Counter-proliferating the rogue states
President George W. Bush, in his State of the Union speech in January 2002, described Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an “axis of evil” and accused them of seeking to acquire and develop weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, biological). Further, Under Secretary of State John Bolton said that Cuba, Libya and Syria could be grouped with these as “rogue states”. In doing so, the mere alleged acquisition, without any stated intent, of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) weapons and delivery systems was designated a threat to local, regional and global stability and security, given the terror and fear they invoked. The ensuing policy agenda and process of arms control (non-proliferation) and disarmament (counter-proliferation) was based on the vulnerability management of these capabilities. This was premised on the refusal of the labelled rogue states to accept the international norms of recognized arms control practices of diplomacy, international negotiation, compliance, regulation, transparency and verification. It is upon this assumption that the crux of the argument exists of a clear case for pre-emptive or preventive armed force against rogue states. On this basis, this article will, through its analysis, settle the outstanding question of whether war against rogue states can be considered a just war, based upon historical precedents. The first of such wars against a rogue state is that waged against Iraq (2003), where the alleged Iraqi WMD capability has not yet been shown to exist. Approaching this mandates rethinking basic notions and mannerisms of international defense and security. America cannot act as world policeman indefinitely. This projects the need for an alternative to unilateral counter-proliferation by way of pre-emptive military action; namely a “Hague Style Convention on Proliferation” to reintroduce the international community of nations to a self-regulatory multi-polar approach towards arms control and disarmament. Given the options, it is clear that there is a consensus to the ends. While the means to the end might be arguable, there is Defense & Security Analysis Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 343–354, December 2004
Master spoiler: a strategic value of Kessler Syndrome
ABSTRACT Massive chain reaction among the orbital debris population, also known as Kessler Syndrome, is generally perceived as a universally hostile scenario. However, the article argues that intentional massive pollution of orbits might be a tool in weak space powers’ strategic arsenal. Given the technological restrictions and irreversible escalatory potential of such a step, its utilization is, nonetheless, extremely limited. It is argued that total spoiling of the utilization of space services and access to outer space would be viable only to a very low number of actors in scenarios of grave threat to their existence, territorial integrity or survival of their regimes.
Frontline Diplomacy: Humanitarian Aid and Conflict in Africa
This text considers the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance and the extent to which it sustains or prolongs conflict. It addresses three themes: how emergency aid can exacerbate conflict; how to minimize negative consequences of aid; and how humanitarian aid might contribute to peace building.