Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are one of the most challenging threats to Internet security. An attacker typically compromises a large number of vulnerable hosts and uses them to flood the victim's site with malicious traffic, clogging its tail circuit and interfering with normal traffic. At present, the network operator of a site under attack has no other resolution but to respond manually by inserting filters in the appropriate edge routers to drop attack traffic. However, as DoS attacks become increasingly sophisticated, manual filter propagation becomes unacceptably slow or even infeasible. In this paper, we present Active Internet Traffic Filtering, a new automatic filter propagation protocol. We argue that this system provides a guaranteed, significant level of protection against DoS attacks in exchange for a reasonable, bounded amount of router resources. We also argue that the proposed system cannot be abused by a malicious node to interfere with normal Internet operation. Finally, we argue that it retains its efficiency in the face of continued Internet growth.
In @cite_5 Mahajan propose mechanisms for detecting and controlling high bandwidth traffic aggregates. One part of their work discusses how a node determines whether it is congested and how it identifies the aggregate(s) responsible for the congestion. In contrast, we start from the point where the node has identified the undesired flow(s). In that sense, their work and our work are complementary. Another part of their work discusses how much to rate-limit an annoying aggregate due to a DoS attack or a flash crowd. In contrast, our mechanism focuses on DoS attack traffic and attempts to limit it to rate @math . We believe that DoS attacks should be addressed separately from flash crowds: Flash crowd aggregates are created by legitimate traffic. Therefore, it makes sense to rate-limit them instead of completely blocking them. On the contrary, DoS attack traffic aims at disrupting the victim's operation. Therefore, it makes sense to block it. Blocking a traffic flow is simpler and cheaper than rate-limiting it. Moreover, DoS attack traffic is generated by malicious compromised nodes. Therefore, it demands a more intelligent defense mechanism.
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The current Internet infrastructure has very few built-in protection mechanisms, and is therefore vulnerable to attacks and failures. In particular, recent events have illustrated the Internet's vulnerability to both denial of service (DoS) attacks and flash crowds in which one or more links in the network (or servers at the edge of the network) become severely congested. In both DoS attacks and flash crowds the congestion is due neither to a single flow, nor to a general increase in traffic, but to a well-defined subset of the traffic --- an aggregate. This paper proposes mechanisms for detecting and controlling such high bandwidth aggregates. Our design involves both a local mechanism for detecting and controlling an aggregate at a single router, and a cooperative pushback mechanism in which a router can ask upstream routers to control an aggregate. While certainly not a panacea, these mechanisms could provide some needed relief from flash crowds and flooding-style DoS attacks. The presentation in this paper is a first step towards a more rigorous evaluation of these mechanisms. Denial of service (DoS) attacks are a serious security threat for Internet based organisations, and effective methods are needed to detect an attack and defend the nodes being attacked in real time. We propose an autonomic approach to DoS defence based on detecting DoS flows, and adaptively dropping attacking packets upstream from the node being attacked using trace-back of the attacking flows. Our approach is based on the Cognitive Packet Network infrastructure which uses smart packets to select paths based on Quality of Service. This approach allows paths being used by a flow (including an attacking flow) to be identified, and also helps legitimate flows to find robust paths during an attack. We evaluate the proposed approach using a mathematical model, as well as using experiments in a laboratory test-bed. We then suggest a more sophisticated defence framework based on authenticity tests as part of the detection mechanism, and on assigning priorities to incoming traffic and rate-limiting it on the basis of the outcome of these tests. Traditional mix-based systems are composed of a small set of static, well known, and highly reliable mixes. To resist traffic analysis attacks at a mix, cover traffic must be used, which results in significant bandwidth overhead. End-to-end traffic analysis attacks are even more difficult to counter because there are only a few entry-and exit-points in the system. Static mix networks also suffer from scalability problems and in several countries, institutions operating a mix could be targeted by legal attacks. In this paper, we introduce MorphMix, a system for peer-to-peer based anonymous Internet usage. Each MorphMix node is a mix and anyone can easily join the system. We believe that MorphMix overcomes or reduces several drawbacks of static mix networks. In particular, we argue that our approach offers good protection from traffic analysis attacks without employing cover traffic. But MorphMix also introduces new challenges. One is that an adversary can easily operate several malicious nodes in the system and try to break the anonymity of legitimate users by getting full control over their anonymous paths. To counter this attack, we have developed a collusion detection mechanism, which allows to identify compromised paths with high probability before they are being used. This paper develops two parametric methods to detect low-rate denial-of-service