Terrorism and public relations
Abstract This paper asks what we can learn from the parallels between terrorism and PR, either for the understanding of terrorism or—of more direct concern here—for the understanding of PR and its place in contemporary society. The already poor public image of PR may suffer from insufficient clarity about these parallels. It is suggested that while analogising between the two is of value, the differences between terrorism and PR also need to be stressed. Public communications need to be differentiated in two ways, firstly in terms of the distinction between spectacular and participatory types of public sphere, and secondly in terms of the distinction between values-based and power-based modes of address. Combining these concepts generates a simple 2×2 matrix for c1assifying public communications. This can help both to identify terrorism and PR as different forms of public communication, and also to identify the practical PR challenges facing governments and civic society in the struggle against terrorism.
Terrorism and the Media
Introduction - David L Paletz and C Danielle Vinson Researchers' Perspectives - David L Paletz and John Boiney Terrorists' Perspectives - Robin P J M Gerrits Memoirs Terrorists' Perspectives - Cynthia L Irvin Interviews Governments' Perspectives - Jennifer Jane Hocking Broadcasting Organizations' Perspectives - David L Paletz and Laura L Tawney Editors' Perspectives - Alex P Schmid Reporters' Perspectives - Mark Blaisse Public's Perspectives - Christopher Hewitt Victims' Perspectives - Ronald D Crelinsten
Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954–1962 . By Martha Crenshaw Hutchinson. (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1978. Pp. xvi + 178. $10.95.)
This case study of the Front de Liberation NationaJe (FLN) is rich in information. It is a useful study but its premises and conclusions are not sufficiently developed. More attention should have been given to the politico-historical context in which the FLN was working and to an analysis of the "terrorism" of the French authorities. One example of the former will have to suffice. In chapter 3 Hutchinson argues that the Toussaint outbreak in 1954, the real beginning of the war, "failed." She believes this because it did not provoke "ideological awareness and sympathy from the Algerian masses" (p. 41). She claims that "the disappointment over the popular response to the Toussaint attacks influenced FLN decision-making" to turn initially to "compliance terrorism" or violence directed at disloyal or compromised members of the subject population to keep the rest of that population 'in line' (p. 43). She presents no evidence to support these views. In fact, earlier Hutchinson gave contrary evidence from Norman Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr. {Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts, Markam, 1970, p. 10), to wit: "The only 'act' that rebellion needs desperately from a large proportion of the populace is non-denunciation. . . . " This the FLN clearly achieved in the Toussaint attack. Not only did no major Algerian spokesperson denounce the FLN action, but also Messali Hadj, according to Alistair Home in A Savage War for Peace (New York: Macmillan, 1977) rushed to claim credit for it for his rival MNA (MouvementNational Alge'rien).