We design an expected polynomial-time, truthful-in-expectation, (1-1 e)-approximation mechanism for welfare maximization in a fundamental class of combinatorial auctions. Our results apply to bidders with valuations that are m matroid rank sums (MRS), which encompass most concrete examples of submodular functions studied in this context, including coverage functions, matroid weighted-rank functions, and convex combinations thereof. Our approximation factor is the best possible, even for known and explicitly given coverage valuations, assuming P != NP. Ours is the first truthful-in-expectation and polynomial-time mechanism to achieve a constant-factor approximation for an NP-hard welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions with heterogeneous goods and restricted valuations. Our mechanism is an instantiation of a new framework for designing approximation mechanisms based on randomized rounding algorithms. A typical such algorithm first optimizes over a fractional relaxation of the original problem, and then randomly rounds the fractional solution to an integral one. With rare exceptions, such algorithms cannot be converted into truthful mechanisms. The high-level idea of our mechanism design framework is to optimize directly over the (random) output of the rounding algorithm, rather than over the input to the rounding algorithm. This approach leads to truthful-in-expectation mechanisms, and these mechanisms can be implemented efficiently when the corresponding objective function is concave. For bidders with MRS valuations, we give a novel randomized rounding algorithm that leads to both a concave objective function and a (1-1 e)-approximation of the optimal welfare.
Without incentive-compatibility constraints, the welfare maximization problem with submodular bidder valuations is completely solved. Vondr 'a k @cite_20 gave a @math -approximation algorithm for the problem, improving over the @math -approximation given in @cite_3 . The algorithm in @cite_20 works in the value oracle model, where each valuation @math is modeled as a black box'' that returns the value @math of a queried set @math in a single operation. The approximation factor of @math is unconditionally optimal in the value-oracle model (for polynomial communication) @cite_12 , and is also optimal (for polynomial time) for certain succinctly represented submodular valuations, assuming @math @cite_11 . The result of @cite_11 implies that @math is the optimal approximation factor in our model as well, assuming @math . We show in Appendix that our oracle model is no more powerful than polynomial-time computation in the special case of explicitly represented coverage functions, for which @math is optimal assuming @math @cite_11 . In contrast, the work of @cite_23 improves on the approximation factor of @math by using , which can not be simulated in polynomial time for explicit coverage functions.
@cite_3 @cite_23 @cite_20 @cite_12 @cite_11
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One of the fundamental questions of Algorithmic Mechanism Design is whether there exists an inherent clash between truthfulness and computational tractability: in particular, whether polynomial-time truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions are provably weaker in terms of approximation ratio than non-truthful ones. This question was very recently answered for universally truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions D11 , and even for truthful-in-expectation mechanisms DughmiV11 . However, both of these results are based on information-theoretic arguments for valuations given by a value oracle, and leave open the possibility of polynomial-time truthful mechanisms for succinctly described classes of valuations. This paper is the first to prove computational hardness results for truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with succinctly described valuations. We prove that there is a class of succinctly represented submodular valuations for which no deterministic truthful mechanism provides an @math -approximation for a constant @math , unless @math ( @math denotes the number of items). Furthermore, we prove that even truthful-in-expectation mechanisms cannot approximate combinatorial auctions with certain succinctly described submodular valuations better than within @math , where @math is the number of bidders and @math some absolute constant, unless @math . In addition, we prove computational hardness results for two related problems. Let @math be a monotone submodular set function, and let @math be a matroid. We consider the problem @math . It is known that the greedy algorithm yields a @math -approximation [M. L. Fisher, G. L. Nemhauser, and L. A. Wolsey, Math. Programming Stud., no. 8 (1978), pp. 73-87] for this problem. For certain special cases, e.g., @math , the greedy algorithm yields a @math -approximation. It is known that this is optimal both in the value oracle model (where the only access to @math is through a black box returning @math for a given set @math ) [G. L. Nemhauser and L. A. Wolsey, Math. Oper. Res., 