To enjoy more social network services, users nowadays are usually involved in multiple online social networks simultaneously. The shared users between different networks are called anchor users, while the remaining unshared users are named as non-anchor users. Connections between accounts of anchor users in different networks are defined as anchor links and networks partially aligned by anchor links can be represented as partially aligned networks. In this paper, we want to predict anchor links between partially aligned social networks, which is formally defined as the partial network alignment problem. The partial network alignment problem is very difficult to solve because of the following two challenges: (1) the lack of general features for anchor links, and (2) the "one-to-one @math " (one to at most one) constraint on anchor links. To address these two challenges, a new method PNA (Partial Network Aligner) is proposed in this paper. PNA (1) extracts a set of explicit anchor adjacency features and latent topological features for anchor links based on the anchor meta path concept and tensor decomposition techniques, and (2) utilizes the generic stable matching to identify the non-anchor users to prune the redundant anchor links attached to them. Extensive experiments conducted on two real-world partially aligned social networks demonstrate that PNA can solve the partial network alignment problem very well and outperform all the other comparison methods with significant advantages.
College admission problem @cite_33 and stable marriage problem @cite_40 have been studied for many years and lots of works have been done in the last century. In recent years, some new papers have come out in these areas. @cite_43 propose to analyze the stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules. Ma @cite_52 analyzes the truncation in stable matching and the small core in nash equilibrium in college admission problems. Flor ' e @cite_23 propose to study the almost stable matching by truncating the Gale-Shapley algorithm.
@cite_33 @cite_52 @cite_43 @cite_40 @cite_23
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Both rematching proof and strong equilibrium outcomes are stable with respect to the true preferences in the marriage problem. We show that not all rematching proof or strong equilibrium outcomes are stable in the college admissions problem. But we show that both rematching proof and strong equilibrium outcomes in truncations at the match point are all stable in the college admissions problem. Further, all true stable matchings can be achieved in both rematching proof and strong equilibrium in truncations at the match point. We show that any Nash equilibrium in truncations admits one and only one matching, stable or not. Therefore, the core at a Nash equilibrium in truncations must be small. But examples exist such that the set of stable matchings with respect to a Nash equilibrium may contain more than one matching. Nevertheless, each Nash equilibrium can only admit at most one true stable matching. If, indeed, there is a true stable matching at a Nash equilibrium, then the only possible equilibrium outcome will be the true stable matching, no matter how different are players' equilibrium strategies from the true preferences and how many other unstable matchings are there at that Nash equilibrium. Thus, we show that a necessary and sufficient condition for the stable matching rule to be implemented in a subset of Nash equilibria by the direct revelation game induced by a stable mechanism is that every Nash equilibrium profile in that subset admits one and only one true stable matching. A stable matching rule is used as the outcome function for the Admission game where colleges behave straightforwardly and the students’ strategies are given by their preferences over the colleges. We show that the college-optimal stable matching rule implements the set of stable matchings via the Nash equilibrium (NE) concept. For any other stable matching rule the strategic behavior of the students may lead to outcomes that are not stable under the true preferences. We then introduce uncertainty about the matching selected and prove that the natural solution concept is that of NE in the strong sense. A general result shows that the random stable matching rule, as well as any stable matching rule, implements the set of stable matchings via NE in the strong sense. Precise answers are given to the strategic questions raised. Abstract Two-sided matching markets of the kind known as the “college admissions problem” have been widely thought to be virtually equivalent to the simpler “marriage problem” for which some striking results concerning agents' preferences and incentives have been recently obtained. It is shown here that some of these results do not generalize to the college admissions problem, contrary to a number of assertions in the recent literature. No stable matching procedure exists that makes it a dominant strategy for colleges to reveal their true preferences, and some outcomes may be preferred by all colleges to the college-optimal stable outcome. The stable marriage problem, i.e., the problem of assigning the members of two disjoint sets to one another is extended to the case in which individual preferences are represented by weak orderings instead of linear orderings. This leads to a more natural solution for such problems as the processing of college admissions and the optimal distribution of personnel. The paper begins with a formal definition of an assignments function and introduces conditions on it, among them stability. It is shown how the Gale and Shapley algorithm for finding stable assignments can be extended to the more general case considered here. It is shown that if there is an assignment which is preferred by a majority to all other assignments, then this assignment is necessarily stable. Moreover, in a situation where all preference orders are linear