Simple Pricing Schemes For Consumers With Evolving Values
We consider a pricing problem where a buyer is interested in purchasing/using a good, such as an app or music or software, repeatedly over time. The consumer discovers his value for the good only as he uses it, and the value evolves with each use. Optimizing for the seller's revenue in such dynamic settings is a complex problem and requires assumptions about how the buyer behaves before learning his future value(s) and in particular, how he reacts to risk. We explore the performance of a class of pricing mechanisms that are extremely simple for both the buyer and the seller to use: the buyer reacts to prices myopically without worrying about how his value evolves in the future; the seller needs to optimize for revenue over a space of only two parameters, and can do so without knowing the buyer's risk profile or fine details of the value evolution process. We present simple versus optimal type results, namely that under certain assumptions, simple pricing mechanisms of the above form are approximately optimal regardless of the buyer's risk profile. Our results assume that the buyer's value per usage evolves as a martingale. For our main result, we consider pricing mechanisms in which the seller offers the product for free for a certain number of uses, and then charges an appropriate fixed price per usage. We assume that the buyer responds by buying the product for as long as his value exceeds the fixed price. Importantly, the buyer does not need to know anything about how his future value will evolve, only how much he wants to use the product right now. Regardless of the buyers' initial value, our pricing captures as revenue a constant fraction of the total value that the buyers accumulate in expectation over time.
SODA