3 (1978), pp. 177-188] and for explicitly posed instances assuming @math [U. Feige, J. ACM, 45 (1998), pp. 634-652]. In this paper, we provide a randomized @math -approximation for any monotone submodular function and an arbitrary matroid. The algorithm works in the value oracle model. Our main tools are a variant of the pipage rounding technique of Ageev and Sviridenko [J. Combin. Optim., 8 (2004), pp. 307-328], and a continuous greedy process that may be of independent interest. As a special case, our algorithm implies an optimal approximation for the submodular welfare problem in the value oracle model [J. Vondrak, Proceedings of the @math th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2008, pp. 67-74]. As a second application, we show that the generalized assignment problem (GAP) is also a special case; although the reduction requires @math to be exponential in the original problem size, we are able to achieve a @math -approximation for GAP, simplifying previously known algorithms. Additionally, the reduction enables us to obtain approximation algorithms for variants of GAP with more general constraints. This paper presents a polynomial-time @math -approximation algorithm for maximizing nonnegative @math -submodular functions. This improves upon the previous @math -approximation by Ward and Z ivn 'y (SODA'14), where @math . We also show that for monotone @math -submodular functions there is a polynomial-time @math -approximation algorithm while for any @math a @math -approximation algorithm for maximizing monotone @math -submodular functions would require exponentially many queries. In particular, our hardness result implies that our algorithms are asymptotically tight. We also extend the approach to provide constant factor approximation algorithms for maximizing skew-bisubmodular functions, which were recently introduced as generalizations of bisubmodular functions. We study a central problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design: constructing truthful mechanisms for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders. Dobzinski, Nisan, and Schapira provided the first mechanism that guarantees a non-trivial approximation ratio of @math [STOC'06], where @math is the number of items. This was subsequently improved to @math [Dobzinski, APPROX'07] and then to @math [Krysta and Vocking, ICALP'12]. In this paper we develop the first mechanism that breaks the logarithmic barrier. Specifically, the mechanism provides an approximation ratio of @math . Similarly to previous constructions, our mechanism uses polynomially many value and demand queries, and in fact provides the same approximation ratio for the larger class of XOS (a.k.a. fractionally subadditive) valuations. We also develop a computationally efficient implementation of the mechanism for combinatorial auctions with budget additive bidders. Although in general computing a demand query is NP-hard for budget additive valuations, we observe that the specific form of demand queries that our mechanism uses can be efficiently computed when bidders are budget additive. We investigate the minimization of Newton's functional for the problem of the body of minimal resistance with maximal height @math cite butt in the class of convex developable functions defined in a disc. This class is a natural candidate to find a (non-radial) minimizer in accordance with the results of cite lrp2. We prove that the minimizer in this class has a minimal set in the form of a regular polygon with @math sides centered in the disc, and numerical experiments indicate that the natural number @math is a non-decreasing function of @math . The corresponding functions all achieve a lower value of the functional than the optimal radially symmetric function with the same height @math . Let @math be a finite lattice and let @math be a positive integer. A function @math is said to be submodular if @math for all @math . In this paper we study submodular functions when @math is a diamond. Given oracle access to @math we are interested in finding @math such that @math as efficiently as possible. We establish a min--max theorem, which states that the minimum of the submodular function is equal to the maximum of a certain function defined over a certain polyhedron; and a good characterisation of the minimisation problem, i.e., we show that given an oracle for computing a submodular @math and an integer @math such that @math , there is a proof of this fact which can be verified in time polynomial in @math and @math ; and a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm for the minimisation problem, i.e., given an oracle for computing a submodular @math one can find @math in time bounded by a polynomial in @math and @math . We provide tight information-theoretic lower bounds for the welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions. In this problem, the goal is to partition m items among k bidders in a way that maximizes the sum of bidders' values for their allocated items. Bidders have complex preferences over items expressed by valuation functions that assign