A Cyber Physical System (CPS) consists of cyber components for computation and communication, and physical components such as sensors and actuators for process control. These components are networked and interact in a feedback loop. CPS are found in critical infrastructure such as water distribution, power grid, and mass transportation. Often these systems are vulnerable to attacks as the cyber components such as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition workstations, Human Machine Interface and Programmable Logic Controllers are potential targets for attackers. In this work, we report a study to investigate the impact of cyber attacks on a water distribution (WADI) system. Attacks were designed to meet attacker objectives and launched on WADI using a specially designed tool. This tool enables the launch of single and multi-point attacks where the latter are designed to specifically hide one or more attacks. The outcome of the experiments led to a better understanding of attack propagation and behavior of WADI in response to the attacks as well as to the design of an attack detection mechanism for water distribution system.
Researchers have presented challenges in safety and security against cyber attacks that need to be addressed while designing a CPS , @cite_36 @cite_19 @cite_2 . , @cite_1 explained the integration of IoT and SCADA systems with a focus on security and how to integrate and create intelligent ICS using the Internet. @cite_20 surveyed literature on cyber physical systems security, and presented a orthogonal framework consists of security, components, system perspectives. They focused mainly on four CPS systems such as ICS, smart grids, medical devices, and smart cars.
@cite_36 @cite_1 @cite_19 @cite_2 @cite_20
2123990969 2322987107 2608911009 2607627346 2579603034
With the exponential growth of cyber-physical systems (CPSs), new security challenges have emerged. Various vulnerabilities, threats, attacks, and controls have been introduced for the new generation of CPS. However, there lacks a systematic review of the CPS security literature. In particular, the heterogeneity of CPS components and the diversity of CPS systems have made it difficult to study the problem with one generalized model. In this paper, we study and systematize existing research on CPS security under a unified framework. The framework consists of three orthogonal coordinates: 1) from the security perspective, we follow the well-known taxonomy of threats, vulnerabilities, attacks and controls; 2) from the CPS components perspective, we focus on cyber, physical, and cyber-physical components; and 3) from the CPS systems perspective, we explore general CPS features as well as representative systems (e.g., smart grids, medical CPS, and smart cars). The model can be both abstract to show general interactions of components in a CPS application, and specific to capture any details when needed. By doing so, we aim to build a model that is abstract enough to be applicable to various heterogeneous CPS applications; and to gain a modular view of the tightly coupled CPS components. Such abstract decoupling makes it possible to gain a systematic understanding of CPS security, and to highlight the potential sources of attacks and ways of protection. With this intensive literature review, we attempt to summarize the state-of-the-art on CPS security, provide researchers with a comprehensive list of references, and also encourage the audience to further explore this emerging field. Industrial systems always prefer to reduce their operational expenses. To support such reductions, they need solutions that are capable of providing stability, fault tolerance, and flexibility. One such solution for industrial systems is cyber physical system (CPS) integration with the Internet of Things (IoT) utilizing cloud computing services. These CPSs can be considered as smart industrial systems, with their most prevalent applications in smart transportation, smart grids, smart medical and eHealthcare systems, and many more. These industrial CPSs mostly utilize supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems to control and monitor their critical infrastructure (CI). For example, WebSCADA is an application used for smart medical technologies, making improved patient monitoring and more timely decisions possible. The focus of the study presented in this paper is to highlight the security challenges that the industrial SCADA systems face in an IoT-cloud environment. Classical SCADA systems are already lacking in proper security measures; however, with the integration of complex new architectures for the future Internet based on the concepts of IoT, cloud computing, mobile wireless sensor networks, and so on, there are large issues at stakes in the security and deployment of these classical systems. Therefore, the integration of these future Internet concepts needs more research effort. This paper, along with highlighting the security challenges of these CI’s, also provides the existing best practices and recommendations for improving and maintaining security. Finally, this paper briefly describes future research directions to secure these critical CPSs and help the research community in identifying the research gaps in this regard. An approach for integrating Six-Step Model (SSM) with Information Flow Diagrams (IFDs) is proposed. SSM