Mobile sensing has become a promising paradigm for mobile users to obtain information by task crowd- sourcing. However, due to the social preferences of mobile users, the quality of sensing reports may be impacted by the underlying social attributes and selfishness of individuals. Therefore, it is crucial to con- sider the social impacts and trustworthiness of mobile users when selecting task participants in mobile sensing. In this paper, we propose a Social Aware Crowdsourcing with Reputation Management (SACRM) scheme to select the well-suited participants and allocate the task rewards in mobile sensing. Specifically, we consider the social attributes, task delay and reputation in crowdsourcing and propose a participant selection scheme to choose the well-suited participants for the sensing task under a fixed task budget. A report assessment and rewarding scheme is also introduced to measure the quality of the sensing reports and allocate the task rewards based the assessed report quality. In addition, we develop a reputation management scheme to evaluate the trustworthiness and cost performance ratio of mobile users for par- ticipant selection. Theoretical analysis and extensive simulations demonstrate that SACRM can efficiently improve the crowdsourcing utility and effectively stimulate the participants to improve the quality of their sensing reports.
Dynamic pricing is an effective incentive mechanism widely used in mobile sensing @cite_21 @cite_4 @cite_1 @cite_19 . Yang et. al. @cite_21 propose two incentive mechanisms to stimulate mobile users' participation respectively for platform-centric and user-centric mobile sensing. For the platform-centric model, they present a Stackelberg game @cite_20 based incentive mechanism to maximize the utility of the platform. For the user-centric model, they design an auction-based incentive mechanism that is proved to be computationally efficient, individually rational, profitable and truthful. Jaimes et. al. @cite_4 propose a recurrent reverse auction incentive mechanism using a greedy algorithm to select a representative subset of users according to their locations under a fixed budget. @cite_1 , the authors develop and evaluate a reverse auction based dynamic pricing incentive mechanism to stimulate mobile users' participation and reduce the incentive cost. Besides the dynamic pricing mechanism, personal demand and social relationship are introduced into the incentive mechanism study @cite_10 @cite_0 @cite_12 . Luo et. al. @cite_10 link the incentive to personal demand for consuming compelling services. Based on the demand principle, two incentive schemes, called Incentive with Demand Fairness (IDF) and Iterative Tank Filling (ITF), are proposed to maximize fairness and social welfare, respectively.
@cite_4 @cite_21 @cite_1 @cite_0 @cite_19 @cite_10 @cite_12 @cite_20
2105385568 1970756365 2058911993 2088940490 2005406065 2074053300 2058210123 2067064328
Participatory sensing (PS) systems rely on the willingness of mobile users to participate in the collection and reporting of data using a variety of sensors either embedded or integrated in their cellular phones. However, this new data collection paradigm has not been very successful yet mainly because of the lack of incentives for participation. Although several incentive schemes have been proposed to encourage user participation, none has used location information and imposed budget and coverage constraints, which will make the scheme more realistic and efficient. We propose a recurrent reverse auction incentive mechanism with a greedy algorithm that selects a representative subset of the users according to their location given a fixed budget. Compared to existing mechanisms, our incentive scheme improves the area covered by more than 60 percent acquiring a more representative set of samples after every round while maintaining the same number of active users in the system and spending the same budget. Mobile phone sensing is a new paradigm which takes advantage of the pervasive smartphones to collect and analyze data beyond the scale of what was previously possible. In a mobile phone sensing system, the platform recruits smartphone users to provide sensing service. Existing mobile phone sensing applications and systems lack good incentive mechanisms that can attract more user participation. To address this issue, we design incentive mechanisms for mobile phone sensing. We consider two system models: the platform-centric model where the platform provides a reward shared by participating users, and the user-centric model where users have more control over the payment they will receive. For the platform-centric model, we design an incentive mechanism using a Stackelberg game, where the platform is the leader while the users are the followers. We show how to compute the unique Stackelberg Equilibrium, at which the utility of the platform is maximized, and none of the users can improve its utility by unilaterally deviating from its current strategy. For the user-centric model, we design an auction-based incentive mechanism, which is computationally efficient, individually rational, profitable, and truthful. Through extensive simulations, we evaluate the performance and validate the theoretical properties of our incentive mechanisms. User participation is one of the most important elements in participatory sensing application for providing adequate level of service quality. However, incentive mechanism and its economic model for user participation have been less addressed so far in this research domain. This paper studies the economic model of user participation incentive in participatory sensing applications. To stimulate user participation, we design and evaluate a novel reverse auction based dynamic pricing incentive mechanism where users can sell their sensing data to a service provider with users' claimed bid prices. The proposed incentive mechanism focuses on minimizing and stabilizing the incentive cost while maintaining adequate level of participants by preventing users from dropping out of participatory sensing applications. Compared with random selection based fixed pricing incentive mechanism, the proposed mechanism not only reduces the incentive cost for retaining the same number of participants but also improves the fairness of incentive distribution and social welfare. It also helps us to achieve the geographically balanced sensing measurements and, more importantly, can remove the burden of accurate price decision for user data that is the most difficult step in designing incentive mechanism. This paper studies economic models of user participation incentive in participatory