values to all subsets of items. We study the "black box" setting in which the auctioneer has oracle access to the valuation functions of the bidders. In particular, we explore the well-known value query model in which the permitted query to a valuation function is in the form of a subset of items, and the reply is the value assigned to that subset of items by the valuation function. We consider different classes of valuation functions: submodular,subadditive, and superadditive. For these classes, it has been shown that one can achieve approximation ratios of 1 -- 1 e, 1 √m, and √ m m, respectively, via a polynomial (in k and m) number of value queries. We prove that these approximation factors are essentially the best possible: For any fixed e > 0, a (1--1 e + e)-approximation for submodular valuations or an 1 m1 2-e-approximation for subadditive valuations would require exponentially many value queries, and a log1+e m m-approximation for superadditive valuations would require a superpolynomial number of value queries. We investigate nonparametric multiproduct pricing problems, in which we want to find revenue maximizing prices for products @math based on a set of customer samples @math . We mostly focus on the unit-demand case, in which products constitute strict substitutes and each customer aims to purchase a single product. In this setting a customer sample consists of a number of nonzero values for different products and possibly an additional product ranking. Once prices are fixed, each customer chooses to buy one of the products she can afford based on some predefined selection rule. We distinguish between the min-buying, max-buying, and rank-buying models. Some of our results also extend to single-minded pricing, in which case products are strict complements and every customer seeks to buy a single set of products, which she purchases if the sum of prices is below her valuation for that set. For the min-buying model we show that the revenue maximization problem is not approximable within factor @math for some constant @math , unless @math , thereby almost closing the gap between the known algorithmic results and previous lower bounds. We also prove inapproximability within @math , @math being an upper bound on the number of nonzero values per customer, and @math under slightly stronger assumptions and provide matching upper bounds. Surprisingly, these hardness results hold even if a price ladder constraint, i.e., a predefined order on the prices of all products, is given. Without the price ladder constraint we obtain similar hardness results for the special case of uniform valuations, i.e., the case that every customer has identical values for all the products she is interested in, assuming specific hardness of the balanced bipartite independent set problem in constant degree graphs or hardness of refuting random 3CNF formulas. Introducing a slightly more general problem definition in which customers are given as an explicit probability distribution, we obtain inapproximability within @math assuming @math . These results apply to single-minded pricing as well. For the max-buying model a polynomial-time approximation scheme exists if a price ladder is given. We give a matching lower bound by proving strong NP-hardness. Assuming limited product supply, we analyze a generic local search algorithm and prove that it is 2-approximate. Finally, we discuss implications for the rank-buying model. We exhibit three approximation algorithms for the allocation problem in combinatorial auctions with complement free bidders. The running time of these algorithms is polynomial in the number of items @math and in the number of bidders n, even though the "input size" is exponential in m. The first algorithm provides an O(log m) approximation. The second algorithm provides an O(√ m) approximation in the weaker model of value oracles. This algorithm is also incentive compatible. The third algorithm provides an improved 2-approximation for the more restricted case of "XOS bidders", a class which strictly contains submodular bidders. We also prove lower bounds on the possible approximations achievable for these classes of bidders. These bounds are not tight and we leave the gaps as open problems. A line of recent work provides welfare guarantees of simple combinatorial auction formats, such as selling m items via simultaneous second price auctions (SiSPAs) ( 2008, Bhawalkar and Roughgarden 2011, 2013). These guarantees hold even when the auctions are repeatedly executed and players use no-regret learning algorithms. Unfortunately, off-the-shelf no-regret algorithms for these auctions are computationally inefficient as the number of actions is exponential. We show that this obstacle is insurmountable: there are no polynomial-time no-regret algorithms for SiSPAs, unless RP @math NP, even when the bidders are unit-demand. Our lower bound raises the question of how good outcomes polynomially-bounded bidders may discover in such auctions. To answer this question, we propose a novel concept of learning in auctions, termed "no-envy learning." This