We show that the problem of finding an -approximate Nash equilibrium in an anonymous game with seven pure strategies is complete in PPAD, when the approximation parameter is exponentially small in the number of players.
Anonymous games have been studied extensively in the economics literature @cite_30 @cite_13 @cite_39 @cite_6 @cite_7 @cite_26 @cite_18 , where the game being considered is usually nonatomic and consists of a continuum of players but a finite number of strategies. For the discrete setting, two special families of anonymous games are symmetric games @cite_0 @cite_42 and congestion games @cite_27 . @cite_0 gave a polynomial-time for finding an exact Nash equilibrium in a symmetric game. For congestion games, PLS-completeness of pure equilibria was established in @cite_34 @cite_44 @cite_16 0.03cm These PLS-hardness results have no implication to the setup of this paper since the number of pure strategies in the congestion games considered there are unbounded. , and efficient approximation algorithms for various latency functions were obtained in @cite_45 @cite_29 @cite_1 .
@cite_30 @cite_18 @cite_26 @cite_7 @cite_29 @cite_42 @cite_1 @cite_6 @cite_39 @cite_0 @cite_44 @cite_27 @cite_16 @cite_45 @cite_34 @cite_13
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A citing sentence is one that appears in a scientific article and cites previous work. Citing sentences have been studied and used in many applications. For example, they have been used in scientific paper summarization, automatic survey generation, paraphrase identification, and citation function classification. Citing sentences that cite multiple papers are common in scientific writing. This observation should be taken into consideration when using citing sentences in applications. For instance, when a citing sentence is used in a summary of a scientific paper, only the fragments of the sentence that are relevant to the summarized paper should be included in the summary. In this paper, we present and compare three different approaches for identifying the fragments of a citing sentence that are related to a given target reference. Our methods are: word classification, sequence labeling, and segment classification. Our experiments show that segment classification achieves the best results. Abstract Documents in computer-readable form can be used to provide information about other documents, i.e. those they cite. To do this efficiently requires procedures for computer recognition of citing statements. This is not easy, especially for multi-sentence citing statements. Computer recognition procedures have been developed which are accurate to the following extent: 73 of the words in statements selected by computer procedures as being citing statements are words which are correctly attributable to the corresponding documents. The retrieval effectiveness of computer-recognized citing statements was tested in the following way. First, for eight retrieval requests in inorganiic chemistry, average recall by search of Chemical Abstracts Service indexing and Chemical Abstracts abstract text words was found to be 50 . Words from citing statements referring to the papers to be retrieved were then added to the index terms and abstract words as additional access points, and searching was repeated. Average recall increased to 70 . Only words from citing statements published within a year of the cited papers were used. The retrieval effect of citing statement words alone (published within a year) without index or abstract terms was the following: average recall was 40 . When just the words of the titles of the cited papers were added to those citing statement words, average recall increased to 50 . Scholars are increasingly citing electronic “web references” which are not preserved in libraries or full text archives. WebCite is a new standard for citing web references. To “webcite” a document involves archiving the cited Web page through www.webcitation.org and citing the WebCite permalink instead of (or in addition to) the unstable live Web page. This journal has amended its “instructions for authors” accordingly, asking authors to archive cited Web pages before submitting a manuscript. Almost 200 other journals are already using the system. We discuss the rationale for WebCite, its technology, and how scholars, editors, and publishers can benefit from the service. Citing scholars initiate an archiving process of all cited Web references, ideally before they submit a manuscript. Authors of online documents and websites which are expected to be cited by others can ensure that their work is permanently available by creating an archived copy using WebCite and providing the citation information including the WebCite link on their Web document(s). Editors should ask their authors to cache all cited Web addresses (Uniform Resource Locators, or URLs) “prospectively” before submitting their manuscripts to their journal. Editors and publishers should also instruct their copyeditors to cache cited Web material if the author has not done so already. Finally, WebCite can process publisher submitted “citing articles” (submitted for example as eXtensible Markup Language [XML] documents) to automatically archive all cited Web pages shortly before or on publication. Finally, WebCite can act as a focussed crawler, caching retrospectively references of already published articles. Copyright issues are addressed by honouring respective Internet standards (robot exclusion files, no-cache and no-archive tags). Long-term preservation is ensured by agreements with libraries and digital preservation organizations. The resulting WebCite Index may also have applications for research assessment exercises, being able to measure the impact of Web services and published Web documents through access and Web citation metrics. @PARASPLIT [J Med Internet Res 2005;7(5):e60] Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to suggest an alternative to the widely used Times Cited criterion for analysing citation networks. The approach involves taking account of the natures of the papers that cite a given paper, so as to differentiate between papers that attract the same number of citations.Design methodology approach – ArticleRank is an algorithm that has been derived from Google's PageRank algorithm to measure the influence of journal articles. ArticleRank is applied