Traditional regulatory methods for spectrum licensing have been recently identified as one of the causes for the under-utilization of the valuable radio spectrum. Governmental agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) are seeking ways to remove stringent regulatory barriers and facilitate broader access to the spectrum resources. The goal is to allow for an improved and ubiquitous sharing of the precious radio spectrum between commercial service providers. In this paper, we propose a novel noncooperative game theoretic approach, to show how to foster more sharing of the radio spectrum via the use of regulatory power. We define a two stage game in which the government regulators move first, followed by the providers. The providers are incentivized by lower spectrum allocation fees from the regulators in return for proof-of-sharing. The providers are offered discounted spectrum bands, potentially at different locations, but will be asked to provide coverage to users that are not subscribed to them so as to maintain their subsidy incentives from the government. In a simplification of the model, analytical expressions for the providers' perfect equilibrium strategies are derived, and we argue for the existence of the government's part of a perfect equilibrium. Our analysis shows that through subsidization, the government can provide small service providers a fair chance to compete with the large providers, thereby avoiding monopolization in the market.
Even though subsidization is heavily employed in several markets, the wireless market has not seen much of its usage beyond a few, limited scenarios. The most known subsidization in a wireless market is the subsidization of the expensive phones to the users by the provider @cite_3 , in that the user pays the phone's cost over a locked, termed contract. Unlocking the contract term either requires return of the phone or payment of a significant fee.
@cite_3
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Methods (100, 200, 300) in a wireless portable communication device and wireless communication network for resolving subsidy lock by transmitting and receiving messages over-the-air are provided. Upon entering a restricted mode of operation (118, 204), the wireless portable communication device transmits a request to the wireless communication network requesting to deactivate the restricted mode of operation (120, 212). In response, the wireless portable communication device receives a message deactivating the restricted mode of operation (122, 214).