In peer-to-peer systems, attrition attacks include both traditional, network-level denial of service attacks as well as application-level attacks in which malign peers conspire to waste loyal peers' resources. We describe several defenses for LOCKSS, a peer-to-peer digital preservation system, that help ensure that application-level attacks even from powerful adversaries are less effective than simple network-level attacks, and that network-level attacks must be intense, wide-spread, and prolonged to impair the system.
. Rate limits on peers joining a DHT have been suggested @cite_47 @cite_37 as a defense against attempts to control parts of the hash space, for example to control the placement of certain data objects or for misrouting. Limiting both joins and stores to empirically determined safe rates will also be needed to thwart the attrition adversary. At least for file sharing, studies @cite_24 have suggested that users' behavior may not be sensitive to latency. The increased storage latency that rate limits create is probably unimportant. XXX Matt Williamson's viral work XXX
@cite_24 @cite_47 @cite_37
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In the span of only a few years, the Internet has experienced an astronomical increase in the use of specialized content delivery systems, such as content delivery networks and peer-to-peer file sharing systems. Therefore, an understanding of content delivery on the lnternet now requires a detailed understanding of how these systems are used in practice.This paper examines content delivery from the point of view of four content delivery systems: HTTP web traffic, the Akamai content delivery network, and Kazaa and Gnutella peer-to-peer file sharing traffic. We collected a trace of all incoming and outgoing network traffic at the University of Washington, a large university with over 60,000 students, faculty, and staff. From this trace, we isolated and characterized traffic belonging to each of these four delivery classes. Our results (1) quantify, the rapidly increasing importance of new content delivery systems, particularly peer-to-peer networks, (2) characterize the behavior of these systems from the perspectives of clients, objects, and servers, and (3) derive implications for caching in these systems. Peer-to-peer (p2p) networking technologies have gained popularity as a mechanism for users to share files without the need for centralized servers. A p2p network provides a scalable and fault-tolerant mechanism to locate nodes anywhere on a network without maintaining a large amount of routing state. This allows for a variety of applications beyond simple file sharing. Examples include multicast systems, anonymous communications systems, and web caches. We survey security issues that occur in the underlying p2p routing protocols, as well as fairness and trust issues that occur in file sharing and other p2p applications.We discuss how techniques, ranging from cryptography, to random network probing, to economic incentives, can be used to address these problems.