Analysis of Chinese Power: The Economic Base and Potential for Military and Political Power
Abstract : It is the purpose of this thesis to measure the economic base of China and to predict her economic potential over the next 10 years. In the next decade, Communist China cannot become a world power. Her economic base is just not adequate enough to take such a giant step in such a short period of time. The basic issues are a huge and expanding population, inability to feed the population, and the absence of the means to rapidly develop Chinese industry. This is not to say that China cannot become a world power -- for she can. She has adequate natural resources; she has human resources; she has an industrial base that is expanding slowly; she has leadership dedicated to making China a world power; she has space and land, even though productive land is scarce; she has an illiterate, but responsive, population; she has the advantage of centralized control and planning for all aspects of the economy; she has discovered the value of incentives to aid production; she shows signs of a willingness to take steps to control population growth; she has a well-supported "National Purpose" of making herself significant in the world; she has no neighbors that seek her territory; and she has a government that is in complete control and has the will and the means to direct China's destiny. In short, China's economic base is not adequate for world power now, but it has all the necessary attributes to become a world power over a period of 30 to 50 years. This time factor could be shortened considerably if China were to make herself respectable and trusted internationally. China could get much needed industrial imports much faster if she presented a less belligerent attitude toward other countries. Even now, countries like France, Canada, Australia, and others are interested in expanding trade with China.
The Chinese Model
CAN the Chinese Model be applied to other underdeveloped societies?1 The volume on China's experience in comparative perspective sets out to answer this question. It contains the main contributions made by China-watchers and developmenteconomists during a conference held in 1976 under the auspices of the American Social Science Research Council. Although some of the domestic changes which followed Mao Zedong's death were known before the editor, Robert Dernberger, got the conference papers through the press, these are hardly reflected in the volume under review. It might have been prudent to delay the publication of the conference proceedings until such time as the events of the last few years could be seen in their proper perspective. In that case, questions concerning the 'transferability' (p. 14) of the Chinese model might well have been answered differently. Claims such as that of full employment in the rural areas (p. 323) might have been toned down in the light of statements made by China's post-Mao leadership. Similar revisions might have been considered in other sections of the proceedings, as in the case of 'the smooth transition from individual household farming to collectivized agriculture' (p. 315). In comparing the experience of the People's Republic of China with that of other countries, the outside observer is likely to see the most significant difference in China's successful Communist revolution. It is thus bound to come as something of a surprise to find that the editor places this earth-shaking event merely in brackets (p. 15), and the index ignores it altogether. Elsewhere the revolution tends to be lumped together with 'noneconomic complementarities' (p. 261). It should be said-in fairness-that Albert Feuerwerker refers to the revolution as a prerequisite of successful economic development. More important, Dwight Perkins rightly bases his economic analysis on the recognition that 'China's revolution created political conditions that made possible major shifts in economic policy' (p. 148); and that the Chinese revolution, unlike the changes instigated by wealthy and educated middle classes elsewhere in developing nations, 'was fought in the name of and to a large extent by the poor' (p. 121). This dictum should indeed stand at the start of any enquiry into the 'transferability' of the Chinese Model, a subject which has been examined on previous occasions, as for instance in a special issue of World Development (May 1978). In the absence of an evaluation of the revolution as one of the most critical aspects of the Chinese Model, non-communist countries might easily be misled into believing that instead of the 'transfer of the complete package', selected programmes and policies could be transferred out of context. A good many years before, Victor Lippit had shown how decisive a role was played by the expropriation, without compensation, of China's landowners and by the abolition of their conspicuous consumption in favour of public investment. Stating this obvious fact does not exclude the possibility of other nations learning certain lessons from specific Chinese experiences and experiments. So as to guide those in search of solutions to seemingly insoluble problems, a
Indices of Industrial Output in Communist China
IT is a well-known fact that a high priority has been placed by the Chinese Communist government on the development of industry in their national economic plans. This extensive industrialization is clearly evidenced by the large share of total investment funds that was devoted to industry in their First and Second Five-Year Plans.1 In order to show the achievements, Peking has published, among other economic indicators, gross values of industrial production for the past years and the corresponding indices under various designations.2 However, there are at least two good reasons for an independent estimate of Communist China's industrial growth. First, it may serve as a check on the official claims by the Chinese Communists. Second, no meaningful comparison of the rate of industrial growth in Communist China with that of other non-communist countries can be made unless an industrial output index is recomputed for Communist China on the conventional methodological basis as employed by most non-communist countries. This paper is a preliminary report of a research project aiming to bridge this gap. Presented here are some highlights of the nature and implications of the industrial output indices we have computed for Mainland China. Owing to the limited space, the vast variety of sources of the official data and the detailed explanations on some estimates we have used in this study in order to remedy certain data deficiencies will not appear here, but they may be available on request. This paper contains two sections. Section I describes the nature of the indices and the underlying data. Section II is devoted to a discussion of some implications drawn from these indices. The indices cover a period from I949 to I959, that is, the first eleven years of the Chinese Communist regime. It was originally intended to bring the indices up to date to cover the actual production of I960. However, this was not possible due to the fact that the government in Communist China failed, by the end of I96I, to publish their economic achievements in ig60.