Pakistan's Naval strategy: Past and future
Abstract Over the past fifty years, the Pakistan Navy has developed an effective naval strategy and capability to counter the threat posed by the superior Indian Navy. It has adopted an offensive sea denial strategy that dictates primacy of submarines and maritime aircraft equipped with missiles as the main instruments of waging war at sea. The Pakistan Navy has taken lead in introducing new weapons in the subcontinent aimed at disturbing the naval balance of power. It is now contemplating a nuclear role for itself that aims to challenge the Indian naval ambitions to build a sea‐based deterrent.
Pakistan's Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, 1979-99: In Search of a Policy
List of Tables List of Figures List of Maps Acknowledgements Preface Foreword Glossary Introduction PART ONE Development of Threat Perception The Official Decisionmaking System Pakistan's Power Politics and Defence Decisionmaking The Cost of Military Buildup Military Industrial Complex PART TWO Military Buildup Decisions, 19779-90 Military Buildup Decisions, 1990-99 Mutually Assured Deterrence: The Nuclear Option Looking Ahead Index Pakistan's Arms Suppliers
The Armed Services and the Indian Defense Budget
COMPETING CLAIMS to India's scarce economic resources require that the defense sector convincingly justify its program against proposed civilian programs that may provide direct economic benefits to the population. Consequently, while external threat conditions may seem like the main arbiter of the size and specifics of Indian defense budgets, domestic political and economic conditions play an equally important part. To a considerable degree, the size and specifics of Indian defense programs depend on the internal political strength of various actors, both civilian and military, who are demanding a larger share of the national budget. At the stage when the Indian Ministry of Finance is considering allocations to various sectors of the economy, the claims of the Ministry of Defence must be weighed against the claims of other ministries such as Food and Agriculture, Industries, Commerce, and Health and Family Welfare. Until the appointment of V. K. Krishna Menon as Defence Minister in 1956, the claims of defense generally received less attention.1 This was partly due to the lower threats perceived by India's national leaders during the immediate years following the 1948 Indo-Pakistan war over Kashmir. The first three defense ministers-Baldev Singh, Gopalaswami Ayyangar, and Kailash Nath Katju-also tended to be comparatively less influential with Prime Minister Nehru than other Cabinet Ministers such as Maulana Azad and Govind Ballabh Pant.