Personal devices (e.g. laptops, tablets, and mobile phones) are conventional in daily life and have the ability to store users' private data. The security problems related to these appliances have become a primary concern for both users and researchers. In this paper, we analyse first-person-view videos to develop a personalized user authentication mechanism. Our proposed algorithm generates provisional image-based passwords which benefit a variety of purposes such as unlocking a mobile device or fallback authentication. First, representative frames are extracted from the egocentric videos. Then, they are split into distinguishable segments before a clustering procedure is applied to discard repetitive scenes. The whole process aims to retain memorable images to form the authentication challenges. We integrate eye tracking data to select informative sequences of video frames and suggest a blurriness-based method if an eye-facing camera is not available. To evaluate our system, we perform experiments in different settings including object-interaction activities and traveling contexts. Even though our mechanism produces variable graphical passwords, the log-in effort for the user is comparable with approaches based on static challenges. We verified the authentication challenges in the presence of a random and an informed attacker who is familiar with the environment and observed that the time required and the number of attempts are significantly higher than for the legitimate user, making it possible to detect attacks on the authentication system.
Pattern-based passwords on touch screens have been comfortably adopted for a long time but they can be compromised, for example, by a camera-based smudge attack @cite_39 . Thus, several user authentication approaches have been proposed as alternative solutions. Most of them exploited users' behaviorial data recorded by wearable sensors such as accelerometer @cite_34 @cite_2 or camera @cite_28 . A couple of innovative authentication forms were built on implicit memory of past information, such as events @cite_11 @cite_18 , images @cite_40 @cite_30 , and installed applications @cite_37 .
@cite_30 @cite_18 @cite_37 @cite_28 @cite_39 @cite_40 @cite_2 @cite_34 @cite_11
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Current secure systems suffer because they neglect the importance of human factors in security. We address a fundamental weakness of knowledge-based authentication schemes, which is the human limitation to remember secure passwords. Our approach to improve the security of these systems relies on recognition-based, rather than recall-based authentication. We examine the requirements of a recognition-based authentication system and propose Deja Vu, which authenticates a user through her ability to recognize previously seen images. Deja Vu is more reliable and easier to use than traditional recall-based schemes, which require the user to precisely recall passwords or PINs. Furthermore, it has the advantage that it prevents users from choosing weak passwords and makes it difficult to write down or share passwords with others. We develop a prototype of Deja Vu and conduct a user study that compares it to traditional password and PIN authentication. Our user study shows that 90 of all participants succeeded in the authentication tests using Deja Vu while only about 70 succeeded using passwords and PINS. Our findings indicate that Deja Vu has potential applications, especially where text input is hard (e.g., PDAs or ATMs), or in situations where passwords are infrequently used (e.g., web site passwords). In this paper, we present the design and evaluation of dynamic security questions for fallback authentication. In case users lose access to their device, the system asks questions about their usage behavior (e.g. calls, text messages or app usage). We performed two consecutive user studies with real users and real adversaries to identify questions that work well in the sense that they are easy to answer for the genuine user, but hard to guess for an adversary. The results show that app installations and communication are the most promising categories of questions. Using three questions from the evaluated categories was sufficient to get an accuracy of 95.5 - 100 . Existing graphical passwords require users to proactively memorize their secrets and meanwhile these schemes are vulnerable to shoulder surfing attacks. We propose a novel graphical password scheme, PassApp, which utilizes users' everyday memory about installed apps on mobile devices as shared secrets. As the registration stage is no longer needed, PassApp exempts users from additional memory burden and greatly enhances user experience. Additionally, PassApp owns a large password set and only a small part of passwords may be exposed during a login. Therefore, PassApp has a natural advance on effectively resisting guessing attacks and shoulder surfing attacks. Our user studies demonstrate that PassApp performs well with a reasonable login time (7.27s) and a high success rate (95.48 ). Our security analysis shows PassApp can effectively withstand one-time shoulder surfing attacks and on average 30 times of shoulder surfing are necessary to expose all passwords. As mobile technology grows rapidly, the smartphone has become indispensable for transmitting private user data, storing the sensitive corporate files, and conducting secure payment transactions. However, with mobile security research lagging, smartphones are extremely vulnerable to unauthenticated access. In this paper, we present, EyeVeri, a novel eye-movement-based authentication system for smartphone security protection. Specifically, EyeVeri tracks human eye movement through the built-in front camera and applies the signal processing and pattern matching techniques to explore volitional and non-volitional gaze patterns for access authentication. Through