Traditional regulatory methods for spectrum licensing have been recently identified as one of the causes for the under-utilization of the valuable radio spectrum. Governmental agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) are seeking ways to remove stringent regulatory barriers and facilitate broader access to the spectrum resources. The goal is to allow for an improved and ubiquitous sharing of the precious radio spectrum between commercial service providers. In this paper, we propose a novel noncooperative game theoretic approach, to show how to foster more sharing of the radio spectrum via the use of regulatory power. We define a two stage game in which the government regulators move first, followed by the providers. The providers are incentivized by lower spectrum allocation fees from the regulators in return for proof-of-sharing. The providers are offered discounted spectrum bands, potentially at different locations, but will be asked to provide coverage to users that are not subscribed to them so as to maintain their subsidy incentives from the government. In a simplification of the model, analytical expressions for the providers' perfect equilibrium strategies are derived, and we argue for the existence of the government's part of a perfect equilibrium. Our analysis shows that through subsidization, the government can provide small service providers a fair chance to compete with the large providers, thereby avoiding monopolization in the market.
Only recently, Yu and Kim @cite_34 focused on the concept of using subsidies for spectrum management. Their work analyzed price and quality of service (QoS) subsidy schemes to increase the utility of the consumers from the data plans. The goal is to increase the availability of wireless data plans to more users. In their model, the regulator offers a subsidized (i.e., less expensive) data plan to the end users with lower quality of service via subsidization to the providers. In our work, we consider subsidizing the spectrum to the providers and focus on implementing a subsidy system mainly between the providers and the government. We aim to make the subsidization seamless to the end users and aim to incentivize the providers to be more welcoming to the users subscribed to other providers. As a major difference, we focus on spectrum subsidy rather than data plan subsidy.
@cite_34
2020629327
Due to the emergence of smart devices, mobile data traffic grows exponentially. A Cisco report predicts that global mobile data traffic will increase 26-fold between 2010 and 2015. Therefore, the spectrum shortage continues and the spectrum price increases, which will eventually lead to decrease of user welfare. Another side effect of the data traffic growth is the polarization of data traffic among users. To resolve these problems, we introduce two subsidy schemes (i.e., price and quality of service (QoS) subsidy schemes) and mathematically analyze the effect of each scheme. We identify that if the regulator has sufficient spectrum amount for the network service, then the QoS subsidy scheme will be a good choice for all players in the network service market. Otherwise, the price subsidy scheme can be better from user welfare perspective. Even though our analytic results are derived under some assumptions for mathematical tractability, it will provide good intuitions for spectrum regulation.