By expanding the connection of objects to the Internet and their entry to human life, the issue of security and privacy has become important. In order to enhance security and privacy on the Internet, many security protocols have been developed. Unfortunately, the security analyzes that have been carried out on these protocols show that they are vulnerable to one or few attacks, which eliminates the use of these protocols. Therefore, the need for a security protocol on the Internet of Things (IoT) has not yet been resolved. Recently, Khor and Sidorov cryptanalyzed the protocol and presented an improved version of it. In this paper, at first, we show that this protocol also does not have sufficient security and so it is not recommended to be used in any application. More precisely, we present a full secret disclosure attack against this protocol, which extracted the whole secrets of the protocol by two communication with the target tag. In addition, recently proposed an ultralightweight mutual authentication RFID protocol for blockchain enabled supply chains, supported by formal and informal security proofs. However, we present a full secret disclosure attack against this protocol as well.
Among different designing strategies of security protocols, attempts to design a secure ultralightweight protocol for constrained environment has a long (unsuccessful) history. Pioneer examples include SASI @cite_27 , RAPP @cite_1 , SLAP @cite_25 , LMAP @cite_10 and R @math AP @cite_11 and among the recent proposals is SecLAP @cite_15 , and many other broken protocols that have been compromised by the later third parties analysis @cite_23 @cite_13 @cite_5 @cite_3 @cite_17 @cite_19 @cite_28 @cite_20 . All those protocols tried to provide enough security only using few lightweight operations such as bitwise operations, e.g. logical AND, OR, XOR and rotation. However, the mentioned analysis have shown that it is not easy to design a strong protocol using cryptographically-weak components.
@cite_13 @cite_28 @cite_1 @cite_17 @cite_3 @cite_19 @cite_27 @cite_23 @cite_5 @cite_15 @cite_10 @cite_25 @cite_20 @cite_11
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RAPP (RFID Authentication Protocol with Permutation) is a recently proposed and efficient ultralightweight authentication protocol. Although it maintains the structure of the other existing ultralightweight protocols, the operation used in it is totally different due to the use of new introduced data dependent permutations and avoidance of modular arithmetic operations and biased logical operations such as AND and OR. The designers of RAPP claimed that this protocol resists against desynchronization attacks since the last messages of the protocol is sent by the reader and not by the tag. This letter challenges this assumption and shows that RAPP is vulnerable against desynchronization attack. This attack has a reasonable probability of success and is effective whether Hamming weight-based or modular-based rotations are used by the protocol. proposed a novel ultralightweight RFID mutual authentication protocol [1] that has recently been analyzed in several articles. In this letter, we first propose a desynchronization attack that succeeds with probability almost 1, which improves upon the 0.25 given in a previous analysis by We also show that the bad properties of the proposed permutation function can be exploited to disclose several bits of the tag's secret rather than just 1bit as previously shown by , which increases the power of a traceability attack. Finally, we show how to extend the aforementioned attack to run a full disclosure attack, which requires to eavesdrop less protocol runs than the proposed attack by i.e., 192<<2 30. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. One of the key problems in RFID is security and privacy. The implementation of authentication protocols is a flexible and effective way to solve this problem. This letter proposes a new ultralightweight RFID authentication protocol with permutation (RAPP). RAPP avoids using unbalanced OR and AND operations and introduces a new operation named permutation. The tags only involve three operations: bitwise XOR, left rotation and permutation. In addition, unlike other existing ultralightweight protocols, the last messages exchanged in RAPP are sent by the reader so as to resist de-synchronization attacks. Security analysis shows that RAPP achieves the functionalities of the authentication protocol and is resistant to various attacks. Performance evaluation illustrates that RAPP uses fewer resources on tags in terms of computation operation, storage requirement and communication cost. Internet of Things (IoT) is a technology in which for any object the ability to send data via communications networks is provided. Ensuring the security of Internet services and applications is an important factor in attracting users to use this platform. In the other words, if people are unable to trust that the equipment and information will be reasonably safe against damage, abuse and the other security threats, this lack of trust leads to a reduction in the use of IoT-based applications. Recently, Tewari and Gupta (J Supercomput 1–18, 2016) have proposed an ultralightweight RFID authentication protocol to provide desired security for objects in IoT. In this paper, we consider the security of the proposed protocol and present