The Eleventh Central Committee : Continuity or Change ?
After the Seventh Party Congress in 1945, party congresses have been landmarks in the listory of the party and the republic. During ~he first six congresses held in the short span ~f seven years, the main focus was on consolidation of’ the ideological and organizational bases under the guidance of the Soviet Union, and on tiie attainment of the bourgeoisdemocratic revolution under the leadership of the Kuomintang (KMT). Chiang Kai-shek’s Shanghai coup of 1927 and the succeeding civil war resulted in fundamental changes in the revolutionary situation in China and CPC’s strategy to attain bourgeois-democratic revolution. This new strategy was more Chinese than Soviet, which resulted in the two-line struggles within the party. The Seventh Party Congress held in 1945 marked the consolidation of the Maoist line
China after the Cultural Revolution: Politics between two party congresses
top-down mobilization can provide opportunities for some individuals to participate in an authentic and spontaneous sense, but the supporting analysis would have to carefully specify the conditions that foster such "democratic" participation. Such an analysis is particularly important, because the conventional view of campaign involvement as both guided and constrained by elites is echoed by the Maoist critique that emerged at the time of the Cultural Revolution. While these issues are touched on in the book, they need further elaboration. In short, this brief book puts the right questions in an interesting and sophisticated way, and should be welcomed by teachers of Chinese politics.
PLEASURE, POWER, AND THE PURSUIT OF COMMUNISM: SOVIET YOUTH AND STATE-SPONSORED POPULAR CULTURE DURING THE EARLY COLD WAR, 1945-1968
art, with certain students accused of “showing political immaturity, failing to understand the Party’s positions on art.” This episode constituted part of a broader crackdown on abstract art by the Khrushchev administration from late 1962, precipitated the the Soviet leader’s derision of such art forms in December 1962 at the Manege exhibit. Such instances demonstrate the limitations of the top-level promotion of youth grassroots initiative, as the Khrushchev leadership reigned in youth autonomy when it threatened to go beyond the boundaries of the permissible. The dates cited above have particular resonance, since both 1957-58 and 1962-63 represent two periods when those at the top of the Party hierarchy moved away from pursuing a more pluralistic, tolerant policy course, due to anxiety inspired by both sharpening Cold War hostilities and domestic developments. In these periods, official rhetoric censured what it labeled as 639 TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 13, d. 546, ll. 56-57. This is likely related to criticism of the Party associated with the fallout from the Secret Speech and the Hungary invasion. For more, see Polly Jones, “From the Secret Speech to the Burial of Stalin: Real and Ideal Responses to De-Stalinization,” in Jones ed., The Dilemmas, 41-63. 640 TsAOPIM, f. 6083, op. 1, d. 52, ll. 166-67. 641 Susan E. Reid, “In the Name of the People: The Manege Affair Revisited,” Kritika 6.4 (Fall 2005): 673716. 642 On these anxieties, see Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer, 156-88.