Human social behavior is structured by relationships. We form teams, groups, tribes, and alliances at all scales of human life. These structures guide multi-agent cooperation and competition, but when we observe others these underlying relationships are typically unobservable and hence must be inferred. Humans make these inferences intuitively and flexibly, often making rapid generalizations about the latent relationships that underlie behavior from just sparse and noisy observations. Rapid and accurate inferences are important for determining who to cooperate with, who to compete with, and how to cooperate in order to compete. Towards the goal of building machine-learning algorithms with human-like social intelligence, we develop a generative model of multi-agent action understanding based on a novel representation for these latent relationships called Composable Team Hierarchies (CTH). This representation is grounded in the formalism of stochastic games and multi-agent reinforcement learning. We use CTH as a target for Bayesian inference yielding a new algorithm for understanding behavior in groups that can both infer hidden relationships as well as predict future actions for multiple agents interacting together. Our algorithm rapidly recovers an underlying causal model of how agents relate in spatial stochastic games from just a few observations. The patterns of inference made by this algorithm closely correspond with human judgments and the algorithm makes the same rapid generalizations that people do.
Inferring the latent mental states of agents (e.g., beliefs, desires, and intentions) from behavior features prominently in machine learning and cognitive science (see for a recent and comprehensive review from the machine learning point of view and for a developmental perspective). Previous computational treatments similar in spirit to the approach here have focused on making inferences about other individuals acting in a single agent setting @cite_27 @cite_37 @cite_35 @cite_1 @cite_34 @cite_15 @cite_23 . When these tools are applied to multi-agent and game theoretic contexts they have focused on dyadic interactions @cite_30 @cite_13 @cite_7 @cite_28 . Dyadic interactions are significantly simpler from a representational perspective since an observer must merely determine whether each agent is cooperating or competing.
@cite_30 @cite_35 @cite_37 @cite_7 @cite_28 @cite_1 @cite_27 @cite_23 @cite_15 @cite_34 @cite_13
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Humans are adept at inferring the mental states underlying other agents’ actions, such as goals, beliefs, desires, emotions and other thoughts. We propose a computational framework based on Bayesian inverse planning for modeling human action understanding. The framework represents an intuitive theory of intentional agents’ behavior based on the principle of rationality: the expectation that agents will plan approximately rationally to achieve their goals, given their beliefs about the world. The mental states that caused an agent’s behavior are inferred by inverting this model of rational planning using Bayesian inference, integrating the likelihood of the observed actions with the prior over mental states. This approach formalizes in precise probabilistic terms the essence of previous qualitative approaches to action understanding based on an ‘‘intentional stance” [Dennett, D. C. (1987). The intentional stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press] or a ‘‘teleological stance” [Gergely, G., Nadasdy, Z., Csibra, G., & Biro, S. (1995). Taking the intentional stance at 12 months of age. Cognition, 56, 165–193]. In three psychophysical experiments using animated stimuli of agents moving in simple mazes, we assess how well different inverse planning models based on different goal priors can predict human goal inferences. The results provide quantitative evidence for an approximately rational inference mechanism in human goal inference within our simplified stimulus paradigm, and for the flexible nature of goal representations that human observers can adopt. We discuss the implications of our experimental results for human action understanding in real-world contexts, and suggest how our framework might be extended to capture other kinds of mental state inferences, such as inferences about beliefs, or inferring whether an entity is an intentional agent. Developing a dialogue agent that is capable of making autonomous decisions and communicating by natural language is one of the long-term goals of machine learning research. Traditional approaches either rely on hand-crafting a small state-action set for applying reinforcement learning that is not scalable or constructing deterministic models for learning dialogue sentences that fail to capture natural conversational variability. In this paper, we propose a Latent Intention Dialogue Model (LIDM) that employs a discrete latent variable to learn underlying dialogue intentions in the framework of neural variational inference. In a goal-oriented dialogue scenario, these latent intentions can be interpreted as actions guiding the generation of machine responses, which can be further refined autonomously by reinforcement learning. The experimental evaluation of LIDM shows that the model out-performs published benchmarks for both corpus-based and human evaluation, demonstrating the effectiveness of discrete latent variable models for learning goal-oriented dialogues. Developing a dialogue agent that is capable of making autonomous decisions and communicating by natural language is one of the long-term goals of machine