Blockchain has become one of the most attractive technologies for applications, with a large range of deployments such as production, economy, or banking. Under the hood, Blockchain technology is a type of distributed database that supports untrusted parties. In this paper we focus Hyperledger Fabric, the first blockchain in the market tailored for a private environment, allowing businesses to create a permissioned network. Hyperledger Fabric implements a PBFT consensus in order to maintain a non forking blockchain at the application level. We deployed this framework over an area network between France and Germany in order to evaluate its performance when potentially large network delays are observed. Overall we found that when network delay increases significantly (i.e. up to 3.5 seconds at network layer between two clouds), we observed that the blocks added to our blockchain had up to 134 seconds offset after 100 th block from one cloud to another. Thus by delaying block propagation, we demonstrated that Hyperledger Fabric does not provide sufficient consistency guaranties to be deployed in critical environments. Our work, is the fist to evidence the negative impact of network delays on a PBFT-based blockchain.
@cite_22 the authors describe two methods for hijacking Bitcoin: one by BGP hijacking and the second one by delaying propagation. They demonstrated that any network attacker can hijack few ( @math 100) BGP prefixes to isolate @math 50 Hijacking attack is also the premise for a full-fledged attacks on Ethereum blockchain to steal coins @cite_22 . They can multiply an asset by 200,000 in just 10 hours in consortium or private context.
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As the most successful cryptocurrency to date, Bitcoin constitutes a target of choice for attackers. While many attack vectors have already been uncovered, one important vector has been left out though: attacking the currency via the Internet routing infrastructure itself. Indeed, by manipulating routing advertisements (BGP hijacks) or by naturally intercepting traffic, Autonomous Systems (ASes) can intercept and manipulate a large fraction of Bitcoin traffic. This paper presents the first taxonomy of routing attacks and their impact on Bitcoin, considering both small-scale attacks, targeting individual nodes, and large-scale attacks, targeting the network as a whole. While challenging, we show that two key properties make routing attacks practical: (i) the efficiency of routing manipulation; and (ii) the significant centralization of Bitcoin in terms of mining and routing. Specifically, we find that any network attacker can hijack few (<100) BGP prefixes to isolate 50 of the mining power---even when considering that mining pools are heavily multi-homed. We also show that on-path network attackers can considerably slow down block propagation by interfering with few key Bitcoin messages. We demonstrate the feasibility of each attack against the deployed Bitcoin software. We also quantify their effectiveness on the current Bitcoin topology using data collected from a Bitcoin supernode combined with BGP routing data. The potential damage to Bitcoin is worrying. By isolating parts of the network or delaying block propagation, attackers can cause a significant amount of mining power to be wasted, leading to revenue losses and enabling a wide range of exploits such as double spending. To prevent such effects in practice, we provide both short and long-term countermeasures, some of which can be deployed immediately.