We study the complexity of (approximate) winner determination under the Monroe and Chamberlin--Courant multiwinner voting rules, which determine the set of representatives by optimizing the total (dis)satisfaction of the voters with their representatives. The total (dis)satisfaction is calculated either as the sum of individual (dis)satisfactions (the utilitarian case) or as the (dis)satisfaction of the worst off voter (the egalitarian case). We provide good approximation algorithms for the satisfaction-based utilitarian versions of the Monroe and Chamberlin--Courant rules, and inapproximability results for the dissatisfaction-based utilitarian versions of them and also for all egalitarian cases. Our algorithms are applicable and particularly appealing when voters submit truncated ballots. We provide experimental evaluation of the algorithms both on real-life preference-aggregation data and on synthetic data. These experiments show that our simple and fast algorithms can in many cases find near-perfect solutions.
These hardness results motivated the search for approximation algorithms. There are now very good approximation algorithms for Kemeny's rule @cite_27 @cite_35 @cite_23 and for Dodgson's rule @cite_41 @cite_29 @cite_1 @cite_17 @cite_4 . In both cases the results are, in essence, optimal. For Kemeny's rule there is a polynomial-time approximation scheme @cite_23 and for Dodgson's rule the achieved approximation ratio is optimal under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions @cite_1 (unfortunately, the approximation ratio is not constant but depends logarithmically on the number of candidates). On the other hand, for Young's rule it is known that no good approximation algorithms exist @cite_1 .
@cite_35 @cite_4 @cite_41 @cite_29 @cite_1 @cite_27 @cite_23 @cite_17
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We consider the following simple algorithm for feedback arc set problem in weighted tournaments --- order the vertices by their weighted indegrees. We show that this algorithm has an approximation guarantee of 5 if the weights satisfy probability constraints (for any pair of vertices u and v, w uv + w vu = 1). Special cases of feedback arc set problem in such weighted tournaments include feedback arc set problem in unweighted tournaments and rank aggregation. Finally, for any constant e > 0, we exhibit an infinite family of (unweighted) tournaments for which the above algorithm (irrespective of how ties are broken) has an approximation ratio of 5 - e. In 1876 Charles Lutwidge Dodgson suggested the intriguing voting rule that today bears his name. Although Dodgson's rule is one of the most well-studied voting rules, it suffers from serious deficiencies, both from the computational point of view - it is NP-hard even to approximate the Dodgson score within sublogarithmic factors - and from the social choice point of view - it fails basic social choice desiderata such as monotonicity and homogeneity. In a previous paper [, SODA 2009] we have asked whether there are approximation algorithms for Dodgson's rule that are monotonic or homogeneous. In this paper we give definitive answers to these questions. We design a monotonic exponential-time algorithm that yields a 2-approximation to the Dodgson score, while matching this result with a tight lower bound. We also present a monotonic polynomial-time O(log m)-approximation algorithm (where m is the number of alternatives); this result is tight as well due to a complexity-theoretic lower bound. Furthermore, we show that a slight variation of a known voting rule yields a monotonic, homogeneous, polynomial-time O(m log m)-approximation algorithm, and establish that it is impossible to achieve a better approximation ratio even if one just asks for homogeneity. We complete the picture by studying several additional social choice properties; for these properties, we prove that algorithms with an approximation ratio that depends only on m do not exist. In the year 1876 the mathematician Charles Dodgson, who wrote fiction under the now more famous name of Lewis Carroll, devised a beautiful voting system that has long fascinated political scientists. However, determining the winner of a Dodgson election is known to be complete for the Θ2 p level of the polynomial hierarchy. This implies that unless P=NP no polynomial-time solution to this problem exists, and unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses to NP the problem is not even in NP. Nonetheless, we prove that when the number of voters is much greater than the number of candidates—although the number of voters may still be polynomial in the number of candidates—a simple greedy algorithm very frequently finds the Dodgson winners in such a way that it “knows” that it has found them, and furthermore the algorithm never incorrectly declares a nonwinner to be a winner. The voting rules proposed by Dodgson and Young are both designed to find an alternative closest to being a Condorcet winner, according to two different notions of proximity; the score of a given alternative is known to be hard to compute under either rule. In this paper, we put forward two algorithms for approximating the Dodgson score: a combinatorial, greedy algorithm and an LP-based algorithm, both of which yield an approximation ratio of H"m"-"1, where m is the number of alternatives and H"m"-"1 is the (m-1)st harmonic number. We also prove that our algorithms are optimal within a factor of 2, unless problems in NP have quasi-polynomial-time algorithms. Despite the intuitive appeal of the greedy algorithm, we argue that the LP-based algorithm has an advantage from a social choice point of view. Further, we demonstrate that computing any reasonable approximation of the ranking produced by Dodgson@?s rule is NP-hard. This result provides a complexity-theoretic explanation of sharp discrepancies that have been observed in the social choice theory literature when comparing Dodgson elections with simpler voting rules. Finally, we show that the problem of calculating the Young score is NP-hard to approximate by any factor. This leads to an inapproximability result for the Young ranking. We address optimization problems in which we are given contradictory pieces of input information and the goal is to find a globally consistent solution that minimizes the extent of disagreement with the respective inputs. Specifically, the problems we address are rank aggregation, the feedback arc set problem on tournaments, and correlation and consensus clustering. We show that for all these problems (and various weighted versions of them), we can obtain improved approximation factors using essentially the same remarkably simple algorithm. Additionally, we almost settle a long-standing conjecture of Bang-Jensen and Thomassen and show that unless NP⊆BPP, there is no polynomial time algorithm for the problem of minimum feedback arc set in tournaments. We present a polynomial time approximation scheme (PTAS) for the minimum feedback arc set problem on tournaments. A simple weighted generalization gives a PTAS for Kemeny-Young rank aggregation. In 1992, Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick opened the study of control attacks on elections-- attempts to improve the election outcome by such actions as adding deleting candidates or voters. That work has led to many results on how algorithms can be used to find attacks on elections and how complexity-theoretic hardness results can be used as shields against attacks. However, all the work in this line has assumed that the attacker employs just a single type of attack. In this paper, we model and study the case in which the attacker launches a multipronged (i.e., multimode) attack. We do so to more realistically capture the richness of real-life settings. For example, an attacker might simultaneously try to suppress some voters, attract new voters into the election, and introduce a spoiler candidate. Our model provides a unified framework for such varied attacks. By constructing polynomialtime multiprong attack algorithms we prove that for various election systems even such concerted, flexible attacks can be perfectly planned in deterministic polynomial time.