Quantum information processing is at the crossroads of physics, mathematics and computer science. It is concerned with what we can and cannot do with quantum information that goes beyond the abilities of classical information processing devices. Communication complexity is an area of classical computer science that aims at quantifying the amount of communication necessary to solve distributed computational problems. Quantum communication complexity uses quantum mechanics to reduce the amount of communication that would be classically required.
Also, Aravind has generalized his own magic square idea @cite_14 to a two-player pseudo-telepathy game in which the players share @math Bell states, @math being an arbitrary odd number larger than 1.
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Bell inequality violations correspond to behavior of entangled quantum systems that cannot be simulated classically. We give two new two-player games with Bell inequality violations that are stronger, fully explicit, and arguably simpler than earlier work.The first game is based on the Hidden Matching problem of quantum communication complexity, introduced by Bar-Yossef, Jayram, and Kerenidis. This game can be won with probability 1 by a quantum strategy using a maximally entangled state with local dimension n (e.g., log n EPR-pairs), while we show that the winning probability of any classical strategy differs from 1 2 by at most O(log(n) sqrt(n)).The second game is based on the integrality gap for Unique Games by Khot and Vishnoi and the quantum rounding procedure of Kempe, Regev, and Toner. Here n-dimensional entanglement allows to win the game with probability 1 (log n)^2, while the best winning probability without entanglement is 1 n. This near-linear ratio ( Bell inequality violation'') is near-optimal, both in terms of the local dimension of the entangled state, and in terms of the number of possible outputs of the two players. Consider the following probabilistic one-player game: The board is a graph with @math vertices, which initially contains no edges. In each step, a new edge is drawn uniformly at random from all nonedges and is presented to the player, henceforth called Painter. Painter must assign one of @math available colors to each edge immediately, where @math is a fixed integer. The game is over as soon as a monochromatic copy of some fixed graph @math has been created, and Painter's goal is to “survive” for as many steps as possible before this happens. We present a new technique for deriving upper bounds on the threshold of this game, i.e., on the typical number of steps Painter will survive with an optimal strategy. More specifically, we consider a deterministic two-player variant of the game where the edges are chosen not randomly, but by a second player Builder. However, Builder has to adhere to the restriction that, for some real number @math , the ratio of edges to vertices in all subgraphs of the evolving board ne... This paper investigates a zero-sum game played on a weighted connected graph @math between two players, the tree player and the edge player. At each play, the tree player chooses a spanning tree @math and the edge player chooses an edge @math . The payoff to the edge player is @math , defined as follows: If @math lies in the tree @math then @math ; if @math does not lie in the tree then @math , where @math is the weight of edge @math and @math is the weight of the unique cycle formed when edge @math is added to the tree @math . The main result is that the value of the game on any @math -vertex graph is bounded above by @math . It is conjectured that the value of the game is @math . The game arises in connection with the @math -server problem on a road network; i.e., a metric space that can be represented as a multigraph @math in which each edge @math represents a road of length @math . It is shown that, if the value of the game on @math is @math , then there is a randomized strategy that achieves a competitive ratio of @math against any oblivious adversary. Thus, on any @math -vertex road network, there is a randomized algorithm for the @math -server problem that is @math competitive against oblivious adversaries. At the heart of the analysis of the game is an algorithm that provides an approximate solution for the simple network design problem. Specifically, for any @math -vertex weighted, connected multigraph, the algorithm constructs a spanning tree @math such that the average, over all edges @math , of @math is less than or equal to @math . This result has potential application to the design of communication networks. It also improves substantially known estimates concerning the existence of a sparse basis for the cycle space of a graph. We study the following one-person game against a random graph process: the Player's goal is to @math -colour a random sequence of edges @math of a complete graph on @math vertices, avoiding a monochromatic triangle for as long as possible. The game is over when a monochromatic triangle is created. The online version of the game requires that the Player should colour each edge as it comes, before looking at the next edge.While it is not hard to prove that the expected length of this game is about @math , the proof of the upper bound suggests the following relaxation: instead of colouring online, the random graph is generated in only two rounds, and the Player colours the edges of the first round before the edges of the second round are thrown in. Given the size of the first round, how many edges can there be in the second round for the Player to be likely to win? In the extreme case, when the first round consists of a random graph with @math edges, where @math is a positive constant, we show that the Player can win with high probability only if constantly many edges are generated in the second round. This paper studies a cooperative card game called Hanabi from