Traceroute measurements are one of our main instruments to shed light onto the structure and properties of today's complex networks such as the Internet. This paper studies the feasibility and infeasibility of inferring the network topology given traceroute data from a worst-case perspective, i.e., without any probabilistic assumptions on, e.g., the nodes' degree distribution. We attend to a scenario where some of the routers are anonymous, and propose two fundamental axioms that model two basic assumptions on the traceroute data: (1) each trace corresponds to a real path in the network, and (2) the routing paths are at most a factor 1 alpha off the shortest paths, for some parameter alpha in (0,1]. In contrast to existing literature that focuses on the cardinality of the set of (often only minimal) inferrable topologies, we argue that a large number of possible topologies alone is often unproblematic, as long as the networks have a similar structure. We hence seek to characterize the set of topologies inferred with our axioms. We introduce the notion of star graphs whose colorings capture the differences among inferred topologies; it also allows us to construct inferred topologies explicitly. We find that in general, inferrable topologies can differ significantly in many important aspects, such as the nodes' distances or the number of triangles. These negative results are complemented by a discussion of a scenario where the trace set is best possible, i.e., "complete". It turns out that while some properties such as the node degrees are still hard to measure, a complete trace set can help to determine global properties such as the connectivity.
Our work is motivated by a series of papers by Acharya and Gouda. @cite_14 , a network tracing theory model is introduced where nodes are irregular'' in the sense that each node appears in at least one trace with its real identifier. @cite_3 , hardness results are derived for this model. However, as pointed out by the authors themselves, the irregular node model---where nodes are anonymous due to high loads---is less relevant in practice and hence they consider strictly anonymous nodes in their follow-up studies @cite_7 . As proved in @cite_7 , the problem is still hard (in the sense that there are many minimal networks corresponding to a trace set), even with only two anonymous nodes, symmetric routing and without aliasing.
@cite_14 @cite_7 @cite_3
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Computing the topology of a network in the Internet is a problem that has attracted considerable research interest. The usual method is to employ Traceroute, which produces sequences of nodes that occur along the routes from one node (source) to another (destination). In every trace thus produced, a node occurs by either its unique identifier, or by the anonymous identifier "*". We have earlier proved that there exists no algorithm that can take a set of traces produced by running Traceroute on network N and compute one topology which is guaranteed to be the topology of N. This paper proves a much stronger result: no algorithm can produce a small set of topologies that is guaranteed to contain the topology of N, as the size of the solution set is exponentially large. This result holds even when every edge occurs in a trace, all the unique identifiers of all the nodes are known, and the number of nodes that are irregular (anonymous in some traces) is given. On the basis of this strong result, we suggest that efforts to exactly reconstruct network topology should focus on special cases where the solution set is small. Traceroute is a widely used program for computing the topology of any network in the Internet. Using Traceroute, one starts from a node and chooses any other node in the network. Traceroute obtains the sequence of nodes that occur between these two nodes, as specified by the routing tables in these nodes. Each use of Traceroute in a network produces a trace of nodes that constitute a simple path in this network. In every trace that is produced by Traceroute, each node occurs either by its unique identifier, or by the anonymous identifier"*". In this paper, we introduce the first theory aimed at answering the following important question. Is there an algorithm to compute the topology of a network N from a trace set T that is produced by using Traceroute in network N , assuming that each edge in N occurs in at least one trace in T , and that each node in N occurs by its unique identifier in at least one trace in T ? We prove that the answer to this question is "No" if N is an even ring or a general network. However, it is "Yes" if N is a tree or an odd ring. The answer is also "No" if N is mostly-regular, but "Yes" if N is a mostly-regular even ring. Many systems require information about the topology of networks on the Internet, for purposes like management, efficiency, testing of new protocols and so on. However, ISPs usually do not share the actual topology maps with outsiders; thus, in order to obtain the topology of a network on the Internet, a system must reconstruct it from publicly observable data. The standard method employs traceroute to obtain paths between nodes; next, a topology is generated such that the observed paths occur in the graph. However, traceroute has the problem that some routers refuse to reveal their addresses, and appear as anonymous nodes in traces. Previous research on the problem of