Whether as telecommunications or power systems, networks are very important in everyday life. Maintaining these networks properly functional and connected, even under attacks or failures, is of special concern. This topic has been previously studied with a whole network robustness perspective,modeling networks as undirected graphs (such as roads or simply cables). This perspective measures the average behavior of the network after its last node has failed. In this article we propose two alternatives to well-known studies about the robustness of the backbone Internet: to use a supply network model and metrics for its representation (we called it the Go-Index), and to use robustness metrics that can be calculated while disconnections appear. Our research question is: if a smart adversary has a limited number of strikes to attack the Internet, how much will the damage be after each one in terms of network disconnection? Our findings suggest that in order to design robust networks it might be better to have a complete view of the robustness evolution of the network, from both the infrastructure and the users perspective.
The stability of scale-free network under degree-based attacks was studied on @cite_11 . Experimental results are shown in @cite_8 who also consider sequential and simultaneous attacks as well as centrality measure strategies. To get closer to a real world strategy scenario on @cite_3 @cite_26 studied the resilience of scale-free networks to a variety of attacks with different amounts of information available to the attacker about the network.
@cite_8 @cite_26 @cite_3 @cite_11
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Many complex systems can be described by networks, in which the constituent components are represented by vertices and the connections between the components are represented by edges between the corresponding vertices. A fundamental issue concerning complex networked systems is the robustness of the overall system to the failure of its constituent parts. Since the degree to which a networked system continues to function, as its component parts are degraded, typically depends on the integrity of the underlying network, the question of system robustness can be addressed by analyzing how the network structure changes as vertices are removed. Previous work has considered how the structure of complex networks change as vertices are removed uniformly at random, in decreasing order of their degree, or in decreasing order of their betweenness centrality. Here we extend these studies by investigating the effect on network structure of targeting vertices for removal based on a wider range of non-local measures of potential importance than simply degree or betweenness. We consider the effect of such targeted vertex removal on model networks with different degree distributions, clustering coefficients and assortativity coefficients, and for a variety of empirical networks. We study the vulnerability of complex networks under intentional attack with incomplete information, which means that one can only preferentially attack the most important nodes among a local region of a network. The known random failure and the intentional attack are two extreme cases of our study. Using the generating function method, we derive the exact value of the critical removal fraction fc of nodes for the disintegration of networks and the size of the giant component. To validate our model and method, we perform simulations of intentional attack with incomplete information in scale-free networks. We show that the attack information has an important effect on the vulnerability of scale-free networks. We also demonstrate that hiding a fraction of the nodes information is a cost-efficient strategy for enhancing the robustness of complex networks. In this work, we estimate the resilience of scale-free networks on a number of different attack methods. We study a number of different cases, where we assume that a small amount of knowledge on the network structure is available, or can be approximately estimated. We also present a class of real-life networks that prove to be very resilient on intentional attacks, or equivalently much more difficult to immunize completely than most model scale-free networks. We study the stability of random scale-free networks to degree-dependent attacks. We present analytical and numerical results to compute the critical fraction @math of nodes that need to be removed for destroying the network under this attack for different attack parameters. We study the effect of different defense strategies, based on the addition of a constant number of links on network robustness. We test defense strategies based on adding links to either low degree, middegree or high degree nodes. We find using analytical results and simulations that the middegree nodes defense strategy leads to the largest improvement to the network robustness against degree-based attacks. We also test these defense strategies on an internet autonomous systems map and obtain similar results.