Conflict or cooperation? The role of India and Pakistan in post-2014 Afghanistan
AbstractAs the coalition forces prepare to exit Afghanistan, concerns regarding peace and stability in the country and future power balance after their departure are becoming paramount. While there will be a considerable American presence, focus has now shifted to local infrastructure and services - civil, military and political and their ability to further peace and progress in the country. Owing to the geostrategic landscape of Afghanistan, in addition to its long conflict ridden history with a significant presence of the Taliban, concerns regarding revival of conflict and violence are coming to the fore - particularly from traditional South Asian rivals i.e. India and Pakistan. Through an in-depth study of the political, economic, cultural and regional dimensions of this tri-lateral relationship, the following paper examines how there is a significant clash of interests and how there can cooperation between India and Pakistan in Afghanistan.Key Words: Afghanistan, Taliban, India-Pakistan relations, US withdrawal, new Great Game, Strategic DepthIntroductionDealing with the situation unfolding in Afghanistan and its ramifications present a formidable challenge, both for Afghanistan as well as regional and international players who have a stake in its future and have contributed significantly to efforts towards reconstruction of the war-torn nation. On May 27, 2014, US President Barack Obama announced that the last American troops would withdraw from Afghanistan by the end of 2016. However, this announcement needs to be further clarified. A Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) would permit a residual American military presence, some 9,800 US troops will remain in the country after 2014, with half of them slated to depart by the end of 2015. From 2015 onward, the remaining troops will train the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) for two more years, eventually leaving only a token force to protect the American embassy in Kabul (Grare, 2010). Nonetheless, the international community is willing to continue engagements in both civilians and military matters for ensuring economic development, security and political stability in Afghanistan (Yuasa, 2014, p.285).The decision of the US and its allies to withdraw troops from Afghanistan is a reflection of domestic political concerns and the large number of casualties. From 2001 until February 2012, the US-led coalition troops lost 2,884 soldiers, including 1,895 from the US alone (Chesser 2012, p.1-4). Based on this data, 2010 and 2011 were the deadliest years in Afghanistan. The Afghan Army and Police have also suffered the loss of roughly 4,000 members (Caldwell 2011 online). In addition to military casualties, the conflict has also claimed the lives of 2,080 civilians just in the year 2010. Even though American forces are preparing for withdrawal, the conflict in Afghanistan is far from over. There is overwhelming evidence of the resurgence of the Taliban and attacks on civilians and state infrastructure are on a rise. In addition, the political and military structure of Afghanistan continues to be weakened by factionalism and tribal rivalries, further clouding prospects for a peaceful transition after the withdrawal of foreign troops. According to Saghafi-Ameri (Saghafi-Ameri, 2012, p.1), "the main causes of the present situation in Afghanistan include lack of proper planning, shifting policies, inattention to geopolitical realities and over-reliance on military power without the necessary attention to development and civilian assistance plans".In such an environment, the involvement of local actors becomes preeminent in shaping the course of future events in Afghanistan. A key ally in the US led military action in Afghanistan is neighbouring Pakistan. A former ally of the Taliban and a country, which faces direct repercussions of conflict in Afghanistan owing to a large number of refugees, Pakistan has been at the forefront of reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. …
Rethinking Proxy War Theory in IR: A Critical Analysis of Principal–Agent Theory

 This paper explores the question of what drives proxy alignment in war and argues that current proxy war scholarship needs further thinking to go beyond focusing on the principal–agent theory and individual actors’ motivation analysis. Rather, there is a need to look at the generative mechanisms of proxy alignment as a process that constitutes patterns of friend–enemy relations. The paper argues securitization patterns from domestic to regional and international levels drive actors to re-evaluate their positions and define their enemies and friends. This is a process of securitization alignment and confluence, which serves as a generative mechanism for proxy alignment in a conflict. Securitization alignment is based on a convergence of securitizations by different actors that create a friend–enemy dynamic and convergence of security interests between actors. The confluence of securitizations from the domestic level to regional and beyond also connects actors across different levels to be in alignment and impact the conflict.
The New Great Game in Muslim Central Asia
1 THE FRAMEWORK The dismantlement of the Soviet Union also brought about the liberation of six Central Asian Muslim republics--Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (figure 1). Although Azerbaijan is part of the Caucasus region, it is included in this study because: * The independence of that country, like that of the Central Asian states, was brought about as a result of the dismantlement of the Soviet Union. * Azerbaijan, like its Central Asian counterparts, is a Muslim state, and faces similar politico-economic problems. Azerbaijan's conflict with Armenia involving Nagorno-Karabkh reminds one of a number of conflicts in the Central Asian region. These include a seething ethnic conflict in Kazakhstan (involving the Khazaks and the Slavs), the ongoing civil war in Tajikistan "along ethnic, national, and religious lines (since the Russian forces are "also involved in this civil war), and the ethnic conflict in the Fargana valley that cuts across the borders of Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. * Like the economies of its Central Asian neighbors, the Azeri economy was largely dependent on the economy of the former Soviet Union. Consequently, like its other neighbors, Azerbaijan is also busy establishing economic self-sufficiency, along with strengthening its religious political, linguistic, and ethnic identities. [FIGURE 1 OMITTED] All these states are ethnically heterogenous, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan having the largest percentage of Russian population; except for Azerbaijan, the Sunni Muslim faith predominates; and the mother tongue of these countries, save Tajikistan, is of Turkic origin. Although these states appear to have more in common with the Middle East than with other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), quite wisely, these states decided to join that organization. Through this action, they appear to have postponed the political instability that their sudden independence was likely to have caused. These states are either primarily or substantially Muslim. They have no tradition or institutional memory of a democratic government. The level of education of their population is among the lowest in the region. As these states deal with this unique period of independence, they will also try to find their proper places in the world community. During this time, they will be influenced by various regional and extraregional actors who have their own agendas vis-a-vis these states. The old version of the "great game" might have entered history; the new version began soon after the breakup of the Soviet Union. It is this "great game--post-Cold War style" that is the topic of this study. The originator of the phrase "great game" was J. W. Kay, who used it in his book, History of the War in Afghanistan, (1) but Rudyard Kipling popularized it in his novel, Kim, to describe the 18th- and 19th-century rivalry between Britain and Russia over the Indian subcontinent. Peter Hopkirk, in The Great Game, establishes that the territory of this struggle--characterized by intrigues and conspiracies--was the land between Russia and India. (2) The Central Asian territory was then ruled by a variety of local khans. Even though they did not have much knowledge of the world beyond their immediate vicinity, they were indeed quite cognizant of Russian motives and of the British conquest of India. To prolong their own rule, they were able to play these two great powers against each other with considerable skill. The new great game may not be aimed at the physical subjugation of Muslim Central Asia, but Russia--the only regional actor with the capability to conquer one or more nations of Muslim Central Asia--may indeed resuscitate its own historical will to reconquer one or more nations of Muslim Central Asia, especially if the democratic experience in that country becomes a miserable failure and if extremists gain control of the Russian government. …