The influence of socio-economic background on Union soldiers during the American Civil War
1 "The Influence ofSocio-Economic Background on Union Soldiers during the American Civil War" . 2 Bibliography . 43 Appendix 1: "Port Clinton White Males ofFighting Age and Port Clinton Civil War Enlistees Compared" 48 Appendix 2: "Breakdown in Age ofLinked Soldiers in the 48" 50 Appendix 3: "Foreign Born Soldiers in the 48 Pennsylvania" 51 Appendix 4: "Breakdown in Total Wealth ofLinked Soldiers in the 48 PA". 53 Appendix 5: "Prewar Occupations of Soldiers in the 48 Pennsylvania Compared with all Union Soldiers" . 56 Appendix 6: "Breakdown in Household and Marital Status" 57 Vita 58
Desertion As Localism: Army Unit Solidarity and Group Norms in the U.S. Civil War
Drawing from the experiences of 3,126 enlisted men from North Carolina who fought for the Confederacy in the U.S. Civil War, this article focuses on the determinants of desertion. I argue that men deserted because their identity as Southerners was eroded by an emergent localism, sustained and organized within the Confederate army. Desertion rates were highest in companies that evidenced a high degree of local homogeneity - company solidarity thus bred rather than reduced desertion rates. There is no supportfor any of the historical models of desertion that search for individual-level determinants, such as social class, occupation, status, family structure, age, or time of enlistment. Finally, contextual variables seem to be weak proxiesfor the central variable accounting for desertion - the emergence of a localist identity.
PLEASURE, POWER, AND THE PURSUIT OF COMMUNISM: SOVIET YOUTH AND STATE-SPONSORED POPULAR CULTURE DURING THE EARLY COLD WAR, 1945-1968
art, with certain students accused of “showing political immaturity, failing to understand the Party’s positions on art.” This episode constituted part of a broader crackdown on abstract art by the Khrushchev administration from late 1962, precipitated the the Soviet leader’s derision of such art forms in December 1962 at the Manege exhibit. Such instances demonstrate the limitations of the top-level promotion of youth grassroots initiative, as the Khrushchev leadership reigned in youth autonomy when it threatened to go beyond the boundaries of the permissible. The dates cited above have particular resonance, since both 1957-58 and 1962-63 represent two periods when those at the top of the Party hierarchy moved away from pursuing a more pluralistic, tolerant policy course, due to anxiety inspired by both sharpening Cold War hostilities and domestic developments. In these periods, official rhetoric censured what it labeled as 639 TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 13, d. 546, ll. 56-57. This is likely related to criticism of the Party associated with the fallout from the Secret Speech and the Hungary invasion. For more, see Polly Jones, “From the Secret Speech to the Burial of Stalin: Real and Ideal Responses to De-Stalinization,” in Jones ed., The Dilemmas, 41-63. 640 TsAOPIM, f. 6083, op. 1, d. 52, ll. 166-67. 641 Susan E. Reid, “In the Name of the People: The Manege Affair Revisited,” Kritika 6.4 (Fall 2005): 673716. 642 On these anxieties, see Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer, 156-88.