On strAtegic cOmmunicAtiOns tOdAy Using Information in Contemporary War
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has sophisticated propaganda capabilities and expertise that can be turned against it. The United States should draw upon its expertise in political communication and psychological operations as well as adapt Russian precepts of operational shock and reflexive control to complement traditional military approaches. T requirements for defeating the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) have many facets: a coherent policy, a confluent political strategy, traditional military and kinetic operations, and effective information warfare (IW) strategies. Despite their dominant role in ISIL's playbook, IW strategies are too often ignored. The group has used information warfare to expand its battlespace beyond the borders of Syria and Iraq to every television set on the planet reaching anyone with Internet access.1 American IW response must be as aggressive and strategic as kinetic military operations. Congress recognized the need to broaden military authority to counter ISIL messaging after US Special Operations Command commander General Joseph L. Votel argued the Department of Defense required more authority to counter recruitment and reduce the flow of foreign fighters.2 This article, therefore, focuses on communication strategies and tactics the US military might employ in close coordination with kinetic operations as well as political and diplomatic efforts. We first examine the broader precepts governing information warfare, then apply them to define potential options for defeating ISIL. Fundamental Assumptions about Winning the War What steps will achieve battlefield dominance against ISIL in information warfare? One key lies in aligning a counter ISIL narrative with our military objectives and the political goals of regional allies, which 1 Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Vintage Press, 2008) Smith argues the future threat environment is defined by engagements (no kinetics) and conflicts (kinetics) that take place in areas in which combatants and noncombatants are intermixed, not on conventional battlefields where opposing armies confront one another. 2 "Hearing on National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016," March 18, 2015, https:/fas.org/irp/congress/2015_hr/socom 2016.pdf; and "DoD Gets Go Ahead to Counter Islamic State Messaging," Federation of American Scientists, November 30, 2015, https:/fas.org /blogs/secrecy/2015/11/dod counter is/ In its FY2016 Defense Authorization Bill, signed into law by President Barack Obama on November 25, 2015, Congress ordained: "The Secretary of Defense should develop creative and agile concepts, technologies, and strategies across all available media to most effectively reach target audiences, to counter and degrade the ability of adversaries and potential adversaries to persuade, inspire, and recruit inside areas of hostilities or in other areas in direct support of the objectives of commanders." On strAtegic cOmmunicAtiOns tOdAy Using Information in Contemporary War James P. Farwell and Darby J. Arakelian (c) 2016 James P. Farwell and Darby J. Arakelian 72 Parameters 46(3) Autumn 2016 requires defining assumptions about US intentions.3 First, battlefield victories including victory in the information environment are vital. Second, taking sides in the long standing tensions between Sunnis and Shi'ites or making US policy the issue in the conflict should be voided. Third, the prominent public role Muslims should take in articulating a counter narrative that discredits and delegitimizes the religious and political dogma of ISIL should be recognized. Public demonstrations denouncing ISIL require words and deeds to contribute significantly to success: Western countries should provide behind the scenes leadership and support, but Muslims must lead. The United States must clearly define the stakes, narratives, themes, and messengers, requiring careful target audience analysis (TAA) for language and content.4 No single narrative or messenger fits every strategy. Components must be consistent, coordinated, and tailored to each target audience. Communication strategies must respect current political and military realities. Iraqi Sunnis comprehend ISIL brutality; however, they will not risk their lives to destroy ISIL to restore the status quo ante of Shi'ite repression. A winning IW strategy requires fresh approaches. Western commercial advertising methods do not work for politics or for changing behavior in military conflict zones. Consumers represent groups who have already decided to purchase. Brand advertising seeks to increase the hit rate of customers in a target group. A successful commercial ad campaign may change the minds of 10 percent of customers. But as Steve Tatham points out, a "10 percent change in the behavior of an insurgent group or hostile community is highly unlikely to be game changing in the context of the wider conflict."5 