In this paper we propose a novel easily reproducible technique to attack the best public Face ID system ArcFace in different shooting conditions. To create an attack, we print the rectangular paper sticker on a common color printer and put it on the hat. The adversarial sticker is prepared with a novel algorithm for off-plane transformations of the image which imitates sticker location on the hat. Such an approach confuses the state-of-the-art public Face ID model LResNet100E-IR, ArcFace@ms1m-refine-v2 and is transferable to other Face ID models.
Usually, the adversarial attacks which are constructed using the specific architecture and even the weights of the attacked model are called white-box attacks. If the attack has no access to model weights then it is called a black-box attack @cite_36 .
@cite_36
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Machine learning (ML) models, e.g., deep neural networks (DNNs), are vulnerable to adversarial examples: malicious inputs modified to yield erroneous model outputs, while appearing unmodified to human observers. Potential attacks include having malicious content like malware identified as legitimate or controlling vehicle behavior. Yet, all existing adversarial example attacks require knowledge of either the model internals or its training data. We introduce the first practical demonstration of an attacker controlling a remotely hosted DNN with no such knowledge. Indeed, the only capability of our black-box adversary is to observe labels given by the DNN to chosen inputs. Our attack strategy consists in training a local model to substitute for the target DNN, using inputs synthetically generated by an adversary and labeled by the target DNN. We use the local substitute to craft adversarial examples, and find that they are misclassified by the targeted DNN. To perform a real-world and properly-blinded evaluation, we attack a DNN hosted by MetaMind, an online deep learning API. We find that their DNN misclassifies 84.24 of the adversarial examples crafted with our substitute. We demonstrate the general applicability of our strategy to many ML techniques by conducting the same attack against models hosted by Amazon and Google, using logistic regression substitutes. They yield adversarial examples misclassified by Amazon and Google at rates of 96.19 and 88.94 . We also find that this black-box attack strategy is capable of evading defense strategies previously found to make adversarial example crafting harder.