In this paper, an electric vehicle (EV) charging competition, among EV aggregators that perform coordinated EV charging, is explored while taking into consideration potential non-ideal actions of the aggregators. In the coordinated EV charging strategy presented in this paper, each aggregator determines EV charging start time and charging energy profiles to minimize overall EV charging energy cost by including consideration of the actions of the neighboring aggregators. The competitive interactions of the aggregators are modeled by developing a two-stage non-cooperative game among the aggregators. The game is then studied under prospect theory to examine the impacts of non-ideal actions of the aggregators in selecting EV charging start times according to subjectively evaluating their opponents' actions. It is shown that the non-cooperative interactions among the aggregators lead to a subgame perfect @math -Nash equilibrium when the game is played with either ideal, or non-ideal, actions of the aggregators. A case study presented demonstrates that the benefits of the coordinated EV charging strategy, in terms of energy cost savings and peak-to-average ratio reductions, are significantly resilient to non-ideal actions of the aggregators.
Strategic decision-making of users has been widely investigated, by modeling user behavior, in many user-centric applications in sociology, economics, and energy markets @cite_38 @cite_34 @cite_14 . Game theory has been a popular analytical platform in demand-side management literature to model how users strategically reason about their neighbors' behavior to determine their own energy strategies such that the system-wide objectives are optimized @cite_15 @cite_36 @cite_33 @cite_32 @cite_2 . The demand-side management approach in @cite_17 optimally schedules the user energy consumption through a non-cooperative game among energy users. The non-cooperative Stackelberg game in @cite_25 explores optimal load interaction between a utility company and residential energy users to balance energy demand and supply. Moreover, the insights of game theory have been used to study the energy trading competition between shared energy storage systems and self-interested solar energy users for small-scale demand-side management @cite_6 @cite_3 .
@cite_38 @cite_14 @cite_33 @cite_36 @cite_32 @cite_6 @cite_3 @cite_2 @cite_15 @cite_34 @cite_25 @cite_17
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Customer behavior modeling has been gaining increasing attention in the operations management community. In this paper we review current models of customer behavior in the revenue management and auction literatures and suggest several future research directions. In contemporary power systems, residential consumers may account for up to 50 of a country's total electrical energy consumption. Even though they constitute a significant portion of the energy market, not much has been achieved towards eliminating the inability for energy suppliers to perform long-term portfolio management, thus maximizing their revenue. The root cause of these problems is the difficulty in modeling consumers' behavior, based on their everyday activities and personal comfort. If one were able to provide targeted incentives based on consumer profiles, the expected impact and market benefits would be significant. This paper introduces a formal residential consumer modeling methodology, that allows (i) the decomposition of the observed electrical load curves into consumer activities and, (ii) the evaluation of the impact of behavioral changes on the household's aggregate load curve. Analyzing electrical consumption measurements from DEHEMS research project enabled the model extraction of real-life consumers. Experiments indicate that the proposed methodology produces accurate small-scale consumer models and verify that small shifts in appliance usage times are sufficient to achieve significant peak power reduction. We study the demand side management (DSM) problem when customers are equipped with energy storage devices. Two games are discussed: the first is a non-cooperative one played between the residential energy consumers, while the second is a Stackelberg game played between the utility provider and the energy consumers. We introduce a new cost function applicable to the case of users selling back stored energy. The non-cooperative energy consumption game is played between users who schedule their energy use to minimize energy cost. The game is shown to have a unique Nash equilibrium, that is also the global system optimal point. In the Stackelberg game, the utility provider sets the prices to maximize its profit knowing that users will respond by minimizing their cost. We provide existence and uniqueness results for the Stackelberg equilibrium. The Stackelberg game is shown to be the general case of the minimum Peak-to-Average power ratio (PAR) problem. Two algorithms, centralized and distributed, are presented to solve the Stackelberg game. We present results that elucidate the interplay between storage capacity, energy requirements, number of users and system performance measured in total cost and peak-to-average power ratio (PAR). This paper investigates the residential energy consumption scheduling problem, which is formulated as a coupled-constraint game by taking the interaction among users and the temporally-coupled constraint into consideration. The proposed solution consists of two parts. Firstly, dual decomposition is applied to transform the original coupled-constraint game into a decoupled one. Then, Nash equilibrium of the decoupled game is proven to be achievable via best response, which is computed by gradient projection. The proposed solution is also extended to an online version, which is able to alleviate the impact of the price prediction error. Numerical results demonstrate that the proposed approach can effectively shift the peak-hour demand to off-peak hours, enhance the welfare of each user, and minimize the peak-to-average ratio. The scalability of the approach and the impact of the user number are also investigated. Demand-side management (DSM) is a key solution for reducing the peak-time power consumption in smart grids. To provide incentives for consumers to shift their consumption to off- peak times, the utility company charges consumers the differential pricing for using power at different times of the day. Consumers take into account these differential prices when deciding when and how much power to consume daily. Importantly, while consumers enjoy lower billing costs when shifting their power usage to off- peak times, they also incur discomfort costs due to the altering of their power consumption patterns. Existing works propose stationary strategies for the myopic consumers to minimize their short-term billing and discomfort costs. In contrast, we model the interaction emerging among self-interested and foresighted consumers as a repeated energy scheduling game and prove that the stationary strategies are suboptimal in terms of long-term total billing and discomfort costs. Subsequently, we propose a novel framework for determining optimal nonstationary DSM strategies, in which consumers can choose different daily power consumption patterns depending on their preferences, routines, and needs. As a direct consequence of the nonstationary DSM policy, different subsets of consumers are allowed to use power in peak times at a low price. The subset of consumers that are selected daily to have their joint discomfort and billing costs minimized is determined based on the consumers power consumption preferences as well as on the past history of which consumers have