The 802.11e standard enables user configuration of several MAC parameters, making WLANs vulnerable to users that selfishly configure these parameters to gain throughput. In this paper we propose a novel distributed algorithm to thwart such selfish behavior. The key idea of the algorithm is for honest stations to react, upon detecting a selfish station, by using a more aggressive configuration that penalizes this station. We show that the proposed algorithm guarantees global stability while providing good response times. By conducting a game theoretic analysis of the algorithm based on repeated games, we also show its effectiveness against selfish stations. Simulation results confirm that the proposed algorithm optimizes throughput performance while discouraging selfish behavior. We also present an experimental prototype of the proposed algorithm demonstrating that it can be implemented on commodity hardware.
The approach proposed by @cite_7 does not suffer from the above drawback but addresses only two types of misbehaving stations: the so-called selfish stations, with @math , and the so-called greedy stations, with @math . While the scheme proposed is effective when dealing with these two particular configurations, other @math configurations that may greatly benefit selfish stations are neither detected nor punished by this mechanism, as we show in the simulation results of . Additionally, the algorithm of @cite_7 is based on heuristics that do not guarantee quick convergence, and indeed we show in a further simulation result in that this approach may suffer from convergence issues.
@cite_7
2162938499
CSMA CA, the contention mechanism of the IEEE 802.11 DCF medium access protocol, has recently been found vulnerable to selfish backoff attacks consisting in nonstandard configuration of the constituent backoff scheme. Such attacks can greatly increase a selfish station's bandwidth share at the expense of honest stations applying a standard configuration. The paper investigates the distribution of bandwidth among anonymous network stations, some of which are selfish. A station's obtained bandwidth share is regarded as a payoff in a noncooperative CSMA CA game. Regardless of the IEEE 802.11 parameter setting, the payoff function is found similar to a multiplayer Prisoners' Dilemma; moreover, the number (though not the identities) of selfish stations can be inferred by observation of successful transmission attempts. Further, a repeated CSMA CA game is defined, where a station can toggle between standard and nonstandard backoff configurations with a view of maximizing a long-term utility. It is argued that a desirable station strategy should yield a fair, Pareto efficient, and subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. One such strategy, called CRISP, is described and evaluated.