to two datasets – a citation network based on an early paper on webometrics, and a self‐citation network based on the 19 most cited papers in the Journal of Documentation – using citation data taken from the Web of Knowledge database.Findings – ArticleRank values provide a different ranking of a set of papers from that provided by the corresponding Times Cited values, and overcomes the inability of the latter to differentiate between papers with the same numbers of citations. The difference in rankings between Times Cited ... In a document network such as a citation network of scientific documents, web-logs, etc., the content produced by authors exhibits their interest in certain topics. In addition some authors influence other authors' interests. In this work, we propose to model the influence of cited authors along with the interests of citing authors. Moreover, we hypothesize that apart from the citations present in documents, the context surrounding the citation mention provides extra topical information about the cited authors. However, associating terms in the context to the cited authors remains an open problem. We propose novel document generation schemes that incorporate the context while simultaneously modeling the interests of citing authors and influence of the cited authors. Our experiments show significant improvements over baseline models for various evaluation criteria such as link prediction between document and cited author, and quantitatively explaining unseen text. A new form of document coupling called co-citation is defined as the frequency with which two documents are cited together. The co-citation frequency of two scientific papers can be determined by comparing lists of citing documents in the Science Citation Index and counting identical entries. Networks of co-cited papers can be generated for specific scientific specialties, and an example is drawn from the literature of particle physics. Co-citation patterns are found to differ significantly from bibliographic coupling patterns, but to agree generally with patterns of direct citation. Clusters of co-cited papers provide a new way to study the specialty structure of science. They may provide a new approach to indexing and to the creation of SDI profiles. In recent years scholars have built maps of science by connecting the academic fields that cite each other, are cited together, or that cite a similar literature. But since scholars cannot always publish in the fields they cite, or that cite them, these science maps are only rough proxies for the potential of a scholar, organization, or country, to enter a new academic field. Here we use a large dataset of scholarly publications disambiguated at the individual level to create a map of science-or research space-where links connect pairs of fields based on the probability that an individual has published in both of them. We find that the research space is a significantly more accurate predictor of the fields that individuals and organizations will enter in the future than citation based science maps. At the country level, however, the research space and citations based science maps are equally accurate. These findings show that data on career trajectories-the set of fields that individuals have previously published in-provide more accurate predictors of future research output for more focalized units-such as individuals or organizations-than citation based science maps. Citation relationship between scientific publications has been successfully used for scholarly bibliometrics, information retrieval and data mining tasks, and citation-based recommendation algorithms are well documented. While previous studies investigated citation relations from various viewpoints, most of them share the same assumption that, if paper1 cites paper2 (or author1 cites author2), they are connected, regardless of citation importance, sentiment, reason, topic, or motivation. However, this assumption is oversimplified. In this study, we employ an innovative "context-rich heterogeneous network" approach, which paves a new way for citation recommendation task. In the network, we characterize 1) the importance of citation relationships between citing and cited papers, and 2) the topical citation motivation. Unlike earlier studies, the citation information, in this paper, is characterized by citation textual contexts extracted from the full-text citing paper. We also propose algorithm to cope with the situation when large portion of full-text missing information exists in the bibliographic repository. Evaluation results show that, context-rich heterogeneous network can significantly enhance the citation recommendation performance. Congestion games constitute an important class of games in which computing an exact or even approximate pure Nash equilibrium is in general PLS -complete. We present a surprisingly simple polynomial-time algorithm that computes @math -approximate Nash equilibria in these games. In particular, for congestion games with linear latency functions, our algorithm computes @math -approximate pure Nash equilibria in time polynomial in the number of players, the number of resources and @math . It also applies to games with polynomial latency functions with constant maximum degree @math ; there, the approximation guarantee is @math . The algorithm essentially identifies a polynomially long sequence of best-response moves that lead to an approximate equilibrium, the existence of such short sequences is interesting in itself. These are the first positive algorithmic results for approximate equilibria in non-symmetric congestion games. We strengthen them further by proving that, for congestion games that deviate from our mild assumptions, computing @math -approximate equilibria is PLS -complete for any polynomial-time computable @math . Historically, papers have been physically bound to the journal in which they were published; but in the digital age papers are available individually, no longer tied to their respective journals. Hence, papers now can be read and cited based on their own merits, independently of the journal's physical availability, reputation, or impact factor (IF). We compare the strength of the relationship between journals' IFs and the actual citations received by their respective papers from 1902 to 2009. Throughout most of the 20th century, papers' citation rates were increasingly linked to their respective journals' IFs. However, since 1990, the advent of the digital age, the relation between IFs and paper citations has been weakening. This began first in physics, a field that was quick to make the transition into the electronic domain. Furthermore, since 1990 the overall proportion of highly cited papers coming from highly cited journals has been decreasing and, of these highly cited papers, the proportion not coming from highly cited journals has been increasing. Should this pattern continue, it might bring an end to the use of the IF as a way to evaluate the quality of journals, papers, and researchers. