In recent time, the standards for Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks (VANETs) and Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSs) matured and scientific and industry interest is high especially as autonomous driving gets a lot of media attention. Autonomous driving and other assistance systems for cars make heavy use of VANETs to exchange information.They may provide more comfort, security and safety for drivers. However, it is of crucial importance for the user's trust in these assistance systems that they could not be influenced by malicious users. VANETs are likely attack vectors for such malicious users, hence application-specific security requirements must be considered during the design of applications using VANETs. In literature, many attacks on vehicular communication have been described but attacks on specific vehicular networking applications are often missing. This paper fills in this gap by describing standardized vehicular networking applications, defining and extending previous attacker models, and using the resulting new models to characterize the possible attackers interested in the specific vehicular networking application. The attacker models presented in this paper hopefully provide great benefit for the scientific community and industry as they allow to compare security evaluations of different works, characterize attackers, their intentions and help to plan application-specific security controls for vehicular networking applications.
A realistic attack scenario is the exploitation of low level software or hardware vulnerabilities in the network stacks of wireless transceivers. The existence and importance of these vulnerabilities has been discussed in various publications, @cite_18 @cite_1 @cite_11 @cite_15 . This scenario marks the lower bound of attack scenarios that are discussed in this paper. While still being relevant specifically to wireless communication, cellular or ad-hoc, it is also not specific to only one vehicular networking application and the root cause of vulnerable soft- and hardware proliferates through all the layers of current systems and is not specific to wireless communications. Therefore, this is not in focus for this publication. Instead, the main contribution is the combination and extension of previous attacker models by @cite_4 @cite_8 @cite_22 and the detailed description of realistic attacker models via the extended model. Most of the previous works @cite_12 @cite_17 @cite_7 @cite_21 @cite_16 , are missing realistic attacker models. Some like @cite_17 @cite_7 @cite_21 use categories of attacks, like impersonation, data tampering, sybil, or DOS attacks and describe each attacker based on its category. @cite_16 is really close to defining realistic attacker models by defining categories of attackers, like driver, road side or infrastructure.
@cite_18 @cite_4 @cite_22 @cite_7 @cite_8 @cite_21 @cite_1 @cite_17 @cite_15 @cite_16 @cite_12 @cite_11
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Mobile communication is an essential part of our daily lives. Therefore, it needs to be secure and reliable. In this paper, we study the security of feature phones, the most common type of mobile phone in the world. We built a framework to analyze the security of SMS clients of feature phones. The framework is based on a small GSM base station, which is readily available on the market. Through our analysis we discovered vulnerabilities in the feature phone platforms of all major manufacturers. Using these vulnerabilities we designed attacks against end-users as well as mobile operators. The threat is serious since the attacks can be used to prohibit communication on a large scale and can be carried out from anywhere in the world. Through further analysis we determined that such attacks are amplified by certain configurations of the mobile network. We conclude our research by providing a set of countermeasures. Vehicular networks are very likely to be deployed in the coming years and thus become the most relevant form of mobile ad hoc networks. In this paper, we address the security of these networks. We provide a detailed threat analysis and devise an appropriate security architecture. We also describe some major design decisions still to be made, which in some cases have more than mere technical implications. We provide a set of security protocols, we show that they protect privacy and we analyze their robustness and efficiency. In this paper, we present a model for application distribution and related security attacks in dense vehicular ad hoc networks (VANET) and sparse VANET which forms a delay tolerant network (DTN). We study the vulnerabilities of VANET to evaluate the attack scenarios and introduce a new attacker‘s model as an extension to the work done in [6]. Then a VANET model has been proposed that supports the application distribution through proxy app stores on top of mobile platforms installed in vehicles. The steps of application distribution have been studied in detail. We have identified key attacks (e.g. malware, spamming and phishing, software attack and threat to location privacy) for dense VANET and two attack scenarios for sparse VANET. It has been shown that attacks can be launched by distributing malicious applications and injecting malicious codes to On Board Unit (OBU) by exploiting OBU software security holes. Consequences of such security attacks have been described. Finally, countermeasures including the concepts of sandbox have also been presented in depth. Last few years, vehicular network has been taken more attention of researchers and automotive industries due to life saving factor. Vehicular Ad hoc Network (VANET) needs security to implement the wireless environment and serves users with safety and non safety applications. Attackers generate different attacks in this life saving vehicular network. In this paper, we propose five different classes of attacks and every class is expected to provide better perspective for the VANET security. The main contribution of this paper is the proposed solution for classification and identification of different attacks in VANET. Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs) have emerged recently as one of the most attractive topics for researchers and automotive industries due to their tremendous potential to improve traffic safety, efficiency and other added services. However, VANETs are themselves vulnerable against attacks that can directly lead to the corruption of networks and then possibly provoke big losses of time, money, and even lives. This paper presents a survey of VANETs attacks and solutions in carefully considering other similar works as well as updating new attacks and categorizing them into different classes. Communication using VANETs is commonly seen as the next milestone for improving traffic safety. Vehicles will be enabled to exchange any kind of information that helps to detect and mitigate dangerous situations. Security research in the past years has shown that VANETs are endangered by a plethora of severe security risk. Subject of this work is the modeling of attackers that target active safety applications in VANETs. Through a risk analysis, this work identifies assets, threats and potential attacks in inter-vehicle communication. The risk analysis shows that the most serious threat arises from a quasi-stationary (road-side) attacker that distributed forged warning messages. This attacker is discussed more deeply. We show the degrees of freedom that are available for position forging and find thereby two attacks that demand attention: single position forging having low effort compared to sophisticated movement path forging having a potentially high influence on road traffic safety. Autonomous vehicles capable of navigating unpredictable real-world environments with little human feedback are a reality today. Such systems rely heavily on onboard sensors such as cameras, radar LIDAR, and GPS as well as capabilities such as 3G 4G connectivity and V2V V2I communication to make real-time maneuvering decisions. Autonomous vehicle control imposes very strict requirements on the security of the communication channels used by the vehicle to exchange information as well as the control logic that performs complex driving tasks such as adapting vehicle velocity or changing lanes. This study presents a first look at the effects of security attacks on the communication channel as well as sensor tampering of a connected vehicle stream equipped to achieve CACC. Our simulation results show that an insider attack can cause significant instability in the CACC vehicle stream. We also illustrate how different countermeasures, such as downgrading to ACC mode, could potentially be used to improve the security and safety of the connected vehicle streams. Published attacks against smartphones have concentrated on software running on the application processor. With numerous countermeasures like ASLR, DEP and code signing being deployed by operating system vendors, practical exploitation of memory corruptions on this processor has become a time-consuming endeavor. At the same time, the cellular baseband stack of most smart-phones runs on a separate processor and is significantly less hardened, if at all. In this paper we demonstrate the risk of remotely exploitable memory corruptions in cellular baseband stacks. We analyze two widely deployed baseband stacks and give exemplary cases of memory corruptions that can be leveraged to inject and execute arbitrary code on the baseband processor. The vulnerabilities can be triggered over the air interface using a rogue GSM base station, for instance using OpenBTS together with a USRP software defined radio.