With the emerging sensing technologies, such as mobile crowdsensing and Internet of Things, people-centric data can be efficiently collected and used for analytics and optimization purposes. These data are typically required to develop and render people-centric services. In this paper, we address the privacy implication, optimal pricing, and bundling of people-centric services. We first define the inverse correlation between the service quality and privacy level from data analytics perspectives. We then present the profit maximization models of selling standalone, complementary, and substitute services. Specifically, the closed-form solutions of the optimal privacy level and subscription fee are derived to maximize the gross profit of service providers. For interrelated people-centric services, we show that cooperation by service bundling of complementary services is profitable compared with the separate sales but detrimental for substitutes. We also show that the market value of a service bundle is correlated with the degree of contingency between the interrelated services. Finally, we incorporate the profit sharing models from game theory for dividing the bundling profit among the cooperative service providers.
Pricing and incentive mechanisms are required to encourage participation in data collection. A reward-based incentive mechanism for mobile crowdsensing was presented in @cite_22 . The reservation wages of the participants are utilized to reduce the total data cost by selecting the sufficient set of participants with the lowest rates. @cite_7 , the participants are paid according to their reliability. The reliability is defined as a probabilistic process and measured based on the historical records of the participants in completing crowdsensing tasks. The authors in @cite_6 considered the heterogeneity of crowdsensing participants and proposed asymmetric payment model which encourages competition among the participants. @cite_20 , the authors introduced a profit maximization and pricing model to optimize the amount of data that should be bought from the sensing participants. None of the existing papers on people-centric sensing in the literature consider the problem of jointly optimizing the pricing and privacy level in people-centric services where data analytics is heavily applied. Moreover, existing works do not consider bundling interrelated people-centric services as complements or substitutes. Therefore, there is a practical demand for privacy-aware pricing, bundling, and profit allocation models which are the major contributions of this paper.
@cite_20 @cite_22 @cite_7 @cite_6
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Big data has been emerging as a new approach in utilizing large datasets to optimize complex system operations. Big data is fueled with Internet-of-Things (IoT) services that generate immense sensory data from numerous sensors and devices. While most current research focus of big data is on machine learning and resource management design, the economic modeling and analysis have been largely overlooked. This paper thus investigates the big data market model and optimal pricing scheme. We first study the utility of data from the data science perspective, i.e., using the machine learning methods. We then introduce the market model and develop an optimal pricing scheme afterward. The case study shows clearly the suitability of the proposed data utility functions. The numerical examples demonstrate that big data and IoT service provider can achieve the maximum profit through the proposed market model. This paper analyzes and compares different incentive mechanisms for a client to motivate the collaboration of smartphone users on both data acquisition and distributed computing applications. The recent paradigm of mobile crowd sensing (MCS) enables a broad range of mobile applications. A critical challenge for the paradigm is to incentivize phone users to be workers providing sensing services. While some theoretical incentive mechanisms for general-purpose crowdsourcing have been proposed, it is still an open issue as to how to incorporate the theoretical framework into the practical MCS system. In this paper, we propose an incentive mechanism based on a quality-driven auction (QDA). The mechanism is specifically for the MCS system, where the worker is paid off based on the quality of sensed data instead of working time, as adopted in the literature. We theoretically prove that the mechanism is truthful, individual rational, platform profitable, and social-welfare optimal. Moreover, we incorporate our incentive mechanism into a Wi-Fi fingerprint-based indoor localization system to incentivize the MCS-based fingerprint collection. We present a probabilistic model to evaluate the reliability of the submitted data, which resolves the issue that the ground truth for the data reliability is unavailable. We realize and deploy an indoor localization system to evaluate our proposed incentive mechanism and present extensive experimental results. Many crowdsourcing scenarios are heterogeneous in the sense that, not only the workers’ types (e.g., abilities or costs) are different, but the beliefs (probabilistic knowledge) about their respective types are also different. In this paper, we design an incentive mechanism for such scenarios using an asymmetric all-pay contest (or auction) model. Our design objective is an optimal mechanism, i.e., one that maximizes the crowdsourcing revenue minus cost. To achieve this, we furnish the contest with a prize tuple which is an array of reward functions each for a potential winner. We prove and characterize the unique equilibrium of this contest, and solve the optimal prize tuple. In addition, this study discovers a counter-intuitive property, called strategy autonomy (SA), which means that heterogeneous workers behave independently of one another as if they were in a homogeneous setting. In game-theoretical terms, it says that an asymmetric auction admits a symmetric equilibrium. Not only theoretically interesting, but SA also has important practical implications on mechanism complexity, energy efficiency, crowdsourcing revenue, and system scalability. By scrutinizing seven mechanisms, our extensive performance evaluation demonstrates the superior performance of our mechanism as well as offers insights into the SA property.