The US Approach toward Islamic Militancy: Current Policies in Historical Perspective
Following the events of 9/11, the US declared a global war on terror and a new strategy based on preemption for defeating Muslim extremism and terrorism. However, the new US strategy so far has not been more successful than earlier strategies in combating either Muslim extremism or international terrorism. Arguably, it may even have contributed to the strengthening of the appeal of Islamic extremism and certain terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. The principal reason for this lack of success has been the historically inconsistent and contradictory approach of the US to dealing with the problem of Muslim militancy and its manipulation of it for short-term objectives.
Study of revenge : Saddam Hussein's unfinished war against America
"Study of Revenge", the sequel to the "New York Times" best-seller "Saddam Hussein and the Crisis in the Gulf", co-authored by Laurie Mylroie and Judith Miller, exposes the threat Saddam Hussein still poses to Americans and challenges the Clinton administration to explain why it has obscured that threat. The Gulf War never ended for Saddam Hussein. He had already recovered sufficiently by 1993 to undertake a campaign of terror, of which only the first two acts were planned in advance: the January shootings outside the CIA headquarters in Virignia and the February bombing of one tower of the World Trade Centre in New York, in an attempt to topple it against its twin. This is the story of the Trade Centre bombing. Mylroie contends that the mastermind behind the bombing was an Iraqi intelligence agent, Ramzi Yousef, who escaped and left behind the Muslim fundamentalists who participated in the plot and were meant to be caught. She argues that the Clinton administration's mishandling of the event led to the emergence of a fraudulent and dangerous theory about Middle East terrorism - that it is no longer primarily state-sponsored but is carried out by individuals or "loose networks". The misunderstanding is particularly dangerous in light of the prospects for biological terrorism. In addition to her account of events around the bombing, Mylroie describes how Saddam Hussein has steadily regained strength and eroded the system of postwar constraints that were supposed to hold him in check. She suggests that because of the proscribed unconventional-weapons capabilities Saddam retained in violation of the Gulf War cease-fire - and without the check of UN weapons inspectors - he is far more dangerous than is generally recognized. Mylroie bases her case on a meticulous analysis of the government's evidence in the terrorism trials that followed the Trade Centre bombing. Her book is written as a detective story, and the reader is invited to conduct the investigation into state sponsorship of the terrorism that the US government failed to conduct.
Factors Likely to Influence Tort Litigation in the European Union
As the European Union moves towards harmonization in a variety of business, political, and regulatory settings, an opportunity exists to influence the form of tort liability found in these nations. The opportunity should not be missed, with rising concern that U.S. influences will set into motion costly litigiousness, particularly as EU member nations pull back on the level of social programmes available to cover costs typically included in tort claims. To assist policymakers in their deliberations about European Union tort directives, this paper provides discussion of the frequently cited key differences between the U.S. tort systems and what is found in most EU member nations. The discussion is focused on available evidence regarding the influences of these differences as well as important areas of future research. The most important areas seem to be (1) the need to enforce European Law when no defined regulatory body exists for this purpose; (2) the connection between government social programmes and the need for tort liability compensation; (3) and the influence of rules governing payment of legal costs and lawyer fees.