Traditional regulatory methods for spectrum licensing have been recently identified as one of the causes for the under-utilization of the valuable radio spectrum. Governmental agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) are seeking ways to remove stringent regulatory barriers and facilitate broader access to the spectrum resources. The goal is to allow for an improved and ubiquitous sharing of the precious radio spectrum between commercial service providers. In this paper, we propose a novel noncooperative game theoretic approach, to show how to foster more sharing of the radio spectrum via the use of regulatory power. We define a two stage game in which the government regulators move first, followed by the providers. The providers are incentivized by lower spectrum allocation fees from the regulators in return for proof-of-sharing. The providers are offered discounted spectrum bands, potentially at different locations, but will be asked to provide coverage to users that are not subscribed to them so as to maintain their subsidy incentives from the government. In a simplification of the model, analytical expressions for the providers' perfect equilibrium strategies are derived, and we argue for the existence of the government's part of a perfect equilibrium. Our analysis shows that through subsidization, the government can provide small service providers a fair chance to compete with the large providers, thereby avoiding monopolization in the market.
Even though subsidization is heavily employed in several markets, the wireless market has not seen much of its usage beyond a few, limited scenarios. The most known subsidization in a wireless market is the subsidization of the expensive phones to the users by the provider @cite_3 , in that the user pays the phone's cost over a locked, termed contract. Unlocking the contract term either requires return of the phone or payment of a significant fee.
@cite_3
1592535133
Unlike telephone operators, which pay termination fees to reach the users of another network, Internet Content Providers (CPs) do not pay the Internet Service Providers (ISPs) of users they reach. While the consequent cross subsidization to CPs has nurtured content innovations at the edge of the Internet, it reduces the investment incentives for the access ISPs to expand capacity. As potential charges for terminating CPs' traffic are criticized under the net neutrality debate, we propose to allow CPs to voluntarily subsidize the usagebased fees induced by their content traffic for end-users. We model the regulated subsidization competition among CPs under a neutral network and show how deregulation of subsidization could increase an access ISP's utilization and revenue, strengthening its investment incentives. Although the competition might harm certain CPs, we find that the main cause comes from high access prices rather than the existence of subsidization. Our results suggest that subsidization competition will increase the competitiveness and welfare of the Internet content market; however, regulators might need to regulate access prices if the access ISP market is not competitive enough. We envision that subsidization competition could become a viable model for the future Internet. Social norm has it that people are expected to respond to mobile phone messages quickly. We investigate how attentive people really are and how timely they actually check and triage new messages throughout the day. By collecting more than 55,000 messages from 42 mobile phone users over the course of two weeks, we were able to predict people's attentiveness through their mobile phone usage with close to 80 accuracy. We found that people were attentive to messages 12.1 hours a day, i.e. 84.8 hours per week, and provide statistical evidence how very short people's inattentiveness lasts: in 75 of the cases mobile phone users return to their attentive state within 5 minutes. In this paper, we present a comprehensive analysis of attentiveness throughout each hour of the day and show that intelligent notification delivery services, such as bounded deferral, can assume that inattentiveness will be rare and subside quickly. Pricing content-providers for connectivity to end- users and setting connection parameters based on the price is an evolving model on the Internet. The implications are heavily debated in telecom policy circles, and some advocates of "Network Neutrality" have opposed price based differentiation in connectivity. However, pricing content providers can possibly subsidize the end-user's cost of connectivity, and the consequent increase in end-user demand can benefit ISPs and content providers. This paper provides a framework to quantify the precise trade-off in the distribution of benefits among ISPs, content-providers, and end-users. The framework generalizes the well-known utility maximization based rate allocation model, which has been extensively studied as an interplay between the ISP and the end-users, to incorporate pricing of content-providers. We derive the resulting equilibrium prices and data rates in two different ISP market conditions: competition and monopoly. Network neutrality based restriction on content-provider pricing is then modeled as a constraint on the maximum price that can be charged to content-providers. We demonstrate that, in addition to gains in total and end- user surplus, content-provider experiences a net surplus from participation in rate allocation under low