We study the inverse power index problem for weighted voting games: the problem of finding a weighted voting game in which the power of the players is as close as possible to a certain target distribution. Our goal is to find algorithms that solve this problem exactly. Thereto, we study various subclasses of simple games, and their associated representation methods. We survey algorithms and impossibility results for the synthesis problem, i.e., converting a representation of a simple game into another representation. We contribute to the synthesis problem by showing that it is impossible to compute in polynomial time the list of ceiling coalitions (also known as shift-maximal losing coalitions) of a game from its list of roof coalitions (also known as shift-minimal winning coalitions), and vice versa. Then, we proceed by studying the problem of enumerating the set of weighted voting games. We present first a naive algorithm for this, running in doubly exponential time. Using our knowledge of the synthesis problem, we then improve on this naive algorithm, and we obtain an enumeration algorithm that runs in quadratic exponential time (that is, O(2^(n^2) p(n)) for a polynomial p). Moreover, we show that this algorithm runs in output-polynomial time, making it the best possible enumeration algorithm up to a polynomial factor. Finally, we propose an exact anytime algorithm for the inverse power index problem that runs in exponential time. This algorithm is straightforward and general: it computes the error for each game enumerated, and outputs the game that minimizes this error. By the genericity of our approach, our algorithm can be used to find a weighted voting game that optimizes any exponential time computable function. We implement our algorithm for the case of the normalized Banzhaf index, and we perform experiments in order to study performance and error convergence.
Finally, a research direction that is related to our problem is that of studying minimal integer representation for a weighted voting game: Bounds on the maximum weight in such a representation provide us with a finite set of weighted representations to search through, as a means of solving our design problem. We explain this in greater detail in the next section. Some classical relevant bounds can be found in @cite_29 , Section 9.3. See @cite_69 @cite_6 for some recent work in this direction.
@cite_29 @cite_69 @cite_6
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A proposal in a weighted voting game is accepted if the sum of the (non-negative) weights of the “yea” voters is at least as large as a given quota. Several authors have considered representations of weighted voting games with minimum sum, where the weights and the quota are restricted to be integers. In Freixas and Molinero (Ann. Oper. Res. 166:243–260, 2009) the authors have classified all weighted voting games without a unique minimum sum representation for up to 8 voters. Here we exhaustively classify all weighted voting games consisting of 9 voters which do not admit a unique minimum sum integer weight representation. In the following paper we offer a method for the a priori evaluation of the division of power among the various bodies and members of a legislature or committee system. The method is based on a technique of the mathematical theory of games, applied to what are known there as “simple games” and “weighted majority games.” We apply it here to a number of illustrative cases, including the United States Congress, and discuss some of its formal properties. The designing of the size and type of a legislative body is a process that may continue for many years, with frequent revisions and modifications aimed at reflecting changes in the social structure of the country; we may cite the role of the House of Lords in England as an example. The effect of a revision usually cannot be gauged in advance except in the roughest terms; it can easily happen that the mathematical structure of a voting system conceals a bias in power distribution unsuspected and unintended by the authors of the revision. How, for example, is one to predict the degree of protection which a proposed system affords to minority interests? Can a consistent criterion for “fair representation” be found? It is difficult even to describe the net effect of a double representation system such as is found in the U. S. Congress (i.e., by states and by population), without attempting to deduce it a priori . The method of measuring “power” which we present in this paper is intended as a first step in the attack on these problems. Simple games cover voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. A simple game or a yes–no voting system is a set of rules that specifies exactly which collections of “yea” votes yield passage of the issue at hand, each of these collections of “yea” voters forms a winning coalition. We are interested in performing a complexity analysis on problems defined on such families of games. This analysis as usual depends on the game representation used as input. We consider four natural explicit representations: winning, losing, minimal winning, and maximal losing. We first analyze the complexity of testing whether a game is simple and testing whether a game is weighted. We show that, for the four types of representations, both problems can be solved in polynomial time. Finally, we provide results on the complexity of testing whether a simple game or a weighted game is of a special type. We analyze strongness, properness, decisiveness and homogeneity, which are desirable properties to be fulfilled for a simple game. We finalize with some considerations on the possibility of representing a game in a more succinct representation showing a natural representation in which the recognition problem is hard. We study minimum integer representations of weighted games, i.e. representations where the weights are integers and every other integer representation is at least as large in each component. Those minimum integer representations, if they exist at all, are linked with some solution