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. We investigate a new class of congestion games, called Totally Unimodular Congestion Games, in which the strategies of each player are expressed as binary vectors lying in a polyhedron defined using a totally unimodular constraint matrix and an integer right-hand side. We study both the symmetric and the asymmetric variants of the game. In the symmetric variant, all players have the same strategy set, i.e. the same constraint matrix and right-hand side. Network congestion games are an example of this class. proved that a pure Nash equilibrium of symmetric network congestion games can be found in strongly polynomial time, while the asymmetric network congestion games are PLS-complete. We give a strongly polynomial-time algorithm to find a pure Nash equilibrium of any symmetric totally unimodular congestion game. We also identify four totally unimodular congestion games, where the players' strategy sets are matchings, vertex covers, edge covers and stable sets of a given bipartite graph. For these games we derive specialized combinatorial algorithms to find a pure Nash equilibrium in the symmetric variant, and show the asymmetric variant is PLS-complete. We investigate the minimization of Newton's functional for the problem of the body of minimal resistance with maximal height @math cite butt in the class of convex developable functions defined in a disc. This class is a natural candidate to find a (non-radial) minimizer in accordance with the results of cite lrp2. We prove that the minimizer in this class has a minimal set in the form of a regular polygon with @math sides centered in the disc, and numerical experiments indicate that the natural number @math is a non-decreasing function of @math . The corresponding functions all achieve a lower value of the functional than the optimal radially symmetric function with the same height @math . We consider structural and algorithmic questions related to the Nash dynamics of weighted congestion games. In weighted congestion games with linear latency functions, the existence of pure Nash equilibria is guaranteed by a potential function argument. Unfortunately, this proof of existence is inefficient and computing pure Nash equilibria in such games is a PLS-hard problem even when all players have unit weights. The situation gets worse when superlinear (e.g., quadratic) latency functions come into play; in this case, the Nash dynamics of the game may contain cycles and pure Nash equilibria may not even exist. Given these obstacles, we consider approximate pure Nash equilibria as alternative solution concepts. A ρ--approximate pure Nash equilibrium is a state of a (weighted congestion) game from which no player has any incentive to deviate in order to improve her cost by a multiplicative factor higher than ρ. Do such equilibria exist for small values of ρ? And if so, can we compute them efficiently? We provide positive answers to both questions for weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions by exploiting an “approximation” of such games by a new class of potential games that we call Ψ-games. This allows us to show that these games have d!-approximate pure Nash equilibria, where d is the maximum degree of the latency functions. Our main technical contribution is an efficient algorithm for computing O(1)-approximate pure Nash equilibria when d is a constant. For games with linear latency functions, the approximation guarantee is 3+√5 2 + Oγ for arbitrarily small γ > 0; for latency functions with maximum degree d≥ 2, it is d2d+o(d). The running time is polynomial in the number of bits in the representation of the game and 1 γ. As a byproduct of our techniques, we also show the following interesting structural statement for weighted congestion games with polynomial latency functions of maximum degree d ≥ 2: polynomially-long sequences of best-response moves from any initial state to a dO(d2)-approximate pure Nash equilibrium exist and can be efficiently identified in such games as long as d is a constant. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first positive algorithmic results for approximate pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games. Our techniques significantly extend our recent work on unweighted congestion games through the use of Ψ-games. The concept of approximating nonpotential games by potential ones is interesting in itself and might have further applications. An overwhelming number of news articles are available every day via the internet. Unfortunately, it is impossible for us to peruse more than a handful; furthermore it is difficult to ascertain an article’s social context, i.e., is it popular, what sorts of people are reading it, etc. In this paper, we develop a system to address this problem in the restricted domain of political news by harnessing implicit and explicit contextual information from the blogosphere. Specifically, we track thousands of blogs and the news articles they cite, collapsing news articles that have highly overlapping content. We then tag each article with the number of blogs citing it, the political orientation of those blogs, and the level of emotional charge expressed in the blog posts that link to the news article. We summarize and present the results to the user via a novel visualization which displays this contextual information; the user can then find the most popular articles, the articles most cited by liberals, the articles most emotionally discussed in the political blogosphere, etc. We investigate from the computational viewpoint multi-player games that are guaranteed to have pure Nash equilibria. We focus on congestion games, and show that