cost of connectivity. The surplus gains are, however, limited under monopoly conditions in comparison to competition in the ISP market. The interaction of a content provider with end users on an infrastructure platform built and maintained by a service provider can be viewed as a two-sided market. Content sponsoring, i.e., charging the content provider instead of viewers for resources consumed in viewing the content, can benefit all parties involved. Without being charged directly or having it counted against their monthly data quotas, end users will view more content, allowing the content provider to generate more advertising revenue, extracted by the service provider to subsidize its investment and operation of the network infrastructure. However, realizing such gains requires a proper contractual relationship between the service provider and content provider. We consider the determination of this contract through a Stackelberg game. The service provider sets a pricing schedule for sponsoring and the content provider responds by deciding how much content to sponsor. We analyze the best strategies for the content provider and service provider in the event that the underlying demand for the content is uncertain. Two separate settings are defined. In the first, end users can be charged for non-sponsored views on a per-byte basis. In the second we extend the model to the more common case in which end users purchase data quotas on a periodic basis. Our main conclusion is that a coordinating contract can be designed that maximizes total system profit. Moreover, the additional profit due to sponsoring can be split between the content provider and service provider in an arbitrary manner. Cloud providers have begun to allow users to bid for surplus servers on a spot market. These servers are allocated if a user's bid price is higher than their market price and revoked otherwise. Thus, analyzing price data to derive optimal bidding strategies has become a popular research topic. In this paper, we argue that sophisticated bidding strategies, in practice, do not provide any advantages over simple strategies for multiple reasons. First, due to price characteristics, there are a wide range of bid prices that yield the optimal cost and availability. Second, given the large number of spot markets, there is always a market with available surplus resources. Thus, if resources become unavailable due to a price spike, users need not wait until the spike subsides, but can instead provision a new spot resource elsewhere and migrate to it. Third, current spot market rules enable users to place maximum bids for resources without any penalty. Given bidding's irrelevance, users can adopt trivial bidding strategies and focus instead on modifying applications to efficiently seek out and migrate to the lowest cost resources. A lot of research is being conducted into improving the usability and security of phone-unlocking. There is however a severe lack of scientic data on users’ current unlocking behavior and perceptions. We performed an online survey (n = 260) and a one-month eld study ( n = 52) to gain insights into real world (un)locking behavior of smartphone users. One of the main goals was to nd out how much overhead unlocking and authenticating adds to the overall phone usage and in how many unlock interactions security (i.e. authentication) was perceived as necessary. We also investigated why users do or do not use a lock screen and how they cope with smartphone-related risks, such as shouldersurng or unwanted accesses. Among other results, we found that on average, participants spent around 2.9 of their smartphone interaction time with authenticating (9 in the worst case). Participants that used a secure lock screen like PIN or Android unlock patterns considered it unnecessary in 24.1 of situations. Shoulder surng was perceived to be a relevant risk in only 11 of 3410 sampled situations. Dynamic spectrum access can significantly improve the spectrum utilization. For wireless service providers, the emergence of dynamic spectrum access brings new opportunities and challenges. The flexible spectrum acquisition gives a particular provider the chance to easily adapt its system capacity to fit end users' demand. However, the competition among several providers for both spectrum and end users complicates the situation. In this paper, we propose a general three-layer spectrum market model for the future dynamic spectrum access system, in which the interaction among spectrum holder, wireless service providers and end users are considered. We study a duopoly situation, where two wireless service providers participate in bandwidth competition in spectrum purchasing and price competition to attract end users, with the aim of maximizing their own profit. We believe we are the first one to explicitly study the relation of these two competitions in dynamic spectrum market. We formulate the wireless service providers' competition as a non-cooperative two-stage game. We first analyze the static game when full information is available for providers. Under general assumptions about the price and demand functions, a unique pure Nash equilibrium is identified as the outcome of the game, which shows the stability of the market. We further evaluate the market efficiency of the equilibrium in a symmetric case, and show that the gap with the social optimal is bounded within a small constant ratio. When the market information is limited, we