concepts in game theory. Closing existing gaps in the literature, we prove that each weighted game with two types of voters admits a (unique) minimum integer representation, and give new examples for more than two types of voters without a minimum integer representation. We characterize the possible weights in minimum integer representations and give examples for t≥4 types of voters without a minimum integer representation preserving types, i.e. where we additionally require that the weights are equal within equivalence classes of voters. In many multiagent settings, situations arise in which agents must collectively make decisions while not every agent is supposed to have an equal amount of influence in the outcome of such a decision. Weighted voting games are often used to deal with these situations. The amount of influence that an agent has in a weighted voting game can be measured by means of various power indices. This paper studies the problem of finding a weighted voting game in which the distribution of the influence among the agents is as close as possible to a given target value. We propose a method to exactly solve this problem. This method relies on a new efficient procedure for enumerating weighted voting games of a fixed number of agents. The enumeration algorithm we propose works by exploiting the properties of a specific partial order over the class of weighted voting games. The algorithm enumerates weighted voting games of a fixed number of agents in time exponential in the number of agents, and polynomial in the number of games output. As a consequence we obtain an exact anytime algorithm for designing weighted voting games. The problems of obesity and overweight are commonly cited as the motivation behind recent efforts to develop technology that promotes physical activity. Prompted by the social nature of many of the emerging applications, this paper presents our investigation of the sociality of weight management as experienced by a broad demographic of individuals. Our findings highlight the broad scope of peer involvement, and provide insight into the context and mechanics of related interaction that may prove valuable in informing the next generation of peer-based weight management technology for use in everyday life. Weighted voting games are mathematical models, used to analyse situations where voters with variable voting weight vote in favour of or against a decision. They have been applied in various political and economic organizations. Similar combinatorial models are also encountered in neuroscience, threshold logic, reliability theory and distributed systems. The calculation of voting powers of players in a weighted voting game has been extensively researched in the last few years. However, the inverse problem of designing a weighted voting game with a desirable distribution of power has received less attention. We present an elegant algorithm which uses generating functions and interpolation to compute an integer weight vector for target Banzhaf power indices. This algorithm has better performance than any other known to us. It can also be used to design egalitarian two-tier weighted voting games and a representative weighted voting game for a multiple weighted voting game. A new form of document coupling called co-citation is defined as the frequency with which two documents are cited together. The co-citation frequency of two scientific papers can be determined by comparing lists of citing documents in the Science Citation Index and counting identical entries. Networks of co-cited papers can be generated for specific scientific specialties, and an example is drawn from the literature of particle physics. Co-citation patterns are found to differ significantly from bibliographic coupling patterns, but to agree generally with patterns of direct citation. Clusters of co-cited papers provide a new way to study the specialty structure of science. They may provide a new approach to indexing and to the creation of SDI profiles. In an expert search task, the users’ need is to identify people who have relevant expertise to a topic of interest. An expert search system predicts and ranks the expertise of a set of candidate persons with respect to the users’ query. In this paper, we propose a novel approach for predicting and ranking candidate expertise with respect to a query, called the Voting Model for Expert Search. In the Voting Model, we see the problem of ranking experts as a voting problem. We model the voting problem using 12 various voting techniques, which are inspired from the data fusion field. We investigate the effectiveness of the Voting Model and the associated voting techniques across a range of document weighting models, in the context of the TREC 2005 and TREC 2006 Enterprise tracks. The evaluation results show that the voting paradigm is very effective, without using any query or collection-specific heuristics. Moreover, we show that improving the quality of the underlying document representation can significantly improve the retrieval performance of the voting techniques on an expert search task. In particular, we demonstrate that applying field-based weighting models improves the ranking of candidates. Finally, we demonstrate that the relative performance of the voting techniques for the proposed approach is stable on a given task regardless of the used weighting models, suggesting that some of the proposed voting techniques will always perform better than other voting techniques. In Introduction, I explain the meaning I give to the qualifier term "robust" and justify my preference for the expression robustness concern rather than robustness analysis, which I feel is likely to be interpreted too narrowly. In Section 2, I discuss this concern in more details and I try to clarify the numerous raisons d'etre of this concern. As a means of examining the multiple facets of robustness concern more comprehensively, I explore the existing research about robustness, attempting to highlight what I see as the three different territories covered by these studies (Section 3). In