learning research. Traditional approaches either rely on hand-crafting a small state-action set for applying reinforcement learning that is not scalable or constructing deterministic models for learning dialogue sentences that fail to capture natural conversational variability. In this paper, we propose a Latent Intention Dialogue Model (LIDM) that employs a discrete latent variable to learn underlying dialogue intentions in the framework of neural variational inference. In a goal-oriented dialogue scenario, these latent intentions can be interpreted as actions guiding the generation of machine responses, which can be further refined autonomously by reinforcement learning. The experimental evaluation of LIDM shows that the model out-performs published benchmarks for both corpus-based and human evaluation, demonstrating the effectiveness of discrete latent variable models for learning goal-oriented dialogues. We introduce two tactics to attack agents trained by deep reinforcement learning algorithms using adversarial examples, namely the strategically-timed attack and the enchanting attack. In the strategically-timed attack, the adversary aims at minimizing the agent's reward by only attacking the agent at a small subset of time steps in an episode. Limiting the attack activity to this subset helps prevent detection of the attack by the agent. We propose a novel method to determine when an adversarial example should be crafted and applied. In the enchanting attack, the adversary aims at luring the agent to a designated target state. This is achieved by combining a generative model and a planning algorithm: while the generative model predicts the future states, the planning algorithm generates a preferred sequence of actions for luring the agent. A sequence of adversarial examples is then crafted to lure the agent to take the preferred sequence of actions. We apply the two tactics to the agents trained by the state-of-the-art deep reinforcement learning algorithm including DQN and A3C. In 5 Atari games, our strategically timed attack reduces as much reward as the uniform attack (i.e., attacking at every time step) does by attacking the agent 4 times less often. Our enchanting attack lures the agent toward designated target states with a more than 70 success rate. Videos are available at this http URL In this paper, we describe a method to represent and discover adversarial group behavior in a continuous domain. In comparison to other types of behavior, adversarial behavior is heavily structured as the location of a player (or agent) is dependent both on their teammates and adversaries, in addition to the tactics or strategies of the team. We present a method which can exploit this relationship through the use of a spatiotemporal basis model. As players constantly change roles during a match, we show that employing a "role-based" representation instead of one based on player "identity" can best exploit the playing structure. As vision-based systems currently do not provide perfect detection tracking (e.g. missed or false detections), we show that our compact representation can effectively "denoise" erroneous detections as well as enabling temporal analysis, which was previously prohibitive due to the dimensionality of the signal. To evaluate our approach, we used a fully instrumented field-hockey pitch with 8 fixed high-definition (HD) cameras and evaluated our approach on approximately 200,000 frames of data from a state-of-the-art real-time player detector and compare it to manually labelled data. According to the paradigm of Cognitive Robotics (Reiter, 2001a), intelligent, autonomous agents interacting with an incompletely known world need to reason logically about the effects of their actions and sensor information they acquire over time. In realistic settings, both the effect of actions and sensor data are subject to errors. A cognitive agent can cope with these uncertainties by maintaining probabilistic beliefs about the state of world. In this paper, we show a formalism to represent probabilistic beliefs about states of the world and how these beliefs change in the course of actions. Additionally, we propose an extension to a logic programming framework, the agent programming language FLUX, to actually infer this probabilistic knowledge for agents. Using associated Bayesian networks allows the agents to maintain a single and compact probabilistic knowledge state throughout the execution of an action sequence. "If I provide you a face image of mine (without telling you the actual age when I took the picture) and a large amount of face images that I crawled (containing labeled faces of different ages but not necessarily paired), can you show me what I would look like when I am 80 or what I was like when I was 5?" The answer is probably a "No." Most existing face aging works attempt to learn the transformation between age groups and thus would require the paired samples as well as the labeled query image. In this paper, we look at the problem from a generative modeling perspective such that no paired samples is required. In addition, given an unlabeled image, the generative model can directly produce the image with desired age attribute. We propose a conditional adversarial autoencoder (CAAE) that learns a face manifold, traversing on which smooth age progression and regression can be realized simultaneously. In CAAE, the face is first mapped to a latent vector through a convolutional encoder, and then the vector is projected to the face manifold conditional on age through a deconvolutional generator. The latent vector preserves personalized