Modern low-latency anonymity systems, no matter whether constructed as an overlay or implemented at the network layer, offer limited security guarantees against traffic analysis. On the other hand, high-latency anonymity systems offer strong security guarantees at the cost of computational overhead and long delays, which are excessive for interactive applications. We propose TARANET, an anonymity system that implements protection against traffic analysis at the network layer, and limits the incurred latency and overhead. In TARANET's setup phase, traffic analysis is thwarted by mixing. In the data transmission phase, end hosts and ASes coordinate to shape traffic into constant-rate transmission using packet splitting. Our prototype implementation shows that TARANET can forward anonymous traffic at over 50 Gbps using commodity hardware.
The first class of network-layer anonymity protocols proposed is the so-called system, which consists of two proposals, @cite_50 and @cite_43 . These systems defend against topological attacks by encrypting forwarding information in packet headers. However, in both schemes, packets stay unchanged from hop to hop, thus enabling bit-pattern correlation of packets at distinct compromised nodes.
@cite_43 @cite_50
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As mobile ad hoc network applications are deployed, security emerges as a central requirement. In this paper, we introduce the wormhole attack, a severe attack in ad hoc networks that is particularly challenging to defend against. The wormhole attack is possible even if the attacker has not compromised any hosts, and even if all communication provides authenticity and confidentiality. In the wormhole attack, an attacker records packets (or bits) at one location in the network, tunnels them (possibly selectively) to another location, and retransmits them there into the network. The wormhole attack can form a serious threat in wireless networks, especially against many ad hoc network routing protocols and location-based wireless security systems. For example, most existing ad hoc network routing protocols, without some mechanism to defend against the wormhole attack, would be unable to find routes longer than one or two hops, severely disrupting communication. We present a general mechanism, called packet leashes, for detecting and, thus defending against wormhole attacks, and we present a specific protocol, called TIK, that implements leashes. We also discuss topology-based wormhole detection, and show that it is impossible for these approaches to detect some wormhole topologies. We propose to use Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANET) as the infrastructure for an urban cyber-physical system for gathering up-to-date data about a city, like traffic conditions or environmental parameters. In this context, it is critical to design a data collection protocol that enables retrieving the data from the vehicles in almost real-time in an efficient way for urban scenarios. We propose Back off-based Per-hop Forwarding (BPF), a broadcast-based receiver-oriented protocol that uses the destination location information to select the forwarding order among the nodes receiving the packet. BFP does not require nodes to exchange periodic messages with their neighbors communicating their locations to keep a low management message overhead. It uses geographic information about the final destination node in the header of each data packet to route it in a hop-by-hop basis. It takes advantage of redundant forwarding to increase packet delivery to a destination, what is more critical in an urban scenario than in a highway, where the road topology does not represent a challenge for forwarding. We evaluate the performance of the BPF protocol using ns-3 and a Manhattan grid topology and compare it with well-known broadcast suppression techniques. Our results show that BPF achieves significantly higher packet delivery rates at a reduced redundancy cost. Sensor networks are often deployed in unattended environments, thus leaving these networks vulnerable to false data injection attacks in which an adversary injects false data into the network with the goal of deceiving the base station or depleting the resources of the relaying nodes. Standard authentication mechanisms cannot prevent this attack if the adversary has compromised one or a small number of sensor nodes. In this paper, we present an interleaved hop-by-hop authentication scheme that guarantees that the base station will detect any injected false data packets when no more than a certain number t nodes are compromised. Further, our scheme provides an upper bound B for the number of hops that a false data packet could be forwarded before it is detected and dropped, given that there are up to t colluding compromised nodes. We show that in the worst case B is O(t sup 2 ). Through performance analysis, we show that our scheme is efficient with respect to the security it provides, and it also allows a tradeoff between security and performance. ABSTRACT Traditionally, routing in wireless sensor networks consists of two steps: First, the routing protocol selects a next hop, and, second, the MAC protocol waits for the intended destination to wake up and receive the data. This design makes it difficult to adapt to link dynamics and introduces delays while waiting