Citizen UK 2000 and the European Convention for the Promotion And Protection of Human Rights and fundamental freedoms
This thesis sets out to review the extent to which the European Convention for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms(1) has influenced the political and legal order of England and Wales.(2) Analysis is explored along a number of lines of investigation. 
 
A review of the influence of the ECHR on the constitutional order of the UK is prefaced by analysis of its early influence on the order of the Netherlands, Germany and France.(3) Analysis gives rise to two questions 
 
Does the ECHR, dependent on the signatory-state with its own constitutional arrangement and legal culture, support a claim that a collective enforcement of human rights (4) protection can not exist empirically, therefore can not achieve as a transcending philosophy? 
 
Does the ECHR's apparent affinity with the monist order of the civil-law tradition render it in relation to the UK dualist order an impracticable statement of ideal? 
 
Drafted under the auspices of the Council of Europe, the rights and freedoms of the ECHR are accorded a generic structure, essentially subject to derogation. Whether the ECHR is capable of advancing an effective fon-n of human rights protection, this thesis examines the genesis of the 
ECHR, including its absence of inquisitorial function. Analysis gives rise to the question: 
 
What is to be expected of the ECHR: the promotion of a common understanding of HR intimated by the Congress of Europe 1948, or a collective enforcement of protection inherent in an understanding of the telos of the ECHR? 
 
Narrowing the focus of analysis to the UK, this thesis examines its response to the concern of terrorism, asylum and various aspects of criminal justice and asks: 
 
Whether the concept of HR protection has become the last haven of sui-generis positivism, and if so, the ECHR a raison d'etre of the signatory- state? 
 
With regard to the judicial treatment of the rights and freedoms of the individual post the (5) Human Rights Act 1998(5), this thesis examines the functioning of Section 3 of the HRA. Analysis raises a number of questions: 
 
Does a division in judicial reasoning exist between, and/or within, the higher and lower courts regarding the application of the HRA/ECHR? If so, on what grounds? 
 
Can a universal humanity exist in a legal order where rights are treated as a form of residual liberty remaining after legal restraints are subtracted? 
 
Whether post 2000, a decline in autonomous law has resulted in a convergence of the legal and political and the creation of a national responsive law in which the HR concern of the individual is placed below that of the prevailing Government and judiciary, the findings of this 
thesis are used to test the assertion that: 
 
The Article I ECHR agreement by the UK to secure to everyone within its jurisdiction the rights defined in Section 1, is not matched by a realisation of those rights by everyone within its jurisdiction; 
 
Subject to the sovereignty of Governments and politics of the national judiciary, the ECHR constitutes an order for the popularisation of the concept of HR protection, as opposed to a system for the collective enforcement of the rights and freedom of the individual. 
 
(1) Hereafter, ECHR 
(2) Excluding the legal order and legislative autonomy of Scotland. Hereafter, UK 
(3) Following its ratification by the Netherlands, Germany 
 and France 
(4) Hereafter,HR 
(5) Hereafter, HRA
How to Do Things with Rules
New to English law? Need to know how rules are made, interpreted and applied? This popular and well-established textbook will show you how. It simplifies legal method by combining examples with an account of rules in general: the who, what, why and how of interpretation. Starting with standpoint and context, it identifies factors that give rise to doubts about the interpretation of a rule and recommends a systematic approach to analysing those factors. Questions and exercises integrated in the text and on the accompanying website will help you to develop skills in reading, interpreting and arguing about legal and other rules. The text is fully updated on developments in the legislative process and the judicial interpretation of statutes and precedent. It includes a new chapter on 'The European Dimension' reflecting the changes brought about by the Human Rights Act 1998.
A Pageant in Modern Dress
The reviewer determined to complain about something had better pick on the title. The death in question, like Mark Twain's, may turn out to have been exaggerated. Mr. Gilmore's book is as much about the birth of contract as its death. And in a deeper sense it is not about the death of anything, but about the way in which the common law lives, perhaps the way in which any system of law lives. To this improbable reviewer, a legal historian practicing mostly in the Middle Ages, it has given that rare and unnerving pleasure experienced by lecturers who suddenly, in full cry, understand what they are saying. From time to time, pretending that he belongs in a law school, the medievalist puts on a course with some such title as "mechanics of legal development." Part of it goes like this. The law is a reiterated failure to classify life. There have always been categories like tort and contract (the medieval words were trespass and covenant); each cycle begins with fact situations being pinned up under the one or the other without much need for thought. Under each heading, the preoccupations of the formative period dictate more or less clear rules; and the system as a whole acquires mathematical force. But as soon as the force is compelling, the system is out of date. Both the classification itself and the rules within each category formed around yesterday's situations; when today's are pinned up on the same principles, they are subjected to rules and yield results no longer appropriate. The individual lawyer cannot hope to get the rules changed for his client, but he can often try to have his case reclassified. No doubt a promise is a promise: but it may also be or imply a statement, and if the rules of contract do not effectively enforce the promise, the statement may still trigger essentially tortious rules about reliance. This is how as-