Modern low-latency anonymity systems, no matter whether constructed as an overlay or implemented at the network layer, offer limited security guarantees against traffic analysis. On the other hand, high-latency anonymity systems offer strong security guarantees at the cost of computational overhead and long delays, which are excessive for interactive applications. We propose TARANET, an anonymity system that implements protection against traffic analysis at the network layer, and limits the incurred latency and overhead. In TARANET's setup phase, traffic analysis is thwarted by mixing. In the data transmission phase, end hosts and ASes coordinate to shape traffic into constant-rate transmission using packet splitting. Our prototype implementation shows that TARANET can forward anonymous traffic at over 50 Gbps using commodity hardware.
The first class of network-layer anonymity protocols proposed is the so-called system, which consists of two proposals, @cite_50 and @cite_43 . These systems defend against topological attacks by encrypting forwarding information in packet headers. However, in both schemes, packets stay unchanged from hop to hop, thus enabling bit-pattern correlation of packets at distinct compromised nodes.
@cite_43 @cite_50
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As mobile ad hoc network applications are deployed, security emerges as a central requirement. In this paper, we introduce the wormhole attack, a severe attack in ad hoc networks that is particularly challenging to defend against. The wormhole attack is possible even if the attacker has not compromised any hosts, and even if all communication provides authenticity and confidentiality. In the wormhole attack, an attacker records packets (or bits) at one location in the network, tunnels them (possibly selectively) to another location, and retransmits them there into the network. The wormhole attack can form a serious threat in wireless networks, especially against many ad hoc network routing protocols and location-based wireless security systems. For example, most existing ad hoc network routing protocols, without some mechanism to defend against the wormhole attack, would be unable to find routes longer than one or two hops, severely disrupting communication. We present a general mechanism, called packet leashes, for detecting and, thus defending against wormhole attacks, and we present a specific protocol, called TIK, that implements leashes. We also discuss topology-based wormhole detection, and show that it is impossible for these approaches to detect some wormhole topologies. We propose to use Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANET) as the infrastructure for an urban cyber-physical system for gathering up-to-date data about a city, like traffic conditions or environmental parameters. In this context, it is critical to design a data collection protocol that enables retrieving the data from the vehicles in almost real-time in an efficient way for urban scenarios. We propose Back off-based Per-hop Forwarding (BPF), a broadcast-based receiver-oriented protocol that uses the destination location information to select the forwarding order among the nodes receiving the packet. BFP does not require nodes to exchange periodic messages with their neighbors communicating their locations to keep a low management message overhead. It uses geographic information about the final destination node in the header of each data packet to route it in a hop-by-hop basis. It takes advantage of redundant forwarding to increase packet delivery to a destination, what is more critical in an urban scenario than in a highway, where the road topology does not represent a challenge for forwarding. We evaluate the performance of the BPF protocol using ns-3 and a Manhattan grid topology and compare it with well-known broadcast suppression techniques. Our results show that BPF achieves significantly higher packet delivery rates at a reduced redundancy cost.