for the next hop to wake up. In this paper we introduce ORW, a practical opportunistic routing scheme for wireless sensor networks. In a duty-cycled setting, packets are addressed to sets of potential receivers and forwarded by the neighbor that wakes up first and successfully receives the packet. This reduces delay and energy consumption by utilizing all neighbors as potential forwarders. Furthermore, this increases resilience to wireless link dynamics by exploiting spatial diversity. Our results show that ORW reduces radio duty-cycles on average by 50 (up to 90 on individual nodes) and delays by 30 to 90 when compared to the state of the art. Recent studies show that network coding can provide significant benefits to network protocols, such as increased throughput, reduced network congestion, higher reliability, and lower power consumption. The core principle of network coding is that intermediate nodes actively mix input packets to produce output packets. This mixing subjects network coding systems to a severe security threat, known as a , where attacker nodes inject corrupted packets into the network. Corrupted packets propagate in an epidemic manner, depleting network resources and significantly decreasing throughput. Pollution attacks are particularly dangerous in wireless networks, where attackers can easily inject packets or compromise devices due to the increased network vulnerability. In this paper, we address pollution attacks against network coding systems in wireless mesh networks. We demonstrate that previous solutions to the problem are impractical in wireless networks, incurring an unacceptably high degradation of throughput. We propose a lightweight scheme, DART, that uses time-based authentication in combination with random linear transformations to defend against pollution attacks. We further improve system performance and propose EDART, which enhances DART with an optimistic forwarding scheme. A detailed security analysis shows that the probability of a polluted packet passing our verification procedure is very low. Performance results using the well-known MORE protocol and realistic link quality measurements from the Roofnet experimental testbed show that our schemes improve system performance over 20 times compared to previous solutions. Low power and lossy networks (LLNs) are rapidly emerging as an important part of ubiquitous computing, and serving as a major building block for the communication infrastructure in the presence of Internet-of-Things (IoT). Routing protocol for low power and lossy networks (RPL) is a novel routing protocol standardized to enable the integration of resources-constrained devices into the Internet. However, due to the shared radio medium, the lack of physical protection and security requirements of inherent routing protocol, low power and lossy networks are admittedly threatened by diverse Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks that primarily disrupt network protocols and interfere with on-going communications. In this paper, we propose a monitor-based approach, called CMD, to mitigate forwarding misbehaviors in LLNs running with RPL, where single or multiple malicious nodes randomly or strategically drop any incoming Data packet. The basic idea of the CMD is that each node monitors the forwarding behaviors of the preferred parent node to observe the packet loss rate, compares the observation result with the collected packet loss rate from one-hop neighbor nodes, and detects the forwarding misbehaviors of the preferred parent node. We evaluate the proposed scheme through extensive simulation experiments using OMNeT++ and compare its performance with the original RPL protocol and the existing two-step detection scheme. The simulation results show that the proposed scheme can not only improve the detection rate and packet delivery ratio (PDR) but also can reduce the energy consumption and isolation latency. Today's networks typically carry or deploy dozens of protocols and mechanisms simultaneously such as MPLS, NAT, ACLs and route redistribution. Even when individual protocols function correctly, failures can arise from the complex interactions of their aggregate, requiring network administrators to be masters of detail. Our goal is to automatically find an important class of failures, regardless of the protocols running, for both operational and experimental networks. To this end we developed a general and protocol-agnostic framework, called Header Space Analysis (HSA). Our formalism allows us to statically check network specifications and configurations to identify an important class of failures such as Reachability Failures, Forwarding Loops and Traffic Isolation and Leakage problems. In HSA, protocol header fields are not first class entities; instead we look at the entire packet header as a concatenation of bits without any associated meaning. Each packet is a point in the 0,1 L space where L is the maximum length of a packet header, and networking boxes transform packets from one point in the space to another point or set of points (multicast). We created a library of tools, called Hassel, to implement our framework, and used it to analyze a variety of networks and protocols. Hassel was used to analyze the Stanford University backbone network, and found all the forwarding loops in less than 10 minutes, and verified