Trade fragmentation and coordination in bilateral oligopolies
This paper studies a strategic market game where agents fragment their bids on different markets. Simple conditions for existence of an interior equilibrium point are provided. In equilibrium, all agents are active on the same markets and prices are identical across markets, so that all equilibria are equivalent to an equilibrium where all agents trade on a single market.
Regional and Sub-Global Climate Blocs. A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Bottom-Up Climate Regimes
No international regime on climate change is going to be fully effective in controlling GHG emissions without the involvement of countries such as China, India, the United States, Australia, and possibly other developing countries. This highlights an unambiguous weakness of the Kyoto Protocol, where the aforementioned countries either have no binding emission targets or have decided not to comply with their targets. Therefore, when discussing possible post-Kyoto scenarios, it is crucial to prioritise participation incentives for all countries, especially those without explicit or with insufficient abatement targets. This paper offers a bottom-up game-theoretic perspective on participation incentives. Rather than focusing on issue linkage, transfers or burden sharing as tools to enhance the incentives to participate in a climate agreement, this paper aims at exploring whether a different policy approach could lead more countries to adopt effective climate control policies. This policy approach is explicitly bottom-up, namely it gives each country the freedom to sign agreements and deals, bilaterally or multilaterally, with other countries, without being constrained by any global protocol or convention. This study provides a game-theoretic assessment of this policy approach and then evaluates empirically the possible endogenous emergence of single or multiple climate coalitions. Welfare and technological consequences of different multiple bloc climate regimes will be assessed and their overall environmental effectiveness will be discussed.
Mathematical Modeling of Scour and Deposition
Electronic computers are opening up the field of sedimentation engineering by permitting the analysis of problems which heretofore have required too much time and effort. Movable stream bed profiles are being calculated in addition to water surface profiles. The initial gradation of sediment material in the stream bed may be prescribed to facilitate the calculation of an armor layer. This gradation is continually changed by the computer program in response to sediment particles being deposited on the stream bed and material on the stream bed being removed to satisfy transport capacity. Hydraulic sorting of sediment by grain size is accomodated. The stream bed does not have to be represented by a single grain size. Retardance of motion because of armor layer is calculated.