The Rights To Punish and Resist Punishment in Hobbes's Leviathan
Received: October 31, 1989 First Revision Received: July 9, 1990 Second Revision Received: August 9, 1990 Accepted for Publication: August 21, 1990 NOTE: I thank Stanley Anderson and Naomi Rosenberg for very helpful readings of an early version. Peter Digeser read more than one draft, his keen judgment repeatedly saving me from myself. Dean Mann and John Moore, as well as anonymous referees at the Western Political Quarterly, made incisive critiques of the penultimate draft. I alone, of course, am responsible for the flaws that remain. This work has been supported by a grant from the Research Committee of the Academic Senate at the University of California, Santa Barbara. I am grateful to Robert Faulkner, John Rogers, Brad Wilson, and Michael Zuckert for creating occasions on which to present versions of this paper. Questions about Hobbes's declaration of a preservationist right to resist unexceptionable punishment, administered by an unexceptionable government, must of course be distinguished from what Francisco Suarez called "the well-worn question of whether or not it is permissible for a private individual or his subjects to kill a tyrannical king" (1944b: 705-III.iv.1). To be sure, some will consider resistance to either kind of government, for any reason, primafacie contempt for Romans 13:2 ("Whatsoever ... resisteth the [higher powers], resisteth the ordinance of God"). Hobbes does not mention Romans 13:1-7 in the vicinity of his declarations of the right to resist (cf. Lev, 42, 100, 308 [589]). 2 Where it is said that "the essence [of a body politic] . . . is the not-resistance of the members" (II, i, 18); see also Elements (El), II, i, 7. On a relevant difference between De Cive (DC) and the Elements, see note 52, below. Tuck (1979: 119-30) traces the emergence of the right to resist in Hobbes's texts.
The Divine Right of Kings.
A key work in the history of political thought, Figgis's book revived the subject of the divine right of kings after it had been effectively destroyed by Locke in the seventeenth century. It displays his astonishingly wide reading and his, at the time, ground-breaking method of stressing the importance of historical setting. Many of his propositions proved seminal and were further developed by others.This, the second edition, includes three additional essays.
Work, Status, and Income: Men in the American Occupational Structure since the Late Nineteenth Century
The historical record rarely presents researchers with precisely the evidence they desire. This is particularly true for social historians and like-minded scholars, whose subjects left precious few signs of their passing. Consequently, certain data have borne a disproportionate evidentiary load in social-historical research. The occupation a person pursued is one key piece of information on which scholars have come to depend. Our understanding of the historical social structure and where people fit into it is bound up with the interpretation of occupations. But this reliance on occupation as the primary social locator in historical research depends on some largely unexamined premises. Whether scholars group occupations or convert them into numerical status measures, they make assumptions about the nature of the occupational structure. When researchers incorporate change over time into their analyses, they suggest that the meaning of occupations remained stable for the purpose of measuring social mobility, class position, or group status-attainment. This assumption has been the subject of little discussion and even less research. For all the use to which historians have put occupation, there has been little effort to assess systematically its stability as a social or economic indicator.