This paper presents a new method and a constraint-based objective function to solve two problemsrelated to the design of optical telecommunication networks, namely the Synchronous Optical Net-work Ring Assignment Problem (SRAP) and the Intra-ring Synchronous Optical Network DesignProblem (IDP). These network topology problems can be represented as a graph partitioning withcapacity constraints as shown in previous works. We present here a new objective function and anew local search algorithm to solve these problems. Experiments conducted in C
Previously, we saw that with local search it is necessary to define a neighborhood to choose the next solution. The authors of @cite_5 use the same for all of their metaheuristics. It tries to assign an item @math from a partition, @math , to another partition, @math . The authors also consider the neighborhood obtained by swapping two items, @math and @math , from two different partitions, @math and @math . But instead of trying all the pairs of items, it will only try to swap the two items if the resulting solution of the assignment of @math to the partition @math is unfeasible.
@cite_5
1969385974
In this paper we study the problem of allocating divisible items to agents without payments. We assume no prior knowledge about the agents. The utility of an agent is additive. The social welfare of a mechanism is defined as the overall utility of all agents. This model is first defined by Guo and Conitzer [7]. Here we are interested in strategy-proof mechanisms that have a good competitive ratio, that is, those that are able to achieve social welfare close to the maximal social welfare in all cases. First, for the setting of n agents and m items, we prove that there is no (1 m+e)-competitive strategy-proof mechanism, for any e>0. And, no mechanism can achieve a competitive ratio better than @math , when @math . Next we study the setting of two agents and m items, which is also the focus of [7]. We prove that the competitive ratio of any swap-dictatorial mechanism is no greater than @math . Then we give a characterization result: for the case of 2 items, if the mechanism is strategy-proof, symmetric and second order continuously differentiable, then it is always swap-dictatorial. In the end we consider a setting where an agent's valuation of each item is bounded by C m, where C is an arbitrary constant. We show a mechanism that is (1 2+e(C))-competitive, where e(C)>0.