reachability constraints between two subnets in 13 seconds. It also found a large and complex loop in an experimental loose source routing protocol in 4 minutes. This paper considers the problem of an attacker disrupting an encrypted victim wireless ad hoc network through jamming. Jamming is broken down into layers and this paper focuses on jamming at the Transport Network layer. Jamming at this layer exploits AODV and TCP protocols and is shown to be very effective in simulated and real networks when it can sense victim packet types, but the encryption is assumed to mask the entire header and contents of the packet so that only packet size, timing, and sequence is available to the attacker for sensing. A sensor is developed and tested on live data. The classification is found to be highly reliable for many packet types. The relative roles of size, timing, and sequence are discussed along with the implications for making networks more secure. This paper describes Extremely Opportunistic Routing (ExOR), a new unicast routing technique for multi-hop wireless networks. ExOR forwards each packet through a sequence of nodes, deferring the choice of each node in the sequence until after the previous node has transmitted the packet on its radio. ExOR then determines which node, of all the nodes that successfully received that transmission, is the node closest to the destination. That closest node transmits the packet. The result is that each hop moves the packet farther (or average) than the hops of the best possible pre-determined route.The ExOR design addresses the challenge of choosing a forwarding node after transmission using a distributed algorithm. First, when a node transmits a packet, it includes in the packet a simple schedule describing the priority order in which the potential receivers should forward the packet. The node computes the schedule based on shared measurements of inter-node delivery rates. ExOR then uses a distributed slotted MAC protocol for acknowledgements to ensure that the receivers agree who the highest priority receiver was.The efficacy of ExOR depends mainly on the rate at which the reception probability falls off with distance. Simulations based on measured radio characteristics [6] suggest that ExOR reduces the total number of transmissions by nearly a factor of two over the best possible pre-determined route. Since ad hoc and sensor networks can be composed of a very large number of devices, the scalability of network protocols is a major design concern. Furthermore, network protocols must be designed to prolong the battery lifetime of the devices. However, most existing routing techniques for ad hoc networks are known not to scale well. On the other hand, the so-called geographical routing algorithms are known to be scalable but their energy efficiency has never been extensively and comparatively studied. In a geographical routing algorithm, data packets are forwarded by a node to its neighbor based on their respective positions. The neighborhood of each node is constituted by the nodes that lie within a certain radio range. Thus, from the perspective of a node forwarding a packet, the next hop depends on the width of the neighborhood it perceives. The analytical framework proposed in this paper allows to analyze the relationship between the energy efficiency of the routing tasks and the extension of the range of the topology knowledge for each node. A wider topology knowledge may improve the energy efficiency of the routing tasks but increases the cost of topology information due to signaling packets needed to acquire this information. The problem of determining the optimal topology knowledge range for each node to make energy efficient geographical routing decisions is tackled by integer linear programming. It is shown that the problem is intrinsically localized, i.e., a limited topology knowledge is sufficient to make energy efficient forwarding decisions. The leading forwarding rules for geographical routing are compared in this framework, and the energy efficiency of each of them is studied. Moreover, a new forwarding scheme, partial topology knowledge forwarding (PTKF), is introduced, and shown to outperform other existing schemes in typical application scenarios. A probe-based distributed protocol for knowledge range adjustment (PRADA) is finally introduced that allows each node to efficiently select online its topology knowledge range. PRADA is shown to rapidly converge to a near-optimal solution. Considered is a mobile ad hoc network consisting of three types of nodes (source, destination and relay nodes) and using the two-hop relay routing protocol. Packets at relay nodes are assumed to have a limited lifetime in the network. All nodes are moving inside a bounded region according to some random mobility model. Both closed-form expressions, and asymptotic results when the number of nodes is large, are provided for the packet delivery delay and the energy needed to transmit a packet from the source to its destination. We also introduce and evaluate a variant of the two-hop relay protocol that limits the number of generated copies in the network. Our model is validated through simulations for two mobility models (random waypoint and random direction mobility models), numerical results for the two-hop relay protocols are reported, and the performance