INDO-IRANIAN TIES: THICKER THAN OIL
This article examines the nature and extent of the Indo-Iranian relationship. Interest in this bilateral relationship piqued in the United States due to the policy debate surrounding the United States-India civilian nuclear agreement and the ever-deepening Iranian nuclear crisis. While it has become de rigueur to suggest that this relationship is centered on hydrocarbon politics, this article contends that the Indo-Iranian relationship has much more to do with India’s great power aspirations and concomitant expansive agenda for Central Asia. This article concludes with some reflections on the limits of this relationship and the importance of India to international efforts to contain Iran.
"Natural Friends"? Relations between the United States and India after 2001
Since the end of the Cold War, India has been very much in the ascendant, not only economically 
and technologically, but also from the military and political point of view. Many 
observers are therefore already talking about a world power of the 21st century emerging 
on the Indian sub-continent. It is not surprising, therefore, that India is playing an 
increasingly important role in the foreign and security policy considerations of the United 
States, the world’s only remaining superpower. 
Their respective size, power and geostrategic position mean that bilateral relations between 
the world’s most mighty and the world’s most populous democracy are a significant 
factor for the future world order. Central questions which are relevant for world 
politics are common positions with regard to the “war on terror”, on the one hand, and 
differences over the legitimacy of armed intervention in the sovereignty of other states, on 
the other. The long-term characteristics of their respective foreign and security policies 
are particularly noticeable in the attitude of the two states towards international law (in 
the context of war and peace), perhaps one of the most important instruments for protecting 
and shaping the global order. 
Despite common political values such as democracy, pluralism and rule of law, the relationship 
between the United States and India during the East-West conflict and in the 
following few years was characterized by alienation rather than friendship. India, which 
had had to struggle for its independence from Great Britain, looked on uneasily as the 
United States took on the legacy of the former colonial powers within the framework of its 
anti-communist foreign policy (for example in Vietnam) and supported coups to overthrow 
democratically elected governments in South and Central America. On the other hand, New 
Delhi’s reputation suffered significantly in Washington as a result of India’s role as a leader 
of the Non-Aligned Movement and its proximity to the socialist economic model of the 
former Soviet Union. The “thaw” did not begin until India started to gradually open up its 
economic system in the early nineties. Paradoxically, following initial U.S. sanctions, India’s 
nuclear tests in 1998 also prompted a positive re-assessment of India’s role in American 
foreign and security policy. From then onwards, the relationship improved noticeably 
and assumed a new strategic character following the events of 11 September 2001. 
India has been the target of terrorist aggression since it was founded in 1947. The biggest 
problem for New Delhi in the meantime is transnational Islamist terrorism. Anti- 
Indian, militant Islamic fundamentalism is nourished primarily by the continuing Indian- 
Pakistani conflict over the Kashmir region. This has led to three wars (1947/48, 1965, 
1999) between the two neighbouring nuclear powers, also bringing them to the verge of 
nuclear war in 1990, 1999 and 2001/2002. It is not surprising therefore that India takes a 
keen interest in the fight against terrorism and in international cooperation which serves 
this goal. 
The attacks of 11 September 2001 suddenly provided India with an opportunity to close 
ranks with the world’s largest military power on the basis of converging interests. India 
offered the United States its full and unreserved support in the “war on terror” in an unprecedented declaration of solidarity. Shortly afterwards, U.S. President Bush and the 
Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee described in a joint declaration the common war on terror 
as the mainspring of their countries’ mutual relations. When the Indian sub-continent 
was hit by a new wave of terrorism from Pakistan in 2001/2002, the United States increasingly 
supported the Indian position and exercised tremendous political pressure on its ally 
Pakistan, despite the fact that it urgently needed Pakistan’s support in the fight against the 
Taliban regime in Afghanistan. All things considered, the Indian Government’s decision to 
side with the United States in the fight against transnational terrorism can be regarded as a 
political success. For the first time, the United States described the elections in Jammu and 
Kashmir in autumn 2002 as “free and fair”, and called upon the Pakistani Government to 
put an end to transnational terrorism emanating from its territory. Moreover, the antiterrorism 
alliance, which was forged following the attacks of 11 September 2001 and was 
further consolidated in the course of the wave of terror in India in 2001/2002, prepared the 
ground for expanding bilateral relations between Washington and New Delhi in other 
fields. 
As a result, both states have not only expanded their trade relations spectacularly in 
recent years, but have also intensified their military cooperation. Furthermore, a recent 
nuclear agreement with the United States means that India has de facto officially been 
admitted to the club of nuclear weapons states. The so-called nuclear deal means that 
India now has access to the world’s nuclear market, a factor which is extremely important 
for the country’s energy supplies. 
