide an entropic uncertainty relation for the outcomes of two binary measurements, where the lower bound on the uncertainty is quantified in terms of the maximum Clauser–Horne–Shimony–Holt value that can be achieved with these measurements. We discuss applications of this uncertainty relation in quantum cryptography, in particular, to certify quantum sources using untrusted devices.
Device-independent quantum key distribution @cite_36 @cite_52 @cite_22 @cite_56 @cite_23 and randomness generation @cite_58 usually bases security on a relation between nonlocality and the randomness of the outcomes relative to some (quantum) adversary. Our result allows to split the security analysis of these protocols into two parts: the nonlocality of the measured correlations first gives a bound on the uncertainty of local measurement outcomes, which in turn can be used to ensure security. The two parts can be analyzed independently and thus our methods can be used to simplify such an analysis and, potentially, reduce the required assumptions.
@cite_22 @cite_36 @cite_52 @cite_56 @cite_23 @cite_58
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In this paper, we provide a proof of unconditional security for a semi-quantum key distribution protocol introduced in a previous work. This particular protocol demonstrated the possibility of using X basis states to contribute to the raw key of the two users (as opposed to using only direct measurement results) even though a semi-quantum participant cannot directly manipulate such states. In this work, we provide a complete proof of security by deriving a lower bound of the protocol's key rate in the asymptotic scenario. Using this bound, we are able to find an error threshold value such that for all error rates less than this threshold, it is guaranteed that A and B may distill a secure secret key; for error rates larger than this threshold, A and B should abort. We demonstrate that this error threshold compares favorably to several fully quantum protocols. We also comment on some interesting observations about the behavior of this protocol under certain noise scenarios. Standard security proofs of quantum-key-distribution (QKD) protocols often rely on symmetry arguments. In this paper, we prove the security of a three-state protocol that does not possess rotational symmetry. The three-state QKD protocol we consider involves three qubit states, where the first two states @math and @math can contribute to key generation, and the third state @math is for channel estimation. This protocol has been proposed and implemented experimentally in some frequency-based QKD systems where the three states can be prepared easily. Thus, by founding on the security of this three-state protocol, we prove that these QKD schemes are, in fact, unconditionally secure against any attacks allowed by quantum mechanics. The main task in our proof is to upper bound the phase error rate of the qubits given the bit error rates observed. Unconditional security can then be proved not only for the ideal case of a single-photon source and perfect detectors, but also for the realistic case of a phase-randomized weak coherent light source and imperfect threshold detectors. Our result in the phase error rate upper bound is independent of the loss in the channel. Also, we compare the three-state protocol with the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) protocol. For the single-photon source case, our result proves that the BB84 protocol strictly tolerates a higher quantum bit error rate than the three-state protocol, while for the coherent-source case, the BB84 protocol achieves a higher key generation rate and secure distance than the three-state protocol when a decoy-state method is used. We present a technique for proving the security of quantum-key-distribution (QKD) protocols. It is based on direct information-theoretic arguments and thus also applies if no equivalent entanglement purification scheme can be found. Using this technique, we investigate a general class of QKD protocols with one-way classical post-processing. We show that, in order to analyze the full security of these protocols, it suffices to consider collective attacks. Indeed, we give new lower and upper bounds on the secret-key rate which only involve entropies of two-qubit density operators and which are thus easy to compute. As an illustration of our results, we analyze the Bennett-Brassard 1984, the six-state, and the Bennett 1992 protocols with one-way error correction and privacy amplification. Surprisingly, the performance of these protocols is increased if one of the parties adds noise to the measurement data before the error correction. In particular, this additional noise makes the protocols more robust against noise in the quantum channel. We present the optimal collective attack on a quantum key distribution protocol in the "device-independent" security scenario, where no assumptions are made about the way the quantum key distribution devices work or on what quantum system they operate. Our main result is a tight bound on the Holevo information between one of the authorized parties and the eavesdropper, as a function of the amount of violation of a Bell-type inequality.