Aggregate location data is often used to support smart services and applications, e.g., generating live traffic maps or predicting visits to businesses. In this paper, we present the first study on the feasibility of membership inference attacks on aggregate location time-series. We introduce a game-based definition of the adversarial task, and cast it as a classification problem where machine learning can be used to distinguish whether or not a target user is part of the aggregates. We empirically evaluate the power of these attacks on both raw and differentially private aggregates using two mobility datasets. We find that membership inference is a serious privacy threat, and show how its effectiveness depends on the adversary's prior knowledge, the characteristics of the underlying location data, as well as the number of users and the timeframe on which aggregation is performed. Although differentially private mechanisms can indeed reduce the extent of the attacks, they also yield a significant loss in utility. Moreover, a strategic adversary mimicking the behavior of the defense mechanism can greatly limit the protection they provide. Overall, our work presents a novel methodology geared to evaluate membership inference on aggregate location data in real-world settings and can be used by providers to assess the quality of privacy protection before data release or by regulators to detect violations.
Membership inference attacks. Such attacks aim to determine the presence of target individuals within a dataset. This is relevant in many settings, e.g., in the context of genomic research , where data inherently tied to sensitive information, such as health stats or physical traits, is commonly released in aggregate form for Genome Wide Association Studies (GWAS) @cite_36 . @cite_9 show that one can learn whether a target individual was part of a case-study group associated to a certain disease by comparing the target's profile against the aggregates of the case study and those of a reference population obtained from public sources. This attack has then been extended by @cite_0 to use correlations within the human genome, reducing the need for prior knowledge about the target. Also, @cite_20 show that membership inference can be mounted against individuals contributing their microRNA expressions to scientific studies.
@cite_36 @cite_9 @cite_0 @cite_20
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The National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI) Catalog of Published Genome-Wide Association Studies (GWAS) Catalog provides a publicly available manually curated collection of published GWAS assaying at least 100000 singlenucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) and all SNP-trait associations with P <110 5 . The Catalog includes 1751 curated publications of 11912 SNPs. In addition to the SNP-trait association data, the Catalog also publishes a quarterly diagram of all SNP-trait associations mapped to the SNPs’ chromosomal locations. The Catalog can be accessed via a tabular web interface, via a dynamic visualization on the human karyotype, as a downloadable tab-delimited file and as an OWL knowledge base. This article presents a number of recent improvements to the Catalog, including novel ways for users to interact with the Catalog and changes to the curation infrastructure. We use high-density single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) genotyping microarrays to demonstrate the ability to accurately and robustly determine whether individuals are in a complex genomic DNA mixture. We first develop a theoretical framework for detecting an individual's presence within a mixture, then show, through simulations, the limits associated with our method, and finally demonstrate experimentally the identification of the presence of genomic DNA of specific individuals within a series of highly complex genomic mixtures, including mixtures where an individual contributes less than 0.1 of the total genomic DNA. These findings shift the perceived utility of SNPs for identifying individual trace contributors within a forensics mixture, and suggest future research efforts into assessing the viability of previously sub-optimal DNA sources due to sample contamination. These findings also suggest that composite statistics across cohorts, such as allele frequency or genotype counts, do not mask identity within genome-wide association studies. The implications of these findings are discussed. Genome-wide association studies (GWAS) aim at discovering the association between genetic variations, particularly single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP), and common diseases, which is well recognized to be one of the most important and active areas in biomedical research. Also renowned is the privacy implication of such studies, which has been brought into the limelight by the recent attack proposed by Homer's attack demonstrates that it is possible to identify a GWAS participant from the allele frequencies of a large number of SNPs. Such a threat, unfortunately, was found in our research to be significantly understated. In this paper, we show that individuals can actually be identified from even a relatively small set of statistics, as those routinely published in GWAS papers. We present two attacks. The first one extends Homer's attack with a much more powerful test statistic, based on the correlations among different SNPs described by coefficient of determination (r2). This attack can determine the presence of an individual from the statistics related to a couple of hundred SNPs. The second attack can lead to complete disclosure of hundreds of participants' SNPs, through analyzing the information derived from published statistics. We also found that those attacks can succeed even when the precisions of the statistics are low and part of data is missing. We evaluated our attacks on the real human genomes and concluded that such threats are completely realistic. The continuous decrease in cost of molecular profiling tests is revolutionizing medical research and practice, but it also raises new privacy concerns. One of the first attacks against privacy of biological data, proposed by in 2008, showed that, by knowing parts of the genome of a given individual and summary statistics of a genome-based study, it is possible to detect if this individual participated in the study. Since then, a lot of work has been carried out to further study the theoretical limits and to counter the genome-based membership inference attack. However, genomic data are by no means the only or the most influential biological data threatening personal privacy. For instance, whereas the genome informs us about the risk of developing some diseases in the future, epigenetic biomarkers, such as microRNAs, are directly and deterministically affected by our health condition including most common severe diseases. In this paper, we show that the membership inference attack also threatens the privacy of individuals contributing their microRNA expressions to scientific studies. Our results on real and public microRNA expression data demonstrate that disease-specific datasets are especially prone to membership detection, offering a true-positive rate of up to 77 at a false-negative rate of less than 1 . We present two attacks: one relying on the L_1 distance and the other based on the likelihood-ratio test. We show that the likelihood-ratio test provides the highest adversarial success and we derive a theoretical limit on this success. In order to mitigate the membership inference, we propose and evaluate both a differentially private mechanism and a hiding mechanism. We also consider two types of adversarial prior knowledge for the differentially private mechanism and show that, for relatively large datasets, this mechanism can protect the privacy of participants in miRNA-based studies against strong adversaries without degrading the data utility too much. Based on our findings and given the current number of miRNAs, we recommend to only release summary statistics of datasets containing at least a couple of hundred individuals.