Internet of Things connects lots of small constrained devices to the Internet. As in any other environment, communication security is important and cryptographic algorithms are one of many elements that we use in order to keep messages secure. It is necessary to use algorithms that do not require high computational power, lightweight ciphers are therefore an ideal candidate for this purpose. Since these devices work in various environments, it is necessary to test security of implementations of cryptographic algorithms. In this paper, we explore a possibility of attacking an ultralightweight cipher PRESENT by using a multiple fault attack. Utilizing the Differential Fault Analysis technique, we were able to recover the secret key with two faulty encryptions and an exhaustive search of 216 remaining key bits. Our attack aims at four nibbles in the penultimate round of the cipher, causing faulty output in all nibbles of the output. We also provide a practical attack scenario by exploiting Hardware Trojan (HT) technique for the proposed fault injection in a Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA.
@cite_11 used a combination of differential fault analysis and statistical cryptanalysis techniques to attack lightweight block ciphers. They tested their methodology on PRESENT-80 and PRINT-48. The attack on PRESENT is aimed at middle rounds of algorithm, using single random S-box and multiple S-boxes fault attack. The main outcome of the paper is an extension of the fault model from the usual fault model, which aims at ultimate or penultimate rounds, to the other rounds as well.
@cite_11
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Differential fault analysis is one of the most efficient side channel attack techniques that threat the security of block cipher. However, it often requires a penultimate or an antepenultimate round faulty encryption and is not suitable for middle round fault. This paper presents attacks combining differential fault analysis with statistical cryptanalysis techniques against lightweight ciphers. The analysis makes use of statistical cryptanalysis techniques in practice rather than theoretically, and exploits the weakness of bit-permutation adopted by many lightweight block ciphers under fault attack. Specific attacks against PRESENT and PRINT CIPHER are given to prove the validity. The result shows that about one fifth of the iterative rounds are needed to be protected for these lightweight ciphers with bit-permutation.