Privacy policies often place requirements on the purposes for which a governed entity may use personal information. For example, regulations, such as HIPAA, require that hospital employees use medical information for only certain purposes, such as treatment. Thus, using formal or automated methods for enforcing privacy policies requires a semantics of purpose requirements to determine whether an action is for a purpose or not. We provide such a semantics using a formalism based on planning. We model planning using a modified version of Markov Decision Processes, which exclude redundant actions for a formal definition of redundant. We use the model to formalize when a sequence of actions is only for or not for a purpose. This semantics enables us to provide an algorithm for automating auditing, and to describe formally and compare rigorously previous enforcement methods.
Psychological studies have produced models of human thought (e.g., @cite_7 ). However, these are too low-level and incomplete for our needs @cite_42 . The GOMS formalism provides a higher level model, but is limited to selecting behavior using simple planning approaches @cite_14 . Simon's approach of @cite_37 and related heuristic-based approaches @cite_20 model more complex planning, but with less precise predictions.
@cite_37 @cite_14 @cite_7 @cite_42 @cite_20
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Introduction, 99. — I. Some general features of rational choice, 100.— II. The essential simplifications, 103. — III. Existence and uniqueness of solutions, 111. — IV. Further comments on dynamics, 113. — V. Conclusion, 114. — Appendix, 115. Sine the publication of The Psychology of Human-Computer Interaction , the GOMS model has been one of the most widely known theoretical concepts in HCI. This concept has produced severval GOMS analysis techniques that differ in appearance and form, underlying architectural assumptions, and predictive power. This article compares and contrasts four popular variantsof the GOMS family (the Keystroke-Level Model, the original GOMS formulation, NGOMSL, and CPM-GOMS) by applying them to a single task example. Adaptive control of thought–rational (ACT–R; J. R. Anderson & C. Lebiere, 1998) has evolved into a theory that consists of multiple modules but also explains how these modules are integrated to produce coherent cognition. The perceptual-motor modules, the goal module, and the declarative memory module are presented as examples of specialized systems in ACT–R. These modules are associated with distinct cortical regions. These modules place chunks in buffers where they can be detected by a production system that responds to patterns of information in the buffers. At any point in time, a single production rule is selected to respond to the current pattern. Subsymbolic processes serve to guide the selection of rules to fire as well as the internal operations of some modules. Much of learning involves tuning of these subsymbolic processes. A number of simple and complex empirical examples are described to illustrate how these modules function singly and in concert. Planning and the Cognitive Paradigm Planning and the PASS Theory The Neuropsychology of Planning The Development of Planning Search and Planning Conceptual Planning New Directions In a complex and uncertain world, humans and animals make decisions under the constraints of limited knowledge, resources, and time. Yet models of rational decision making in economics, cognitive science, biology, and other fields largely ignore these real constraints and instead assume agents with perfect information and unlimited time. About forty years ago, Herbert Simon challenged this view with his notion of "bounded rationality." Today, bounded rationality has become a fashionable term used for disparate views of reasoning. This book promotes bounded rationality as the key to understanding how real people make decisions. Using the concept of an "adaptive toolbox," a repertoire of fast and frugal rules for decision making under uncertainty, it attempts to impose more order and coherence on the idea of bounded rationality. The contributors view bounded rationality neither as optimization under constraints nor as the study of people's reasoning fallacies. The strategies in the adaptive toolbox dispense with optimization and, for the most part, with calculations of probabilities and utilities. The book extends the concept of bounded rationality from cognitive tools to emotions; it analyzes social norms, imitation, and other cultural tools as rational strategies; and it shows how smart heuristics can exploit the structure of environments.