In this paper, we propose RECOUP, a reliable group communication routing protocol for IoT networks. RECOUP efficiently uses a low-overhead cluster-based multicast routing technique on top of the RPL protocol. RECOUP increases the probability of message delivery to the intended destination(s), irrespective of the network size and faults (such as broken links or non-responsive nodes), and in the presence of misbehaving nodes.We show that the cluster-based routing mechanism of RECOUP remains robust in presence of various topology (i.e., rank and sybil) and data communication (i.e., blackhole, wormhole, and jamming) attacks targeting the IoT networking infrastructure.An implementation of RECOUP is realized in Contiki. Our results show the effectiveness of RECOUP over state-of-art protocols concerning packet delivery ratio to 25 , end-to-end delay down to 100 ms, low radio transmissions required for per packet delivery to 6 mJ, and most importantly, it improves the robustness and scalability of data communication process in thewhole network.
As RPL or an extension of RPL are the most used routing protocols in IoT networks. We now briefly discuss the security challenges that these protocols might face during the routing process. Authors in @cite_1 propose a sinkhole attack mitigation method that integrates rank authentication with parent fail-over. The proposal uses DIO message along with the one way hash function technique for rank authentication. The root node generates hash value by selecting random numbers, and broadcast these values through DIO messages. When the root node again broadcast the initially selected random number securely then intermediate nodes can verify its parent rank using the intermediate hops number. @cite_5 authors propose a Merkle tree authentication based solution which can be used to prevent wormhole attack on RPL protocol. In this proposal, the RPL tree is formed in the reverse direction by using the node ID and public key which are used to calculate the hash values. After the Merkle tree formation, the authentication for any node starts from the root node and if any intermediate node fails to authenticate, a possible wormhole is detected.
@cite_5 @cite_1
1999949961 2023532542
Smart metering application has received a lot of attention from the research community lately. Usually, LLN based network runs on RPL protocol which constructs a DAG structure for its normal operation. In this paper, we devise a wormhole attack scenario in such a network. Furthermore, we propose a Merkle tree based authentication protocol which runs on the notion of constructing a tree of hashed security information. We evaluated the approach by formulating the wormhole problem as graph theoretic problem and have shown the effectiveness of the proposed Merkle tree based approach for authenticating communications. Furthermore, we perform simulations in NS 2 to observe the network performance by adopting Merkle tree based to prevent from disrupting the links and observed boost in throughput, reduction in jitter and end to end delay. In the end, we have taken the step towards optimizing the performance of the algorithm by proposing an effective tree traversal algorithm which works on the notion of electing nodes as root in a large scale network from where a Merkle tree will be originated this will assist in managing the authentication in a huge sized network broken down into many trees avoiding wormhole attacks in the network. Low power and lossy networks (LLNs) are rapidly emerging as an important part of ubiquitous computing, and serving as a major building block for the communication infrastructure in the presence of Internet-of-Things (IoT). Routing protocol for low power and lossy networks (RPL) is a novel routing protocol standardized to enable the integration of resources-constrained devices into the Internet. However, due to the shared radio medium, the lack of physical protection and security requirements of inherent routing protocol, low power and lossy networks are admittedly threatened by diverse Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks that primarily disrupt network protocols and interfere with on-going communications. In this paper, we propose a monitor-based approach, called CMD, to mitigate forwarding misbehaviors in LLNs running with RPL, where single or multiple malicious nodes randomly or strategically drop any incoming Data packet. The basic idea of the CMD is that each node monitors the forwarding behaviors of the preferred parent node to observe the packet loss rate, compares the observation result with the collected packet loss rate from one-hop neighbor nodes, and detects the forwarding misbehaviors of the preferred parent node. We evaluate the proposed scheme through extensive simulation experiments using OMNeT++ and compare its performance with the original RPL protocol and the existing two-step detection scheme. The simulation results show that the proposed scheme can not only improve the detection rate and packet delivery ratio (PDR) but also can reduce the energy consumption and isolation latency. In this work, we present the results of a study on the detrimental effects of sinkhole attacks on Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) which employ the Routing Protocol for LLNs (Low-power and Lossy Networks). A sinkhole is a compromised node which attempts to capture traffic with the intent to drop messages, thus degrading the end-to-end delivery performance, that is, reducing the number of messages successfully delivered to their destination. The mechanism by which the sinkhole captures traffic is by advertising an attractive route to its neighbors. We evaluate two countermeasures addressing the sinkhole problem: a parent fail-over and a rank authentication technique. We show via simulation that while each technique, applied alone, does not work all that well, the combination of the two techniques significantly improves the performance of a network under attack. We also demonstrate that, with the defenses described, increasing the density of the network can combat a penetration of sinkholes nodes, without needing to identify the sinkholes. RPL (IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low Power and Lossy networks) is a routing protocol recently standardized by the IETF. RPL has been designed to operate in