Like any other logical theory, domain descriptions in reasoning about actions may evolve, and thus need revision methods to adequately accommodate new information about the behavior of actions. The present work is about changing action domain descriptions in propositional dynamic logic. Its contribution is threefold: first we revisit the semantics of action theory contraction that has been done in previous work, giving more robust operators that express minimal change based on a notion of distance between Kripke-models. Second we give algorithms for syntactical action theory contraction and establish their correctness w.r.t. our semantics. Finally we state postulates for action theory contraction and assess the behavior of our operators w.r.t. them. Moreover, we also address the revision counterpart of action theory change, showing that it benefits from our semantics for contraction.
Liberatore @cite_37 proposes a framework for reasoning about actions in which it is possible to express a given semantics of belief update, like Winslett's @cite_42 and Katsuno and Mendelzon's @cite_1 . This means it is the formalism, essentially an action description language, that is used to describe updates (the change of propositions from one state of the world to another) by expressing them as laws in the action theory. The main difference between Liberatore's work and Li and Pereira's is that, despite not being concerned, at least a priori, with changing action laws, Liberatore's framework allows for abductively introducing in the action theory new effect propositions (effect laws, in our terms) that consistently explain the occurrence of an event.
@cite_37 @cite_42 @cite_1
1574702170 175258934 1594099509
The Katsuno and Mendelzon theory of belief update has been proposed as a reasonable model for revising beliefs about a changing world. However, the semantics of update relies on information which is not readily available. We describe an alternative semantical view of update in which observations are incorporated into a belief set by: a) explaining the observation in terms of a set of plausible events that might have caused that observation; and b) predicting further consequences of those explanations. We also allow the possibility of conditional explanations. We show that this picture naturally induces an update operator under certain assumptions. However, we argue that these assumptions are not always reasonable, and they restrict our ability to integrate update with other forms of revision when reasoning about action. When a planning task cannot be solved then it can often be made solvable by modifying it a bit: one may change either the set of actions, or the initial state, or the goal description. We show that modification of actions can be reduced to initial state modification. We then apply Katsuno and Mendelzon's distinction between update and revision and show that the modification of the initial state is an update and the modification of the goal description is a revision. We consider variants of Forbus's update and Dalal's revision operation and argue that existing belief change operations do not apply as they stand because their inputs are boolean formulas, while plan task modification involves counterfactual statements. We show that they can be captured in Dynamic Logic of Propositional Assignments DL-PA. How can an intelligent agent update her knowledge base about an action domain, relative to some conditions (possibly obtained from earlier observations)? We study this question in a formal framework for reasoning about actions and change, in which the meaning of an action domain description can be represented by a directed graph whose nodes correspond to states and whose edges correspond to action occurrences. We define the update of an action domain description in this framework, and show among other results that a solution to this problem can be obtained by a divide-and-conquer approach in some cases. We also introduce methods to compute a solution and an approximate solution to this problem, and analyze the computational complexity of these problems. Finally, we discuss techniques to improve the quality of solutions. In this paper we show how several different semantics for belief update can be expressed in a framework for reasoning about actions. This framework can therefore be considered as a common core of all these update formalisms, thus making it clear what they have in common. This framework also allows expressing scenarios that are problematic for the classical formalization of belief update. Abstract Belief revision and belief update are two different forms of belief change, and they serve different purposes. In this paper we focus on belief update, the formalization of change in beliefs due to changes in the world. The complexity of the basic update (introduced by Winslett, 1990) has been determined by Eiter and Gottlob (1992). Since then, many other formalizations have been proposed to overcome the limitations and drawbacks of Winslett's update. In this paper we analyze the complexity of the proposals presented in the literature: the standard semantics by Winslett (1986), the minimal change with exception and the minimal change with maximal disjunctive information by Zhang and Foo (1996), the update with disjunctive function by Herzig (1996), the abduction-based update and the generalized update by Boutilier (1996). We relate some of these approaches to belief update to previous work on closed world reasoning. This paper describes a change theory based on abductive reasoning. We take the AGM postulates for revisions, expansions and contractions, and Katsuno and Mendelzon postulates for updates and incorporate abduction into them. A key feature of the theory is that presents a unified view of standard change operators and abductive change operators rather than a new and independent change theory for abductive changes. Abductive operators reduce to standard change operators in the limiting cases. This paper presents a general, consistency-based framework for expressing belief change. The framework has good formal properties while being well-suited for implementation. For belief revision, informally, in revising a knowledge base K by a sentence