Drugs, Thugs, and the Diablos Rojos: Perils and Progress in Panama
In many ways, Panama has come into its own. Its running of the Panama Canal is indisputably successful, its post-Noriega elections appear to be relatively corruption free, the multibillion dollar expansion of the Canal and the modernization of its transportation system are in full swing—all ostensibly signs of a developed country, but appearances can be deceiving. Dig deeper, and perils emerge: an increase in gangs and drug trafficking, a huge disparity between the wealthy and the poor, and an emerging threat to democracy. Examining these perils and progress demonstrates that Panamanians do not yet enjoy full citizenship; instead, “client-ship” still dominates.
Civil Society, Social Capital and Economic Development
In recent decades, debates over the determinants of economic development have routinely turned on disagreements over the proper boundaries between the state and the market. Statists argue that the imperfect and immature markets of most developing countries require the guidance of a strong, autonomous, Weberian state. Neo-liberals champion the ef® ciency of free markets in allocating resources toward their most productive uses and decry the distortions accompanying many forms of state intervention. Neither perspective places primary emphasis on the role of civil society‐ those intermediate forms of social organisation that stand between, and partially independent of, both state and market. When statistsand neo-liberals do sometimes focus on the role that civil society plays in economic development, they ® nd common ground around a negative assessment of the economic impact of associationalism. Statists fear that a vigorous civil society will press multiplied demands upon the state. These external pressures undermine the bureaucratic autonomy that serves as the central prerequisite to neutral, technocratic management of the development process. At the extreme, a constantly agitated civil society threatens to overwhelm fragile political institutions and lead to ungovernability in the face of fractious and contradictory demands from below. 1 Neo-liberals see matters in similar terms. Societal mobilisation usually entails collusion among rent-seeking agents who seek to transfer income from other segments of society by manipulating markets or state policies. These distributive coalitions reward the organised at the expense of the unorganised in a zero-sum game. Widespread rent seeking adds nothing to overall economic development and in fact interferes with the growth process by distorting incentives and impeding innovation. 2 In the last decade, a growing number of sociologists, economists and political scientists has sought to overturn this negative portrayal of the economic consequences of associationalism. The notion of social capital has served as the driving wedge of this effort to de® ne a ``third way’’ along the path to development. Social capital consists of the economic potential embodied in social organisations and the norms of trust and reciprocity that animate them. In this view, the self-organisation of civil society is a necessary element of successful
Anarchist Ideology, Worker Practice: The 1917 General Strike and the Formation of São Paulo’s Working Class
O N August 2, 1914, anarchist, socialist, and other left political organizations in the city of Sdo Paulo rallied to protest the declaration of war in Europe. The advent of the Great War had worsened already unstable conditions in Sdo Paulo, including shortages of food, price speculation, and an industrial downturn that threw 0o,ooo out of work. In this atmosphere, groups such as the Comissto Internacional contra a Guerra, Centro Socialista Internacional, Centro Libertairio, Circulo de Estudos Sociais Francisco Ferrer, and Grupo Anarquista "Os Sem Paitria" met in the Largo da Se (now Prala da Se) to denounce the European "hemorrhage of blood promoted by capitalism." In the midst of this denunciation of the war, workers in the crowd stood up and demanded that the speakers address their problems. They wanted to know what anarchist and socialist leaders were willing to do about the shortages of goods in the markets. How did these leaders plan to combat the decreasing number of jobs, increasing work loads in the factories for those still employed, and low wages earned?' Less than three years later, however, the city's workers demonstrated great unity by launching a devastatingly effective general strike that won increased wages, price controls, and limits on factory regimes. Given the seeming antipathy between the city's workers and labor activists in 1914, what explains this later successful mobilization? Who launched this strike, and what were the forms of organization? And what did the strike gain or lose for Sdo Paulo's workers in the long run?