In this note we consider the following problem to study the effect of malicious players on the social optimum in load balancing games: Consider two players SOC and MAL controlling (1-f) and f fraction of the flow in a load balancing game. SOC tries to minimize the total cost faced by her players while MAL tries to maximize the same. If the latencies are linear, we show that this 2-player zero-sum game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we show that one of the optimal strategies for MAL is to play selfishly: let the f fraction of the flow be sent as when the flow was controlled by infinitesimal players playing selfishly and reaching a Nash equilibrium. This shows that a malicious player cannot cause more harm in this game than a set of selfish agents. We also introduce the notion of Cost of Malice - the ratio of the cost faced by SOC at equilibrium to (1-f)OPT, where OPT is the social optimum minimizing the cost of all the players. In linear load balancing games we bound the cost of malice by (1+f 2).
The study of malice has not been restricted to the congestion game setting. Moscibroda @cite_2 study the effect of malicious agents in a virus inoculation game. Indeed, they also define a notion of price of malice as the ratio of the cost of an equilibrium setting with and without malicious agents. The definition is not quite same as that of Babaioff @cite_1 . In fact, to avoid a third price of malice" definition, we call the effect of malice to the optimum, the cost of malice'' instead.
@cite_1 @cite_2
2124034793 2140356130
We study the equilibria of non-atomic congestion games in which there are two types of players: rational players, who seek to minimize their own delay, and malicious players, who seek to maximize the average delay experienced by the rational players. We study the existence of pure and mixed Nash equilibria for these games, and we seek to quantify the impact of the malicious players on the equilibrium. One counter intuitive phenomenon which we demonstrate is the "windfall of malice": paradoxically, when a myopically malicious player gains control of a fraction of the flow, a fraction of the players change from rational to malicious, the new equilibrium may be more favorable for the remaining rational players than the previous equilibrium. Over the last years, game theory has provided great insights into the behavior of distributed systems by modeling the players as utility-maximizing agents. In particular, it has been shown that selfishness causes many systems to perform in a globally suboptimal fashion. Such systems are said to have a large Price of Anarchy. In this paper, we extend this active field of research by allowing some players to be malicious or Byzantine rather than selfish. We ask: What is the impact of Byzantine players on the system's efficiency compared to purely selfish environments or compared to the social optimum? In particular, we introduce the Price of Malice which captures this efficiency degradation. As an example, we analyze the Price of Malice of a game which models the containment of the spread of viruses. In this game, each node can choose whether or not to install anti-virus software. Then, a virus starts from a random node and iteratively infects all neighboring nodes which are not inoculated. We establish various results about this game. For instance, we quantify how much the presence of Byzantine players can deteriorate or---in case of highly risk-averse selfish players---improve the social welfare of the distributed system.