We study the cohesion within and the coalitions between political groups in the Eighth European Parliament (2014–2019) by analyzing two entirely different aspects of the behavior of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in the policy-making processes. On one hand, we analyze their co-voting patterns and, on the other, their retweeting behavior. We make use of two diverse datasets in the analysis. The first one is the roll-call vote dataset, where cohesion is regarded as the tendency to co-vote within a group, and a coalition is formed when the members of several groups exhibit a high degree of co-voting agreement on a subject. The second dataset comes from Twitter; it captures the retweeting (i.e., endorsing) behavior of the MEPs and implies cohesion (retweets within the same group) and coalitions (retweets between groups) from a completely different perspective. We employ two different methodologies to analyze the cohesion and coalitions. The first one is based on Krippendorff’s Alpha reliability, used to measure the agreement between raters in data-analysis scenarios, and the second one is based on Exponential Random Graph Models, often used in social-network analysis. We give general insights into the cohesion of political groups in the European Parliament, explore whether coalitions are formed in the same way for different policy areas, and examine to what degree the retweeting behavior of MEPs corresponds to their co-voting patterns. A novel and interesting aspect of our work is the relationship between the co-voting and retweeting patterns.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that studies legislative behavior in the Eighth European Parliament. The legislative behavior of the previous parliaments was thoroughly studied by Hix, Attina, and others @cite_17 @cite_14 @cite_16 @cite_0 @cite_8 @cite_23 . These studies found that voting behavior is determined to a large extent---and when viewed over time, increasingly so---by affiliation to a political group, as an organizational reflection of the ideological position. The authors found that the cohesion of political groups in the parliament has increased, while nationality has been less and less of a decisive factor @cite_3 . The literature also reports that a split into political camps on the left and right of the political spectrum has recently replaced the grand coalition' between the two big blocks of Christian Conservatives () and Social Democrats () as the dominant form of finding majorities in the parliament. The authors conclude that coalitions are to a large extent formed along the left-to-right axis @cite_3 .
@cite_14 @cite_8 @cite_3 @cite_0 @cite_23 @cite_16 @cite_17
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This article analyzes coalition formation within the European Parliament (EP) under the cooperation procedure through the analysis of a random sample of 100 roll call votes. The authors find that generally, coalitions form on the basis of ideology, not nationality, although they are able to identify some national groups that occasionally vote against the majority of their party group. More interestingly, they find that the political initiative within the EP belongs to the Left and that the majorities required at different stages affect not only the outcomes of votes but also the coalitions that will form. Finally, a slight variation is found in coalition building depending on the subject matter. On the basis of these findings, the authors suggest an alternative interpretation of the conflicts between the Council and EP based on an ideological conflict about more (EP) or less (Council) regulation, as opposed to more or less integration. The European Parliament has be? come one of the most powerful insti? tutions in the European Union. Mem? bers of the European Parliament (MEPs) can now enact legislation, amend the European Union budget, veto the nominee for the European Union Commission President, and censure the Commission. But, we know little about what determines MEPs' voting behavior. Do they vote according to their personal policy preferences? Do the EP parties force MEPs to toe the party line? And, when national party and EP party preferences conflict, which way do MEPs respond?to the principals who control their election (the national parties) or the principals who control their influence in the EP (the EP par? ties)? The results reported here show that national party policies are the strongest predictors of voting behav? ior in the EP. Introduction 1. Development of the European Parliament 2. Democracy, transaction costs and political parties 3. Ideological not territorial politics 4. Participation 5. Trends in party cohesion 6. Agenda setting and cohesion 7. Who controls the MEPs? 8. Competition and coalition formation 9. Dimensions of politics 10. Investiture and censure of the Santer Commission 11. The takeover directive Conclusion. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) typically follow one of two career paths, either advancing within the European Parliament itself or returning to higher offices in their home states. We argue that these different ambitions condition legislative behavior. Specifically, MEPs seeking domestic careers defect from group leadership votes more frequently and oppose legislation that expands the purview of supranational institutions. We show how individual, domestic-party, and national-level variables shape the careers available to MEPs and, in turn, their voting choices. To test the argument, we analyze MEPs’ roll-call voting behavior in the 5th session of the EP (1999–2004) using a random effects model that captures idiosyncrasies in voting behavior across both individual MEPs and specific roll-call votes. We examined how voting behavior in the European Parliament changed after the European Union added ten new member-states in 2004. Using roll-call votes, we compared voting behavior in the first half of the Sixth European Parliament (July 2004-December 2006) with voting behavior in the previous Parliament (1999–2004). We looked at party cohesion, coalition formation, and the spatial map of voting by members of the European Parliament. We found stable levels of party cohesion and interparty coalitions that formed mainly around the left-right dimension. Ideological distance between parties was the strongest predictor of coalition preferences. Overall, the enlargement of the European Union in 2004 did not change the way politics works inside the European Parliament. We also looked at the specific case of the controversial Services Directive and found that ideology remained the main predictor of voting behavior, although nationality also played a role. . The members of the European Parliament are elected in nationally organized and domestically oriented polls; however, in the Strasbourg Assembly they form transnational Party Groups or Europarties. The Rules of Procedure require such formations for the functioning of the Assembly, but Party Groups are much more than procedure requisites. They assemble elected representatives of national parties which share a consistent similarity in political ideologies and strategies. Party integration is a decisive development in the unification process of the Western European countries and it is expected to come from the Party Groups experience. The paper analyses such an issue by examining roll-call votes. Data include a systematic sample of votes cast during the first and second elected Parliament. The research looks into two fundamental items: (a) Party Group cohesion (an index of agreement is used to measure it); (b) voting line-ups of Party Groups. The aim is to point out the most important political cleavages and issues of the Community political system.