Australia's Nuclear Horizon: Moving Beyond the Drumbeat of Risk Inflation
The 2006 Switkowski review report commissioned by the Howard government highlighted some of the economic and foreign policy benefits that could flow from a major expansion of Australia's uranium export program. It also identified the long-term advantages for Australia's energy security flowing from the development of a national nuclear industry. The report has been condemned by anti-nuclear groups, who argue that proposals for Australia's continuing and, possibly, deeper involvement in the nuclear fuel cycle are unacceptable. The primary risk identified is that Australian uranium exports will contribute to global nuclear proliferation pressures, but claims concerning nuclear-related terrorism are also an increasingly common theme in anti-nuclear commentary. These arguments, in turn, are framed within a broader set of assumptions about the ‘immoral’ nature of any engagement in the nuclear fuel cycle. This article examines the most prominent claims put forward by anti-nuclear proponents and argues that many of them are based on an unnecessary inflation of risk.
No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation
No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation. By Nathan E. Busch. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004. 512p. $40.00. This new work on the core issue of nuclear proliferation is somewhat unique in its focus and organization. Most of the works on this subject have a virtually standard organization involving a country-by-country breakdown of the most recent and most likely proliferators (India, Pakistan, Israel, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, etc.), according to their motives (why they want to go nuclear) and their capacity to do so, either by themselves or with the help of existing nuclear powers. The focus of these works is, therefore, on what often is called “horizontal proliferation,” having to do with the addition of extra members to the “nuclear club.” Regarding the Cold War superpowers, the United States and former USSR, there has been a largely separate literature devoted to “vertical proliferation,” and associated arms control measures and possibilities, in the context of nuclear deterrence theories and concepts. The uniqueness of Nathan Busch's book is that he combines these two genres, treating various aspects of the nuclear programs of the long-existent large nuclear powers, as well as the emerging nuclear programs of Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and so on as an integrated subject.
The Proliferation Security Initiative and North Korea: Legality and Limitations of a Coalition Strategy
As a US-led coalition operation designed to obstruct weapons proliferation, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is especially applicable to North Korea. Though practical measures have been developed to implement the interdiction of seaborne weapons shipments in particular, the PSI has yet to be rendered consistent with the international legal regime supporting free navigation of the high seas. Nor has it attracted specific United Nations support. A review of the 1962 ‘quarantine’ of Cuba demonstrates that in the absence of a more restrictive approach towards Pyongyang and conclusive evidence that North Korean weapons capability poses a current threat to the United States, the appellation ‘Cuba Lite’ is not inappropriate. Furthermore, in the context of multilateral diplomacy intended to persuade North Korea to relinquish its nuclear weapons programs in exchange for security guarantees, the PSI may be interpreted as pressuring Pyongyang and thus may not be perceived – even by PSI coalition partners – as consistent with that diplomacy.