Challenges of Triangular Relations: The US, the EU, and Turkish Accession
The US government became deeply involved in European Union (EU)–Turkey relations from the mid-1990s and has provided extensive diplomatic support for full Turkish membership in the EU since then. Washington's strategic considerations have been paramount in the US government's approach to Turkey's full integration into the EU. The US policy on this issue has played a constructive role in Turkish–US relations. However, it has also created strains in transatlantic ties, since the pressure the US has put on the EU has angered many European officials, who resent what they view as interference in the EU's internal affairs. The US has become more sensitive to the complaints voiced by European leaders and EU officials, and it has adopted a more subtle approach to the issue of Turkish membership. While Washington continues to support Turkey's European integration, it has also recognised that the accession process is likely to be lengthy.
The Cyprus Obstacle on Turkey's Road to Membership in the European Union
textabstractIntroduction: Turkish-Greek relations and the Cyprus problem following the Turkish
intervention of 1974 have occupied an important place throughout the
evolution of the relations between Turkey and the European Union (EU).1
These two issues, often linked, figured among the most difficult to handle.
The fact that Greece became a member of the EU in 1981 has complicated
matters further, especially for the EU. From that point on, the EU could no
longer keep its benevolent neutrality towards its two allies. Consequently,
the road towards the amelioration of Turkish–EU relations passed via
Athens and Nicosia,2 despite Turkey’s desire to keep the resolution of these
issues separate from the question of its accession to the EU.
What Happened to Suicide Bombings in Israel? Insights from a Terror Stock Model
An analysis of three years of suicide bombing data in Israel reveals an increase in such attacks through March 2002 followed by a steep decline through the end of 2003. The authors propose a terror-stock model that treats the suicide bombing attack rate as a function of the number of terrorists available to plan and execute suicide bombings. The intent of Israeli tactics such as targeted killings and preemptive arrests is to reduce the capacity of terror organizations to commit attacks. When fit to the data, this model suggests that the targeted killing of terror suspects sparks estimated recruitment to the terror stock that increases rather than decreases the rate of suicide bombings. Surprisingly, only the deaths of suspected terrorists, and not Palestinian civilians, are associated with such estimated recruitment. Although Israeli actions have reduced the rate of suicide bombings over time, it is preventive arrests rather than targeted killings that seem more responsible for this outcome.