We design an expected polynomial-time, truthful-in-expectation, (1-1 e)-approximation mechanism for welfare maximization in a fundamental class of combinatorial auctions. Our results apply to bidders with valuations that are m matroid rank sums (MRS), which encompass most concrete examples of submodular functions studied in this context, including coverage functions, matroid weighted-rank functions, and convex combinations thereof. Our approximation factor is the best possible, even for known and explicitly given coverage valuations, assuming P != NP. Ours is the first truthful-in-expectation and polynomial-time mechanism to achieve a constant-factor approximation for an NP-hard welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions with heterogeneous goods and restricted valuations. Our mechanism is an instantiation of a new framework for designing approximation mechanisms based on randomized rounding algorithms. A typical such algorithm first optimizes over a fractional relaxation of the original problem, and then randomly rounds the fractional solution to an integral one. With rare exceptions, such algorithms cannot be converted into truthful mechanisms. The high-level idea of our mechanism design framework is to optimize directly over the (random) output of the rounding algorithm, rather than over the input to the rounding algorithm. This approach leads to truthful-in-expectation mechanisms, and these mechanisms can be implemented efficiently when the corresponding objective function is concave. For bidders with MRS valuations, we give a novel randomized rounding algorithm that leads to both a concave objective function and a (1-1 e)-approximation of the optimal welfare.
The aforementioned works @cite_15 @cite_9 are precursors to our general design framework that optimizes directly over the output of a randomized rounding algorithm. In the framework of Lavi and Swamy @cite_9 , the input to and output of the rounding algorithm are assumed to coincide up to a scaling factor, so optimizing over its input (as they do) is equivalent to optimizing over its output (as we do). In the result of @cite_15 , optimizing with respect to their proxy bidders'' is equivalent to optimizing over the output of a particular randomized rounding algorithm.
@cite_9 @cite_15
2103751307 1727602370
We design an expected polynomial time, truthful in expectation, (1-1 e)-approximation mechanism for welfare maximization in a fundamental class of combinatorial auctions. Our results apply to bidders with valuations that are matroid rank sums (MRS), which encompass most concrete examples of submodular functions studied in this context, including coverage functions and matroid weighted-rank functions. Our approximation factor is the best possible, even for known and explicitly given coverage valuations, assuming P  NP. Ours is the first truthful-in-expectation and polynomial-time mechanism to achieve a constant-factor approximation for an NP-hard welfare maximization problem in combinatorial auctions with heterogeneous goods and restricted valuations. Our mechanism is an instantiation of a new framework for designing approximation mechanisms based on randomized rounding algorithms. A typical such algorithm first optimizes over a fractional relaxation of the original problem, and then randomly rounds the fractional solution to an integral one. With rare exceptions, such algorithms cannot be converted into truthful mechanisms. The high-level idea of our mechanism design framework is to optimize directly over the (random) output of the rounding algorithm, rather than over the input to the rounding algorithm. This approach leads to truthful-in-expectation mechanisms, and these mechanisms can be implemented efficiently when the corresponding objective function is concave. For bidders with MRS valuations, we give a novel randomized rounding algorithm that leads to both a concave objective function and a (1-1 e)-approximation of the optimal welfare. We study the problem of efficiently optimizing submodular functions under cardinality constraints in distributed setting. Recently, several distributed algorithms for this problem have been introduced which either achieve a sub-optimal solution or they run in super-constant number of rounds of computation. Unlike previous work, we aim to design distributed algorithms in multiple rounds with almost optimal approximation guarantees at the cost of outputting a larger number of elements. Toward this goal, we present a distributed algorithm that, for any e > 0 and any constant r, outputs a set S of O(rk e1 r) items in r rounds, and achieves a (1-e)-approximation of the value of the optimum set with k items. This is the first distributed algorithm that achieves an approximation factor of (1-e) running in less than log 1 e number of rounds. We also prove a hardness result showing that the output of any 1-e approximation distributed algorithm limited to one distributed round should have at least (k e) items. In light of this hardness result, our distributed algorithm in one round, r = 1, is asymptotically tight in terms of the output size. We support the theoretical guarantees with an extensive empirical study of our algorithm showing that achieving almost optimum solutions is indeed possible in a few rounds for large-scale real datasets.