On the definition of terrorism according to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon
The definition of terrorism applied by the STL. Does a customary definition of the crime of terrorism exist?
Introduction: The STL Interlocutory Decision on the Definition of Terrorism – Judicial Ingenuity or Radicalism?
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), set up in The Hague to try those responsible for the 2005 bombing that killed former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others, is the first international court with jurisdiction over the crime of terrorism.1 On 16 February 2011, the STL Appeals Chamber issued an Interlocutory Decision on the applicable law, having been asked by the pre-trial judge to clarify the law on 15 points.2 This unanimous Decision is a landmark ruling that has sparked debate amongst legal practitioners and scholars. Two of those, Kai Ambos and Ben Saul, will comment on the ruling in this symposium. As an introduction to their comments, we briefly discuss the most important points of the Appeals Chamber’s decision. The Chamber answered the questions put to it by the pre-trial judge under the following headings: (I) Interpretation of the STL Statute, (II) The notion of terrorism to be applied by the Tribunal, (III) Other crimes falling under the jurisdiction of the STL, (IV) Modes of criminal responsibility, and (V) The question of cumulative charging. As to the first issue – the interpretation of the STL Statute – the Appeals Chamber held that the Tribunal is to apply Lebanese law as interpreted and applied by Lebanese courts3 unless such interpretation or application is unreasonable, would result in manifest injustice, or is non-consonant with international principles and rules binding Lebanon.4 Interestingly enough, the Chamber does not rely on international law in that modest manner, namely as a correction mechanism or for the sole purpose of filling a lacuna. Instead, it adopts an activist ‘internationalist approach’ by granting
The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral Convictions into Law
Professor Michael Perry's new book, Morality, Politics, and Law, is an ambitious attempt to address the extent to which moral and religious beliefs in a pluralistic society, such as ours, can legitimately influence law. He departs from the common opinion in legal circles that moral beliefs are a matter of taste or "values," and defends an older conception that it is possible to attain moral "knowledge." ' He also departs from the "liberal political-philosophical project," 2 which claims that it is possible (and desirable) for governments to steer a neutral course between competing moral understandings of the good. This, he suggests, is an illusion, and a disguise for the imposition of a particular moral structure without opportunity for open deliberation and reflection. Professor Perry brings some refreshing common sense to these riddles of moral philosophy. His "naturalist" approach has obvious roots in Aristotle-not a bad place to begin thinking about ethics. His dismissal of