Flawed logics: strategic nuclear arms control from Truman to Obama
security threat" (p. 7) loomed over the western world in the form of the Soviet Union. even in a cantankerous democracy, this threat provided a guiding star by which to organize efforts. in the absence of it, is arguable whether post 1989 Britain has really had a true national security strategy and certainly not a grand strategy. This observation is not offered as a lament; it would be perverse to wish upon ourselves an existential threat which would require one. in the face of numerous non existential threats, such strategy as there is consists of "risk management" and the development of "resilience" as Richards notes (p. 33) But the broader truth is that it is more the ebb and flow of external events say, a civil war in Libya, or a flood of migrants at Calais which determines the month to month allocation of priorities and resources. Short term politics and the "BBC effect" usually have more to do with this than what is written in strategy documents. This book would have benefited from greater emphasis on this dynamic. Part of the reason that this book cannot grapple fully with this question is timing. in 2012, when this book was published, it was arguably too early to judge either the implementation of the Uk national security review or the operation of the National Security Council. A book wanting to argue that there was something truly original in all of this would doubtless need to take a longer view. it is still too early to do so in this reviewer's opinion. But it seems at least as likely that the Coalition government will be remembered more for the remark attributed to Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond that there are "no votes in defence" than for a consequential reorganization of national security policy making. Furthermore, the outcome of the intervention in Libya which Richards says "appeared to be successful" (p. 176) as perhaps it did in 2012 looks much murkier today. it certainly calls into question the Uk government's claim to be acting strategically and in cognizance of the long term rather than in response to short term developments. in sum, Richards' book is a competent introduction to Uk national security policy which will provide a basis for future historians and analysts who are able to consider the record of the Coalition government in the round. in the meantime, it serves as a useful introduction to Uk national security policy making for students. Andrew J. Gawthorpe Harvard University andrew_gawthorpe@hks.harvard.edu