Terrorist attacks all across the world have become a major source of concern for almost all national governments. The United States Department of State's Bureau of Counter-Terrorism, maintains a list of 66 terrorist organizations spanning the entire world. Actively monitoring a large number of organizations and their members, require considerable amounts of resources on the part of law enforcement agencies. Oftentimes, the law enforcement agencies do not have adequate resources to monitor these organizations and their members effectively. On multiple incidences of terrorist attacks in recent times across Europe, it has been observed that the perpetrators of the attack were in the suspect databases of the law enforcement authorities, but weren't under active surveillance at the time of the attack, due to resource limitations on the part of the authorities. As the suspect databases in various countries are very large, and it takes significant amount of technical and human resources to monitor a suspect in the database, monitoring all the suspects in the database may be an impossible task. In this paper, we propose a novel terror network monitoring approach that will significantly reduce the resource requirement of law enforcement authorities, but still provide the capability of uniquely identifying a suspect in case the suspect becomes active in planning a terrorist attack. The approach relies on the assumption that, when an individual becomes active in planning a terrorist attack, his her friends associates will have some inkling of the individuals plan. Accordingly, even if the individual is not under active surveillance by the authorities, but the individual's friends associates are, then the individual planning the attack can be uniquely identified. We apply our techniques on various real-world terror network datasets and show the effectiveness of our approach.
A special case, where only a subset of nodes needs a unique code, can be modeled with a bipartite graph, and this version of Identifying Codes is called Discriminating Codes'' and was studied in @cite_12 . This special case is relevant for our study as, our problem formulation of individual to organization network requires us to find the unique signatures of all nodes of one side of bi-partition of a bipartite graph, by selecting only a subset of the nodes in the other side of bi-partition. This formulation corresponds directly to Discriminating Codes''.
@cite_12
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In the study of deterministic distributed algorithms it is commonly assumed that each node has a unique O(log n)-bit identifier. We prove that for a general class of graph problems, local algorithms (constant-time distributed algorithms) do not need such identifiers: a port numbering and orientation is sufficient. Our result holds for so-called simple PO-checkable graph optimisation problems; this includes many classical packing and covering problems such as vertex covers, edge covers, matchings, independent sets, dominating sets, and edge dominating sets. We focus on the case of bounded-degree graphs and show that if a local algorithm finds a constant-factor approximation of a simple PO-checkable graph problem with the help of unique identifiers, then the same approximation ratio can be achieved on anonymous networks. As a corollary of our result and by prior work, we derive a tight lower bound on the local approximability of the minimum edge dominating set problem. Our main technical tool is an algebraic construction of homogeneously ordered graphs: We say that a graph is (α,r)-homogeneous if its nodes are linearly ordered so that an α fraction of nodes have pairwise isomorphic radius-r neighbourhoods. We show that there exists a finite (α,r)-homogeneous 2k-regular graph of girth at least g for any α