The Welfare Effects of a Liquidity-Saving Mechanism
This paper considers the welfare effect of introducing a liquidity-saving mechanism (LSM) in a real-time gross settlement (RTGS) payment system. We study the planner's problem to get a better understanding of the economic role of an LSM and find that an LSM can achieve the planner's allocation for some parameter values. The planner's allocation cannot happen without an LSM, as long as some payments can be delayed without cost. We show that, in equilibrium with an LSM, there can be either too few or too many payments settled early compared with the planner's allocation, depending on the parameter values. Using Fedwire data to calibrate our model, we describe the equilibrium that would arise with an LSM and compare welfare with and without an LSM. Our results suggest that introducing an LSM could have significant benefits.
A Study of Competing Designs for a Liquidity-Saving Mechanism
We study two designs for a liquidity-saving mechanism (LSM), a queuing arrangement used with an interbank settlement system. With a balance-reactive LSM, banks can set a balance threshold below which payments are not released from the queue, an action not possible with a receipt-reactive LSM. Payments that are costly to delay are settled earlier with a receipt reactive LSM. Payments that are not costly to delay may be queued with a balance reactive LSM but are always delayed with a receipt reactive LSM. We show that either system can provide higher welfare.
White-Collar Crime in Modern England: Financial Fraud and Business Morality, 1845-1929.
List of tables Acknowledgments Introduction 1. The new economy: transformation of finance and opportunities for crime 2. The railway mania 3. Banking and credit fraud 4. Stock fraud 5. Company fraud: promotion 6. Company fraud: management 7. Company law and the courts 8. Business ethics and professionalization Conclusion Notes Bibliography Index.