On the bargaining set of three-player games
The description and the characterization of the (Aumann-Maschler) bargaining set are known, but its determination is still hard given a generic transferable utility cooperative game. We provide here an exhaustive determination of the bargaining set of any three-player game, balanced or not, superadditive or not.
N-Non-Cooperative Games Under a Dynamic Multidimensional Graphical Prism
This paper explores the concept of multidimensional Nash equilibrium as a prospective solution in a non-cooperative multi-player normal form game. The paper suggests a paradigm shift: a new multidimensional geometric approach to capture all symmetrical and asymmetrical strategic graphical movements in real space and time. The Multidimensional Non-Cooperative Games Graphical Framework (MNCGG-Framework) extends the traditional two-dimensional normal form game into a multidimensional graphical framework that synchronizes the optimal agent interactions with corresponding payoffs in real-time. The paper applies the proposed graphical framework on John Forbes Nash’s six examples on non-cooperative games taken from his doctoral dissertation.
The Kernel of the General-Sum Four-Person Game
In this paper we apply various results and methods of previous papers on the kernel to four-person games. Section 2 contains the basic definitions needed. In §3 we prove that the kernel of the general-sum four-person game consists of a line segment (which may shrink to a point). A method for classifying games according to their kernels is suggested in §4 and is used there to characterize all four-person games whose kernel consists of a non-degenerate interval. In the last section, §5, we offer a bargaining procedure, based on principles established in (1), which leads to the kernel in the case of a non-degenerate interval.