Unexpected changes in tax revenues and the stabilisation function of fiscal policy. Evidence for EU
This paper analyzes the size and the determinants of unexpected changes in EU countries' tax revenues and their impact on the ability of EU governments to use fiscal policy as a macroeconomic stabilisation device. We make use of information taken from the Stability and Convergence Programmes (SCP) setting countries' medium-term fiscal plans and focus on the period preceding the 2008/2009 global financial crisis. Tax revenue surprises are found to have fluctuated widely, alternating periods of sizeable windfalls and periods of substantial shortfalls.When analysing this, we find that GDP growth surprises and, in some cases (i.e. Ireland, Spain the UK and Finland) asset prices fluctuations have exerted the most significant influence. In the sequel we provide evidence on the incidence of these unexpected changes in governments' tax revenues on the ability of governments to conduct counter-cyclical fiscal policies, which are desirable from a macroeconomic perspective.We find that countries that have experienced the largest tax revenue windfalls in the run-up to the 2008/2009 crisis have also tended to run more pro-cyclical fiscal policies although these results vary depending on the use of ex-post vs. real-time data and on the method used to calculate the cyclical position of the economy. Put differently, these results tend to indicate that while tax revenue windfalls may be good for the public purse during favourable times they may also (paradoxically) dwindle the ability of the countries concerned to run counter-cyclical fiscal policies when cyclical conditions revert.
The electoral advantage of the left in times of fiscal adjustment
Despite widely held views on fiscal adjustment as a political minefield for government parties, the empirical literature on the issue has been surprisingly inconclusive. A crucial variable that has been often overlooked in the debate is partisan politics. Building on the micro-logic of Albert Hirschman’s ‘exit, voice, and loyalty’ framework, this article offers a novel theoretical perspective on the conditioning impact of partisan government in the electoral arena. Due to their more limited exit options at their disposal, left-wing voters are less likely to inflict electoral punishment on their parties, offering the latter an electoral advantage over their right-wing rivals. Relying on the largest cross-national data set to date on the evolution of close to 100 parties’ popularity ratings in 21 democracies, time-series–cross-section results confirm this electoral advantage. Somewhat paradoxically, while center-right government parties systematically lose popularity in years of fiscal adjustment, no such regularity is found for left-leaning incumbents.
Reforming the Russian legal system
Preface 1. Pre-revolutionary Russian law 2. The Bolshevik experience 3. The history of legal reform 4. Forging a new constitution 5. Citizens and the state: the debate over the Procuracy 6. In search of a just system: the courts and judicial reform 7. Law and the transition to a market economy 8. Legal reform in the republics 9. Legal reform and the transition to democracy in Russia Appendix Notes Index.