“Just in Case”: Extended Nuclear Deterrence in the Defense of Australia
This paper examines the foundations and rationale for Australian reliance on US assurances of extended nuclear deterrence. The Australian model of extended nuclear deterrence is marked by its lack of public presence, a lack of certainty about its standing and character in US eyes, its lack of a direct nuclear threat, and its resurgence at a time when nuclear abolition possibilities are being embraced by the leader of the deterrence provider. Australian policy amounts to a claim that the nuclear guarantee is necessary “just in case”– though without any plausible specifics. The fundamental questions remain – for Australia as for other recipients of extended nuclear deterrence assurances – what threats, what probabilities, what alternatives?
The ANZUS crisis, nuclear visiting and deterrence
List of tables Preface List of abbreviations 1. Introduction: the revolt of an underling 2. The ANZUS treaty and strategic developments 3. Defence co-operation and nuclear connections 4. Warship access and the ANZUS liability suspensions 5. Nuclear hazards and environmental safety 6. Anti-nuclear politics 7. From negotiation to legislation 8. Regional security and the future of ANZUS 9. The ANZUS crisis, nuclear visiting and the western alliance Appendices Notes Bibliography Index.
Cairo, Dimona, and the June 1967 War
The June 1967 War had an important nuclear dimension. While the nuclear issue was not the hidden cause of the war, nuclear-related events and considerations, on both the Arab and Israeli sides, played a more important role in the evolution of the crisis than has been acknowledged. New and little-known Israeli sources suggest that Israel had a nuclear capability on the eve of war. Israeli-inspired interpretations of events leading to the June 1967 War cite false Soviet intelligence reports of an imminent Israeli attack on Syria as the primary reason for Egyptian president Jamal Abd al-Nasir's miscalculations that led to war. Arab-inspired interpretations assert that it was Israeli prime minister Levi Eshkol's and chief of staff Yitzhak Rabin's provocative measures along the Israeli-Syrian border that led to war. Other accounts divide the responsibility for the miscalculations and mistakes between the Arabs and Israelis. All interpretations however, agree, that the 1967 crisis was the result of miscalculations that led to the failure of conventional deterrence. Virtually no account takes into consideration the war's nuclear dimension.l Recently, however, some of the facts regarding the nuclear aspects of the 1967 crisis have come to light: First, that Egyptian planes made at least two deep reconnaissance flights over Dimona, in May 1967, which alarmed Israeli political and military leaders, and influenced the way in which they interpreted and responded to the crisis;2 second, that the Israeli nuclear research centers at Dimona and Nachal Soreq were high-priority targets in Egypt's war plans, and Israel was aware of this; third, that in the early and mid-1960s, senior US diplomats and policy-makers were concerned about the possibility of an Egyptian preemptive attack on Israel's nuclear facility at Dimona; finally, that during the crisis, Israel already had a rudimentary but operational nuclear weapons capability. These facts indicate that the 1967 crisis had at least some nuclear dimension. How significant was this dimension? Regarding the Egyptians, to what extent was Dimona a real factor in the events that led to Nasir's initial decision, in mid-May 1967, to challenge the status quo, and to subsequent Egyptian decisions during the crisis? As for the Israelis, the question is, to what extent did nuclear-related considerations shape their response to and understanding of the crisis? These questions have hardly been explored. Shlomo Aronson was the first scholar to suggest that Israeli concern about Dimona "might have generated" the war, and that Nasir's initial move and subsequent escalation of the crisis were largely motivated by his desire to prevent Israel from acquiring nuclear weapons.3 Aronson's claim, however, is not backed by empirical evidence relating to Egypt. More recently, Ariel Levite and Emily Landau have also raised, in passing, the question of the actual role of nuclear weapons (or the perception of that role) in the 1967 war. Levite and Landau, however, do not take an unequivocal position on the question, stating instead, "This historical issue remains for now still a mystery."4 Recently declassified American documents and Egyptian and Israeli testimonies have shed new light on this mystery. While Aronson's suggestion that Dimona "might have generated" the 1967 war is not supported by the available evidence, the nuclear issue did play a more important role than is generally recognized. THE HISTORICAL SETTING: EGYPTIAN REACTIONS TO DIMONA AND US CONCERNS, 1960-66 Twice, during the 1960s, Israel's nuclear potential emerged as a major political concern in the Arab-Israeli conflict that could lead to war. Each time, however, interest in the issue was short-lived. Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, the editor of the Egyptian daily, al-Ahram and one of Nasir's closest confidants, was the first Arab commentator to recognize the centrality of the nuclear issue to the Arab-Israeli conflict. …