Strike or not to Strike Options on the Table to Stop Iran from Going Nuclear
Latterly, various experts and political analysts have been hotly debating in the world press whether the West should strike Iran in order tostop its nuclear program. The first part of the article deals with argumentation whether to strike Iran in order to stop its nuclear programand simultaneously presents variant viewpoints on what specific threat nuclear-armed Iran poses. The second half of the article discussesa possible course of action the United States might take to curb Iran and consequential events. The article aims to arrive at a less destructivesolution to the problem.The article directs to the conclusion that Iran’s aggressive foreign policy bears defensive nature driven by the self-survival instinct of anisolated country. The nuclear program also serves this very purpose to provide more security guarantees for the regime, minimize therisk of external strike and increase its bargaining power during the negotiations. Currently, the regional spoiler role is the only one to beplayed by Iran, enabling this developing and unformed economy country to resemble a great power player. Thus, if the United States doeswish to neutralize nuclear-armed Iran and consequential threats, it should stop to isolate the latter from regional politics and let it becomeone of the building blocks of regional political security architecture, as this could assure Iran in the possibility of maintaining its securitywithout going nuclear.
Why Iran Should Get the Bomb
The past several months have witnessed a heated debate over the best way for the United States and Israel to respond to Iran's nuclear activities. As the argument has raged, the United States has tightened its already robust sanctions regime against the Islamic Republic, and the European Union announced in January that it will begin an embargo on Iranian oil on July 1. Although the United States, the EU, and Iran have recently returned to the negotiating table, a palpable sense of crisis still looms.
Understanding the broader implications of strategic evidence disclosure in police interviews with suspects
Police around the world present evidence to suspects at different points during the interview. Some psychologists suggest that police should strategically delay disclosing evidence and test the truthfulness of a suspect’s account by comparing it with the evidence. Moreover, psychologists suggest interviewers who plan strategic evidence disclosure might be less guilt-presumptive about the suspect because they must consider alternative explanations of the evidence as part of their planning. In contrast, many lawyers argue that police should not strategically disclose evidence as it undermines a suspect’s fair trial rights and prevents lawyers from advising suspects effectively before the interview. 
 
To address these conflicting perspectives from the domains of psychology and law, this thesis takes an interdisciplinary approach and considers strategic evidence disclosure within the broader legal context of a suspect’s custodial detention. First, a field study of police disclosure briefings with lawyers, lawyer-client consultations, and police interviews, and a survey of lawyers highlights how lawyers rely upon the police’s evidence to advise suspects in custody. When police strategically disclose evidence, lawyers cannot provide informed legal advice and tend to advise suspects to not answer police questions. Second, three experiments and a mini meta-analysis show that generating alternative evidential explanations for criminal cases, as interviewers planning strategic evidence disclosure might do, has a very small effect, or plausibly no effect, on people’s beliefs about the suspect’s guilt. Finally, a mock crime experiment shows that, even two months after a crime, truthful suspects’ accounts fit evidence that was strategically withheld more than deceptive suspects’ accounts did. Independent laypeople from a follow-up experiment could distinguish between these truthful and deceptive accounts. Together, these findings suggest that strategic evidence disclosure could help deception detection even months after a crime, but it also impinges upon suspects’ legal rights and is unlikely to make interviewers less guilt-presumptive.