Constructing a Theory: Einstein's Model
from his publications and letters, Albert Einstein considJudging ered it one of his important tasks to express and elaborate his views concerning the philosophy of science. There seem to have been two reasons for that. First, Einstein experienced in his own work in the early years, and then again among his "ablest students," how important the discussions concerning the aims and methods of the sciences are.1 Such interest was not merely a matter of intellectual curiosity but, in his opinion, went to the heart of the task of the innovator. Epistemology and science, he said, "are dependent on each other. Epistemology without contact with science becomes an empty scheme. Science without epistemology is insofar as it is thinkable at all primitive and muddled." At the same time he warned that the scientist cannot permit himself to be too restricted "by the adherence to an epistemological system" (Schilpp, pp. 683 84) He might, therefore, seem to be more a philosophical opportunist than school philosopher. However, that accusation seemed to bother Einstein as little as did the more serious attacks from so many other quarters upon his science and his other views. He avoided almost every opportunity either to engage in debates with opposing philosophers or to cite those who supported his views. Reading his opinions on age old questions of methodology, we feel we are given a direct report on a deeply felt, personal struggle with ideas. A second reason why a scientist concerned with the grand problems should not avoid epistemologie considerations was, in Einstein's opinion, that there simply was no other way. In our time, when scientific foundations are changing rapidly, "the physicist cannot simply surrender to the philosopher the critical contemplation of the theoretical foundations; for he himself knows best and feels most surely where the shoe pinches" (Ideas and Opinions, p. 290) With these motivations, Einstein found himself publishing con