Cloud business intelligence is an increasingly popular choice to deliver decision support capabilities via elastic, pay-per-use resources. However, data security issues are one of the top concerns when dealing with sensitive data. In this paper, we propose a novel approach for securing cloud data warehouses by flexible verifiable secret sharing, fVSS. Secret sharing encrypts and distributes data over several cloud service providers, thus enforcing data privacy and availability. fVSS addresses four shortcomings in existing secret sharing-based approaches. First, it allows refreshing the data warehouse when some service providers fail. Second, it allows on-line analysis processing. Third, it enforces data integrity with the help of both inner and outer signatures. Fourth, it helps users control the cost of cloud warehousing by balancing the load among service providers with respect to their pricing policies. To illustrate fVSS' efficiency, we thoroughly compare it with existing secret sharing-based approaches with respect to security features, querying power and data storage and computing costs.
Among encryption techniques, only secret sharing @cite_12 handles both data privacy and availability, which is why we focus on this family of approaches. The principle of secret sharing @cite_17 is based on the fact that @math points define a polynomial @math of degree @math . The secret is the polynomial's constant term and the remaining terms are usually randomly selected. Each data piece is transformed into @math shares @math corresponding to points of the polynomial. Reconstruction of the secret is achieved through Lagrange interpolation @cite_2 : there is only one polynomial @math such that @math and @math . Then the secret is @math . Moreover, modern secret sharing schemes, such as multi-secret sharing @cite_7 @cite_13 @cite_14 , verifiable secret sharing @cite_0 , and verifiable multi-secret sharing @cite_9 @cite_4 , also help reduce shared data volume, verify the honesty of CSPs, and both, respectively. We classify secret sharing-based approaches for securing DBs and DWs into two families.
@cite_14 @cite_4 @cite_7 @cite_9 @cite_0 @cite_2 @cite_13 @cite_12 @cite_17
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A secret sharing scheme is a method to store information securely and reliably. Particularly, in a threshold secret sharing scheme , a secret is encoded into @math shares, such that any set of at least @math shares suffice to decode the secret, and any set of at most @math d @math t_ 1 d n$ . The scheme is based on a generalization of Shamirs secret sharing scheme and preserves its simplicity and efficiency. In addition, we consider the setting of secure distributed storage where the proposed communication efficient secret sharing schemes not only improve decoding bandwidth but further improve disk access complexity during decoding. A new multi-secret sharing (t, n) threshold scheme is proposed in this paper. The scheme uses the Lagrange interpolating polynomial to split and reconstruct the secrets based on Shamir secret sharing scheme, and verifies the legality of data by NTRU algorithm and one-way hashing function. Compared with other public key cryptosystems such as elliptic curve cryptography, the proposed is simpler in design, which requires less calculation and fewer storage spaces. It can detect effectively a variety of cheating and forgery behaviors, which guarantee that the reconstruction of secret is the secure and trustworthy. Highlights? We propose an efficient (n, t, n)-VSS. ? We propose a (n, t, n)-MSS. ? We propose a (n, t, n)-VMSS. ? All our (n, t, n) SS are unconditionally secure. Recently, Harn and Lin introduced a notion of strong t-consistency of a (t, n) secret sharing scheme and proposed a strong (n, t, n) verifiable secret sharing (VSS). In this paper, we propose a strong (n, t, n) VSS which is more efficient than Harn and Lin's VSS. Using the same approach, we propose a (n, t, n) multi-secret sharing scheme (MSS) to allow shareholders to share n-t+1 secrets. Also, the proposed (n, t, n) MSS can be modified to include the verifiable feature. All proposed schemes are unconditionally secure and are based on Shamir's (t, n) secret sharing scheme. A secret-sharing scheme is a method by which a dealer distributes shares to parties such that only authorized subsets of parties can reconstruct the secret. Secret-sharing schemes are an important tool in cryptography and they are used as a building box in many secure protocols, e.g., general protocol for multiparty computation, Byzantine agreement, threshold cryptography, access control, attribute-based encryption, and generalized oblivious transfer. In this survey, we describe the most important constructions of secret-sharing schemes; in particular, we explain the connections between secret-sharing schemes and monotone formulae and monotone span programs. We then discuss the main problem with known secret-sharing schemes - the large share size, which is exponential in the number of parties. We conjecture that this is unavoidable. We present the known lower bounds on the share size. These lower bounds are fairly weak and there is a big gap between the lower and upper bounds. For linear secret-sharing schemes, which is a class of schemes based on linear algebra that contains most known schemes, super-polynomial lower bounds on the share size are known. We describe the proofs of these lower bounds. We also present two results connecting secret-sharing schemes for a