Pornography and Obscenity
In ancient Greek, the term “pornography” means “writes about prostitutes,” emphasizing the link between pornography and prostitution. Although both involve the selling of sex for money, the two are often treated as (legally) distinct practices. The thread of the Greek root that is preserved in most modern considerations of pornography is the part about “writing” or words, and hence, particularly in the United States legal and social context, speech and expression (see Speech, Freedom of). 
 
 
Keywords: 
 
feminist philosophy; 
law; 
legal and political
Can Liberals Support a Ban on Violent Pornography?
Proponents of a ban on violent pornography have defended their position in a number of different ways. One type of argument alleges that violent pornography harms women and that banning its production and distribution would prevent much of the harm. For example, some have claimed that it (as well as much nonviolent pornography) defames all women.' Another argument is that the abuse and degradation of women depicted in violent pornography is often real rather than simulated and inflicted on unwilling models or actresses afraid to report their victimization because of their vulnerability to further harm. This argument implies that we should ban violent pornography for more or less the same reasons that we currently ban child pornography. Yet another argument taps the resources of J. L. Austin's speech act theory in an attempt to show that violent (as well as much nonviolent) pornography performs a speech act with the illocutionary force of "subordinating" and the perlocutionary force of reinforcing women's subordinate sociopolitical status.2 There are other harm arguments in addition to these, but perhaps the most popular of them is that violent pornography produces and/or strengthens in its male consumers desires to sexually assault women. Many of these consumers act on the desires, and the end result is an increased number of sexual assaults. Without elaborating on the reasons why, I believe that this last
Tort Liability for Nonlibelous Negligent Statements: First Amendment Considerations
If a negligent physical act causes an injury, the tort-feasor, absent a defense of contributory negligence, is usually liable. If, however, that same injury is the result of some form of speech,1 the First Amendment could conceivably insulate the tort-feasor from liability.' Two recent state supreme court decisions' have barred recovery in such tort actions because the defendants' actions were deemed protected speech. By adopting the strict "incitement" standard of Brandenburg v. Ohio4 in one case,5 and the closely related "clear and present danger" test6 in the other, ' these courts have required a plaintiff to bear a heavy burden in proving culpable negligence. This Note argues that the First Amendment should not impose so great a bar to recovery, and that the authors and publishers of nonlibelous negligent statements' should be held liable in tort for the physical harm proximately caused by such statements. 9 Instead of relying upon indeterminate