The United States and the International Court of Justice: Coping with Antinomies
Since 1946, the United States has had an uneasy relationship with the International Court of Justice (ICJ or World Court or Court). This chapter addresses certain salient aspects of that relationship. Following an introductory Part I, Part II briefly sets forth three "antinomies" (i.e. equally rational but conflicting principles) in U.S. foreign relations that have had important ramifications for the U.S. relationship with the Court from the outset. First, the United States operates on the basis of conflicting principles with respect to the relevance of international law and institutions for U.S. foreign policy. These conflicting principles have been referred to broadly in international relations theory as "realism" and "institutionalism." Second, the United States operates on the basis of conflicting principles with respect to whether states should be treated as equal sovereigns or as units characterized by inescapable power differentials. Third, the United States operates on the basis of conflicting principles with respect to whether international law should be "embedded" in U.S. law, including the manner in which international courts relate to U.S. law. Part III suggests that the International Court was initially designed to accommodate such antinomies (which also exist with respect to other states, to varying degrees) by providing the means for mediating between these conflicting principles. These techniques for mediating antinomies are discussed in the context of the history of the U.S. relationship with the Court from its inception to modern times. Part IV then briefly highlights the unfolding of these antimonies in some of the recent cases of the United States before the Court, with particular attention to the Oil Platforms case, the Israeli Wall advisory opinion, and the Breard/LaGrand/Avena cases. Among other things, Part V suggests that certain formal and informal means for mediating these antimonies may have been forgotten in the past twenty years, leading to a point where the Court readily finds fault in the United States and the United States holds the Court in very low regard. The chapter concludes that these antinomies are unlikely to be resolved through the further development of formal or informal mediating techniques. In the near term, American policymakers will seek to avoid any involvement in matters before the Court, while the Court will embrace opportunities to speak to the legality of U.S. actions.
Judicial Decision-Making: Interdisciplinary Analysis with Special Reference to International Courts
Centrinis sios disertacijos klausimas yra kiek teisminių sprendimų priėmimas priklauso nuo samprotavimo teisinių taisyklių pagrindu. Ar teisėjai, nustate bylos faktus, viso labo suras reikiamas teisines taisykles ir tuomet priims sprendimą? O gal lygtis anot kurios teismo sprendimas lygus faktams plius teisinėms taisyklėms yra viso labo iliuzija? 
Teisėjai paprastai gali priimti sprendimą dėl bylos baigties visiskai nesivadovaudami teisinėmis taisyklėmis ir tik tuomet naudotis formaliomis taisyklėmis, tik tam kad pateisinti savo sprendimą. 
Teisėjai, kaip ir visi žmonės, teikia pirmenybe ne loginiam ir taisyklėmis paremtam samprotavimui, o intuityviems sprendimams. Nors loginis samprotavimas gali pakeisti intuityvius sprendimus, praktikoje tai nutiks retai. 
Jei teisėjai priims sprendimus kitais pagrindais nei formalios teisinės taisyklės, formalios taisyklės nesuvaržys teisminio kūrybingumo. Teisėjams retai iskils sunkumų pateisinant sprendimus formaliomis taisyklėmis todėl kad jie beveik visuomet suras tarp konkuruojancių teisinių taisyklių kokį nors teisinį pagrindą, kuris pateisins jų norimą sprendimą. Tai bus įmanoma nes tarptautinė viesoji teisė yra itin dviprasmiska. 
Konkretūs lemiami sprendimo priėmimo veiksniai skirsis kiekvienoje byloje. Kai kuriuose bylose visiskai įmanoma, jog formalios teisinės taisyklės is tikrųjų nulems bylos baigtį.
A Special Chamber of the International Court of Justice — An Alternative to Ad Hoc Arbitration
Litigation of contentious cases before the International Court of Justice has in some instances been a lengthy and comparatively expensive procedure. However, it is not necessarily the Court or its procedure that produces this situation, because governments parties to litigation sometimes feel it is important to retain a number of advocates to plead, and they agree on comparatively long periods for the preparation of written pleadings. Comparing this procedure with ad hoc arbitration before a referee and two arbitrators, the latter looks comparatively swift and inexpensive. However, there are as yet unused possibilities for the International Court to adjudicate cases on a basis comparable in time and expense to ad hoc arbitration. The use of the Court for what might be less important cases would also contribute to its institutional development.