“Just in Case”: Extended Nuclear Deterrence in the Defense of Australia
This paper examines the foundations and rationale for Australian reliance on US assurances of extended nuclear deterrence. The Australian model of extended nuclear deterrence is marked by its lack of public presence, a lack of certainty about its standing and character in US eyes, its lack of a direct nuclear threat, and its resurgence at a time when nuclear abolition possibilities are being embraced by the leader of the deterrence provider. Australian policy amounts to a claim that the nuclear guarantee is necessary “just in case”– though without any plausible specifics. The fundamental questions remain – for Australia as for other recipients of extended nuclear deterrence assurances – what threats, what probabilities, what alternatives?
Nuclear-enmeshed Australia: an obstacle to nuclear weapons eradication
While Australia’s commitment under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), along with 185 other governments, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons is a welcome contribution to global health and security, Australia is deeply enmeshed in different aspects of the nuclear chain. There are deep contradictions in Australia’s nuclear history and policies; on balance, it is clearly more a part of the problem of existential nuclear dangers facing humanity than it is of their resolution. Australia is the only nation without nuclear weapons to have mined uranium for production of nuclear weapons by another state which were then exploded on its own territory. Australia is the only country claiming protection by nuclear weapons through ‘extended nuclear deterrence’ which is also a member of a nuclear weapons-free zone.
Global attractivity in time-delayed predator-prey systems
Abstract For a predator-prey model with time-delay due to gestation, criteria are obtained for persistence and global attractivity. The global attractivity criteria apply only to models with a decreasing prey isocline.