In this study, we formulate positive and negative externalities caused by changes in the supply of shared vehicles as ride sharing games. The study aims to understand the price of anarchy (PoA) and its improvement via a coordination technique in ride sharing games. A critical question is whether ride sharing games exhibit a pure Nash equilibrium (pNE) since the PoA bound assumes it. Our result shows a sufficient condition for a ride sharing game to have a finite improvement property and a pNE similar to potential games. This is the first step to analyze PoA bound and its improvement by coordination in ride sharing games. We also show an example of coordinating players in ride sharing games using signaling and evaluate the improvement in the PoA.
According to a review of sharing studies in transportation areas @cite_14 , there are few game theory studies on externalities and coordination of players' moves in vehicle sharing problems. Traditional studies on sharing include the optimization of vehicle routes for picking up all passengers (the Dial-a-ride problem ), problems of splitting passengers' fares according to their riding distances, optimization of locations of carpool stations, and problems of relocation of carpool vehicles among stations. Those studies mainly focus on optimization problems under given moves (origins and destinations) of passengers and fixed drivers of vehicles, and therefore, do not analyze the PoA when passengers strategically choose their moves in response to the moves of other passengers and vehicles. The review states that there are no studies on coordination of players' moves to improve the efficiency of sharing or reduce the PoA.
@cite_14
2031128290
Ride-sharing services are transforming urban mobility by providing timely and convenient transportation to anybody, anywhere, and anytime. These services present enormous potential for positive societ al impacts with respect to pollution, energy consumption, congestion, etc. Current mathematical models, however, do not fully address the potential of ride-sharing. Recently, a large-scale study highlighted some of the benefits of car pooling but was limited to static routes with two riders per vehicle (optimally) or three (with heuristics). We present a more general mathematical model for real-time high-capacity ride-sharing that ( i ) scales to large numbers of passengers and trips and ( ii ) dynamically generates optimal routes with respect to online demand and vehicle locations. The algorithm starts from a greedy assignment and improves it through a constrained optimization, quickly returning solutions of good quality and converging to the optimal assignment over time. We quantify experimentally the tradeoff between fleet size, capacity, waiting time, travel delay, and operational costs for low- to medium-capacity vehicles, such as taxis and van shuttles. The algorithm is validated with 3 million rides extracted from the New York City taxicab public dataset. Our experimental study considers ride-sharing with rider capacity of up to 10 simultaneous passengers per vehicle. The algorithm applies to fleets of autonomous vehicles and also incorporates rebalancing of idling vehicles to areas of high demand. This framework is general and can be used for many real-time multivehicle, multitask assignment problems.