The Internet of Things (IoT) has become increasingly popular in people's daily lives. The pervasive IoT devices are encouraged to share data with each other in order to better serve the users. However, users are reluctant to share sensitive data due to privacy concerns. In this paper, we study the anonymous data aggregation for the IoT system, in which the IoT company servers, though not fully trustworthy, are used to assist the aggregation. We propose an efficient and accountable aggregation scheme that can preserve the data anonymity. We analyze the communication and computation overheads of the proposed scheme, and evaluate the total execution time and the per-user communication overhead with extensive simulations. The results show that our scheme is more efficient than the previous peer-shuffle protocol, especially for data aggregation from multiple providers.
The second class of aggregation schemes consists of Mix-Net @cite_0 , onion routing @cite_9 @cite_18 , and peer-shuffle based approach @cite_7 . Mix-Net offers anonymity by relaying encrypted messages through a chain of proxy servers (mixes), which take turns to perform decryption, shuffle, and re-ordering on the messages. In onion networks, the encrypted message is transmitted along a path of pre-selected onion routers, each peels away one layer of encryption and uncovers the successor router. However, both Mix-Net and early onion routing systems all require reliable and trustful 3rd-party proxies routers, which may not be available in practice. The evolved onion routing based systems propose peer-forwarding strategy @cite_2 , in which users themselves serve as the relay for each other. However, the predecessor of the first colluder has a greater chance to be the data originator than other honest users, and this scheme is unable to defend against traffic analysis attacks launched by a global eavesdropper. RAC protocol @cite_1 solves these issues by enforcing periodical broadcasts for all users, which bring in huge communication overheads.
@cite_18 @cite_7 @cite_9 @cite_1 @cite_0 @cite_2
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Protection of privacy has become an important problem in data mining. In particular, individuals have become increasingly unwilling to share their data, frequently resulting in individuals either refusing to share their data or providing incorrect data. In turn, such problems in data collection can affect the success of data mining, which relies on sufficient amounts of accurate data in order to produce meaningful results. Random perturbation and randomized response techniques can provide some level of privacy in data collection, but they have an associated cost in accuracy. Cryptographic privacy-preserving data mining methods provide good privacy and accuracy properties. However, in order to be efficient, those solutions must be tailored to specific mining tasks, thereby losing generality.In this paper, we propose efficient cryptographic techniques for online data collection in which data from a large number of respondents is collected anonymously, without the help of a trusted third party. That is, our solution allows the miner to collect the original data from each respondent, but in such a way that the miner cannot link a respondent's data to the respondent. An advantage of such a solution is that, because it does not change the actual data, its success does not depend on the underlying data mining problem. We provide proofs of the correctness and privacy of our solution, as well as experimental data that demonstrates its efficiency. We also extend our solution to tolerate certain kinds of malicious behavior of the participants. Onion routing is an infrastructure for private communication over a public network. It provides anonymous connections that are strongly resistant to both eavesdropping and traffic analysis. Onion routing's anonymous connections are bidirectional, near real-time, and can be used anywhere a socket connection can be used. Any identifying information must be in the data stream carried over an anonymous connection. An onion is a data structure that is treated as the destination address by onion routers; thus, it is used to establish an anonymous connection. Onions themselves appear different to each onion router as well as to network observers. The same goes for data carried over the connections they establish. Proxy-aware applications, such as Web browsers and e-mail clients, require no modification to use onion routing, and do so through a series of proxies. A prototype onion routing network is running between our lab and other sites. This paper describes anonymous connections and their implementation using onion routing. This paper also describes several application proxies for onion routing, as well as configurations of onion routing networks. Enabling anonymous communication over the Internet is crucial. The first protocols that have been devised for anonymous communication are subject to freeriding. Recent protocols have thus been proposed to deal with this issue. However, these protocols do not scale to large systems, and some of them further assume the existence of trusted servers. In this paper, we present RAC, the first anonymous communication protocol that tolerates freeriders and that scales to large systems. Scalability comes from the fact that the complexity of RAC in terms of the number of message exchanges is independent from the number of nodes in the system. Another important aspect of RAC is that it does not rely on any trusted third party. We theoretically prove, using game theory, that our protocol is a Nash equilibrium, i.e, that freeriders have no interest in deviating from the protocol. Further, we experimentally evaluate RAC using simulations. Our evaluation shows that, whatever the size of the system (up to 100.000 nodes), the nodes participating in the system observe the same throughput. A technique based on public key cryptography is presented that allows an electronic mail system to hide who a participant communicates with as well as the content of the communication - in spite of an unsecured underlying telecommunication system. The technique does not require a universally trusted authority. One correspondent can remain anonymous to a second, while allowing the second to respond via an untraceable return address. The technique can also be used to form rosters of untraceable digital pseudonyms from selected applications. Applicants retain the exclusive ability to form digital signatures corresponding to their pseudonyms. Elections in which any interested party can verify that the ballots have been properly counted are possible if anonymously mailed ballots are signed with pseudonyms from a roster of registered voters. Another use allows an individual to correspond with a record-keeping organization under a unique pseudonym, which appears in a roster of acceptable clients. In this paper we introduce a system called Crowds for protecting users' anonymity on the world-wide-web. Crowds, named for the notion of “blending into a crowd,” operates by grouping users into a large and geographically diverse group (crowd) that collectively issues requests on behalf of its members. Web servers are unable to learn the true source of a request because it is equally likely to have originated from any member of the crowd, and even collaborating crowd members cannot distinguish the originator of a request from a member who is merely forwarding the request on behalf of another. We describe the design, implementation, security, performance, and scalability of our system. Our security analysis introduces degrees of anonymity as an important tool for describing and proving anonymity properties.