is a model for Cyber-Physical System (CPS) safety and security analysis, which incorporates six hierarchies of CPS, namely, functions, structure, failures, safety countermeasures, cyber-attacks, and security countermeasures. Relationship matrices are used in SSM to identify inter-relationships between these hierarchies and determine the effect of failures and cyber-attacks on CPSs. Although SSM is a useful tool for CPS safety and security modeling, it lacks guidance for identifying failures and attacks, and selecting adequate set of safety and security countermeasures. To address this issue, an approach for integrating SSM with IFDs is proposed and explained using the water treatment system example. In recent years, tremendous effort has been spent to modernizing communication infrastructure in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) such as Industrial Control Systems (ICS) and related Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. While a great amount of research has been conducted on network security of office and home networks, recently the security of CPS and related systems has gained a lot of attention. Unfortunately, real-world CPS are often not open to security researchers, and as a result very few reference systems and topologies are available. In this work, we present MiniCPS, a CPS simulation toolbox intended to alleviate this problem. The goal of MiniCPS is to create an extensible, reproducible research environment targeted to communications and physical-layer interactions in CPS. MiniCPS builds on Mininet to provide lightweight real-time network emulation, and extends Mininet with tools to simulate typical CPS components such as programmable logic controllers, which use industrial protocols (Ethernet IP, Modbus TCP). In addition, MiniCPS defines a simple API to enable physical-layer interaction simulation. In this work, we demonstrate applications of MiniCPS in two example scenarios, and show how MiniCPS can be used to develop attacks and defenses that are directly applicable to real systems. Pervasive healthcare systems, smart grids, and unmanned aircraft systems are examples of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) that have become highly integrated in the modern world. As this integration deepens, the importance of securing these systems increases. In order to identify gaps and propose research directions in CPS intrusion detection research, we survey the literature of this area. Our approach is to classify modern CPS Intrusion Detection System (IDS) techniques based on two design dimensions: detection technique and audit material. We summarize advantages and drawbacks of each dimension’s options. We also summarize the most and least studied CPS IDS techniques in the literature and provide insight on the effectiveness of IDS techniques as they apply to CPSs. Finally, we identify gaps in CPS IDS research and suggest future research areas. The Smart Grid, generally referred to as the next-generation power system, is considered as a revolutionary and evolutionary regime of existing power grids. More importantly, with the integration of advanced computing and communication technologies, the Smart Grid is expected to greatly enhance efficiency and reliability of future power systems with renewable energy resources, as well as distributed intelligence and demand response. Along with the silent features of the Smart Grid, cyber security emerges to be a critical issue because millions of electronic devices are inter-connected via communication networks throughout critical power facilities, which has an immediate impact on reliability of such a widespread infrastructure. In this paper, we present a comprehensive survey of cyber security issues for the Smart Grid. Specifically, we focus on reviewing and discussing security requirements, network vulnerabilities, attack countermeasures, secure communication protocols and architectures in the Smart Grid. We aim to provide a deep understanding of security vulnerabilities and solutions in the Smart Grid and shed light on future research directions for Smart Grid security. The Internet of Things (IoT) enables the integration of data from virtual and physical worlds. 1 It involves smart objects that can understand and react to their environment in a variety of industrial, commercial and household settings. 2 As the IoT expands the number of connected devices, there is the potential to allow cyber-attackers into the physical world in which we live, as they seize on security holes in these new systems. 3 New security issues arise through the heterogeneity of IoT applications and devices and their large-scale deployment. The Internet of Things (IoT) enables the integration of data from virtual and physical worlds. But as the IoT expands it becomes more vulnerable to cyber-attackers. New security issues arise through the heterogeneity of IoT applications and devices and their large-scale deployment. Mark Taylor, Denis Reilly and Brett Lempereur of Liverpool John Moores University present a multi-tiered security approach for IoT devices that incorporates physical proximity controls, geo-location checking, instruction encryption, embedded controls and exception reporting. Internet of Things (IoT), also referred to as the Internet of Objects, is envisioned as a transformative approach for providing numerous services. Compact smart