We consider crowdsourcing problems where the users are asked to provide evaluations for items; the user evaluations are then used directly, or aggregated into a consensus value. Lacking an incentive scheme, users have no motive in making effort in completing the evaluations, providing inaccurate answers instead. We propose incentive schemes that are truthful and cheap: truthful as the optimal user behavior consists in providing accurate evaluations, and cheap because the truthfulness is achieved with little overhead cost. We consider both discrete evaluation tasks, where an evaluation can be done either correctly, or incorrectly, with no degrees of approximation in between, and quantitative evaluation tasks, where evaluations are real numbers, and the error is measured as distance from the correct value. For both types of tasks, we propose hierarchical incentive schemes that can be effected with a small amount of additional evaluations, and that scale to arbitrarily large crowd sizes: they have the property that the strength of the incentive does not weaken with increasing hierarchy depth. Interestingly, we show that for these schemes to work, the only requisite is that workers know their place in the hierarchy in advance.
The Bayesian Truth Serum scoring method proposed in @cite_15 elicits truthful subjective answers on multiple choice questions. The author shows that the truthful reporting is a Nash equilibrium with the highest payoff. The model is different from other approaches in that besides the answers, workers need to provide predictions on the final distribution of answers. Workers receive a high score if their answer is surprisingly'' common - the actual percentage of their answer is larger than the predicted fraction. Similarly, incentive mechanisms in @cite_28 @cite_1 @cite_7 @cite_17 @cite_6 require workers provide belief reports along with answers on tasks. Truthful mechanisms in @cite_34 @cite_19 @cite_23 requires knowledge about the distribution from which answers are drawn. Our mechanisms do not rely on worker's beliefs on other workers' responses nor require knowledge about the global answer distribution.
@cite_7 @cite_28 @cite_1 @cite_6 @cite_19 @cite_23 @cite_15 @cite_34 @cite_17
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Several mechanisms have been proposed for incentivizing truthful reports of a private signals owned by rational agents, among them the peer prediction method and the Bayesian truth serum. The robust Bayesian truth serum (RBTS) for small populations and binary signals is particularly interesting since it does not require a common prior to be known to the mechanism. We further analyze the problem of the common prior not known to the mechanism and give several results regarding the restrictions that need to be placed in order to have an incentive-compatible mechanism. Moreover, we construct a Bayes-Nash incentive-compatible scheme called multi-valued RBTS that generalizes RBTS to operate on both small populations and non-binary signals. In this paper, I introduce a class of mechanisms for eliciting private correlated signals from a group of expected score maximizers without external verification or knowledge about the agents’ belief structure. Built on proper scoring rules, these minimum truth serums ask agents to report a signal and a prediction of the signals of others. If two agents with the same signal have the same expectations about the signals of others, the Bayesian incentive compatibility of these mechanisms follows with no further assumptions on the agents’ belief structure. With a slight modification, the mechanism is still feasible and incentive compatible when the prediction portion of the report is optional. We consider settings where a collective intelligence is formed by aggregating information contributed from many independent agents, such as product reviews, community sensing, or opinion polls. We propose a novel mechanism that elicits both private signals and beliefs. The mechanism extends the previous versions of the Bayesian Truth Serum (the original BTS, the RBTS, and the multi-valued BTS), by allowing small populations and non-binary private signals, while not requiring additional assumptions on the belief updating process. For priors that are sufficiently smooth, such as Gaussians, the mechanism allows signals to be continuous. We address the problem of ranking question answerers according to their credibility, characterized here by the probability that a given question answerer (user) will be awarded a best answer on a question given the answerer’s question-answering history. This probability (represented by θ ) is considered to be a hidden variable that can only be estimated statistically from specific observations associated with the user, namely the number b of best answers awarded, associated with the number n of questions answered. The more specific problem addressed is the potentially high degree of uncertainty associated with such credibility estimates when they are based on small numbers of answers. We address this problem by a kind of Bayesian smoothing. The credibility estimate will consist of a mixture of the overall population statistics and those of the specific user. The greater the number of questions asked, the greater will be the contribution of the specific user statistics relative to those of the overall population. We use the Predictive Stochastic Complexity (PSC) as an accuracy measure to evaluate several methods that can be used for the estimation. We compare our technique (Bayesian Smoothing (BS)) with maximum a priori (MAP) estimation, maximum likelihood (ML) estimation and Laplace smoothing. When eliciting opinions from a group of experts, traditional devices used to promote honest reporting assume that there is an observable future outcome. In practice, however, this assumption is not always reasonable. In this paper, we