Counter-proliferating the rogue states
President George W. Bush, in his State of the Union speech in January 2002, described Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an “axis of evil” and accused them of seeking to acquire and develop weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, biological). Further, Under Secretary of State John Bolton said that Cuba, Libya and Syria could be grouped with these as “rogue states”. In doing so, the mere alleged acquisition, without any stated intent, of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) weapons and delivery systems was designated a threat to local, regional and global stability and security, given the terror and fear they invoked. The ensuing policy agenda and process of arms control (non-proliferation) and disarmament (counter-proliferation) was based on the vulnerability management of these capabilities. This was premised on the refusal of the labelled rogue states to accept the international norms of recognized arms control practices of diplomacy, international negotiation, compliance, regulation, transparency and verification. It is upon this assumption that the crux of the argument exists of a clear case for pre-emptive or preventive armed force against rogue states. On this basis, this article will, through its analysis, settle the outstanding question of whether war against rogue states can be considered a just war, based upon historical precedents. The first of such wars against a rogue state is that waged against Iraq (2003), where the alleged Iraqi WMD capability has not yet been shown to exist. Approaching this mandates rethinking basic notions and mannerisms of international defense and security. America cannot act as world policeman indefinitely. This projects the need for an alternative to unilateral counter-proliferation by way of pre-emptive military action; namely a “Hague Style Convention on Proliferation” to reintroduce the international community of nations to a self-regulatory multi-polar approach towards arms control and disarmament. Given the options, it is clear that there is a consensus to the ends. While the means to the end might be arguable, there is Defense & Security Analysis Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 343–354, December 2004
On the Fringes of the International Community. The Making and Survival of "Rogue States"
Studies on "rogue states" often present normative analyses focused on the perspective of Western actors. From a purely analytical point of view, the present article steps away from this tradition and aims to examine the process of designating actors as "rogue states", its impact on them, and their capabilities to defy stigmatization. The argument developed proceeds in two steps. Firstly, the paper discloses and discusses characteristic features of states that lead to them being labeled "rogue states." Thereby the paradoxical situation occurs that "rogue states" can be seen either as a part of the international community or as an entity being excluded from this community. Furthermore, it is emphasized that the selection process of "rogue states" is based on biased securitization policies. Secondly, despite being exposed to significant external pressure, most "rogue states" have shown a remark able resistance to transforming their political conduct. Two main sources of strength are identified: the ability of "rogue states" to draw material and ideational resources from the international system and their disposal over state capacities.
Method validation in pharmaceutical analysis
Method validation in pharmaceutical analysis , Method validation in pharmaceutical analysis , کتابخانه دیجیتال جندی شاپور اهواز