Experience in Implementing Social Benefits Monetization Reform in Russia; Literature Review
The present paper is an integral part of the "Preparation of the strategy for social benefits monetization reform in Ukraine" project, co-financed by the 2008 Polish aid programme of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland and carried out by CASE in 2008. The paper was prepared as background material aimed at obtaining a better understanding of the main bottlenecks in reforming a vast in-kind benefits system typical for many countries of the Former Soviet Union (FSU). The paper focuses on the following issues: aims and motives of monetization reforms in Russia; expected outcomes of the reform; description of the implementation process; changes of the roles of various actors and agencies; compensation of housing and communal services (HCS) expenses in the course of HCS and monetization reforms; and the major gains and failures of the reform. The paper concludes with lessons that can be derived from the Russian monetization experience for the planned Ukrainian monetization reform. The paper is based on extensive research on the monetization reform in Russia and literature published by leading Russian independent research centers including the Independent Institute for Social Policy (IISP), the Institute for Urban Economics, the Centre for Economic and Financial studies (CEFIR), and the Institute for the Economy in Transition (IET).
Welfare Reforms in Post-Soviet States: A Comparison of Social Benefits Reform in Russia and Kazakhstan
Concerned with the question of why governments display varying degrees of success in implementing social reforms, (judged by their ability to arrive at coherent policy outcomes), my dissertation aims to identify the most important factors responsible for the stagnation of social benefits reform in Russia, as opposed to its successful implementation in Kazakhstan. Given their comparable Soviet political and economic characteristics in the immediate aftermath of Communism’s disintegration, why did the implementation of social benefits reform succeed in Kazakhstan, but largely fail in Russia? I argue that although several political and institutional factors did, to a certain degree, influence the course of social benefits reform in these two countries, their success or failure was ultimately determined by the capacity of key state actors to frame the problem and form an effective policy coalition that could further the reform agenda despite various political and institutional obstacles and socioeconomic challenges. In the case of Kazakhstan, the successful implementation of the social benefits reform was a result of a bold and skillful endeavour by Kazakhstani authorities, who used the existing conditions to justify the reform initiative and achieve the reform’s original objectives. By contrast, in Russia, the failure to effectively restructure the old Soviet social benefits system was rooted largely in the political instability of the Yeltsin era, and a lack of commitment to the reforms on the part of key political actors. And when the reform was finally launched, its ill-considered policies and the government’s failure to iii form the broad coalition and effectively frame the problem led to public protests and subsequent reform stagnation. Based on in-depth fieldwork conducted in Russia and Kazakhstan in 2006 and 2008, my study enriches the literature on the transformation of post-communist welfare regimes, and contributes important insights to the central question in the literature on public policy, that is, when, why and how policies change. It also enhances our understanding of political and public policy processes in transitional and competitive authoritarian contexts.
Budget Federalism and Interbudgetary Relations
Budget federalism in Russia began in 1992. Under the effects of strong centrifugal trends, the decentralization of the budget and tax system took place in the form of "waves" of agreements regarding the share distribution of tax receipts, the entry into which entailed the delegation of ever greater powers to finance spending, especially social spending, to the regions.