In online debates, as in offline ones, individual utterances or arguments support or attack each other, leading to some subset of arguments winning (potentially from different sides of the debate). However, online conversations are much larger in scale than offline ones, with often hundreds of thousands of users weighing in, and so, readers are often forced to sample a subset of the arguments or arguments being put forth. Since such sampling is rarely done in a principled manner, users may not get all the relevant "winning" arguments to get a full picture of the debate from a sample. This paper is interested in answering the question of how users should sample online conversations to selectively favour winning arguments. We apply techniques from argumentation theory and complex networks to build a model that predicts the probabilities of the normatively winning arguments given their location in idealised online discussions. Online discussions are modeled as reply networks where nodes represent the comments exchanged and directed edges represent replies that can either be supporting or attacking. Our model shows that the proportion of replies that are supporting in the network, the network's in-degree distribution and the locations of unrebutted arguments ("the last words") all determine the behaviour of the probability that a comment is a winning argument given its location. This is also verified with data scraped from the online debating platform Kialo. In predicting the locations of the winning arguments in reply networks, we can therefore suggest which arguments a reader should sample and read if he or she would like to grasp the winning opinions in such discussions. Our models have important implications for the design of future online discussion platforms.
Given our arguments @math and their disagreements @math , how can a subset of arguments be seen as winning''? The two basic requirements is that no pair of arguments in such a set are attacking (a consistency requirement), and that this set of arguments can defend itself from outside attacks @cite_29 . More precisely, given an argumentation framework @math , let @math and @math . We say @math is iff no two arguments in @math attack each other. Graph-theoretically, conflict-free sets are independent sets. We say @math or an argument @math iff every attacker of @math is in turn attacked by some argument in @math . We say @math is iff for all @math , @math is defended by @math . We say @math is iff @math is conflict-free and self-defending.
@cite_29
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The purpose of this paper is to study the fundamental mechanism, humans use in argumentation, and to explore ways to implement this mechanism on computers. We do so by first developing a theory for argumentation whose central notion is the acceptability of arguments. Then we argue for the “correctness” or “appropriateness” of our theory with two strong arguments. The first one shows that most of the major approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning in AI and logic programming are special forms of our theory of argumentation. The second argument illustrates how our theory can be used to investigate the logical structure of many practical problems. This argument is based on a result showing that our theory captures naturally the solutions of the theory of n-person games and of the well-known stable marriage problem. By showing that argumentation can be viewed as a special form of logic programming with negation as failure, we introduce a general logic-programming-based method for generating meta-interpreters for argumentation systems, a method very much similar to the compiler-compiler idea in conventional programming. Keyword: Argumentation; Nonmonotonic reasoning; Logic programming; n-person games; The stable marriage problem