In a smart grid environment, we study coalition formation of prosumers that aim at entering the energy market. It is paramount for the grid operation that the energy producers are able to sustain the grid demand in terms of stability and minimum production requirement. We design an algorithm that seeks to form coalitions that will meet both of these requirements: a minimum energy level for the coalitions and a steady production level which leads to finding uncorrelated sources of energy to form a coalition. We propose an algorithm that uses graph tools such as correlation graphs or clique percolation to form coalitions that meet such complex constraints. We validate the algorithm against a random procedure and show that, it not only performs better in term of social welfare for the power grid, but also that it is more robust against unforeseen production variations due to changing weather conditions for instance.
On a narrower scale, @cite_7 study the formation, in a game theoretic setting, of virtual power plants (VPP) composed of multiple self-interested DER. Two requirements for the formation of virtual power plants are considered : the reliability of supply and the minimization of entities the grid has to deal with. From this, @cite_7 builds a pricing mechanism that encourages VPP to report true estimates of their aggregated production and penalizes prediction errors. A redistribution scheme of the VPP to the DER is also constructed such that the payoff allocation lies in the core of the game, meaning that no DER has an incentive to leave the coalition.
@cite_7
156819711
The creation of Virtual Power Plants (VPPs) has been suggested in recent years as the means for achieving the cost-efficient integration of the many distributed energy resources (DERs) that are starting to emerge in the electricity network. In this work, we contribute to the development of VPPs by offering a game-theoretic perspective to the problem. Specifically, we design cooperatives (or "cooperative VPPs"---CVPPs) of rational autonomous DER-agents representing small-to-medium size renewable electricity producers, which coalesce to profitably sell their energy to the electricity grid. By so doing, we help to counter the fact that individual DERs are often excluded from the wholesale energy market due to their perceived inefficiency and unreliability. We discuss the issues surrounding the emergence of such cooperatives, and propose a pricing mechanism with certain desirable properties. Specifically, our mechanism guarantees that CVPPs have the incentive to truthfully report to the grid accurate estimates of their electricity production, and that larger rather than smaller CVPPs form; this promotes CVPP efficiency and reliability. In addition, we propose a scheme to allocate payments within the cooperative, and show that, given this scheme and the pricing mechanism, the allocation is in the core and, as such, no subset of members has a financial incentive to break away from the CVPP. Moreover, we develop an analytical tool for quantifying the uncertainty about DER production estimates, and distinguishing among different types of errors regarding such estimates. We then utilize this tool to devise protocols to manage CVPP membership. Finally, we demonstrate these ideas through a simulation that uses real-world data.