Influential users have great potential for accelerating information dissemination and acquisition on Twitter. How to measure the influence of Twitter users has attracted significant academic and industrial attention. Existing influence measurement techniques are vulnerable to sybil users that are thriving on Twitter. Although sybil defenses for online social networks have been extensively investigated, they commonly assume unique mappings from human-established trust relationships to online social associations and thus do not apply to Twitter where users can freely follow each other. This paper presents TrueTop, the first sybil-resilient system to measure the influence of Twitter users. TrueTop is rooted in two observations from real Twitter datasets. First, although non-sybil users may incautiously follow strangers, they tend to be more careful and selective in retweeting, replying to, and mentioning other users. Second, influential users usually get much more retweets, replies, and mentions than non-influential users. Detailed theoretical studies and synthetic simulations show that TrueTop can generate very accurate influence measurement results with strong resilience to sybil attacks.
There is significant effort to explore social networks for effective sybil defenses in various distributed systems, such as SybilGuard @cite_3 and SybilLimit @cite_22 for P2P networks, SumUp @cite_18 for online voting systems, and SybilInfer @cite_0 , SybilDefense @cite_35 , and SybilRank @cite_39 for online social networks. A common assumption is that each node can be mapped into one in an undirected social network graph where every edge corresponds to a human-established trust relation. Although the attacker can create many sybil accounts, he cannot establish an arbitrarily large number of social trust relations with non-sybil users. Moreover, all schemes assume that the honest region is fast mixing and separate from the sybil region. Built upon these two key insights, these schemes conduct varying community detection methods @cite_43 to limit the number of sybil users admitted into or their impact in various application scenarios.
@cite_35 @cite_18 @cite_22 @cite_3 @cite_39 @cite_0 @cite_43
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Distributed systems without trusted identities are particularly vulnerable to sybil attacks, where an adversary creates multiple bogus identities to compromise the running of the system. This paper presents SybilDefender, a sybil defense mechanism that leverages the network topologies to defend against sybil attacks in social networks. Based on performing a limited number of random walks within the social graphs, SybilDefender is efficient and scalable to large social networks. Our experiments on two 3,000,000 node real-world social topologies show that SybilDefender outperforms the state of the art by one to two orders of magnitude in both accuracy and running time. SybilDefender can effectively identify the sybil nodes and detect the sybil community around a sybil node, even when the number of sybil nodes introduced by each attack edge is close to the theoretically detectable lower bound. Besides, we propose two approaches to limiting the number of attack edges in online social networks. The survey results of our Facebook application show that the assumption made by previous work that all the relationships in social networks are trusted does not apply to online social networks, and it is feasible to limit the number of attack edges in online social networks by relationship rating. Obtaining user opinion (using votes) is essential to ranking user-generated online content. However, any content voting system is susceptible to the Sybil attack where adversaries can out-vote real users by creating many Sybil identities. In this paper, we present SumUp, a Sybilresilient vote aggregation system that leverages the trust network among users to defend against Sybil attacks. SumUp uses the technique of adaptive vote flow aggregation to limit the number of bogus votes cast by adversaries to no more than the number of attack edges in the trust network (with high probability). Using user feed-back on votes, SumUp further restricts the voting power of adversaries who continuously misbehave to below the number of their attack edges. Using detailed evaluation of several existing social networks (YouTube, Flickr), we show SumUp's ability to handle Sybil attacks. By applying SumUp on the voting trace of Digg, a popular news voting site, we have found strong evidence of attack on many articles marked "popular" by Digg. Open-access distributed systems such as peer-to-peer systems are particularly vulnerable to sybil attacks, where a malicious user creates multiple fake identities (called sybil nodes). Without a trusted central authority that can tie identities to real human beings, defending against sybil attacks is quite challenging. Among the small number of decentralized approaches, our recent SybilGuard protocol leverages a key insight on social networks to bound the number of sybil nodes accepted. Despite its promising direction, SybilGuard can allow a large number of sybil nodes to be accepted. Furthermore, SybilGuard assumes that social networks are fast-mixing, which has never been confirmed in the real world. This paper presents the novel SybilLimit protocol that leverages the