In the classical Maximum Acyclic Subgraph problem (MAS), given a directed-edge weighted graph, we are required to find an ordering of the nodes that maximizes the total weight of forward-directed edges. MAS admits a 2 approximation, and this approximation is optimal under the Unique Game Conjecture. In this paper we consider a generalization of MAS, the Restricted Maximum Acyclic Subgraph problem (RMAS), where each node is associated with a list of integer labels, and we have to find a labeling of the nodes so as to maximize the weight of edges whose head label is larger than the tail label. The best known (almost trivial) approximation for RMAS is 4. The interest of RMAS is mostly due to its connections with the Vertex Pricing problem (VP). In VP we are given an undirected graph with positive edge budgets. A feasible solution consists of an assignment of non-negative prices to the nodes. The profit for each edge @math is the sum of its endpoints prices if that sum is at most the budget of @math , and zero otherwise. Our goal is to maximize the total profit. The best known approximation for VP, which works analogously to the mentioned approximation algorithm for RMAS, is 4. Improving on that is a challenging open problem. On the other hand, the best known 2 inapproximability result is due to a reduction from a special case of RMAS. In this paper we present an improved LP-rounding @math approximation for RMAS. Our result shows that, in order to prove a 4 hardness of approximation result for VP (if possible), one should consider reductions from harder problems. Alternatively, our approach might suggest a different way to design approximation algorithms for VP.
Something more about MAS. How that the 2-apx work? Why does not generalize to RMAS? The intuitive argument is that for MAS the optimum is always at least @math . Our interest in RMAS is motivated by the following problem (VP): we are given an undirected (multi-) graph @math , with positive edge budgets @math . Our goal is to assign a non-negative price @math to each node @math so as to maximize the sum @math over the edges @math such that @math . @cite_10 proved that VP is @math -hard to approximate (under UGC) via a reduction from a special case of RMAS. Their reduction exploits instances of RMAS where labels are non-negative, each @math contains @math , and @math for any distinct @math . Note that such instances still generalize MAS. I meant more details about the reduction to VP. Why do you want to stress the special case of RMAS? The reductions are always special in some sense
@cite_10
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We investigate nonparametric multiproduct pricing problems, in which we want to find revenue maximizing prices for products @math based on a set of customer samples @math . We mostly focus on the unit-demand case, in which products constitute strict substitutes and each customer aims to purchase a single product. In this setting a customer sample consists of a number of nonzero values for different products and possibly an additional product ranking. Once prices are fixed, each customer chooses to buy one of the products she can afford based on some predefined selection rule. We distinguish between the min-buying, max-buying, and rank-buying models. Some of our results also extend to single-minded pricing, in which case products are strict complements and every customer seeks to buy a single set of products, which she purchases if the sum of prices is below her valuation for that set. For the min-buying model we show that the revenue maximization problem is not approximable within factor @math for some constant @math , unless @math , thereby almost closing the gap between the known algorithmic results and previous lower bounds. We also prove inapproximability within @math , @math being an upper bound on the number of nonzero values per customer, and @math under slightly stronger assumptions and provide matching upper bounds. Surprisingly, these hardness results hold even if a price ladder constraint, i.e., a predefined order on the prices of all products, is given. Without the price ladder constraint we obtain similar hardness results for the special case of uniform valuations, i.e., the case that every customer has identical values for all the products she is interested in, assuming specific hardness of the balanced bipartite independent set problem in constant degree graphs or hardness of refuting random 3CNF formulas. Introducing a slightly more general problem definition in which customers are given as an explicit probability distribution, we obtain inapproximability within @math assuming @math . These results apply to single-minded pricing as well. For the max-buying model a polynomial-time approximation scheme exists if a price ladder is given. We give a matching lower bound by proving strong NP-hardness. Assuming limited product supply, we analyze a generic local search algorithm and prove that it is 2-approximate. Finally, we discuss implications for the rank-buying model.