The problem of adversarial examples, evasion attacks on machine learning classifiers, has proven extremely difficult to solve. This is true even when, as is the case in many practical settings, the classifier is hosted as a remote service and so the adversary does not have direct access to the model parameters. This paper argues that in such settings, defenders have a much larger space of actions than have been previously explored. Specifically, we deviate from the implicit assumption made by prior work that a defense must be a stateless function that operates on individual examples, and explore the possibility for stateful defenses. To begin, we develop a defense designed to detect the process of adversarial example generation. By keeping a history of the past queries, a defender can try to identify when a sequence of queries appears to be for the purpose of generating an adversarial example. We then introduce query blinding, a new class of attacks designed to bypass defenses that rely on such a defense approach. We believe that expanding the study of adversarial examples from stateless classifiers to stateful systems is not only more realistic for many black-box settings, but also gives the defender a much-needed advantage in responding to the adversary.
Other work has been done to defend against white-box attacks, such as adversarial training @cite_28 . Such defenses are complementary to our defense: we can apply our detection strategy on top of any model. In our paper we study our defense on top of a non-robust model for simplicity and to accurately measure the value of this type of defense. Recent work on robust similarity @cite_12 could also be useful for improving our scheme.
@cite_28 @cite_12
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Recent work has demonstrated that neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples, i.e., inputs that are almost indistinguishable from natural data and yet classified incorrectly by the network. In fact, some of the latest findings suggest that the existence of adversarial attacks may be an inherent weakness of deep learning models. To address this problem, we study the adversarial robustness of neural networks through the lens of robust optimization. This approach provides us with a broad and unifying view on much of the prior work on this topic. Its principled nature also enables us to identify methods for both training and attacking neural networks that are reliable and, in a certain sense, universal. In particular, they specify a concrete security guarantee that would protect against any adversary. These methods let us train networks with significantly improved resistance to a wide range of adversarial attacks. They also suggest the notion of security against a first-order adversary as a natural and broad security guarantee. We believe that robustness against such well-defined classes of adversaries is an important stepping stone towards fully resistant deep learning models. It has been recently shown that the hidden variables of convolutional neural networks make for an efficient perceptual similarity metric that accurately predicts human judgment on relative image similarity assessment. First, we show that such learned perceptual similarity metrics (LPIPS) are susceptible to adversarial attacks that dramatically contradict human visual similarity judgment. While this is not surprising in light of neural networks' well-known weakness to adversarial perturbations, we proceed to show that self-ensembling with an infinite family of random transformations of the input --- a technique known not to render classification networks robust --- is enough to turn the metric robust against attack, while retaining predictive power on human judgments. Finally, we study the geometry imposed by our our novel self-ensembled metric (E-LPIPS) on the space of natural images. We find evidence of "perceptual convexity" by showing that convex combinations of similar-looking images retain appearance, and that discrete geodesics yield meaningful frame interpolation and texture morphing, all without explicit correspondences.