Security in a ‘Warming World’: Competences of the Un Security Council for Preventing Dangerous Climate Change
Without resolute counteraction, the effects of climate change are likely to exceed many societies’ adaptive capacities to internal or external stresses within the coming decades. This could result in destabilization and violence, jeopardizing national and international security to a new and unknown degree.2 Currently there still is a window of opportunity for avoiding dangerous anthropogenic climate change by adopting a dynamic and coordinated global climate policy. Yet, the outlook of getting an effective international climate treaty into place in time to avoid dangerous climate change is dim; the chances for stopping climate change at a non-dangerous level rapidly decreasing. If not halted, the likelihood sharply increases that climate change will draw ever deeper lines of division and conflict in international relations. It has the potential to trigger numerous conflicts between and within countries over the distribution of resources (especially water and land), over the management of migration, or over compensation payments between the countries mainly responsible for climate change and those countries most affected by its destructive effects.3 In giving recognition to this threat, on April, the Security Council held its first-ever debate on the impact of climate change on international peace and security.4 No concrete action or decision followed this debate.The main achievement was perhaps that of global awareness rising of the consequences of climate change rather than any concrete outcome. Prior and during the debate there had been strong opposition from some countries to any suggestion that the Security Council play a role in the international response to climate change. At the same time, the ever-increasing urgency of decisive action to address climate change, combined with the challenge’s scale and complexity, suggest that at this stage all options (including a more active role of the Security Council) ought to be examined. The second part will give an overview over the controversial discussion about the link between climate change and security threats. The third part deals with the normative concept of peace and security in the UN Charter and its relationship to climate change as a (possible) non-military threat. Part four assesses the current multilateral climate regime for its effectiveness to prevent climate change related threats.The fifth part investigates the mandate of the Security Council with regard to addressing environmental threats.Of particular interest in this context are the Council’s competences to impose sanctions, to ‘legislate’, and to condemn state actions or in actions.5 Also, in this part, the competences of the Security Council to request of the International Court of Justice an advisory on opinion legal questions in relation to climate change will be analyzed in connection. Part six concludes this chapter.
The Responsibility of the UN Security Council for Climate Security
International legal responsibility for responding to climate change has, within the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) regime, been determined on a national basis, according to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC). The patent inadequacy of the UNFCCC regime and increased awareness of the security implications of climate change has more recently prompted debate on whether the United Nations Security Council has responsibility in respect of climate security. To the extent that the Council does have such a responsibility it would seem to be of a secondary order, a consequence of the Council’s primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. This article examines the rhetorical shift in debate regarding a climate security role for the Council, from the question of legitimacy to that of responsibility, gives some consideration to how the Council might meet such a responsibility and concludes with some observations on what might precipitate the Council taking such a radical step.
A quality control model that uses PTV-rectal distances to predict the lowest achievable rectum dose, improves IMRT planning for patients with prostate cancer.
BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE
To predict the lowest achievable rectum D35 for quality assurance of IMRT plans of prostate cancer patients.


MATERIALS AND METHODS
For each of 24 patients from a database of 47 previously treated patients, the anatomy was compared to the anatomies of the other 46 to predict the minimal achievable rectum D35. The 24 patients were then replanned to obtain maximally reduced rectum D35. Next, the newly derived plans were added to the database to replace the original clinical plans, and new predictions of the lowest achievable rectum D35 were made.


RESULTS
After replanning, the rectum D35 reduced by 9.3 Gy±6.1 (average±1 SD; p<0.001) compared to the original plan. The first predictions of the rectum D35 were 4.8 Gy±4.2 (average±1 SD; p<0.001) too high when evaluated with the new plans. After updating the database, the replanned and newly predicted rectum D35 agreed within 0.1 Gy±2.8 (average±1 SD; p=0.89). The doses to the bladder, anus and femoral heads did not increase compared to the original plans.


CONCLUSIONS
For individual prostate patients, the lowest achievable rectum D35 in IMRT planning can be accurately predicted from dose distributions of previously treated patients by quantitative comparison of patient anatomies. These predictions can be used to quantitatively assess the quality of IMRT plans.