attacks and other similar near-periodic traffic, without the need for flow separation. The first method, the periodic attack detector, is based on a previous approach that exploits the near-periodic nature of attack traffic in aggregate traffic by modeling the peak frequency in the traffic spectrum. The new method adopts simple statistical models for attack and background traffic in the time-domain. Both approaches use sequential probability ratio tests (SPRTs), allowing control over false alarm rate while examining the trade-off between detection time and attack strength. We evaluate these methods with real and synthetic traces, observing that the new Poisson- based scheme uniformly detects attacks more rapidly, often in less than 200 ms, and with lower complexity than the periodic attack detector. Current entropy-based detection methods provide an equivalent time to detection but require flow-separation since they utilize source destination IP addresses. We evaluate sensitivity to attack strength (compared to the rate of background traffic) with synthetic traces, finding that the new approach can detect attacks that represent only 10 of the total traffic bitrate in fractions of a second. Today's cloud-based services integrate globally distributed resources into seamless computing platforms. Provisioning and accounting for the resource usage of these Internet-scale applications presents a challenging technical problem. This paper presents the design and implementation of distributed rate limiters, which work together to enforce a global rate limit across traffic aggregates at multiple sites, enabling the coordinated policing of a cloud-based service's network traffic. Our abstraction not only enforces a global limit, but also ensures that congestion-responsive transport-layer flows behave as if they traversed a single, shared limiter. We present two designs - one general purpose, and one optimized for TCP - that allow service operators to explicitly trade off between communication costs and system accuracy, efficiency, and scalability. Both designs are capable of rate limiting thousands of flows with negligible overhead (less than 3 in the tested configuration). We demonstrate that our TCP-centric design is scalable to hundreds of nodes while robust to both loss and communication delay, making it practical for deployment in nationwide service providers. Detecting and understanding anomalies in IP networks is an open and ill-defined problem. Toward this end, we have recently proposed the subspace method for anomaly diagnosis. In this paper we present the first large-scale exploration of the power of the subspace method when applied to flow traffic. An important aspect of this approach is that it fuses information from flow measurements taken throughout a network. We apply the subspace method to three different types of sampled flow traffic in a large academic network: multivariate timeseries of byte counts, packet counts, and IP-flow counts. We show that each traffic type brings into focus a different set of anomalies via the subspace method. We illustrate and classify the set of anomalies detected. We find that almost all of the anomalies detected represent events of interest to network operators. Furthermore, the anomalies span a remarkably wide spectrum of event types, including denial of service attacks (single-source and distributed), flash crowds, port scanning, downstream traffic engineering, high-rate flows, worm propagation, and network outage. Attackers can render distributed denial-of-service attacks more difficult to defend against by bouncing their flooding traffic off of reflectors; that is, by spoofing requests from the victim to a large set of Internet servers that will in turn send their combined replies to the victim. The resulting dilution of locality in the flooding stream complicates the victim's abilities both to isolate the attack traffic in order to block it, and to use traceback techniques for locating the source of streams of packets with spoofed source addresses, such as ITRACE [Be00a], probabilistic packet marking [SWKA00], [SP01], and SPIE [S+01]. We discuss a number of possible defenses against reflector attacks, finding that most prove impractical, and then assess the degree to which different forms of reflector traffic will have characteristic signatures that the victim can use to identify and filter out the attack traffic. Our analysis indicates that three types of reflectors pose particularly significant threats: DNS and Gnutella servers, and TCP-based servers (particularly Web servers) running on TCP implementations that suffer from predictable initial sequence numbers. We argue in conclusion in support of "reverse ITRACE" [Ba00] and for the utility of packet traceback techniques that work even for low volume flows, such as SPIE. This paper is concerned with providing radio access network (RAN) elements (supply) for flash crowd traffic demands. The concept of multi-tier cells [heterogeneous networks (HetNets)] has been introduced in 5G network proposals to alleviate the erratic supply–demand mismatch. However, since the locations of the RAN elements are determined mainly based on the long-term traffic behavior in 5G networks, even the HetNet architecture will have difficulty in coping up with the cell overload induced by flash crowd traffic. In this paper, we propose a proactive drone-cell deployment framework to alleviate overload conditions caused by flash crowd traffic in 5G networks. First, a hybrid distribution and three kinds of flash crowd traffic are developed in this framework. Second, we propose a prediction scheme and an operation control scheme to solve the deployment problem of drone cells according to the information collected from the sensor network. Third, the software-defined networking