Internet search companies sell advertisement slots based on users' search queries via an auction. Advertisers have to determine how to place bids on the keywords of their interest in order to maximize their return for a given budget: this is the budget optimization problem. The solution depends on the distribution of future queries. In this paper, we formulate stochastic versions of the budget optimization problem based on natural probabilistic models of distribution over future queries, and address two questions that arise. [Evaluation] Given a solution, can we evaluate the expected value of the objective function? [Optimization] Can we find a solution that maximizes the objective function in expectation? Our main results are approximation and complexity results for these two problems in our three stochastic models. In particular, our algorithmic results show that simple prefix strategies that bid on all cheap keywords up to some level are either optimal or good approximations for many cases; we show other cases to be NP-hard.
There has been a lot of other work on search-related auctions in the presence of budgets, but it has primarily focused on the game-theoretic aspects @cite_7 @cite_11 , strategy-proof mechanisms @cite_16 @cite_0 , and revenue maximization @cite_3 @cite_13 .
@cite_7 @cite_3 @cite_0 @cite_16 @cite_13 @cite_11
1975392791 2564127794 2015324401 2127347613
We investigate the "generalized second price" auction (GSP), a new mechanism which is used by search engines to sell online advertising that most Internet users encounter daily. GSP is tailored to its unique environment, and neither the mechanism nor the environment have previously been studied in the mechanism design literature. Although GSP looks similar to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, its properties are very different. In particular, unlike the VCG mechanism, GSP generally does not have an equilibrium in dominant strategies, and truth-telling is not an equilibrium of GSP. To analyze the properties of GSP in a dynamic environment, we describe the generalized English auction that corresponds to the GSP and show that it has a unique equilibrium. This is an ex post equilibrium that results in the same payoffs to all players as the dominant strategy equilibrium of VCG. We consider the problem of online keyword advertising auctions among multiple bidders with limited budgets, and propose a bidding heuristic to optimize the utility for bidders by equalizing the return-on-investment for each bidder across all keywords. We show that natural auction mechanisms combined with this heuristic can experience chaotic cycling (as is the case with many current advertisement auction systems), and therefore propose a modified class of mechanisms with small random perturbations. This perturbation is reminiscent of the small time-dependent perturbations employed in the dynamical systems literature to convert many types of chaos into attracting motions. We show that our perturbed mechanism provably converges in the case of first-price auctions and experimentally converges in the case of second-price auctions. Moreover, we show that our bidder-optimal system does not decrease the revenue of the auctioneer in the sense that it converges to the unique market equilibrium in the case of first-price auctions. In the case of second-price auctions, we conjecture that it converges to the non-unique “supplyaware” market equilibrium. We also observe that our perturbed auction scheme is useful in a broader context: In general, it can allow bidders to “share” a particular item, leading to stable allocations and pricing for the bidders, and improved revenue for the auctioneer. We study the problem of optimally allocating online advertisement space to budget-constrained advertisers. This problem was defined and studied from the perspective of worst-case online competitive analysis by Our objective is to find an algorithm that takes advantage of the given estimates of the frequencies of keywords to compute a near optimal solution when the estimates are accurate, while at the same time maintaining a good worst-case competitive ratio in case the estimates are totally incorrect. This is motivated by real-world situations where search engines have stochastic information that provide reasonably accurate estimates of the frequency of search queries except in certain highly unpredictable yet economically valuable spikes in the search pattern. Our approach is a black-box approach: we assume we have access to an oracle that uses the given estimates to recommend an advertiser everytime a query arrives. We use this oracle to design an algorithm that provides two performance guarantees: the performance guarantee in the case that the oracle gives an accurate estimate, and its worst-case performance guarantee. Our algorithm can be fine tuned by adjusting a parameter α, giving a tradeoff curve between the two performance measures with the best competitive ratio for the worst-case scenario at one end of the curve and the optimal solution for the scenario where estimates are accurate at the other en. Finally, we demonstrate the applicability of our framework by applying it to two classical online problems, namely the lost cow and the ski rental problems. We present a truthful auction for pricing advertising slots on a web-page assuming that advertisements for different merchants must be ranked in decreasing order of their (weighted) bids. This captures both the Overture model where bidders are ranked in order of the submitted bids, and the Google model where bidders are ranked in order of the expected revenue (or utility) that their advertisement generates. Assuming separable click-through rates, we prove revenue-equivalence between our auction and the non-truthful next-price auctions currently in use.