Derivatives of 1-naphthyl ethylenediamine dihydrochloride for standardization of direct-bilirubin assays done with the Technicon "SMAC".
The Jendrassik--Groff assay for direct bilirubin was adapted for analysis rates of 150/h on the Technicon "SMAC" continuous-flow analyzer. This requires development of a standard that is compatible with the other 19 channels on this analyzer. N-1-Naphthyl ethylenediamine dihydrochloride has been used for standardization of direct bilirubin assays, but we found it to be unsuitable because values for potassium are falsely elevated when potassium is determined with a valinomycin ion-selective electrode. This interference can be eliminated by alkylating the aliphatic amine group in the standard. The resulting compounds undergo the coupling reaction in the same way as the original compound and function equally well as standards for the direct bilirubin reaction. The only limitation of these analogs is their decreased solubility at physiological pH in some cases. Thus only certain alkyl groups are suitable.
A STABLE "BILIRUBIN" STANDARD.
An aqueous solution of N-(1-naphthyl) ethylenediamine dihydrochloride has been successfully employed as a routine secondary "bilirubin" standard. It possesses a stability which is, unfortunately, not a characteristic of bilirubin itself.
Corporations and the Market for Law
The state competition for corporate law has long been studied as a distinct phenomenon. Under the traditional view, corporations are subject to a unique choice-of-law rule, the internal affairs doctrine (IAD). This rule is explained as a historical accident, or by the special logistics of the corporate contract. The resulting market for corporate law appears to have special characteristics, particularly including the dominance by the single state of Delaware. This paper challenges the traditional view. It shows that the corporate law market is best understood as a special application of the general market for law. Any differences are matters of degree rather than kind, and are explained by considerations underlying enforcement of all choice-of-law contracts rather than by factors unique to corporations. It follows that theories of corporate competition that ignore the broader law market context are incomplete, and that the competition for corporate law carries lessons for the law market generally. Moreover, the connection between the corporate and other law markets has implications for the nature of corporate law, the constitutional status of the IAD, the scope of the IAD, and for the relationship between state and federal law.