notion is founded upon Walrasian equilibrium, and we show that it is both efficiently implementable and results in approximately optimal welfare, even when the bidders have fractionally subadditive (XOS) valuations (assuming demand oracles) or coverage valuations (without demand oracles). No-envy learning outcomes are a relaxation of no-regret outcomes, which maintain their approximate welfare optimality while endowing them with computational tractability. Our results extend to other auction formats that have been studied in the literature via the smoothness paradigm. Our results for XOS valuations are enabled by a novel Follow-The-Perturbed-Leader algorithm for settings where the number of experts is infinite, and the payoff function of the learner is non-linear. This algorithm has applications outside of auction settings, such as in security games. Our result for coverage valuations is based on a novel use of convex rounding schemes and a reduction to online convex optimization. We study the problem of fair allocation for indivisible goods. We use the the maxmin share paradigm introduced by Budish as a measure for fairness. Procacciafirst (EC'14) were first to investigate this fundamental problem in the additive setting. In contrast to what real-world experiments suggest, they show that a maxmin guarantee (1- @math allocation) is not always possible even when the number of agents is limited to 3. While the existence of an approximation solution (e.g. a @math - @math allocation) is quite straightforward, improving the guarantee becomes subtler for larger constants. Procaccia provide a proof for existence of a @math - @math allocation and leave the question open for better guarantees. Our main contribution is an answer to the above question. We improve the result of ! to a @math factor in the additive setting. The main idea for our @math - @math allocation method is clustering the agents. To this end, we introduce three notions and techniques, namely reducibility, matching allocation, and cycle-envy-freeness, and prove the approximation guarantee of our algorithm via non-trivial applications of these techniques. Our analysis involves coloring and double counting arguments that might be of independent interest. One major shortcoming of the current studies on fair allocation is the additivity assumption on the valuations. We alleviate this by extending our results to the case of submodular, fractionally subadditive, and subadditive settings. More precisely, we give constant approximation guarantees for submodular and XOS agents, and a logarithmic approximation for the case of subadditive agents. Furthermore, we complement our results by providing close upper bounds for each class of valuation functions. Finally, we present algorithms to find such allocations for additive, submodular, and XOS settings in polynomial time. We investigate the approximability of several classes of real-valued functions by functions of a small number of variables ( juntas ). Our main results are tight bounds on the number of variables required to approximate a function @math within @math -error @math over the uniform distribution: 1. If @math is submodular, then it is @math -close to a function of @math variables. This is an exponential improvement over previously known results. We note that @math variables are necessary even for linear functions. 2. If @math is fractionally subadditive (XOS) it is @math -close to a function of @math variables. This result holds for all functions with low total @math -influence and is a real-valued analogue of Friedgut's theorem for boolean functions. We show that @math variables are necessary even for XOS functions. As applications of these results, we provide learning algorithms over the uniform distribution. For XOS functions, we give a PAC learning algorithm that runs in time @math . For submodular functions we give an algorithm in the more demanding PMAC learning model (Balcan and Harvey, 2011) which requires a multiplicative @math factor approximation with probability at least @math over the target distribution. Our uniform distribution algorithm runs in time @math . This is the first algorithm in the PMAC model that over the uniform distribution can achieve a constant approximation factor arbitrarily close to 1 for all submodular functions. As follows from the lower bounds in (, 2013) both of these algorithms are close to optimal. We also give applications for proper learning, testing and agnostic learning with value queries of these classes. We consider the problem of maximizing a nonnegative submodular set function @math over a ground set @math subject to a variety of packing-type constraints including (multiple) matroid constraints, knapsack constraints, and their intersections. In this paper we develop a general framework that allows us to derive a number of new results, in particular, when @math may be a nonmonotone function. Our algorithms are based on (approximately) maximizing the multilinear extension @math of @math over a polytope @math that represents the constraints, and then effectively