Optimization of parameterized policies for reinforcement learning (RL) is an important and challenging problem in artificial intelligence. Among the most common approaches are algorithms based on gradient ascent of a score function representing discounted return. In this paper, we examine the role of these policy gradient and actor-critic algorithms in partially-observable multiagent environments. We show several candidate policy update rules and relate them to a foundation of regret minimization and multiagent learning techniques for the one-shot and tabular cases, leading to previously unknown convergence guarantees. We apply our method to model-free multiagent reinforcement learning in adversarial sequential decision problems (zero-sum imperfect information games), using RL-style function approximation. We evaluate on commonly used benchmark Poker domains, showing performance against fixed policies and empirical convergence to approximate Nash equilibria in self-play with rates similar to or better than a baseline model-free algorithm for zero sum games, without any domain-specific state space reductions.
Recent work on policy gradient approaches to MARL addresses scalability by using newer algorithms such as A3C or TRPO @cite_10 . However, they focus significantly less (if at all) on convergence guarantees. Naive approaches such as independent reinforcement learning fail to find optimal stochastic policies @cite_93 @cite_42 and can overfit the training data, failing to generalize during execution @cite_40 . Considerable progress has been achieved for cooperative MARL: learning to communicate @cite_89 , Starcraft unit micromanagement @cite_95 , taxi fleet optimization @cite_8 , and autonomous driving @cite_12 . There has also been significant progress for mixed cooperative competitive environments: using a centralized critic @cite_54 , learning to negotiate @cite_78 , anticipating learning opponent responses in social dilemmas @cite_43 @cite_23 , and control in realistic physical environments @cite_82 @cite_24 . In this line of research, the most common evaluation methodology has been to train centrally (for decentralized execution), either having direct access to the other players' policy parameters or modeling them explicitly. As a result, assumptions are made about the form of the other agents' policies, utilities, or learning mechanisms.
@cite_78 @cite_8 @cite_54 @cite_42 @cite_89 @cite_24 @cite_95 @cite_40 @cite_43 @cite_23 @cite_93 @cite_10 @cite_12 @cite_82
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Multi-agent reinforcement learning offers a way to study how communication could emerge in communities of agents needing to solve specific problems. In this paper, we study the emergence of communication in the negotiation environment, a semi-cooperative model of agent interaction. We introduce two communication protocols -- one grounded in the semantics of the game, and one which is ungrounded and is a form of cheap talk. We show that self-interested agents can use the pre-grounded communication channel to negotiate fairly, but are unable to effectively use the ungrounded channel. However, prosocial agents do learn to use cheap talk to find an optimal negotiating strategy, suggesting that cooperation is necessary for language to emerge. We also study communication behaviour in a setting where one agent interacts with agents in a community with different levels of prosociality and show how agent identifiability can aid negotiation. The current mainstream approach to train natural language systems is to expose them to large amounts of text. This passive learning is problematic if we are interested in developing interactive machines, such as conversational agents. We propose a framework for language learning that relies on multi-agent communication. We study this learning in the context of referential games. In these games, a sender and a receiver see a pair of images. The sender is told one of them is the target and is allowed to send a message from a fixed, arbitrary vocabulary to the receiver. The receiver must rely on this message to identify the target. Thus, the agents develop their own language interactively out of the need to communicate. We show that two networks with simple configurations are able to learn to coordinate in the referential game. We further explore how to make changes to the game environment to cause the "word meanings" induced in the game to better reflect intuitive semantic properties of the images. In addition, we present a simple strategy for grounding the agents' code into natural language. Both of these are necessary steps towards developing machines that are able to communicate with humans productively. Social dilemmas are situations where individuals face a temptation to increase their payoffs at a cost to total welfare. Building artificially intelligent agents that achieve good outcomes in these situations is important because many real world interactions include a tension between selfish interests and the welfare of others. We show how to modify modern reinforcement learning methods to construct agents that act in ways that are simple to understand, nice (begin by cooperating), provokable (try to avoid being exploited), and forgiving (try to return to mutual cooperation). We show both theoretically and experimentally that such agents can maintain cooperation in Markov social dilemmas. Our construction does not require training methods beyond a modification of self-play, thus if an environment is such that good strategies can be constructed in the zero-sum case (eg. Atari) then we can construct agents that solve social dilemmas in this environment. In the Markov decision process (MDP) formalization of reinforcement learning, a single adaptive agent interacts with an environment defined by a probabilistic transition function. In this solipsis-tic view, secondary agents can only be part of the environment and are therefore fixed in their behavior. The framework of Markov games allows us to widen this view to include multiple adaptive agents with interacting or competing goals. This paper considers a step in this direction in which exactly two agents with diametrically opposed goals share an environment. It describes a Q-learning-like algorithm for finding optimal policies and demonstrates its application to a simple two-player game in which the optimal policy is probabilistic. We describe an iterative procedure for optimizing policies, with guaranteed monotonic improvement. By making several approximations to the theoretically-justified procedure, we develop a practical algorithm, called Trust Region Policy Optimization (TRPO). This algorithm is similar to natural policy gradient methods and is effective for optimizing large nonlinear policies such as neural networks. Our experiments demonstrate its robust performance on a wide variety of tasks: learning simulated robotic swimming, hopping, and walking gaits; and playing Atari games using images of the screen as input. Despite its approximations that deviate from the theory, TRPO tends to give monotonic improvement, with little tuning of hyperparameters. Ability to continuously learn and adapt from limited experience in nonstationary environments is an important milestone on the path towards general intelligence. In this paper, we cast the problem of continuous adaptation into the learning-to-learn framework. We develop a simple gradient-based meta-learning algorithm suitable for adaptation in dynamically changing and adversarial scenarios. Additionally, we design a new multi-agent competitive environment, RoboSumo, and define iterated adaptation games for testing various aspects of continuous adaptation. We demonstrate that meta-learning enables significantly more efficient adaptation than reactive baselines in the few-shot regime. Our experiments with a population of agents that learn and compete suggest that meta-learners are the fittest.