energy-constrained networks with thousands of nodes, and therefore it is one of the most promising candidate routing protocols for Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) networks. In this paper a performance evaluation of RPL is presented. An extensive study of the protocol is carried out with particular focus on Trickle, the algorithm adopted to control routing update distribution across the network. The performance of the protocol is analyzed considering different Trickle parameters in order to capture their impact on route formation and node power consumption. Results highlight that the nondeterministic nature of Trickle can lead to sub-optimal route formation especially when high message suppression is per-formed. In order to mitigate this issue, an enhanced version of the protocol, namely Trickle-F, is proposed in order to guarantee fair broadcast suppression. Trickle-F is demonstrated to be effective in obtaining more efficient routes with the same power consumption of the original version. A number of multi-hop, wireless, network programming systems have emerged for sensor network retasking but none of these systems support a cryptographically-strong, public-key-based system for source authentication and integrity verification. The traditional technique for authenticating a program binary, namely a digital signature of the program hash, is poorly suited to resource-contrained sensor nodes. Our solution to the secure programming problem leverages authenticated streams, is consistent with the limited resources of a typical sensor node, and can be used to secure existing network programming systems. Under our scheme, a program binary consists of several code and data segments that are mapped to a series of messages for transmission over the network. An advertisement, consisting of the program name, version number, and a hash of the very first message, is digitally signed and transmitted first. The advertisement authenticates the first message, which in turn contains a hash of the second message. Similarly, the second message contains a hash of the third message, and so on, binding each message to the one logically preceding it in the series through the hash chain. We augmented the Deluge network programming system with our protocol and evaluated the resulting system performance. We describe LEAPp (Localized Encryption and Authentication Protocol), a key management protocol for sensor networks that is designed to support in-network processing, while at the same time restricting the security impact of a node compromise to the immediate network neighborhood of the compromised node. The design of the protocol is motivated by the observation that different types of messages exchanged between sensor nodes have different security requirements, and that a single keying mechanism is not suitable for meeting these different security requirements. LEAPp supports the establishment of four types of keys for each sensor node: an individual key shared with the base station, a pairwise key shared with another sensor node, a cluster key shared with multiple neighboring nodes, and a global key shared by all the nodes in the network. LEAPp also supports (weak) local source authentication without precluding in-network processing. Our performance analysis shows that LEAPp is very efficient in terms of computational, communication, and storage costs. We analyze the security of LEAPp under various attack models and show that LEAPp is very effective in defending against many sophisticated attacks, such as HELLO flood attacks, node cloning attacks, and wormhole attacks. A prototype implementation of LEAPp on a sensor network testbed is also described. In Sybil attacks, a physical adversary takes multiple fabricated or stolen identities to maliciously manipulate the network. These attacks are very harmful for Internet of Things (IoT) applications. In this paper we implemented and evaluated the performance of RPL (Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks) routing protocol under mobile sybil attacks, namely SybM, with respect to control overhead, packet delivery and energy consumption. In SybM attacks, Sybil nodes take the advantage of their mobility and the weakness of RPL to handle identity and mobility, to flood the network with fake control messages from different locations. To counter these type of attacks we propose a trust-based intrusion detection system based on RPL. As mobile ad hoc network applications are deployed, security emerges as a central requirement. In this paper, we introduce the wormhole attack, a severe attack in ad hoc networks that is particularly challenging to defend against. The wormhole attack is possible even if the attacker has not compromised any hosts, and even if all communication provides authenticity and confidentiality. In the wormhole attack, an attacker records packets (or bits) at one location in the network, tunnels them (possibly selectively) to another location, and retransmits them there into the network. The wormhole attack can form a serious threat in wireless networks, especially against many ad hoc network routing protocols and location-based wireless security systems. For example, most existing ad hoc network routing protocols, without some mechanism to defend against the wormhole attack, would be unable to find routes longer than one or two hops, severely disrupting communication. We present a general mechanism, called packet leashes, for detecting and, thus defending against wormhole attacks, and we present a specific protocol, called TIK, that implements leashes. We also discuss topology-based wormhole detection, and show that it is impossible for these approaches to detect some wormhole topologies. This paper describes a new protocol for authentication in ad-hoc networks. The protocol has been designed to meet specialized requirements of ad-hoc networks, such as lack of direct communication between nodes or requirements for revocable anonymity. At the same time, a ad-hoc authentication protocol must be resistant to spoofing, eavesdropping and playback, and man-in-the-middle attacks. The article analyzes existing authentication methods based on the Public Key Infrastructure, and finds that they have several drawbacks in ad-hoc networks. Therefore, a new authentication protocol, basing on established cryptographic primitives (Merkle's puzzles and zero-knowledge proofs) is proposed. The protocol is studied for a model ad-hoc chat application that provides private conversations. Sensor nodes that are deployed in hostile environments are vulnerable to capture and compromise. An adversary may obtain private information from these sensors, clone and intelligently deploy them in the network to launch a variety of insider attacks. This attack process is broadly termed as a clone attack. Currently, the defenses against clone attacks are not only very few, but also suffer from selective interruption of detection and high overhead (computation and memory). In this paper, we propose a new effective and efficient scheme, called SET, to detect such clone attacks. The key idea of SET is to detect clones by computing set operations (intersection and union) of exclusive subsets in the network. First, SET securely forms exclusive unit subsets among one-hop neighbors in the network in a distributed way. This secure subset formation also provides the authentication of nodes’ subset membership. SET then employs a tree structure to compute non-overlapped set operations and integrates interleaved authentication to prevent unauthorized falsification of subset information during forwarding. Randomization is used to further make the exclusive subset and tree formation unpredictable to an adversary. We show the reliability and resilience of SET by analyzing the probability that an adversary may effectively obstruct the set operations. Performance analysis and simulations also demonstrate that the proposed scheme is more efficient than existing schemes from both communication and memory cost standpoints. We consider a cellular Internet of things (CIoT) network where many source nodes aim at exchanging messages with a single concentrator node. To this end, they are assisted by anchor nodes that are trusted and securely connected with the concentrator node. In this context, we aim at providing a message authentication scheme based on the characteristics of the channel between the source nodes and the anchor nodes. According to this approach, the anchor nodes estimate the channel to source nodes in an initially externally authenticated fashion, while forthcoming messages are authenticated by comparing the current channel estimate with the initial estimate. Moreover, assuming that the anchor nodes have a limited energy availability, we derive suitable scheduling policies for the activation of the anchor nodes for authentication purposes. In particular, we aim at maximizing the anchors lifespan while guaranteeing given false alarm and missed detection probabilities of the authentication process. The performance of the proposed authentication protocols is evaluated in a typical CIoT scenario. The emergence of the Mobile Ad Hoc Networking (MANET) technology advocates self-organized wireless interconnection of communication devices that would either extend or operate in concert with the wired networking infrastructure or, possibly, evolve to autonomous networks. In either case, the proliferation of MANET-based applications depends on a multitude of factors, with trustworthiness being one of the primary challenges to be met. Despite the existence of well-known security mechanisms, additional vulnerabilities and features pertinent to this new networking paradigm might render such traditional solutions inapplicable. In particular, the absence of a central authorization facility in an open and distributed communication environment is a major challenge, especially due to the need for cooperative network operation. In particular, in MANET, any node may compromise the routing protocol functionality by disrupting the route discovery process. In this paper, we present a route discovery protocol that mitigates the detrimental effects of such malicious behavior, as to provide correct connectivity information. Our protocol guarantees that fabricated, compromised, or replayed route replies would either be rejected or never reach back the querying node. Furthermore, the protocol responsiveness is safeguarded under different types of attacks that exploit the routing protocol itself. The sole requirement of the proposed scheme is the existence of a security association between the node initiating the query and the sought destination. Specifically, no assumption is made regarding the intermediate nodes, which may exhibit arbitrary and malicious behavior. The scheme is robust in the presence of a number of non-colluding nodes, and provides accurate routing information in a timely manner. Sensor networks include nodes with limited computation and communication capabilities. One of the basic functions of sensor networks is to sense and transmit data to the end users. The resource constraints and security issues pose a challenge to information aggregation in large sensor networks. Bootstrapping keys is another challenge because public key cryptosystems are unsuitable for use in resource-constrained sensor networks. In this paper, we propose a solution by dividing the problem in two domains. First, we present a protocol for establishing cluster keys in sensor networks using verifiable secret sharing. We chose elliptic curve cryptosystems for security because of their smaller key size, faster computations and reductions in processing power. Second, we develop a secure data aggregation and verification (SecureDAV) protocol that ensures that the base station never accepts faulty aggregate readings. An integrity check of the readings is done using Merkle hash trees, avoiding over-reliance on the cluster-heads. Privacy protection is increasingly important during authentications in Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) systems. In order to achieve high-speed authentication in large-scale RFID systems, researchers propose tree-based approaches, in which any pair of tags share a number of key components. Such designs, being efficient, often fail to achieve forward secrecy and resistance to attacks, such as compromising and desynchronization. Indeed, these attacks may still take effect even after a tag successfully finishes the authentication and key-updating procedure. To address the issue, we propose a lightweight RFID private authentication protocol, RWP, based on the random walk concept. RWP also provides the forward security and temporal