Strike or not to Strike Options on the Table to Stop Iran from Going Nuclear
Latterly, various experts and political analysts have been hotly debating in the world press whether the West should strike Iran in order tostop its nuclear program. The first part of the article deals with argumentation whether to strike Iran in order to stop its nuclear programand simultaneously presents variant viewpoints on what specific threat nuclear-armed Iran poses. The second half of the article discussesa possible course of action the United States might take to curb Iran and consequential events. The article aims to arrive at a less destructivesolution to the problem.The article directs to the conclusion that Iran’s aggressive foreign policy bears defensive nature driven by the self-survival instinct of anisolated country. The nuclear program also serves this very purpose to provide more security guarantees for the regime, minimize therisk of external strike and increase its bargaining power during the negotiations. Currently, the regional spoiler role is the only one to beplayed by Iran, enabling this developing and unformed economy country to resemble a great power player. Thus, if the United States doeswish to neutralize nuclear-armed Iran and consequential threats, it should stop to isolate the latter from regional politics and let it becomeone of the building blocks of regional political security architecture, as this could assure Iran in the possibility of maintaining its securitywithout going nuclear.
Iran's Foreign Policy Strategy after Saddam
During President Mahmud Ahmadinejad’s first term, Iranian foreign policy had two key enduring components. First, Tehran sought to deal with Iran’s new security dilemma brought about by the U.S. presence in both Iraq and Afghanistan after 2003. Iran responded with an ‘‘accommodating policy,’’ which consisted of expanding cooperation after Saddam’s fall with the main Arab world actors, principally Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and seeking direct talks with the United States. This included Iran’s engagement in direct talks with Coalition Forces regarding the prevailing security situations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In this way, Iran hoped to avoid both a new round of rivalry with its Arab neighbors and a new security dilemma in its relations with the United States. The second component was to seek an ‘‘alliance policy’’ while regionalizing the nuclear issue, in which Iran sought to tie and interweave the nuclear issue with broader regional dynamics such as Israel’s undeclared nuclear arsenal and the Arab-Israeli conflict. By building relationships with friendly states (e.g., Syria) and political movements (e.g., Hezbollah or Shi‘ite factions in Iraq), Iran tried to deter the U.S. or Israeli military threat in the short term and to prevent the institutionalization of a U.S. role in its backyard in the long term. The prevailing view in the United States is that Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy and Iran’s increasing presence in the region has been offensive, expansionist, opportunistic, and often ideological. Though Iran has occasionally taken advantage of new opportunities, these characterizations have been exaggerated in the United States. Instead, Iran’s action should be perceived in a more
The Paradox of Iran's Nuclear Consensus
TEHRAN—Though from American shores it may seem as if Iran’s recent election tumult speaks of deep divisions in society and politics, there is one policy issue on which public opinion remains nearly unanimous: the nuclear program. Among the Iranian political elite, there is a clear internal consensus—in the run-up to the recent elections, even President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s reformist challenger, Mir Hossein Moussavi, professed his support for the nascent program. As such, unless this consensus dramatically falls apart, the politics of Iran’s nuclear program will likely continue down the current path, making progress in negotiations with the United States a challenge, but a distinct possibility. In the aftermath of Iran’s post-election drama, some Western observers have argued that the apparent weakening of the Iranian elite’s policy consensus, and also by implication the legitimacy of the incumbent government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, will enable the West to acquire leverage vis-a-vis the nuclear issue. In fact, the reality is quite different. Divisions within the Islamic Republic, if they truly exist, will not provide the space for reconsidering the nuclear question. Only when there is an internal consensus among Iran’s elite and the possibility of negotiating from a position of strength will Tehran come to a genuine and definitive agreement with the United States over the nuclear issue. Iran seeks an “independent nuclear fuel cycle,” the domestic capacity to produce enriched uranium and plutonium to fuel nuclear reactors for electricity generation. The legitimacy of this civilian goal is almost universally acknowledged, but Western governments have voiced concerns over Iran’s reluctance to allow inspectors to view facilities and over fears that, once a nuclear capability is achieved, producing weapons-grade material is but a few steps away. The Iranian government, for its part, has said it does not intend to pursue this secondary course. Yet, from the perspective of Iran’s elite, any negotiations between Tehran and Washington which might cause Iran to deviate from the long-term project of an independent nuclear fuel cycle would be an untenable strategic mistake. There is little doubt that post-election events have splintered the consensus over issues of foreign policy among the Iranian elite, but such divisions will not severely impact the previous consensus around the nuclear issue as a matter of national and geostrategic pride. Some Western policy makers have suggested it would be unwise to proceed with nuclear negotiations in The Paradox of Iran’s Nuclear Consensus Kayhan Barzegar