devices constitute an essential part of IoT. They range widely in use, size, energy capacity, and computation power. However, the integration of these smart things into the standard Internet introduces several security challenges because the majority of Internet technologies and communication protocols were not designed to support IoT. Moreover, commercialization of IoT has led to public security concerns, including personal privacy issues, threat of cyber attacks, and organized crime. In order to provide a guideline for those who want to investigate IoT security and contribute to its improvement, this survey attempts to provide a comprehensive list of vulnerabilities and countermeasures against them on the edge-side layer of IoT, which consists of three levels: (i) edge nodes, (ii) communication, and (iii) edge computing. To achieve this goal, we first briefly describe three widely-known IoT reference models and define security in the context of IoT. Second, we discuss the possible applications of IoT and potential motivations of the attackers who target this new paradigm. Third, we discuss different attacks and threats. Fourth, we describe possible countermeasures against these attacks. Finally, we introduce two emerging security challenges not yet explained in detail in previous literature. This article presents an innovative approach to address a rapidly evolving and polymorphic threat environment related to the emergence of the Internet of Things in the global Internet, with a focus on Cyber Physical Systems, Cloud architecture and SDN NFV technologies. The article presents the view and methodological approach of ANASTACIA research project to address this evolution. ANASTACIA researches, develops and demonstrates a holistic solution enabling trust and security by-design for cyber physical systems (CPS) based on IoT and cloud architectures. Smart Cyber--Physical Systems (sCPS) are modern CPS systems that are engineered to seamlessly integrate a large number of computation and physical components; they need to control entities in their environment in a smart and collective way to achieve a high degree of effectiveness and efficiency. At the same time, these systems are supposed to be safe and secure, deal with environment dynamicity and uncertainty, cope with external threats, and optimize their behavior to achieve the best possible outcome. This "smartness" typically stems from highly cooperative behavior, self--awareness, self--adaptation, and selfoptimization. Most of the "smartness" is implemented in software, which makes the software one of the most complex and most critical constituents of sCPS. As the specifics of sCPS render traditional software engineering approaches not directly applicable, new and innovative approaches to software engineering of sCPS need to be sought. This paper reports on the results of the Second International Workshop on Software Engineering for Smart Cyber--Physical Systems (SEsCPS 2016), which specifically focuses on challenges and promising solutions in the area of software engineering for sCPS. Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are large interconnected softwareintensive systems that influence, by sensing and actuating, the physical world. Examples are traffic management and power grids. One of the trends we observe is the need to endow such systems with the "smart" capabilities, typically in the form of selfawareness and self-adaptation, along with the traditional qualities of safety and dependability. These requirements combined with specifics of the domain of smart CPS -- such as large scale, the role of end-users, uncertainty, and open-endedness -- render traditional software engineering (SE) techniques not directly applicable; making systematic SE of smart CPS a challenging task. This paper reports on the results of the First International Workshop on Software Engineering of Smart Cyber-Physical Systems (SEsCPS 2015), where participants discussed characteristics, challenges and opportunities of SE for smart CPS, with the aim to outline an agenda for future research in this important area. A smart grid is a new form of electricity network with high fidelity power-flow control, self-healing, and energy reliability and energy security using digital communications and control technology. To upgrade an existing power grid into a smart grid, it requires significant dependence on intelligent and secure communication infrastructures. It requires security frameworks for distributed communications, pervasive computing and sensing technologies in smart grid. However, as many of the communication technologies currently recommended to use by a smart grid is vulnerable in cyber security, it could lead to unreliable system operations, causing unnecessary expenditure, even consequential disaster to both utilities and consumers. In this paper, we summarize the cyber security requirements and the possible vulnerabilities in smart grid communications and survey the current solutions on cyber security for smart grid communications. Security of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) against cyber attacks is an important yet challenging problem. Since most cyber attacks happen in erratic ways, it is difficult to describe them systematically. In this paper, instead of identifying a specific cyber attack model, we are focused on analyzing the system's response during