Deep neural networks are susceptible to various inference attacks as they remember information about their training data. We perform a comprehensive analysis of white-box privacy inference attacks on deep learning models. We measure the privacy leakage by leveraging the final model parameters as well as the parameter updates during the training and fine-tuning processes. We design the attacks in the stand-alone and federated settings, with respect to passive and active inference attackers, and assuming different adversary prior knowledge. We design and evaluate our novel white-box membership inference attacks against deep learning algorithms to measure their training data membership leakage. We show that a straightforward extension of the known black-box attacks to the white-box setting (through analyzing the outputs of activation functions) is ineffective. We therefore design new algorithms tailored to the white-box setting by exploiting the privacy vulnerabilities of the stochastic gradient descent algorithm, widely used to train deep neural networks. We show that even well-generalized models are significantly susceptible to white-box membership inference attacks, by analyzing state-of-the-art pre-trained and publicly available models for the CIFAR dataset. We also show how adversarial participants of a federated learning setting can run active membership inference attacks against other participants, even when the global model achieves high prediction accuracies.
Investigating different privacy aspects of deep neural networks is an active field of research. @cite_9 showed if an adversary has access to the parameters of machine learning models such as Support Vector Machines (SVM) or Hidden Markov Models (HMM) @cite_19 , she can extract valuable information about the training data (e.g., the accent of the speaker in speech recognition models).
@cite_19 @cite_9
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Today's Web-enabled deluge of electronic data calls for automated methods of data analysis. Machine learning provides these, developing methods that can automatically detect patterns in data and then use the uncovered patterns to predict future data. This textbook offers a comprehensive and self-contained introduction to the field of machine learning, based on a unified, probabilistic approach. The coverage combines breadth and depth, offering necessary background material on such topics as probability, optimization, and linear algebra as well as discussion of recent developments in the field, including conditional random fields, L1 regularization, and deep learning. The book is written in an informal, accessible style, complete with pseudo-code for the most important algorithms. All topics are copiously illustrated with color images and worked examples drawn from such application domains as biology, text processing, computer vision, and robotics. Rather than providing a cookbook of different heuristic methods, the book stresses a principled model-based approach, often using the language of graphical models to specify models in a concise and intuitive way. Almost all the models described have been implemented in a MATLAB software package--PMTK (probabilistic modeling toolkit)--that is freely available online. The book is suitable for upper-level undergraduates with an introductory-level college math background and beginning graduate students. Machine-learning ML enables computers to learn how to recognise patterns, make unintended decisions, or react to a dynamic environment. The effectiveness of trained machines varies because of more suitable ML algorithms or because superior training sets. Although ML algorithms are known and publicly released, training sets may not be reasonably ascertainable and, indeed, may be guarded as trade secrets. In this paper we focus our attention on ML classifiers and on the statistical information that can be unconsciously or maliciously revealed from them. We show that it is possible to infer unexpected but useful information from ML classifiers. In particular, we build a novel meta-classifier and train it to hack other classifiers, obtaining meaningful information about their training sets. Such information leakage can be exploited, for example, by a vendor to build more effective classifiers or to simply acquire trade secrets from a competitor's apparatus, potentially violating its intellectual property rights.