DEL "DESCONTROL" DE LA PRODUCCIÓN NORMATIVA EN MATERIA DE CONTRATACIÓN PÚBLICA EN COLOMBIA* THE "CHAOS" OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LEGISLATION IN COLOMBIA
this article presents a reflection on the effects resulting from the dysfunction in issuing rules on public procurement in colombia. a reflection which, concentrated on the analysis of the activities of auditing contracts, seeks to demonstrate how regulatory dysfunctions interfere from achieving adequate standards of efficiency in the development of the civil service. also, this article, reflecting on the practical implications of the dysfunctions of regulatory, tries to put in evidence that, contrary to what the colombian government sustains, the rules of public procurement are not clear and have multiple inconsistencies that contribute to inefficiency in the performance of public management.
CORRUPCIÓN Y ANTICORRUPCIÓN: UNA PERSPECTIVA NEO-INSTITUCIONAL
Corruption is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. The aim of this article is to open the “black box” of corrupt transactions using the framework of the New Institutional Economics. First, it examines “corrupt contracts”, the institutions that promote them, the mechanisms involved, the transaction costs and the problems faced by the actors. Then the stages of a typical corrupt agreement are described: initiation, execution and post-contractual phase. To combat corruption the understanding of how corrupt actors think and how corrupt agreements work is necessary. Finally, the potential and limitations of traditional and the more recent anti-corruption measures are analyzed.
Making corrupt deals: contracting in the shadow of the law
Abstract Because corruption must be hidden from the public, transaction costs arising are of a different type than those of legal exchange. Moreover, because of the ever-present threat of mutual denunciation partners of a corrupt agreement are “locked-in” to each other even after an exchange has been finalized. This results in corrupt agreements being primarily arranged by middlemen or emerging as a by-product of legal exchange. It is concluded that corruption has little do with free competition. Fighting corruption should focus less on individual moral attitudes or penalties and more on methods to destabilize corrupt relationships.