«Исламское государство» в контексте политических изменений на Ближнем Востоке
The article "The Islamic State phenomenon in the framework of the political changes in the Middle East" is dedicated to the "Islamic State", one of the most powerful and dangerous extremist organizations. Author realizes in this article: research of the genesis and causes of appearance of the movement "Islamic State"; analysis of the sociopolitical and geopolitical situation of the Iraqi Sunni community after the American invasion of 2003; bringing to the light factors of the high scale propagation of the Islamic extremism in Syria and Iraq; research of the military and political potential of the "Islamic State" and factors which could impede its expansion. Author considers "Islamic State" as an emergent phenomenon giving huge impact on the political situation in the Middle East. It provoked repartition of the old frontiers existed since the Sykes-Pico treaty of 1916. To the author's opinion oppression of the Iraqi Sunni community by the government of Nuri al-Maliki was the main cause of the Sunni revolt in Summer of 2014. Sunni tribes of Northern Iraq and former Baath party members were the driving forces of the revolt but then Jihadi extremists hijacked this revolt. To the author's mind elimination of the "Islamic State" is impossible without reconciliation between various religious communities in Syria and Iraq.
Fourth Generation Governance -- Sheikh Tamimi defends the Islamic State of Iraq
Abstract : On October 15, 2006 al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) and its allies declared an independent Islamic State across a swath of Western Iraq. The Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) was widely scorned by Western counterterrorism experts, many of whom rightly concluded that the ISI would never be capable of developing the material and bureaucratic infrastructure widely expected of a modern state. The ISI has not been embraced in the Mideast either. More secularist elements of the Iraqi insurgency condemn it. Most importantly to al-Qa'ida, well-known jihadi scholars, who could provide the ISI critical legitimacy, have been slow to support the new organization. The scholars are apparently concerned about the strategic wisdom and theological correctness of establishing an Islamic State now. The ISI's defenders -- ranging from jihadi pundit Shaykh Atiyatallah to Al-Qa'ida commander Abu Yahya al-Libi -- have developed a series of theological, philosophical, and practical arguments to justify the ISI's existence to the ulema -- Islamic scholars. The most comprehensive defense, entitled "Informing the People about the Birth of the Islamic State of Iraq," was authored by Uthman Bin Abd al-Rahman al-Tamimi and released by Furqan Media, the ISI's official media development unit. This book is significant for two reasons: (1) it delineates the ideological schism within the jihadi movement over the ISI's existence, and (2) Tamimi defends the ISI by combining modern globalization theory with Koranic and hadith-based justifications to fundamentally redefine what a modern Islamic nation state should be. To limit the ISI's long-term effectiveness, the United States should carefully attack its material and human infrastructure inside Iraq and the intellectual infrastructure that Tamimi is trying to erect in "Informing the People." Specific recommendations are to challenge Tamimi's intellectual framework for the ISI, confuse the ISI's leadership picture, and beat the ISI on the ground.
A View from Inside the Surge
[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] DURING THE EARLY YEARS of Operation Iraqi Freedom, too many units attempted to fight an emerging and eventually flourishing insurgency the wrong way. They over-emphasized kinetic operations against an adaptive insurgent hidden in a sympathetic or intimidated population. While there are examples of successful counterinsurgency efforts at various levels of command during the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom, those successes have been sporadic and short-lived at best. However, with the implementation of a new strategy in Iraq based on the tenets of FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency, our military has proven that it can effectively conduct counterinsurgency operations on a large scale. An increase in troop density at key locations in and around Baghdad, a significant effort to move away from large forward operating bases to combat outposts (to protect the people), and a relentless attack on Al-Qaeda in Iraq were critical to the improved security levels across the country. David Galula's 1964 treatise Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice served as the primary source behind the development of chapter five of FM 3-24, "Executing Counterinsurgency Operations." The principles Galula emphasizes have stood the test of time in various theaters of operation. Unfortunately, his work has remained largely unknown to front-line Soldiers, some of whom ventured into the Iraq insurgency relying primarily on previous experience and instinct rather than the proven principles discussed by Galula. Writing from first-hand experiences on the counterinsurgency battlefields of the 1940s and 1950s, Galula emphasized the importance of collecting intelligence from the local population to identify and then purge the insurgents from their midst. As a battalion commander during the surge, I found that our unit had limited effectiveness during our first several weeks on the ground in Baghdad. Almost all of our tactical victories and defeats were kinetic in nature. Over time, however, we pursued a winning strategy centered on the population that resulted in a complete reversal on the ground. Previously unknown to me, I have since found David Galula's book on counterinsurgency warfare to be indispensable as an operational framework. Facing the insurgency in Baghdad, 1-4 Cavalry of the 4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), 1st Infantry Division, employed Galula's tactics during the surge of 2007-2008. Background Serving as the commander of 1 -4 CAV during this time, I received the mission to reposition our unit from the Al Hadr, Saha, and Abu T'Shir neighborhoods of East Rashid in southwest Baghdad slightly north to the Doura neighborhood. Al Hadr was a violent neighborhood, but Doura was the most violent and contested neighborhood in the Rashid District. The 2-12 Infantry was fighting valiantly as the 4th IBCT main effort there with three rifle companies, but it would require a greater concentration of troops to defeat the entrenched insurgency led by Al-Qaeda. We were assigned the eastern one-third of the territory, allowing 2-12 Infantry to concentrate in the west part of Doura while 2-23 Stryker assumed control of our former area of operations. Doura was a perfect breeding ground for the insurgency for several reasons, and a place that Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) felt it could and must hold on to. After some analysis, it became clear that our new area of operations was the gateway into Doura from the southern belts of Baghdad. Insurgents regularly met in various locations in the area to plan their activities, and they brought in significant amounts of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other materials for use throughout Doura. This Sunni neighborhood was important to Al-Qaeda because it was readily accessible from the southern belts where AQI remained largely unchallenged (this would change dramatically when follow-on surge brigades arrived in the coming months), and it offered insurgents passage over the Tigris to the Karadah Peninsula and into the Rusafa District-- both Shi'a dominated areas. …