Community-based question answering platforms can be rich sources of information on a variety of specialized topics, from finance to cooking. The usefulness of such platforms depends heavily on user contributions (questions and answers), but also on respecting the community rules. As a crowd-sourced service, such platforms rely on their users for monitoring and flagging content that violates community rules. Common wisdom is to eliminate the users who receive many flags. Our analysis of a year of traces from a mature Q&A site shows that the number of flags does not tell the full story: on one hand, users with many flags may still contribute positively to the community. On the other hand, users who never get flagged are found to violate community rules and get their accounts suspended. This analysis, however, also shows that abusive users are betrayed by their network properties: we find strong evidence of homophilous behavior and use this finding to detect abusive users who go under the community radar. Based on our empirical observations, we build a classifier that is able to detect abusive users with an accuracy as high as 83 .
Qualitative and quantitative studies of bad behavior in online settings have been done before including newsgroups @cite_1 , online chat communities @cite_4 , and online multiplayer video games @cite_25 . A body of work also investigates the impact of the bad behavior. Researchers find that bad behavior has negative effects on the community and its members: it decreases community's cohesion @cite_18 , performance @cite_2 and participation @cite_30 . In the worst case, users who are the targets of bad behavior may leave or avoid online social spaces @cite_30 .
@cite_30 @cite_18 @cite_4 @cite_1 @cite_2 @cite_25
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This study investigated the effect of a single work group deviant on other group members' perceptions of the deviant, and their perceptions of the cohesiveness of the group as a whole. Group members, particularly those high in perceived self-typicality, were expected to downgrade the deviant, and view groups containing a deviant as less cohesive. Undergraduate management students were placed in a simulated organizational context in which deviance was manipulated so that the participant's work group contained either a single negative deviant or no deviant. Results showed that the deviant colleague was judged less favorably than the normative colleague, particularly by those high in perceived self-typicality. Groups that contained a deviant were perceived as having lower levels of task cohesion, but ratings of social cohesion varied depending on perceivers' self-typicality. The findings suggest that as well as attracting negative evaluations, deviant group members can adversely affect group cohesion. A wide variety of deviant behavior may arise as the population of an online multimedia community increases. That behavior can span the range from simple mischievous antics to more serious expressions of psychopathology, including depression, sociopathy, narcissism, dissociation, and borderline dynamics. In some cases the deviant behavior may be a process of pathological acting out—in others, a healthy attempt to work through. Several factors must be taken into consideration when explaining online deviance, such as social cultural issues, the technical infrastructure of the environment, transference reactions, and the effects of the ambiguous, anonymous, and fantasy-driven atmosphere of cyberspace life. In what we may consider an "online community psychology," intervention strategies for deviant behavior can be explored along three dimensions: preventative versus remedial, user versus superuser based, and automated versus interpersonal. This article is an account of a Usenet newsgroup whose participants, in response to a perceived ''invasion'' of ''barbarians,'' explored and articulated the value of the group, the nature of the crisis facing it, and the strategies available to meet the crisis. The newsgroup facilitated political and personal support for some gay, lesbian, or bisexual men and women. The primary threat to the group was the increasing number of newcomers who were oblivious to established norms, who tended to view access to the group as a commodity, and who attempted to impose ''outside'' paradigms on the operations of the group. Defensive strategies involved calling on rhetorical devices (such as flaming or ostracism) or structural resources (such as employers, network operators, or lawsuits). All strategies had the potential to backfire, but rhetorical strategies were less risky, more available, and more community affirming than strategies requiring access to structural resources. Through this account, the article addresse... The influences of organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) and workplace deviant behavior (WDB) on business unit performance were investigated using data from branches of a fast food organization. Data included measures of WDB and OCB obtained from staff, ratings of performance provided by supervisors, and objective measures of performance. It was found that WDB was negatively and significantly associated with business unit performance measured both subjectively and objectively. OCB, however, failed to contribute to the prediction of business unit performance beyond the level that was achieved by WDB. It appeared, therefore, that the presence of deviant employees among business units impinges upon the performance of the business unit as a whole, whereas OCBs had comparatively little effect. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Online gaming is a multi-billion dollar industry that entertains a large, global population. One unfortunate phenomenon, however, poisons the competition and the fun: cheating. The costs of cheating span from industry-supported expenditures to detect and limit cheating, to victims' monetary losses due to cyber crime. This paper studies cheaters in the Steam Community, an online social network built on top of the world's dominant digital game delivery platform. We collected information about more than 12 million gamers connected in a global social network, of which more than 700 thousand have their profiles flagged as cheaters. We also collected in-game interaction data of over 10 thousand players from a popular multiplayer gaming server. We show that cheaters are well embedded in the social and interaction networks: their network position is largely indistinguishable from that of fair players. We observe that the cheating behavior appears to spread through a social mechanism: the presence and the number of cheater friends of a fair player is correlated with the likelihood of her becoming a cheater in the future. Also, we observe that there is a social penalty involved with being labeled as a cheater: cheaters are likely to switch to more restrictive privacy settings once they are tagged and they lose more friends than fair players. Finally, we observe that the number of cheaters is not correlated with the geographical, real-world population density, or with the local popularity of the Steam Community.