α, we begin with α and include as much of K as consistently possible. This is done by expressing K and α in disjoint languages, asserting that the languages agree on the truth values of corresponding atoms wherever consistently possible, and then re-expressing the result in the original language of K. There may be more than one way in which the languages of K and α can be so correlated: in choice revision, one such "extension" represents the revised state; alternately (skeptical) revision consists of the intersection of all such extensions. Contraction is similarly defined although, interestingly, it is not interdefinable with revision.The framework is general and flexible. For example, one could go on and express other belief change operations such as update and erasure, and the merging of knowledge bases. Further, the framework allows the incorporation of static and dynamic integrity constraints. The approach is well-suited for implementation: belief change can be equivalently expressed in terms of a finite knowledge base; and the scope of a belief change operation can be restricted to just those propositions common to the knowledge base and sentence for change. We give a high-level algorithm implementing the procedure, and an expression of the approach in Default Logic. Lastly, we briefly discuss two implementations of the approach. In this work we address the problem of elaborating domain descriptions (alias action theories), in particular those that are expressed in dynamic logic. We define a general method based on contraction of formulas in a version of propositional dynamic logic with a solution to the frame problem. We present the semantics of our theory change and define syntactical operators for contracting a domain description. We establish soundness and completeness of the operators w.r.t. the semantics for descriptions that satisfy a principle of modularity that we have defined in previous work. We study resolving conflicts between an action description and a set of conditions (possibly obtained from observations), in the context of action languages. In this formal framework, the meaning of an action description can be represented by a transition diagram---a directed graph whose nodes correspond to states and whose edges correspond to transitions describing action occurrences. This allows us to characterize conflicts by means of states and transitions of the given action description that violate some given conditions. We introduce a basic method to resolve such conflicts by modifying the action description, and discuss how the user can be supported in obtaining more preferred solutions. For that, we identify helpful questions the user may ask (e.g., which specific parts of the action description cause a conflict with some given condition), and we provide answers to them using properties of action descriptions and transition diagrams. Finally, we discuss the computational complexity of these questions in terms of related decision problems. Abstract This paper proposes a new logic programming language called GOLOG whose interpreter automatically maintains an explicit representation of the dynamic world being modeled, on the basis of user supplied axioms about the preconditions and effects of actions and the initial state of the world. This allows programs to reason about the state of the world and consider the effects of various possible courses of action before committing to a particular behavior. The net effect is that programs may be written at a much higher level of abstraction than is usually possible. The language appears well suited for applications in high level control of robots and industrial processes, intelligent software agents, discrete event simulation, etc. It is based on a formal theory of action specified in an extended version of the situation calculus. A prototype implementation in Prolog has been developed. Katsuno and Mendelzon divide theory change, the problem of adding new information to a logical theory, into two types: revision and update. We propose a third type of theory change: arbitration. The key idea is the following: the new information is considered neither better nor worse than the old information represented by the logical theory. The new information is simply one voice against a set of others already incorporated into the logical theory. From this follows that arbitration should be commutative. First we define arbitration by a set of postulates and then describe a model-theoretic characterization of arbitration for the case of propositional logical theories. We also study weighted arbitration where different models of a theory can have different weights. According to the paradigm of Cognitive Robotics (Reiter, 2001a), intelligent, autonomous agents interacting with an incompletely known world need to reason logically about the effects of their actions and sensor information they acquire over time. In realistic settings, both the effect of actions and sensor data are subject to errors. A cognitive agent can cope with these uncertainties by maintaining probabilistic beliefs about the state of world. In this paper, we show a formalism to represent probabilistic beliefs about states of the world and how these beliefs change in the course of actions. Additionally, we propose an extension to a logic programming framework, the agent programming language FLUX, to actually infer this probabilistic knowledge for agents. Using associated Bayesian networks allows the agents to maintain a single and compact probabilistic knowledge state throughout the execution of an action sequence. We present the language m P cal C + for probabilistic reasoning about actions, which is a generalization of the action language cal C + that allows to deal with probabilistic as well as nondeterministic effects of actions. We define a formal semantics of m P cal C + in terms of probabilistic transitions between sets of states. Using a concept of a history and its belief state, we then show how several important problems in reasoning about actions can be concisely formulated in our formalism. John McCarthy's situation calculus has left an enduring mark on artificial intelligence research. This simple yet elegant formalism for modelling and reasoning