rounding the fractional solution. Although this approach has been used quite successfully, it has been limited in some important ways. We overcome these limitations as follows. First, we give constant factor approximation algorithms to maximize @math over a downward-closed polytope @math described by an efficient separation oracle. Previously this was known only for monotone functions. For nonmonotone functions, a constant factor was ... We consider the following generalization of the binary search problem. A search strategy is required to locate an unknown target node @math in a given tree @math . Upon querying a node @math of the tree, the strategy receives as a reply an indication of the connected component of @math containing the target @math . The cost of querying each node is given by a known non-negative weight function, and the considered objective is to minimize the total query cost for a worst-case choice of the target. Designing an optimal strategy for a weighted tree search instance is known to be strongly NP-hard, in contrast to the unweighted variant of the problem which can be solved optimally in linear time. Here, we show that weighted tree search admits a quasi-polynomial time approximation scheme: for any @math , there exists a @math -approximation strategy with a computation time of @math . Thus, the problem is not APX-hard, unless @math . By applying a generic reduction, we obtain as a corollary that the studied problem admits a polynomial-time @math -approximation. This improves previous @math -approximation approaches, where the @math -notation disregards @math -factors. For Bayesian combinatorial auctions, we present a general framework for approximately reducing the mechanism design problem for multiple buyers to single buyer sub-problems. Our framework can be applied to any setting which roughly satisfies the following assumptions: (i) buyers' types must be distributed independently (not necessarily identically), (ii) objective function must be linearly separable over the buyers, and (iii) except for the supply constraints, there should be no other inter-buyer constraints. Our framework is general in the sense that it makes no explicit assumption about buyers' valuations, type distributions, and single buyer constraints (e.g., budget, incentive compatibility, etc). We present two generic multi buyer mechanisms which use single buyer mechanisms as black boxes; if an @math -approximate single buyer mechanism can be constructed for each buyer, and if no buyer requires more than @math of all units of each item, then our generic multi buyer mechanisms are @math -approximation of the optimal multi buyer mechanism, where @math is a constant which is at least @math . Observe that @math is at least 1 2 (for @math ) and approaches 1 as @math . As a byproduct of our construction, we present a generalization of prophet inequalities. Furthermore, as applications of our framework, we present multi buyer mechanisms with improved approximation factor for several settings from the literature. We consider @math -median clustering in finite metric spaces and @math -means clustering in Euclidean spaces, in the setting where @math is part of the input (not a constant). For the @math -means problem, show that if the optimal @math -means clustering of the input is more expensive than the optimal @math -means clustering by a factor of @math , then one can achieve a @math -approximation to the @math -means optimal in time polynomial in @math and @math by using a variant of Lloyd's algorithm. In this work we substantially improve this approximation guarantee. We show that given only the condition that the @math -means optimal is more expensive than the @math -means optimal by a factor @math for some constant @math , we can obtain a PTAS. In particular, under this assumption, for any @math we achieve a @math -approximation to the @math -means optimal in time polynomial in @math and @math , and exponential in @math and @math . We thus decouple the strength of the assumption from the quality of the approximation ratio. We also give a PTAS for the @math -median problem in finite metrics under the analogous assumption as well. For @math -means, we in addition give a randomized algorithm with improved running time of @math . Our technique also obtains a PTAS under the assumption of that all @math approximations are @math -close to a desired target clustering, in the case that all target clusters have size greater than @math and @math is constant. Note that the motivation of is that for many clustering problems, the objective function is only a proxy for the true goal of getting close to the target. From this perspective, our improvement is that for @math -means in Euclidean spaces we reduce the distance of the clustering found to the target from @math to @math when all target clusters are large, and for @math -median we improve the largeness'' condition needed in the work of to get exactly @math -close from @math to @math . Our results are based on a new notion of clustering stability. In the Submodular Welfare Problem, m items are