Today or not today: Deregulating the Russian gas sector
Abstract Although Russia is the world's biggest producer of natural gas, its ability to maintain timely and reliable supply to meet the growing global demand has come under question in recent months. The gas war with Ukraine notwithstanding, concern has been raised by a number of observers that underinvestment in the gas sector will lead to a systemic failure of the state monopolist OAO Gazprom to increase or even maintain current levels of production. Yet with a quarter of European gas coming from Russia, and with increasing presence of Gazprom in European downstream operations (such as Germany, Hungary, and other CIS states) as well as seemingly closer ties with Algeria, another major supplier of gas to Europe, there has been a strong reaction from Europe's policy-makers to decrease dependence on Russian gas. Deregulating and liberalising the gas sector would see the lifting of restrictions to foreign or independent investors wishing to gain access to Russian reserves, as well as the unhindered access to the pipeline infrastructure and export markets. It would also signal the unbundling of Gazprom and an end to the artificially low price of gas to the domestic consumer. This paper discusses whether deregulation is the optimal way to raise capital, attract investment and increase supply security for Russia's Western neighbours. In doing so, the paper identifies the objectives of the EU as the importer whilst trying to align them with the objectives of the Russian Federation as the exporter, in the current political context.
Under the Kremlin's Thumb: Does Increased State Control in the Russian Gas Sector Endanger European Energy Security?
Abstract This article examines the effect of increased state control over the Russian gas sector and its ultimate impact on energy security in Europe. The various mechanisms by which the state has acquired ownership (or quasi-ownership) over several independent gas producers as well as the potential dangers this poses for European energy supplies are scrutinised. Due to the demonstrated inefficiency of Russian state-controlled companies, negative consequences, such as slowed production growth, are likely to result. The few remaining independent gas producers are still hampered in their development due to the government's reluctance to implement structural reforms in the Russian gas sector.
ThAT is The qUesTion : CoMPAring The AdvAnTAges And disAdvAnTAges oF TesTiFying ACross siTUATions
Criminal defendants are under no obligation to testify on their own behalf and doing so can lead to deleterious outcomes. Specifically, if the defendant has a criminal record, the prosecution can introduce this into evidence in an effort to impeach the defendant’s testimony. Yet, failure to take the stand and proclaim one’s innocence arouses suspicion among jurors that may influence verdicts. In this study, we manipulated whether the defendant testified or not. In those instances where he did testify, we varied whether he had (1) no criminal record, (2) a criminal record for a similar offense, or (3) a criminal record for a dissimilar offense. Results indicated that mock jurors who adjudicated the defendant guilty were influenced by the defendant’s failure to take the stand. Furthermore, mock jurors were more likely to render guilty verdicts when they perceived the defendant as less trustworthy, more aggressive, and less credible (as a witness). However, in no instance were these decisions and perceptions related to the manipulations. This suggests that mock jurors were suspicious of the defendant regardless of whether or not he testified, or whether he had a criminal record.