The Monument, or, Christopher Wren's Roman Accent
To commemorate the Great Fire, the Corporation of London commissioned Christopher Wren to design the Monument. This article identifies its formal sources in ancient Roman triumphal columns and in a sixteenth-century fluted Tuscan Doric column in Paris, in the inscription on the Column of Trajan, and in a passage from Ammianus Marcellinus. Textual models for the Latin inscriptions on the pedestal include Suetonius's Augustus, Seneca the Younger's Epistle no. 91, and Tacitus's Annals. The political situation in Restoration England cast references to Tacitus into oblivion, yet this commission demonstrates how Wren's knowledge of Latin had a determining effect on his architectural practice.
ROBERT HOOKE, MONUMENTS AND MEMORY
In June 1682, when Robert Hooke (1635–1703) delivered a lecture to the Royal Society on memory – his first and only excursion into human psychology – he had just witnessed a spectacularly public failure of memory when new texts were added to the Monument (1671–76), which he had designed with Christopher Wren. In a direct civic challenge to royal authority, these explained that the ‘Papists’ had set London's Great Fire of September 1666. This paper examines the tensions and accommodations between the City of London and Charles II that accompanied the Monument's erection; the column serves to dramatize the difficulties besetting would-be memorializers in Restoration England. It is suggested that Hooke's memory lecture must be read, not only in the light of specific political anxieties then attached to memory, but against the other ways in which he grappled with forms of signification, here treated as forms of historical witness.
Participation Improves Collective Decisions (When It Involves Deliberation): Experimental Evidence From Kenya
Abstract Citizen participation in decision making has been widely lauded as a method for improving societal outcomes. Deliberative discussion, in particular, is believed to be more transformative than a mere aggregation of individual preferences, leading to more socially optimal decision making and behavior. I report the results from a laboratory experiment with 570 subjects in Nairobi, directly testing the effect of participation in deliberative group decision making on collective outcomes. Participants engage in a group task to earn compensation toward a shared group fund. Randomly assigned treatments vary according to whether decision making over the task to be completed involves: (1) external assignment; (2) non-deliberative majority voting; or (3) consensus through deliberative discussion. I find that deliberation improves collective decision making. Deliberation is also associated with changes in preferences, greater agreement with decision outcomes, and greater perceived fairness. Evidence for behavior change is weaker, but there is some support for further research into the relationship between preference change and behavior change.