orders, all stable assignments are majority assignments. The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and woman who are not married to each other both prefer each other. Such a problem has a wide variety of practical applications ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals to matching students to schools. A well-known algorithm to solve this problem is the Gale-Shapley algorithm, which runs in polynomial time. It has been proven that stable marriage procedures can always be manipulated. Whilst the Gale-Shapley algorithm is computationally easy to manipulate, we prove that there exist stable marriage procedures which are NP-hard to manipulate. We also consider the relationship between voting theory and stable marriage procedures, showing that voting rules which are NP-hard to manipulate can be used to define stable marriage procedures which are themselves NP-hard to manipulate. Finally, we consider the issue that stable marriage procedures like Gale-Shapley favour one gender over the other, and we show how to use voting rules to make any stable marriage procedure gender neutral. Abstract : A two sided matching model is a game in which there are two types of agents, and the essential coalitions are singletons and doubletons containing one agent of each type. Over the years, they have become an important part of economic theory. One reason for this is that they have been deemed worthy models of economic markets with indivisible goods. Gale and Shapley modeled college admissions as a matching market. Shapley and Shubik adopted a similar model for their housing market. Crawford and Knoer defined labor markets in these terms. In all of these instances, the relevant solution concept is that of the core which is the set of economic allocations where no coalition of agents can improve their lot on their own. Herein lies another reason for the study of these games; the fact that their cores have many nice properties. For instance, their cores are always nonempty. Much of the literature relate relatively simple algorithms which calculate core points. Another important idea is that in some of these games, the core and the set of economic equilibria are equivalent and both are generally sets of positive measure. This contrasts other economic models (with completely divisible goods) in which the set of equilibria is a proper subset of the core and is of measure zero. Thus, given a sets of agents' preferences, there is usually some latitude in choosing equilibrium prices. Intuitively, the amount of flexibility would be measured by the core's volume. This paper quantifies this last notion in the setting of Shapley and Shubik's housing market. The stable admissions polytope– the convex hull of the stable assignments of the university admissions problem – is described by a set of linear inequalities. It depends on a new characterization of stability and arguments that exploit and extend a graphical approach that has been fruitful in the analysis of the stable marriage problem. Abstract Irregular sampling and “stable sampling” of band-limited functions have been studied by H.J. Landau [H.J. Landau, Necessary density conditions for sampling and interpolation of certain entire functions, Acta Math. 117 (1967) 37–52]. We prove that quasicrystals are sets of stable sampling. To cite this article: B. Matei, Y. Meyer, C. R. Acad. Sci. Paris, Ser. I 346 (2008). In any two-sided matching market, a stable matching can be found by a central agency using the deferred acceptance procedure of Gale and Shapley. But if the market is decentralized and information is incomplete then stability of the ensuing matching is not to be expected. Despite the prevalence of such matching situations, and the importance of stability, little theory exists concerning instability. We discuss various measures of instability and analyze how they interact with the structure of the underlying preferences. Our main result is that even the outcome of decentralized matching with incomplete information can be expected to be “almost stable” under reasonable assumptions. This book probes the stable marriage problem and its variants as a rich source of problems and ideas that illustrate both the design and analysis of efficient algorithms. It covers the most recent structural and algorithmic work on stable matching problems, simplifies and unifies many earlier proofs, strengthens several earlier results, and presents new results and more efficient algorithms.The authors develop the structure of the set of stable matchings in the stable marriage problem in a more general and algebraic context than has been done previously; they discuss the problem's structure in terms of rings of sets, which allows many of the most useful features to be seen as features of a more general set of problems. The relationship between the structure of the stable marriage problem and the more general stable roommates problem is demonstrated, revealing many commonalities.The results the authors obtain provide an algorithmic response to the practical, and political, problems created by the asymmetry inherent in the Gale Shapley solutions, leading to alternative methods and better compromises than are provided by the Gale Shapley method. And, in contrast to Donald Knuth's earlier work which primarily focused on the application of mathematics to the analysis of algorithms, this book illustrates the productive and almost inseparable relationship between mathematical insight and the design of efficient algorithms.Dan Gusfield is Associate Professor of Computer Science at the University of California, Davis. Robert W. Irving is Senior Lecturer in Computing Science at the University of Glasgow. The Stable Marriage Problem is included in the Foundations of Computing Series, edited by Michael Garey and Albert Meyer. We study strategic issues in the Gale-Shapley stable marriage model. In the first part of the paper, we derive the optimal