provide myopically optimal adjustment algorithms for the providers. With such strategies, short term price updating converges to the Nash equilibrium of the given subgame, while long term bandwidth updating converges to a point close to the Nash equilibrium of the full game. Mechanism design for one-sided markets is an area of extensive research in economics and, since more than a decade, in computer science as well. Two-sided markets, on the other hand, have not received the same attention despite the numerous applications to web advertisement, stock exchange, and frequency spectrum allocation. This work studies double auctions, in which unit-demand buyers and unit-supply sellers act strategically. An ideal goal in double auction design is to maximize the social welfare of buyers and sellers with individually rational (IR), incentive compatible (IC) and strongly budget-balanced (SBB) mechanisms. The first two properties are standard. SBB requires that the payments charged to the buyers are entirely handed to the sellers. This property is crucial in all the contexts that do not allow the auctioneer retaining a share of buyers' payments or subsidizing the market. Unfortunately, this goal is known to be unachievable even for the special case of bilateral trade, where there is only one buyer and one seller. Therefore, in subsequent papers, meaningful trade-offs between these requirements have been investigated. Our main contribution is the first IR, IC and SBB mechanism that provides an O(1)-approximation to the optimal social welfare. This result holds for any number of buyers and sellers with arbitrary, independent distributions. Moreover, our result continues to hold when there is an additional matroid constraint on the sets of buyers who may get allocated an item. To prove our main result, we devise an extension of sequential posted price mechanisms to two-sided markets. In addition to this, we improve the best-known approximation bounds for the bilateral trade problem. Research in social science has shown that mobile phone conversations distract users, presenting a significant impact to pedestrian safety; for example, a mobile phone user deep in conversation while crossing a street is generally more at risk than other pedestrians not engaged in such behavior. We propose WalkSafe, an Android smartphone application that aids people that walk and talk, improving the safety of pedestrian mobile phone users. WalkSafe uses the back camera of the mobile phone to detect vehicles approaching the user, alerting the user of a potentially unsafe situation; more specifically WalkSafe i) uses machine learning algorithms implemented on the phone to detect the front views and back views of moving vehicles and ii) exploits phone APIs to save energy by running the vehicle detection algorithm only during active calls. We present our initial design, implementation and evaluation of the WalkSafe App that is capable of real-time detection of the front and back views of cars, indicating cars are approaching or moving away from the user, respectively. WalkSafe is implemented on Android phones and alerts the user of unsafe conditions using sound and vibration from the phone. WalkSafe is available on Android Market. As Internet traffic grows exponentially due to the pervasive Internet accesses via mobile devices and increasing adoptions of cloud-based applications, broadband providers start to shift from flat-rate to usage-based pricing, which has gained support from regulators such as the FCC. We consider generic congestion-prone network services, including cloud services, and study the pay-as-you-go type of usage-based pricing of service providers under market competition. Based on a novel model that captures users' preferences over usage price and congestion alternatives, we derive the induced congestion and market share of the service providers under a market equilibrium and design algorithms to calculate them. By analyzing different market structures, we reveal how users' value on usage and sensitivity to congestion influence the optimal price, revenue, and competition of service providers, as well as the social welfare. We also obtain the conditions under which monopolistic providers have strong incentives to implement service differentiation via Paris Metro Pricing and whether regulators should encourage such practices. Providing proper economic incentives is essential for the success of dynamic spectrum sharing. Cooperative spectrum sharing is one effective way to achieve this goal. In cooperative spectrum sharing, secondary users (SUs) relay traffics for primary users (PUs), in exchange for dedicated transmission time for the SUs' own communication needs. In this paper, we study the cooperative spectrum sharing under incomplete information, where SUs' types (which capture the relay channel gains and the SUs' power costs) are private information and are not known to the PU. Inspired by the contract theory, we model the network as a labor market. The PU is an employer who offers a contract to the SUs. The contract consists of a set of items representing combinations of spectrum access time (i.e., reward) and relay power (i.e., contribution). The SUs are employees, and each of them selects the best contract item to maximize its payoff. We study the optimal contract design for both weakly and strongly incomplete information scenarios. First, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for feasible contracts in