Abstract We study the two-player safe game of Competitive Diffusion, a game-theoretic model for the diffusion of technologies or influence through a social network. In game theory, safe strategies are mixed strategies with a minimum expected gain against unknown strategies of the opponents. Safe strategies for competitive diffusion lead to maximum spread of influence in the presence of uncertainty about the other players. We study the safe game on two specific classes of trees, spiders and complete trees, and give tight bounds on the minimum expected gain. We then use these results to give an algorithm that suggests a safe strategy for a player on any tree. We test this algorithm on randomly generated trees and show that it finds strategies that are close to optimal.
In cascade models, as a vertex becomes activated, it activates each of its neighbours with a given probability. The most well-known is the Independent Cascade Model (see @cite_17 and @cite_9 ). In this model, we also start with an initial set of activated vertices. Here, each edge @math is assigned a probability @math . If vertex @math becomes activated, its neighbour @math will become activated in the next round with probability @math . The spread of influence in competitive diffusion can be seen as a cascade model where the activation probability equals 1.
@cite_9 @cite_17
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Models for the processes by which ideas and influence propagate through a social network have been studied in a number of domains, including the diffusion of medical and technological innovations, the sudden and widespread adoption of various strategies in game-theoretic settings, and the effects of "word of mouth" in the promotion of new products. Recently, motivated by the design of viral marketing strategies, Domingos and Richardson posed a fundamental algorithmic problem for such social network processes: if we can try to convince a subset of individuals to adopt a new product or innovation, and the goal is to trigger a large cascade of further adoptions, which set of individuals should we target?We consider this problem in several of the most widely studied models in social network analysis. The optimization problem of selecting the most influential nodes is NP-hard here, and we provide the first provable approximation guarantees for efficient algorithms. Using an analysis framework based on submodular functions, we show that a natural greedy strategy obtains a solution that is provably within 63 of optimal for several classes of models; our framework suggests a general approach for reasoning about the performance guarantees of algorithms for these types of influence problems in social networks.We also provide computational experiments on large collaboration networks, showing that in addition to their provable guarantees, our approximation algorithms significantly out-perform node-selection heuristics based on the well-studied notions of degree centrality and distance centrality from the field of social networks. Though word-of-mouth (w-o-m) communications is a pervasive and intriguing phenomenon, little is known on its underlying process of personal communications. Moreover as marketers are getting more interested in harnessing the power of w-o-m, for e-business and other net related activities, the effects of the different communications types on macro level marketing is becoming critical. In particular we are interested in the breakdown of the personal communication between closer and stronger communications that are within an individual's own personal group (strong ties) and weaker and less personal communications that an individual makes with a wide set of other acquaintances and colleagues (weak ties).