The United States should not confuse political communication with commercial advertising. Branding and commercial advertising are the kiss of death for information warfare. Strategic Considerations for Information Warfare We define communication as words, deeds, images, or symbols that shape public opinion and attitudes to change behavior in order to achieve specific effects or end states.6 Information warfare must discredit and delegitimize ISIL, destroy the ideological pillars upon which its appeal rests, reveal its leaders are hypocrites, and drive the message that ISIL faces inevitable defeat and does not represent the winning side. Information warfare can help undercut ISIL's center of gravity, whatever enables a party to keep on fighting, in this case the will and decision making of ISIL. We must subvert and destroy that will, which means attacking the core claims of ISIL: 3 James P. Farwell, Persuasion and Power (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012) 145. 4 This article suggests some messages or narratives. Each needs to be phrased in proper Arab language or dialects so testing yields dependable answers. Research for story, narrative, theme, and message must be keyed to a clear comprehension of religious, cultural, psychological, linguistic, and psychological factors that shape behavior, not merely attitudes, among target audiences. For a good discussion of these, see Dr. Steve Tatham and Keir Giles, Training Humans for the Human Domain (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, November 2015) 5 Dr. Steve Tatham, US Governmental Information Operations and Strategic Communications: A Discredited Tool or User Failure? Implications for Future Conflict (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, December 2013) 33 35. 6 Farwell, Persuasion and Power. On Strategic cOmmunicatiOnS tOday Farwell and Arakelian 73 1. Controlling territory governed through a new Caliphate 2. Contrasting corrupt, apostate governments with those of "religious" integrity 3. Rejecting the artificial Middle Eastern borders drawn by the SykesPicot Agreement (1916) which fuel the revolutionary appeal for a new Arab nationalism7 4. Protecting Sunnis against Shi'ite repression 5. Proclaiming inevitable victory ordained by God8 ISIL spreads its narratives, themes, and messages through social media and battlefield results. Information warfare conducted by coalition allies must discredit the claim ISIL advances its notions of theology or justice are true to Islam.9 Muslim religious leaders must lead the effort. While noting that a grand counter messaging campaign lies beyond the scope of this comment, this article focuses on IW support for US military strategies, operations, and tactics. The Maxwell Message Grid, a four dimensional analysis tool, frames perceptions ISIL has about itself and its enemies as well as what enemies of ISIL say about themselves and their messages beyond the subjective views communicated through narratives, themes, and messages. Applied rigorously, the grid can help achieve persuasive information dominance.10 Moreover information superiority, "the imbalance in one's favor (relative advantage) in the information domain that is achieved by being able to get the right information to the right people at the right time in the right form while denying the adversary the ability to do the same," informs operators while minimizing risks of information compromise and helps throw adversaries off balance. Advanced information technology provides a competitive edge by fostering collaboration and enhancing awareness of relevant, accurate information.11 Sharing knowledge provides a real time, accurate picture of ground realities. Key channels for achieving information dominance include social media, cyberspace, grass roots activities and broadcasts, as well as political actions and statements by key communicators.12 Even though defeating ISIL requires a whole of government approach, US government allocation of task as well as the debate between advocates of 7 History.com This Day in History, http:/www.history.com/this day in history/britain andfrance conclude sykes picot agreement. This claim of arguably erasing the border between Syria and Iraq was among his most popular actions among its supporters. 8 Abetted by soldiers and security operatives who once served Saddam Hussein, ISIL has enhanced its lethality in combat. See Liz Sly, "The Hidden Hand behind the Islamic State Militants? Saddam Hussein's," Washington Post, April 4, 2015, https:/www.washingtonpost.com/world /middle_east/the hidden hand behind the islamic state militants saddam husseins/2015/04/04 /aa97676c cc32 11e4 8730 4f473416e759_story.html. Abetted by soldiers and security operatives who once served Saddam Hussein, ISIL has enhanced its lethality in combat. 9 Led by Majid Nawaz, the Quilliam Foundation has articulated some of the most actionable ideas for achieving this goal on their website at Quilliamfoundation.org. 10 Named after the distinguished political consu