shifted their usage previously. Importantly, we show that the proposed strategies are incentive compatible. Simulations confirm that, given the same peak-to-average ratio, the proposed strategy can reduce the total cost (billing and discomfort costs) by up to 50 compared to existing DSM strategies. This paper develops a novel energy trading system with a community energy storage (CES) device for demand-side load management within a neighborhood area network. The energy users in the proposed system that have their own photovoltaic power generation are allowed to trade energy from their personal surplus with the grid and the CES device. We adopt a dynamic noncooperative repeated game with Pareto-efficient pure strategies as the decentralized approach for the users to determine optimal energy trading amounts for the next day. This decentralized model needs minimal information exchange or communication between users. Simulation results show that our system is able to provide peak load leveling for the grid, while providing financial benefits to users. Moreover, the performance benefits of our system are robust to both inaccuracy in day-ahead power forecasts and CES battery inefficiencies. This paper proposes an innovative game theoretic framework for a next-generation retail electricity market (“Energy Internet”) with high penetration of distributed residential electricity suppliers (“Energy Cells”). The envisioned Energy Internet is developed for plug-and-play of a large number of distributed renewable energy generation and energy storage. The residential customers, referred as Energy Cells, are not only the electricity consumers but can also be the electricity suppliers by locally operating and managing their own distributed generators, distributed energy storage devices, and dispatchable loads. This paper formulates a set of mathematical models of the retail electricity market participants with a number of local and global constraints. A numerical case study is performed to validate the proposed next-generation retail electricity market framework using game-theoretic methodologies. The numerical simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed market clearing scheme with high penetration of distributed residential electricity suppliers. Demand-side management in smart grids has emerged as a hot topic for optimizing energy consumption. In conventional research works, energy consumption is optimized from the perspective of either the users or the power company. In this paper, we investigate how energy consumption may be optimized by taking into consideration the interaction between both parties. We propose a new energy price model as a function of total energy consumption. Also, we propose a new objective function, which optimizes the difference between the value and cost of energy. The power supplier pulls consumers in a round-robin fashion and provides them with energy price parameter and current consumption summary vector. Each user then optimizes his own schedule and reports it to the supplier, which, in turn, updates its energy price parameter before pulling the next consumers. This interaction between the power company and its consumers is modeled through a two-step centralized game, based on which we propose our game-theoretic energy schedule (GTES) method. The objective of our GTES method is to reduce the peak-to-average power ratio by optimizing the users' energy schedules. The performance of the GTES approach is evaluated through computer-based simulations. Choice behavior is typically evaluated by assuming that the data is generated by one latent decision-making process or another. What if there are two (or more) latent decision-making processes generating the observed choices? Some choices might then be better characterized as being generated by one process, and other choices by the other process. A finite mixture model can be used to estimate the parameters of each decision process while simultaneously estimating the probability that each process applies to the sample. We consider the canonical case of lottery choices in a laboratory experiment and assume that the data is generated by expected utility theory and prospect theory decision rules. We jointly estimate the parameters of each theory as well as the fraction of choices characterized by each. The methodology provides the wedding invitation, and the data consummates the ceremony followed by a decent funeral for the representative agent model that assumes only one type of decision process. The evidence suggests support for each theory, and goes further to identify under what demographic domains one can expect to see one theory perform better than the other. We therefore propose a reconciliation of the debate over two of the dominant theories of choice under risk, at least for the tasks and samples we consider. The methodology is broadly applicable to a range of debates over competing theories generated by experimental and non-experimental data. Demand-response (DR) is regarded as a promising solution for future power grids. Here we use a Stackelberg game approach, and describe a novel DR model for electricity trading between one utility company and multiple users, which is aimed at balancing supply and demand, as well as smoothing the aggregated load in the system. The interactions between the utility company (leader) and users (followers) are formulated into a 1-leader, N-follower Stackelberg game, where optimization problems are formed for each player to help select the optimal strategy. A pricing function is adopted for regulating real-time prices (RTP), which then act as a coordinator, inducing users to join the game. An iterative algorithm is proposed to derive the Stackelberg equilibrium, through which optimal power generation and power demands are determined for the utility company and users respectively. Numerical results indicate that the proposed method can efficiently reshape users’ demands, including flattening peak demands and filling the vacancy of valley demands, and significantly reduce the mismatch between supply and demand. Most of the existing demand-side management programs focus primarily on the interactions between a utility company and its customers users. In this paper, we present an autonomous and distributed demand-side energy management system among users that takes advantage of a two-way digital communication infrastructure which is envisioned in the future smart grid. We use game theory and formulate an energy consumption scheduling game, where the players are the users and their strategies are the daily schedules of their household appliances and loads. It is assumed that the utility company can adopt adequate pricing tariffs that differentiate the energy usage in time and level. We show that for a common scenario, with a single utility company serving multiple customers, the global optimal performance in terms of minimizing the energy costs is achieved at the Nash equilibrium of the formulated energy consumption scheduling game. The proposed distributed demand-side energy management strategy requires each user to simply apply its best response strategy to the current total load and tariffs in the power distribution system. The users can maintain privacy and do not need to reveal the details on their energy consumption schedules to other users. We also show that users will have the incentives to participate in the energy consumption scheduling game and subscribing to such services. Simulation results confirm that the proposed approach can reduce the peak-to-average ratio of the total energy demand, the total energy costs, as well as each user's individual daily electricity charges.