cheating strategy and show that it is not always possible for a woman to recover her women-optimal stable partner from the men-optimal stable matching mechanism when she can only cheat by permuting her preferences. In fact, we show, using simulation, that the chances that a woman can benefit from cheating are slim. In the second part of the paper, we consider a two-sided matching market found in Singapore. We study the matching mechanism used by the Ministry of Education (MOE) in the placement of primary six students in secondary schools, and discuss why the current method has limited success in accommodating the preferences of the students, and the specific needs of the schools (in terms of the “mix” of admitted students). Using insights from the first part of the paper, we show that stable matching mechanisms are more appropriate in this matching market and explain why the strategic behavior of the students need not be a major concern. (Stable Marriage; Strategic Issues; Gale-Shapley Algorithm; Student Posting Exercise) We describe a fixed-point based approach to the theory of bipartite stable matchings. By this, we provide a common framework that links together seemingly distant results, like the stable marriage theorem of Gale and Shapley, the Mendelsohn-Dulmage theorem, the Kundu-Lawler theorem, Tarski's fixed-point theorem, the Cantor-Bernstein theorem, Pym's linking theorem, or the monochromatic path theorem of In this framework, we formulate a matroid-generalization of the stable marriage theorem and study the lattice structure of generalized stable matchings. Based on the theory of lattice polyhedra and blocking polyhedra, we extend results of Vande Vate and Rothblum on the bipartite stable matching polytope. We show that the ratio of matched individuals to blocking pairs grows linearly with the number of propose–accept rounds executed by the Gale–Shapley algorithm for the stable marriage problem. Consequently, the participants can arrive at an almost stable matching even without full information about the problem instance; for each participant, knowing only its local neighbourhood is enough. In distributed-systems parlance, this means that if each person has only a constant number of acceptable partners, an almost stable matching emerges after a constant number of synchronous communication rounds. We apply our results to give a distributed (2+e)-approximation algorithm for maximum-weight matching in bicoloured graphs and a centralised randomised constant-time approximation scheme for estimating the size of a stable matching. Abstract Documents in computer-readable form can be used to provide information about other documents, i.e. those they cite. To do this efficiently requires procedures for computer recognition of citing statements. This is not easy, especially for multi-sentence citing statements. Computer recognition procedures have been developed which are accurate to the following extent: 73 of the words in statements selected by computer procedures as being citing statements are words which are correctly attributable to the corresponding documents. The retrieval effectiveness of computer-recognized citing statements was tested in the following way. First, for eight retrieval requests in inorganiic chemistry, average recall by search of Chemical Abstracts Service indexing and Chemical Abstracts abstract text words was found to be 50 . Words from citing statements referring to the papers to be retrieved were then added to the index terms and abstract words as additional access points, and searching was repeated. Average recall increased to 70 . Only words from citing statements published within a year of the cited papers were used. The retrieval effect of citing statement words alone (published within a year) without index or abstract terms was the following: average recall was 40 . When just the words of the titles of the cited papers were added to those citing statement words, average recall increased to 50 . The original work of Gale and Shapley on an assignment method using the stable marriage criterion has been extended to find all the stable marriage assignments. The algorithm derived for finding all the stable marriage assignments is proved to satisfy all the conditions of the problem. Algorithm 411 applies to this paper. Input Queued (IQ) switches have been very well studied in the recent past. The main problem in the IQ switches concerns scheduling. The main focus of the research has been the fixed length packet-known as cells-case. The scheduling decision becomes relatively easier for cells compared to the variable length packet case as scheduling needs to be done at a regular interval of fixed cell time. In real traffic dividing the variable packets into cells at the input side of the switch and then reassembling these cells into packets on the output side achieve it. The disadvantages of this cell-based approach are the following: (a) bandwidth is lost as division of a packet may generate incomplete cells, and (b) additional overhead of segmentation and reassembling cells into packets. This motivates the packet scheduling: scheduling is done in units of arriving packet sizes and in nonpreemptive fashion. In M.A. (2001) the problem of packet scheduling was first considered. They show that under any admissible Bernoulli i.i.d. arrival traffic a simple modification of maximum weight matching (MWM) algorithm is stable, similar to cell-based MWM. In this paper, we study the stability properties of packet based scheduling algorithm for general admissible arrival traffic pattern. We first show that the result of extends to general regenerative traffic model instead of just admissible traffic, that is, packet based MWM is stable. Next we show that there exists an admissible traffic pattern under which any work-conserving (that is maximal type) scheduling algorithm will be unstable. This suggests that the packet based MWM will be unstable too. To