The 802.11e standard enables user configuration of several MAC parameters, making WLANs vulnerable to users that selfishly configure these parameters to gain throughput. In this paper we propose a novel distributed algorithm to thwart such selfish behavior. The key idea of the algorithm is for honest stations to react, upon detecting a selfish station, by using a more aggressive configuration that penalizes this station. We show that the proposed algorithm guarantees global stability while providing good response times. By conducting a game theoretic analysis of the algorithm based on repeated games, we also show its effectiveness against selfish stations. Simulation results confirm that the proposed algorithm optimizes throughput performance while discouraging selfish behavior. We also present an experimental prototype of the proposed algorithm demonstrating that it can be implemented on commodity hardware.
Perhaps the most closely related to this paper is our previous work of @cite_11 , which uses a similar technique to counteract selfish stations, based also on repeated games. However, both the scope of the work and the algorithm design are substantially different. Indeed, while @cite_11 focuses on distributed opportunistic scheduling, here we address the problem of selfishness in 802.11. Furthermore, @cite_11 relies on local linearized analysis, while here we use Lyapunov theory for the global design and analysis of the algorithm. As a consequence, the algorithm proposed in this paper provides much stronger guarantees on stability and convergence than that of @cite_11 .
@cite_11
2001247770
Distributed opportunistic scheduling (DOS) is inherently more difficult than conventional opportunistic scheduling due to the absence of a central entity that knows the channel state of all stations. With DOS, stations use random access to contend for the channel and, upon winning a contention, they measure the channel conditions. After measuring the channel conditions, a station only transmits if the channel quality is good; otherwise, it gives up the transmission opportunity. The distributed nature of DOS makes it vulnerable to selfish users: By deviating from the protocol and using more transmission opportunities, a selfish user can gain a greater share of wireless resources at the expense of "well-behaved" users. In this paper, we address the problem of selfishness in DOS from a game-theoretic standpoint. We propose an algorithm that satisfies the following properties: 1) When all stations implement the algorithm, the wireless network is driven to the optimal point of operation; and 2) one or more selfish stations cannot obtain any gain by deviating from the algorithm. The key idea of the algorithm is to react to a selfish station by using a more aggressive configuration that (indirectly) punishes this station. We build on multivariable control theory to design a mechanism for punishment that is sufficiently severe to prevent selfish behavior, yet not so severe as to render the system unstable. We conduct a game-theoretic analysis based on repeated games to show the algorithm's effectiveness against selfish stations. These results are confirmed by extensive simulations.