Because preferences naturally arise and play an important role in many real-life decisions, they are at the backbone of various fields. In particular preferences are increasingly used in almost all matching procedures-based applications. In this work we highlight the benefit of using AI insights on preferences in a large scale application, namely the French Admission Post-Baccalaureat Platform (APB). Each year APB allocates hundreds of thousands first year applicants to universities. This is done automatically by matching applicants preferences to university seats. In practice, APB can be unable to distinguish between applicants which leads to the introduction of random selection. This has created frustration in the French public since randomness, even used as a last mean does not fare well with the republican egalitarian principle. In this work, we provide a solution to this problem. We take advantage of recent AI Preferences Theory results to show how to enhance APB in order to improve expressiveness of applicants preferences and reduce their exposure to random decisions.
In Artificial Intelligence, several researchers considered the stable marriage problem. In @cite_32 , the authors introduce a local search approach which exploits properties of the problems to reduce the size of a state neighborhood. In @cite_17 , male optimality and uniqueness of stable marriages for partially ordered preferences are studied.
@cite_32 @cite_17
2047128428 1481515824
In this paper, we study the concepts of male optimality and uniqueness of stable marriages for partially ordered preferences. We give an algorithm to find a stable marriage that is male optimal, and a sufficient condition on the preferences, which guarantees the uniqueness of stable marriages. The stable marriage (SM) problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools or, more generally, to any two-sided market. In the classical formulation, n men and n women express their preferences (via a strict total order) over the members of the other sex. Solving an SM problem means finding a stable marriage where stability is an envy-free notion: no man and woman who are not married to each other would both prefer each other to their partners or to being single. We consider both the classical stable marriage problem and one of its useful variations (denoted SMTI (Stable Marriage with Ties and Incomplete lists)) where the men and women express their preferences in the form of an incomplete preference list with ties over a subset of the members of the other sex. Matchings are permitted only with people who appear in these preference lists, and we try to find a stable matching that marries as many people as possible. Whilst the SM problem is polynomial to solve, the SMTI problem is NP-hard. We propose to tackle both problems via a local search approach, which exploits properties of the problems to reduce the size of the neighborhood and to make local moves efficiently. We empirically evaluate our algorithm for SM problems by measuring its runtime behavior and its ability to sample the lattice of all possible stable marriages. We evaluate our algorithm for SMTI problems in terms of both its runtime behavior and its ability to find a maximum cardinality stable marriage. Experimental results suggest that for SM problems, the number of steps of our algorithm grows only as O(n log(n)), and that it samples