a comprehensive user study, EyeVeri performs well and is a promising approach for smartphone user authentication. We also discuss the evaluation results in-depth and analyze opportunities for future work. Touch screens are an increasingly common feature on personal computing devices, especially smartphones, where size and user interface advantages accrue from consolidating multiple hardware components (keyboard, number pad, etc.) into a single software definable user interface. Oily residues, or smudges, on the touch screen surface, are one side effect of touches from which frequently used patterns such as a graphical password might be inferred. In this paper we examine the feasibility of such smudge attacks on touch screens for smartphones, and focus our analysis on the Android password pattern. We first investigate the conditions (e.g., lighting and camera orientation) under which smudges are easily extracted. In the vast majority of settings, partial or complete patterns are easily retrieved. We also emulate usage situations that interfere with pattern identification, and show that pattern smudges continue to be recognizable. Finally, we provide a preliminary analysis of applying the information learned in a smudge attack to guessing an Android password pattern. Knowledge-based authentication systems generally rely upon users' explicit recollection of passwords, facts, or personal preferences. These systems impose a cognitive burden that often results in forgotten secrets or secrets with poor entropy. We propose an authentication system that instead draws on implicit memory - that is, the unconscious encoding and usage of information. In such a system, a user is initially presented with images of common objects in a casual familiarization task. When the user later authenticates, she is asked to perform a task involving a set of degraded images, some of which are based upon the images in the familiarization task. The prior exposure to those images influences the user's responses in the task, thereby eliciting authentication information. We ran a user study to investigate the plausibility of our system design. Our results suggest that implicit memory has potential as a basis for low-cognitive-overhead, high-stability, knowledge-based authentication. We introduce hand movement, orientation, and grasp (HMOG), a set of behavioral features to continuously authenticate smartphone users. HMOG features unobtrusively capture subtle micro-movement and orientation dynamics resulting from how a user grasps, holds, and taps on the smartphone. We evaluated authentication and biometric key generation (BKG) performance of HMOG features on data collected from 100 subjects typing on a virtual keyboard. Data were collected under two conditions: 1) sitting and 2) walking. We achieved authentication equal error rates (EERs) as low as 7.16 (walking) and 10.05 (sitting) when we combined HMOG, tap, and keystroke features. We performed experiments to investigate why HMOG features perform well during walking. Our results suggest that this is due to the ability of HMOG features to capture distinctive body movements caused by walking, in addition to the hand-movement dynamics from taps. With BKG, we achieved the EERs of 15.1 using HMOG combined with taps. In comparison, BKG using tap, key hold, and swipe features had EERs between 25.7 and 34.2 . We also analyzed the energy consumption of HMOG feature extraction and computation. Our analysis shows that HMOG features extracted at a 16-Hz sensor sampling rate incurred a minor overhead of 7.9 without sacrificing authentication accuracy. Two points distinguish our work from current literature: 1) we present the results of a comprehensive evaluation of three types of features (HMOG, keystroke, and tap) and their combinations under the same experimental conditions and 2) we analyze the features from three perspectives (authentication, BKG, and energy consumption on smartphones). In this paper, we present the design, implementation and evaluation of a user authentication system, Headbanger, for smart head-worn devices, through monitoring the user's unique head-movement patterns in response to an external audio stimulus. Compared to today's solutions, which primarily rely on indirect authentication mechanisms via the user's smartphone, thus cumbersome and susceptible to adversary intrusions, the proposed head-movement based authentication provides an accurate, robust, light-weight and convenient solution. Through extensive experimental evaluation with 95 participants, we show that our mechanism can accurately authenticate users with an average true acceptance rate of 95.57 while keeping the average false acceptance rate of 4.43 . We also show that even simple head-movement patterns are robust against imitation attacks. Finally, we demonstrate our authentication algorithm is rather light-weight: the overall processing latency on Google Glass is around 1.9 seconds. We explore how well the intersection between our own everyday memories and those captured by our smartphones can be used for what we call autobiographical authentication-a challenge-response authentication system that queries users about day-to-day experiences. Through three studies-two on MTurk and one field study-we found that users are good, but make systematic errors at answering autobiographical questions. Using Bayesian modeling to account for these systematic response errors, we derived a formula for computing a confidence rating that the attempting authenticator is the user from a sequence of question-answer responses. We tested our formula against five simulated adversaries based on plausible real-life counterparts. Our simulations indicate that our model of autobiographical authentication generally performs well in assigning high confidence estimates to the user and low confidence estimates to impersonating adversaries.