an algorithmic combinatorial game theory viewpoint. The aim of the game is to play cards from @math to @math in increasing order (this has to be done independently in @math different colors). Cards are drawn from a deck one by one. Drawn cards are either immediately played, discarded or stored for future use (overall each player can store up to @math cards). We introduce a simplified mathematical model of a single-player version of the game, and show several complexity results: the game is intractable in a general setting, but becomes tractable (and even linear) in some interesting restricted cases (i.e., for small values of @math and @math ). We present a novel polynomial time approximation scheme fortwo-strategy anonymous games, in which the players’ utilityfunctions, although potentially different, do not differentiateamong the identities of the other players. Our algorithm computesan e-approximate Nash equilibrium of an n-player 2-strategyanonymous game in time @math , which significantly improves uponthe running time @math required by the algorithm ofDaskalakis & Papadimitriou, 2007. The improved running time isbased on a new structural understanding of approximate Nashequilibria: We show that, for any e, there exists ane-approximate Nash equilibrium in which either onlyO(1 e 3) players randomize, or all players who randomizeuse the same mixed strategy. To show this result we employ toolsfrom the literature on Stein’s Method. We investigate how and to which extent one can exploit risk-aversion and modify the perceived cost of the players in selfish routing so that the Price of Anarchy @math is improved. We introduce small random perturbations to the edge latencies so that the expected latency does not change, but the perceived cost of the players increases due to risk-aversion. We adopt the model of @math -modifiable routing games, a variant of routing games with restricted tolls. We prove that computing the best @math -enforceable flow is @math -hard for parallel-link networks with affine latencies and two classes of heterogeneous risk-averse players. On the positive side, we show that for parallel-link networks with heterogeneous players and for series-parallel networks with homogeneous players, there exists a nicely structured @math -enforceable flow whose @math improves fast as @math increases. We show that the complexity of computing such a @math -enforceable flow is determined by the complexity of computing a Nash flow of the original game. Moreover, we prove that the @math of this flow is best possible in the worst-case, in the sense that there are instances where ii¾?the best @math -enforceable flow has the same @math , and iii¾?considering more flexible modifications does not lead to any further improvement. We propose a simple yet rich model to extend strategic games to the quantum setting, in which we define quantum Nash and correlated equilibria and study the relations between classical and quantum equilibria. Unlike all previous work that focused on qualitative questions on specific games of very small sizes, we quantitatively address the following fundamental question for general games of growing sizes: How much "advantage" can playing quantum strategies provide, if any? Two measures of the advantage are studied. 1. Since game mainly is about each player trying to maximize individual payoff, a natural measure is the increase of payoff by playing quantum strategies. We consider natural mappings between classical and quantum states, and study how well those mappings preserve equilibrium properties. Among other results, we exhibit a correlated equilibrium p whose quantum superposition counterpart [EQUATION] is far from being a quantum correlated equilibrium; actually a player can increase her payoff from almost 0 to almost 1 in a [0, 1]-normalized game. We achieve this by a tensor product construction on carefully designed base cases. The result can also be interpreted as in Meyer's comparison [47]: In a state no classical player can gain, one player using quantum computers has an huge advantage than continuing to play classically. 2. Another measure is the hardness of generating correlated equilibria, for which we propose to study correlation complexity, a new complexity measure for correlation generation. We show that there are n-bit correlated equilibria which can be generated by only one EPR pair followed by local operation (without communication), but need at least log2(n) classical shared random bits plus communication. The randomized lower bound can be improved to n, the best possible, assuming (even a much weaker version of) a recent conjecture in linear algebra. We believe that the correlation complexity, as a complexity-theoretical counterpart of the celebrated Bell's inequality, has independent interest in both physics and computational complexity theory and deserves more explorations. We study the ability of decentralized, local dynamics in non-cooperative games to rapidly reach an approximate (pure) Nash equilibrium. Our main result states that for symmetric congestion games in which the cost function associated with each resource satisfies a "bounded jump" condition, convergence to an [epsilon]-Nash equilibrium occurs within a number of steps that is polynomial in the number of players and [epsilon]-1. We show moreover that this result holds under a variety of conventions governing the move orders among the players, including the minimal liveness assumption that no player is indefinitely blocked from moving. We also prove that in the generalized setting where players have different "tolerances" [epsilon]i, the number of moves a player makes before equilibrium is reached depends only on his associated [epsilon]i, and not on those of other players. Finally, we show that polynomial time convergence holds even when a constant number of resources have arbitrary cost functions. We introduce quantum