We present the design and implementation of the PeerShare, a system that can be used by applications to securely distribute sensitive data to social contacts of a user. PeerShare incorporates a generic framework that allows different applications to distribute data with different security requirements. By using interfaces available from existing popular social networks. PeerShare is designed to be easy to use for both end users as well as developers of applications. PeerShare can be used to distribute shared keys, public keys and any other data that need to be distributed with authenticity and confidentiality guarantees to an authorized set of recipients, specified in terms of social relationships. We have used already in three different applications and plan to make it available for developers.
@cite_1 presents a generic cryptographic framework that allows social relations establishment and resource sharing with user anonymity, secrecy of resources, privacy of social relations and access control secured. Unlike that uses social network specified sharing policies, it requires users to explicitly establish social relationships with other users which makes it less intuitive for users in real deployments.
@cite_1
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We present a cryptographic framework to achieve access control, privacy of social relations, secrecy of resources, and anonymity of users in social networks. We illustrate our technique on a core API for social networking, which includes methods for establishing social relations and for sharing resources. The cryptographic protocols implementing these methods use pseudonyms to hide user identities, signatures on these pseudonyms to establish social relations, and zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge of such signatures to demonstrate the existence of social relations without sacrificing user anonymity. As we do not put any constraints on the underlying social network, our framework is generally applicable and, in particular, constitutes an ideal plug-in for decentralized social networks. We analyzed the security of our protocols by developing formal definitions of the aforementioned security properties and by verifying them using ProVerif, an automated theorem prover for cryptographic protocols. Finally, we built a prototypical implementation and conducted an experimental evaluation to demonstrate the efficiency and the scalability of our framework.