Job interview simulation with a virtual agents aims at improving people's social skills and supporting professional inclusion. In such simulators, the virtual agent must be capable of representing and reasoning about the user's mental state based on social cues that inform the system about his her affects and social attitude. In this paper, we propose a formal model of Theory of Mind (ToM) for virtual agent in the context of human-agent interaction that focuses on the affective dimension. It relies on a hybrid ToM that combines the two major paradigms of the domain. Our framework is based on modal logic and inference rules about the mental states, emotions and social relations of both actors. Finally, we present preliminary results regarding the impact of such a model on natural interaction in the context of job interviews simulation.
To support such adaptability, we propose to rely on the BDI model. Several computational models of emotions have already been proposed (e.g. @cite_22 @cite_13 ) that show that BDI is a good basis to represent and to reason about the interlocutor's mental state. Our aim is thus to define a logical model of emotions and ToM in BDI.
@cite_13 @cite_22
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This article discusses a formal belief, desire, intention (BDI)-based agent model for theory of mind (ToM). The model uses BDI concepts to describe the reasoning process of an agent that reasons about the reasoning process of another agent, which is also based on BDI concepts. We discuss three different application areas and illustrate how the model can be applied to each of them. We explore a case study for each of the application areas and apply our model to it. For each case study, a number of simulation experiments are described, and their results are discussed. In this paper, we provide a logical formalization of the emotion triggering process and of its relationship with mental attitudes, as described in Ortony, Clore, and Collinss theory. We argue that modal logics are particularly adapted to represent agents mental attitudes and to reason about them, and use a specific modal logic that we call Logic of Emotions in order to provide logical definitions of all but two of their 22 emotions. While these definitions may be subject to debate, we show that they allow to reason about emotions and to draw interesting conclusions from the theory.