XOR games, a model of two-player, one-round games that extends the model of XOR games by allowing the referee’s questions to the players to be quantum states. We give examples showing that quantum XOR games exhibit a wide range of behaviors that are known not to exist for standard XOR games, such as cases in which the use of entanglement leads to an arbitrarily large advantage over the use of no entanglement. By invoking two deep extensions of Grothendieck’s inequality, we present an efficient algorithm that gives a constant-factor approximation to the best performance that players can obtain in a given game, both in the case that they have no shared entanglement and that they share unlimited entanglement. As a byproduct of the algorithm, we prove some additional interesting properties of quantum XOR games, such as the fact that sharing a maximally entangled state of arbitrary dimension gives only a small advantage over having no entanglement at all. We show a parallel repetition theorem for the entangled value @math of any two-player one-round game @math where the questions @math to Alice and Bob are drawn from a product distribution on @math . We show that for the @math -fold product @math of the game @math (which represents the game @math played in parallel @math times independently), @math , where @math and @math represent the sets from which the answers of Alice and Bob are drawn. We study exploration in Multi-Armed Bandits in a setting where @math players collaborate in order to identify an @math -optimal arm. Our motivation comes from recent employment of bandit algorithms in computationally intensive, large-scale applications. Our results demonstrate a non-trivial tradeoff between the number of arm pulls required by each of the players, and the amount of communication between them. In particular, our main result shows that by allowing the @math players to communicate only once, they are able to learn @math times faster than a single player. That is, distributing learning to @math players gives rise to a factor @math parallel speed-up. We complement this result with a lower bound showing this is in general the best possible. On the other extreme, we present an algorithm that achieves the ideal factor @math speed-up in learning performance, with communication only logarithmic in @math . We propose a general multiparty computation protocol secure against an active adversary corrupting up to @math of the n players. The protocol may be used to compute securely arithmetic circuits over any finite field @math . Our protocol consists of a preprocessing phase that is both independent of the function to be computed and of the inputs, and a much more efficient online phase where the actual computation takes place. The online phase is unconditionally secure and has total computational and communication complexity linear in n, the number of players, where earlier work was quadratic in n. Moreover, the work done by each player is only a small constant factor larger than what one would need to compute the circuit in the clear. We show this is optimal for computation in large fields. In practice, for 3 players, a secure 64-bit multiplication can be done in 0.05 ms. Our preprocessing is based on a somewhat homomorphic cryptosystem. We extend a scheme by , so that we can perform distributed decryption and handle many values in parallel in one ciphertext. The computational complexity of our preprocessing phase is dominated by the public-key operations, we need @math operations per secure multiplication where s is a parameter that increases with the security parameter of the cryptosystem. Earlier work in this model needed @math operations. In practice, the preprocessing prepares a secure 64-bit multiplication for 3 players in about 13 ms. Two players A and B are randomly placed on a line. The distribution of the distance between them is unknown except that the expected initial distance of the (two) players does not exceed some constant @math The players can move with maximal velocity 1 and would like to meet one another as soon as possible. Most of the paper deals with the asymmetric rendezvous in which each player can use a different trajectory. We find rendezvous trajectories which are efficient against all probability distributions in the above class. (It turns out that our trajectories do not depend on the value of @math ) We also obtain the minimax trajectory of player A if player B just waits for him. This trajectory oscillates with a geometrically increasing amplitude. It guarantees an expected meeting time not exceeding @math We show that, if player B also moves, then the expected meeting time can be reduced to @math The expected meeting time can be further reduced if the players use mixed strategies. We show that if player B rests, then the optimal strategy of player A is a mixture of geometric trajectories. It guarantees an expected meeting time not exceeding @math This value can be reduced even more (below @math ) if player B also moves according to a (correlated) mixed strategy. We also obtain a bound for the expected meeting time of the corresponding symmetric rendezvous problem. We propose approximation algorithms under game-theoretic considerations. We indroduce and study the general covering problem which is a natural generalization of the well-studied max-n -cover problem. In the general covering problem, we are given a universal set of weighted elements E and n collections of subsets of the elements. The task is to choose one subset from each collection such that the total weight of their union is as large as possible. In our game-theoretic setting, the choice in each collection is made by an independent player. For covering an element, the players receive a payoff defined by a non-increasing utility sharing function. This function defines the fraction that each covering player receives from the weight of the elements. We