both scenarios. In the weakly incomplete information scenario, we further derive the optimal contract that achieves the same maximum PU's utility as in the complete information benchmark. In the strongly incomplete information scenario, we propose a Decompose-and-Compare algorithm that achieves a close-to-optimal contract. We further show that the PU's expected utility loss due to the suboptimal algorithm and the strongly incomplete information are both relatively small (less than 2 and 1.3 , respectively, in our numerical results with two SU types). Since there is, in principle, no reason why third parties should not pay individuals for the use of their data, we introduce a realistic market that would allow these payments to be made while taking into account the privacy attitude of the participants. And since it is usually important to use unbiased samples to obtain credible statistical results, we examine the properties that such a market should have and suggest a mechanism that compensates those individuals that participate according to their risk attitudes. Equally important, we show that this mechanism also benefits buyers, as they pay less for the data than they would if they compensated all individuals with the same maximum fee that the most concerned ones expect. Spectrum is a critical yet scarce resource and it has been shown that dynamic spectrum access can significantly improve spectrum utilization. To achieve this, it is important to incentivize the primary license holders to open up their under-utilized spectrum for sharing. In this paper we present a secondary spectrum market where a primary license holder can sell access to its unused or under-used spectrum resources in the form of certain fine-grained spectrum-space-time unit. Secondary wireless service providers can purchase such contracts to deploy new service, enhance their existing service, or deploy ad hoc service to meet flash crowds demand. Within the context of this market, we investigate how to use auction mechanisms to allocate and price spectrum resources so that the primary license holder's revenue is maximized. We begin by classifying a number of alternative auction formats in terms of spectrum demand. We then study a specific auction format where secondary wireless service providers have demands for fixed locations (cells). We propose an optimal auction based on the concept of virtual valuation. Assuming the knowledge of valuation distributions, the optimal auction uses the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to maximize the expected revenue while enforcing truthfulness. To reduce the computational complexity, we further design a truthful suboptimal auction with polynomial time complexity. It uses a monotone allocation and critical value payment to enforce truthfulness. Simulation results show that this suboptimal auction can generate stable expected revenue. Recent years have seen an explosive growth in the number of mobile devices such as smart phones and tablets. This has resulted in a growing need of the operators to understand the usage patterns of the mobile apps used on these devices. Previous studies in this area have relied on volunteers using instrumented devices or using fields in the HTTP traffic such as User-Agent to identify the apps in network traces. However, the results of the former approach are difficult to be extrapolated to real-world scenario while the latter approach is not applicable to platforms like Android where developers generally use generic strings, that can not be used to identify the apps, in the User-Agent field. In this paper, we present a novel way of identifying Android apps in network traces using mobile in-app advertisements. Our preliminary experiments with real world traces show that this technique is promising for large scale mobile app usage pattern studies. We also present an analysis of the official Android market place from an advertising perspective. DakNet provides extraordinarily low-cost digital communication, letting remote villages leapfrog past the expense of traditional connectivity solutions and begin development of a full-coverage broadband wireless infrastructure. What is the basis for a progressive, market-driven migration from e-governance to universal broadband connectivity that local users will pay for? DakNet, an ad hoc network that uses wireless technology to provide asynchronous digital connectivity, is evidence that the marriage of wireless and asynchronous service may indeed be the beginning of a road to universal broadband connectivity. DakNet has been successfully deployed in remote parts of both India and Cambodia at a cost two orders of magnitude less than that of traditional landline solutions. In this article, we study the problem of online market clearing where there is one commodity in the market being bought and sold by multiple buyers and sellers whose bids arrive and expire at different times. The auctioneer is faced with an online clearing problem of deciding which buy and sell bids to match without knowing what bids will arrive in the future. For maximizing profit, we present a (randomized) online algorithm with a competitive ratio of ln(pmax − pmin) p 1, when bids are in a range [pmin, pmax], which we show is the best possible. A simpler algorithm has a ratio twice this, and can be used even if expiration times are not known. For maximizing the number of trades, we present a simple greedy algorithm that achieves a factor of 2 