Hamiltonian access structure to the NP vs. coNP problem and to a major open problem in cryptography - constructing oblivious-transfer protocols from one-way functions. Consider two parties holding samples from correlated distributions @math and @math , respectively, where these samples are within distance @math of each other in some metric space. The parties wish to agree on a close-to-uniformly distributed secret key @math by sending a single message over an insecure channel controlled by an all-powerful adversary who may read and modify anything sent over the channel. We consider both the keyless case, where the parties share no additional secret information, and the keyed case, where the parties share a long-term secret @math that they can use to generate a sequence of session keys @math using multiple pairs @math . The former has applications to, e.g., biometric authentication, while the latter arises in, e.g., the bounded-storage model with errors. We show solutions that improve upon previous work in several respects. The best prior solution for the keyless case with no errors (i.e., @math ) requires the min-entropy of @math to exceed @math , where @math is the bit length of @math . Our solution applies whenever the min-entropy of @math exceeds the minimal threshold @math , and yields a longer key. We consider the problem of threshold secret sharing in groups with hierarchical structure. In such settings, the secret is shared among a group of participants that is partitioned into levels. The access structure is then determined by a sequence of threshold requirements: a subset of participants is authorized if it has at least k0 0 members from the highest level, as well as at least k1 > k0 members from the two highest levels and so forth. Such problems may occur in settings where the participants differ in their authority or level of confidence and the presence of higher level participants is imperative to allow the recovery of the common secret. Even though secret sharing in hierarchical groups has been studied extensively in the past, none of the existing solutions addresses the simple setting where, say, a bank transfer should be signed by three employees, at least one of whom must be a department manager. We present a perfect secret sharing scheme for this problem that, unlike most secret sharing schemes that are suitable for hierarchical structures, is ideal. As in Shamir's scheme, the secret is represented as the free coefficient of some polynomial. The novelty of our scheme is the usage of polynomial derivatives in order to generate lesser shares for participants of lower levels. Consequently, our scheme uses Birkhoff interpolation, i.e., the construction of a polynomial according to an unstructured set of point and derivative values. A substantial part of our discussion is dedicated to the question of how to assign identities to the participants from the underlying finite field so that the resulting Birkhoff interpolation problem will be well posed. In addition, we devise a In the secret sharing schemes already published, the security of the scheme is mostly established upon difficult mathematical problems such as the solution of discrete logarithm and the factoring of large number. However, such schemes take up lots of resources while result in low speed. In this paper we propose a new secret-sharing scheme, which is based on shamir secret sharing scheme and use the NTRU and one-way hashing function to verify the validity of data. The security of our scheme is built on quick and efficient NTRU algorithm. It can use the public channel to issue information, detect effectively a variety of cheating or forgery behaviors, and ensure the credibility of resumption of secret. We describe a novel approach for building a secure and fault tolerant data storage service in collaborative work environments, which uses perfect secret sharing schemes to store data. Perfect secret sharing schemes have found little use in managing generic data because of the high computation overheads incurred by such schemes. Our proposed approach uses a novel combination of XOR secret sharing and replication mechanisms, which drastically reduce the computation overheads and achieve speeds comparable to standard encryption schemes. The combination of secret sharing and replication manifests itself as an architectural framework, which has the attractive property that its dimension can be varied to exploit tradeoffs amongst different performance metrics. We evaluate the properties and performance of the proposed framework and show that the combination of perfect secret sharing and replication can be used to build efficient fault-tolerant and secure distributed data storage systems. Secret image sharing is a method for distributing a secret image amongst n data stores, each storing a shadow image of the secret, such that the original secret image can be recovered only if any k out of the n shares is available. Existing secret image sharing schemes, however, do not support scaling and cropping operations on the shadow image, which are useful for zooming on large images. In this paper, we propose an image sharing scheme that allows the user to retrieve a scaled or cropped version of the secret image by operating directly on the shadow images, therefore reducing the amount of data sent from the data stores to the user. Results and analyses show that our scheme is highly secure, requires low computational cost, and supports a large number of scale factors with arbitrary crop.