We consider crowdsourcing problems where the users are asked to provide evaluations for items; the user evaluations are then used directly, or aggregated into a consensus value. Lacking an incentive scheme, users have no motive in making effort in completing the evaluations, providing inaccurate answers instead. We propose incentive schemes that are truthful and cheap: truthful as the optimal user behavior consists in providing accurate evaluations, and cheap because the truthfulness is achieved with little overhead cost. We consider both discrete evaluation tasks, where an evaluation can be done either correctly, or incorrectly, with no degrees of approximation in between, and quantitative evaluation tasks, where evaluations are real numbers, and the error is measured as distance from the correct value. For both types of tasks, we propose hierarchical incentive schemes that can be effected with a small amount of additional evaluations, and that scale to arbitrarily large crowd sizes: they have the property that the strength of the incentive does not weaken with increasing hierarchy depth. Interestingly, we show that for these schemes to work, the only requisite is that workers know their place in the hierarchy in advance.
The Bayesian Truth Serum scoring method proposed in @cite_15 elicits truthful subjective answers on multiple choice questions. The author shows that the truthful reporting is a Nash equilibrium with the highest payoff. The model is different from other approaches in that besides the answers, workers need to provide predictions on the final distribution of answers. Workers receive a high score if their answer is surprisingly'' common - the actual percentage of their answer is larger than the predicted fraction. Similarly, incentive mechanisms in @cite_28 @cite_1 @cite_7 @cite_17 @cite_6 require workers provide belief reports along with answers on tasks. Truthful mechanisms in @cite_34 @cite_19 @cite_23 requires knowledge about the distribution from which answers are drawn. Our mechanisms do not rely on worker's beliefs on other workers' responses nor require knowledge about the global answer distribution.
@cite_7 @cite_28 @cite_1 @cite_6 @cite_19 @cite_23 @cite_15 @cite_34 @cite_17
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Crowdsourcing is widely proposed as a method to solve a large variety of judgment tasks, such as classifying website content, peer grading in online courses, or collecting real-world data. As the data reported by workers cannot be verified, there is a tendency to report random data without actually solving the task. This can be countered by making the reward for an answer depend on its consistency with answers given by other workers, an approach called peer consistency. However, it is obvious that the best strategy in such schemes is for all workers to report the same answer without solving the task. Dasgupta and Ghosh [2013] show that, in some cases, exerting high effort can be encouraged in the highest-paying equilibrium. In this article, we present a general mechanism that implements this idea and is applicable to most crowdsourcing settings. Furthermore, we experimentally test the novel mechanism, and validate its theoretical properties. Crowdsourcing platforms enable to propose simple human intelligence tasks to a large number of participants who realise these tasks. The workers often receive a small amount of money or the platforms include some other incentive mechanisms, for example they can increase the workers reputation score, if they complete the tasks correctly. We address the problem of identifying experts among participants, that is, workers, who tend to answer the questions correctly. Knowing who are the reliable workers could improve the quality of knowledge one can extract from responses. As opposed to other works in the literature, we assume that participants can give partial or incomplete responses, in case they are not sure that their answers are correct. We model such partial or incomplete responses with the help of belief functions, and we derive a measure that characterizes the expertise level of each participant. This measure is based on precise and exactitude degrees that represent two parts of the expertise level. The precision degree reflects the reliability level of the participants and the exactitude degree reflects the knowledge level of the participants. We also analyze our model through simulation and demonstrate that our richer model can lead to more reliable identification of experts. Prediction markets are economic mechanisms for aggregating information about future events through sequential interactions with traders. The pricing mechanisms in these markets are known to be related to optimization algorithms in machine learning and through these connections we have some understanding of how equilibrium market prices relate to the beliefs of the traders in a market. However, little is known about rates and guarantees for the convergence of these sequential mechanisms, and two recent papers cite this as an important open question. In this paper we show how some previously studied prediction market trading models can be understood as a natural generalization of randomized coordinate descent which we call randomized subspace descent (RSD). We establish convergence rates for RSD and leverage them to prove rates for the two prediction market models above, answering the open questions. Our results extend beyond standard centralized markets to arbitrary trade networks. We present the results of a survey that collected information about the demographics of participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk, together with information about their level of activity and motivation for working on Amazon Mechanical Turk. We find that approximately 50 of the workers come from the United States and 40 come from India. Country of origin tends to change the motivating reasons for workers to participate in the marketplace. Significantly more workers from India participate on Mechanical Turk because the online marketplace is a primary source of income, while in the US most workers consider Mechanical Turk a secondary source of income. While money is a primary motivating reason for workers to participate in the marketplace, workers also cite a variety of other motivating reasons, including entertainment and education. Subjective judgments, an essential information