a passive secret disclosure attack against it. The success probability of the attack is ‘1’ while the complexity of the attack is only eavesdropping one session of the protocol. The presented attack has negligible complexity. We verify the correctness of the presented attack by simulation. As low-cost RFIDs become more and more popular, it is imperative to design ultralightweight RFID authentication protocols to resist all possible attacks and threats. However, all of the previous ultralightweight authentication schemes are vulnerable to various attacks. In this paper, we propose a new ultralightweight RFID authentication protocol that provides strong authentication and strong integrity protection of its transmission and of updated data. The protocol requires only simple bit-wise operations on the tag and can resist all the possible attacks. These features make it very attractive to low-cost RFIDs and very low-cost RFIDs. In the recent years, there has been an increasing interest in the development of secure and private authentication protocols for RFID. In order to suit the very lightweight nature of RFID tags, a number of proposals have focused on the design of very efficient authentication protocols using no classical cryptographic primitives. This article presents the state of the art in this field by summarizing this family of protocols and the most important attacks against them. The contribution also consists of a passive full-disclosure attack on the SASI and Yeh-Lo-Winata ultralightweight authentication protocols. Since RFID tags are ubiquitous and at times even oblivious to the human user, all modern RFID protocols are designed to resist tracking so that the location privacy of the human RFID user is not violated. Another design criterion for RFIDs is the low computational effort required for tags, in view that most tags are passive devices that derive power from an RFID reader's signals. Along this vein, a class of ultralightweight RFID authentication protocols has been designed, which uses only the most basic bitwise and arithmetic operations like exclusive-OR, OR, addition, rotation, and so forth. In this paper, we analyze the security of the SASI protocol, a recently proposed ultralightweight RFID protocol with better claimed security than earlier protocols. We show that SASI does not achieve resistance to tracking, which is one of its design objectives. Abstract The safety of medical data and equipment plays a vital role in today’s world of Medical Internet of Things (MIoT). These IoT devices have many constraints (e.g., memory size, processing capacity, and power consumption) that make it challenging to use cost-effective and energy-efficient security solutions. Recently, researchers have proposed a few Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) based security solutions for MIoT. The use of RFID technology in securing IoT systems is rapidly increasing because it provides secure and lightweight safety mechanisms for these systems. More recently, authors have proposed a lightweight RFID mutual authentication (LRMI) protocol. The authors argue that LRMI meets the necessary security requirements for RFID systems, and the same applies to MIoT applications as well. In this paper, our contribution has two-folds, firstly we analyze the LRMI protocol’s security to demonstrate that it is vulnerable to various attacks such as secret disclosure, reader impersonation, and tag traceability. Also, it is not able to preserve the anonymity of the tag and the reader. Secondly, we propose a new secure and lightweight mutual RFID authentication (SecLAP) protocol, which provides secure communication and preserves privacy in MIoT systems. Our security analysis shows that the SecLAP protocol is robust against de-synchronization, replay, reader tag impersonation, and traceability attacks, and it ensures forward and backward data communication security. We use Burrows-Abadi-Needham (BAN) logic to validate the security features of SecLAP. Moreover, we compare SecLAP with the state-of-the-art and validate its performance through a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) implementation, which shows that it is lightweight, consumes fewer resources on tags concerning computation functions, and requires less number of flows. Data security is crucial for a RFID system. Since the existing RFID mutual authentication protocols encounter the challenges such as security risks, poor performance, an ultra-lightweight authentication protocol named Succinct and Lightweight Authentication Protocol (SLAP) is proposed. SLAP is only composed of bitwise operations like XOR, left rotation and conversion which is easy to implement on a passive tag. The proposed conversion operation as the main security component guarantees the security of RFID system with the properties such as irreversibility, sensibility, full confusion and low complexity, which better performed or even absent in other previous protocols. Security analysis shows that SLAP guarantees the functionalities of mutual authentication as well as resistance to various attacks such as de-synchronization attack, replay attack and traceability attack, etc. Furthermore, performance evaluation also indicates that the proposed scheme outperforms the existing protocols in terms of less computation requirement and fewer communication messages during authentication process.