A complete key recovery timing attack on a GPU
Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) have become mainstream parallel computing devices. They are deployed on diverse platforms, and an increasing number of applications have been moved to GPUs to exploit their massive parallel computational resources. GPUs are starting to be used for security services, where high volume data is encrypted to ensure integrity and confidentiality. However, the security of GPUs has only begun to receive attention. Issues such as side channel vulnerability have not been addressed. The goal of this paper is to evaluate the side channel security of GPUs and demonstrate a complete AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) key recovery using known ciphertext through a timing channel. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that clearly demonstrates the vulnerability of a commercial GPU architecture to side channel timing attacks. Specifically, for AES 128, we have been able to recover all key bytes utilizing a timing side channel in under 30 minutes.
2016 IEEE International Symposium on High Performance Computer Architecture (HPCA)