In this contribution, the performance of a multiuser system is analyzed in the context of frequency selective fading channels. Using game theoretic tools, a useful framework is provided in order to determine the optimal power allocation when users know only their own channel (while perfect channel state information is assumed at the base station). This scenario illustrates the case of decentralized schemes, where limited information on the network is available at the terminal. Various receivers are considered, namely the matched filter, the MMSE filter and the optimum filter. The goal of this paper is to extend previous work, and to derive simple expressions for the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium as the number of mobiles becomes large and the spreading length increases. To that end two asymptotic methodologies are combined. The first is asymptotic random matrix theory which allows us to obtain explicit expressions of the impact of all other mobiles on any given tagged mobile. The second is the theory of non-atomic games which computes good approximations of the Nash equilibrium as the number of mobiles grows.
In @cite_17 , defining the utility as advised in @cite_4 as the ratio of the throughput to the transmission power, the authors obtain results of existence and unicity of a Nash equilibrium for a CDMA system. They extend this work to the case of multiple carriers in @cite_36 . In particular, it is shown that users will select and only transmit over their best carrier. As far as the attenuation is concerned, the consideration is restricted to flat fading in @cite_17 and in @cite_36 (each carrier being flat fading in the latter). However, wireless transmissions generally suffer from the effect of multiple paths, thus becoming frequency-selective. The goal of this paper is to determine the influence of the number of paths (or the selectivity of the channel) on the performance of PA.
@cite_36 @cite_4 @cite_17
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A game-theoretic model for studying power control in multicarrier code-division multiple-access systems is proposed. Power control is modeled as a noncooperative game in which each user decides how much power to transmit over each carrier to maximize its own utility. The utility function considered here measures the number of reliable bits transmitted over all the carriers per joule of energy consumed and is particularly suitable for networks where energy efficiency is important. The multidimensional nature of users' strategies and the nonquasi-concavity of the utility function make the multicarrier problem much more challenging than the single-carrier or throughput-based-utility case. It is shown that, for all linear receivers including the matched filter, the decorrelator, and the minimum-mean-square-error detector, a user's utility is maximized when the user transmits only on its "best" carrier. This is the carrier that requires the least amount of power to achieve a particular target signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio at the output of the receiver. The existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium for the proposed power control game are studied. In particular, conditions are given that must be satisfied by the channel gains for a Nash equilibrium to exist, and the distribution of the users among the carriers at equilibrium is characterized. In addition, an iterative and distributed algorithm for reaching the equilibrium (when it exists) is presented. It is shown that the proposed approach results in significant improvements in the total utility achieved at equilibrium compared with a single-carrier system and also to a multicarrier system in which each user maximizes its utility over each carrier independently Recent publications recognize that decentralized algorithms useful in wireless data applications can be obtained via microeconomics and game theory. In these studies, each agent maximizes, under appropriate rules and constraints, a quality-of-service (QoS) index. A key solution is a "Nash equilibrium"; i.e., an allocation from which no agent is better off by unilaterally "deviating". The actual maximization may be made by software which may not be directly "controllable" by a human user. The model and, especially, the chosen QoS index should be as general as possible, so that the derived results be applicable to a wide variety of channel conditions, modulation schemes, and other physical-layer characteristics. Likewise, the chosen index should exhibit predictable and reliable technical behavior, without exacting a high complexity cost. This note describes a model, and particularly, a QoS index which can accommodate a wide variety of physical layer situations. The proposed index is shown to exhibit solid technical behavior, be physically significant, intuitively appealing, and applicable to a wide variety of physical layer situations. A game in which terminals carrying multi-rate traffic seek to maximize this index is analyzed, and closed-form equilibrium conditions and power levels are derived "from first principles". All terminals want the same signal-to-interference ratio (SIR), but some cannot reach the necessary power level. At equilibrium, a number of terminals transmit full power, and others achieve the same optimal SIR. A basic rationale to search for these equilibria is provided. In this paper, the cross-layer design problem of joint multiuser detection and power control is studied, using a game-theoretic approach that focuses on energy efficiency. The uplink of a direct-sequence code-division multiple-access data network is considered, and a noncooperative game is proposed in which users in the network are allowed to choose their uplink receivers as well as their transmit powers to maximize their own utilities. The utility function measures the number of reliable bits transmitted by the user per joule of energy consumed. Focusing on linear receivers, the Nash equilibrium for the proposed game is derived. It is shown that the equilibrium is one where the powers are signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio-balanced with the minimum mean-square error (MMSE) detector as the receiver. In addition, this framework is used to study power-control games for the matched filter, the decorrelator, and the MMSE detector; and the receivers' performance is compared in terms of the utilities achieved at equilibrium (in bits joule). The optimal cooperative solution is also discussed and compared with the noncooperative approach. Extensions of the results to the case of multiple receive antennas are also presented. In addition, an admission-control scheme based on maximizing the total utility in the network is proposed.