In the context of using norms for controlling multiagent systems, a vitally important question that has not yet been addressed in the literature is the development of mechanisms for monitoring norm compliance under partial action observability. This paper proposes the reconstruction of unobserved actions to tackle this problem. In particular, we formalize the problem of reconstructing unobserved actions, and propose an information model and algorithms for monitoring norms under partial action observability using two different processes for reconstructing unobserved actions. Our evaluation shows that reconstructing unobserved actions increases significantly the number of norm violations and fulfilments detected.
mechanisms prevent agents from performing forbidden actions (vs. force agents to perform obligatory actions) by mediating access to resources and the communication channel, such as Electronic Institutions (EIs) @cite_17 . However, the regimentation of all actions is often difficult or impossible. Furthermore, it is sometimes preferable to allow agents to make flexible decisions about norm compliance @cite_8 . In response to this need, mechanisms were developed. Proposals on the enforcement of norms can be classified according to the entity that monitors whether norms are fulfilled or not. Specifically, norm compliance can be monitored by either agents themselves or the underlying infrastructure may provide monitoring entities.
@cite_8 @cite_17
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The right framework for studying normative issues in infosociety and MAS is that of deliberate or spontaneous social order, and intended or unintended, centralised or decentralised forms of social control. For effectively supporting human cooperation it is necessary to "incorporate" social and normative knowledge in intelligent technology; computers should deal with--and thus partially "understand"--permissions, obligations, power, roles, commitments, trust, etc. Here only one facet of this problem is considered: the spontaneous and decentralised norm creation, and normative monitoring and intervention. Cognitive aspects of spontaneous conventions, implicit commitments, tacit agreements, and the bottom-up issuing and spreading of norms are discussed. The transition from "face to face" normative relationships to some stronger constraints on agents' action, and to institutions and authority, and the possibility of a consequent increase of trust, are explored. In particular, I focus on the transition from two party trust, right, permission, and commitment, to three party relationships, where some witness or some enforcing authority is introduced. In this perspective of 'formalising the informal', i.e., the interpersonal unofficial normative matter, I discuss (also in order to stress dangers of computer-based formalisation and enforcement of rules) the important phenomenon of functional (collaborative) systematic violation of rules in organisation and cooperation, and the possible emergence of a "convention to violate". The design and development of open multi-agent systems (MAS) is a key aspect in agent research. We advocate that they can be realised as electronic institutions. In this paper we focus on the execution of electronic institutions by introducing AMELI, an infrastructure that mediates agentsý interactions while enforcing institutional rules. An innovative feature of AMELI is that it is of general purpose (it can interpret any institution specification), and therefore it can be regarded as domain-independent. The combination of ISLANDER [5] and AMELI provides full support for the design and development of electronic institutions.