The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act: Federal Leadership in State Reform
The policies advanced by the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, while generally viewed as a success, are seen by some as a failure that may even abet juveniles in the commission of crime. After tracing the evolution of federal juvenile justice legislation and examining arrest and treatment data, the authors confront the criticisms aimed at the Act, and find reason for considerable optimism. Nationwide, the number, proportion, and rate of juvenile arrests have fallen more than the juvenile population, and many states appear to have made substantial progress in improving the processing and treatment of juveniles. The authors conclude that the Act is a continuing source of federal leadership for state innovation.
Mapping the shadow carceral state: Toward an institutionally capacious approach to punishment
The expansion of the US carceral state has been accompanied by the emergence of what we call the ‘shadow carceral state’. Operating beyond the confines of criminal law and justice institutions, the shadow carceral state expands penal power through institutional annexation and legal hybridity, including: (1) increased civil and administrative pathways to incarceration; (2) the creation of civil ‘alternatives’ to invalidated criminal statutes; and (3) the incorporation of criminal law into administrative legal processes in ways that enhance state carceral power. Although legal doctrine deems civil and administration sanctions to be ‘not-punishment’, we call for a broad understanding of penal power and the carceral state.
KANT'S SECOND THOUGHTS ON RACE
During the 1780s, as Kant was developing his universalistic moral theory, he published texts in which he defended the superiority of whites over non-whites. Whether commentators see this as evidence of inconsistent universalism or of consistent inegalitarianism, they generally assume that Kant's position on race remained stable during the 1780s and 1790s. Against this standard view, I argue on the basis of his texts that Kant radically changed his mind. I examine his 1780s race theory and his hierarchical conception of the races, and subsequently address the question of the significance of these views, especially in the light of Kant's own ethical theory. I then show that during the 1790s Kant restricts the role of the concept of race, and drops his hierarchical account of the races in favour of a more genuinely egalitarian and cosmopolitan view.