In this paper, computational aspects of the panel aggregation problem are addressed. Motivated primarily by applications of risk assessment, an algorithm is developed for aggregating large corpora of internally incoherent probability assessments. The algorithm is characterized by a provable performance guarantee, and is demonstrated to be orders of magnitude faster than existing tools when tested on several real-world data-sets. In addition, unexpected connections between research in risk assessment and wireless sensor networks are exposed, as several key ideas are illustrated to be useful in both fields.
Finally, proponents of Dempster-Shafer theory @cite_7 (and associated fusion rules) object to probability as an idiom for belief, in part because of its inability to distinguish uncertainty from ignorance. The merits of Dempster-Shafer aside, one could argue for abstention as an expression of ignorance. As the preceding examples illustrate, even abstaining experts may disagree (i.e., experts' forecasts may be mutually incoherent), and therefore the panel aggregation problem remains. Thus, CAP is a natural aggregation principle in the setting where judges express uncertainty with probability and ignorance through abstention, and thereby extends the utility of probabilistic forecasts by affording experts more expressive beliefs with abstention.
@cite_7
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Both in science and in practical affairs we reason by combining facts only inconclusively supported by evidence. Building on an abstract understanding of this process of combination, this book constructs a new theory of epistemic probability. The theory draws on the work of A. P. Dempster but diverges from Depster's viewpoint by identifying his "lower probabilities" as epistemic probabilities and taking his rule for combining "upper and lower probabilities" as fundamental. The book opens with a critique of the well-known Bayesian theory of epistemic probability. It then proceeds to develop an alternative to the additive set functions and the rule of conditioning of the Bayesian theory: set functions that need only be what Choquet called "monotone of order of infinity." and Dempster's rule for combining such set functions. This rule, together with the idea of "weights of evidence," leads to both an extensive new theory and a better understanding of the Bayesian theory. The book concludes with a brief treatment of statistical inference and a discussion of the limitations of epistemic probability. Appendices contain mathematical proofs, which are relatively elementary and seldom depend on mathematics more advanced that the binomial theorem.