Fichte and Schelling: The Limitations of the Wissenschaftslehre?
In 1800 Fichte and Schelling began a correspondence in which they frankly addressed their philosophical differences,1 each alleging irreparable defects in the other's system and misunderstandings of their own. Their closing exchange in 1802, after which all direct communication between the two men ceased and mutual criticism became a feature of their published writings, brought to an end what had been originally and officially, ever since 1794, a relationship of philosophical cooperation, a common radical progressive front in the Kantian aftermath, confronting a single set of critics. Concerning one thing at least, they remained in agreement: the doctrine which defines in bold their philosophical opposition is that of the reality of Nature, denied by Fichte and affirmed by Schelling. The disagreement is however by no means self explanatory, for what it means to grant or deny Nature's reality is not, after Kant, a straightforward matter Fichte is no Berkeleyan idealist and Schelling no Lockeian realist and a lengthy route needs to be taken in order to understand how it evolved from what had been, to all appearances, a common post Kantian starting point. The first two parts of my discussion trace accordingly the history of their philosophical relationship, with close attention to Schelling's earliest published works, often referred to as comprising the 'Fichtean' period in his development. The third reviews the systematic ground of their disagreement.