Underground online forums are platforms that enable trades of illicit services and stolen goods. Carding forums, in particular, are known for being focused on trading financial information. However, little evidence exists about the sellers that are present on carding forums, the precise types of products they advertise, and the prices buyers pay. Existing literature mainly focuses on the organisation and structure of the forums. Furthermore, studies on carding forums are usually based on literature review, expert interviews, or data from forums that have already been shut down. This paper provides first-of-its-kind empirical evidence on active forums where stolen financial data is traded. We monitored 5 out of 25 discovered forums, collected posts from the forums over a three-month period, and analysed them quantitatively and qualitatively. We focused our analyses on products, prices, seller prolificacy, seller specialisation, and seller reputation.
Sood and Enbody @cite_15 provide a more detailed estimation of rates charged per credit card number. Numbers from the USA cost @math 10 on average, from Canada @math 7 and from the UK @math 8. Classified according to credit card types, a classic or standard credit card number from the USA or Canada costs @math 10, a gold card @math 20 and an Amex @math 10. Classic and Amex cards are the cheapest in the listing of Sood and Enbody @cite_15 . Nevertheless, they are still more expensive than the lower limits of their quoted price range ( @math 5). However, it is not ideal that these rates have not been observed but estimated and it remains unclear on which basis they have been calculated.
@cite_15
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RFID-enabled credit cards are widely deployed in the United States and other countries, but no public study has thoroughly analyzed the mechanisms that provide both security and privacy. Using samples from a variety of RFID-enabled credit cards, our study observes that (1) the cardholder's name and often credit card number and expiration are leaked in plaintext to unauthenticated readers, (2) our homemade device costing around $150 effectively clones one type of skimmed cards thus providing a proof-of-concept implementation for the RF replay attack, (3) information revealed by the RFID transmission cross contaminates the security of RFID and non-RFID payment contexts, and (4) RFID-enabled credit cards are susceptible in various degrees to a range of other traditional RFID attacks such as skimming and relaying.