Researches on signed languages still strongly dissociate linguistic issues related on phonological and phonetic aspects, and gesture studies for recognition and synthesis purposes. This paper focuses on the imbrication of motion and meaning for the analysis, synthesis and evaluation of sign language gestures. We discuss the relevance and interest of a motor theory of perception in sign language communication. According to this theory, we consider that linguistic knowledge is mapped on sensory-motor processes, and propose a methodology based on the principle of a synthesis-by-analysis approach, guided by an evaluation process that aims to validate some hypothesis and concepts of this theory. Examples from existing studies illustrate the different concepts and provide avenues for future work.
Little has been done so far to determine the role of sensory-motor activity for the understanding (perception and production) of signed languages. The idea that semantic knowledge is embodied into sensory-motor systems has given rise to many studies, bringing together researchers from domains as different as cognitive neuroscience and linguistics, but most of these works concern spoken languages. This interaction between language and action are based on different claims such as: imagining and acting share the same neural substrate @cite_4 ; language makes use in large part of brain structures akin to those used to support perception and action @cite_3 .
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People are minded creatures; we have thoughts, feelings and emotions. More intriguingly, we grasp our own mental states, and conduct the business of ascribing them to ourselves and others without instruction in formal psychology. How do we do this? And what are the dimensions of our grasp of the mental realm? In this book, Alvin I. Goldman explores these questions with the tools of philosophy, developmental psychology, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience. He refines an approach called simulation theory, which starts from the familiar idea that we understand others by putting ourselves in their mental shoes. Can this intuitive idea be rendered precise in a philosophically respectable manner, without allowing simulation to collapse into theorizing? Given a suitable definition, do empirical results support the notion that minds literally create (or attempt to create) surrogates of other peoples mental states in the process of mindreading? Goldman amasses a surprising array of evidence from psychology and neuroscience that supports this hypothesis. Abstract The discovery of mirror neurons in the macaque monkey and the discovery of a homologous “mirror system for grasping” in Broca’s area in the human brain has revived the gestural origins theory of the evolution of the human capability for language, enriching it with the suggestion that mirror neurons provide the neurological core for this evolution. However, this notion of “mirror neuron support for the transition from grasp to language” has been worked out in very different ways in the Mirror System Hypothesis model [Arbib, M.A., 2005a. From monkey-like action recognition to human language: an evolutionary framework for neurolinguistics (with commentaries and author’s response). Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28, 105–167; Rizzolatti, G., Arbib, M.A., 1998. Language within our grasp. Trends in Neuroscience 21(5), 188–194] and the Embodied Concept model [Gallese, V., Lakoff, G., 2005. The brain’s concepts: the role of the sensory-motor system in reason and language. Cognitive Neuropsychology 22, 455–479]. The present paper provides a critique of the latter to enrich analysis of the former, developing the role of schema theory [Arbib, M.A., 1981. Perceptual structures and distributed motor control. In: Brooks, V.B. (Ed.), Handbook of Physiology – The Nervous System II. Motor Control. American Physiological Society, pp. 1449–1480].