WMD Intelligence Analysis of Lessons from Iraq to Iran: Only Dot the I's - Don't Cross the T's
On January 29, 2010, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair gave evidence to the Iraq Enquiry in London, which was broadcast worldwide on satellite TV by the BBC. He emphasized the need to learn the lessons of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from the case of Iraq for the case of Iran. In his words “propping up one dictator to handle another dictator is not the way, we must get rid of the dictator.” More interesting is how many intelligence analysts are being instructed to dot the I’s but in the case of Iraq the analysis went to far and also crossed the T’s. Here is the previously untold story of what really happened.
Unscom and the Iraqi Biological Weapons Program: Implications for Arms Contro
V erification ofbiological weapons (BW) arms control agreements is one ofthe most difficult tasks in disarmament. While biological arms were outlawed 25 years ago by the multilateral Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), there is still no accepted verification mechanism for biological weapons disarmament. The discovery ofan enormous, diverse biological weapons program in Iraq sparked new interest in development ofa verification regime for the BWC. The investigation of Iraq's BW program also provides the first case history of an international BW arms control verification effort. The inquiry undertaken by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) demonstrates both the inherent difficulties ofsuch an investigation and the possibilities of success. The United Nation's actions in Iraq have made use of nearly all of the verification processes envisaged for the BWC, including information monitoring, remote sensing, inspections, on-site measures, and continuous monitoring. The UNSCOM case portrays examples ofthe real-world implementation ofBW verification techniques, including their accomplishments and failures. Specifically, the commission's efforts in Iraq have shown the value of a process or systematic approach to BW verification, rather than a reliance on discrete verification tools. Using a multifaceted verification strategy, UNSCOM has also proven the possibility ofdetecting a covert, well-hidden biological weapons program. Following the detection ofthe Iraqi BW program, UNSCOM is attempting to determine the full scope of the program in order to eliminate it.
The Tsetse Problem on the Eastern Cattle Route in the Gold Coast
1. Primary fly-belts round Makongo consisted of three different vegetational communities: a Cynometra-Vitex association along the main length of the Makongo river, on a clay soil; a Ficus congensis association along the river close to the town, on a sandy soil; and Isoberlinia doka woodland on moist sandy soil north-west and south of Makongo. 2. Secondary fly-belts of less dense vegetation occur in the orchard bush savannah round Makongo, and these are not colonised until the commencement of the rainy season. 3. Glossina tachinoides and G. palpalis both occurred in the riverside communities, and G. palpalis alone in the Isoberlinia woodland. 4. Along the river G. palpalis outnumbered G. tachinoides by 3:1 in the dry season. At the commencement of the rains G. tachinoides increased more quickly than G. palpalis , bringing their numbers very nearly equal, but at the end of the rains there was a decrease in G. tachinoides which restored the original proportion. 5. G. morsitans had been found at Makongo formerly but was not met with at the time of this investigation, its absence being due to the disappearance of the larger antelope from the neighbourhood. 6. Smaller game animals, small mammals and reptiles afforded an adequate food supply for tsetse in the fly-belts, and also passing herds of cattle, as well as natives from the village and travellers. 7. The distribution of G. palpalis within the fly-belts was markedly influenced by the proximity of a cattle road along which herds of cattle passed almost daily, and by village water-holes. 8. During the dry season the primary foci were always found to be the places of greatest relative humidity, and the fly does not tend to move out of these until the general atmospheric humidity has reached a certain fairly high degree. 9. In clearing the fly-belts the removal of all primary foci within a quarter of a mile of the town and of thick bush within 100 yards of water-holes was undertaken. The work lasted from the beginning of February to the end of March 1931. 10. The effect of clearing the Isoberlinia doka woodland was to banish G. palpalis completely, and it never returned to these clearings. 11. On clearing the riverside Ficus congensis fly-belt, G. tachinoides was practically eliminated for the first three months, but reappeared in the clearings in June when there was a general increase and up-stream migration of this fly. G. palpalis remained in this clearing in fluctuating numbers up to June, when observations were suspended. 12. 565 marked tsetse were liberated in the fly-belts immediately previous to clearing. Of G. palpalis 12·7% were recaptured in the clearings and 11% outside the clearings. Of G. tachinoides 5·5% were recaptured in the clearings and 6·8% outside.