cyber attacks. Deception attacks (or false data injection attacks), which are performed by tampering with system components or data, are not of particular concern if they can be easily detected by the system's monitoring system. However, intelligent cyber attackers can avoid being detected by the monitoring system by carefully design cyber attacks. Our main objective is to investigate the performance of such stealthy deception attacks from the system's perspective. We investigate three kinds of stealthy deception attacks according to the attacker's ability to compromise the system. Based on the information about the dynamics of the system and existing hypothesis testing algorithms, we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions under which the attacker could perform each kind of attack without being detected. In the end, we illustrate the threat of these cyber attacks using an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) navigation example. Integrating the various embedded devices and systems in our environment enables an Internet of Things (IoT) for a smart city. The IoT will generate tremendous amount of data that can be leveraged for safety, efficiency, and infotainment applications and services for city residents. The management of this voluminous data through its lifecycle is fundamental to the realization of smart cities. Therefore, in contrast to existing surveys on smart cities we provide a data-centric perspective, describing the fundamental data management techniques employed to ensure consistency, interoperability, granularity, and reusability of the data generated by the underlying IoT for smart cities. Essentially, the data lifecycle in a smart city is dependent on tightly coupled data management with cross-cutting layers of data security and privacy, and supporting infrastructure. Therefore, we further identify techniques employed for data security and privacy, and discuss the networking and computing technologies that enable smart cities. We highlight the achievements in realizing various aspects of smart cities, present the lessons learned, and identify limitations and research challenges. Within the last decade, Security became a major focus in the traditional IT-Industry, mainly through the interconnection of systems and especially through the connection to the Internet. This opened up a huge new attack surface, which resulted in major takedowns of legitimate services and new forms of crime and destruction. This led to the development of a multitude of new defense mechanisms and strategies, as well as the establishing of Security procedures on both, organizational and technical level. Production systems have mostly remained in isolation during these past years, with security typically focused on the perimeter. Now, with the introduction of new paradigms like Industry 4.0, this isolation is questioned heavily with Physical Production Systems (PPSs) now connected to an IT-world resulting in cyber-physical systems sharing the attack surface of traditional web based interfaces while featuring completely different goals, parameters like lifetime and safety, as well as construction. In this work, we present an outline on the major security challenges faced by cyber-physical production systems. While many of these challenges harken back to issues also present in traditional web based IT, we will thoroughly analyze the differences. Still, many new attack vectors appeared in the past, either in practical attacks like Stuxnet, or in theoretical work. These attack vectors use specific features or design elements of cyber-physical systems to their advantage and are unparalleled in traditional IT. Furthermore, many mitigation strategies prevalent in traditional IT systems are not applicable in the industrial world, e.g., patching, thus rendering traditional strategies in IT-Security unfeasible. A thorough discussion of the major challenges in CPPS-Security is thus required in order to focus research on the most important targets. The development of advanced wireless communication technologies and smart embedded control devices makes everything connected, leading to an emerging paradigm of the Internet of Controlled Things IoCT. IoCT consists of two layers of systems: cyber layer and physical layer. This work aims to establish a holistic framework that integrates the cyber-physical layers of the IoCT through the lens of contract theory. For the cyber layer, we use a FlipIt game to capture the cloud security. We focus on two types of cloud, high-type and low-type, in terms of their provided quality of service QoS. The cloud's type is of private information which is unknown to the contract maker. Therefore, the control system administrator CSA at the physical layer needs to design a menu of two contracts for each type of service provider SP due to this asymmetric information structure. According to the received contract, SP decides his cyber defense strategy in the FlipIt game of which the Nash equilibrium determines the QoS of the cloud, and further influences the physical system performance. The objective of CSA is to minimize the payment to the cloud SP and the control cost jointly by designing optimal contracts. Due to the interdependence between the cyber and physical layers in the cloud-enabled IoCT, we need to address the cloud security and contract design problems in an integrative