We study the large-coalition asymptotics of fingerprinting and group testing and derive explicit decoders that provably achieve capacity for many of the considered models. We do this both for simple decoders (which are fast but commonly require larger code lengths) and for joint decoders (which may be slower but achieve the best code lengths). We further make the distinction between informed decoding, where the pirate strategy is exactly known, and uninformed decoding, and we design decoding schemes for both settings. For fingerprinting, we show that if the pirate strategy is known, the Neyman-Pearson-based log-likelihood decoders provably achieve capacity, regardless of the strategy. The decoder built against the interleaving attack is further shown to be a universal decoder, able to deal with arbitrary attacks and achieving the uninformed capacity. This universal decoder is shown to be closely related to the Lagrange-optimized decoder of and the empirical mutual information decoder of Moulin. Joint decoders are also proposed, and we conjecture that these also achieve the corresponding joint capacities. For group testing, the simple decoder for the classical model is shown to be more efficient than the one of and it provably achieves the simple group testing capacity. For generalizations of this model such as noisy group testing, the resulting simple decoders also achieve the corresponding simple capacities.
Based on channel capacities, Amiri and Tardos @cite_1 and Huang and Moulin @cite_11 independently derived the optimal leading constant to be @math (i.e. an asymptotic code length of @math ) and many improvements to Tardos's original scheme were made @cite_13 @cite_26 @cite_21 @cite_22 to reduce the leading constant from @math to @math . Recently it was shown that with Tardos' original score function' one cannot achieve capacity @cite_4 , which lead to the study of different score functions. Based on a result of Abbe and Zheng @cite_20 , Meerwald and Furon @cite_31 noted that a score function designed against the worst-case attack achieves capacity against arbitrary attacks. This also lead to a proposal for a capacity-achieving score function in @cite_38 , which achieves the lower bound on the leading constant of @math .
@cite_38 @cite_26 @cite_4 @cite_22 @cite_21 @cite_1 @cite_31 @cite_13 @cite_20 @cite_11
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We study the asymptotic-capacity-achieving score function that was recently proposed by for bias-based traitor tracing codes. For the bias function, we choose the Dirichlet distribution with a cutoff. Using Bernstein's inequality and Bennett's inequality, we upper bound the false-positive and false-negative error probabilities. From these bounds we derive sufficient conditions for the scheme parameters. We solve these conditions in the limit of large coalition size c0 and obtain asymptotic solutions for the cutoff, the sufficient code length, and the corresponding accusation threshold. We find that the code length converges to its asymptote approximately as c0?1 2 @math , which is faster than the c0?1 3 @math of Tardos' score function. MSC:94B60 We study a fingerprinting game in which the number of colluders and the collusion channel are unknown. The encoder embeds fingerprints into a host sequence and provides the decoder with the capability to trace back pirated copies to the colluders. Fingerprinting capacity has recently been derived as the limit value of a sequence of maximin games with mutual information as their payoff functions. However, these games generally do not admit saddle-point solutions and are very hard to solve numerically. Here under the so-called Boneh-Shaw marking assumption, we reformulate the capacity as the value of a single two-person zero-sum game, and show that it is achieved by a saddle-point solution. If the maximal coalition size is k and the fingerprinting alphabet is binary, we show that capacity decays quadratically with k. Furthermore, we prove rigorously that the asymptotic capacity is 1 (k221n2) and we confirm our earlier conjecture that Tardos' choice of the arcsine distribution asymptotically maximizes the mutual information payoff function while the interleaving attack minimizes it. Along with the asymptotics, numerical solutions to the game for small k are also presented. We compute the channel capacity of non-binary fingerprinting under the Marking Assumption, in the limit of large coalition size c. The solution for the binary case was found by Huang and Moulin. They showed that asymptotically, the capacity is 1 (c22 ln 2), the interleaving attack is optimal and the arcsine distribution is the optimal bias distribution. In this paper we prove that the asymptotic capacity for general alphabet size q is (q - 1) (c22 lnq). Our proof technique does not reveal the optimal attack or bias distribution. The fact that the capacity is an increasing function of q shows that there is a real gain in going to non-binary alphabets. We study the Tardos' probabilistic fingerprinting scheme and show that its codeword length may be shortened by a factor of approximately 4. We achieve this by retracing Tardos' analysis of the scheme and extracting from it all constants that were arbitrarily selected. We replace those constants with parameters and derive a set of inequalities that those parameters must satisfy so that the desired security properties of the scheme still hold. Then we look for a solution of those inequalities in which the parameter that governs the codeword length is minimal. A further reduction in the codeword length is achieved by decoupling the error probability of falsely accusing innocent users from the error probability of missing all colluding pirates. Finally, we simulate the Tardos scheme and show that, in practice, one may use codewords that are shorter than those in the original Tardos scheme by a factor of at least 16. For the Tardos traitor tracing scheme, we show that by combining the symbol-symmetric accusation function of ? with the improved analysis of Blayer and Tassa we get further improvements. Our construction gives codes that are up to four times shorter than Blayer and Tassa's, and up to two times shorter than the codes from ? Asymptotically, we achieve the theoretical optimal codelength for Tardos' distribution function and the symmetric score function. For large coalitions, our codelengths are asymptotically about 4.93 of Tardos' original codelengths, which also improves upon results from We develop a systematic approach, based on convex programming and real analysis, for obtaining upper bounds on the capacity of the binary deletion channel and, more generally, channels with i.i.d. insertions and deletions. Other than the classical deletion channel, we give a special attention to the Poisson-repeat channel introduced by Mitzenmacher and Drinea (IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 2006). Our framework can be applied to obtain capacity upper bounds for any repetition distribution (the deletion and Poisson-repeat