Comparative Financial Systems in Judaism, Christianity and Islam: The Case of Interest
In today’s discussions the prohibition of interest, based in Shari’a law, is seen as solely an Islamic finance phenomenon and often advocated as a new way of providing financial services. It is important to recognise that the principles underpinning Shari’a are largely similar to those preached and practised by Judaism and Christianity as well as other religions. Both Judaism and Christianity have, for example, banned the receipt and payment of interest for a significant period of time, albeit that each had a slightly different interpretation on the permissibility of lending at interest. Although there is evidence about the existence of prohibitions on interest in other religions such as, for example, Buddhism, the focus of this paper is on the prohibition of interest in the three religions that are generally referred to as the Abrahamic or monotheistic faiths; Judaism, Christianity and Islam, the way in which the prohibitions entered into law and the impact on the availability of financial transactions that were executed despite the restrictions. The paper provides an insight into the way in which opinions regarding the permissibility of interest has changed over time.
Papal and Royal Attitudes Toward Jewish Lending in the Thirteenth Century
The question of Jewish usury is usually perceived in straightforward terms. The Church unilaterally opposed Jewish lending, and the kings did all they could to promote it. In the long run, however, the utility of Jewish lending diminished, and the forces of the Church were thus able to prevail. The kings, too, soon began to outlaw Jewish lending.
The honesty of thinking : reflections on critical thinking in Nietzsche's middle period and the later Heidegger
This dissertation engages with contemporary interpretations of Nietzsche and Heidegger on the issue of self-knowing with respect to the notions of honesty and authenticity. Accounting for the two philosophers' developing conceptions of these notions allows a response to interpreters who conceive the activity of self-knowing as a primarily personal problem. The alternative accounts proposed take as a point of departure transitional texts that reveal both thinkers to be engaged in processes of revision. The reading of honesty in Chapters 1 and 2 revolves around Nietzsche's groundwork on prejudice in Morgenrothe (1880-81), where he first problematizes the moral-historical forces entailed in actuating the 'will to truth'. The reading of authenticity in Chapters 3 and 4 revolves around Heidegger's lectures on what motivates one's thinking in Was heist Denken? (1951-52). The lectures call into question his previous formal suppositions on what calls forth one's 'will-to-have-a-conscience', in an interpretation of Parmenides on the issue of thought's linguistic determination, discussed further in the context of Unterwegs zur Sprache (1950-59). Chapter 5 shows how Heidegger's confrontation with Nietzsche contributed to his ongoing revisions to the notion of authenticity, and to the attending conceptions of critique and its authority. Particular attention is given to the specific purposes to which distinct Nietzschean foils are put near the confrontation's beginning--in Heidegger's lectures on Nietzsche's second Unzeitgemasse Betrachtung (1938), and in the monograph entitled Besinnung (1939) which they prepare--and near its end, in the interpretation of Also Sprach Zarathustra (1883-85) presented in the first half of Was heist Denken? Chapter 6 recapitulates the developments traced from the vantage point of the retrospective texts Die Zollikoner Seminare (1959-72) and the fifth Book of Die frohliche Wissenschaft (1887). Closing remarks are made in relation to recent empirical research on the socio-environmental structures involved in determining self-identity.