The partnership with a thriving India is playing an increasingly important role in the 
United States’ “Grand Strategy”, particularly in the context of Washington’s competition 
for power with its challenger, China. Washington wants New Delhi to act as a counterbalance 
to China in Southern Asia in order to contain Beijing’s influence in the region. Many 
observers conclude that India and the United States are not merely strategic partners, but 
much rather “natural friends”: two democracies with the same opponents (China, Islamist 
terrorism), the same values, transnational networks and concurring economic interests. 
However, it would be overhasty to presuppose perfect harmony between Washington and 
New Delhi. 
Contrary to the hopes of policy-makers in Washington, India did not simply let itself 
become integrated in the United States’ foreign and security policy.
Auf den ersten Blick scheint nichts naheliegender zu sein als ein enges Bundnis zwischen den USA und Indien. Die machtigste und die bevolkerungsreichste Demokratie der Welt verbinden dieselben Gegner (China, islamistischer Terrorismus), gleiche Werte und ahnliche wirtschaftliche Interessen. 
So zogerte Indien nach den Anschlagen vom 11. September 2001 nicht, den USA seine volle Unterstutzung im Anti-Terror-Kampf zuzusagen. In der Folge intensivierten beide Lander ihre bilateralen Beziehungen auch auf anderen Gebieten. Perfekte Freundschaft? 
Harald Muller und Andreas Schmidt zeigen in ihrem Report die Grenzen dieser Freundschaft auf. Nach ihrer grundliche Analyse kommen sie zu dem Schluss, dass es betrachtliche Differenzen uber die Gestaltung der internationalen Ordnung gibt. Anders als fur die USA haben Volkerrecht und internationale Organisation fur Indien unbedingte Prioritat und gelten nicht als Behinderung, sondern als Stutze der eigenen Souveranitat. So distanzierte sich Indien nachdrucklich vom Irak-Krieg der USA und zeigte damit deutlich, dass es nicht bereit ist, sich vorbehaltlos an die USA zu binden. 
Mit dieser Wertschatzung von Volkerrecht und Vereinten Nationen liegt Indien deutlich naher an der Politik Berlins als an der jungeren Politik der USA und konnte damit in Zukunft auch fur Deutschland ein interessanter Verbundeter werden, wenn es darum geht, sich gelegentlich gegen den grosen Bruder in Washington durchzusetzen.
India and the Middle East
Part 1 Introduction: common historical experience of imperial domination the British policy of divide and rule the Khalifat issue the Palestine problem the creation of Pakistan the Kashmir issue India's general foreign policy objectives non-alignment - rationale and resilience non-alignment and balance of power global balance regional balance sub-continental balance India and the superpowers India and China self-sufficiency bilateralism. Part 2 India's politico-diplomatic interest in the Middle East - Egypt and Iraq: the Pakistan factor India's fears of an Islamic bloc Kashmir nonalignment a Cairo-centric policy India and Egypt Egypt's opposition to the formation of an Islamic bloc the Pakistani-Egyptian equation Indo-Egyptian cooperation the Suez Crisis, 1956 the cooling of Indo-Egyptian relations India and Iraq Indo-Iraqi relations till 1958 the Baghdad Pact, 1955 the 1958 Ba'athist coup and after the Iraqi foreign minister's visit to India, 1967 the importance of growing Indo-Iraqi ties Indo-Iraqi political honeymoon Iraq and the Janata interregnum, 1977-79 Indo-Iraqi relations in the 1980s. Part 2 India's politico-diplomatic interest in the Middle East - Iran and Saudi Arabia: India and Iran alignment and alienation the Nehru factor the Nasser factor Islam and Pakistan as factors the changing scenario of the 1960s the changing Pakistan-Iran equation the changing tenor of Indo-Arab relations the Bangladesh crisis, 1971 the Arabi-Israeli War, 1973 Khomeini's Iran and India India and Saudi Arabia the initial harmony the Nasser factor Islam and Pakistan as a counter Kashmir the post-1973 period Indo-Saudi ties in the 1980s. Part 3 India's security and strategic interests in the Middle East: India's security concerns and policies in the Middle East till 1971 fears of an Islamic bloc the Baghdad Pact, 1955 non-Pakistani security concerns the Indo-Pakistan wars and the Middle East India's security concerns in the Middle East since 1971 Pakistan and Iran Pakistan and Saudi Arabia the "Islamic bomb" Islamic fundamentalism Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Part 4 India's economic interests in the Middle East: trade labour remittances oil loans and aid civil construction and industrial projects. Part 5 Indo-Israeli relations: at the UN India's position - a reformulation recognition issue diplomatic relations Bandung, 1955 the Suez Crisis, 1956 covert contacts moments of pettiness the Arab-Israeli War, 1967 the Yom Kippur War, 1973 the Janata government and Israel Israeli invasion of Lebanon, 1982 the Pakistani bomb and Indo-Israeli cooperation Indo-Israeli relations - a reappraisal. Part 6 India and the Palestine Liberation Organization: India and the Palestine question till 1969 differences between the Indian and Arab approaches Indian support at the UN for the Palestinian refugees. (Part contents).