Website privacy policies are too long to read and difficult to understand. The over-sophisticated language makes privacy notices to be less effective than they should be. People become even less willing to share their personal information when they perceive the privacy policy as vague. This paper focuses on decoding vagueness from a natural language processing perspective. While thoroughly identifying the vague terms and their linguistic scope remains an elusive challenge, in this work we seek to learn vector representations of words in privacy policies using deep neural networks. The vector representations are fed to an interactive visualization tool (LSTMVis) to test on their ability to discover syntactically and semantically related vague terms. The approach holds promise for modeling and understanding language vagueness.
Comprehensive studies have been missing for understanding vagueness in the natural language processing community. focus on the detection of uncertainty cues and their linguistic scope in natural language texts. The motivation behind this task is to distinguish factual and uncertain information in text, which is of essential importance to information extraction. Much of the techniques involve sentence-level classifications using SVM, CRF, and maximum entropy. However, it remains to be seen if a word- or sentence-level classification formulation is well suited for this task. @cite_4 , vagueness is considered to be a linguistic phenomenon. It arises with a lack of clear boundaries and conditions. These boundaries usually do not allow concrete distinction. Classifying text as vague or not vague can be subjective, making it important to look at agreement between interpretations and annotations. Using a naive Bayes classifier, the study shows that vague and not vague senses can be separated.
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The void-for-vagueness concept is itself indefinite, and the language of the doctrine exacerbates the problem. This article addresses situations where the doctrine has been used to invalidate criminal statutes that do not implicate specially protected constitutional rights. Its thesis is that application of the vagueness doctrine in this context can be understood as based on one or both of two constitutional requirements, and that they provide a better explanation for the results than traditional rhetoric. The two principles are: all crime must be based on conduct; and there must be a defensible and predictable correlation between the established meaning of a criminal prohibition and the conduct to which it is applied. The article begins by tracing the ori- gins of these two principles and then illustrates their explanatory power in two state cases — Lanzetta and Papachristou — and two federal cases — Skilling and Screws. Additional factors extraneous to the vagueness doctrine itself, however, often control the outcome in vagueness cases. This proposition is illustrated by two state cases — Morales and Kolender — and one federal case — Johnson v. United States.