In this paper, we design a new quantum key distribution protocol, allowing two limited semi-quantum or "classical" users to establish a shared secret key with the help of a fully quantum server. A semi-quantum user can only prepare and measure qubits in the computational basis and so must rely on this quantum server to produce qubits in alternative bases and also to perform alternative measurements. However, we assume that the sever is untrusted and we prove the unconditional security of our protocol even in the worst case: when this quantum server is an all-powerful adversary. We also compute a lower bound of the key rate of our protocol, in the asymptotic scenario, as a function of the observed error rate in the channel allowing us to compute the maximally tolerated error of our protocol. Our results show that a semi-quantum protocol may hold similar security to a fully quantum one.
The first multi-user QKD protocol that we are aware of was developed by @cite_23 and it involved the center @math sending Bell states, with one particle sent to each party. Encoding was done by @math and @math performing unitary operations on their respective qubits and returning the result to the center, who performed a measurement, informing @math and @math of the result.
@cite_23
2012145584
Abstract Quantum cryptography has been shown to be an effective technology for the secure distribution of keys on point-to-point optical links. We show how the existing techniques can be extended to allow multi-user secure key distribution on optical networks. We demonstrate that using network configurations typical of those found in passive optical network architectures any of the current quantum key distribution protocols can be adapted to implement secure key distribution from any user to any other user. An important feature of these adapted protocols is that the broadcaster, or service provider on the network, does not have to be trusted by the two users who wish to establish a key.