Jews, Modernity, and the Fiction of Ben-Levi
This article presents the work of Ben-Lévi [pseud. Godchaux Weil, 1806-1878], who published a series of short stories in the Archives Israélites de France, the leading French Jewish newspaper, during the 1840s. One of the first Jews to write fiction in French, Ben-Lévi offers a portrait of a community caught between tradition and progress. Combining the "realist" literary codes of Balzac with the "idealist" codes of Sand, his stories hold up a critical mirror to the assimilating Jewish bourgeoisie of the era and show how a reformed Judaism could help resolve the dilemmas of modernity. Ben-Lévi's forgotten fictions reveal the agency and creativity of nineteenth-century French Jews in the face of momentous social change while also demonstrating the versatility of French literary models. (MS)
Obstinate Hebrews: Representations of Jews in France, 1715-1815
Acknowledgments Introduction 1. A Nation within the Nation? The Jews of Old Regime France 2. Jews and Philosophes 3. Jews and Citizens 4. Contrapuntal Readings: Jewish Self-Representation in Prerevolutionary France 5. Constituting Differences: The French Revolution and the Jews 6. Familiar Strangers: Napoleon and the Jews Conclusion: Jews and Other "Others" Epilogue Notes Bibliography Index
Between identity and difference: Three ways of reading Nishida's non-dualism
The philosophy of Nishida KitarŌ offers the reader today not only a paradigm for a comparative philosophy, but also a methodological framework to construct a Buddhist philosophy. The key and, at the same time, the obstacle to his philosophy is the concept of the "self-identity of the absolute contradiction." This conceptual cornerstone of Nishida's philosophy is as controversial among scholars today as it is central to his philosophy. Critics, such as Tanabe Hajime and Takahashi Satomi, argue that Nishida's philosophy privileges the principle of identity over that of difference and falls into a monism; his supporters, most of all Nishitani Keiji and Ueda Shizuteru, to the contrary, claim that it comprises the key to philosophical non-dualism. In general, I am convinced that even his "self-identity of the absolute contradiction," if it is read carefully within the context of Nishida's philosophy, will render a paradigm that falls neither into a logical contradiction nor into a monism but that provides the foundation for a non-dualist philosophy. To this end, I will reread it first in the context of Nishida's overall project and, then, on the background of Nishida's debates with his critics.