Agricultural Policies in the Next Decade: A Global Perspective
Many countries around the world either tax agriculture or provide subsidies through trade and agricultural policies. This paper presents historical developments in the United States, European Union, Canada, China, India, and Thailand, which generally subsidize agriculture although the level of subsidization has decreased because of the significant rise in commodity prices. While progress has been made in lowering tariff and non-tariff barriers around the world with positive outcomes, the future progress in this area is questionable as evidenced by the Doha Round trade talks. Policy makers are now grappling with how to deal with price instability, uncertainty, and rising food prices.
High Commodity Prices and the EU's Single Payment Scheme: Some Consequences of Double‐Dipping
"When negotiating agricultural policies, decisions are generally based on historical net farm income figures, which are derived from the then current price and production data. In 2003, when the Single Payment Scheme (SPS) was introduced in the EU, agricultural commodity prices were "low." As a result the SPS is very generous when viewed in light of today's "high" agricultural commodities prices: farmers are double-dipping. We provide an empirical assessment of the implications for compensatory payments under the SPS in combination with high commodity prices for two major EU crops: wheat and barley. Yearly compensatory payments for these two crops alone exceed $10 billion. The lesson of this result for agricultural policy reform is that the payments under the SPS should have been made more flexible and tied to future (farm gate) prices, i.e., so payouts would usually vary with changing market conditions, while still being decoupled from production decisions." Copyright (c) 2008 Canadian Agricultural Economics Society.
Fuel Ethanol Subsidies and Farm Price Support
Ethanol subsidies are well established in U.S. policy and have high priority in corn growers' political agenda. This paper develops a vertical market model of ethanol, byproducts, and corn which is used to analyze whether corn growers would prefer the government's subsidy dollar to be spent directly on corn subsidies (though deficiency payments) rather than on a subsidy on ethanol made from corn. Because the subsidy dollar has to be shared with ethanol manufacturers under the ethanol subsidy, it is to be expected, and the model confirms, that a dollar spent on a direct corn subsidy increases corn growers' producer surplus more than an a dollar spent on an ethanol subsidy under many plausible values of the relevant parameters. But there are equally plausible parameter values under which the ethanol subsidy is preferred by corn growers. The economics of this result turn mainly on the price discrimination an ethanol subsidy creates between ethanol and corn used for feed and export purposes, reducing the buyers' price of ethanol and byproducts but increasing the price of corn fed and exported. This enables producers of corn and ethanol to increase their joint producer surpluses above the total value of subsidies paid. The paper also analyzes the social cost (deadweight loss) of these subsidies, and finds the ethanol subsidy to generate deadweight losses likely to be in the billions of dollars annually.