Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security
Abstract : This report examines the premise that there are lessons from Israeli experience that might enhance the United States' homeland security efforts. The research for this study included a literature review and field interviews with American and Israeli leaders in Washington, D.C., and Israel during the summer of 2005. The report addresses the common and unique threats facing each state and related homeland security issues and policies. It begins with the threats experienced by each nation, examining the respective homeland security organizational structures and ways of preventing attacks and responding to attacks that do occur. The report then compares each country's homeland security program. Where appropriate, personal observations derived from the authors' interviews in each country are included. The final section addresses a series of lessons the United States might consider in its efforts to improve its homeland security, as well as a discussion of where it might not be advantageous or feasible to follow the Israeli model. The United States and Israel each face a number of threats to their homeland -- some shared, some unique to each state. Some threats common to both the United States and Israel include the following: Terrorism and the Global War on Terror, State Aggression by Sovereign Powers, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Trans-Border Issues. The report discusses the organizational structures that the United States and Israel employ to respond to threats, the countries' efforts at preventing terrorist attacks, and comparative efforts to respond to an attack. The research and field interviews conducted by the authors to identify lessons from Israeli experience resulted in the following recommendations: know your adversary, interagency cooperation, tight internal security, profiling, protected spaces, barriers, information sharing, public education, offensive military action, security decision making, compromise and appeasement, and advanced technology.
Leveraging Social Media to Engage the Public in Homeland Security
Abstract : We live in disparate times. There seems to be an increase in the occurrence of natural disasters and acts of terrorism, creating an increased dependence on government services and emergency responders. By contrast, public safety budgets are shrinking and there are fewer resources to address this greater, widespread need. The answer may be what homeland security officials have yet to do - engage the public as a full partner. A relatively new concept has emerged in which social media or Web 2.0 tools can be utilized to facilitate the timely and accurate exchange of information and better engage the public. This thesis examines the current use of Web 2.0 technologies and crisis informatics and seeks to discover how existing social media can be used to engage the public in homeland security and emergency management. This thesis concludes that social media connects people and helps build communities. Unfortunately, public safety officials have not embraced Web 2.0 technologies and are missing a great opportunity to engage the public and harness its collective power. With virtually no capital investment, public safety agencies can create an innovative partnership by capitalizing on tools the public uses everyday.
Motivations and Possible Actions of Potential Criminal Adversaries of U.S. Nuclear Programs: Executive Summary
Abstract : This report summarizes the findings of a study of the motivations and intentions of potential criminal adversaries of U.S. nuclear programs and facilities. The study was based on two premises. The first is that if one understands motivations, one can infer the actions and targets that an adversary is likely to prefer. The second is that given such inferences, and linking them to information about the material and operational capabilities of various types of adversaries, those responsible for nuclear security will be better able to assess the potential threat to nuclear programs and to devise more effective systems for deterring and defending against nuclear crimes. The authors use the term "nuclear programs and facilities" in its broadest sense, to include weapon fabrication facilities, civilian nuclear energy facilities, facilities in the fuel cycle, nuclear research facilities, facilities that fabricate fuel for naval reactors, and all related transport of nuclear material. The term "nuclear crime" refers to a malevolent criminal action against a nuclear target or involving nuclear material or weapons. The authors are most concerned with crimes that may cause significant damage or disruption, and especially with those crimes that may directly or indirectly imperil public safety. They include among these attack, seizure, or sabotage of a nuclear facility; threats against nuclear facility personnel or their kidnapping or assassination; theft or diversion of nuclear material; release of radioactive materials; theft or detonation of a nuclear weapon; construction of an improvised nuclear device; and extortion involving nuclear materials or weapons. The remainder of this section describes the study's approach to the problem and offers a simple typology of motivations. Section II presents a matrix that links specific motivations with the actions they might inspire and flags types of actions that have already occurred. Section III reviews the study's major conclusions.