From Social Insurance to Social Assistance
In attempting to establish a social security system that would function to smooth the transition from a planned to market economy, the government of China has, for most of the time in the past decades, focused its efforts on setting up social insurance programs in the urban areas. Along with the emergence of urban poverty since the mid 1990s, the emphasis of the government has shifted to means-tested social assistance programs as the major means to combat poverty and maintain social stability. However, with the absence of more equitable social and economic policies that can protect people against the many risks associated with a market economy, the role of social assistance is very limited.
The Emergence and Development of Social Assistance in Beijing
As an integral part of the social protection system, the social assistance program in China was fully implemented in all cities in 1999. In recent years, the government has made a further commitment to guide its development, extension, and institutionalization. Accordingly, it has grown dramatically in recent years both in terms of expenditure and number of recipients. It acts as a last resort ‘safety net’ for urban poverty-stricken residents and as a ‘shock absorber’ mitigating social tensions resulting from market-oriented reforms. This paper presents an analysis of the background and development of the social assistance program in Beijing, focusing on issues related to the design and implementation of the program. Relying as it does on a decentralized delivery structure at the neighborhood level, Beijing social assistance programs can have substantial variations in terms of practice and outcomes. This paper proposes that in the long term, China needs to design a more coherent and integrated social protection system.
Deliberative Democracy and the Resource Curse: A Nationwide Experiment in Tanzania
Oil and gas discoveries in developing countries are often associated with short-sighted economic policies and, in response, calls to insulate resource management from populist impulses. We report on a randomized experiment testing methods to overcome this apparent tension between sound resource governance and democratic politics. Soon after Tanzania’s discovery of major natural gas reserves, we invited a nationally representative sample of voters to an intensive public deliberation of policy options featuring nationally recognized experts and small-group discussions. Democratic deliberation reinforced the public’s strong preference for rapid spending of gas revenues, but also increased support for various prudential and economically orthodox measures, including independent oversight of gas revenues, limits on government borrowing, and selling gas abroad rather than subsidizing fuel at home. These effects were driven by deliberation per se, rather than a pure information treatment, and show no evidence of contamination by facilitatoror peer-effects in group deliberations. www.cgdev.org Justin Sandefur, Nancy Birdsall, James Fishkin, and Mujobu Moyo