Many Targets, Many Instruments: Where Do We Stand?
Thank you to the International Monetary Fund for allowing me to take part in what I expect will be a very lively discussion. 1  Only five or six years ago, there wouldn ’ t have been a panel on the “ many instruments ” and “ many targets ” of monetary policy. Before the financial crisis, the focus was on one policy instrument: the short-term policy interest rate. Although central banks did not uniformly rely on a single policy target, many adopted an “ inflation targeting ” framework that, as the name implies, gives a certain preeminence to that one objective. Of course, the Federal Reserve has long been a bit of an outlier in this regard, with its explicit dual mandate of price stability and maximum employment. Still, the discussion might not have gone much beyond “ one instrument and two targets ” if not for the financial crisis and its aftermath, which have presented central banks with great challenges and transformed how we look at this topic. Let me start with a few general observations to get the ball rolling. In terms of the targets, or, more generally, the objectives of policy, I see continuity in the abiding importance of a framework of flexible inflation targeting. By one authoritative account, about twenty-seven countries now operate full-fledged inflation-targeting regimes. 2 The United States is not on this list, but the Federal Reserve has embraced most of the key features of flexible inflation targeting: a commitment to promote low and stable inflation over a longer-term horizon, a predictable monetary policy, and clear and transparent communication. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) struggled for years to formulate an inflation goal that would not seem to give preference to price stability over maximum employment. In January 2012, the committee adopted a “ Statement on Many Targets, Many Instruments: Where Do We Stand?
MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN BRAZIL UNDER THE INFLATION TARGETING REGIME
ABSTRACTThis study analyses theoretically and empirically the relationship between monetary institutions and macroeconomic performance in Brazil, in the period after the adoption of the inflation targeting regime (ITR), in 1999. The hypothesis is that the monetary institutions inhibited economic growth, rather than being effective at controlling inflation, whose main causes are related to structural and institutional factors, indexation process and domestic and external shocks. The main results of the ITR, embodied in the highly restrictive monetary policy, are the following negative effects: A reduction in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates, a rise in the stock of public debt and an appreciation of the domestic currency. Likewise, the itr has not been successful in maintaining inflation rate below its target. In this respect, revisions in the Brazilian monetary institutions would be essential to improve the results of the ITR, both in terms of actual inflation and economic performance. DESEMPEÑO MACROECONÓMICO EN BRASIL DESPUÉS DEL RÉGIMEN DE METAS DE INFLACIÓNRESUMENEste estudio analiza teórica y empíricamente la relación entre las instituciones monetarias y el desempeño macroeconómico en Brasil en el periodo posterior a la adopción del régimen de metas de inflación (RMI) en 1999. La hipótesis es que las instituciones monetarias impidieron el crecimiento económico, más que controlar efectivamente la inflación, cuyas causas principales están relacionadas con factores estructurales e institucionales, procesos de indexación y choques internos y externos. Los principales resultados del RMI, consustanciados en la política monetaria altamente restrictiva, son los siguientes efectos negativos: una reducción de las tasas de crecimiento del producto interno bruto (PIB), un aumento del stock de deuda pública y una apreciación de la moneda nacional. Asimismo, el RMI no logró mantener la tasa de inflación por debajo de su meta. A este respecto, revisiones en las instituciones monetarias brasileñas serían esenciales para mejorar los resultados del rmi, tanto en términos de inflación como de desempeño económico.
Complexity, Network-Decisions And Alternative Risk Premia: Some New Theories Of Structural Change And Portfolio Decisions.
Structural Change is the basis for many decisions such as government fiscal and monetary policies, government interventions, corporate-expenditure decisions, corporate strategic decisions, portfolio management decisions in finance; household allocation decisions, etc.. Structural change in industries and national economies is increasingly more difficult to detect partly because of the growth and dominance of Complex Systems and “Networks” in modern industries and economies – such Networks and Complex Systems include GVCs (global value chains), retail store networks; franchising networks; internet networks; services networks; credit-chains in industries; online social networks; etc.. The relationship between Complexity and Structural Change is well established in the physics, applied math and economic dynamics literatures. Traditional definitions and modeling of structural change have erroneously focused on changes in labor, technological progress, market share, and or capital – which are grossly inadequate in the new economy and post- global financial crisis (as confirmed by changes in the global retailing and housing industries and other industries). Also the modeling of structural change seems to be constrained by the availability of data, and often omits the relationship between structural change on one hand, and globalization, financial stability and international financial contagion. This article: i) introduces the Operations Strategy Model of structural change, explains how it differs from the Lewis Model of Structural Change; and explains the often omitted relationship between operations strategy (of companies and government agencies) and structural change; ii) introduces other new Complexity-based models/theories of Structural Change in industries; iii) reviews the relationships among Operations Research, Complexity and Structural Change; iv) explains the symbiotic relationship between structural change on one hand, and economic growth, financial stability, financial contagion and globalization; v) discusses the significant gap between academic research and practice and explains some issues and factors that should be considered in the development and testing of structural change models; vi) explains how alternative risk premia can be generated from new models of Structural Change.