Section 4, I refer to these territories to illustrate how responses to robustness concern could be even more varied than they currently are. In this perspective, I propose in Section 5 three new measures of robustness. In the last section, I identify several aspects of the problem that should be examined more closely because they could lead to new avenues of research, which could in turn yield new and innovative responses. The geometric representation and parameterization used in an aerodynamic wing design process determines the number of design variables and influences the smoothness of the wing representation. In an attempt to reduce the number of design variables while preserving good smoothness properties, the present research investigates the performance of an optimized nonuniform rational B-spline (NURBS) geometrical representation for the aerodynamic design of wings. As a first step, an approach is described whereby optimal spatial positions and weights of a fixed number of NURBS control points is determined using a quasi-Newton optimization algorithm to approximate a general airfoil section. The resulting optimized NURBS representation significantly reduces the number of design variables needed to define accurately a wing section while ensuring good smoothness properties. In a second step, the NURBS control point positions and weights are used as design variables in an aerodynamic optimization problem. This methodology results in a rapid and robust design process, as illustrated by examples of aerodynamic optimization for two- and three-dimensional cases Simple coalitional games are a fundamental class of cooperative games and voting games which are used to model coalition formation, resource allocation and decision making in computer science, artificial intelligence and multiagent systems. Although simple coalitional games are well studied in the domain of game theory and social choice, their algorithmic and computational complexity aspects have received less attention till recently. The computational aspects of simple coalitional games are of increased importance as these games are used by computer scientists to model distributed settings. This thesis fits in the wider setting of the interplay between economics and computer science which has led to the development of algorithmic game theory and computational social choice. A unified view of the computational aspects of simple coalitional games is presented here for the first time. Certain complexity results also apply to other coalitional games such as skill games and matching games. The following issues are given special consideration: influence of players, limit and complexity of manipulations in the coalitional games and complexity of resource allocation on networks. The complexity of comparison of influence between players in simple games is characterized. The simple games considered are represented by winning coalitions, minimal winning coalitions, weighted voting games or multiple weighted voting games. A comprehensive classification of weighted voting games which can be solved in polynomial time is presented. An efficient algorithm which uses generating functions and interpolation to compute an integer weight vector for target power indices is proposed. Voting theory, especially the Penrose Square Root Law, is used to investigate the fairness of a real life voting model. Computational complexity of manipulation in social choice protocols can determine whether manipulation is computationally feasible or not. The computational complexity and bounds of manipulation are considered from various angles including control, false-name manipulation and bribery. Moreover, the computational complexity of computing various cooperative game solutions of simple games in dierent representations is studied. Certain structural results regarding least core payos extend to the general monotone cooperative game. The thesis also studies a coalitional game called the spanning connectivity game. It is proved that whereas computing the Banzhaf values and Shapley-Shubik indices of such games is #P-complete, there is a polynomial time combinatorial algorithm to compute the nucleolus. The results have interesting significance for optimal strategies for the wiretapping game which is a noncooperative game defined on a network. A citing sentence is one that appears in a scientific article and cites previous work. Citing sentences have been studied and used in many applications. For example, they have been used in scientific paper summarization, automatic survey generation, paraphrase identification, and citation function classification. Citing sentences that cite multiple papers are common in scientific writing. This observation should be taken into consideration when using citing sentences in applications. For instance, when a citing sentence is used in a summary of a scientific paper, only the fragments of the sentence that are relevant to the summarized paper should be included in the summary. In this paper, we present and compare three different approaches for identifying the fragments of a citing sentence that are related to a given target reference. Our methods are: word classification, sequence labeling, and segment classification. Our experiments show that segment classification achieves the best results. The quest for a linear-time single-source shortest-path (SSSP) algorithm on directed graphs with positive edge weights is an ongoing hot research topic. While Thorup recently found an O(n + m) time RAM algorithm for undirected graphs with n nodes, m edges and integer edge weights in 0,…,2w - 1 where w denotes the word length, the currently best time bound for directed sparse graphs on a RAM is O(n + m · log log n). In the present paper we study the average-case complexity of SSSP. We give a simple algorithm for arbitrary directed graphs with random edge weights uniformly distributed in [0, 1] and show that it needs linear time O(n + m) with high probability. In a document network such as a citation network of scientific documents, web-logs, etc., the content