Introduction: multilingualism and education: the critical nexus
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A Recurring Decimal: English in Language Policy and Planning
One reality of language policy discourse in the world today is that it inevitably gravitates toward English. This is regardless of whether such discourse relates to any of Kachru's categories of Inner, Outer and Expanding Circles. My metaphor for this ubiquitous presence is a recurring decimal. The prominence that a language has in language policy may be due to a number of factors such as population, prestige, status, functionality, nationalism, etc. English shares all these factors in different countries, and may, in fact, have more than one of the factors in the same country. The recurrence of English in language policy is often presented as an outcome of deliberate choice. To maintain this position is to fail to “problematize the notion of choice” (Pennycook, 1994), since it is well known that there are historical, economic and bureaucratic constraints to language decisions. The resulting hegemony of English may be seen as beneficial from the perspective of its communicative and instrumental functions, particularly in the contexts of a “shrinking world,” which globalization represents. However, in Outer Circle countries, where English is largely acquired though formal education, its detrimental effects can be seen in social stratification, exclusion, and problems associated with education and literacy, status of languages other than English, and language rights. These problems inevitably invite attention to the broader issues of English in the context of educational failure and overall language policy.
Corporations and the Market for Law
The state competition for corporate law has long been studied as a distinct phenomenon. Under the traditional view, corporations are subject to a unique choice-of-law rule, the internal affairs doctrine (IAD). This rule is explained as a historical accident, or by the special logistics of the corporate contract. The resulting market for corporate law appears to have special characteristics, particularly including the dominance by the single state of Delaware. This paper challenges the traditional view. It shows that the corporate law market is best understood as a special application of the general market for law. Any differences are matters of degree rather than kind, and are explained by considerations underlying enforcement of all choice-of-law contracts rather than by factors unique to corporations. It follows that theories of corporate competition that ignore the broader law market context are incomplete, and that the competition for corporate law carries lessons for the law market generally. Moreover, the connection between the corporate and other law markets has implications for the nature of corporate law, the constitutional status of the IAD, the scope of the IAD, and for the relationship between state and federal law.