resistance to the tracking attack. The analysis results show that RWP effectively enhances the security protection for RFID private authentication, and increases the authentication efficiency from O(logN) to O(1). We study the problem of secure communication in a multi-channel, single-hop radio network with a malicious adversary that can cause collisions and spoof messages. We assume no pre-shared secrets or trusted-third-party infrastructure. The main contribution of this paper is f-AME: a randomized (f)ast-(A)uthenticated (M)essage (E)xchange protocol that enables nodes to exchange messages in a reliable and authenticated manner. It runs in O(|E|t2 log n) time and has optimal resilience to disruption, where E is the set of pairs of nodes that need to swap messages, n is the total number of nodes, C the number of channels, and t Sensor networks are often deployed in unattended environments, thus leaving these networks vulnerable to false data injection attacks in which an adversary injects false data into the network with the goal of deceiving the base station or depleting the resources of the relaying nodes. Standard authentication mechanisms cannot prevent this attack if the adversary has compromised one or a small number of sensor nodes. In this paper, we present an interleaved hop-by-hop authentication scheme that guarantees that the base station will detect any injected false data packets when no more than a certain number t nodes are compromised. Further, our scheme provides an upper bound B for the number of hops that a false data packet could be forwarded before it is detected and dropped, given that there are up to t colluding compromised nodes. We show that in the worst case B is O(t sup 2 ). Through performance analysis, we show that our scheme is efficient with respect to the security it provides, and it also allows a tradeoff between security and performance. We propose localized, self organizing, robust, and energy-efficient data aggregation tree approaches for sensor networks, which we call Localized Power-Efficient Data Aggregation Protocols (L-PEDAPs). They are based on topologies, such as LMST and RNG, that can approximate minimum spanning tree and can be efficiently computed using only position or distance information of one-hop neighbors. The actual routing tree is constructed over these topologies. We also consider different parent selection strategies while constructing a routing tree. We compare each topology and parent selection strategy and conclude that the best among them is the shortest path strategy over LMST structure. Our solution also involves route maintenance procedures that will be executed when a sensor node fails or a new node is added to the network. The proposed solution is also adapted to consider the remaining power levels of nodes in order to increase the network lifetime. Our simulation results show that by using our power-aware localized approach, we can almost have the same performance of a centralized solution in terms of network lifetime, and close to 90 percent of an upper bound derived here. In their seminal work on authentication, Wegman and Carter propose that to authenticate multiple messages, it is sufficient to reuse the same hash function as long as each tag is encrypted with a one-time pad. They argue that because the one-time pad is perfectly hiding, the hash function used remains completely unknown to the adversary. Since their proof is not composable, we revisit it using a composable security framework. It turns out that the above argument is insufficient: if the adversary learns whether a corrupted message was accepted or rejected, information about the hash function is leaked, and after a bounded finite amount of rounds it is completely known. We show however that this leak is very small: Wegman and Carter's protocol is still ( ) -secure, if ( ) -almost strongly universal (_2 ) hash functions are used. This implies that the secret key corresponding to the choice of hash function can be reused in the next round of authentication without any additional error than this ( ) . We also show that if the players have a mild form of synchronization, namely that the receiver knows when a message should be received, the key can be recycled for any arbitrary task, not only new rounds of authentication. Authentication is one of the foremost goals of many security protocols. It is most often formalised as a form of agreement, which expresses that the communicating partners agree on the values of a number of variables. In this paper we formalise and study an intensional form of authentication which we call synchronisation. Synchronisation expresses that the messages are transmitted exactly as prescribed by the protocol description. Synchronisation is a strictly stronger property than agreement for the standard intruder model, because it can be used to detect preplay attacks. In order to prevent replay attacks on simple protocols, we also define injective synchronisation. Given a synchronising protocol, we show that a sufficient syntactic criterion exists that guarantees that the protocol is injective as well. This document describes the Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) protocol for mobile ad hoc networks. The protocol is an optimization of the classical link state algorithm tailored to the requirements of a mobile wireless LAN. The key concept used in the protocol is that of multipoint relays (MPRs). MPRs are selected nodes which forward broadcast messages during the flooding process. This technique substantially reduces the message overhead as compared to a classical flooding mechanism, where every node retransmits each message when it receives the first copy of the message. In OLSR, link state information is generated only by nodes elected as MPRs. Thus, a second optimization is achieved by minimizing the number of control messages flooded in the network. As a third optimization, an MPR node may chose to report only links between itself and its MPR selectors. Hence, as contrary to the classic link state algorithm, partial link state information is distributed in the network. This information is then used for route calculation. OLSR provides optimal routes (in terms of number of hops). The protocol is particularly suitable for large and dense networks as the technique of MPRs works well in this context.