Max-min fairness (MMF) is a widely known approach to a fair allocation of bandwidth to each of the users in a network. This allocation can be computed by uniformly raising the bandwidths of all users without violating capacity constraints. We consider an extension of these allocations by raising the bandwidth with arbitrary and not necessarily uniform time-depending velocities (allocation rates). These allocations are used in a game-theoretic context for routing choices, which we formalize in progressive filling games (PFGs). We present a variety of results for equilibria in PFGs. We show that these games possess pure Nash and strong equilibria. While computation in general is NP-hard, there are polynomial-time algorithms for prominent classes of Max-Min-Fair Games (MMFG), including the case when all users have the same source-destination pair. We characterize prices of anarchy and stability for pure Nash and strong equilibria in PFGs and MMFGs when players have different or the same source-destination pairs. In addition, we show that when a designer can adjust allocation rates, it is possible to design games with optimal strong equilibria. Some initial results on polynomial-time algorithms in this direction are also derived.
Combined routing and congestion control has been studied by several works (cf. @cite_23 @cite_27 @cite_2 @cite_25 ). In all these works, the existence of an equilibrium is proved by showing that it corresponds to an optimal solution of an associated convex utility maximization problem. This, however, implies that every user possibly splits the flow among an exponential number of routes which might be critical for some applications. For instance, the standard TCP IP protocol suite uses single path routing, because splitting the demand comes with several practical complications, e.g., packets arriving out of order, packet jitter due to different path delays etc. This issue has been explicitly addressed by @cite_11 .
@cite_27 @cite_23 @cite_2 @cite_25 @cite_11
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We propose two flow control algorithms for networks with multiple paths between each source-destination pair. Both are distributed algorithms over the network to maximize aggregate source utility. Algorithm 1 is a first order Lagrangian method applied to a modified objective function that has the same optimal solution as the original objective function but has a better convergence property. Algorithm 2 is based on the idea that, at optimality, only paths with the minimum price carry positive flows, and naturally decomposes the overall decision into flow control (determines total transmission rate based on minimum path price) and routing (determines how to split the flow among available paths). Both algorithms can be implemented as simply a source-based mechanism in which no link algorithm nor feedback is needed. We present numerical examples to illustrate their behavior. We consider the problem of congestion-aware multi-path routing in the Internet. Currently, Internet routing protocols select only a single path between a source and a destination. However, due to many policy routing decisions, single-path routing may limit the achievable throughput. In this paper, we envision a scenario where multi-path routing is enabled in the Internet to take advantage of path diversity. Using minimal congestion feedback signals from the routers, we present a class of algorithms that can be implemented at the sources to stably and optimally split the flow between each source-destination pair. We then show that the connection-level throughput region of such multi-path routing congestion control algorithms can be larger than that of a single-path congestion control scheme. In this paper we investigate the potential benefits of coordinated congestion control for multipath data transfers, and contrast with uncoordinated control. For static random path selections, we show the worst-case throughput performance of uncoordinated control behaves as if each user had but a single path (scaling like log(log(N)) log(N) where N is the system size, measured in number of resources). Whereas coordinated control gives a throughput allocation bounded away from zero, improving on both uncoordinated control and on the greedy-least loaded path selection of e.g. Mitzenmacher. We then allow users to change their set of routes and introduce the notion of a Nash equilibrium. We show that with RTT bias (as in TCP Reno), uncoordinated control can lead to inefficient equilibria. With no RTT bias, both uncoordinated or coordinated Nash equilibria correspond to desirable welfare maximising states. Moreover, simple path reselection polices that shift to paths with higher net benefit can find these states. The authors consider a communication network shared by several selfish users. Each user seeks to optimize its own performance by controlling the routing of its given flow demand, giving rise to a noncooperative game. They investigate the Nash equilibrium of such systems. For a two-node multiple links system, uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium is proven under reasonable convexity conditions. It is shown that this Nash equilibrium point possesses interesting monotonicity properties. For general networks, these convexity conditions are not sufficient for guaranteeing uniqueness, and a counterexample is presented. Nonetheless, uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for general topologies is established under various assumptions. >