Greece and NATO: A Study of Policy Divergence and Alliance Cohesion
Modem alliance theory is based on the assumption that states come together in defense against a common threat. However, these theories were developed early in the Cold War in an effort to explain how and why the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed. Some member states do not fit into the neat theories suggested. This thesis is an examination of the historical events that have shaped Greek relations with NA TO and the United States. The thesis seeks to assess the usefulness of contemporary alliance theory in explaining divergent principles among alliance members and the effect this has had on the Atlantic Alliance and alliances in general. It also seeks to assess the influence of the US in Greek foreign policy from 1945 and the institution of the Truman Doctrine. The failure of the US and NA TO to react to overt moves by Turkey against Greek sovereignty, the failure of the US and NATO to react to the 'Colonels' Coup,' or the Turkish invasion of Cyprus distanced Greeks from the common policy promoted by the US and NATO. Alliance theory is far from complete. The theories developed during the Cold War lack fundamental concepts regarding intra-alliance relationships and cleavages that develop among member states, such as the problems between Greece and Turkey. This failure has hindered understanding of the true relationship between Greece and NATO to be understood.
The Origins of the Greek Civil War
Part 1 Greece after the First World War: dependency and schism the hydrocephalous state social structure the Greek Communist Party the bourgeois reaction. Part 2 Right-wing dictatorship, 1935-41: anti-Venizelist resurgence parliamentary democracy in crisis Metaxas's tyranny its legacy axis invasion. Part 3 Invasion and collapse of authority, April 1941-March 1943: the old order in decay the birth of the National Liberation Front, EAM communist strategy. Part 4 EAM challenges the old order, April 1943-October 1944: reactions to EAM EAM predominant the start of civil strife communist agreement with the British nation-wide polarization liberation. Part 5 Revolution defeated, October 1944-February 1945: growing communist power the demobilization crisis the battle for Athens communist surrender. Part 6 The white terror, February 1945-March 1946: right-wing vendetta the British role communist revival election victory for the right communists on the brink. Part 7 Descent to civil war, April 1946-March 1947: the monarchist regime revival of guerrilla warfare the national army intervenes the Truman doctrine. Part 8 The Civil War, 1947-50 the Democratic Army right-wing victory aftermath.
What Happened to Suicide Bombings in Israel? Insights from a Terror Stock Model
An analysis of three years of suicide bombing data in Israel reveals an increase in such attacks through March 2002 followed by a steep decline through the end of 2003. The authors propose a terror-stock model that treats the suicide bombing attack rate as a function of the number of terrorists available to plan and execute suicide bombings. The intent of Israeli tactics such as targeted killings and preemptive arrests is to reduce the capacity of terror organizations to commit attacks. When fit to the data, this model suggests that the targeted killing of terror suspects sparks estimated recruitment to the terror stock that increases rather than decreases the rate of suicide bombings. Surprisingly, only the deaths of suspected terrorists, and not Palestinian civilians, are associated with such estimated recruitment. Although Israeli actions have reduced the rate of suicide bombings over time, it is preventive arrests rather than targeted killings that seem more responsible for this outcome.