face features (i.e., personality) and the age condition controls progression vs. regression. Two adversarial networks are imposed on the encoder and generator, respectively, forcing to generate more photo-realistic faces. Experimental results demonstrate the appealing performance and flexibility of the proposed framework by comparing with the state-of-the-art and ground truth. This paper introduces a model of ‘theory of mind’, namely, how we represent the intentions and goals of others to optimise our mutual interactions. We draw on ideas from optimum control and game theory to provide a ‘game theory of mind’. First, we consider the representations of goals in terms of value functions that are prescribed by utility or rewards. Critically, the joint value functions and ensuing behaviour are optimised recursively, under the assumption that I represent your value function, your representation of mine, your representation of my representation of yours, and so on ad infinitum. However, if we assume that the degree of recursion is bounded, then players need to estimate the opponent's degree of recursion (i.e., sophistication) to respond optimally. This induces a problem of inferring the opponent's sophistication, given behavioural exchanges. We show it is possible to deduce whether players make inferences about each other and quantify their sophistication on the basis of choices in sequential games. This rests on comparing generative models of choices with, and without, inference. Model comparison is demonstrated using simulated and real data from a ‘stag-hunt’. Finally, we note that exactly the same sophisticated behaviour can be achieved by optimising the utility function itself (through prosocial utility), producing unsophisticated but apparently altruistic agents. This may be relevant ethologically in hierarchal game theory and coevolution. There is a long history in game theory on the topic of Bayesian or "rational" learning, in which each player maintains beliefs over a set of alternative behaviours, or types, for the other players. This idea has gained increasing interest in the artificial intelligence (AI) community, where it is used as a method to control a single agent in a system composed of multiple agents with unknown behaviours. The idea is to hypothesise a set of types, each specifying a possible behaviour for the other agents, and to plan our own actions with respect to those types which we believe are most likely, given the observed actions of the agents. The game theory literature studies this idea primarily in the context of equilibrium attainment. In contrast, many AI applications have a focus on task completion and payoff maximisation. With this perspective in mind, we identify and address a spectrum of questions pertaining to belief and truth in hypothesised types. We formulate three basic ways to incorporate evidence into posterior beliefs and show when the resulting beliefs are correct, and when they may fail to be correct. Moreover, we demonstrate that prior beliefs can have a significant impact on our ability to maximise payoffs in the long-term, and that they can be computed automatically with consistent performance effects. Furthermore, we analyse the conditions under which we are able complete our task optimally, despite inaccuracies in the hypothesised types. Finally, we show how the correctness of hypothesised types can be ascertained during the interaction via an automated statistical analysis. In this paper, we describe a novel approach to imitation learning that infers latent policies directly from state observations. We introduce a method that characterizes the causal effects of latent actions on observations while simultaneously predicting their likelihood. We then outline an action alignment procedure that leverages a small amount of environment interactions to determine a mapping between the latent and real-world actions. We show that this corrected labeling can be used for imitating the observed behavior, even though no expert actions are given. We evaluate our approach within classic control environments and a platform game and demonstrate that it performs better than standard approaches. Code for this work is available at this https URL. We consider the problem of learning to act in partially observable, continuous-state-and-action worlds where we have abstract prior knowledge about the structure of the optimal policy in the form of a distribution over policies. Using ideas from planning-as-inference reductions and Bayesian unsupervised learning, we cast Markov Chain Monte Carlo as a stochastic, hill-climbing policy search algorithm. Importantly, this algorithm's search bias is directly tied to the prior and its MCMC proposal kernels, which means we can draw on the full Bayesian toolbox to express the search bias, including nonparametric priors and structured, recursive processes like grammars over action sequences. Furthermore, we can reason about uncertainty in the search bias itself by constructing a hierarchical prior and reasoning about latent variables that determine the abstract structure of the policy. This yields an adaptive search algorithm--our algorithm learns to learn a structured policy efficiently. We show how inference over the latent variables in these policy priors enables intra- and intertask transfer of abstract knowledge. We demonstrate the flexibility of this approach by learning meta search biases, by constructing a nonparametric finite state controller to model memory, by discovering motor primitives using a simple grammar over primitive actions, and by combining all three.