topology inference with anonymous nodes has demonstrated that it is at best NP-complete. In this paper, we improve upon this result. In our previous research, we showed that in the special case where nodes may be anonymous in some traces but not in all traces (so all node identifiers are known), there exist trace sets that are generable from multiple topologies. This paper extends our theory of network tracing to the general case (with strictly anonymous nodes), and shows that the problem of computing the network that generated a trace set, given the trace set, has no general solution. The weak version of the problem, which allows an algorithm to output a "small" set of networks- any one of which is the correct one- is also not solvable. Any algorithm guaranteed to output the correct topology outputs at least an exponential number of networks. Our results are surprisingly robust: they hold even when the network is known to have exactly two anonymous nodes, and every node as well as every edge in the network is guaranteed to occur in some trace. On the basis of this result, we suggest that exact reconstruction of network topology requires more powerful tools than traceroute. The proliferation of online social networks, and the concomitant accumulation of user data, give rise to hotly debated issues of privacy, security, and control. One specific challenge is the sharing or public release of anonymized data without accidentally leaking personally identifiable information (PII). Unfortunately, it is often difficult to ascertain that sophisticated statistical techniques, potentially employing additional external data sources, are unable to break anonymity. In this paper, we consider an instance of this problem, where the object of interest is the structure of a social network, i.e., a graph describing users and their links. Recent work demonstrates that anonymizing node identities may not be sufficient to keep the network private: the availability of node and link data from another domain, which is correlated with the anonymized network, has been used to re-identify the anonymized nodes. This paper is about conditions under which such a de-anonymization process is possible. We attempt to shed light on the following question: can we assume that a sufficiently sparse network is inherently anonymous, in the sense that even with unlimited computational power, de-anonymization is impossible? Our approach is to introduce a random graph model for a version of the de-anonymization problem, which is parameterized by the expected node degree and a similarity parameter that controls the correlation between two graphs over the same vertex set. We find simple conditions on these parameters delineating the boundary of privacy, and show that the mean node degree need only grow slightly faster than log n with network size n for nodes to be identifiable. Our results have policy implications for sharing of anonymized network information. A mobile ad hoc network consists of mobile nodes that can move freely in an open environment. Communicating nodes in a wireless and mobile ad hoc network usually seek the help of other intermediate nodes to establish communication channels. In such an open environment, malicious intermediate nodes can be a threat to the security and or anonymity of the exchanged data between the mobile nodes. While data encryption can protect the content exchanged between nodes, routing information may reveal valuable information about end users and their relationships. The main purposes of this paper are to study the possibility of achieving anonymity in ad hoc networks, and propose an anonymous routing protocol, similar to onion routing concept used in wired networks. Our protocol includes a mechanism to establish a trust among mobile nodes while avoiding untrustworthy nodes during the route discovery process. The major objective of our protocol is to allow only trustworthy intermediate nodes to participate in the routing protocol without jeopardizing the anonymity of the communicating nodes. We present our scheme, and report on its performance using an extensive set of simulation set of experiments using ns-2 simulator. Our results indicate clearly that anonymity can be achieved in mobile ad hoc networks, and the additional overhead of our scheme to DSR is reasonably low when compared to a non-secure DSR ad hoc routing protocol. We consider the problem of computing a maximal independent set (MIS) in an extremely harsh broadcast model that relies only on carrier sensing. The model consists of an anonymous broadcast network in which nodes have no knowledge about the topology of the network or even an upper bound on its size. Furthermore, it is assumed that an adversary chooses at which time slot each node wakes up. At each time slot a node can either beep, that is, emit a signal, or be silent. At a particular time slot, beeping nodes receive no feedback, while silent nodes can only differentiate between none of its neighbors beeping, or at least one of its neighbors beeping. We start by proving a lower bound that shows that in this model, it is not possible to locally converge to an MIS in sub-polynomial time. We then study four different relaxations of the model which allow us to circumvent the lower bound and find an MIS in polylogarithmic time. First, we show that if a polynomial upper bound on the network size is known, it is possible to find an MIS in ( O ( ^3 