of the two-hop routing and of the epidemic routing protocols are compared. In classical routing strategies for multihop mobile wireless networks packets are routed on a pre-defined route usually obtained by a shortest path routing protocol. In opportunistic routing schemes, for each packet and each hop, the next relay is found by dynamically selecting the node that captures the packet transmission and which is the nearest to the destination. Such a scheme allows each packet to take advantage of the local pattern of transmissions and fadings at any slot and at any hop. The aim of this paper is to quantify and optimize the potential performance gains of such opportunistic routing strategies compared with classical routing schemes. The analysis is conducted under the following lower layer assumptions: the Medium Access (MAC) layer is a spatial version of Aloha which has been shown to scale well for large multihop networks; the capture of a packet by some receiver is determined by the Signal over Interference and Noise Ratio (SINR) experienced by the receiver. The paper contains a detailed simulation study which shows that such time-space opportunistic schemes very significantly outperform classical routing schemes. It also contains a mathematical study where we show how to optimally tune the MAC parameters so as to minimize the average number of time slots required to carry a typical packet from origin to destination on long paths. We show that this optimization is independent of network density. Due to their simplicity and efficiency, the two-hop relay algorithm and its variants serve as a class of attractive routing schemes for mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). With the available two-hop relay schemes, a node, whenever getting an opportunity for transmission, randomly probes only once a neighbor node for the possible transmission. It is notable that such single probing strategy, although simple, may result in a significant waste of the precious transmission opportunities in highly dynamic MANETs. To alleviate such limitation for a more efficient utilization of limited wireless bandwidth, this paper proposes a more general probing-based two-hop relay algorithm with limited packet redundancy. In such an algorithm with probing round limit τ and packet redundancy limit f, each transmitter is allowed to conduct up to τ rounds of probing for identifying a possible receiver and each packet can be delivered to at most f distinct relays. A general theoretical framework is further developed to help us understand that under different setting of τ and f, how we can benefit from multiple probings in terms of the per node throughput capacity and the expected end-to-end packet delay. We present an overview of ad hoc routing protocols that make forwarding decisions based on the geographical position of a packet's destination. Other than the destination's position, each node need know only its own position and the position of its one-hop neighbors in order to forward packets. Since it is not necessary to maintain explicit routes, position-based routing does scale well even if the network is highly dynamic. This is a major advantage in a mobile ad hoc network where the topology may change frequently. The main prerequisite for position-based routing is that a sender can obtain the current position of the destination. Therefore, previously proposed location services are discussed in addition to position-based packet forwarding strategies. We provide a qualitative comparison of the approaches in both areas and investigate opportunities for future research. This paper considers (p, q )-Epidemic Routing, a class of store-carry-forward routing schemes, for sparsely populated mobile ad hoc networks. Our forwarding scheme includes Two-Hop Forwarding and the conventional Epidemic Routing as special cases. In such forwarding schemes, the original packet is copied many times and its packet copies spread over the network. Therefore those packet copies should be deleted after a packet reaches the destination. We analyze the performance of (p, q)-Epidemic Routing with VACCINE recovery scheme. Unlike most of the existing studies, we discuss the performance of (p, q)-Epidemic Routing in depth, taking account of the recovery process that deletes unnecessary packets from the network. In this paper, we consider CSMA policies for scheduling packet transmissions in multihop wireless networks with one-hop traffic. The main contribution of the paper is to propose a novel CSMA policy, called Unlocking CSMA (U-CSMA), that enables to obtain both high throughput and low packet delays in large wireless networks. More precisely, we show that for torus interference graph topologies with one-hop traffic, U-CSMA is throughput optimal and achieves order-optimal delay. For one-hop traffic, the delay performance is defined to be order-optimal if the delay stays bounded as the network-size increases. Simulations that we conducted suggest that (a) U-CSMA is throughput-optimal and achieves order-optimal delay for general geometric interference graphs and (b) that U-CSMA can be combined with congestion control algorithms to maximize the network-wide utility and obtain order-optimal delay. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that a simple distributed scheduling policy has been proposed that is both throughput utility optimal and achieves order-optimal delay. A typical wireless sensor node has little protection against radio jamming. The situation becomes worse if energy-efficient jamming can be achieved by exploiting knowledge of the data link layer. Encrypting the packets may help prevent the jammer from taking actions based on the content of the packets, but the temporal arrangement of the packets induced by the nature of the protocol might unravel patterns that the jammer can take advantage of even when the packets are encrypted. By looking at the packet interarrival times in three representative MAC protocols, S-MAC, LMAC and B-MAC, we derive several jamming attacks that allow the jammer to jam S-MAC, LMAC and B-MAC energy-efficiently. The jamming attacks are based on realistic assumptions. The algorithms are described in detail and simulated. The effectiveness and efficiency of the attacks are examined. Careful analysis of other protocols belonging to the respective categories of S-MAC, LMAC and B-MAC reveal that those protocols are, to some extent, also susceptible to our attacks. The result of this investigation provides new insights into the security considerations of MAC protocols. Abstract Though an increasing number of wireless hotspots and mesh networksare being deployed, the problem of location privacy has been ignored.When a user’s location privacy is compromised, an attacker can deter-mine where the user is, and use this information, for example, to stalkor blackmail the user. In existing systems, a user’s location can beeasily inferred from the signal strengths of packets transmitted fromher x ed address. Even if an attacker cannot decode packet contentsand addresses, he can correlate different transmissions using a modelof the user’s movement. In this paper, we argue that location privacymust be a rst-class citizen in the design of a wireless communica-tions system. We build a transaction -based wireless communicationsystem in which transactions (a single request-response exchange be-tween two nodes) are unlinkable ; that is, they cannot be correlated.We nd that it is even possible to support real-time session-based ser-vices such as Voice-over-IP on top of transaction primitives, thoughwith weaker privacy properties. We also identify a number of chal-lenges in providing location privacy in the areas of routing, incentivesfor multi-hop forwarding, and user- and application-driven tuning ofthe privacy-performance tradeoff. A new packet routing model proposed by the Internet Engineering Task Force is MultiProtocol Label Switching, or MPLS [B. Davie and Y. Rekhter, MPLS: Technology and Applications, Morgan Kaufmann (Elsevier), New York, 2000]. Instead of each router's parsing the packet network layer header and doing its lookups based on that analysis (as in much of conventional packet routing), MPLS ensures that the analysis of the header is performed just once. The packet is then assigned a stack of labels, where the labels are usually much smaller than the packet headers themselves. When a router receives a packet, it examines the label at the top of the label stack and makes the decision of where the packet is forwarded based solely on that label. It can pop the top label off the stack if it so desires, and can also push some new labels onto the stack, before forwarding the packet. This scheme has several advantages over conventional routing protocols, the two primary ones being (a) reduced amount of header analysis at intermediate routers, which allows for faster switching times, and (b) better traffic engineering capabilities and hence easier handling of quality of service issues. However, essentially nothing is known at a theoretical level about the performance one can achieve with this protocol, or about the intrinsic trade-offs in its use of resources. This paper initiates a theoretical study of MPLS protocols, and routing algorithms and lower bounds are given for a variety of situations. We first study the routing problem on the line, a case which is already nontrivial, and give routing protocols whose trade-offs are close to optimality. We then extend our results for paths to trees, and thence onto more general graphs. These routing algorithms on general graphs are obtained by finding a tree cover of a graph, i.e., a small family of subtrees of the graph such that, for each pair of vertices, one of the trees in the family contains an (almost-)shortest path between them. Our results show tree covers of logarithmic size for planar graphs and graphs with bounded separators, which may be of independent interest. This paper presents Packet Re-cycling (PR), a technique that takes advantage of cellular graph embeddings to reroute packets that would otherwise be dropped in case of link or node failures. The technique employs only one bit in the packet header to cover any single link failures, and in the order of log2(d) bits to cover all non-disconnecting failure combinations, where d is the diameter of the network. We show that our routing strategy is effective and that its path length stretch is acceptable for realistic topologies. The packet header overhead incurred by PR is very small, and the extra memory and packet processing time required to implement it at each router are insignificant. This makes PR suitable for loss-sensitive, mission-critical network applications.