Quantum information processing is at the crossroads of physics, mathematics and computer science. It is concerned with what we can and cannot do with quantum information that goes beyond the abilities of classical information processing devices. Communication complexity is an area of classical computer science that aims at quantifying the amount of communication necessary to solve distributed computational problems. Quantum communication complexity uses quantum mechanics to reduce the amount of communication that would be classically required.
There are other pseudo-telepathy games that are related to the magic square game. Ad 'an Cabello's game @cite_31 @cite_26 does not resembles the magic square game on first approach. However, closer analysis reveals that the two games are totally equivalent!
@cite_31 @cite_26
2143828652 2105652832
In this paper, we examine the use of Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS) for a variant of one of the most popular and profitable games in the world: the card game Magic: The Gathering (M:TG). The game tree for M:TG has a range of distinctive features, which we discuss here; it has incomplete information through the opponent's hidden cards and randomness through card drawing from a shuffled deck. We investigate a wide range of approaches that use determinization, where all hidden and random information is assumed known to all players, alongside MCTS. We consider a number of variations to the rollout strategy using a range of levels of sophistication and expert knowledge, and decaying reward to encourage play urgency. We examine the effect of utilizing various pruning strategies in order to increase the information gained from each determinization, alongside methods that increase the relevance of random choices. Additionally, we deconstruct the move generation procedure into a binary yes no decision tree and apply MCTS to this finer grained decision process. We compare our modifications to a basic MCTS approach for M:TG using fixed decks, and show that significant improvements in playing strength can be obtained. Part I of this paper has described a new theory for the analysis of games with incomplete information. It has been shown that, if the various players' subjective probability distributions satisfy a certain mutual-consistency requirement, then any given game with incomplete information will be equivalent to a certain game with complete information, called the Bayes-equivalent of the original game, or briefly a Bayesian game. Part II of the paper will now show that any Nash equilibrium point of this Bayesian game yields a Bayesian equilibrium point for the original game and conversely. This result will then be illustrated by numerical examples, representing two-person zero-sum games with incomplete information. We shall also show how our theory enables us to analyze the problem of exploiting the opponent's erroneous beliefs. However, apart from its indubitable usefulness in locating Bayesian equilibrium points, we shall show it on a numerical example the Bayes-equivalent of a two-person cooperative game that the normal form of a Bayesian game is in many cases a highly unsatisfactory representation of the game situation and has to be replaced by other representations e.g., by the semi-normal form. We shall argue that this rather unexpected result is due to the fact that Bayesian games must be interpreted as games with delayed commitment whereas the normal-form representation always envisages a game with immediate commitment.