From a European to a common security and defence policy. IES WORKING PAPER 5/2010
The Lisbon Treaty has introduced significant changes in the field of EU security and 
defence. On the one hand, important institutional reforms, such as the creation of a 
renewed High Representative, have of course a great impact on this policy field. On the 
other hand, the Lisbon Treaty has also introduced specific innovations in the security and 
defence of the European Union. The mutual defence clause and the new mechanisms for 
flexible cooperation such as the permanent structured cooperation, are only some of the 
key innovations. Generally, the European Security and Defence Policy receives its own 
section in the Treaty on European Union and is rebranded as Common Security and Defence 
Policy. Thus, the Lisbon Treaty sets the objective for a common policy in this field. 
However, does this reform really provide for the means for the realization of such a 
common policy? Furthermore, does the Lisbon Treaty increase the importance of CSDP or is 
the increasing importance of this policy field just reflected in the Treaty text? These are 
the main questions that the present paper attempts to address through the analysis of the 
new institutional setting of the post-Lisbon security and defence policy, as well as through 
the examination of the specific innovations in this area.
GATS and the Social Regulation of Services
Many service transactions are highly complex, and their quality is difficult to ascertain for consumers. In order to have properly functioning service markets, the services thus often require regulation. However, with the advent of the WTO, international trade in services has become increasingly rule-bound. GATS has considerable, intricate effects on social regulation due to the characteristics of services. The allocation of regulatory jurisdiction between home and host country, for example, is rendered difficult by the process-based nature of a lot of services. The WTO US – Gambling dispute settlement report is the first to address GATS disciplines on social regulation in a detailed manner. This working paper submits that the US Gambling report has increased interference with domestic social regulation and created regulatory uncertainty for WTO members. However, it is also argued that the real impact of the GATS on social regulation can only be understood by looking beyond the text of the GATS. GATS disciplines may become amplified through their interaction with domestic and other international law. The GATS also contains some “political” counterbalancing mechanisms that allow members to renegotiate their commitments. It is argued that these political mechanisms strengthen subsidiarity in the GATS, and make WTO dispute settlement bodies accountable to WTO members.
Center of Gravity Analysis
MILITARY STUDENTS defining the concept of the center of gravity (COG) are like blind men describing an elephant. They know a definition exists, but they describe it according to their own experiences, and invariably someone will define COG as "the will of the people." The center of gravity is too important a concept to guess at. Joint Publication (JP) 5-0 (Draft 2), Doctrine for Joint Planning Operations, clearly states the critical role of COG analysis: "The most important task confronting campaign planners in this process is being able to identify friendly and adversary strategic centers of gravity; that is, the sources of strength, power, and resistance."1 The reason identifying centers of gravity is the most important task is because a "faulty analysis of friendly or adversary centers of gravity can have very serious consequences; specifically, the inability to accomplish the military objectives at an acceptable cost and the unconscionable expenditure of lives, time, and materiel in efforts that do not produce decisive strategic or operational results."2 There are two reasons why centers of gravity are so difficult to identify or define. First, the armed services suffered because in 1997, they agreed from years of conflicting definitions for center of gravity. Not until 1997 did they agree to the current joint definition.3 second, the services teach a COG theory without a practical framework to make the theory useful. Fixing the problem is easy; the joint community must agree on a simple definition and provide a framework. What are Centers of Gravity? Centers of gravity are sources of power. Joseph Strange of the U.S. Marine Corps War College defines centers of gravity as the "primary sources of moral or physical strength, power, and resistance."4 A center of gravity is the source of power that creates a force or a critical capability that allows an entity to act or accomplish a task or purpose. Ignore the joint definition; it only leads to confusion and debate. Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz states, "Out of the characteristics a certain center of gravity develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed."5 However, Clausewitz's definition, according to U.S. Army and joint doctrine, misses the mark, so the joint community changed it by limiting sources of power to military systems and by defining centers of gravity as "those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight."6 According to this definition, only military forces have centers of gravity; nations and other systems do not. Most planners and strategists ignore this limitation, but the definition is flawed, nonetheless. The joint definition also gives the impression that military forces are not centers of gravity themselves but only possess them. The current joint definition should replace "military force" with something like "system" or "entity." This change would broaden the definition to include nations or organizations. Next, the definition should be simplified by replacing "characteristics, capabilities, or localities" with simple words like "source," "agent," or "things." Next, we should drop terms like "freedom of action," "physical strength," or "will to fight" and replace them with the plainer "ability to act." We should drop "physical strength" and "will to fight" entirely because they are prerequisites for freedom of action. Without "will" or "strength," one cannot act, and the ability to act is a definition of power.7 The simplified joint definition of center of gravity then becomes "a system's source of power to act." Requirements and Vulnerabilities Once having defined "center of gravity," we next need to build a framework for understanding and identifying it. Essential to understanding the center of gravity is understanding "critical capabilities," "critical requirements," and "critical vulnerabilities. …