We consider the classic Moran process modeling the spread of genetic mutations, as extended to structured populations by (Nature, 2005). In this process, individuals are the vertices of a connected graph G. Initially, there is a single mutant vertex, chosen uniformly at random. In each step, a random vertex is selected for reproduction with a probability proportional to its fitness: mutants have fitness r > 1, while non-mutants have fitness 1. The vertex chosen to reproduce places a copy of itself to a uniformly random neighbor in G, replacing the individual that was there. The process ends when the mutation either reaches fixation (i.e., all vertices are mutants), or gets extinct. The principal quantity of interest is the probability with which each of the two outcomes occurs. A problem that has received significant attention recently concerns the existence of families of graphs, called strong amplifiers of selection, for which the fixation probability tends to 1 as the order n of the graph increases, and the existence of strong suppressors of selection, for which this probability tends to 0. For the case of directed graphs, it is known that both strong amplifiers and suppressors exist. For the case of undirected graphs, however, the problem has remained open, and the general belief has been that neither strong amplifiers nor suppressors exist. In this paper we disprove this belief, by providing the first examples of such graphs. The strong amplifier we present has fixation probability 1 − ˜ O(n^ −1 3), and the strong suppressor has fixation probability ˜O(n^−1 4). Both graph constructions are surprisingly simple. We also prove a general upper bound of 1 − ˜Ω(n^−1 3) on the fixation probability of any undirected graph. Hence, our strong amplifier is existentially optimal.
More involved population dynamics have been studied in evolutionary game theory in the context of well-mixed populations @cite_20 @cite_2 , and more recently in populations on graphs @cite_17 @cite_27 . The fitness of an individual is no longer fixed (determined by its type: mutant or non-mutant), but is determined by the expected payoff for the individual when playing a two-player game against a randomly chosen neighbor. In this game mutants play with one strategy and non-mutants with another.
@cite_27 @cite_17 @cite_20 @cite_2
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The Moran process, as studied by [10], is a stochastic process modeling the spread of genetic mutations in populations. In this process, agents of a two-type population (i.e. mutants and residents) are associated with the vertices of a graph. Initially, only one vertex chosen uniformly at random (u.a.r.) is a mutant, with fitness (r > 0 ), while all other individuals are residents, with fitness 1. In every step, an individual is chosen with probability proportional to its fitness, and its state (mutant or resident) is passed on to a neighbor which is chosen u.a.r. In this paper, we introduce and study for the first time a generalization of the model of [10] by assuming that different types of individuals perceive the population through different graphs defined on the same vertex set, namely (G_R = (V, E_R) ) for residents and (G_M = (V, E_M) ) for mutants. In this model, we study the fixation probability, namely the probability that eventually only mutants remain in the population, for various pairs of graphs. Evolutionary dynamics have been traditionally studied in the context of homogeneous or spatially extended populations1,2,3,4. Here we generalize population structure by arranging individuals on a graph. Each vertex represents an individual. The weighted edges denote reproductive rates which govern how often individuals place offspring into adjacent vertices. The homogeneous population, described by the Moran process3, is the special case of a fully connected graph with evenly weighted edges. Spatial structures are described by graphs where vertices are connected with their nearest neighbours. We also explore evolution on random and scale-free networks5,6,7. We determine the fixation probability of mutants, and characterize those graphs for which fixation behaviour is identical to that of a homogeneous population7. Furthermore, some graphs act as suppressors and others as amplifiers of selection. It is even possible to find graphs that guarantee the fixation of any advantageous mutant. We also study frequency-dependent selection and show that the outcome of evolutionary games can depend entirely on the structure of the underlying graph. Evolutionary graph theory has many fascinating applications ranging from ecology to multi-cellular organization and economics. Evolutionary graph theory (EGT), studies the ability of a mutant gene to overtake a nite structured population. In this review, we describe the original framework for EGT and the major work that has followed it. This review looks at the calculation of the probability" - the probability of a mutant taking over a population and focuses on game-theoretic applications. We look at varying topics such as alternate evolutionary dynamics, time to xation, special topological cases, and game theoretic results. Throughout the review, we examine several interesting open problems that warrant further research. We analyze evolutionary dynamics on graphs, where the nodes represent individuals of a population. The links of a node describe which other individuals can be displaced by the offspring of the individual on that node. Amplifiers of selection are graphs for which the fixation probability is increased for advantageous mutants and decreased for disadvantageous mutants. A few examples of such amplifiers have been developed, but so far it is unclear how many such structures exist and how to construct them. Here, we show that almost any undirected random graph is an amplifier of selection for Birth-death updating, where an individual is selected to reproduce with probability proportional to its fitness and one of its neighbors is replaced by that offspring at random. If we instead focus on death-Birth updating, in which a random individual is removed and its neighbors compete for the empty spot, then the same ensemble of graphs consists of almost only suppressors of selection for which the fixation probability is decreased for advantageous mutants and increased for disadvantageous mutants. Thus, the impact of population structure on evolutionary dynamics is a subtle issue that will depend on seemingly minor details of the underlying evolutionary process.