source for science and policy, are problematic because there are no public criteria for assessing judgmental truthfulness. I present a scoring method for eliciting truthful subjective data in situations where objective truth is unknowable. The method assigns high scores not to the most common answers but to the answers that are more common than collectively predicted, with predictions drawn from the same population. This simple adjustment in the scoring criterion removes all bias in favor of consensus: Truthful answers maximize expected score even for respondents who believe that their answer represents a minority view. Question answering (QA) helps one go beyond traditional keywords-based querying and retrieve information in more precise form than given by a document or a list of documents. Several community-based QA (CQA) services have emerged allowing information seekers pose their information need as questions and receive answers from their fellow users. A question may receive multiple answers from multiple users and the asker or the community can choose the best answer. While the asker can thus indicate if he was satisfied with the information he received, there is no clear way of evaluating the quality of that information. We present a study to evaluate and predict the quality of an answer in a CQA setting. We chose Yahoo! Answers as such CQA service and selected a small set of questions, each with at least five answers. We asked Amazon Mechanical Turk workers to rate the quality of each answer for a given question based on 13 different criteria. Each answer was rated by five different workers. We then matched their assessments with the actual asker's rating of a given answer. We show that the quality criteria we used faithfully match with asker's perception of a quality answer. We furthered our investigation by extracting various features from questions, answers, and the users who posted them, and training a number of classifiers to select the best answer using those features. We demonstrate a high predictability of our trained models along with the relative merits of each of the features for such prediction. These models support our argument that in case of CQA, contextual information such as a user's profile, can be critical in evaluating and predicting content quality. In a document network such as a citation network of scientific documents, web-logs, etc., the content produced by authors exhibits their interest in certain topics. In addition some authors influence other authors' interests. In this work, we propose to model the influence of cited authors along with the interests of citing authors. Moreover, we hypothesize that apart from the citations present in documents, the context surrounding the citation mention provides extra topical information about the cited authors. However, associating terms in the context to the cited authors remains an open problem. We propose novel document generation schemes that incorporate the context while simultaneously modeling the interests of citing authors and influence of the cited authors. Our experiments show significant improvements over baseline models for various evaluation criteria such as link prediction between document and cited author, and quantitatively explaining unseen text. We study crowdsourcing quality management, that is, given worker responses to a set of tasks, our goal is to jointly estimate the true answers for the tasks, as well as the quality of the workers. Prior work on this problem relies primarily on applying Expectation-Maximization (EM) on the underlying maximum likelihood problem to estimate true answers as well as worker quality. Unfortunately, EM only provides a locally optimal solution rather than a globally optimal one. Other solutions to the problem (that do not leverage EM) fail to provide global optimality guarantees as well. In this paper, we focus on filtering, where tasks require the evaluation of a yes no predicate, and rating, where tasks elicit integer scores from a finite domain. We design algorithms for finding the global optimal estimates of correct task answers and worker quality for the underlying maximum likelihood problem, and characterize the complexity of these algorithms. Our algorithms conceptually consider all mappings from tasks to true answers (typically a very large number), leveraging two key ideas to reduce, by several orders of magnitude, the number of mappings under consideration, while preserving optimality. We also demonstrate that these algorithms often find more accurate estimates than EM-based algorithms. This paper makes an important contribution towards understanding the inherent complexity of globally optimal crowdsourcing quality management. Crowdsourcing systems, in which numerous tasks are electronically distributed to numerous information pieceworkers, have emerged as an effective paradigm for human-powered solving of large-scale problems in domains such as image classification, data entry, optical character recognition, recommendation, and proofreading. Because these low-paid workers can be unreliable, nearly all such systems must devise schemes to increase confidence in their answers, typically by assigning each task multiple times and combining the answers in an appropriate manner, e.g., majority voting. In this paper, we consider a general model of such crowdsourcing tasks and pose the problem of minimizing the total price i.e., number of task assignments that must be paid to achieve a target overall reliability. We give a new algorithm for deciding which tasks to assign to which workers and for inferring correct answers from the workers' answers. We show that our algorithm, inspired by belief propagation and low-rank matrix approximation, significantly outperforms majority voting and, in fact, is optimal through comparison to an oracle that knows the reliability of every worker. Further, we compare our approach with a more general class of algorithms that can dynamically assign tasks. By adaptively deciding which questions to ask to the next set of arriving workers, one might hope to reduce uncertainty more efficiently. We show that, perhaps surprisingly, the minimum price necessary to achieve a target reliability scales in the same manner under both adaptive and nonadaptive scenarios. Hence, our nonadaptive approach is order optimal under both scenarios. This strongly relies on the fact that workers are fleeting