This paper presents an analysis of data from a gift-exchange-game experiment. The experiment was described in The Impact of Social Comparisons on Reciprocity' by G " 2012. Since this paper uses state-of-art data science techniques, the results provide a different point of view on the problem. As already shown in relevant literature from experimental economics, human decisions deviate from rational payoff maximization. The average gift rate was @math . Gift rate was under no conditions zero. Further, we derive some special findings and calculate their significance.
A similar approach is already explored on three datasets -- a zero-sum game of mixed strategies, an ultimatum game and repeated social guessing game @cite_28 @cite_11 . For these datasets, extracted deterministic regularities outperformed state-of-art models. It was shown that some regularities can be easily verbalized, what underlines their plausibility. A very comprehensive gathering of works in experimental psychology and economics on human behavior in general games can be found in @cite_34 . Quantal response equilibrium became popular as a model for deviations from equilibria @cite_18 . It is a parametrized shift between mixed strategies equilibrium and an equal distribution. The basic idea for quantal response equilibrium is the concept of trembling hand -- people make mistakes with certain probability. Unfortunately, the Akaike information criterion @cite_8 is rarely calculated to judge the trade-off between fit quality and model complexity @cite_20 . Another popular model is the linear regression. It is used in the original paper to model the dataset @cite_29 . For linear regression, data is translated into real numbers.
@cite_18 @cite_8 @cite_28 @cite_29 @cite_34 @cite_20 @cite_11
2264897026 2058815839 2105906421 1580723584 1967445478
We investigate the use of standard statistical models for quantal choice in a game theoretic setting. Players choose strategies based on relative expected utility and assume other players do so as well. We define a quantal response equilibrium (ORE) as a fixed point of this process and establish existence. For a logit specification of the error structure, we show that as the error goes to zero, QRE approaches a subset of Nash equilibria and also implies a unique selection from the set of Nash equilibria in generic games. We fit the model to a variety of experimental data sets by using maximum likelihood estimation. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C19, C44, C72, C92. In this paper it is shown that the classical maximum likelihood principle can be considered to be a method of asymptotic realization of an optimum estimate with respect to a very general information theoretic criterion. This observation shows an extension of the principle to provide answers to many practical problems of statistical model fitting. We investigate the effects of pay comparison information (i.e. information about what coworkers earn) and effort comparison information (information about how co-workers perform) in experimental firms composed of one employer and two employees. Exposure to pay comparison information in isolation from effort comparison information does not appear to affect reciprocity toward employers: in this case own wage is a powerful determinant of own effort, but co-worker wages have no effect. By contrast, we find that exposure to both pieces of social information systematically influences employees’ reciprocity. A generous wage offer is virtually ineffective if an employee is matched with a lazy co-worker who is also paid generously: in such circumstances the employee tends to expend low effort irrespective of her own wage. Reciprocity is more pronounced when the co-worker is hard-working, as effort is strongly and positively related to own wage in this case. Reciprocity is also pronounced when the employer pays unequal wages to the employees: in this case the co-worker’s effort decision is disregarded and effort decisions are again strongly and positively related to own wage. On average exposure to social information weakens reciprocity, though we find substantial heterogeneity in responses across individuals, and find that sometimes social information has beneficial effects. We suggest that group composition may be an important tool for harnessing the positive effects of social comparison processes. Markets market economics of uncertainty general equilibrium and the economics games mechanisms design and policy applications non-market and organizational research institutional choice and the evolution individual choice, beliefs and behaviour methods, classroom applications. In this paper, we want to introduce experimental economics to the field of data mining and vice versa. It continues related work on mining deterministic behavior rules of human subjects in data gathered from experiments. Game-theoretic predictions partially fail to work with this data. Equilibria also known as game-theoretic predictions solely succeed with experienced subjects in specific games - conditions, which are rarely given. Contemporary experimental economics offers a number of alternative models apart from game theory. In relevant literature, these models are always biased by philosophical plausibility considerations and are claimed to fit the data. An agnostic data mining approach to the problem is introduced in this paper - the philosophical plausibility considerations follow after the correlations are found. No other biases are regarded apart from determinism. The dataset of the paper Social Learning in Networks" by 2012 is taken for evaluation. As a result, we come up with new findings. As future work, the design of a new infrastructure is discussed.