channels corresponding to the special cases of Bernoulli and Poisson distributions). Our techniques essentially reduce the task of proving capacity upper bounds to maximizing a univariate, real-valued, and often concave function over a bounded interval. The corresponding univariate function is carefully designed according to the underlying distribution of repetitions and the choices vary depending on the desired strength of the upper bounds as well as the desired simplicity of the function (e.g., being only efficiently computable versus having an explicit closed-form expression in terms of elementary, or common special, functions). Among our results, we show that the capacity of the binary deletion channel with deletion probability d is at most (1−d) logϕ for d ≥ 1 2, and, assuming the capacity function is convex, is at most 1−d log(4 ϕ) for d Furthermore, we derive the first set of capacity upper bounds for the Poisson-repeat channel. Our results uncover further striking connections between this channel and the deletion channel, and suggest, somewhat counter-intuitively, that the Poisson-repeat channel is actually analytically simpler than the deletion channel and may be of key importance to a complete understanding of the deletion channel. Finally, we derive several novel upper bounds on the capacity of the deletion channel. All upper bounds are maximums of efficiently computable, and concave, univariate real functions over a bounded domain. In turn, we upper bound these functions in terms of explicit elementary and standard special functions, whose maximums can be found even more efficiently (and sometimes, analytically, for example for d=1 2). Along the way, we develop several new techniques of potentially independent interest. For example, we develop systematic techniques to study channels with mean constraints over the reals. Furthermore, we motivate the study of novel probability distributions over non-negative integers, as well as novel special functions which could be of interest to mathematical analysis. We propose a novel schedulability analysis for verifying the feasibility of large periodic task sets under the rate monotonic algorithm when the exact test cannot be applied on line due to prohibitively long execution times. The proposed test has the same complexity as the original Liu and Layland (1973) bound, but it is less pessimistic, thus allowing it to accept task sets that would be rejected using the original approach. The performance of the proposed approach is evaluated with respect to the classical Liu and Layland method and theoretical bounds are derived as a function of n (the number of tasks) and for the limit case of n tending to infinity. The analysis is also extended to include aperiodic servers and blocking times due to concurrency control protocols. Extensive simulations on synthetic tasks sets are presented to compare the effectiveness of the proposed test with respect to the Liu and Layland method and the exact response time analysis. We investigate alternative suspicion functions for Tardos traitor tracing schemes. In the simple decoder approach (computation of a score for every user independently) we derive suspicion functions that optimize a performance indicator related to the sufficient code length l in the limit of large coalition size c. Our results hold for the Restricted-Digit Model as well as the Combined-Digit Model. The scores depend on information that is usually not available to the tracer -- the attack strategy or the tallies of the symbols received by the colluders. We discuss how such results can be used in realistic contexts. We study several combinations of coalition attack strategy versus suspicion function optimized against some attack (another attack or the same). In many of these combinations the usual scaling l c2 is replaced by a lower power of c, e.g. c3 2. We find that the interleaving strategy is an especially powerful attack, and the suspicion function tailored against interleaving is effective against all considered attacks. Let f be a random Boolean formula that is an instance of 3-SAT. We consider the problem of computing the least real number k such that if the ratio of the number of clauses over the number of variables of f strictly exceeds k , then f is almost certainly unsatisfiable. By a well-known and more or less straightforward argument, it can be shown that kF5.191. This upper bound was improved by to 4.758 by first providing new improved bounds for the occupancy problem. There is strong experimental evidence that the value of k is around 4.2. In this work, we define, in terms of the random formula f, a decreasing sequence of random variables such that, if the expected value of any one of them converges to zero, then f is almost certainly unsatisfiable. By letting the expected value of the first term of the sequence converge to zero, we obtain, by simple and elementary computations, an upper bound for k equal to 4.667. From the expected value of the second term of the sequence, we get the value 4.601q . In general, by letting the U This work was performed while the first author was visiting the School of Computer Science, Carleton Ž University, and was partially supported by NSERC Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council . of Canada , and by a grant from the University of Patras for sabbatical leaves. The second and third Ž authors were supported in part by grants from NSERC Natural Sciences and Engineering Research . Council of Canada . During the last stages of this research, the first and last authors were also partially Ž . supported by EU ESPRIT Long-Term Research Project ALCOM-IT Project No. 20244 . †An extended abstract of this paper was published in the Proceedings of the Fourth Annual European Ž Symposium on Algorithms, ESA’96, September 25]27, 1996, Barcelona, Spain Springer-Verlag, LNCS, . pp. 27]38 . That extended abstract was coauthored by the first three authors of the present paper. Correspondence to: L. M. Kirousis Q 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. CCC 1042-9832r98r030253-17 253 The Tardos scheme is a well-known traitor tracing scheme to protect copyrighted content against collusion attacks. The original scheme contained some suboptimal design choices, such as the score function and the distribution function used for generating the biases. previously showed that a symbol-symmetric score function leads to shorter codes, while obtained the optimal distribution functions for arbitrary coalition sizes. Later, showed that combining these results leads to even shorter codes when the coalition size is small. We extend their analysis to the case of large coalitions and prove that these optimal distributions converge to the arcsine distribution, thus showing that the arcsine distribution is asymptotically optimal in the symmetric Tardos scheme. We also present a new, practical alternative to the discrete distributions of and give a comparison of the estimated lengths of the fingerprinting codes for each of these distributions.