in this paper we describe a method which allows agents to dynamically select protocols and roles when they need to execute collaborative tasks
To date, there have been some efforts to overcome this limitation. @cite_0 introduces more flexibility in agents' coordination but it only applies to planning mechanisms of the individual agents. @cite_1 also proposes a framework based on multi-agent Markov decision processes. Rather than identifying a coordination mechanism which suits best for a situation, this work deals with optimal reasoning within the context of a given coordination mechanism. @cite_6 proposed a framework that enables autonomous agents to dynamically select the mechanism they employ in order to coordinate their inter-related activities. Using this framework, agents select their coordination mechanisms reasoning about the rewards they can obtain from collaborative tasks execution as well as the probability for these tasks to succeed.
@cite_0 @cite_1 @cite_6
1484740474 1607001533
This paper presents a framework that enables autonomous agents to dynamically select the mechanism they employ in order to coordinate their inter-related activities. Adopting this framework means coordination mechanisms move from the realm of being imposed upon the system at design time, to something that the agents select at run-time in order to fit their prevailing circumstances and their current coordination needs. Empirical analysis is used to evaluate the effect of various design alternatives for the agent's decision making mechanisms and for the coordination mechanisms themselves. Coordination of agent activities is a key problem in multiagent systems. Set in a larger decision theoretic context, the existence of coordination problems leads to difficulty in evaluating the utility of a situation. This in turn makes defining optimal policies for sequential decision processes problematic. We propose a method for solving sequential multi-agent decision problems by allowing agents to reason explicitly about specific coordination mechanisms. We define an extension of value iteration in which the system's state space is augmented with the state of the coordination mechanism adopted, allowing agents to reason about the short and long term prospects for coordination, the long term consequences of (mis)coordination, and make decisions to engage or avoid coordination problems based on expected value. We also illustrate the benefits of mechanism generalization. This paper presents ALIAS, an agent architecture based on intelligent logic agents, where the main form of agent reasoning is abduction. The system is particularly suited for solving problems where knowledge is incomplete, where agents may need to make reasonable hypotheses about the problem domain and other agents, and where the raised hypotheses have to be consistent for the overall set of agents. ALIAS agents are pro-active, exhibiting a goal-directed behavior, and autonomous, since each one can solve problems using its own private knowledge base. ALIAS agents are also social, because they are able to interact with other agents, in order to cooperatively solve problems. The coordination mechanisms are modeled by means of LAILA, a logic-based language which allows to express intra-agent reasoning and inter-agent coordination. As an application, we show how LAILA can be used to implement inter-agent dialogues, e.g., for negotiation. In particular, LAILA is well-suited to coordinate the process of negotiation aimed at exchanging resources between agents, thus allowing them to execute the plans to achieve their goals.