In contrast to today's IP-based host-oriented Internet architecture, Information-Centric Networking (ICN) emphasizes content by making it directly addressable and routable. Named Data Networking (NDN) architecture is an instance of ICN that is being developed as a candidate next-generation Internet architecture. By opportunistically caching content within the network, NDN appears to be well-suited for large-scale content distribution and for meeting the needs of increasingly mobile and bandwidth-hungry applications that dominate today's Internet. One key feature of NDN is the requirement for each content object to be digitally signed by its producer. Thus, NDN should be, in principle, immune to distributing fake (aka "poisoned") content. However, in practice, this poses two challenges for detecting fake content in NDN routers: (1) overhead due to signature verification and certificate chain traversal, and (2) lack of trust context, i.e., determining which public keys are trusted to verify which content. Because of these issues, NDN does not force routers to verify content signatures, which makes the architecture susceptible to content poisoning attacks. This paper explores root causes of, and some cures for, content poisoning attacks in NDN. In the process, it becomes apparent that meaningful mitigation of content poisoning is contingent upon a network-layer trust management architecture, elements of which we construct, while carefully justifying specific design choices. This work represents the initial effort towards comprehensive trust management for NDN.
Since a single trust metric might not suffice to express trustworthiness of nodes, a multi-dimensional trust management framework is suggested in @cite_9 . Three metrics are used: (1) node collaboration to perform tasks, such as packet forwarding, (2) node behavior, e.g., flagging nodes that flood the network, and (3) correctness of node-disseminated information, e.g., routing updates.
@cite_9
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Nodes in Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) are required to relay data packets to enable communication between other nodes that are not in radio range with each other. However, whether for selfish or malicious reasons, a node may fail to cooperate during the network operations or even attempt to disturb them, both of which have been recognized as misbehaviors. Various trust management schemes have been studied to assess the behaviors of nodes so as to detect and mitigate node misbehaviors inMANETs. Most of existing schemes model a node's trustworthiness along a single dimension, combining all of the available evidence to calculate a single, scalar trust metric. A single measure, however, may not be expressive enough to adequately describe a node's trustworthiness in many scenarios. In this paper, we describe a multi-dimensional framework to evaluate the trustworthiness of MANET node from multiple perspectives. Our scheme evaluates trustworthiness from three perspectives: collaboration trust, behavioral trust, and reference trust. Different types of observations are used to independently derive values for these three trust dimensions. We present simulation results that illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed scheme in several scenarios.