a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time in the symmetric network case, while the problem is PLS-complete in general. We discuss implications to non-atomic congestion games, and we explore the scope of the potential function method for proving existence of pure Nash equilibria. The complexity of computing pure Nash equilibria in congestion games was recently shown to be PLS-complete. In this paper, we therefore study the complexity of computing approximate equilibria in congestion games. An alpha-approximate equilibrium, for α > 1, is a state of the game in which none of the players can make an α-greedy step, i.e., an unilateral strategy change that decreases the player's cost by a factor of at least α. Our main result shows that finding an α-approximate equilibrium of a given congestion game is sc PLS-complete, for any polynomial-time computable α > 1. Our analysis is based on a gap introducing PLS-reduction from FLIP, i.e., the problem of finding a local optimum of a function encoded by an arbitrary circuit. As this reduction is tight it additionally implies that computing an α-approximate equilibrium reachable from a given initial state by a sequence of α-greedy steps is PSPACE-complete. Our results are in sharp contrast to a recent result showing that every local search problem in PLS admits a fully polynomial time approximation scheme. In addition, we show that there exist congestion games with states such that any sequence of α-greedy steps leading from one of these states to an α-approximate Nash equilibrium has exponential length, even if the delay functions satisfy a bounded-jump condition. This result shows that a recent result about polynomial time convergence for α-greedy steps in congestion games satisfying the bounded-jump condition is restricted to symmetric games only. We study the impact of combinatorial structure in congestion games on the complexity of computing pure Nash equilibria and the convergence time of best response sequences. In particular, we investigate which properties of the strategy spaces of individual players ensure a polynomial convergence time. We show that if the strategy space of each player consists of the bases of a matroid over the set of resources, then the lengths of all best response sequences are polynomially bounded in the number of players and resources. We also prove that this result is tight, that is, the matroid property is a necessary and sufficient condition on the players' strategy spaces for guaranteeing polynomial-time convergence to a Nash equilibrium. In addition, we present an approach that enables us to devise hardness proofs for various kinds of combinatorial games, including first results about the hardness of market sharing games and congestion games for overlay network design. Our approach also yields a short proof for the PLS-completeness of network congestion games. In particular, we show that network congestion games are PLS-complete for directed and undirected networks even in case of linear latency functions. The old Asian legend about the blind men and the elephant comes to mind when looking at how different authors of scientific papers describe a piece of related prior work. It turns out that different citations to the same paper often focus on different aspects of that paper and that neither provides a full description of its full set of contributions. In this article, we will describe our investigation of this phenomenon. We studied citation summaries in the context of research papers in the biomedical domain. A citation summary is the set of citing sentences for a given article and can be used as a surrogate for the actual article in a variety of scenarios. It contains information that was deemed by peers to be important. Our study shows that citation summaries overlap to some extent with the abstracts of the papers and that they also differ from them in that they focus on different aspects of these papers than do the abstracts. In addition to this, co-cited articles (which are pairs of articles cited by another article) tend to be similar. We show results based on a lexical similarity metric called cohesion to justify our claims. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. The popular h-index used to measure scientific output can be described in terms of a pool of evaluated objects (the papers), a quality function on the evaluated objects (the number of citations received by each paper) and a sentencing line crossing the origin, whose intersection with the graph of the quality function yields the index value (in the h-index this is a line with slope 1). Based on this abstraction, we present a new index, the c-index, in which the evaluated objects are the citations received by an author, a group of authors, a journal, etc., the quality function of a citation is the collaboration distance between the authors of the cited and the citing papers, and the sentencing line can take slopes between 0 and ∞. As a result, the new index counts only those citations which are significant enough, where significance is proportional to collaboration distance. Several advantages of the new c-index with respect to previous proposals are discussed. Strategic games may exhibit symmetries in a variety of ways. A characteristic feature, enabling the compact representation of games even when the number of players is unbounded, is that players cannot, or need not, distinguish between the other players. We investigate the computational complexity of pure Nash equilibria in four classes of symmetric games obtained by considering two additional properties: identical payoff functions for all players and the ability to distinguish oneself from the other players. In contrast to other types of succinctly representable multi-player games, the pure equilibrium problem is tractable in all four classes when only a constant number of actions is available to each player. Identical payoff functions make the difference between TC^0-completeness and membership in AC^0, while a growing number of actions renders the equilibrium problem NP-hard for three of the classes and PLS-hard for the most restricted class for which the existence of a pure equilibrium is guaranteed. Our results also extend to larger classes of threshold symmetric games where players are unable to determine the exact number of players playing a certain action.