In this paper, we question the common practice of assigning security impact ratings to OS updates. Specifically, we present evidence that ranking updates by their perceived security importance, in order to defer applying some updates, exposes systems to significant risk. We argue that OS vendors and security groups should not focus on security updates to the detriment of other updates, but should instead seek update technologies that make it feasible to distribute updates for all disclosed OS bugs in a timely manner.
Security researchers have surveyed known vulnerabilities, computing statistics involving various dates, such as dates of first disclosure and of exploit availability. Rescorla @cite_5 analyzed vulnerability disclosure rates to suggest that popular software contains many more vulnerabilities than have been discovered so far.
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Despite the large amount of effort that goes toward finding and patching security holes, the available data does not show a clear improvement in software quality as a result. This article aims to measure the effect of vulnerability finding. Any attempt to measure this kind of effect is inherently rough, depending as it does on imperfect data and several simplifying assumptions. Because I'm looking for evidence of usefulness, where possible, I bias such assumptions in favor of a positive result - explicitly calling out those assumptions biased in the opposite direction. Thus, the analysis in this article represents the best-case scenario, consistent with the data and my ability to analyze it, for the vulnerability finding's usefulness