How China's 'trade not aid' strategy became construed as charitable help: deconstructing the 'touching' idyll of Li Li's investment in Africa
In recent years, China has increased investments in Africa and its “Trade Not Aid” model appears to be the best delivery of sustainable assistance. By reviewing the history of Chinese aid to Africa, examining race-relations literature, and deconstructing contemporary models of aid, the author argues that, at least in terms of agricultural endeavors, China’s current approach resembles the colonialism that it once sought to disassemble. T have been many arguments against traditional patterns of aid to Africa. In 2009, Dambisa Moyo provided one of the most recent and prominent rationales, asserting that trade-based economic relationships encourage investment, production, as well as technical knowledge exchange, which therefore provides the effectiveness and sustainability that are lacking in traditional aid projects.1 This “ Trade Not Aid ” approach has become synonymous with contemporary China-Africa economic relations, and as it enhances its investments in Africa, China is also winning Moyo’s praise as Africa’s best friend.2 Nonetheless, a closer inspection of their relationship reveals that, at least in terms of agricultural investment, China’s strategy is not as radical of a departure from colonialism as the existing literature would suggest. This paper takes Li Li’s Jonken Farm situated in Moyo’s home — Zambia — as a case study to explore the dichotomy between perceptions of aid providers and recipients. Li and her husband Wang Chi built Jonken Farm in 1992. Their story first became known in a 2004 television interview,3 and after 2 How China’s “ Trade Not Aid ” Strategy Became Construed As Charitable Help Li assumed the management of the 3573-hectare farm when Wang passed away in 2005, she became a national celebrity in China. Beijing crowned Li with titles such as “the Chinese who touches Africa the most”, “National Heroine”, and “Distinguished Communist.” She was also mentioned in two important English-language publications on the Sino-African relationship. Basing herself on Jonken, Deborah Brautigam concludes that Li’s private investment generates profit as well as employment opportunities for locals.4 Serge Michel and Michel Beuret add that trade-based relationships buffer interracial discontent in ways aid does not; despite recent anti-Chinese revolts in Zambia, they find that Jonken is described as “a perfect example of the cooperation between China and Zambia”5. I deconstruct the Jonken story in the context of Beijing’s agricultural endeavors in Africa since 1960. Chinese assistance to Africa began with altruistic roots, but these have been lost over time even though Chinese media frames investments as “help” to its former aid recipients so it appears that China has not discontinued any aid. While Chinese perceive the contemporary business relationships as assistance, however, “aid” recipients often do not; while Beijing paints Li as a national hero, Zambians find her a bigoted and harsh. Despite investments being more efficient than traditional forms of aid, the racism that has accompanied the capitalism foretells grave risks in the future of Sino-African relations.
Chinese aid and African development: exporting Green Revolution.
List of Tables, Figures and Maps Abbreviations Preface Introduction Development and Foreign Aid: Theory and Practice Chinese Development Aid in Africa The State and Agriculture in West Africa Exporting Green Revolution: Ideology, Politics and Technology Project Governance: Implementation and Institutions Exporting Ideology Conclusion Appendix Bibliography Index
The Role Of Nanjing University In The Nanjing Incident
The death of Zhou Enlai a few months earlier gave the Qing Ming Festival in 1976 a special significance. The festival marks the traditional time to mourn the dead, and Zhou had been widely revered. It was generally felt that he had played a moderating role in the leadership, particularly in the turbulent period of the Cultural Revolution. His death created a political vacuum and the position of premier was left vacant. Conflict in the upper echelons of the Party had increased after the Fourth National Peoples’ Congress in January 1975 adopted as official policy Zhou Enlai's call for a concerted effort to modernize China's industry, agriculture, defence, science and technology. Opposition from those who believed that stressing economic goals would undermine political ones began to be reflected in the media as 1975 progressed. By the end of the year an attack had been launched on “the Right–wing deviationist wind.” Fears were aroused that if the left gained power, China might again face a period of chaos and disruption.