Legal uncertainty under EU acquis for the author of Graphical User Interface design - A new sui generis protection needed?
This thesis is about the legal protection of the Intellectual Property (IP) of the design of the graphical user interface (GUI) for computer programs aka software. The research into this matter of law was done by finding out and analysing how this protection is provided through international treaties, statutory law and case law. It concludes that there is a certain amount of legal uncertainty within the area researched and that full harmonization of IPRs within EU most probably would remove this issue and thereby benefit the individual author. This thesis takes the reader on a journey where we will explore the dimension where law and technology meet and merge.
The Challenges of Reforming Intellectual Property Protection for Computer Software
This article examines three critical, interrelated challenges for reforming legal protection for computer software: (1) analyzing the market failures that might justify government intervention to define (or alter) the legal entitlements granted for software innovations; (2) predicting the likely path of computer technology; and (3) anticipating and navigating potential impediments to legislative reform of legal protection for software. It warns that patent protection for computer software poses serious potential problems and should be addressed before powerful economic interests vest in large software patent portfolios.
Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation
A N IMPORTANT QUESTION of positive and normative legislation theory is what role courts should assume when they interpret statutes (as opposed to the Constitution and the common law). One can imagine the range of roles as a continuum. At one pole is an "archeological approach," in which a court's role is to unearth and enforce the original intent or expectations of the legislature that created the statute. Under this approach, statutory interpretation is an effort to discern the original answer put into the statute. At the other pole is a "free inquiry approach," in which the court's role is to reach the best result, formally unconstrained (though perhaps influenced or persuaded) by the statute's text and legislative history. These two poles represent different aspirations for statutory interpretation. The archeological approach appeals to formal legitimacy (the nonelected judge is not exercising any discretion but is merely carrying out the will of the majoritarian legislature), while the free inquiry approach appeals to functional legitimacy (justice or good results).1 Traditional theories of statutory interpretation take something close to an archeological approach, though without admitting that good results are thereby sacrificed. 2 Traditional theorists accomplish this feat by assuming (with varying degrees of explicitness) a