Is it Time to Rewrite the Constitution? Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution
This essay considers arguments that the U.S. Constitution is so imperfect — and the constitutional and political system so dysfunctional or otherwise failing — that it is time to rewrite the Constitution through amendment or constitutional convention. I argue that if we adopt and maintain an attitude of fidelity to our imperfect Constitution, it may be unnecessary to formally amend the Constitution unless there is good reason to believe that something better might come out of this process. The better approach is to maintain an attitude of fidelity to the imperfect Constitution and to apply a Constitution-perfecting theory — to interpret the Constitution so as to make it the best it can be. Furthermore, maintaining that attitude, we should recognize the need to “rewrite” the constitutional culture the better to secure constitutional democracy: to cultivate the civic virtues and foster the capacities needed to maintain constitutional self-government.
The Rights Retained By The People The History And Meaning Of The Ninth Amendment
Thank you for reading the rights retained by the people the history and meaning of the ninth amendment. Maybe you have knowledge that, people have look numerous times for their chosen books like this the rights retained by the people the history and meaning of the ninth amendment, but end up in infectious downloads. Rather than enjoying a good book with a cup of tea in the afternoon, instead they juggled with some malicious bugs inside their desktop computer.
Tethering the Administrative State: The Case Against Chevron Deference for FCC Jurisdictional Claims
Like many other agencies, the Federal Communications Commission has seen significant regulatory growth under President Obama. But unlike health care, financial reform, and other areas, this growth has come without statutory guidance from Congress. The FCC’s assertion of jurisdiction over broadband service is reminiscent of its earlier attempts to regulate cable and to deregulate telephone service, efforts that courts have viewed skeptically in the absence of specific statutory authorization. But this skepticism is in tension with Chevron, which grants agencies substantial deference to interpret ambiguities in the statutes that they administer. This article argues that Chevron deference should not extend to agency jurisdictional claims, such as the FCC’s claim to authority over broadband. For both constitutional and policy reasons, courts should distinguish between agency action that fills a gap in a statutory scheme and action that defines the outer boundary of that scheme. As the Commission’s net neutrality project winds its way through the judicial system, courts should not allow the agency to define the limits of its own authority, and should instead search closely for a grant of authority from Congress.