in this paper we describe a method which allows agents to dynamically select protocols and roles when they need to execute collaborative tasks
Protocols selection in agents interactions design is something generally done at design time. Indeed, most of the agent-oriented design methodologies ( @cite_3 and @cite_4 to quote a few) all make designers decide which role agents should play for each single interaction. However dynamic behaviours and openness in MAS demand greater flexibility.
@cite_4 @cite_3
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Despite all the research done in the last years on the development of methodologies for designing MAS, there is no methodology suitable for the specification and design of MAS in complex domains where both the agent view and the organizational view can be modeled. Current multiagent approaches either take a centralist, static approach to organizational design or take an emergent view in which agent interactions are not pre-determined, thus making it impossible to make any predictions on the behavior of the whole systems. Most of them also lack a model of the norms in the environment that should rule the (emergent) behavior of the agent society as a whole and or the actions of individuals. In this paper, we propose a framework for modeling agent organizations, Organizational Model for Normative Institutions (OMNI), that allows the balance of global organizational requirements with the autonomy of individual agents. It specifies global goals of the system independently from those of the specific agents that populate the system. Both the norms that regulate interaction between agents, as well as the contextual meaning of those interactions are important aspects when specifying the organizational structure. We consider stationary consensus protocols for networks of dynamic agents with fixed topologies. At each time instant, each agent knows only its and its neighbors’ state, but must reach consensus on a group decision value that is function of all the agents’ initial state. We show that the agents can reach consensus if the value of such a function is time-invariant when computed over the agents’ state trajectories. We use this basic result to introduce a non-linear protocol design rule allowing consensus on a quite general set of values. Such a set includes, e.g., any generalized mean of order p of the agents’ initial states. As a second contribution we show that our protocol design is the solution of individual optimizations performed by the agents. This notion suggests a game theoretic interpretation of consensus problems as mechanism design problems. Under this perspective a supervisor entails the agents to reach a consensus by imposing individual objectives. We prove that such objectives can be chosen so that rational agents have a unique optimal protocol, and asymptotically reach consensus on a desired group decision value. We use a Lyapunov approach to prove that the asymptotical consensus can be reached when the communication links between nearby agents define a time-invariant undirected network. Finally we perform a simulation study concerning the vertical alignment maneuver of a team of unmanned air vehicles.