about dynamic systems is still in common use more than forty years since it was first proposed. The ability to reason about action and change has long been considered a necessary component for any intelligent system. The situation calculus and its numerous extensions as well as the many competing proposals that it has inspired deal with this problem to some extent. In this paper, we offer a new approach to belief change associated with performing actions that addresses some of the shortcomings of these approaches. In particular, our approach is based on a well-developed theory of action in the situation calculus extended to deal with belief. Moreover, by augmenting this approach with a notion of plausibility over situations, our account handles nested belief, belief introspection, mistaken belief, and handles belief revision and belief update together with iterated belief change. Knowledge about how the world changes over time is a vital component of commonsense knowledge for Artificial Intelligence (AI) and natural language understanding. Actions and events are fundamental components to any knowledge about changes in the state of the world: the states before and after an event differ in regular and predictable ways. We describe a novel system that tackles the problem of extracting knowledge from text about how actions and events change the world over time. We leverage standard language-processing tools, like semantic role labelers and coreference resolvers, as well as large-corpus statistics like pointwise mutual information, to identify STRIPS representations of actions and events, a type of representation commonly used in AI planning systems. In experiments on Web text, our extractor’s Area under the Curve (AUC) improves by more than 31 over the closest system from the literature for identifying the preconditions and add effects of actions. In addition, we also extract significant aspects of STRIPS representations that are missing from previous work, including delete effects and arguments. This paper shows how action theories, expressed in an extended version of the language , can be naturally encoded using Prioritized Default Theory. We also show how prioritized default theory can be extended to express preferences between rules. This extension provides a natural framework to introduce different types of preferences in action theories—preferences between actions and preferences between final states. In particular, we demonstrate how these preferences can be expressed within extended prioritized default theory. We also discuss how this framework can be implemented in terms of answer set programming. We extend the 0-approximation of sensing actions and incomplete information in Son and Baral (2001) to action theories with static causal laws and prove its soundness with respect to the possible world semantics. We also show that the conditional planning problem with respect to this approximation is NP-complete. We then present an answer set programming based conditional planner, called ASCP, that is capable of generating both conformant plans and conditional plans in the presence of sensing actions, incomplete information about the initial state, and static causal laws. We prove the correctness of our implementation and argue that our planner is sound and complete with respect to the proposed approximation. Finally, we present experimental results comparing ASCP to other planners. This paper proposes a method of nonmonotonic theory change. We first introduce a new form of abduction that can account for observations in nonmonotonic situation. Then we provide a framework of autoepistemic update, which describes nonmonotonic theory change through the extended abductive framework. The proposed update semantics is fairly general and provides a unified framework for various update semantics such as first-order update, view update of databases, and contradiction removal of nonmonotonic theories. In this paper, we present an approach for robustly grasping objects under positional uncertainty. We maintain a belief state (a probability distribution over world states), model the problem as a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP), and select actions with a receding horizon using forward search through the belief space. Our actions are world-relative trajectories, or fixed trajectories expressed relative to the most-likely state of the world. We localize the object, ensure its reachability, and robustly grasp it at a goal position by using information-gathering, reorientation, and goal actions. We choose among candidate actions in a tractable way online by computing and storing the observation models needed for belief update offline. This framework is used to successfully grasp objects (including a powerdrill and a Brita pitcher) despite significant uncertainty, both in simulation and with an actual robot arm. AI planning requires the definition of action models using a formal action and plan description language, such as the standard Planning Domain Definition Language (PDDL), as input. However, building action models from scratch is a difficult and time-consuming task, even for experts. In this paper, we develop an algorithm called ARMS (action-relation modelling system) for automatically discovering action models from a set of successful observed plans. Unlike the previous work in action-model learning, we do not assume complete knowledge of states in the middle of observed plans. In fact, our approach works when no or partial intermediate states are given. These example plans are obtained by an observation agent who does not know the logical encoding of the actions and the full state information between the actions. In a real world application, the cost is prohibitively high in labelling the training examples by manually annotating every state in a plan example from snapshots of an environment. To learn action models, ARMS gathers knowledge on the statistical distribution of frequent sets of actions in the example plans. It then builds a weighted propositional satisfiability (weighted MAX-SAT) problem and solves it using a MAX-SAT solver. We lay the theoretical foundations of the learning problem and evaluate the effectiveness of ARMS empirically.