This paper, by comparing three potential energy trading systems, studies the feasibility of integrating a community energy storage (CES) device with consumer-owned photovoltaic (PV) systems for demand-side management of a residential neighborhood area network. We consider a fully-competitive CES operator in a non-cooperative Stackelberg game, a benevolent CES operator that has socially favorable regulations with competitive users, and a centralized cooperative CES operator that minimizes the total community energy cost. The former two game-theoretic systems consider that the CES operator first maximizes their revenue by setting a price signal and trading energy with the grid. Then the users with PV panels play a non-cooperative repeated game following the actions of the CES operator to trade energy with the CES device and the grid to minimize energy costs. The centralized CES operator cooperates with the users to minimize the total community energy cost without appropriate incentives. The non-cooperative Stackelberg game with the fully-competitive CES operator has a unique Stackelberg equilibrium at which the CES operator maximizes revenue and users obtain unique Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium CES energy trading strategies. Extensive simulations show that the fully-competitive CES model gives the best trade-off of operating environment between the CES operator and the users.
The Stackelberg game between a shared-facility controller and users in @cite_26 yields effective demand-side management by managing consumer demand with an energy storage device at the controller-side that is enabled to charge and discharge with the grid. In contrast, in this paper, the charging and discharging mechanism of the CES device is intended to accommodate energy trading strategies from PV energy generation of users. In doing so, we focus on exploiting onsite energy generation from user-owned PV systems for demand-side management as an alternative to energy consumption scheduling of users.
@cite_26
2051301990
In this paper, the benefits of distributed energy resources are considered in an energy management scheme for a smart community consisting of a large number of residential units (RUs) and a shared facility controller (SFC). A noncooperative Stackelberg game between the RUs and the SFC is proposed in order to explore how both entities can benefit, in terms of achieved utility and minimizing total cost respectively, from their energy trading with each other and the grid. From the properties of the game, it is shown that the maximum benefit to the SFC, in terms of reduction in total cost, is obtained at the unique and strategy-proof Stackelberg equilibrium (SE). It is further shown that the SE is guaranteed to be reached by the SFC and RUs by executing the proposed algorithm in a distributed fashion, where participating RUs comply with their best strategies in response to the action chosen by the SFC. In addition, a charging–discharging scheme is introduced for the SFC's storage device that can further lower the SFC's total cost if the proposed game is implemented. Numerical experiments confirm the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.