technology is employed to seamlessly integrate and disintegrate drone cells by reconfiguring the network. Our experimental results have shown that the proposed framework can effectively address the overload caused by flash crowd traffic. A new algorithm for intelligent routing in Approximate Flow-Aware Networks (AFAN) is presented and analyzed in the paper. In contrast to basic AFAN, where cross-protect routers block excessive traffic under congestion, it assumes a possibility of using other routes to destination nodes based on the idea similar to load balancing. The analysis is provided for the AFAN concept, which is the newest version of Flow-Aware Networks (FAN). The simulation experiments, discussed in the paper, were provided for basic AFAN and for the network with one of two congestion control mechanisms, the Remove and Accept Most Active Flows (RAMAF) and Simple Congestion Control Mechanism (SCCM). These solutions allow for fast acceptance of streaming flows independently of the volume of traffic load in a network. The results are presented for four different simulation topologies and prove the advantages of the proposed intelligent routing approach. Moreover, it is shown that the SCCM ensures better transmission properties than the RAMAF. Security issues are crucial in a number of machine learning applications, especially in scenarios dealing with human activity rather than natural phenomena (e.g., information ranking, spam detection, malware detection, etc.). In such cases, learning algorithms may have to cope with manipulated data aimed at hampering decision making. Although some previous work addressed the issue of handling malicious data in the context of supervised learning, very little is known about the behavior of anomaly detection methods in such scenarios. In this contribution, we analyze the performance of a particular method--online centroid anomaly detection--in the presence of adversarial noise. Our analysis addresses the following security-related issues: formalization of learning and attack processes, derivation of an optimal attack, and analysis of attack efficiency and limitations. We derive bounds on the effectiveness of a poisoning attack against centroid anomaly detection under different conditions: attacker's full or limited control over the traffic and bounded false positive rate. Our bounds show that whereas a poisoning attack can be effectively staged in the unconstrained case, it can be made arbitrarily difficult (a strict upper bound on the attacker's gain) if external constraints are properly used. Our experimental evaluation, carried out on real traces of HTTP and exploit traffic, confirms the tightness of our theoretical bounds and the practicality of our protection mechanisms. Aggregate location data is often used to support smart services and applications, e.g., generating live traffic maps or predicting visits to businesses. In this paper, we present the first study on the feasibility of membership inference attacks on aggregate location time-series. We introduce a game-based definition of the adversarial task, and cast it as a classification problem where machine learning can be used to distinguish whether or not a target user is part of the aggregates. We empirically evaluate the power of these attacks on both raw and differentially private aggregates using two mobility datasets. We find that membership inference is a serious privacy threat, and show how its effectiveness depends on the adversary's prior knowledge, the characteristics of the underlying location data, as well as the number of users and the timeframe on which aggregation is performed. Although differentially private mechanisms can indeed reduce the extent of the attacks, they also yield a significant loss in utility. Moreover, a strategic adversary mimicking the behavior of the defense mechanism can greatly limit the protection they provide. Overall, our work presents a novel methodology geared to evaluate membership inference on aggregate location data in real-world settings and can be used by providers to assess the quality of privacy protection before data release or by regulators to detect violations. To date, techniques to counter cyber-attacks have predominantly been reactive; they focus on monitoring network traffic, detecting anomalies and cyber-attack traffic patterns, and, a posteriori, combating the cyber-attacks and mitigating their effects. Contrary to such approaches, we advocate proactively detecting and identifying botnets prior to their being used as part of a cyber-attack (, 2006). In this paper, we present our work on using machine learning-based classification techniques to identify the command and control (C2) traffic of IRC-based botnets - compromised hosts that are collectively commanded using Internet relay chat (IRC). We split this task into two stages: (I) distinguishing between IRC and non-IRC traffic, and (II) distinguishing between botnet and real IRC traffic. For stage I, we compare the performance of J48, naive Bayes, and Bayesian network classifiers, identify the features that achieve good overall classification accuracy, and determine the classification sensitivity to the training set size. While sensitive to the training data and the attributes used to characterize communication flows, machine learning-based classifiers show promise in identifying IRC traffic. Using classification in stage II is trickier, since accurately labeling IRC traffic as botnet and non-botnet is challenging. We are currently exploring labeling flows as suspicious and non-suspicious based on telltales of hosts being compromised In this work, we present the results of a study on the detrimental effects of sinkhole attacks on Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) which employ the Routing Protocol for LLNs (Low-power and Lossy Networks). A sinkhole is a compromised node which attempts to capture traffic with the intent to drop messages, thus degrading the end-to-end delivery performance, that is, reducing the number of messages successfully delivered to their destination. The mechanism by which the sinkhole captures traffic is by advertising an attractive route to its neighbors. We evaluate two countermeasures addressing the sinkhole problem: a parent fail-over and a rank authentication technique. We show via simulation that while each technique, applied alone, does not work all that well, the combination of the two techniques significantly improves the performance of a network under attack. We also demonstrate that, with the defenses described, increasing the density of the network can combat a penetration of sinkholes nodes, without needing to identify the sinkholes. Internet traffic contains a rich set of periodic patterns. Examples include regular packet transmissions along bottleneck links, periodic routing information exchange, and periodicities inside Denial-of-Service attack streams. Analyzing such periodic patterns has wide applications, including a better understanding of network traffic dynamics, diagnosis of network anomalies, and detection of Denial-of-Service attacks. However, current understanding of periodic behavior in aggregate traffic is quite limited. Many previous approaches often analyze traffic on a per-flow basis, and are not suited to analyze high speed aggregate traffic. In addition, a number of approaches only indicate that they may reveal periodic patterns, but fall short of proposing automatic detection algorithms and quantitatively evaluating their performance. This thesis explores the application of spectral and statistical methods to detect periodic patterns in Internet traffic. In our approach we first apply spectral techniques to obtain the traffic spectrum, and then use algorithms based on rigorous statistical methods to automatically detect periodic patterns from the traffic spectrum. One salient feature of our approach is that it operates at the aggregate traffic level and does not require flow separation. We first carry out controlled lab experiments to demonstrate the spectral characteristics of various periodic patterns. We then propose four non-parametric detection algorithms and evaluate their performance using real-world Internet traffic. Results show that one of them, the Top-Frequency Algorithm, is the best choice in terms of detection performance and algorithm simplicity. It can provide excellent accuracy (up to 95 ) for detecting the periodic pattern caused a bottleneck link even when the traffic through the bottleneck accounts for less than 10 of the aggregate traffic observed at the monitoring point. We also investigate two extensions to our algorithms. The first one is to utilize harmonics, and the second one is to have parametric detection that considers the variation of traffic spectra according to other factors, such as traffic volume. Evaluation results show that we can get significant improvement by considering harmonics for traffic similar to the training data and marginal improvement by considering traffic volume for parametric detection. This paper presents a new distributed approach to detecting DDoS (distributed denial of services) flooding attacks at the traffic-flow level The new defense system is suitable for efficient implementation over the core networks operated by Internet service providers (ISPs). At the early stage of a DDoS attack, some traffic fluctuations are detectable at Internet routers or at the gateways of edge networks. We develop a distributed change-point detection (DCD) architecture using change aggregation trees (CAT). The idea is to detect abrupt traffic changes across multiple network domains at the earliest time. Early detection of DDoS attacks minimizes the floe cling damages to the victim systems serviced by the provider. The system is built over attack-transit routers, which work together cooperatively. Each ISP domain has a CAT server to aggregate the flooding alerts reported by the routers. CAT domain servers collaborate among themselves to make the final decision. To resolve policy conflicts at different ISP domains, a new secure infrastructure protocol (SIP) is developed to establish mutual trust or consensus. We simulated the DCD system up to 16 network domains on the Cyber Defense Technology Experimental Research (DETER) testbed, a 220-node PC cluster for Internet emulation experiments at the University of Southern California (USC) Information Science Institute. Experimental results show that four network domains are sufficient to yield a 98 percent detection accuracy with only 1 percent false-positive alarms. Based on a 2006 Internet report on autonomous system (AS) domain distribution, we prove that this DDoS defense system can scale well to cover 84 AS domains. This security coverage is wide enough to safeguard most ISP core networks from real-life DDoS flooding attacks. This paper describes Active Internet Traffic Filtering (AITF), a mechanism for blocking highly distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. These attacks are an acute contemporary problem, with few practical solutions available today; we describe in this paper the reasons why no effective DDoS filtering mechanism has been deployed yet. We show that the current Internet's routers have sufficient filtering resources to thwart such attacks, with the condition that attack traffic be blocked close to its sources; AITF leverages this observation. Our results demonstrate that AITF can block a million-flow attack within seconds, while it requires only tens of thousands of wire-speed filters per participating router -- an amount easily accommodated by today's routers. AITF