We present a generic and automated approach to re-identifying nodes in anonymized social networks which enables novel anonymization techniques to be quickly evaluated. It uses machine learning (decision forests) to matching pairs of nodes in disparate anonymized sub-graphs. The technique uncovers artefacts and invariants of any black-box anonymization scheme from a small set of examples. Despite a high degree of automation, classification succeeds with significant true positive rates even when small false positive rates are sought. Our evaluation uses publicly available real world datasets to study the performance of our approach against real-world anonymization strategies, namely the schemes used to protect datasets of The Data for Development (D4D) Challenge. We show that the technique is effective even when only small numbers of samples are used for training. Further, since it detects weaknesses in the black-box anonymization scheme it can re-identify nodes in one social network when trained on another.
Anonymizing social networks has proven to be a tough challenge. presented @cite_12 active (using sybil nodes) and passive attacks based on searching patterns in sub-graphs to learn relationships between pre-selected target individuals of an anonymised social graph. Group membership has been shown @cite_8 to be sufficient to identify an individual in a social network.
@cite_12 @cite_8
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In a social network, nodes correspond topeople or other social entities, and edges correspond to social links between them. In an effort to preserve privacy, the practice of anonymization replaces names with meaningless unique identifiers. We describe a family of attacks such that even from a single anonymized copy of a social network, it is possible for an adversary to learn whether edges exist or not between specific targeted pairs of nodes. Social networking sites such as Facebook, LinkedIn, and Xing have been reporting exponential growth rates and have millions of registered users. In this paper, we introduce a novel de-anonymization attack that exploits group membership information that is available on social networking sites. More precisely, we show that information about the group memberships of a user (i.e., the groups of a social network to which a user belongs) is sufficient to uniquely identify this person, or, at least, to significantly reduce the set of possible candidates. That is, rather than tracking a user's browser as with cookies, it is possible to track a person. To determine the group membership of a user, we leverage well-known web browser history stealing attacks. Thus, whenever a social network user visits a malicious website, this website can launch our de-anonymization attack and learn the identity of its visitors. The implications of our attack are manifold, since it requires a low effort and has the potential to affect millions of social networking users. We perform both a theoretical analysis and empirical measurements to demonstrate the feasibility of our attack against Xing, a medium-sized social network with more than eight million members that is mainly used for business relationships. Furthermore, we explored other, larger social networks and performed experiments that suggest that users of Facebook and LinkedIn are equally vulnerable.