A Leakage Resilient CCA Secure Identity Based Encryption Scheme
Identity based encryption (IBE) has many appealing applications. However, some traditional IBE schemes may not be secure in the real world due to the side channel attacks. Leakage resilient cryptography can capture these attacks by modeling information leakage that adversary can access. In this paper, we apply a hash proof technique in the existing CCA secure variant of the Gentry's IBE scheme to construct a new leakage resilient IBE scheme in the bounded leakage model. The proposed scheme is more computationally efficient than the original Alwen et al.'s leakage resilient IBE scheme. It enjoys a shorter key (public/secret key) length, and a higher relative key leakage ratio. The new leakage resilient scheme is proved semantically secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack in the standard model under the truncated augmented bilinear Diffie Hellman exponent (q TABDHE) assumption.
Comput. J.