Fog computing is transforming the network edge into an intelligent platform by bringing storage, computing, control, and networking functions closer to end-users, things, and sensors. How to allocate multiple resource types (e.g., CPU, memory, bandwidth) of capacity-limited heterogeneous fog nodes to competing services with diverse requirements and preferences in a fair and efficient manner is a challenging task. To this end, we propose a novel market-based resource allocation framework in which the services act as buyers and fog resources act as divisible goods in the market. The proposed framework aims to compute a market equilibrium (ME) solution at which every service obtains its favorite resource bundle under the budget constraint while the system achieves high resource utilization. This work extends the General Equilibrium literature by considering a practical case of satiated utility functions. Also, we introduce the notions of non-wastefulness and frugality for equilibrium selection, and rigorously demonstrate that all the non-wasteful and frugal ME are the optimal solutions to a convex program. Furthermore, the proposed equilibrium is shown to possess salient fairness properties including envy-freeness, sharing-incentive, and proportionality. Another major contribution of this work is to develop a privacy-preserving distributed algorithm, which is of independent interest, for computing an ME while allowing market participants to obfuscate their private information. Finally, extensive performance evaluation is conducted to verify our theoretical analyses.
Another approach to enable data privacy is to employ cryptographic techniques such as Garble Circuit (GC) @cite_45 and Fully Homomorphic Encryption (HE) @cite_31 , which are often used in secure multi-party computation @cite_38 . However, HE is computationally expensive due to public key operations and GC has expensive communication costs. Hence, these cryptographic approaches are not suitable for distributed optimization which typically needs many iterations to converge. Indeed, @cite_26 is the only work that we are aware of studying privacy-preserving decentralized optimization. Different from their proposed algorithm that based on ADMM and partially homomorphic cryptography, part is and simpler.
@cite_38 @cite_31 @cite_45 @cite_26
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In this paper, we survey the basic paradigms and notions of secure mul- tiparty computation and discuss their relevance to the fleld of privacy-preserving data mining. In addition to reviewing deflnitions and constructions for secure mul- tiparty computation, we discuss the issue of e-ciency and demonstrate the di-cul- ties involved in constructing highly e-cient protocols. We also present common errors that are prevalent in the literature when secure multiparty computation techniques are applied to privacy-preserving data mining. Finally, we discuss the relationship between secure multiparty computation and privacy-preserving data mining, and show which problems it solves and which problems it does not. We propose a fully homomorphic encryption scheme -- i.e., a scheme that allows one to evaluate circuits over encrypted data without being able to decrypt. Our solution comes in three steps. First, we provide a general result -- that, to construct an encryption scheme that permits evaluation of arbitrary circuits, it suffices to construct an encryption scheme that can evaluate (slightly augmented versions of) its own decryption circuit; we call a scheme that can evaluate its (augmented) decryption circuit bootstrappable. Next, we describe a public key encryption scheme using ideal lattices that is almost bootstrappable. Lattice-based cryptosystems typically have decryption algorithms with low circuit complexity, often dominated by an inner product computation that is in NC1. Also, ideal lattices provide both additive and multiplicative homomorphisms (modulo a public-key ideal in a polynomial ring that is represented as a lattice), as needed to evaluate general circuits. Unfortunately, our initial scheme is not quite bootstrappable -- i.e., the depth that the scheme can correctly evaluate can be logarithmic in the lattice dimension, just like the depth of the decryption circuit, but the latter is greater than the former. In the final step, we show how to modify the scheme to reduce the depth of the decryption circuit, and thereby obtain a bootstrappable encryption scheme, without reducing the depth that the scheme can evaluate. Abstractly, we accomplish this by enabling the encrypter to start the decryption process, leaving less work for the decrypter, much like the server leaves less work for the decrypter in a server-aided cryptosystem. Two millionaires wish to know who is richer; however, they do not want to find out inadvertently any additional information about each other’s wealth. How can they carry out such a conversation? This is a special case of the following general problem. Suppose m people wish to compute the value of a function f(x1, x2, x3, . . . , xm), which is an integer-valued function of m integer variables xi of bounded range. Assume initially person Pi knows the value of xi and no other x’s. Is it possible for them to compute the value of f , by communicating among themselves, without unduly giving away any information about the values of their own variables? The millionaires’ problem corresponds to the case when m = 2 and f(x1, x2) = 1 if x1 < x2, and 0 otherwise. In this paper, we will give precise formulation of this general problem and describe three ways of solving it by use of one-way functions (i.e., functions which are easy to evaluate but hard to invert). These results have applications to secret voting, private querying of database, oblivious negotiation, playing mental poker, etc. We will also discuss the complexity question “How many bits need to be exchanged for the computation”, and describe methods to prevent participants from cheating. Finally, we study the question “What cannot be accomplished with one-way functions”. Before describing these results, we would like to put this work in perspective by first considering a unified view of secure computation in the next section.