The Policy Dynamics of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System
Since 1977, oil produced in northern Alaska has posed a major environmental threat across large areas of Alaska while simultaneously playing a dominant role in the economy of Alaska. This enduring dilemma was created by the building of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System to transport oil produced on the North Slope of Alaska, a region containing the largest oil field ever developed in North America. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline System transports oil through an 800-mile pipeline and ocean-going oil tankers. This complex technological system poses an enduring risk of environmentally damaging oil spills in Alaska. This study applies the punctuated equilibrium theory of policy change to examine the processes and enduring consequences of the national policy reforms that allowed the building of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System.
The Alaska Pipeline as an Internal Improvement, 1969-1973
Over four years after oil companies first applied for a permit, Congress authorized the Alaska Oil Pipeline in November 1973. Running from the Arctic Ocean to the Pacific, the pipeline crossed 600 miles of federal land, which made it a "major action significantly affecting the environment," thus triggering an environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA). Standard accounts tell of revolutionary environmental laws running into the economic reality of the 1970s. What has been lost in the telling is that the pipeline approval offered Congress an opportunity to investigate the wisdom of a proposed internal improvement. The pipeline controversy was not just the first battle of the environmental decade. It also continued nearly two centuries of debate over internal improvements, public financing of private investments, federal incorporation, monopoly charters, and national security. The pipeline approval was as much a decision about political economy as it was an environmental policy decision.
Deliberative Democracy and the Resource Curse: A Nationwide Experiment in Tanzania
Oil and gas discoveries in developing countries are often associated with short-sighted economic policies and, in response, calls to insulate resource management from populist impulses. We report on a randomized experiment testing methods to overcome this apparent tension between sound resource governance and democratic politics. Soon after Tanzania’s discovery of major natural gas reserves, we invited a nationally representative sample of voters to an intensive public deliberation of policy options featuring nationally recognized experts and small-group discussions. Democratic deliberation reinforced the public’s strong preference for rapid spending of gas revenues, but also increased support for various prudential and economically orthodox measures, including independent oversight of gas revenues, limits on government borrowing, and selling gas abroad rather than subsidizing fuel at home. These effects were driven by deliberation per se, rather than a pure information treatment, and show no evidence of contamination by facilitatoror peer-effects in group deliberations. www.cgdev.org Justin Sandefur, Nancy Birdsall, James Fishkin, and Mujobu Moyo