There is an ever growing number of users with accounts on multiple social media and networking sites. Consequently, there is increasing interest in matching user accounts and profiles across different social networks in order to create aggregate profiles of users. In this paper, we present models for Digital Stylometry, which is a method for matching users through stylometry inspired techniques. We experimented with linguistic, temporal, and combined temporal-linguistic models for matching user accounts, using standard and novel techniques. Using publicly available data, our best model, a combined temporal-linguistic one, was able to correctly match the accounts of 31 of 5,612 distinct users across Twitter and Facebook.
There are several recent works that attempt to match profiles across different Internet services. Some of these works utilize private user data, while some, like ours, use publicly available data. An example of a work that uses private data is @cite_14 . They use data from the system (which includes some private data) provided by various social networks to link users across services. Though one can achieve a relatively high level of success by using private data to link user accounts, we are interested in using only publicly available data for this task. In fact, as mentioned earlier, we do not even consider publicly available information that could explicitly identify a user, such as names, birthdays and locations.
@cite_14
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Recently, social networks such as Facebook have experienced a huge surge in popularity. The amount of personal information stored on these sites calls for appropriate security precautions to protect this data. In this paper, we describe how we are able to take advantage of a common weakness, namely the fact that an attacker can query popular social networks for registered e-mail addresses on a large scale. Starting with a list of about 10.4 million email addresses, we were able to automatically identify more than 1.2 million user profiles associated with these addresses. By automatically crawling and correlating these profiles, we collect detailed personal information about each user, which we use for automated profiling (i.e., to enrich the information available from each user). Having access to such information would allow an attacker to launch sophisticated, targeted attacks, or to improve the efficiency of spam campaigns. We have contacted the most popular providers, who acknowledged the threat and are currently implementing our proposed countermeasures. Facebook and XING, in particular, have recently fixed the problem.