Refocusing the Lens of Child Advocacy Reform on the Child
When placed within family court jurisdiction, children need lawyers. Dependency [FN1] cases in the family court--in which parents are accused of abusing or neglecting their children--are fraught with constitutional tensions regarding the state's and parents' rights to regulate the well-being of children, [FN2] along with systemic pressures such as federal statutes and state funding [FN3] that substantially affect family relationships. Children sit at *482 the heart of these proceedings; indeed they are the very reason for them. Facing abrupt state intervention into their family life and the oft-accompanying physical removal [FN4] from their homes, these children travel a tumultuous and uncertain road from the time the alleged abuse or neglect occurs until the allegations are resolved. Threatened also with termination of parental rights, [FN5] they--for better or worse--face the potential permanent loss of their natural family life. The recognition that children are not mere property to be tossed between their parents and the state has prompted states to require representation of children as independent parties. Children possess unique rights and interests--to be free from harm and to access relevant social services, among others--that need separate advocacy, particularly in light of the frequent conflicts between the respective interests of parents and children. [FN6] Though a relatively common practice, child representation in dependency proceedings remains both inconsistent and disputed across the country.
Two Distinct Roles/Bright Line Test
It is a mistake to try to develop a single lawyer role for children in child welfare cases which tries to accommodate their developing capacities from infants to articulate teens. The older child needs a traditional attorney; the youngest child, incapable of directing counsel, needs a substitute to define and advocate for his or her best interests. We should adopt different standards for the different advocate roles. Trying to define a single lawyer role for children of all ages and all capacities is an impossible task.' A better approach towards recognizing and accommodating the child's developing cognitive abilities and judgment would be to adopt a bright line age test, say at seven. At age seven (or eight or ten) and above the youth would receive a client directed advocate, that is, a child's attorney, and below the bright-line age a child gets a best interests (or substituted judgment) advocate. The court should appoint either one or the other, or both, under certain circumstances as set out in law. Both roles should be clearly established in law with duties that are aggressive and active. 3
Chemical, biological, and immunological characterization of mono- and diiodothyrotropin releasing factor.
Abstract Iodination of thyrotropin releasing factor (TRF) with chloramine-T and NaI at pH 7.5 produces both mono- and diiodo-TRF as well as unreacted TRF and I − . The four compounds can be separated by ion-exchange chromatography on SP-Sephadex C-25, using a stepwise gradient of 0.01 m MH 4 OAc at pH 3.5, 5.2 and 7.2. The monoiodo-TRF was characterized by nuclear magnetic resonance, mass spectra, and elemental analysis as [Im-5-iodo-His 2 ]-TRF while the diiodo-TRF was similarly characterized as [Im-2,5-diiodo-His 2 ]-TRF. Both iodination products showed no thyrotropin releasing activity at doses up to 1 μg in the in vivo mouse bioassay. The specific binding of mono- and diiodo-TRF was measured against three different TRF antisera. In the absence of TRF, antisera A and C bound more diiodo-TRF than monoiodo-TRF while antiserum B seemed to bind both tracers equally. In all cases steeper curves were produced when diiodo-TRF was displaced by synthetic TRF.