Cache timing attacks allow attackers to infer the properties of a secret execution by observing cache hits and misses. But how much information can actually leak through such attacks? For a given program, a cache model, and an input, our CHALICE framework leverages symbolic execution to compute the amount of information that can possibly leak through cache attacks. At the core of CHALICE is a novel approach to quantify information leak that can highlight critical cache side-channel leaks on arbitrary binary code. In our evaluation on real-world programs from OpenSSL and Linux GDK libraries, CHALICE effectively quantifies information leaks: For an AES-128 implementation on Linux, for instance, CHALICE finds that a cache attack can leak as much as 127 out of 128 bits of the encryption key.
Finally, static cache analysis @cite_13 is still an active research topic. Compared to static cache analysis, our approach has significant flavors of testing and debugging. Moreover, our approach can highlight memory accesses that leak significant information via side-channels. This can be leveraged to drive security-related optimizations.
@cite_13
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Static cache analysis characterizes a program's cache behavior by determining in a sound but approximate manner which memory accesses result in cache hits and which result in cache misses. Such information is valuable in optimizing compilers, worst-case execution time analysis, and side-channel attack quantification and mitigation.Cache analysis is usually performed as a combination of must' and may' abstract interpretations, classifying instructions as either always hit', always miss', or unknown'. Instructions classified as unknown' might result in a hit or a miss depending on program inputs or the initial cache state. It is equally possible that they do in fact always hit or always miss, but the cache analysis is too coarse to see it.Our approach to eliminate this uncertainty consists in (i) a novel abstract interpretation able to ascertain that a particular instruction may definitely cause a hit and a miss on different paths, and (ii) an exact analysis, removing all remaining uncertainty, based on model checking, using abstract-interpretation results to prune down the model for scalability.We evaluated our approach on a variety of examples; it notably improves precision upon classical abstract interpretation at reasonable cost.