n) ) time. Second, if we assume sleeping nodes are awoken by neighboring beeps, then we can also find an MIS in ( O ( ^3 n) ) time. Third, if in addition to this wakeup assumption we allow sender-side collision detection, that is, beeping nodes can distinguish whether at least one neighboring node is beeping concurrently or not, we can find an MIS in ( O ( ^2 n) ) time. Finally, if instead we endow nodes with synchronous clocks, it is also possible to find an MIS in ( O ( ^2 n) ) time. The proliferation of network data in various application domains has raised privacy concerns for the individuals involved. Recent studies show that simply removing the identities of the nodes before publishing the graph social network data does not guarantee privacy. The structure of the graph itself, and in its basic form the degree of the nodes, can be revealing the identities of individuals. To address this issue, we study a specific graph-anonymization problem. We call a graph k-degree anonymous if for every node v, there exist at least k-1 other nodes in the graph with the same degree as v. This definition of anonymity prevents the re-identification of individuals by adversaries with a priori knowledge of the degree of certain nodes. We formally define the graph-anonymization problem that, given a graph G, asks for the k-degree anonymous graph that stems from G with the minimum number of graph-modification operations. We devise simple and efficient algorithms for solving this problem. Our algorithms are based on principles related to the realizability of degree sequences. We apply our methods to a large spectrum of synthetic and real datasets and demonstrate their efficiency and practical utility. We present a study of anonymized data capturing a month of high-level communication activities within the whole of the Microsoft Messenger instant-messaging system. We examine characteristics and patterns that emerge from the collective dynamics of large numbers of people, rather than the actions and characteristics of individuals. The dataset contains summary properties of 30 billion conversations among 240 million people. From the data, we construct a communication graph with 180 million nodes and 1.3 billion undirected edges, creating the largest social network constructed and analyzed to date. We report on multiple aspects of the dataset and synthesized graph. We find that the graph is well-connected and robust to node removal. We investigate on a planetary-scale the oft-cited report that people are separated by "six degrees of separation" and find that the average path length among Messenger users is 6.6. We find that people tend to communicate more with each other when they have similar age, language, and location, and that cross-gender conversations are both more frequent and of longer duration than conversations with the same gender. In a social network, nodes correspond topeople or other social entities, and edges correspond to social links between them. In an effort to preserve privacy, the practice of anonymization replaces names with meaningless unique identifiers. We describe a family of attacks such that even from a single anonymized copy of a social network, it is possible for an adversary to learn whether edges exist or not between specific targeted pairs of nodes. Network information distribution is a fundamental service for any anonymization network. Even though anonymization and information distribution about the network are two orthogonal issues, the design of the distribution service has a direct impact on the anonymization. Requiring each node to know about all other nodes in the network (as in Tor and AN.ON -- the most popular anonymization networks) limits scalability and offers a playground for intersection attacks. The distributed designs existing so far fail to meet security requirements and have therefore not been accepted in real networks. In this paper, we combine probabilistic analysis and simulation to explore DHT-based approaches for distributing network information in anonymization networks. Based on our findings we introduce NISAN, a novel approach that tries to scalably overcome known security problems. It allows for selecting nodes uniformly at random from the full set of all available peers, while each of the nodes has only limited knowledge about the network. We show that our scheme has properties similar to a centralized directory in terms of preventing malicious nodes from biasing the path selection. This is done, however, without requiring to trust any third party. At the same time our approach provides high scalability and adequate performance. Additionally, we analyze different design choices and come up with diverse proposals depending on the attacker model. The proposed combination of security, scalability, and simplicity, to the best of our knowledge, is not available in any other existing network information distribution system. We propose a model for deterministic distributed function computation by a network of identical and anonymous nodes. In this model, each node has bounded computation and storage capabilities that do not grow with the network size. Furthermore, each node only knows its neighbors, not the entire graph. Our goal is to characterize the class of functions that can be computed within this model. In our main result, we provide a necessary condition for computability which we show to be nearly sufficient, in the sense