show how to construct a utility sharing function such that every Nash Equilibrium approximates the optimal solution by a factor of @math . We also prove that any sequence of unilateral improving steps is polynomially bounded. This gives rise to a polynomial-time local search approximation algorithm whose approximation ratio is best possible. In the generalized Russian cards problem, the three players Alice, Bob and Cath draw @math a , b and @math c cards, respectively, from a deck of @math a + b + c cards. Players only know their own cards and what the deck of cards is. Alice and Bob are then required to communicate their hand of cards to each other by way of public messages. For a natural number @math k , the communication is said to be @math k -safe if Cath does not learn whether or not Alice holds any given set of at most @math k cards that are not Cath's, a notion originally introduced as weak @math k -security by Swanson and Stinson. An elegant solution by Atkinson views the cards as points in a finite projective plane. We propose a general solution in the spirit of Atkinson's, although based on finite vector spaces rather than projective planes, and call it the geometric protocol'. Given arbitrary @math c , k > 0 , this protocol gives an informative and @math k -safe solution to the generalized Russian cards problem for infinitely many values of @math ( a , b , c ) with @math b = O ( a c ) . This improves on the collection of parameters for which solutions are known. In particular, it is the first solution which guarantees @math k -safety when Cath has more than one card. The @math -online Ramsey game is a combinatorial game between two players, Builder and Painter. Starting from an infinite set of isolated vertices, Builder draws an edge at each step and Painter immediately paints the edge red or blue. Builder's goal is to force Painter to create either a red @math or a blue @math using as few edges as possible. The online Ramsey number @math is the minimum number of edges Builder needs to guarantee a win in the @math -online Ramsey game. By analyzing the special case where Painter plays randomly, we obtain an exponential improvement [ r (n,n) 2^ (2- 2 )n + O(1) ] for the lower bound on the diagonal online Ramsey number, as well as a corresponding improvement [ r (m,n) n^ (2- 2 )m + O(1) ] for the off-diagonal case, where @math is fixed and @math . Using a different randomized Painter strategy and the Lopsided Lov 'asz Local Lemma, we prove that @math , determining this function up to a polylogarithmic factor. We also improve the upper bound in the off-diagonal case for @math . In connection with the online Ramsey game with random Painter, we study the problem of finding a copy of a target graph @math in a sufficiently large unknown Erd o s--R ' e nyi random graph @math using as few queries as possible, where each query reveals whether or not a particular pair of vertices are adjacent. We call this problem the Subgraph Query Problem. We determine the order of the number of queries needed for complete graphs up to five vertices and prove general bounds for this problem. Complex information-processing systems, for example, quantum circuits, cryptographic protocols, or multi-player games, are naturally described as networks composed of more basic information-processing systems. A modular analysis of such systems requires a mathematical model of systems that is closed under composition, i.e., a network of these objects is again an object of the same type. We propose such a model and call the corresponding systems causal boxes . Causal boxes capture superpositions of causal structures, e.g., messages sent by a causal box @math can be in a superposition of different orders or in a superposition of being sent to box @math and box @math . Furthermore, causal boxes can model systems whose behavior depends on time. By instantiating the abstract cryptography framework with causal boxes, we obtain the first composable security framework that can handle arbitrary quantum protocols and relativistic protocols. Given a collection @math of weighted subsets of a ground set @math , the set cover problem is to find a minimum weight subset of @math which covers all elements of @math . We study a strategic game defined upon this classical optimization problem. Every element of @math is a player which chooses one set of @math where it appears. Following a public tax function, every player is charged a fraction of the weight of the set that it has selected. Our motivation is to design a tax function having the following features: it can be implemented in a distributed manner, existence of an equilibrium is guaranteed and the social cost for these equilibria is minimized. We study the ability of decentralized, local dynamics in non-cooperative games to rapidly reach an approximate Nash equilibrium. For symmetric congestion games in which the edge delays satisfy a "bounded jump" condition, we show that convergence to an e-Nash equilibrium occurs within a number of steps that is polynomial in the number of players and e-1. This appears to be the first such result for a class of games that includes examples for which finding an exact Nash equilibrium is PLS-complete, and in which shortest paths to an exact equilibrium are exponentially long. We show moreover that rapid convergence holds even under only the apparently minimal assumption that no player is excluded from moving for arbitrarily many steps. We also prove that, in a generalized setting where players have different "tolerances" e i that specify their thresholds in the approximate Nash equilibrium, the number of moves made by a player before equilibrium is reached depends only on his associated e i , and not on those of the other players. Finally, we show that polynomial time convergence still holds even when a bounded number of edges are allowed to have arbitrary delay functions.