We design an expected polynomial-time, truthful-in-expectation, (1-1 e)-approximation mechanism for welfare maximization in a fundamental class of combinatorial auctions. Our results apply to bidders with valuations that are m matroid rank sums (MRS), which encompass most concrete examples of submodular functions studied in this context, including coverage functions, matroid weighted-rank functions, and convex combinations thereof. Our approximation factor is the best possible, even for known and explicitly given coverage valuations, assuming P != NP. Ours is the first truthful-in-expectation and polynomial-time mechanism to achieve a constant-factor approximation for an NP-hard welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions with heterogeneous goods and restricted valuations. Our mechanism is an instantiation of a new framework for designing approximation mechanisms based on randomized rounding algorithms. A typical such algorithm first optimizes over a fractional relaxation of the original problem, and then randomly rounds the fractional solution to an integral one. With rare exceptions, such algorithms cannot be converted into truthful mechanisms. The high-level idea of our mechanism design framework is to optimize directly over the (random) output of the rounding algorithm, rather than over the input to the rounding algorithm. This approach leads to truthful-in-expectation mechanisms, and these mechanisms can be implemented efficiently when the corresponding objective function is concave. For bidders with MRS valuations, we give a novel randomized rounding algorithm that leads to both a concave objective function and a (1-1 e)-approximation of the optimal welfare.
Without incentive-compatibility constraints, the welfare maximization problem with submodular bidder valuations is completely solved. Vondr 'a k @cite_20 gave a @math -approximation algorithm for the problem, improving over the @math -approximation given in @cite_3 . The algorithm in @cite_20 works in the value oracle model, where each valuation @math is modeled as a black box'' that returns the value @math of a queried set @math in a single operation. The approximation factor of @math is unconditionally optimal in the value-oracle model (for polynomial communication) @cite_12 , and is also optimal (for polynomial time) for certain succinctly represented submodular valuations, assuming @math @cite_11 . The result of @cite_11 implies that @math is the optimal approximation factor in our model as well, assuming @math . We show in Appendix that our oracle model is no more powerful than polynomial-time computation in the special case of explicitly represented coverage functions, for which @math is optimal assuming @math @cite_11 . In contrast, the work of @cite_23 improves on the approximation factor of @math by using , which can not be simulated in polynomial time for explicit coverage functions.
@cite_3 @cite_23 @cite_20 @cite_12 @cite_11
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One of the fundamental questions of Algorithmic Mechanism Design is whether there exists an inherent clash between truthfulness and computational tractability: in particular, whether polynomial-time truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions are provably weaker in terms of approximation ratio than non-truthful ones. This question was very recently answered for universally truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions D11 , and even for truthful-in-expectation mechanisms DughmiV11 . However, both of these results are based on information-theoretic arguments for valuations given by a value oracle, and leave open the possibility of polynomial-time truthful mechanisms for succinctly described classes of valuations. This paper is the first to prove computational hardness results for truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with succinctly described valuations. We prove that there is a class of succinctly represented submodular valuations for which no deterministic truthful mechanism provides an @math -approximation for a constant @math , unless @math ( @math denotes the number of items). Furthermore, we prove that even truthful-in-expectation mechanisms cannot approximate combinatorial auctions with certain succinctly described submodular valuations better than within @math , where @math is the number of bidders and @math some absolute constant, unless @math . In addition, we prove computational hardness results for two related problems. Let @math be a monotone submodular set function, and let @math be a matroid. We consider the problem @math . It is known that the greedy algorithm yields a @math -approximation [M. L. Fisher, G. L. Nemhauser, and L. A. Wolsey, Math. Programming Stud., no. 8 (1978), pp. 73-87] for this problem. For certain special cases, e.g., @math , the greedy algorithm yields a @math -approximation. It is known that this is optimal both in the value oracle model (where the only access to @math is through a black box returning @math for a given set @math ) [G. L. Nemhauser and L. A. Wolsey, Math. Oper. Res., 3 (1978), pp. 177-188] and for explicitly posed instances assuming @math [U. Feige, J. ACM, 45 (1998), pp. 634-652]. In this paper, we provide a randomized @math -approximation for any monotone submodular function and an arbitrary matroid. The algorithm works in the value oracle model. Our main tools are a variant of the pipage rounding technique of Ageev and Sviridenko [J. Combin. Optim., 8 (2004), pp. 307-328], and a continuous greedy process that may be of independent interest. As a special case, our algorithm implies an optimal approximation for the submodular welfare problem in the value oracle model [J. Vondrak, Proceedings of the @math th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2008, pp. 67-74]. As a second application, we show that the generalized assignment problem (GAP) is also a special case; although the reduction requires @math to be exponential in the original problem size, we are able to achieve a @math -approximation for GAP, simplifying previously known algorithms. Additionally, the reduction enables us to obtain approximation algorithms for variants of GAP with more general constra This paper presents a polynomial-time @math -approximation algorithm for maximizing nonnegative @math -submodular functions. This improves upon the previous @math -approximation by Ward and Z ivn 'y (SODA'14), where @math . We also show that for monotone @math -submodular functions there is a polynomial-time @math -approximation algorithm while for any @math a @math -approximation algorithm for maximizing monotone @math -submodular functions would require exponentially many queries. In particular, our hardness result implies that our algorithms are asymptotically tight. We also extend the approach to provide constant factor approximation algorithms for maximizing skew-bisubmodular functions, which were recently introduced as generalizations of bisubmodular functions. We study a central problem in Algorithmic Mechanism Design: constructing truthful mechanisms for welfare maximization in combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders. Dobzinski, Nisan, and Schapira provided the first mechanism that guarantees a non-trivial approximation ratio of @math [STOC'06], where @math is the number of items. This was subsequently improved to @math [Dobzinski, APPROX'07] and then to @math [Krysta and Vocking, ICALP'12]. In this paper we develop the first mechanism that breaks the logarithmic barrier. Specifically, the mechanism provides an approximation ratio of @math . Similarly to previous constructions, our mechanism uses polynomially many value and demand queries, and in fact provides the same approximation ratio for the larger class of XOS (a.k.a. fractionally subadditive) valuations. We also develop a computationally efficient implementation of the mechanism for combinatorial auctions with budget additive bidders. Although in general computing a demand query is NP-hard for budget additive valuations, we observe that the specific form of demand queries that our mechanism uses can be efficiently computed when bidders are budget additive. We investigate the minimization of Newton's functional for the problem of the body of minimal resistance with maximal height @math cite butt in the class of convex developable functions defined in a disc. This class is a natural candidate to find a (non-radial) minimizer in accordance with the results of cite lrp2. We prove that the minimizer in this class has a minimal set in the form of a regular polygon with @math sides centered in the disc, and numerical experiments indicate that the natural number @math is a non-decreasing function of @math . The corresponding functions all achieve a lower value of the functional than the optimal radially symmetric function with the same height @math .