that every function that violates this condition can at least be approximated. The problem of computing (suitably rounded) averages in a distributed manner plays a central role in our development; we provide an algorithm that solves it in time that grows quadratically with the size of the network. We present Tor, a circuit-based low-latency anonymous communication service. This second-generation Onion Routing system addresses limitations in the original design by adding perfect forward secrecy, congestion control, directory servers, integrity checking, configurable exit policies, and a practical design for location-hidden services via rendezvous points. Tor works on the real-world Internet, requires no special privileges or kernel modifications, requires little synchronization or coordination between nodes, and provides a reasonable tradeoff between anonymity, usability, and efficiency. We briefly describe our experiences with an international network of more than 30 nodes. We close with a list of open problems in anonymous communication. A common problem in mobile networking research and development is the cost related to deploying and running real-world mobile testbeds. Due to cost and operational constraints, these testbeds usually run for short time periods but generate very unique and relevant results that are hard to reproduce. We propose the use of ns-3 as a solution to successfully reproduce real-world mobile testbed experiments. This is accomplished by feeding ns-3 with real testbed traces including node positions and radio link quality only. In order to validate our approach, the network throughput between a fixed Base Station and a Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) was measured in a real-world testbed. The experimental results were compared to the network throughput achieved using the ns-3 trace-based simulation and a plain ns-3 simulation. The obtained results show the high accuracy of the trace-based simulation, thus validating our approach. In a document network such as a citation network of scientific documents, web-logs, etc., the content produced by authors exhibits their interest in certain topics. In addition some authors influence other authors' interests. In this work, we propose to model the influence of cited authors along with the interests of citing authors. Moreover, we hypothesize that apart from the citations present in documents, the context surrounding the citation mention provides extra topical information about the cited authors. However, associating terms in the context to the cited authors remains an open problem. We propose novel document generation schemes that incorporate the context while simultaneously modeling the interests of citing authors and influence of the cited authors. Our experiments show significant improvements over baseline models for various evaluation criteria such as link prediction between document and cited author, and quantitatively explaining unseen text. We consider using trust information to improve the anonymity provided by onion-routing networks. In particular, we introduce a model of trust in network nodes and use it to design path-selection strategies that minimize the probability that the adversary can successfully control the entrance to and exit from the network. This minimizes the chance that the adversary can observe and correlate patterns in the data flowing over the path and thereby deanonymize the user. We first describe the general case in which onion routers can be assigned arbitrary levels of trust. Selecting a strategy can be formulated in a straightforward way as a linear program, but it is exponential in size. We thus analyze a natural simplification of path selection for this case. More importantly, however, when choosing routes in practice, only a very coarse assessment of trust in specific onion routers is likely to be feasible. Therefore, we focus next on the special case in which there are only two trust levels. For this more practical case we identify three optimal route-selection strategies such that at least one is optimal, depending on the trust levels of the two classes, their size, and the reach of the adversary. This can yield practical input into routing decisions. We set out the relevant parameters and choices for making such decisions. Characterizing the contacts between nodes is of utmost importance when evaluating mobile opportunistic networks. The most common characterization of inter-contact times is based on the study of the aggregate distribution of contacts between individual pairs of nodes, assuming an homogenous network, where contact patterns between nodes are similar. The problem with this aggregate distribution is that it is not always representative of the individual pair distributions, especially in the short term and when the number of nodes in the network is high. Thus, deriving results from this characterization can lead to inaccurate performance evaluation results.In this paper, we propose new approaches to characterize the inter-contact times distribution having a higher representativeness and, thus, increasing the accuracy of the derived performance results. Furthermore, these new characterizations require only a moderate number of contacts in order to be representative, thereby allowing to perform a temporal modelization of traffic traces. This a key issue for increasing accuracy, since real-traces can have a high variability in