same insight as SybilGuard, but offers dramatically improved and near-optimal guarantees. The number of sybil nodes accepted is reduced by a factor of Θ(√n), or around 200 times in our experiments for a million-node system. We further prove that SybilLimit's guarantee is at most a log n factor away from optimal when considering approaches based on fast-mixing social networks. Finally, based on three large-scale real-world social networks, we provide the first evidence that real-world social networks are indeed fast-mixing. This validates the fundamental assumption behind SybilLimit's and SybilGuard's approach. Peer-to-peer and other decentralized,distributed systems are known to be particularly vulnerable to sybil attacks. In a sybil attack,a malicious user obtains multiple fake identities and pretends to be multiple, distinct nodes in the system. By controlling a large fraction of the nodes in the system,the malicious user is able to "out vote" the honest users in collaborative tasks such as Byzantine failure defenses. This paper presents SybilGuard, a novel protocol for limiting the corruptive influences of sybil attacks.Our protocol is based on the "social network "among user identities, where an edge between two identities indicates a human-established trust relationship. Malicious users can create many identities but few trust relationships. Thus, there is a disproportionately-small "cut" in the graph between the sybil nodes and the honest nodes. SybilGuard exploits this property to bound the number of identities a malicious user can create.We show the effectiveness of SybilGuard both analytically and experimentally. Users increasingly rely on the trustworthiness of the information exposed on Online Social Networks (OSNs). In addition, OSN providers base their business models on the marketability of this information. However, OSNs suffer from abuse in the form of the creation of fake accounts, which do not correspond to real humans. Fakes can introduce spam, manipulate online rating, or exploit knowledge extracted from the network. OSN operators currently expend significant resources to detect, manually verify, and shut down fake accounts. Tuenti, the largest OSN in Spain, dedicates 14 full-time employees in that task alone, incurring a significant monetary cost. Such a task has yet to be successfully automated because of the difficulty in reliably capturing the diverse behavior of fake and real OSN profiles. We introduce a new tool in the hands of OSN operators, which we call SybilRank. It relies on social graph properties to rank users according to their perceived likelihood of being fake (Sybils). SybilRank is computationally efficient and can scale to graphs with hundreds of millions of nodes, as demonstrated by our Hadoop prototype. We deployed SybilRank in Tuenti's operation center. We found that ∼90 of the 200K accounts that SybilRank designated as most likely to be fake, actually warranted suspension. On the other hand, with Tuenti's current user-report-based approach only ∼5 of the inspected accounts are indeed fake. SybilInfer is an algorithm for labelling nodes in a social network as honest users or Sybils controlled by an adversary. At the heart of SybilInfer lies a probabilistic model of honest social networks, and an inference engine that returns potential regions of dishonest nodes. The Bayesian inference approach to Sybil detection comes with the advantage label has an assigned probability, indicating its degree of certainty. We prove through analytical results as well as experiments on simulated and real-world network topologies that, given standard constraints on the adversary, SybilInfer is secure, in that it successfully distinguishes between honest and dishonest nodes and is not susceptible to manipulation by the adversary. Furthermore, our results show that SybilInfer outperforms state of the art algorithms, both in being more widely applicable, as well as providing vastly more accurate results. Recently, there has been much excitement in the research community over using social networks to mitigate multiple identity, or Sybil, attacks. A number of schemes have been proposed, but they differ greatly in the algorithms they use and in the networks upon which they are evaluated. As a result, the research community lacks a clear understanding of how these schemes compare against each other, how well they would work on real-world social networks with different structural properties, or whether there exist other (potentially better) ways of Sybil defense. In this paper, we show that, despite their considerable differences, existing Sybil defense schemes work by detecting local communities (i.e., clusters of nodes more tightly knit than the rest of the graph) around a trusted node. Our finding has important implications for both existing and future designs of Sybil defense schemes. First, we show that there is an opportunity to leverage the substantial amount of prior work on general community detection algorithms in order to defend against Sybils. Second, our analysis reveals the fundamental limits of current social network-based Sybil defenses: We demonstrate that networks with well-defined community structure are inherently more vulnerable to Sybil attacks, and that, in such networks, Sybils can carefully target their links in order make their attacks more effective.