competitive ratio if no money-losing trades are allowed. We also show that if the online algorithm is allowed to subsidize matches---match money-losing pairs if it has already collected enough money from previous pairs to pay for them---then it can actually be 1-competitive with respect to the optimal offline algorithm that is not allowed subsidy. That is, for maximizing the number of trades, the ability to subsidize is at least as valuable as knowing the future. We also consider objectives of maximizing buy or sell volume and social welfare. We present all of these results as corollaries of theorems on online matching in an incomplete interval graph.We also consider the issue of incentive compatibility, and develop a nearly optimal incentive-compatible algorithm for maximizing social welfare. For maximizing profit, we show that no incentive-compatible algorithm can achieve a sublinear competitive ratio, even if only one buy bid and one sell bid are alive at a time. However, we provide an algorithm that, under certain mild assumptions on the bids, performs nearly as well as the best fixed pair of buy and sell prices, a weaker but still natural performance measure. This latter result uses online learning methods, and we also show how such methods can be used to improve our “optimal” algorithms to a broader notion of optimality. Finally, we show how some of our results can be generalized to settings in which the buyers and sellers themselves have online bidding strategies, rather than just each having individual bids. Mobile communication is an essential part of our daily lives. Therefore, it needs to be secure and reliable. In this paper, we study the security of feature phones, the most common type of mobile phone in the world. We built a framework to analyze the security of SMS clients of feature phones. The framework is based on a small GSM base station, which is readily available on the market. Through our analysis we discovered vulnerabilities in the feature phone platforms of all major manufacturers. Using these vulnerabilities we designed attacks against end-users as well as mobile operators. The threat is serious since the attacks can be used to prohibit communication on a large scale and can be carried out from anywhere in the world. Through further analysis we determined that such attacks are amplified by certain configurations of the mobile network. We conclude our research by providing a set of countermeasures. Ride-hailing drivers pay a proportion of their fares to the ride-hailing platform operator, a commission-based compensation model used by many internet-mediated service providers. To Uber drivers, this commission is known as the Uber fee. By contrast, traditional taxi drivers in most US cities make a fixed payment independent of their earnings, usually a weekly or daily medallion lease, but keep every fare dollar net of expenses. We assess these compensation models from a driver’s point of view using an experiment that offered random samples of Boston Uber drivers opportunities to lease a virtual taxi medallion that eliminates the Uber fee. Some drivers were offered a negative fee. Drivers’ labor supply response to our offers reveals a large intertemporal substitution elasticity, on the order of 1.2. At the same time, our virtual lease program was under-subscribed: many drivers who would have benefitted from buying an inexpensive lease chose to opt out. We use these results to compute the average compensation required to make drivers indifferent between ride-hailing and a traditional taxi compensation contract. The results suggest that ride-hailing drivers gain considerably from the opportunity to drive without leasing. Mobile phone usage provides a wealth of information, which can be used to better understand the demographic structure of a population. In this paper we focus on the population of Mexican mobile phone users. Our first contribution is an observational study of mobile phone usage according to gender and age groups. We were able to detect significant differences in phone usage among different subgroups of the population. Our second contribution is to provide a novel methodology to predict demographic features (namely age and gender) of unlabeled users by leveraging individual calling patterns, as well as the structure of the communication graph. We provide details of the methodology and show experimental results on a real world dataset that involves millions of users. Dynamic spectrum access is a new paradigm of secondary spectrum utilization and sharing. It allows unlicensed secondary users (SUs) to exploit the opportunistically underutilized licensed spectrum. Market mechanism is a widely used promising means to regulate the consuming behaviours of users and, hence, achieve the efficient allocation and consumption of limited resources. In this paper, we propose and study a hybrid secondary spectrum market consisting of both the futures market and the spot market, in which SUs (buyers) purchase underutilized licensed spectrum from a spectrum regulator (SR), either through predefined contracts via the futures market, or through spot transactions via the spot market. We focus on the optimal spectrum allocation among SUs in an exogenous hybrid market that maximizes the secondary spectrum utilization efficiency. The problem is challenging because of the stochasticity and asymmetry of network information. To solve this problem, we first derive an off-line optimal allocatio...