From a European to a common security and defence policy. IES WORKING PAPER 5/2010
The Lisbon Treaty has introduced significant changes in the field of EU security and 
defence. On the one hand, important institutional reforms, such as the creation of a 
renewed High Representative, have of course a great impact on this policy field. On the 
other hand, the Lisbon Treaty has also introduced specific innovations in the security and 
defence of the European Union. The mutual defence clause and the new mechanisms for 
flexible cooperation such as the permanent structured cooperation, are only some of the 
key innovations. Generally, the European Security and Defence Policy receives its own 
section in the Treaty on European Union and is rebranded as Common Security and Defence 
Policy. Thus, the Lisbon Treaty sets the objective for a common policy in this field. 
However, does this reform really provide for the means for the realization of such a 
common policy? Furthermore, does the Lisbon Treaty increase the importance of CSDP or is 
the increasing importance of this policy field just reflected in the Treaty text? These are 
the main questions that the present paper attempts to address through the analysis of the 
new institutional setting of the post-Lisbon security and defence policy, as well as through 
the examination of the specific innovations in this area.
The European Gendarmerie Force: a solution in search of problems?
Abstract By creating the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF), some European Union (EU) member states have devised a ‘structured solution’ to provide international civilian police capabilities. In this article, we undertake a critical examination of the EGF by first arguing that the EGF has been widely misrepresented, notably with regard to its general purpose and specific relationship to the EU. Next, we examine a range of security problems used to justify the EGF, arguing that its potential role in handling certain tasks has not been very carefully considered. Finally, we suggest that a major rationale behind the EGF was the shared desire among its members to draw attention to a policing model that is not universally appreciated, and to promote this model by offering its ‘third-type’ capabilities while keeping the EGF outside of EU institutional constraints. In the conclusion, we identify some crucial questions related to the EGF–EU relations, notably in terms of non-optimisation of EU resources and possible incoherence in EU/Common Security and Defence Policy efforts.
Domestic Regulation and Free Trade in Services – A Balancing Act
In the absence of border measures, protectionism in services trade takes almost exclusively the form of internal regulatory interventions. Most regulatory interventions do not however have any protectionist intent. The GATS structure creates a built-in flexibility for the purpose of ensuring that appropriate consideration is taken of the fact that countries are at different stages of their liberalization process. When developing new disciplines for domestic regulation in GATS, Members must consider whether this flexibility should extend to such disciplines or whether a necessity test for domestic regulation in GATS should simply, in itself, assimilate a certain amount of flexibility in order to safeguard legitimate national policy concerns. The amount of flexibility guaranteed by a more or less stringent balancing requirement in Article VI:4 GATS and the consequences of applying means-end and least trade restrictive criteria, derived from this provision, in a services context will ultimately depend on the future scope of Article VI:4 GATS itself.