In Combinatorial Public Projects, there is a set of projects that may be undertaken, and a set of self-interested players with a stake in the set of projects chosen. A public planner must choose a subset of these projects, subject to a resource constraint, with the goal of maximizing social welfare. Combinatorial Public Projects has emerged as one of the paradigmatic problems in Algorithmic Mechanism Design, a field concerned with solving fundamental resource allocation problems in the presence of both selfish behavior and the computational constraint of polynomial-time. We design a polynomial-time, truthful-in-expectation, (1-1 e)-approximation mechanism for welfare maximization in a fundamental variant of combinatorial public projects. Our results apply to combinatorial public projects when players have valuations that are matroid rank sums (MRS), which encompass most concrete examples of submodular functions studied in this context, including coverage functions, matroid weighted-rank functions, and convex combinations thereof. Our approximation factor is the best possible, assuming P != NP. Ours is the first mechanism that achieves a constant factor approximation for a natural NP-hard variant of combinatorial public projects.
Combinatorial Public Projects, in particular its variant, was first introduced by Papadimitriou, Schapira and Singer @cite_25 . They show that no deterministic truthful mechanism for exact CPP with submodular valuations can guarantee better than a @math approximation to the optimal social welfare. The non-strategic version of the problem, on the other hand, is equivalent to maximizing a submodular function subject to a cardinality constraint, and admits a @math -approximation algorithm due to Nemhauser, Wolsey and Fisher @cite_14 , and this is optimal @cite_20 assuming @math .
@cite_14 @cite_25 @cite_20
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LetN be a finite set andz be a real-valued function defined on the set of subsets ofN that satisfies z(S)+z(T)gez(SxcupT)+z(SxcapT) for allS, T inN. Such a function is called submodular. We consider the problem maxSsubN a(S):|S|leK,z(S) submodular . Several hard combinatorial optimization problems can be posed in this framework. For example, the problem of finding a maximum weight independent set in a matroid, when the elements of the matroid are colored and the elements of the independent set can have no more thanK colors, is in this class. The uncapacitated location problem is a special case of this matroid optimization problem. We analyze greedy and local improvement heuristics and a linear programming relaxation for this problem. Our results are worst case bounds on the quality of the approximations. For example, whenz(S) is nondecreasing andz(0) = 0, we show that a ldquogreedyrdquo heuristic always produces a solution whose value is at least 1 –[(K – 1) K] K times the optimal value. This bound can be achieved for eachK and has a limiting value of (e – 1) e, where e is the base of the natural logarithm. The central problem in computational mechanism design is the tension between incentive compatibility and computational efficiency. We establish the first significant approximability gap between algorithms that are both truthful and computationally-efficient, and algorithms that only achieve one of these two desiderata. This is shown in the context of a novel mechanism design problem which we call the combinatorial public project problem (cppp). cpppis an abstraction of many common mechanism design situations, ranging from elections of kibbutz committees to network design.Our result is actually made up of two complementary results -- one in the communication-complexity model and one in the computational-complexity model. Both these hardness results heavily rely on a combinatorial characterization of truthful algorithms for our problem. Our computational-complexity result is one of the first impossibility results connecting mechanism design to complexity theory; its novel proof technique involves an application of the Sauer-Shelah Lemma and may be of wider applicability, both within and without mechanism design.