The aim of this paper is to investigate the interplay between knowledge shared by a group of agents and its coalition ability. We investigate this relation in the standard context of imperfect information concurrent game. We assume that whenever a set of agents form a coalition to achieve a goal, they share their knowledge before acting. Based on this assumption, we propose a new semantics for alternating-time temporal logic with imperfect information and perfect recall. It turns out that this semantics is sufficient to preserve all the desirable properties of coalition ability in traditional coalitional logics. Meanwhile, we investigate how knowledge sharing within a group of agents contributes to its coalitional ability through the interplay of epistemic and coalition modalities. This work provides a partial answer to the question: which kind of group knowledge is required for a group to achieve their goals in the context of imperfect information.
Finally, it is also worth mentioning that @cite_4 adopts a similar meaning of coalition so as to capture the notion of knowing how to play''. Besides the different motivations, that work is based on STIT framework and just considers one-step uniform strategies without investigating the interplay of epistemic and coalitional operators.
@cite_4
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Reasoning about capabilities, strategies and knowledge is important in the analysis of multiagent systems. Alternating-time Temporal Epistemic Logic (ATEL) was designed with this aim. Nevertheless, the original interpretation of the language suffered from some counterintuitive properties. These are due to the fact that the strategies the agent applies in worlds that he cannot distinguish may not be uniform, in the sense that the same action is applied in all indistinguishable worlds. Several refinements of the original ATEL semantics were proposed since then. In this paper we argue that the STIT framework can easily account for uniform strategies. STIT is a logic of agency that has been proposed in the 90ies in the domain of philosophy of action. It is the logic of constructions of the form "agent a sees to it that φ". To support our claim, we first present a straightforward solution in STIT logic augmented by a modal operator of knowledge. Then we offer a simplification, by introducing a modal logic of knowledge-based uniform agency, for one-step strategies, alias choices.