GAME COMPLETE ANALYSIS OF BERTRAND DUOPOLY
In this paper we apply the Complete Analysis of Differentiable Games (introduced by D. Carfi in [3], [6], [8] and [9]) and al-ready employed by himself and others in [4], [5], [7]) to the classic Bertrand Duopoly (1883), classic oligopolistic market in which there are two enterprises producing the same commodity and selling it in the same market. In this classic model, in a competitive background, the two enterprises employ as possible strategies the unit prices of their product, contrary to the Cournot duopoly, in which the enterprises decide to use the quantities of the commodity produced as strategies. The main solutions proposed in literature for this kind of duopoly (as in the case of Cournot duopoly) are the Nash equilibrium and the Collusive Optimum, without any subsequent critical exam about these two kinds of solutions. The absence of any critical quantitative analysis is due to the relevant lack of knowledge regarding the set of all possible outcomes of this strategic interaction. On the contrary, by considering the Bertrand Duopoly as a differentiable game (games with differentiable payoff functions) and studying it by the new topological methodologies introduced by D. Carfi, we obtain an exhaustive and complete vision of the entire payoff space of the Bertrand game (this also in asymmetric cases with the help of computers) and this total view allows us to analyze critically the classic solutions and to find other ways of action to select Pareto strategies. In order to illustrate the application of this topological methodology to the considered infinite game, several compromise pricing-decisions are considered, and we show how the complete study gives a real extremely extended comprehension of the classic model.
Game Theoretic Modeling of Horizontal Supply Chain Coopetition among Growers
Horizontal supply chains is the term used when suppliers competing at a particular level of the chain form a coalition to benefit from their cooperation rather than the usual competitive strategies used by them to become part of the supply chain. Such horizontal cooperation among competitors is studied by Wood, using qualitative research methodology, based on case studies done in New Zealand. The term "coopetition" is used in the literature to describe such a cooperative behavior among competitors. In this paper we examine the coopetition phenomenon from a game theoretic perspective and give a model that brings out the equilibria that will lead to optimal participation among the coalition partners. The model considers a set of growers who can choose to form a coopetitive alliance to market their production in some external regions, while competing within the internal regions. By means of a general analytical framework of competition, we show the strategies that could provide solutions, in a coopetitive perspective, for the growers. These solutions offer a win–win outcome for the growers, letting them share the pie fairly within a growth path of games. We determine the proportion of resources they'll use and how the gain will be shared.
Knowledge, learning, networks and performance of firms in knowledge-based economies
The paper examines the issue of knowledge as a public good, and, therefore, the question of open knowledge. Moreover, it analyses the crucial relationship between knowledge and learning and, more specifically, the relationship between technological knowledge, learning and the environment. Thus the construct of absorptive capacity is investigated and the related dynamic capability approach is also considered. Finally, the paper looks at the networks and investigate the rationale of networking. Therefore, in this context, the paper discusses the issue of competition/collaboration duality, since alliance is also a complex phenomenon, where collaborative behaviours and competitive relations coexist; a more eclectic view is, thus, offered on this issue with the aim to provide a new theoretical framework of inter-firm relations.