Implementing a Korea–Japan Nuclear‐Weapon‐Free Zone: Precedents, Legal Forms, Governance, Scope, Domain, Verification, Compliance and Regional Benefits
To assess the possibility of a future denuclearized Korean peninsula it is important to consider not only US and allied security interests, but also North Korean underlying security concerns. However, beyond the North–South conflict on the Korean peninsula, there is also a longer-term problem of Korean–Japanese relations. Both Japan and South Korea have the capacity to rapidly develop and acquire nuclear weapons. North Korean nuclear acquisition could well provide the rationale for either or both to acquire nuclear weapons. In the Northeast Asian region there is already a lengthy history of denuclearization proposals and even agreements. While the focus of previous proposals had concentrated on the Korean peninsula itself, an alternative way forward would be the initial establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) between Japan and South Korea, with North Korea encouraged to join at a later date. The negotiation of a Korea–Japan NWFZ would serve to confirm and guarantee the current non-nuclear-weapon status of South Korea and Japan, while acting as an important confidence-building step to address North Korea's underlying security concerns and enable it to subsequently join the NWFZ. Internationally, the commitment of the US Obama administration to a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, the recent unanimous final document of the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference calling for expansion of NWFZs, and the greater openness of the USA and other nuclear powers to NWFZ establishment in areas of regional conflict, suggest that we now have a new window of opportunity for denuclearization of Northeast Asia.
North Korean Nuclear Nationalism and the Threat of Nuclear War in Korea
This essay reviews the status of nuclear threat in Korea and analyzes the appropriate policy response to the emergence of the DPRK as a nuclear-armed state. We suggest that as of 2009, the DPRK made the ROK the main target of its nuclear strategy rather than the USA, as was the case from 1991–2009. The sinking of the ROK corvette Cheonan in 2010 provides a mini-case-study of the collision of ROK and DPRK historical trajectories, and portends continuing clashes involving nuclear threat that need to be managed to avoid escalation to nuclear next-use. The artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010 may be the second in what proves to be a series of such risky provocations. We conclude the paper by outlining the advantages of a ROK–Japan-only nuclear-weapon-free zone relative to alternative ROK responses to the threat posed by the DPRK nuclear breakout. In an Epilogue, we reflect on the methodological difficulties posed by the DPRK in interpreting its nuclear statements.
Stereoselective disposition of ibuprofen enantiomers in infants.
The pharmacokinetics of the enantiomers of ibuprofen were investigated after oral administration of a single 7.6 +/- 0.3 mg kg-1 dose of the racemate in 11 infants. Mean (+/- s.d.) half-lives were 1.6 +/- 0.5 h for S(+) and 1.5 +/- 0.5 h for R(-) and mean (+/- s.d.) AUC values were 31.5 +/- 14.3 mg l-1 h for S(+) and 36.6 +/- 13.8 mg l-1 h for R(-). Since plasma concentrations of the active S(+)-isomer were lower than those reported in adults, a higher dosage might be required in infants.