In contrast to today's IP-based host-oriented Internet architecture, Information-Centric Networking (ICN) emphasizes content by making it directly addressable and routable. Named Data Networking (NDN) architecture is an instance of ICN that is being developed as a candidate next-generation Internet architecture. By opportunistically caching content within the network, NDN appears to be well-suited for large-scale content distribution and for meeting the needs of increasingly mobile and bandwidth-hungry applications that dominate today's Internet. One key feature of NDN is the requirement for each content object to be digitally signed by its producer. Thus, NDN should be, in principle, immune to distributing fake (aka "poisoned") content. However, in practice, this poses two challenges for detecting fake content in NDN routers: (1) overhead due to signature verification and certificate chain traversal, and (2) lack of trust context, i.e., determining which public keys are trusted to verify which content. Because of these issues, NDN does not force routers to verify content signatures, which makes the architecture susceptible to content poisoning attacks. This paper explores root causes of, and some cures for, content poisoning attacks in NDN. In the process, it becomes apparent that meaningful mitigation of content poisoning is contingent upon a network-layer trust management architecture, elements of which we construct, while carefully justifying specific design choices. This work represents the initial effort towards comprehensive trust management for NDN.
Trust and trust management systems are well studied in the literature, especially, in distributed environments, such as MANETs, ad hoc and wireless sensor networks (WSNs). @cite_25 surveys the state of the art in trust management systems for MANETs. It emphasizes the need to combine the notions of social trust'' with quality-of-service (QoS) trust''. A similar survey can be found in @cite_2 . @cite_17 presents an extensive review of trust management systems in WSNs. Based on unique features of WSNs, trust management system's best practices are derived and state of the art countermeasures are evaluated against them. @cite_28 discusses security challenges in designing WSNs. It distinguishes between the definitions of trust and security, and shows that cryptography is not always the solution for trust management. Instead, techniques from other domains should be included in defining and formalizing trust.
@cite_28 @cite_17 @cite_25 @cite_2
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SUMMARY The range of applications of wireless sensor networks is so wide that it tends to invade our every day life. In the future, a sensor network will survey our health, our home, the roads we follow, the office or the industry we work in or even the aircrafts we use, in an attempt to enhance our safety. However, the wireless sensor networks themselves are prone to security attacks. The list of security attacks, although already very long, continues to augment impeding the expansion of these networks. The trust management schemes consist of a powerful tool for the detection of unexpected node behaviours (either faulty or malicious). Once misbehaving nodes are detected, their neighbours can use this information to avoid cooperating with them, either for data forwarding, data aggregation or any other cooperative function. A variety of trust models which follow different directions regarding the distribution of measurement functionality, the monitored behaviours and the way measurements are used to calculate define the node’s trustworthiness has been presented in the literature. In this paper, we survey trust models in an attempt to explore the interplay among the implementation requirements, the resource consumption and the achieved security. Our goal is to draw guidelines for the design of deployable trust model designs with respect to the available node and network capabilities and application peculiarities. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have been proven a useful technology for perceiving information about the physical world and as a consequence has been used in many applications such as measurement of temperature, radiation, flow of liquids, etc. The nature of this kind of technology, and also their vulnerabilities to attacks make the security tools required for them to be considered in a special way. The decision making in a WSN is essential for carrying out certain tasks as it aids sensors establish collaborations. In order to assist this process, trust management systems could play a relevant role. In this paper, we list the best practices that we consider are essential for developing a good trust management system for WSN and make an analysis of the state of the art related to these practices. Managing trust in a distributed Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) is challenging when collaboration or cooperation is critical to achieving mission and system goals such as reliability, availability, scalability, and reconfigurability. In defining and managing trust in a military MANET, we must consider the interactions between the composite cognitive, social, information and communication networks, and take into account the severe resource constraints (e.g., computing power, energy, bandwidth, time), and dynamics (e.g., topology changes, node mobility, node failure, propagation channel conditions). We seek to combine the notions of "social trust" derived from social networks with "quality-of-service (QoS) trust" derived from information and communication networks to obtain a composite trust metric. We discuss the concepts and properties of trust and derive some unique characteristics of trust in MANETs, drawing upon social notions of trust. We provide a survey of trust management schemes developed for MANETs and discuss generally accepted classifications, potential attacks, performance metrics, and trust metrics in MANETs. Finally, we discuss future research areas on trust management in MANETs based on the concept of social and cognitive networks. A mobile ad hoc network is a wireless communication network which does not rely on a pre-existing infrastructure or any centralized management. Securing the exchanges in such network is compulsory to guarantee a widespread development of services for this kind of networks. The deployment of any security policy requires the definition of a trust model that defines who trusts who and how. There is a host of research efforts in trust models framework to securing mobile ad hoc networks. The majority of well-known approaches is based on public-key certificates, and gave birth to miscellaneous trust models ranging from centralized models to web-of-trust and distributed certificate authorities. In this paper, we survey and classify the existing trust models that are based on public-key certificates proposed for mobile ad hoc networks, and then we discuss and compare them with respect to some relevant criteria. Also, we have developed analysis and comparison among trust models using stochastic Petri nets in order to measure the performance of each one with what relates to the certification service availability.