The European-ness of Estonia's Ethnic Integration Policy: Nation, culture, and security in an applicant state
This article argues that the process of European Union accession prioritises the linguistic and cultural hegemony of the ethnic Estonian majority as a necessary condition of securing post-Soviet Estonia in an enlarged European Union. This occurs through a conceptualisation of security used by 'e´lites of statecraft' that binds together 'nation', 'culture', and 'state' as cornerstones of a stable interstate system. Evidence is gathered from extensive interviews with Estonian and western European officials as well as analyses of international agreements on minority rights and Estonia's main ethnic integration document, State Programme: Integration in Estonian Society 2000-2007. Estonia's ethnic integration policy should not be understood as a peculiar, eastern European case of cultural protectionism. Rather, it is a logical expression of broader European patterns of political organisation. The research was funded by a 1999-2000 Fulbright-IIE fellowship to Estonia and 2000-01 David L. Boren Fellowship. I would like to thank the staff of the Integration Foundation and the United Nations Development Program: Estonia for their invaluable assistance during my ethnographic fieldwork. Numerous diplomats, administrators, officials, and minority leaders also provided indispensable help. I would also like to thank Merje Kuus and two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments.
Systems of Partial Control: Ethnic Dynamics in Post-Soviet Estonia and Latvia
This article offers a theory to capture ethnic dynamics in post-Soviet Estonia and Latvia. It also explores a research question of great interest to political scientists, historians, sociologists, and economists: what accounts for stability in deeply divided societies? Drawing on Ian Lustick’s formulation of control, the author suggests that stability in deeply divided societies is a result of conscious efforts made by elites to construct what she calls “systems of partial control.” In such systems, the majority ethnic group controls the political sector, but shares control of the economic sector with minority ethnic groups. Economic prosperity derived from dispersed economic control accounts for stability in Estonia and Latvia. The article identifies two conditions that must be satisfied for elites to tolerate partial control. First, elites must reach a threshold of political hegemony at which point they dominate the political sector and second, the respective state must have a flourishing private sector. The article concludes with an assessment of whether or not systems of partial control are likely to be stable, and a reflection on implications of these systems beyond the post-Soviet region.
The Posse Comitatus Act: Liberation from the Lawyers
"Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." --Posse Comitatus Act (1) Much has been written about the Posse Comitatus Act. As a few others have noted, much of this commentary is "just plain nonsense." (2) The majority opinion, however, including that of the Department of Defense, maintains that this 19th-century law strictly limits almost all DOD participation in any activity related to "law enforcement" or "homeland security." (3) This fundamental mischaracterization, while understandable, is potentially dangerous to national security and has done nothing to protect civil liberties. So how did a racist law from the bitter Reconstruction period morph, in many minds, into shorthand for the respected principle that Americans do not want a military national police force? In a nutshell: deliberate mischaracterization by the original supporters who hid behind patriotic language to strip the freed slaves of their nascent civil and voting rights; excessive focus on the false historical arguments as opposed to the law's actual text and ugly history; and some bad policy that misused a few key court decisions, and part of a statute, in a way that limited DOD efforts in the "war on drugs" at a time when Congress was pushing expanded participation. This article introduces the actual history and meaning of the Posse Comitatus Act, distinguishing clearly between the law and a misleading DOD regulation that requires an army of lawyers to navigate. Despite what you've heard, the Posse Comitatus Act is not a significant impediment to DOD participation in law enforcement or homeland security. The Act's Uninspiring Pedigree General Acceptance of Army Participation in Law Enforcement (1787-1861) While the nation's founders were deeply concerned with the abuses of the British army during the colonial period and military interference in civil affairs, the majority was even more concerned about a weak national government incapable of securing life, liberty, and property. Some vocal patriots sought to avoid a standing army and any federal control over the state militias; however, in the end, theirs was the minority view. The new Constitution did not contain the explicit limits and outright bans desired by some, even though the pro-Constitution Federalists explicitly argued that the standing army could assist in law enforcement efforts. The framers even debated the federal government's power to call out the posse comitatus (literally meaning the power or authority of the county) and did not prohibit this established feature of the common law. Clearly, the Posse Comitatus Act did not originate from the prevailing opinion during the revolutionary period. Legislative and executive actions in the early days of the American republic confirm that the use of federal troops or federalized militia to preserve domestic order, either as part of a posse comitatus or otherwise, was an accepted feature of American life under the new Constitution. In 1794, President Washington led federal troops into western Pennsylvania because unruly farmers refused to pay a whiskey excise tax. President Jefferson issued a broad proclamation that relied upon the Chief Executive's authority to call on the entire populace, military and civilian, to serve as a grand posse comitatus to counter Aaron Burr's planned expedition against Spanish territory. In 1832, President Jackson initially sent military forces toward South Carolina under a Jefferson-like posse comitatus theory to prevent secession. In an 1851 report to the Senate, President Fillmore stated that he had the inherent power to use regular troops to enforce the laws and that all citizens could be called into a posse by the marshal. …