terms of contact patterns along time. The experiments show that the new characterizations, compared with the established one, are more precise, even using short time contact traces. This paper considers the computational power of anonymous message passing algorithms (henceforth, anonymous algorithms), i.e., distributed algorithms operating in a network of unidentified nodes. We prove that every problem that can be solved (and verified) by a randomized anonymous algorithm can also be solved by a deterministic anonymous algorithm provided that the latter is equipped with a 2-hop coloring of the input graph. Since the problem of 2-hop coloring a given graph (i.e., ensuring that two nodes with distance at most 2 have different colors) can by itself be solved by a randomized anonymous algorithm, it follows that with the exception of a few mock cases, the execution of every randomized anonymous algorithm can be decoupled into a generic preprocessing randomized stage that computes a 2-hop coloring, followed by a problem-specific deterministic stage. The main ingredient of our proof is a novel simulation method that relies on some surprising connections between 2-hop colorings and an extensively used graph lifting technique. The problem of privacy-preserving data mining has attracted considerable attention in recent years because of increasing concerns about the privacy of the underlying data. In recent years, an important data domain which has emerged is that of graphs and structured data. Many data sets such as XML data, transportation networks, traffic in IP networks, social networks and hierarchically structured data are naturally represented as graphs. Existing work on graph privacy has focussed on the problem of anonymizing nodes or edges of a single graph, in which the identity is assumed to be associated with individual nodes. In this paper, we examine the more complex case, where we have a collection of graphs, and the identity is associated with individual graphs rather than nodes or edges. In such cases, the problem of identity anonymization is extremely difficult, since we need to not only anonymize the labels on the nodes, but also the underlying global structural information. In such cases, both the global and local structural information can be a challenge to the anonymization process, since any combination of such information can be used in order to de-identify the underlying graphs. In order to achieve this goal, we will create synthesized representations of the underlying graphs based on aggregate structural analytics of the collection of graphs. The synthesized graphs retain the properties of the original data while satisfying the k-anonymity requirement. Our experimental results show that the synthesized graphs maintain a high level of structural information and compatible classification accuracies with the original data. Message delivery in sparse Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) is difficult due to the fact that the network graph is rarely (if ever) connected. A key challenge is to find a route that can provide good delivery performance and low end-to-end delay in a disconnected network graph where nodes may move freely. This paper presents a multidisciplinary solution based on the consideration of the so-called small world dynamics which have been proposed for economy and social studies and have recently revealed to be a successful approach to be exploited for characterising information propagation in wireless networks. To this purpose, some bridge nodes are identified based on their centrality characteristics, i.e., on their capability to broker information exchange among otherwise disconnected nodes. Due to the complexity of the centrality metrics in populated networks the concept of ego networks is exploited where nodes are not required to exchange information about the entire network topology, but only locally available information is considered. Then SimBet Routing is proposed which exploits the exchange of pre-estimated "betweenness' centrality metrics and locally determined social "similarity' to the destination node. We present simulations using real trace data to demonstrate that SimBet Routing results in delivery performance close to Epidemic Routing but with significantly reduced overhead. Additionally, we show that SimBet Routing outperforms PRoPHET Routing, particularly when the sending and receiving nodes have low connectivity. A citing sentence is one that appears in a scientific article and cites previous work. Citing sentences have been studied and used in many applications. For example, they have been used in scientific paper summarization, automatic survey generation, paraphrase identification, and citation function classification. Citing sentences that cite multiple papers are common in scientific writing. This observation should be taken into consideration when using citing sentences in applications. For instance, when a citing sentence is used in a summary of a scientific paper, only the fragments of the sentence that are relevant to the summarized paper should be included in the summary. In this paper, we present and compare three different approaches for identifying the fragments of a citing sentence that are related to a given target reference. Our methods are: word classification, sequence labeling, and segment classification. Our experiments show that segment classification achieves the best results.