sensing applications. User participation is the most important element in participatory sensing applications for providing adequate level of service quality. However, incentive mechanism and its economic model for user participation have never been addressed so far in this research domain. In order to stimulate user participation, we design and evaluate a novel Reverse Auction based Dynamic Price (RADP) incentive mechanism, where users can sell their sensing data to a service provider with users' claimed bid prices. The proposed incentive mechanism focuses on minimizing and stabilizing incentive cost while maintaining adequate number of participants by preventing users from dropping out of participatory sensing applications. Compared with a Random Selection with Fixed Price (RSFP) incentive mechanism, the proposed mechanism not only reduces the incentive cost for retaining same number of participants by more than 60 but also improves the fairness of incentive distribution and social welfare. More importantly, RADP can remove burden of accurate pricing for user sensing data, the most difficult step in RSFP. Participatory sensing has emerged as a novel paradigm for data collection and collective knowledge formation about a state or condition of interest, sometimes linked to a geographic area. In this paper, we address the problem of incentive mechanism design for data contributors for participatory sensing applications. The service provider receives service queries in an area from service requesters and initiates an auction for user participation. Upon request, each user reports its perceived cost per unit of amount of participation, which essentially maps to a requested amount of compensation for participation. The participation cost quantifies the dissatisfaction caused to user due to participation. This cost is considered to be private information for each device, as it strongly depends on various factors inherent to it, such as the energy cost for sensing, data processing and transmission to the closest point of wireless access, the residual battery level, the number of concurrent jobs at the device processor, the required bandwidth to transmit data and the related charges of the mobile network operator, or even the user discomfort due to manual effort to submit data. Hence, participants have strong motive to mis-report their cost, i.e. declare a higher cost that the actual one, so as to obtain higher payment. We seek a mechanism for user participation level determination and payment allocation which is most viable for the provider, that is, it minimizes the total cost of compensating participants, while delivering a certain quality of experience to service requesters. We cast the problem in the context of optimal reverse auction design, and we show how the different quality of submitted information by participants can be tracked by the service provider and used in the participation level and payment selection procedures. We derive a mechanism that optimally solves the problem above, and at the same time it is individually rational (i.e., it motivates users to participate) and incentive-compatible (i.e. it motivates truthful cost reporting by participants). Finally, a representative participatory sensing case study involving parameter estimation is presented, which exemplifies the incentive mechanism above. Participatory sensing has emerged recently as a promising approach to large-scale data collection. However, without incentives for users to regularly contribute good quality data, this method is unlikely to be viable in the long run. In this paper, we link incentive to users' demand for consuming compelling services, as an approach complementary to conventional credit or reputation based approaches. With this demand-based principle, we design two incentive schemes, Incentive with Demand Fairness (IDF) and Iterative Tank Filling (ITF), for maximizing fairness and social welfare, respectively. Our study shows that the IDF scheme is max-min fair and can score close to 1 on the Jain's fairness index, while the ITF scheme maximizes social welfare and achieves a unique Nash equilibrium which is also Pareto and globally optimal. We adopted a game theoretic approach to derive the optimal service demands. Furthermore, to address practical considerations, we use a stochastic programming technique to handle uncertainty that is often encountered in real life situations. The idea of social participatory sensing provides a substrate to benefit from friendship relations in recruiting a critical mass of participants willing to attend in a sensing campaign. However, the selection of suitable participants who are trustable and provide high quality contributions is challenging. In this paper, we propose a recruitment framework for social participatory sensing. Our framework leverages multi-hop friendship relations to identify and select suitable and trustworthy participants among friends or friends of friends, and finds the most trustable paths to them. The framework also includes a suggestion component which provides a cluster of suggested friends along with the path to them, which can be further used for recruitment or friendship establishment. Simulation results demonstrate the efficacy of our proposed recruitment framework in terms of selecting a large number of well-suited participants and providing contributions with high overall trust, in comparison with one-hop recruitment architecture. This survey provides a structured and comprehensive overview of research on security and privacy in computer and communication networks that use game-theoretic approaches. We present a selected set of works to highlight the application of game theory in addressing different forms of security and privacy problems in computer networks and mobile applications. We organize the presented works in six main categories: security of the physical and MAC layers, security of self-organizing networks, intrusion detection systems, anonymity and privacy, economics of network security, and cryptography. In each category, we identify security problems, players, and game models. We summarize the main results of selected works, such as equilibrium analysis and security mechanism designs. In addition, we provide a discussion on the advantages, drawbacks, and future direction of using game theory in this field. In this survey, our goal is to instill in the reader an enhanced understanding of different research approaches in applying game-theoretic methods to network security. This survey can also help researchers from various fields develop game-theoretic solutions to current and emerging security problems in computer networking.