overcome this difficulty we propose a new class of "waiting" algorithms. We show that "waiting"-MWM algorithm is stable for any admissible traffic using fluid limit technique. We study a labor market with finitely many heterogeneous workers and firms to illustrate the decentralized (myopic) blocking dynamics in two-sided one-to-one matching markets with continuous side payments (assignment problems, Shapley and Shubik, 1971). A labor market is unstable if there is at least one blocking pair, that is, a worker and a firm who would prefer to be matched to each other in order to obtain higher payoffs than the payoffs they obtain by being matched to their current partners. A blocking path is a sequence of outcomes (specifying matchings and payoffs) such that each outcome is obtained from the previous one by satisfying a blocking pair (i.e., by matching the two blocking agents and assigning new payoffs to them that are higher than the ones they received before). We are interested in the question if starting from any (unstable) outcome, there always exists a blocking path that will lead to a stable outcome. In contrast to discrete versions of the model (i.e., for marriage markets, one-to-one matching, or discretized assignment problems), the existence of blocking paths to stability cannot always be guaranteed. We identify a necessary and sufficient condition for an assignment problem (the existence of a stable outcome such that all matched agents receive positive payoffs) to guarantee the existence of paths to stability and show how to construct such a path whenever this is possible. Baiou and Balinski characterized the stable admissions polytope using a system of linear inequalities. The structure of feasible solutions to this system of inequalities---fractional stable matchings---is the focus of this paper. The main result associates a geometric structure with each fractional stable matching. This insight appears to be interesting in its own right, and can be viewed as a generalization of the lattice structure (for integral stable matchings) to fractional stable matchings. In addition to obtaining simple proofs of many known results, the geometric structure is used to prove the following two results: First, it is shown that assigning each agent their “median” choice among all stable partners results in a stable matching, which can be viewed as a “fair” compromise; second, sufficient conditions are identified under which stable matchings exist in a problem with externalities, in particular, in the stable matching problem with couples. The Stable Marriage Problem and its many variants have been widely studied in the literature (Gusfield and Irving, The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1989; Roth and Sotomayor, Two-sided matching: a study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis, Econometric Society Monographs, vol. 18, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990; Knuth, Stable Marriage and its Relation to Other Combinatorial Problems, CRM Proceedings and Lecture Notes, vol. 10, American Mathematical Society, Providence, RI, 1997), partly because of the inherent appeal of the problem, partly because of the elegance of the associated structures and algorithms, and partly because of important practical applications, such as the National Resident Matching Program (Roth, J. Political Economy 92(6) (1984) 991) and similar large-scale matching schemes. Here, we present the first comprehensive study of variants of the problem in which the preference lists of the participants are not necessarily complete and not necessarily totally ordered. We show that, under surprisingly restrictive assumptions, a number of these variants are hard, and hard to approximate. The key observation is that, in contrast to the case where preference lists are complete or strictly ordered (or both), a given problem instance may admit stable matchings of different sizes. In this setting, examples of problems that are hard are: finding a stable matching of maximum or minimum size, determining whether a given pair is stableeven if the indifference takes the form of ties on one side only, the ties are at the tails of lists, there is at most one tie per list, and each tie is of length 2; and finding, or approximating, both an egalitarian' and a minimum regret' stable matching. However, we give a 2-approximation algorithm for the problems of finding a stable matching of maximum or minimum size. We also discuss the significant implications of our results for practical matching schemes. One reason for wanting to compute an (approximate) Nash equilibrium of a game is to predict how players will play. However, if the game has multiple equilibria that are far apart, or e-equilibria that are far in variation distance from the true Nash equilibrium strategies, then this prediction may not be possible even in principle. Motivated by this consideration, in this paper we define the notion of games that are approximation stable, meaning that all e-approximate equilibria are contained inside a small ball of radius Δ around a true equilibrium, and investigate a number of their properties. Many natural small games such as matching pennies and rock-paper-scissors are indeed approximation stable. We show furthermore there exist 2-player n-by-n approximationstable games in which the Nash equilibrium and all approximate equilibria have support Ω(log n). On the other hand, we show all (e,Δ) approximation-stable games must have an e-equilibrium of support O(Δ2-o(1) e2 log n), yielding an immediate nO(Δ2-o(1) e2 log n) -time algorithm, improving over the bound of [11] for games satisfying this condition. We in addition give a polynomial-time algorithm for the case that Δ and e are sufficiently close together. We also consider an inverse property, namely that all non-approximate equilibria are far from some true equilibrium, and give an efficient algorithm for games satisfying that condition.