The Relationship of International Criminal Tribunals to Domestic Courts: Towards a New Division of Labor? (L'Articulation Entre Tribunaux Penaux Internationaux Et Juridictions Nationales: Vers Un Nouveau Partage Des Competences Judiciaires?)
International criminal justice claims to challenge the very fundamentals of the international legal order. Yet international criminal justice is also still very much a work in progress. It success will depend on how well it can deal with its great founding dilemmas, while respecting international law and its continuity. No question seems more central yet more ambiguous to international criminal tribunals' existence, in this context, than how they relate to domestic courts. This is an issue which in fact raises anew the very conundrum at the heart of international criminal tribunals' creation and identity. On the one hand, international criminal tribunals can be seen from a "universalist" perspective which argues that they are first and foremost about the emergence of a global public order; on the other hand, they can be conceived from a "sovereignist" angle, which sees their prime duty as working for the benefit of states whose crimes they are judging. It is by putting this problematic relationship back into its overall evolution and, in particular, by focusing on what a "non-functioning" domestic court is under international law, that it will become possible to transcend that ambiguity. It will appear that the issue of what is a domestic court that is either "unwilling" or "unable" is in fact an old international law question whose understanding can be improved by a dynamic reading of the evolution of international law. In final analysis, however, it may be that the International Criminal Court's capacity to emancipate itself entirely from the political will be limited, as the Prosecutor adopts a prosecutorial policy which, in itself, is unlikely to be reducible to law's categories.
A Fresh Look at the Meaning of the Doctrine of Denial of Justice under International Law
About four decades ago, an eminent jurist described the doctrine of denial of justice as “l'une des plus anciennes et “l'une des plus mal elucidees du droit international.” Another writer, also noting the persistent confusion over the meaning of the doctrine, suggested that the term denial of justice could as well be removed from the language of international law. Despite such suggestions, the doctrine of denial of justice, whose origin has been traced back to antiquity, has been retained, and international lawyers have constantly attempted to elucidate its meaning. In doing so, however, international lawyers, such as Alwyn Freeman in his classic book on the subject, have, for reasons explained elsewhere, eschewed the attempt to define the term justice as such. They have concentrated mainly upon the conduct that has most frequently been regarded as constituting a denial of justice. Thus, from its origin and development, the term denial of justice may be said to have been used in the following three senses: In its broadest sense, this term [denial of justice] seems to embrace the whole field of State responsibility, and has been applied to all types of wrongful conduct on the part of the State towards aliens. In its narrowest sense, this term has been limited to refusal of a State to grant an alien access to its courts or a failure of a court to pronounce a judgment. In an intermediate sense, the expression “denial of justice” is employed in connection with the improper administration of civil and criminal justice as regards an alien, including denial of access to courts, inadequate procedures, and unjust decisions.
La inseguridad jurídica en normas de contratación estatal
It is established by different studies that the issue of government procurement has been marred by several factors, the test objective to publicize these factors, we take as starting point the constant conflict between the branches of government to try and organize this subject; will collect and analyze diverse regulatory and case material in order to achieve evidence and demonstrate the different concepts of constant change that produces excessive regulation of the subject procurement and is in turn causing rapid changes that result in legal uncertainty for our law on the Contract Status.