The Banking Firm: The Role of Signaling with Collaterals
In this paper we challenge basic results of signaling models. In our banking model each project of a borrower is described by a continuous density of outcomes. Different density functions are classified according to second stochastisch dominance. Combining these features we find that in a banking model collateral is no longer in a position to signal the degree of riskiness of the borrower to the lender. In most cases the equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium.
Prospect Theory and Two Moment Model: The Firm Under Price Uncertainty
Within the prospect theory the paper examines production and hedging decisions of a competitive firm under price uncertainty. We consider the prospect theory for the firm's utility function in the two moment model known as (mu,sigma)-preference. In contrast to the literature our findings show that the production under uncertainty can be larger than in the certainty case. Furthermore, we demonstrate that although the futures markets are unbiased the firm is overhedging.
The Role of Environmental and Technology Policies in the Transition to a Low-Carbon Energy Industry
In a dynamic general equilibrium model we study the interplay between gradual and structural change in the transition to a low-carbon energy industry. We focus on the welfare-theoretic consequences of diverging social and private rates of time preference and a time-to-build feature in capital accumulation. Both features are particularly important in the transformation of energy systems. We show that only a combination of environmental and technology policies can achieve a socially optimal transition. We thus provide a new reason for environmental regulation to be complemented by technology policy such as a non-distortionary investment subsidy.