can be deployed incrementally and yields benefits even to the very first adopters. Distributed systems without trusted identities are particularly vulnerable to sybil attacks, where an adversary creates multiple bogus identities to compromise the running of the system. This paper presents SybilDefender, a sybil defense mechanism that leverages the network topologies to defend against sybil attacks in social networks. Based on performing a limited number of random walks within the social graphs, SybilDefender is efficient and scalable to large social networks. Our experiments on two 3,000,000 node real-world social topologies show that SybilDefender outperforms the state of the art by one to two orders of magnitude in both accuracy and running time. SybilDefender can effectively identify the sybil nodes and detect the sybil community around a sybil node, even when the number of sybil nodes introduced by each attack edge is close to the theoretically detectable lower bound. Besides, we propose two approaches to limiting the number of attack edges in online social networks. The survey results of our Facebook application show that the assumption made by previous work that all the relationships in social networks are trusted does not apply to online social networks, and it is feasible to limit the number of attack edges in online social networks by relationship rating. In recent years, academic literature has analyzed many attacks on network trace anonymization techniques. These attacks usually correlate external information with anonymized data and successfully de-anonymize objects with distinctive signatures. However, analyses of these attacks still underestimate the real risk of publishing anonymized data, as the most powerful attack against anonymization is traffic injection. We demonstrate that performing live traffic injection attacks against anonymization on a backbone network is not difficult, and that potential countermeasures against these attacks, such as traffic aggregation, randomization or field generalization, are not particularly effective. We then discuss tradeoffs of the attacker and defender in the so-called injection attack space. An asymmetry in the attack space significantly increases the chance of a successful de-anonymization through lengthening the injected traffic pattern. This leads us to re-examine the role of network data anonymization. We recommend a unified approach to data sharing, which uses anonymization as a part of a technical, legal, and social approach to data protection in the research and operations communities. A regional central manager is employed to set aside, for the regional (or back-bone) network that it manages, for each flow class, communications capacity resources for a specific future time horizon. In the context of such a traffic management operation, a longer temporal scale is involved in controlling the admission and distribution of flows across the network. For management scal-ability purposes, flows are aggregated into flow classes. Furthermore, we consider a network operation under which multiple simultaneously activated routes are employed, across possibly distinct segments, to distribute traffic between identified source-destination pairs. We aim to ensure that the utility assigned to each class is as high as feasibly possible while striving to raise the utility gained by all classes in a maxmin fair manner. In doing so, we incorporate the communications capacity constraints that are imposed by the underlying hybrid of directional and or multiple-access wireline and wireless communications media employed across the network system. We develop and present in this paper an optimal algorithm for solving such a traffic management problem. It yields multi-utility-based max-min fair distributions of flow rates, per each class, across the specified multitude of simultaneously activated multi-segment routes. To guarantee that admitted flows are granted their desired capacity resources (and targeted corresponding utility levels), the selection of optimal flow distributions across the network routes is combined with the use of a flow admission control scheme that serves to optimally limit the aggregate rate of flows admitted for each flow class. As illustrative examples, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our solution in comparing its performance with that obtained under the use of a traffic regulation scheme that is not overlaid with a traffic management mechanism that serves to set aside resources for the support of flow classes. We also illustrate the use of our optimal algorithm for determining the optimal placement of unmanned aerial vehicle platforms that serve to supplement a terrestrial transport segment with a space-based one. The shared nature of the medium in wireless networks makes it easy for an adversary to launch a Wireless Denial of Service (WDoS) attack. Recent studies, demonstrate that such attacks can be very easily accomplished using off-the-shelf equipment. To give a simple example, a malicious node can continually transmit a radio signal in order to block any legitimate access to the medium and or interfere with reception. This act is called jamming and the malicious nodes are referred to as jammers. Jamming techniques vary from simple ones based on the continual transmission of interference signals, to more sophisticated attacks that aim at exploiting vulnerabilities of the particular protocol used. In this survey, we present a detailed up-to-date discussion on the jamming attacks recorded in the literature. We also describe various techniques proposed for detecting the presence of jammers. Finally, we survey numerous mechanisms which attempt to protect the network from jamming attacks. We conclude with a summary and by suggesting future directions.