Conditional domain generation is a good way to interactively control sample generation process of deep generative models. However, once a conditional generative model has been created, it is often expensive to allow it to adapt to new conditional controls, especially the network structure is relatively deep. We propose a conditioned latent domain transfer framework across latent spaces of unconditional variational autoencoders(VAE). With this framework, we can allow unconditionally trained VAEs to generate images in its domain with conditionals provided by a latent representation of another domain. This framework does not assume commonalities between two domains. We demonstrate effectiveness and robustness of our model under widely used image datasets.
Autoencoder(AE) is another class of deep generative model that compiles inputs and reconstruct samples through encoding features in latent space. Recent work done by Liu et.al. @cite_11 has shown that VAE can perform well on matching the latent space between images from two domains. The added adversarial loss facilitates the training of the VAE by preventing it from mode collapsing.
@cite_11
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We explore methods of producing adversarial examples on deep generative models such as the variational autoencoder (VAE) and the VAE-GAN. Deep learning architectures are known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples, but previous work has focused on the application of adversarial examples to classification tasks. Deep generative models have recently become popular due to their ability to model input data distributions and generate realistic examples from those distributions. We present three classes of attacks on the VAE and VAE-GAN architectures and demonstrate them against networks trained on MNIST, SVHN and CelebA. Our first attack leverages classification-based adversaries by attaching a classifier to the trained encoder of the target generative model, which can then be used to indirectly manipulate the latent representation. Our second attack directly uses the VAE loss function to generate a target reconstruction image from the adversarial example. Our third attack moves beyond relying on classification or the standard loss for the gradient and directly optimizes against differences in source and target latent representations. We also motivate why an attacker might be interested in deploying such techniques against a target generative network.