If you recommend a product to me and I buy it, how much should you be paid by the seller? And if your sole interest is to maximize the amount paid to you by the seller for a sequence of recommendations, how should you recommend optimally if I become more inclined to ignore you with each irrelevant recommendation you make? Finding an answer to these questions is a key challenge in all forms of marketing that rely on and explore social ties; ranging from personal recommendations to viral marketing. In the first part of this paper, we show that there can be no pricing mechanism that is “truthful” with respect to the seller, and we use solution concepts from coalitional game theory, namely the Core, the Shapley Value, and the Nash Bargaining Solution, to derive provably “fair” prices for settings with one or multiple recommenders. We then investigate pricing mechanisms for the setting where recommenders have different “purchase arguments”. Here we show that it might be beneficial for the recommenders to withhold some of their arguments, unless anonymity-proof solution concepts, such as the anonymity-proof Shapley value, are used. In the second part of this paper, we analyze the setting where the recommendee loses trust in the recommender for each irrelevant recommendation. Here we prove that even if the recommendee regains her initial trust on each successful recommendation, the expected total profit the recommender can make over an infinite period is bounded. This can only be overcome when the recommendee also incrementally regains trust during periods without any recommendation. Here, we see an interesting connection to “banner blindness”, suggesting that showing fewer ads can lead to a higher long-term profit.
We are also addressing the topic of how rumors spread through social networks, or how to identify the best nodes to target for a viral marketing campaign @cite_0 @cite_28 . Our work focuses on a single atomic link in the corresponding cascades of conversions and, in the first part, we ask what a fair price should be to pay a node for activating one of her neighbors. In answering this question we limit our attention to the immediate profit of the seller due to the individual sale, and we do consider the additional value due to recommendation cascades caused by the newly activated node. However, given any algorithm to compute this higher order'' profit, it can trivially be incorporated into our results. The question whether a selfish node should actually try to activate her neighbors at all is addressed in .
@cite_0 @cite_28
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One of the major applications of data mining is in helping companies determine which potential customers to market to. If the expected profit from a customer is greater than the cost of marketing to her, the marketing action for that customer is executed. So far, work in this area has considered only the intrinsic value of the customer (i.e, the expected profit from sales to her). We propose to model also the customer's network value: the expected profit from sales to other customers she may influence to buy, the customers those may influence, and so on recursively. Instead of viewing a market as a set of independent entities, we view it as a social network and model it as a Markov random field. We show the advantages of this approach using a social network mined from a collaborative filtering database. Marketing that exploits the network value of customers---also known as viral marketing---can be extremely effective, but is still a black art. Our work can be viewed as a step towards providing a more solid foundation for it, taking advantage of the availability of large relevant databases. Models for the processes by which ideas and influence propagate through a social network have been studied in a number of domains, including the diffusion of medical and technological innovations, the sudden and widespread adoption of various strategies in game-theoretic settings, and the effects of "word of mouth" in the promotion of new products. Recently, motivated by the design of viral marketing strategies, Domingos and Richardson posed a fundamental algorithmic problem for such social network processes: if we can try to convince a subset of individuals to adopt a new product or innovation, and the goal is to trigger a large cascade of further adoptions, which set of individuals should we target?We consider this problem in several of the most widely studied models in social network analysis. The optimization problem of selecting the most influential nodes is NP-hard here, and we provide the first provable approximation guarantees for efficient algorithms. Using an analysis framework based on submodular functions, we show that a natural greedy strategy obtains a solution that is provably within 63 of optimal for several classes of models; our framework suggests a general approach for reasoning about the performance guarantees of algorithms for these types of influence problems in social networks.We also provide computational experiments on large collaboration networks, showing that in addition to their provable guarantees, our approximation algorithms significantly out-perform node-selection heuristics based on the well-studied notions of degree centrality and distance centrality from the field of social networks.