Overview of Research
I am a microeconomic theorist studying market design. My research contributes to four areas of this field: matching, allocation without transfers, auctions, and the foundations of market design. The papers on matching formulated some of the first approaches to the study of complementarities, peer effects, and externalities, as well as a unifying approach to standard and far sighted stability concepts. The papers on allocation without transfers constructed and analyzed incentivecompatible and efficient mechanisms, and they showed that in large markets ordinal school choice mechanisms become allocationally equivalent while the efficiency advantage of cardinal mechanisms remains pronounced. The papers on auctions developed the theory of pay as bid auctions, the main auction format for the sale of divisible goods such as treasuries or electricity. One of the papers on the foundations of market design established that risk averse agents can trade efficiently. This unexpected result contrasts with the fundamental Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of efficient trade between quasi linear agents. Another paper showed how commitment emerges and the celebrated Coase conjecture fails when one accounts for buyers' ability to leave the negotiating table.