Scientific and Legal Developments in Fire and Arson Investigation Expertise in Texas v. Willingham
The forensic sciences, as a form of professional knowledge, are changing with new advancements in technology and continuing research and development. With the National Academy of Science's recent call for more research and testing of the forensic sciences, the criminal justice system is faced with the challenges of handling cases where convictions are based on outdated or discredited evidence. In light of technological advancements in the field, this article examines the evolution of fire- and arson-investigation knowledge over the course of a highly publicized capital murder case. The history of arson investigation is discussed, as is the legal admissibility of such expert testimony. Arson investigation expertise stems from non-scientific or experience-based origins, yet is conveyed in court as scientific fact. The article identifies the dangers of admitting such testimony into court without scrutiny. The lack of scientific validation of investigative methods, overreaching scientific claims based on case facts and witness statements, and fire investigators' susceptibility to contextual bias are discussed. The article raises questions as to whether and how the legal system has propagated the misuse of arson investigation testimony and how outdated understandings of evidence may impact the identification of future miscarriages of justice.
The Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences
The methods, techniques, and reliability of the forensic sciences in general, and the pattern identification disciplines in particular, have faced significant scrutiny in recent years. Critics have attacked the scientific basis for the assumptions and claims made by forensic scientists both in and out of the courtroom. Defenders have emphasized courts’ long-standing acceptance of forensic science evidence, the relative dearth of known errors, and the skill and experience of practitioners. This Article reflects an effort made by a diverse group of participants in these debates, including law professors, academics from several disciplines, and practicing forensic scientists, to find and explore common ground. To what extent do the forensic sciences need to change in order to place themselves on an appropriately secure foundation in the 21st century? We all firmly agree that the traditional forensic sciences in general, and the pattern identification disciplines, such as fingerprint, firearm, tool mark and handwriting identification evidence in particular, do not currently possess – and absolutely must develop – a well-established scientific foundation. This can only be accomplished through the development of a research culture that permeates the entire field of forensic science. A research culture, we argue, must be grounded in the values of empiricism, transparency, and a commitment to an ongoing critical perspective. The forensic science disciplines need to substantially increase their commitment to evidence from empirical research as the basis for their conclusions. Sound research, rather than experience, training, and longstanding use, must become the central method by which assertions are justified. In this Article, we describe the underdeveloped research culture in the non-DNA forensic sciences, offer suggestions for how it might be improved, and explain why it matters.
The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral Convictions into Law
Professor Michael Perry's new book, Morality, Politics, and Law, is an ambitious attempt to address the extent to which moral and religious beliefs in a pluralistic society, such as ours, can legitimately influence law. He departs from the common opinion in legal circles that moral beliefs are a matter of taste or "values," and defends an older conception that it is possible to attain moral "knowledge." ' He also departs from the "liberal political-philosophical project," 2 which claims that it is possible (and desirable) for governments to steer a neutral course between competing moral understandings of the good. This, he suggests, is an illusion, and a disguise for the imposition of a particular moral structure without opportunity for open deliberation and reflection. Professor Perry brings some refreshing common sense to these riddles of moral philosophy. His "naturalist" approach has obvious roots in Aristotle-not a bad place to begin thinking about ethics. His dismissal of