produced by authors exhibits their interest in certain topics. In addition some authors influence other authors' interests. In this work, we propose to model the influence of cited authors along with the interests of citing authors. Moreover, we hypothesize that apart from the citations present in documents, the context surrounding the citation mention provides extra topical information about the cited authors. However, associating terms in the context to the cited authors remains an open problem. We propose novel document generation schemes that incorporate the context while simultaneously modeling the interests of citing authors and influence of the cited authors. Our experiments show significant improvements over baseline models for various evaluation criteria such as link prediction between document and cited author, and quantitatively explaining unseen text. Weighted voting games are a popular model of collaboration in multiagent systems. In such games, each agent has a weight (intuitively corresponding to resources he can contribute), and a coalition of agents wins if its total weight meets or exceeds a given threshold. Even though coalitional stability in such games is important, existing research has nonetheless only considered the stability of the grand coalition. In this paper, we introduce a model for weighted voting games with coalition structures. This is a natural extension in the context of multiagent systems, as several groups of agents may be simultaneously at work, each serving a different task. We then proceed to study stability in this context. First, we define the CS-core, a notion of the core for such settings, discuss its non-emptiness, and relate it to the traditional notion of the core in weighted voting games. We then investigate its computational properties. We show that, in contrast with the traditional setting, it is computationally hard to decide whether a game has a non-empty CS-core, or whether a given outcome is in the CS-core. However, we then provide an efficient algorithm that verifies whether an outcome is in the CS-core if all weights are small (polynomially bounded). Finally, we also suggest heuristic algorithms for checking the non-emptiness of the CS-core. We present two new algorithms for solving the All Pairs Shortest Paths (APSP) problem for weighted directed graphs. Both algorithms use fast matrix multiplication algorithms.The first algorithm solves the APSP problem for weighted directed graphs in which the edge weights are integers of small absolute value in O(n2+μ) time, where μ satisfies the equation ω(1, μ, 1) = 1 + 2μ and ω(1, μ, 1) is the exponent of the multiplication of an n × nμ matrix by an nμ × n matrix. Currently, the best available bounds on ω(1, μ, 1), obtained by Coppersmith, imply that μ 0 is an error parameter and W is the largest edge weight in the graph, after the edge weights are scaled so that the smallest non-zero edge weight in the graph is 1. It returns estimates of all the distances in the graph with a stretch of at most 1 + e. Corresponding paths can also be found efficiently. This paper reports a systematic review of empirical studies concerning the effectiveness of elicitation techniques, and the subsequent aggregation of empirical evidence gathered from those studies. The most significant results of the aggregation process are as follows: (1) Interviews, preferentially structured, appear to be one of the most effective elicitation techniques; (2) Many techniques often cited in the literature, like card sorting, ranking or thinking aloud, tend to be less effective than interviews; (3) Analyst experience does not appear to be a relevant factor; and (4) The studies conducted have not found the use of intermediate representations during elicitation to have significant positive effects. It should be noted that, as a general rule, the studies from which these results were aggregated have not been replicated, and therefore the above claims cannot be said to be absolutely certain. However, they can be used by researchers as pieces of knowledge to be further investigated and by practitioners in development projects, always taking into account that they are preliminary findings. Abstract Documents in computer-readable form can be used to provide information about other documents, i.e. those they cite. To do this efficiently requires procedures for computer recognition of citing statements. This is not easy, especially for multi-sentence citing statements. Computer recognition procedures have been developed which are accurate to the following extent: 73 of the words in statements selected by computer procedures as being citing statements are words which are correctly attributable to the corresponding documents. The retrieval effectiveness of computer-recognized citing statements was tested in the following way. First, for eight retrieval requests in inorganiic chemistry, average recall by search of Chemical Abstracts Service indexing and Chemical Abstracts abstract text words was found to be 50 . Words from citing statements referring to the papers to be retrieved were then added to the index terms and abstract words as additional access points, and searching was repeated. Average recall increased to 70 . Only words from citing statements published within a year of the cited papers were used. The retrieval effect of citing statement words alone (published within a year) without index or abstract terms was the following: average recall was 40 . When just the words of the titles of the cited papers were added to those citing statement words, average recall increased to 50 . The new voting system of the Council of the European Union cannot be represented as the intersection of six or fewer weighted games, i.e., its dimension is at least 7. This sets a new record for real-world voting bodies. A heuristic combination of different discrete optimization methods yields a representation as the intersection of 13368 weighted games. Determination of the exact dimension is posed as a challenge to the community. The system's Boolean dimension is proven to be 3.