Britain’s ‘Independent’ V-Bomber Force and US Nuclear Weapons, 1957–1962
This article examines a secret Anglo-American programme, Project ‘E’, which equipped the RAF’s V-bomber Force with US nuclear weapons for use in wartime. It shows Project ‘E’ was ineffective as a warhead supply programme and, furthermore, that it crippled the operational effectiveness of the V-bomber Force as a whole between 1958 and 1962. This article argues that as a result of Project ‘E’, the V-Force was neither operationally nor politically independent as a nuclear deterrent force. This challenges the traditional view of the V-Force as the benchmark of nuclear independence to assess the Skybolt, Polaris and Trident programmes.
Preserving ‘Great Power Status’: The Complex Case of the British Intervention in the Falklands (1982)
Abstract This article aims to examine the importance of an often overlooked argument when it comes to explaining why great powers go to war against a weaker actor. This argument involves great power status considerations. The article argues that states care deeply about their status, especially states which are current and former great powers, and would opt to go to war to preserve this status even if the political and military consequences of such intervention are negligible to objective observers. To illustrate this argument, I will be looking at why the British decided to reestablish their sovereignty over the Falklands in 1982. The empirical part of the analysis is based on formerly secret documents declassified by the British government. This qualitative primary analysis of British documents provides new insights about the crisis and suggests that status considerations played a large role in the British decision to re-conquer the Falklands.
No Blank Cheque: Anglo-American (Mis)understandings and the Use of the English Airbases
Following the Berlin crisis of 1948, U.S. strategic bombers—supposed "atomic capable"—were based in Britain, but with no agreement on the terms of their operation. Using British and U.S. archival sources, this article examines the discussions about the conditions under which U.S. bombers would have operated from British soil in a nuclear strike upon the Soviet Union, a key issue in the emergence of Britain's postwar "special relationship" with the United States. It focuses on the political and military concerns on both sides of the Atlantic about agreements limiting the use of the airbases during the crucial period 1948–58.