propose a scoring method built on strictly proper scoring rules to induce honest reporting without assuming observable outcomes. Our method provides scores based on pairwise comparisons between the reports made by each pair of experts in the group. For ease of exposition, we introduce our scoring method by illustrating its application to the peer-review process. In order to do so, we start by modeling the peer-review process using a Bayesian model where the uncertainty regarding the quality of the manuscript is taken into account. Thereafter, we introduce our scoring method to evaluate the reported reviews. Under the assumptions that reviewers are Bayesian decision-makers and that they cannot influence the reviews of other reviewers, we show that risk-neutral reviewers strictly maximize their expected scores by honestly disclosing their reviews. We also show how the group's scores can be used to find a consensual review. Experimental results show that encouraging honest reporting through the proposed scoring method creates more accurate reviews than the traditional peer-review process. Predicated on the increasing abundance of electronic health records, we investigate the problem of inferring individualized treatment effects using observational data. Stemming from the potential outcomes model, we propose a novel multi-task learning framework in which factual and counterfactual outcomes are modeled as the outputs of a function in a vector-valued reproducing kernel Hilbert space (vvRKHS). We develop a nonparametric Bayesian method for learning the treatment effects using a multi-task Gaussian process (GP) with a linear coregionalization kernel as a prior over the vvRKHS. The Bayesian approach allows us to compute individualized measures of confidence in our estimates via pointwise credible intervals, which are crucial for realizing the full potential of precision medicine. The impact of selection bias is alleviated via a risk-based empirical Bayes method for adapting the multi-task GP prior, which jointly minimizes the empirical error in factual outcomes and the uncertainty in (unobserved) counterfactual outcomes. We conduct experiments on observational datasets for an interventional social program applied to premature infants, and a left ventricular assist device applied to cardiac patients wait-listed for a heart transplant. In both experiments, we show that our method significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art. We aim to produce predictive models that are not only accurate, but are also interpretable to human experts. Our models are decision lists, which consist of a series of if...then... statements (for example, if high blood pressure, then stroke) that discretize a high-dimensional, multivariate feature space into a series of simple, readily interpretable decision statements. We introduce a generative model called Bayesian Rule Lists that yields a posterior distribution over possible decision lists. It employs a novel prior structure to encourage sparsity. Our experiments show that Bayesian Rule Lists has predictive accuracy on par with the current top algorithms for prediction in machine learning. Our method is motivated by recent developments in personalized medicine, and can be used to produce highly accurate and interpretable medical scoring systems. We demonstrate this by producing an alternative to the CHADS2 score, actively used in clinical practice for estimating the risk of stroke in patients that have atrial fibrillation. Our model is as interpretable as CHADS2, but more accurate. Bayesian model averaging linearly mixes the probabilistic predictions of multiple models, each weighted by its posterior probability. This is the coherent Bayesian way of combining multiple models only under certain restrictive assumptions, which we outline. We explore a general framework for Bayesian model combination (which differs from model averaging) in the context of classification. This framework explicitly models the relationship between each model’s output and the unknown true label. The framework does not require that the models be probabilistic (they can even be human assessors), that they share prior information or receive the same training data, or that they be independent in their errors. Finally, the Bayesian combiner does not need to believe any of the models is in fact correct. We test several variants of this classifier combination procedure starting from a classic statistical model proposed by Dawid and Skene (1979) and using MCMC to add more complex but important features to the model. Comparisons on several data sets to simpler methods like majority voting show that the Bayesian methods not only perform well but result in interpretable diagnostics on the data points and the models. We consider a Bayesian approach to variable selection in the presence of high dimensional covariates based on a hierarchical model that places prior distributions on the regression coefficients as well as on the model space. We adopt the well-known spike and slab Gaussian priors with a distinct feature, that is, the prior variances depend on the sample size through which appropriate shrinkage can be achieved. We show the strong selection consistency of the proposed method in the sense that the posterior probability of the true model converges to one even when the number of covariates grows nearly exponentially with the sample size. This is arguably the strongest selection consistency result that has been available in the Bayesian variable selection literature; yet the proposed method can be carried out through posterior sampling with a simple Gibbs sampler. Furthermore, we argue that the proposed method is asymptotically similar to model selection with the @math penalty. We also demonstrate through empirical work the fine performance of the proposed approach relative to some state of the art alternatives.