Generative models estimate the underlying distribution of a dataset to generate realistic samples according to that distribution. In this paper, we present the first membership inference attacks against generative models: given a data point, the adversary determines whether or not it was used to train the model. Our attacks leverage Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs), which combine a discriminative and a generative model, to detect overfitting and recognize inputs that were part of training datasets, using the discriminator's capacity to learn statistical differences in distributions. We present attacks based on both white-box and black-box access to the target model, against several state-of-the-art generative models, over datasets of complex representations of faces (LFW), objects (CIFAR-10), and medical images (Diabetic Retinopathy). We also discuss the sensitivity of the attacks to different training parameters, and their robustness against mitigation strategies, finding that defenses are either ineffective or lead to significantly worse performances of the generative models in terms of training stability and or sample quality.
Differential Privacy @cite_3 can be used to mitigate inference attacks, and it has been widely applied to various machine learning models @cite_57 @cite_51 @cite_10 @cite_30 @cite_34 @cite_41 . Shokri and Shmatikov @cite_10 support distributed training of deep learning networks in a privacy-preserving way, where independent entities collaboratively build a model without sharing their training data, but selectively share subsets of noisy model parameters during training. @cite_57 show how to train deep neural networks (DNNs) with non-convex objectives with an acceptable privacy budget, while @cite_37 show that 's proposal partially mitigates the effects of 's @cite_46 membership inference attack.
@cite_30 @cite_37 @cite_41 @cite_3 @cite_57 @cite_51 @cite_46 @cite_34 @cite_10
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We study statistical risk minimization problems under a privacy model in which the data is kept confidential even from the learner. In this local privacy framework, we establish sharp upper and lower bounds on the convergence rates of statistical estimation procedures. As a consequence, we exhibit a precise tradeoff between the amount of privacy the data preserves and the utility, as measured by convergence rate, of any statistical estimator or learning procedure. Private regression has received attention from both database and security communities. Recent work by (USENIX Security 2014) analyzed the functional mechanism ( VLDB 2012) for training linear regression models over medical data. Unfortunately, they found that model accuracy is already unacceptable with differential privacy when @math . We address this issue, presenting an explicit connection between differential privacy and stable learning theory through which a substantially better privacy utility tradeoff can be obtained. Perhaps more importantly, our theory reveals that the most basic mechanism in differential privacy, output perturbation, can be used to obtain a better tradeoff for all convex-Lipschitz-bounded learning tasks. Since output perturbation is simple to implement, it means that our approach is potentially widely applicable in practice. We go on to apply it on the same medical data as used by Encouragingly, we achieve accurate models even for @math . In the last part of this paper, we study the impact of our improved differentially private mechanisms on model inversion attacks, a privacy attack introduced by We observe that the improved tradeoff makes the resulting differentially private model more susceptible to inversion attacks. We analyze this phenomenon formally. Over the past five years a new approach to privacy-preserving data analysis has born fruit [13, 18, 7, 19, 5, 37, 35, 8, 32]. This approach differs from much (but not all!) of the related literature in the statistics, databases, theory, and cryptography communities, in that a formal and ad omnia privacy guarantee is defined, and the data analysis techniques presented are rigorously proved to satisfy the guarantee. The key privacy guarantee that has emerged is differential privacy. Roughly speaking, this ensures that (almost, and quantifiably) no risk is incurred by joining a statistical database. In this survey, we recall the definition of differential privacy and two basic techniques for achieving it. We then show some interesting applications of these techniques, presenting algorithms for three specific tasks and three general results on differentially private learning. Machine learning techniques based on neural networks are achieving remarkable results in a wide variety of domains. Often, the training of models requires large, representative datasets, which may be crowdsourced and contain sensitive information. The models should not expose private information in these datasets. Addressing this goal, we develop new algorithmic techniques for learning and a refined analysis of privacy costs within the framework of differential privacy. Our implementation and experiments demonstrate that we can train deep neural networks with non-convex objectives, under a modest privacy budget, and at a manageable cost in software complexity, training efficiency, and model quality. Some machine learning applications involve training data that is sensitive, such as the medical histories of patients in a clinical trial. A model may inadvertently and implicitly store some of its training data; careful analysis of the model may therefore reveal sensitive information. To address this problem, we demonstrate a generally applicable approach to providing strong privacy guarantees for training data: Private Aggregation of Teacher Ensembles (PATE). The approach combines, in a black-box fashion, multiple models trained with disjoint datasets, such as records from different subsets of users. Because they rely directly on sensitive data, these models are not published, but instead used as "teachers" for a "student" model. The student learns to predict an output chosen by noisy voting among all of the teachers, and cannot directly access an individual teacher or the underlying data or parameters. The student's privacy properties can be understood both intuitively (since no single teacher and thus no single dataset dictates the student's training) and formally, in terms of differential privacy. These properties hold even if an adversary can not only query the student but also inspect its internal workings. Compared with previous work, the approach imposes only weak assumptions on how teachers are trained: it applies to any model, including non-convex models like DNNs. We achieve state-of-the-art privacy utility trade-offs on MNIST and SVHN thanks to an improved privacy analysis and semi-supervised learning. We quantitatively investigate how machine learning models leak information about the individual data records on which they were trained. We focus on the basic membership inference attack: given a data record and black-box access to a model, determine if the record was in the model's training dataset. To perform membership inference against a target model, we make adversarial use of machine learning and train our own inference model to recognize differences in the target model's predictions on the inputs that it trained on versus the inputs that it did not train on. We empirically evaluate our inference techniques on classification models trained by commercial "machine learning as a service" providers such as Google and Amazon. Using realistic datasets and classification tasks, including a hospital discharge dataset whose membership is sensitive from the privacy perspective, we show that these models can be vulnerable to membership inference attacks. We then investigate the factors that influence this leakage and evaluate mitigation strategies. Bayesian optimization is a powerful tool for fine-tuning the hyper-parameters of a wide variety of machine learning models. The success of machine learning has led practitioners in diverse real-world settings to learn classifiers for practical problems. As machine learning becomes commonplace, Bayesian optimization becomes an attractive method for practitioners to automate the process of classifier hyper-parameter tuning. A key observation is that the data used for tuning models in these settings is often sensitive. Certain data such as genetic predisposition, personal email statistics, and car accident history, if not properly private, may be at risk of being inferred from Bayesian optimization outputs. To address this, we introduce methods for releasing the best hyper-parameters and classifier accuracy privately. Leveraging the strong theoretical guarantees of differential privacy and known Bayesian optimization convergence bounds, we prove that under a GP assumption these private quantities are also near-optimal. Finally, even if this assumption is not satisfied, we can use different smoothness guarantees to protect privacy.