The Human Security Paradigm: Peace with Justice and Equality?
This chapter explores the possibilities of achieving global justice and peace. The author contends that the hopes for peace and the so-called ‘peace dividend’ following the end of the Cold War had the potential for nations to consider bold new attempts to define national and global security in a uni-polar world. The author also discusses a more sobering view that crafting a new approach to a changing world requires deliberate and concerted efforts. The chapter advances the notion of ‘human security’ that is advanced through: (1) protection—primarily the state-based responsibility to protect people from critical and pervasive threats, with institutions, civil society and nongovernmental actors, and the private sector also playing a key role in that protection and (2) empowering individuals and communities by developing their capabilities to make informed choices and to act on their own behalf. The author believes that at the core human security policies seek to enhance both individual and societal security by promoting “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear.” 
 
 
Keywords: 
 
justice; 
global justice; 
global security; 
war; 
peace; 
equality; 
human security; 
globalization
The Limits of the human security agenda: the case of Canada's response to the Timor crisis
Enthusiasts of human security argue that what is needed in the post‐Cold‐War period is a foreign policy agenda that is more ‘people‐centred’ than the state‐centred focus of security policy during the Cold War period. Among the most enthusiastic proponents of the human security paradigm in the 1990s was the Canadian government, which, in partnership with a number of other like‐minded governments, sought to press the human security agenda, taking a number of human security initiatives. However, since the late 1990s, we have seen a paradox: the concept has attracted increased attention from scholars while its salience among policy‐makers appears to be declining. Using the case of the Canadian government's policy towards the crisis in Timor in September 1999, we explore the difficulty that policy‐makers have had in moving human security from the rhetorical realm to the level of concrete policy that makes a difference to the safety of people whose security is threatened. We conclude that there was a significant gap between Canada's human security rhetoric and Ottawa's actual policy in Timor. While the Canadian government did eventually contribute troops to the International Force, East Timor (INTERFET), we show that Canada's response was slow, cautious, and minimalist. There was neither the willingness nor the capacity to be at the forefront of the efforts to send a robust force to East Timor. This case demonstrates some important limits of the human security agenda, and why this agenda remained so firmly in the realm of the rhetorical in the 1990s.
Pinchpenny Diplomacy
ASPIRITED DEBATE HAS EMERGED IN CANADA IN THE 1990S IN BOTH the academic and the policy communities about the nature of Canadian foreign and defence policies in the post-cold war era. The debate focuses on how Canadian foreign and defence policies should be characterized; the doctrinal bases (if any) that underlie contemporary foreign policy in Canada; and, of course, the appropriate approach to policy. Given the traditional concerns of Canadians about the role of their country in the world,(f.1) it is perhaps not surprising that much of the debate revolves around whether Canada's role in world affairs is changing and, if so, how.Of particular concern is the fate of internationalism, the dominant foreign policy idea in Canada for much of the cold war era.(f.2) Some argue that it is simply no longer appropriate: to use the evocative analogy suggested by Fen Osler Hampson and Christopher J. Maule, Canada may be like Sunset Boulevards Norma Desmond, the star of the silent movies left behind by profound change.(f.3) Some applaud what they see as a more hard-headed calculus of Canadian 'self-interest' while some decry what they see as a 'retreat from internationalism.' And some argue that internationalism has not disappeared in Canada.The purpose of this article is to contribute to our understanding of the changes in train in Canadian foreign policy in the 1990s. The dualism usually used to assess the orientation of foreign policy - internationalism or isolationism - tends to be drawn from a parallel debate in the United States which is not fully applicable to the Canadian context. Although the 1990s have witnessed a progressive retreat from internationalism, this does not mean that what C.P. Stacey once called the 'tough weed' of isolationism has again taken root in Canada;(f.4) isolationism is an inappropriate description for Canada's foreign policy orientation in the 1990s. At the same time, however, other interpretations of Canada's external policy do not do justice to the profound changes that are occurring. Instead of such flattering notions as 'niche diplomacy,' what has occurred over the course of the 1990s is pinchpenny diplomacy, marked by a meanness of spirit that delegitimizes the voluntaristic acts of 'good international citizenship' that are essential components of internationalism.CANADIAN INTERNATIONALISM IN THE 1990S: JUST RESTING OR PINING FOR THE FJORDS?How 'alive' is internationalism in contemporary Canadian foreign policy? Two broad schools of thought seem to have emerged. One argues that internationalism in Canadian diplomacy is alive and well. This is certainly the government line - and the line of those who tend to interpret foreign policy using the government's criteria. This argument stresses the continuity in Canadian foreign policy, linking contemporary trends with a long tradition that dates back to the halcyon days of the birth of the internationalist era in the 1940s and 1950s. From this perspective Canadian foreign policy in the 1990s, despite the annual cycle of retrenchment, cutbacks, and closures, is as steadfastly internationalist as ever - appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. Shifts in Canadian diplomacy are attributed to other factors. Some suggest that the uncertainties of domestic politics and the national unity question divert national attention inwards and dilute national energies that might otherwise be devoted to international affairs. (I have argued elsewhere(f.5) that what some have called the Canadian 'malaise' does not seem to have affected day-to-day foreign policy; on the contrary, the domestic political uncertainties of Canadian politics from Meech Lake to the Charlottetown referendum and the 1995 referendum stand in marked contrast to the relative self-assurance of foreign policy under both the Progressive Conservative government of Brian Mulroney and the Liberal government of Jean Chretien, however much those policies may have differed.)Alternatively, the downsizing and retrenchment of Canadian diplomacy are said to be merely the result of tough economic times and the need to get federal spending under control. …