What Owners Want and Governments Do - Evidence from the Oregon Experiment
In 2004, Oregonians approved ballot Measure 37 by 61% to 39%. The measure answered the calls of critics of contemporary takings jurisprudence by requiring either compensation for losses caused by land use restrictions imposed after acquisition of the property or waivers of the restrictions. Three years later, voters acted to repeal most of Measure 37 by an even greater margin. Together the birth, brief life, and rapid demise of Measure 37 comprise an unusual natural experiment in property law. The results of this experiment go to the heart of debates about regulatory takings in property law and policy. First, the Oregon experience resulted in a sea change in owners’ understandings of property rights. The 2004 vote reflected the popular understanding of land use restrictions as invasions of property rights. Faced with effective repeal of those restrictions, as reflected in passionate testimony before the Oregon legislature, Oregonians came to see the regulations as in fact an important source of property rights. In effect Measure 37 brought the background government and community support on which property rights depend into the foreground of owners’ consciousness. Second, government responses to Measure 37 challenged arguments that compensation will dispel the fiscal illusion under which governments operate and result in more efficient regulation. Rather than weigh costs and benefits, in all but one of thousands of cases, the government waived the regulations rather than compensate. These decisions were made without analysis of the benefits of the regulations waived, and despite predictably negative results. Finally, the thousands of claims and research catalyzed by these claims complicated questions of the compensation to which owners are justly entitled. While limited, therefore, the Oregon experiment provided valuable grounded evidence for the continuing debate about takings law and the ways that property mediates the relationships between individuals, communities, and the state.
Optimal Compensation for Regulatory Takings
One argument for forcing governments to pay compensation for regulatory takings is that they will tend to over regulate if compensation is not paid. In this paper, a model is developed in which there are two groups in society, one of which bears all of the costs of regulation. Regulation provides (potentially unequal) benefits to both groups. In the absence of compensation, a biased government will not choose the efficient level of regulation. If taxes are non-distorting, a compensation rule can be designed to achieve the first best outcome. The optimal rule always involves a positive degree of compensation regardless of the direction of the government bias. If the government is biased in favor of the regulated group, then compensation will increase the level of the regulation. When taxes are distortionary, the first best outcome cannot be achieved, and the optimal level of compensation may be 0.
Did the metamorphosis from Export Processing Zones to Special Economic Zones improve the efficiency of trade enclaves in India?
In this paper, the efficiency of seven conventional Special Economic Zones in India is analyzed, by adopting a stochastic production frontier technique, for the period between 1986–1987 and 2007–2008.Results indicate that although the efficiency scores of these enclaves have improved over the years, specifically with the introduction of the SEZ policy (2000–2001), it is far below the threshold level as identified in the literature. Besides, one can also observe a discrepancy emerging between better export earning zones and efficient zones. On the determinants side, policy intervention and large geographical area, accompanied by clustering of units, are found to have impacted the efficiency scores of these enclaves positively.