We consider a crowdsourcing data acquisition scenario, such as federated learning, where a Center collects data points from a set of rational Agents, with the aim of training a model. For linear regression models, we show how a payment structure can be designed to incentivize the agents to provide high-quality data as early as possible, based on a characterization of the influence that data points have on the loss function of the model. Our contributions can be summarized as follows: (a) we prove theoretically that this scheme ensures truthful data reporting as a game-theoretic equilibrium and further demonstrate its robustness against mixtures of truthful and heuristic data reports, (b) we design a procedure according to which the influence computation can be efficiently approximated and processed sequentially in batches over time, (c) we develop a theory that allows correcting the difference between the influence and the overall change in loss and (d) we evaluate our approach on real datasets, confirming our theoretical findings.
Our ideas are closely related to the literature of mechanisms @cite_8 and @cite_17 . The idea behind this literature is to extract high-quality information from individuals by comparing their reports against those of randomly chosen peers. This approach has been largely successful in eliciting information. The same principle applies to our case, where the payments are dependent on the improvement of the model and therefore agents are rewarded for providing information. Finally, jia2019towards [ jia2019towards ] recently considered a setting in which the value of the provided data information is determined via the . Their approach is inherently different from ours, but it is worth noting that they consider the influence approximation of @cite_1 for approximating the Shapley value.
@cite_1 @cite_17 @cite_8
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How can we explain the predictions of a black-box model? In this paper, we use influence functions — a classic technique from robust statistics — to trace a model's prediction through the learning algorithm and back to its training data, thereby identifying training points most responsible for a given prediction. To scale up influence functions to modern machine learning settings, we develop a simple, efficient implementation that requires only oracle access to gradients and Hessian-vector products. We show that even on non-convex and non-differentiable models where the theory breaks down, approximations to influence functions can still provide valuable information. On linear models and convolutional neural networks, we demonstrate that influence functions are useful for multiple purposes: understanding model behavior, debugging models, detecting dataset errors, and even creating visually-indistinguishable training-set attacks. Crowdsourcing is widely proposed as a method to solve a large variety of judgment tasks, such as classifying website content, peer grading in online courses, or collecting real-world data. As the data reported by workers cannot be verified, there is a tendency to report random data without actually solving the task. This can be countered by making the reward for an answer depend on its consistency with answers given by other workers, an approach called peer consistency. However, it is obvious that the best strategy in such schemes is for all workers to report the same answer without solving the task. Dasgupta and Ghosh [2013] show that, in some cases, exerting high effort can be encouraged in the highest-paying equilibrium. In this article, we present a general mechanism that implements this idea and is applicable to most crowdsourcing settings. Furthermore, we experimentally test the novel mechanism, and validate its theoretical properties. Abstract Intelligent systems often depend on data provided by information agents, for example, sensor data or crowdsourced human computation. Providing accurate and relevant data requires costly effort that agents may not always be willing to provide. Thus, it becomes important not only to verify the correctness of data, but also to provide incentives so that agents that provide high-quality data are rewarded while those that do not are discouraged by low rewards. We cover different settings and the assumptions they admit, including sensing, human computation, peer grading, reviews, and predictions. We survey different incentive mechanisms, including proper scoring rules, prediction markets and peer prediction, Bayesian Truth Serum, Peer Truth Serum, Correlated Agreement, and the settings where each of them would be suitable. As an alternative, we also consider reputation mechanisms. We complement the game-theoretic analysis with practical examples of applications in prediction platforms, community sensin...