Generals, Guerrillas, Drugs, and Third World War–Making
For much of the past fifty years a sizable share of the world was locked in a geopolitical battle that pitted the United States and its clients against the Soviet Union and its satellites. The most violent events in this political battle often were set in the developing world, where the superpowers spent billions of dollars on aid and armaments to support governments or to back opposing or insurgent forces (Nietschmann and LeBon 1987). Countries in which the superpowers supported opposing groups included but were hardly limited to Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, Cuba, Korea, and Afghanistan. In many an instance, internal policies of the governments or revolutionary groups relating to such matters as human rights or education and to the welfare of their citizens factored not at all into their receiving or being denied support. The defining factor was alignment: the stance of a movement or government toward the United States or the Soviet Union. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the two primary sources of funding and weaponry vanished, leaving many revolutionary groups and governments without a powerful sponsor. As the familiar glow of Soviet influence faded from the international landscape, many a former political proxy was forced to alter strategies and policies, the better to adjust to the "new world order." No longer could a country claim to be anticapitalist and routinely receive Soviet aid, as Cuba learned to its considerable dismay and fiduciary disarray. Nor did claiming to be anticommunist guarantee a deluge of financial, political, and military support from the United States. Numerous civil wars thus came to an end, elections were held in many countries, and former hard-line Soviet allies reached out with grasping hands to the West for recognition and financial support. Nicaragua, Vietnam, and numerous Eastern European states come to mind as examples. However, termination of the cold war did not end all of the military ventures in the developing world. Conflicts continue in countries such as Colombia, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, and the Congo; and low-intensity, sporadic outbreaks of political violence persist in such sites as Myanmar, Lebanon, and Mexico. Without the support of superpowers, participants in military conflicts have been forced to seek financial aid from alternative sources. In this note I discuss the implications of a particularly insidious funding source: the production and export of illegal narcotics. [1] What are known in Spanish as narcotraficantes have become a new financial "superpower" employed to prop up--or, in some cases, becoming--unsavory governments and revolutionary groups. A raffish relationship has been consummated, and the offspring threatens to be of insalubrious character and demeanor. A SETTING FOR SUBVERSION Current conflicts in Colombia and Myanmar demonstrate the relationship between narcotics production and revolutionary movements or rogue governments. The connection between them is anything but recent: Historical examples include British control of and profit from opium sales in China in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's covert support of opium production among ethnic-minority hill tribes in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War, and Nicaraguan Contra leaders profiting from cocaine shipments through their territory in the 1980s (McCoy 1991; Cox 1996). For the most part, the geographical and financial scope is larger than it was in the past. Revolutionary movements and governments control vast amounts of territory and command thousands of combatants, and all derive a majority of their financing--and power--from the production of narcotics (Robinson 1998; McCoy 1999). Unlike past examples, some current political groups and governments are completely dependent on narcotrafficking to further their agendas. Also, with the increasing ease of travel to and from once-remote lands, drug smugglers can send greater quantities of their product almost directly to the streets of the developed world. …
Environmental Aspects of Security Threats to Japan in Southeast Asia
Since the end of the Cold War there has been growing attention paid to relationships between environment and security. Some scholars and policymakers have suggested that regional environmental protection provides a 'soft power' means by which Japan can contribute to its own as well as international security. However, there have been few studies devoted to articulating the links between environmental degradation and Japan's security. This study presents a case of how regional environmental problems affect Japan's security and strategic interests in Southeast Asia. The analysis suggests there are, in fact, compelling reasons for environmental problems in Southeast Asia to be viewed with concern from a security standpoint in Japan.
Burma's Clearing Account Agreements
T HE COMPELLING REASON for Burma's entry into the clearing account ("barter") agreements in I954-I956 with mainland China, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was her need to sell more rice.' It was necessary to dispose of stocks in order to avoid a loss on unsold rice, to maintain imports and to halt the decline in foreign exchange reserves. "We have rice to sell and we must sell it if we are to survive ... If we cannot sell it for cash, we shall sell it under clearing account arrangements." In these words U Raschid, then Minister of trade development, justified the agreements (Burmca Commerce, February i9, I956). Certainly rice is vital to the Burmese economy and has become increasingly so in the postwar period. In the i937-i94i period rice constituted on the average 47 percent of the value of Burma's exports and amounted to nearly 3.2 million tons a year.2 In i955 the tonnage was about one-half that of the I937-I94i average but comprised 75 percent of the value of exports and was thus about 20 percent of the value of gross domestic product. Burma's problem derives from the fact that while paddy production has been high, reaching a peak of more than six million tons in i956 before the decline of nearly 20 percent in I957, rice exports have been considerably below the amount Burma regarded as available for export and needed to sell in order to maintain its desired level of imports. Sales in I95I-I952 and I952I953 hovered around I.2 million tons. At one point Burma had 2.5 million tons of rice stocks available for export. The I953 exports only slightly exceeded i.o million tons. Although Burma marketed i.5 million tons in I954, approximately a million tons were carried over from I953 and I954 into i955. In I955 Burma sold I.7 million tons and carried over about 6oo,ooo tons into i956.