The Sybil attack plagues all peer-to-peer systems, and modern open distributed ledgers employ a number of tactics to prevent it from proof of work, or other resources such as space, stake or memory, to traditional admission control in permissioned settings. With SybilQuorum we propose an alternative approach to securing an open distributed ledger against Sybil attacks, and ensuring consensus amongst honest participants, leveraging social network based Sybil defences. We show how nodes expressing their trust relationships through the ledger can bootstrap and operate a value system, and general transaction system, and how Sybil attacks are thwarted. We empirically evaluate our system as a secure Federated Byzantine Agreement System, and extend the theory of those systems to do so.
Academic works within this family of systems consider general social network information distributed in a peer to peer network to allow each node to determine which other nodes are genuine or Sybils. In this line of work SybilGuard @cite_1 and SybilLimit @cite_13 perform a distributed computation, using random walks in a network, to determine the honest regions within it. SybilInfer @cite_19 takes a centralized approach, and analyzes a stored social graph to identify potential Sybil regions.
@cite_13 @cite_19 @cite_1
2110801527 1551760018 2153305401
Open-access distributed systems such as peer-to-peer systems are particularly vulnerable to sybil attacks, where a malicious user creates multiple fake identities (called sybil nodes). Without a trusted central authority that can tie identities to real human beings, defending against sybil attacks is quite challenging. Among the small number of decentralized approaches, our recent SybilGuard protocol leverages a key insight on social networks to bound the number of sybil nodes accepted. Despite its promising direction, SybilGuard can allow a large number of sybil nodes to be accepted. Furthermore, SybilGuard assumes that social networks are fast-mixing, which has never been confirmed in the real world. This paper presents the novel SybilLimit protocol that leverages the same insight as SybilGuard, but offers dramatically improved and near-optimal guarantees. The number of sybil nodes accepted is reduced by a factor of Θ(√n), or around 200 times in our experiments for a million-node system. We further prove that SybilLimit's guarantee is at most a log n factor away from optimal when considering approaches based on fast-mixing social networks. Finally, based on three large-scale real-world social networks, we provide the first evidence that real-world social networks are indeed fast-mixing. This validates the fundamental assumption behind SybilLimit's and SybilGuard's approach. SybilInfer is an algorithm for labelling nodes in a social network as honest users or Sybils controlled by an adversary. At the heart of SybilInfer lies a probabilistic model of honest social networks, and an inference engine that returns potential regions of dishonest nodes. The Bayesian inference approach to Sybil detection comes with the advantage label has an assigned probability, indicating its degree of certainty. We prove through analytical results as well as experiments on simulated and real-world network topologies that, given standard constraints on the adversary, SybilInfer is secure, in that it successfully distinguishes between honest and dishonest nodes and is not susceptible to manipulation by the adversary. Furthermore, our results show that SybilInfer outperforms state of the art algorithms, both in being more widely applicable, as well as providing vastly more accurate results. Peer-to-peer and other decentralized, distributed systems are known to be particularly vulnerable to sybil attacks. In a sybil attack, a malicious user obtains multiple fake identities and pretends to be multiple, distinct nodes in the system. By controlling a large fraction of the nodes in the system, the malicious user is able to ldquoout voterdquo the honest users in collaborative tasks such as Byzantine failure defenses. This paper presents SybilGuard, a novel protocol for limiting the corruptive influences of sybil attacks. Our protocol is based on the ldquosocial networkrdquo among user identities, where an edge between two identities indicates a human-established trust relationship. Malicious users can create many identities but few trust relationships. Thus, there is a disproportionately small ldquocutrdquo in the graph between the sybil nodes and the honest nodes. SybilGuard exploits this property to bound the number of identities a malicious user can create. We show the effectiveness of SybilGuard both analytically and experimentally.