Facebook pages offer an easy way to reach out to a very large audience as they can easily be promoted using Facebook's advertising platform. Recently, the number of likes of a Facebook page has become a measure of its popularity and profitability, and an underground market of services boosting page likes, aka like farms, has emerged. Some reports have suggested that like farms use a network of profiles that also like other pages to elude fraud protection algorithms, however, to the best of our knowledge, there has been no systematic analysis of Facebook pages' promotion methods. This paper presents a comparative measurement study of page likes garnered via Facebook ads and by a few like farms. We deploy a set of honeypot pages, promote them using both methods, and analyze garnered likes based on likers' demographic, temporal, and social characteristics. We highlight a few interesting findings, including that some farms seem to be operated by bots and do not really try to hide the nature of their operations, while others follow a stealthier approach, mimicking regular users' behavior.
Stringhini al @cite_0 and Lee al @cite_9 created honeypot profiles in Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter to detect spammers. Their work differs from ours in that (1) their honeypot profiles were designed to look legitimate, while our honeypot pages explicitly indicated they were not real'' (to deflect real profiles), and (2) our honeypot pages actively attracted fake profiles by means of paid campaigns, as opposed to passive honeypot profiles. Also, Thomas al @cite_10 analyzed trafficking of fake accounts in Twitter. They bought fake profiles from 27 merchants and developed a classifier to detect these fake accounts. In a similar study, Stringhini al @cite_5 analyzed the market of Twitter followers , which, akin to Facebook like farms, provide Twitter followers for sale. Note that Twitter follower markets differ from Facebook like farms as Twitter entails a follower-followee relationship among users, while Facebook friendships imply a bidirectional relationships. Also, there is no equivalent of liking a Facebook page in the Twitter ecosystem.
@cite_0 @cite_5 @cite_9 @cite_10
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Facebook pages offer an easy way to reach out to a very large audience as they can easily be promoted using Facebook's advertising platform. Recently, the number of likes of a Facebook page has become a measure of its popularity and profitability, and an underground market of services boosting page likes, aka like farms, has emerged. Some reports have suggested that like farms use a network of profiles that also like other pages to elude fraud protection algorithms, however, to the best of our knowledge, there has been no systematic analysis of Facebook pages' promotion methods. This paper presents a comparative measurement study of page likes garnered via Facebook ads and by a few like farms. We deploy a set of honeypot pages, promote them using both methods, and analyze garnered likes based on likers' demographic, temporal, and social characteristics. We highlight a few interesting findings, including that some farms seem to be operated by bots and do not really try to hide the nature of their operations, while others follow a stealthier approach, mimicking regular users' behavior. The rise in popularity of social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook has been paralleled by the rise of unwanted, disruptive entities on these networks-  including spammers, malware disseminators, and other content polluters. Inspired by sociologists working to ensure the success of commons and criminologists focused on deterring vandalism and preventing crime, we present the first long-term study of social honeypots for tempting, profiling, and filtering content polluters in social media. Concretely, we report on our experiences via a seven-month deployment of 60 honeypots on Twitter that resulted in the harvesting of 36,000 candidate content polluters. As part of our study, we (1) examine the harvested Twitter users, including an analysis of link payloads, user behavior over time, and followers following network dynamics and (2) evaluate a wide range of features to investigate the effectiveness of automatic content polluter identification. Web-based social systems enable new community-based opportunities for participants to engage, share, and interact. This community value and related services like search and advertising are threatened by spammers, content polluters, and malware disseminators. In an effort to preserve community value and ensure longterm success, we propose and evaluate a honeypot-based approach for uncovering social spammers in online social systems. Two of the key components of the proposed approach are: (1) The deployment of social honeypots for harvesting deceptive spam profiles from social networking communities; and (2) Statistical analysis of the properties of these spam profiles for creating spam classifiers to actively filter out existing and new spammers. We describe the conceptual framework and design considerations of the proposed approach, and we present concrete observations from the deployment of social honeypots in MySpace and Twitter. We find that the deployed social honeypots identify social spammers with low false positive rates and that the harvested spam data contains signals that are strongly correlated with observable profile features (e.g., content, friend information, posting patterns, etc.). Based on these profile features, we develop machine learning based classifiers for identifying previously unknown spammers with high precision and a low rate of false positives. Abstract In this paper, we present a generic statistical approach to identify spam profiles on Online Social Networks (OSNs). Our study is based on real datasets containing both normal and spam profiles crawled from Facebook and Twitter networks. We have identified a set of 14 generic statistical features to identify spam profiles. The identified features are common to both Facebook and Twitter networks. For classification task, we have used three different classification algorithms  na i ve Bayes , Jrip , and J48 , and evaluated them on both individual and combined datasets to establish the discriminative property of the identified features. The results obtained on a combined dataset has detection rate (DR) as 0.957 and false positive rate (FPR) as 0.048, whereas on Facebook dataset the DR and FPR values are 0.964 and 0.089, respectively, and that on Twitter dataset the DR and FPR values are 0.976 and 0.075, respectively. We have also analyzed the contribution of each individual feature towards the detection accuracy of spam profiles. Thereafter, we have considered 7 most discriminative features and proposed a clustering-based approach to identify spam campaigns on Facebook and Twitter networks.