Optimization of parameterized policies for reinforcement learning (RL) is an important and challenging problem in artificial intelligence. Among the most common approaches are algorithms based on gradient ascent of a score function representing discounted return. In this paper, we examine the role of these policy gradient and actor-critic algorithms in partially-observable multiagent environments. We show several candidate policy update rules and relate them to a foundation of regret minimization and multiagent learning techniques for the one-shot and tabular cases, leading to previously unknown convergence guarantees. We apply our method to model-free multiagent reinforcement learning in adversarial sequential decision problems (zero-sum imperfect information games), using RL-style function approximation. We evaluate on commonly used benchmark Poker domains, showing performance against fixed policies and empirical convergence to approximate Nash equilibria in self-play with rates similar to or better than a baseline model-free algorithm for zero sum games, without any domain-specific state space reductions.
Much work in classical MARL focuses on Markov games where the environment is fully observable and agents take actions simultaneously, which in some cases admit Bellman operators @cite_93 @cite_81 @cite_94 @cite_59 . When the environment is partially observable, policies generally map to values and actions from agents' observation histories; even when the problem is cooperative, learning is hard @cite_96 .
@cite_96 @cite_81 @cite_59 @cite_93 @cite_94
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Although variants of value iteration have been proposed for finding Nash or correlated equilibria in general-sum Markov games, these variants have not been shown to be effective in general. In this paper, we demonstrate by construction that existing variants of value iteration cannot find stationary equilibrium policies in arbitrary general-sum Markov games. Instead, we propose an alternative interpretation of the output of value iteration based on a new (non-stationary) equilibrium concept that we call "cyclic equilibria." We prove that value iteration identifies cyclic equilibria in a class of games in which it fails to find stationary equilibria. We also demonstrate empirically that value iteration finds cyclic equilibria in nearly all examples drawn from a random distribution of Markov games. The main contribution of this paper consists in extending several non-stationary Reinforcement Learning (RL) algorithms and their theoretical guarantees to the case of discounted zero-sum Markov Games (MGs).As in the case of Markov Decision Processes (MDPs), non-stationary algorithms are shown to exhibit better performance bounds compared to their stationary counterparts. The obtained bounds are generically composed of three terms: 1) a dependency over gamma (discount factor), 2) a concentrability coefficient and 3) a propagation error term. This error, depending on the algorithm, can be caused by a regression step, a policy evaluation step or a best-response evaluation step. As a second contribution, we empirically demonstrate, on generic MGs (called Garnets), that non-stationary algorithms outperform their stationary counterparts. In addition, it is shown that their performance mostly depends on the nature of the propagation error. Indeed, algorithms where the error is due to the evaluation of a best-response are penalized (even if they exhibit better concentrability coefficients and dependencies on gamma) compared to those suffering from a regression error. In the Markov decision process (MDP) formalization of reinforcement learning, a single adaptive agent interacts with an environment defined by a probabilistic transition function. In this solipsis-tic view, secondary agents can only be part of the environment and are therefore fixed in their behavior. The framework of Markov games allows us to widen this view to include multiple adaptive agents with interacting or competing goals. This paper considers a step in this direction in which exactly two agents with diametrically opposed goals share an environment. It describes a Q-learning-like algorithm for finding optimal policies and demonstrates its application to a simple two-player game in which the optimal policy is probabilistic. This paper provides an analysis of error propagation in Approximate Dynamic Programming applied to zero-sum two-player Stochastic Games. We provide a novel and unified error propagation analysis in Lp-norm of three well-known algorithms adapted to Stochastic Games (namely Approximate Value Iteration, Approximate Policy Iteration and Approximate Generalized Policy Iteration). We show that we can achieve a stationary policy which is 2γe+e′ (1-γ)2 -optimal, where e is the value function approximation error and e′ is the approximate greedy operator error. In addition, we provide a practical algorithm (AGPI-Q) to solve infinite horizon γ-discounted two-player zero-sum Stochastic Games in a batch setting. It is an extension of the Fitted-Q algorithm (which solves Markov Decisions Processes from data) and can be non-parametric. Finally, we demonstrate experimentally the performance of AGPI-Q on a simultaneous two-player game, namely Alesia.