The Influence of Technologists on Corporate Decision‐Making in the United Kingdom
One reason for the poor performance of UK industry in the management of technology is the rift between corporate decision‐making and technology as a discipline, creating a barrier to the influence of technologists on policy making. This paper presents evidence from recent secondary sources, which indicates the weak position of technologists by comparison with other specialists in organisational hierarchies. Reasons for this relative lack of organisational power can be found both in the aspirations and attitudes of technologists and in culturally‐induced organisational structures, which act to severely limit the participation of technologists in decision‐making at the highest levels. Some cross‐national comparisons are referred to. Suggestions are made for ways in which a more even balance between disciplines within UK companies might be achieved.
Technical knowledge as value added in business markets: Implications for procurement and marketing
Abstract For many businesses, competitiveness is highly dependent on the technical knowledge of its operating personnel. This article presents the view that vendors able to offer cutting-edge technological expertise relevant to customers' operations as part of their overall “bundled” offering add more value for customers than competitors emphasizing product supply alone. Concurrently, it is suggested that purchasing and materials management should view technical knowledge as a strategic resource and adopt procurement strategies that encourage knowledge acquisition. An exploratory study was undertaken to determine the degree to which technical knowledge is linked to more desirable decision-making styles and outcomes using a sample of key buying center members (operating/manufacturing managers). The results of a mail survey indicate that higher levels of technical knowledge are linked to more desirable decision styles and decision outcomes, suggesting that managers' technical knowledge is an important asset for firms with manufacturing or process operations. Implications for procurement and marketing are discussed.
DIRECTORS' PAY, GROWTH AND PROFITABILITY
THE last i5 years have witnessed a series of theoretical works that have sought to replace the traditional motive of company directors, maximization of profit, with the maximization of some form of growth.' In support of this new maximand, several writers maintain that increases in size present overwhelmingly greater material incentives to directors than do increases in profitability. Several analysts have reviewed the evidence for this contention, using correlation or regression techniques to estimate the respective influence of size and profitability on pay. Studies before I970 obtained results that were surprisingly decisive by the standards of applied economics, and reported in favour of the 'managerial theorists" arguments with remarkable unanimity.2 The relation between size and pay was found to be positive and passed the usual statistical significance tests with flying colours, whereas that between profitability and pay earned only scorn: the estimated coefficient was not significantly different from zero even at the permissive 5% level. In 1970 the harmony was disturbed by Lewellen and Huntsman [i], who declared, on the basis of new estimates, that '. . . reported profits are substantially more important in the determination of executive compensation than are sales-indeed sales seem to be quite irrelevant.. .'3 This paper, using hitherto unavailable data for a very large sample of U.K. companies,4 reconciles these apparently conflicting statistical results; and, in interpreting them, rejects both extreme positions.