to be distributed among n players with utility functions wi: 2[m] → R+. The utility functions are assumed to be monotone and submodular. Assuming that player i receives a set of items Si, we wish to maximize the total utility ∑i=1n wi(Si). In this paper, we work in the value oracle model where the only access to the utility functions is through a black box returning wi(S) for a given set S. Submodular Welfare is in fact a special case of the more general problem of submodular maximization subject to a matroid constraint: max f(S): S ∈ I , where f is monotone submodular and I is the collection of independent sets in some matroid. For both problems, a greedy algorithm is known to yield a 1 2-approximation [21, 16]. In special cases where the matroid is uniform (I = S: |S| ≤ k) [20] or the submodular function is of a special type [4, 2], a (1-1 e)-approximation has been achieved and this is optimal for these problems in the value oracle model [22, 6, 15]. A (1-1 e)-approximation for the general Submodular Welfare Problem has been known only in a stronger demand oracle model [4], where in fact 1-1 e can be improved [9]. In this paper, we develop a randomized continuous greedy algorithm which achieves a (1-1 e)-approximation for the Submodular Welfare Problem in the value oracle model. We also show that the special case of n equal players is approximation resistant, in the sense that the optimal (1-1 e)-approximation is achieved by a uniformly random solution. Using the pipage rounding technique [1, 2], we obtain a (1-1 e)-approximation for submodular maximization subject to any matroid constraint. The continuous greedy algorithm has a potential of wider applicability, which we demonstrate on the examples of the Generalized Assignment Problem and the AdWords Assignment Problem. We give the first improvement to the space approximation trade-off of distance oracles since the seminal result of Thorup and Zwick [STOC'01]. For unweighted graphs, our distance oracle has size @math and, when queried about vertices at distance @math , returns a path of length @math . For weighted graphs with @math edges, our distance oracle has size @math and returns a factor 2 approximation. Based on a plausible conjecture about the hardness of set intersection queries, we show that a 2-approximate distance oracle requires space @math . For unweighted graphs, this implies a @math space lower bound to achieve approximation @math . In this paper we show a new way of constructing deterministic polynomial-time approximation algorithms for computing complex-valued evaluations of a large class of graph polynomials on bounded degree graphs. In particular, our approach works for the Tutte polynomial and independence polynomial, as well as partition functions of complex-valued spin and edge-coloring models. More specifically, we define a large class of graph polynomials @math and show that if @math and there is a disk @math centered at zero in the complex plane such that @math does not vanish on @math for all bounded degree graphs @math , then for each @math in the interior of @math there exists a deterministic polynomial-time approximation algorithm for evaluating @math at @math . This gives an explicit connection between absence of zeros of graph polynomials and the existence of efficient approximation algorithms, allowing us to show new relationships between well-known conjectures. Our work builds on a recent line of work initiated b... We study the problem of approximating the commuting-operator value of a two-player non-local game. It is well-known that it is @math -complete to decide whether the classical value of a non-local game is 1 or @math . Furthermore, as long as @math is small enough, this result does not depend on the gap @math . In contrast, a recent result of Fitzsimons, Ji, Vidick, and Yuen shows that the complexity of computing the quantum value grows without bound as the gap @math decreases. In this paper, we show that this also holds for the commuting-operator value of a game. Specifically, in the language of multi-prover interactive proofs, we show that the power of @math (proofs with two provers, one round, completeness probability @math , soundness probability @math , and commuting-operator strategies) can increase without bound as the gap @math gets arbitrarily small. Our results also extend naturally in two ways, to perfect zero-knowledge protocols, and to lower bounds on the complexity of computing the approximately-commuting value of a game. Thus we get lower bounds on the complexity class @math - @math of perfect zero-knowledge multi-prover proofs with approximately-commuting operator strategies, as the gap @math gets arbitrarily small. While we do not know any computable time upper bound on the class @math , a result of the first author and Vidick shows that for @math and @math , the class @math , with constant communication from the provers, is contained in @math . We give a lower bound of @math (ignoring constants inside the function) for this class, which is tight up to polynomial factors assuming the exponential time hypothesis.