With the growing realization that current Internet protocols are reaching the limits of their senescence, a number of on-going research efforts aim to design potential next-generation Internet architectures. Although they vary in maturity and scope, in order to avoid past pitfalls, these efforts seek to treat security and privacy as fundamental requirements. Resilience to Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks that plague today's Internet is a major issue for any new architecture and deserves full attention. In this paper, we focus on DoS in a specific candidate next-generation Internet architecture called Named-Data Networking (NDN) -- an instantiation of Information-Centric Networking approach. By stressing content dissemination, NDN appears to be attractive and viable approach to many types of current and emerging communication models. It also incorporates some basic security features that mitigate certain attacks. However, NDN's resilience to DoS attacks has not been analyzed to-date. This paper represents the first step towards assessment and possible mitigation of DoS in NDN. After identifying and analyzing several new types of attacks, it investigates their variations, effects and counter-measures. This paper also sheds some light on the long-standing debate about relative virtues of self-certifying, as opposed to human-readable, names.
NDN caching performance optimization has been recently investigated with respect to various metrics including energy impact @cite_34 @cite_31 @cite_28 . To the best of our knowledge, the work of Xie, et al @cite_3 is the first to address cache robustness in NDN. It introduces CacheShield, a mechanism that helps routers to prevent caching unpopular content and therefore maximizing the use of cache for popular content.
@cite_28 @cite_31 @cite_34 @cite_3
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Many systems employ caches to improve performance. While isolated caches have been studied in-depth, multi-cache systems are not well understood, especially in networks with arbitrary topologies. In order to gain insight into and manage these systems, a low-complexity algorithm for approximating their behavior is required. We propose a new algorithm, termed a-Net, that approximates the behavior of multi-cache networks by leveraging existing approximation algorithms for isolated LRU caches. We demonstrate the utility of a-Net using both per- cache and network-wide performance measures. We also perform factor analysis of the approximation error to identify system parameters that determine the precision of a-Net. A variety of proposals call for a new Internet architecture focused on retrieving content by name, but it has not been clear that any of these approaches are general enough to support Internet applications like real-time streaming or email. We present a detailed description of a prototype implementation of one such application -- Voice over IP (VoIP) -- in a content-based paradigm. This serves as a good example to show how content-based networking can offer advantages for the full range of Internet applications, if the architecture has certain key properties. With the advent of content-centric networking (CCN) where contents can be cached on each CCN router, cache robustness will soon emerge as a serious concern for CCN deployment. Previous studies on cache pollution attacks only focus on a single cache server. The question of how caching will behave over a general caching network such as CCN under cache pollution attacks has never been answered. In this paper, we propose a novel scheme called CacheShield for enhancing cache robustness. CacheShield is simple, easy-to-deploy, and applicable to any popular cache replacement policy. CacheShield can effectively improve cache performance under normal circumstances, and more importantly, shield CCN routers from cache pollution attacks. Extensive simulations including trace-driven simulations demonstrate that CacheShield is effective for both CCN and today's cache servers. We also study the impact of cache pollution attacks on CCN and reveal several new observations on how different attack scenarios can affect cache hit ratios unexpectedly.