As the Internet struggles to cope with scalability, mobility, and security issues, new network architectures are being proposed to better accommodate the needs of modern systems and applications. In particular, Content-Oriented Networking (CON) has emerged as a promising next-generation Internet architecture: it sets to decouple content from hosts, at the network layer, by naming data rather than hosts. CON comes with a potential for a wide range of benefits, including reduced congestion and improved delivery speed by means of content caching, simpler configuration of network devices, and security at the data level. However, it remains an interesting open question whether or not, and to what extent, this emerging networking paradigm bears new privacy challenges. In this paper, we provide a systematic privacy analysis of CON and the common building blocks among its various architectural instances in order to highlight emerging privacy threats, and analyze a few potential countermeasures. Finally, we present a comparison between CON and today's Internet in the context of a few privacy concepts, such as, anonymity, censoring, traceability, and confidentiality.
Privacy Issues in CON. To the best of our knowledge, the only related privacy study is the recent article by in @cite_48 @cite_37 , that covers security and privacy issues of CCN @cite_27 . Specifically, they highlight a few Denial-of-Service (DoS) vulnerabilities as well as different cache-related attacks. In CCN, a possible DoS attack (also discussed in @cite_27 ) relies on resource exhaustion, targeting either routers or content source. Routers are forced to perform expensive computation, such as, signature verification, which negatively affects the quality of service and can ultimately block traffic. Content source can also be flooded with a huge number of interests, ending up denying service to legitimate users. Additional DoS attacks mainly target the cache mechanism, to either decrease network performance or to gain free and uncontrolled storage. Transforming the cache into a permanent storage is achieved by continuously issuing interests for a desired file. Decreased network performance can also be achieved through cache pollution.
@cite_48 @cite_37 @cite_27
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Named Data Networking architectures have been proposed to improve various shortcomings of the current Internet architecture. A key part of these proposals is the capability of caching arbitrary content in arbitrary network locations. While caching has the potential to improve network performance, the data stored in caches can be seen as transient traces of past communication that attackers can exploit to compromise the users' privacy. With this editorial note, we aim to raise awareness of privacy attacks as an intrinsic and relevant issue in Named Data Networking architectures. Countermeasures against privacy attacks are subject to a trade-off between performance and privacy. We discuss several approaches to countermeasures representing different incarnations of this tradeoff, along with open issues to be looked at by the research community. Network use has evolved to be dominated by content distribution and retrieval, while networking technology still speaks only of connections between hosts. Accessing content and services requires mapping from the what that users care about to the network's where. We present Content-Centric Networking (CCN) which treats content as a primitive - decoupling location from identity, security and access, and retrieving content by name. Using new approaches to routing named content, derived heavily from IP, we can simultaneously achieve scalability, security and performance. We implemented our architecture's basic features and demonstrate resilience and performance with secure file downloads and VoIP calls.