Many basic key distribution schemes specifically tuned to wireless sensor networks have been proposed in the literature. Recently, several researchers have proposed schemes in which they have used group-based deployment models and assumed predeployment knowledge of the expected locations of nodes. They have shown that these schemes achieve better performance than the basic schemes, in terms of connectivity, resilience against node capture and storage requirements. But in many situations expected locations of nodes are not available. In this paper we propose a solution which uses the basic scheme, but does not use group-based deployment model and predeployment knowledge of the locations of nodes, and yet performs better than schemes which make the aforementioned assumptions. In our scheme, groups are formed after deployment of sensor nodes, on the basis of their physical locations, and the nodes sample keys from disjoint key pools. Compromise of a node affects secure links with other nodes that are part of its group only. Because of this reason, our scheme performs better than the basic schemes and the schemes using predeployment knowledge, in terms of connectivity, storage requirement, and security. Moreover, the post-deployment key generation process completes sooner than in schemes like LEAP+.
Various key distribution schemes have been proposed in the literature for wireless sensor networks, keeping in view the resource-constrained devices used in these networks. Eschenauer and Gligor @cite_14 proposed a scheme in which for every node, keys are picked randomly (with replacement) from a key pool and assigned to it before deployment; this scheme is known as the basic or EG scheme. After key discovery, two neighbor nodes that have a common key use that as the key for secure communication. Based on this basic scheme, several schemes with enhanced security features have been suggested in @cite_4 @cite_2 @cite_3 @cite_9 @cite_0 .
@cite_14 @cite_4 @cite_9 @cite_3 @cite_0 @cite_2
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Distributed Sensor Networks (DSNs) are ad-hoc mobile networks that include sensor nodes with limited computation and communication capabilities. DSNs are dynamic in the sense that they allow addition and deletion of sensor nodes after deployment to grow the network or replace failing and unreliable nodes. DSNs may be deployed in hostile areas where communication is monitored and nodes are subject to capture and surreptitious use by an adversary. Hence DSNs require cryptographic protection of communications, sensor-capture detection, key revocation and sensor disabling. In this paper, we present a key-management scheme designed to satisfy both operational and security requirements of DSNs. The scheme includes selective distribution and revocation of keys to sensor nodes as well as node re-keying without substantial computation and communication capabilities. It relies on probabilistic key sharing among the nodes of a random graph and uses simple protocols for shared-key discovery and path-key establishment, and for key revocation, re-keying, and incremental addition of nodes. The security and network connectivity characteristics supported by the key-management scheme are discussed and simulation experiments presented. Key establishment in sensor networks is a challenging problem because asymmetric key cryptosystems are unsuitable for use in resource constrained sensor nodes, and also because the nodes could be physically compromised by an adversary. We present three new mechanisms for key establishment using the framework of pre-distributing a random set of keys to each node. First, in the q-composite keys scheme, we trade off the unlikeliness of a large-scale network attack in order to significantly strengthen random key predistribution's strength against smaller-scale attacks. Second, in the multipath-reinforcement scheme, we show how to strengthen the security between any two nodes by leveraging the security of other links. Finally, we present the random-pairwise keys scheme, which perfectly preserves the secrecy of the rest of the network when any node is captured, and also enables node-to-node authentication and quorum-based revocation. A key distribution scheme for dynamic conferences is a method by which initially an (off-line) trusted server distributes private individual pieces of information to a set of users. Later any group of users of a given size (a dynamic conference) is able to compute a common secure key. In this paper we study the theory and applications of such perfectly secure systems. In this setting, any group of t users can compute a common key by each user computing using only his private piece of information and the identities of the other t − 1 group users. Keys are secure against coalitions of up to k users, that is, even if k users pool together their pieces they cannot compute anything about a key of any t-size conference comprised of other users. To achieve security in wireless sensor networks, it is important to he able to encrypt messages sent among sensor nodes. Keys for encryption purposes must he agreed upon by communicating nodes. Due to resource constraints, achieving such key agreement in wireless sensor networks is nontrivial. Many key agreement schemes used in general networks, such as Diffie-Hellman and public-key based schemes, are not suitable for wireless sensor networks. Pre-distribution of secret keys for all pairs of nodes is not viable due to the large amount of memory used when the network size is large. Recently, a random key pre-distribution scheme and its improvements have been proposed. A common assumption made by these random key pre-distribution schemes is that no deployment knowledge is available. Noticing that in many practical scenarios, certain deployment knowledge may be available a priori, we propose a novel random key pre-distribution scheme that exploits deployment knowledge and avoids unnecessary key assignments. We show that the performance (including connectivity, memory usage, and network resilience against node capture) of sensor networks can he substantially improved with the use of our proposed scheme. The scheme and its detailed performance evaluation are presented in this paper. In this paper we propose an approach for key management in sensor networks which takes the location of sensor nodes into consideration while deciding the keys to be deployed on each node. As a result, this approach not only reduces the number of keys that have to be stored on each sensor node but also provides for the containment of node compromise. Thus compromise of a node in a location affects the communications only around that location. This approach which we call as location dependent key management does not require any knowledge about the deployment of sensor nodes. The proposed scheme starts off with loading a single key on each sensor node prior to deployment. The actual keys are then derived from this single key once the sensor nodes are deployed. The proposed scheme allows for additions of sensor nodes to the network at any point in time. We study the proposed scheme using both analysis and simulations and point out the advantages. To achieve security in wireless sensor networks, it is important to be able to encrypt and authenticate messages sent between sensor nodes. Before doing so, keys for performing encryption and authentication must be agreed upon by the communicating parties. Due to resource constraints, however, achieving key agreement in wireless sensor networks is nontrivial. Many key agreement schemes used in general networks, such as Diffie-Hellman and other public-key based schemes, are not suitable for wireless sensor networks due to the limited computational abilities of the sensor nodes. Predistribution of secret keys for all pairs of nodes is not viable due to the large amount of memory this requires when the network size is large.In this paper, we provide a framework in which to study the security of key predistribution schemes, propose a new key predistribution scheme which substantially improves the resilience of the network compared to previous schemes, and give an in-depth analysis of our scheme in terms of network resilience and associated overhead. Our scheme exhibits a nice threshold property: when the number of compromised nodes is less than the threshold, the probability that communications between any additional nodes are compromised is close to zero. This desirable property lowers the initial payoff of smaller-scale network breaches to an adversary, and makes it necessary for the adversary to attack a large fraction of the network before it can achieve any significant gain.