As a significant business paradigm, many online information platforms have emerged to satisfy society's needs for person-specific data, where a service provider collects raw data from data contributors, and then offers value-added data services to data consumers. However, in the data trading layer, the data consumers face a pressing problem, i.e., how to verify whether the service provider has truthfully collected and processed data? Furthermore, the data contributors are usually unwilling to reveal their sensitive personal data and real identities to the data consumers. In this paper, we propose TPDM, which efficiently integrates data Truthfulness and Privacy preservation in Data Markets. TPDM is structured internally in an Encrypt-then-Sign fashion, using partially homomorphic encryption and identity-based signature. It simultaneously facilitates batch verification, data processing, and outcome verification, while maintaining identity preservation and data confidentiality. We also instantiate TPDM with a profile matching service and a distribution fitting service, and extensively evaluate their performances on Yahoo! Music ratings dataset and 2009 RECS dataset, respectively. Our analysis and evaluation results reveal that TPDM achieves several desirable properties, while incurring low computation and communication overheads when supporting large-scale data markets.
However, the original intention of above works is pricing data or monitoring data usage rather than integrating data truthfulness with privacy preservation in data markets, which is the consideration of this work The early version of this paper @cite_116 mainly focused on the profile matching service. .
@cite_116
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We initiate the study of markets for private data, through the lens of differential privacy. Although the purchase and sale of private data has already begun on a large scale, a theory of privacy as a commodity is missing. In this paper, we propose to build such a theory. Specifically, we consider a setting in which a data analyst wishes to buy information from a population from which he can estimate some statistic. The analyst wishes to obtain an accurate estimate cheaply, while the owners of the private data experience some cost for their loss of privacy, and must be compensated for this loss. Agents are selfish, and wish to maximize their profit, so our goal is to design truthful mechanisms. Our main result is that such problems can naturally be viewed and optimally solved as variants of multi-unit procurement auctions. Based on this result, we derive auctions which are optimal up to small constant factors for two natural settings: When the data analyst has a fixed accuracy goal, we show that an application of the classic Vickrey auction achieves the analyst's accuracy goal while minimizing his total payment. When the data analyst has a fixed budget, we give a mechanism which maximizes the accuracy of the resulting estimate while guaranteeing that the resulting sum payments do not exceed the analyst's budget. In both cases, our comparison class is the set of envy-free mechanisms, which correspond to the natural class of fixed-price mechanisms in our setting. In both of these results, we ignore the privacy cost due to possible correlations between an individual's private data and his valuation for privacy itself. We then show that generically, no individually rational mechanism can compensate individuals for the privacy loss incurred due to their reported valuations for privacy. This is nevertheless an important issue, and modeling it correctly is one of the many exciting directions for future work.