manner. We find that CSA always requires the best QoS from two types of cloud. In addition, under the optimal contracts, the utilities of both SPs are constants. Furthermore, no contracts will be offered to the cloud if the resulting service cannot stabilize the physical system. In this paper we advocate the use of workflow---describing how a system provides its intended functionality---as a pillar of cybersecurity analysis and propose a holistic workflow-oriented assessment framework. While workflow models are currently used in the area of performance and reliability assessment, these approaches are designed neither to assess a system in the presence of an active attacker, nor to assess security aspects such as confidentiality. On the other hand, existing security assessment methods typically focus on modeling the active attacker (e.g., attack graphs), but many rely on restrictive models that are not readily applicable to complex (e.g., cyber-physical or cyber-human) systems. By "going with the flow," our assessment framework can naturally adopt a holistic view of such systems, unifying information about system components, their properties, and possible attacks to argue about a security goal. The argument is expressed in a graph structure, based on inputs from several distinct classes that are integrated in a systematic manner. That rigorous structure allows our approach to provide quantitative assessment in an automated fashion (like reliability assessment tools and attack graphs), while maintaining a broad assessment scope. We demonstrate our security assessment process using the case of Advanced Metering Infrastructure in a smart power grid and obtain quantitative results for system availability and confidentiality. Internet of things (IoT) or Web of Things (WoT) is a wireless network between smart products or smart things connected to the internet. It is a new and fast developing market which not only connects objects and people but also billions of gadgets and smart devices. With the rapid growth of IoT, there is also a steady increase in security vulnerabilities of the linked objects. For example, a car manufacturer may want to link the systems within a car to smart home network networks to increase sales, but if all the various people involved do not embrace security the system will be exposed to security risks. As a result, there are several new published protocols of IoT, which focus on protecting critical data. However, these protocols face challenges and in this paper, numerous solutions are provided to overcome these problems. The widely used protocols such as, 802.15.4, 6LoWPAN, and RPL are the resenting of the IoT layers PHY MAC, Adoption and Network. While CoAP (Constrained Application Protocol) is the application layer protocol designed as replication of the HTTP to serve the small devices coming under class 1 and 2. Many implementations of CoAP has been accomplished which indicates it's crucial amd upcoming role in the future of IoT applications. This research article explored the security of CoAP over DTLS incurring many issues and proposed solutions as well as open challenges for future research. In this paper, we aim to establish a holistic framework that integrates the cyber-physical layers of a cloud-enabled Internet of Controlled Things (IoCT) through the lens of contract theory. At the physical layer, the device uses cloud services to operate the system. The quality of cloud services is unknown to the device, and hence the device designs a menu of contracts to enable a reliable and incentive-compatible service. Based on the received contracts, the cloud service provider (SP) serves the device by determining its optimal cyber defense strategy. A contract-based FlipCloud game is used to assess the security risk and the cloud quality of service (QoS) under advanced persistent threats. The contract design approach creates a pricing mechanism for on-demand security as a service for cloud-enabled IoCT. By focusing on high and low QoS types of cloud SPs, we find that the contract design can be divided into two regimes (regimes I and II) with respect to the provided cloud QoS. Specifically, the physical devices whose optimal contracts are in regime I always request the best possible cloud security service. In contrast, the device only asks for a cloud security level that can stabilize the system when the optimal contracts lie in regime II. We illustrate the obtained results via case studies of a cloud-enabled smart home. Smart grid is a promising power delivery infrastructure integrated with communication and information technologies. Its bi-directional communication and electricity flow enable both utilities and customers to monitor, predict, and manage energy usage. It also advances energy and environmental sustainability through the integration of vast distributed energy resources. Deploying such a green electric system has enormous and far-reaching economic and social benefits. Nevertheless, increased interconnection and integration also introduce cyber-vulnerabilities into the grid. Failure to address these problems will hinder the modernization of the existing power system. In order to build a reliable smart grid, an overview of relevant cyber security and privacy issues is presented. Based on current literatures, several potential research fields are discussed at the end of this paper.