Financing Regional Development Through Development Banks
A combination of various sources of financing is a necessary prerequisite to finance any development as well as regional development. Sources of financing can be monitored and evaluated from the aspects of suitability (cost aspect), availability and abundance. Ultimate users of funds give advantage to financial sources whose availability and abundance is at the maximum level, and costs are at their minimum. For the most part, development bank funds meet the above mentioned requirements, since the main function of these banks is to finance certain activities under special (more favourable) conditions. The significance, justification and evaluation of this form of financial resources in the regional development segment are becoming more and more prominent. The subject of this paper is the amount and conditions of development bank loans in the area of Osijek-Baranja and Vukovar-Srijem Counties.
Gender Pay Gap in the European Union Labor Market
The participation of women in the European Union labor market has been increasing over recent years, putting an end to the notion that women are a marginal part of the labor force. However, such increased integration of women into paid work has neither ended the traditional gender divide between jobs nor it translated into gender equality in terms of economic opportunity and economic participation in the labor market. The purpose of the paper is to briefly discuss the gender pay gap in the EU labor market. The paper defines gender pay gap and provides a brief theoretical overview of the underlying causes of such pay asymmetry between men and women. Statistics provided for EU 25 reveal that the current policy attempts to reduce such a gender asymmetry still lack improvement in practice. The paper concludes with selected policy suggestions aiming to make a progress in the issue of the gender equality in pay.
Strategy and Manipulation in Medieval Elections
There are many goals in developing electoral protocols, including a desire for a system which is transparent, in that it is clear what the rule or procedure to follow is; nonmanipulable, in that it is not in a person’s best interest to misrepresent their preferences; honest, in the sense that it elects the ‘right’ candidate; and not open to strategizing, i.e., bribery or collusion. However, these desiderata are in tension with each other: Often, transparent electoral procedures are the least strategy resistant, and many honest procedures encourage manipulation. Thus a balance between these different goals must be sought. In modern times, since the seminal result on vote manipulation, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem [5, 6], much attention has been devoted to developing voting rules where manipulation is never in the best interest of the voters [4] or which are computationally too complex for the average bounded agent to be able to manipulate [1]. This focus on computational aspects of electoral methods is one of the hallmarks of modern studies on voting. But pursuit of these goals is not restricted to modern times: Those participating in elections in the Middle Ages also sought transparency, non-manipulability, honesty, and strategyproofness in so far as these properties can be consistently expressed in a single procedure. However, given the lack of computational sophistication in the Middle Ages, alternate approaches were needed in order to promote honesty, discourage strategizing, etc. These approaches can be classified as either external (constraints introduced outside of the electoral procedure, such as incentives for coming to consensus quickly) or internal (constraints introduced within the electoral procedure, such as voting rules which cannot be manipulated without adverse effects, or which are too difficult for the average bounded agent to manipulate). Surveying examples of both approaches in the context of medieval ecclesiastical and secular elections provides an interesting comparison to modern electoral procedures. Elections in the Middle Ages were used for the same reasons that they are today: To select suitable candidate(s) for a particular office, duty, or obligation. However, it is important to note that the term electio was used in the Middle Ages in a broader sense than our modern ‘election’. Its primary sense was ‘selection’ or ‘choice’, and only secondarily ‘election’ in the modern sense. Thus, many records which purportedly discuss elections are not discussing elections of the type which interests us. We can identify four categories of medieval electoral processes: (1) Election by an external authority having no direct interest in the election; (2) Indirect election, where electors name other electors who then select or elect the officials; (3) Election by lot; and (4) Election by ballot. Elections of the first and third types are generally computationally uninteresting; the first type corresponds to dictatorial voting rules, and the third type collapses to probability theory. In general, interesting voting methods are found only in the fourth type, election by ballot, though they can also occur in indirect election.