Infrastructure networks are vulnerable to both cyber and physical attacks. Building a secure and resilient networked system is essential for providing reliable and dependable services. To this end, we establish a two-player three-stage game framework to capture the dynamics in the infrastructure protection and recovery phases. Specifically, the goal of the infrastructure network designer is to keep the network connected before and after the attack, while the adversary aims to disconnect the network by compromising a set of links. With costs for creating and removing links, the two players aim to maximize their utilities while minimizing the costs. In this paper, we use the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) to characterize the optimal strategies of the network defender and attacker. We derive the SPE explicitly in terms of system parameters. We further investigate the resilience planning of the defender and the strategic timing of attack of the adversary. Finally, we use case studies of UAV-enabled communication networks for disaster recovery to corroborate the obtained analytical results.
The adopted method and framework in our infrastructure network design are relevant to the recent advances in adversarial networks @cite_4 @cite_29 @cite_10 @cite_12 and strategic network formation games @cite_21 @cite_2 @cite_35 . Furthermore, the current work extends our previous one @cite_13 in multiple aspects. First, our goal in this work is to design the optimal protection, resilience planning and recovery strategies for infrastructure networks in a holistic manner which differs from @cite_13 in which the critical resilience planning factor is not considered. Second, we investigate the new topic of network resilience and the strategic behavior of attacker in Section . Third, we provide the detailed proofs of all theoretical results which were omitted in @cite_13 . Fourth, we extensively expand the introduction and related work sections as well as the case studies section with more examples to explicitly illustrate the newly obtained analytical results.
@cite_13 @cite_35 @cite_4 @cite_29 @cite_21 @cite_2 @cite_10 @cite_12
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Infrastructure networks are vulnerable to both cyber and physical attacks. Building a secure and resilient networked system is essential for providing reliable and dependable services. To this end, we establish a two-player three-stage game framework to capture the dynamics in the infrastructure protection and recovery phases. Specifically, the goal of the infrastructure network designer is to keep the network connected before and after the attack, while the adversary aims to disconnect the network by compromising a set of links. With costs for creating and removing links, the two players aim to maximize their utilities while minimizing the costs. In this paper, we use the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) to characterize the optimal strategies of the network defender and attacker. We derive the SPE explicitly in terms of system parameters. Finally, we use a case study of UAV-enabled communication networks for disaster recovery to corroborate the obtained analytical results. The increasing connectivity between critical infrastructures creates a network of networks in which the interdependencies between the networks play an important role in understanding the emerging functions and performances. To this end, this paper aims to establish a game-theoretic framework to capture the interactions between two system designers who aim to maximize individual network utilities. In particular, we use the game model to investigate the decentralized interdependent network for maximizing the algebraic connectivity of the global network. We develop an alternating play algorithm, and show its convergence to a Nash equilibrium network after a finite number of iterations. We corroborate our results through case studies of power and communication networks, and compare the Nash equilibrium solutions with their constrained team solution counterparts. The experimental results provide design guidelines and insights to increase the efficiency of the interdependent network formation games. Connections between individuals facilitate the exchange of goods, resources and information and create benefits. These connections may be exploited by adversaries to spread their attacks as well. What is the optimal way to design and defend networks in the face of attacks? We develop a model with a Designer and an Adversary. The Designer moves first and chooses a network and an allocation of defense resources across nodes. The Adversary then allocates attack resources on nodes; if an attack succeeds then the Adversary decides on how successful resources should navigate the network. We obtain two principal results. One, we show that in a wide variety of circumstances a star network with all defence resources allocated to the central node is optimal for the Designer. Two, we identify conditions on the technology of conflict, network value function and the resource configuration for which networks with multiple hubs components are optimal. Infrastructure networks are a key feature of an economy. Their functionality depends on the connectivity and sizes of different components and they face a variety of threats, from natural disasters to intelligent attacks. How should networks be defended and designed to ensure the best functionality? Network connectivity plays an important role in the information exchange between different agents in the multi-level networks. In this paper, we establish a game-theoretic framework to capture the uncoordinated nature of the decision-making at different layers of the multi-level networks. Specifically, we design a decentralized algorithm that aims to maximize the algebraic connectivity of the global network iteratively. In addition, we show that the designed algorithm converges to a Nash equilibrium asymptotically and yields an equilibrium network. To study the network resiliency, we introduce three adversarial attack models and characterize their worst-case impacts on the network performance. Case studies based on a two-layer mobile robotic network are used to corroborate the effectiveness and resiliency of the proposed algorithm and show the interdependency between different layers of the network during the recovery processes. We present an approach to network formation based on the notion that social networks are formed by individual decisions that trade off the costs of forming and maintaining links against the potential rewards from doing so. We suppose that a link with another agent allows access, in part and in due course, to the benefits available to the latter via his own links. Thus individual links generate externalities whose value depends on the level of decay delay associated with indirect links. A distinctive aspect of our approach is that the costs of link formation are incurred only by the person who initiates the link. This allows us to formulate the network formation process as a noncooperative game. With the remarkable growth of the Internet and communication technologies over the past few decades, Internet of Things (IoTs) is enabling the ubiquitous connectivity of heterogeneous physical devices with software, sensors, and actuators. IoT networks are naturally two-layer with the cloud and cellular networks coexisting with the underlaid device-todevice (D2D) communications. The connectivity of IoTs plays an important role in information dissemination for missioncritical and civilian applications. However, IoT communication networks are vulnerable to cyber attacks including the denialof- service (DoS) and jamming attacks, resulting in link removals in IoT network. In this work, we develop a heterogeneous IoT network design framework in which a network designer can add links to provide additional communication paths between two nodes or secure links against attacks by investing resources. By anticipating the strategic cyber attacks, we characterize the optimal design of secure IoT network by first providing a lower bound on the number of links a secure network requires for a given budget of protected links, and then developing a method to construct networks that satisfy the heterogeneous network design specifications. Therefore, each layer of the designed heterogeneous IoT network is resistant to a predefined level of malicious attacks with minimum resources. Finally, we provide case studies on the Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) to corroborate and illustrate our obtained results