Comparing to well protected data frames, Wi-Fi management frames (MFs) are extremely vulnerable to various attacks. Since MFs are transmitted without encryption, attackers can forge them easily. Such attacks can be detected in cooperative environment such as Wireless Intrusion Detection System (WIDS). However, in non-cooperative environment it is difficult for a single station to identify these spoofing attacks using Received Signal Strength (RSS)-based detection, due to the strong correlation of RSS to both the transmission power (Txpower) and the location of the sender. By exploiting some unique characteristics (i.e., rapid spatial decorrelation, independence of Txpower, and much richer dimensions) of the Channel State Information (CSI), a standard feature in 802.11n Specification, we design a prototype, called CSITE, to authenticate the Wi-Fi management frames by a single station without external support. Our design CSITE, built upon off-the-shelf hardware, achieves precise spoofing detection without collaboration and in-advance finger-print. Several novel techniques are designed to address the challenges caused by user mobility and channel dynamics. To verify the performances of our solution, we implement a prototype of our design and conduct extensive evaluations in various scenarios. Our test results show that our design significantly outperforms the RSS-based method in terms of accuracy, robustness, and efficiency: we observe about 8 times improvement by CSITE over RSS-based method on the falsely accepted attacking frames.
A new attack against PHY-layer authentication called was identified in @cite_19 . However, such attack is neither easy to launch due to the existence of , and it is not likely to succeed due to the MIMO configuration which introduces richer channel information.
@cite_19
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Wireless link signature is a physical layer authentication mechanism, which uses the unique wireless channel characteristics between a transmitter and a receiver to provide authentication of wireless channels. A vulnerability of existing link signature schemes has been identified by introducing a new attack, called mimicry attack. To defend against the mimicry attack, we propose a novel construction for wireless link signature, called time-synched link signature, by integrating cryptographic protection and time factor into traditional wireless link signatures. We also evaluate the mimicry attacks and the time-synched link signature scheme on the USRP2 platform running GNURadio. The experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of time-synched link signature.