TOLERATION AND POLITICAL CONFLICT
1 B. Williams, ‘Tolerating the Intolerable’, in Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, Selected, edited with an introduction by A.W. Moore, Princeton/Oxford, Princeton Universitity Press, 2006, pp. 126-134, 126. 2 C. McKinnon, Toleration. A criticical introduction, London/New York, Routledge, 2006, pp. 6-7; cf. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 126-1130. 3 A.E. Galeotti, Toleration as Recognition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 20; cf. R.H. Dees, Trust and Toleration, London/New York, Routledge, 2004, p. 4. 4 H. Paetzold, ‘Review essay. Respect and toleration considered’, in Philosophy and Social Criticism 34 (2008) 941-954, p. 951. TOLERATION AND POLITICAL CONFLICT
Tolerance as a Virtue of Justice
Abstract This article argues that the civic virtue of tolerance has to be understood as a virtue of justice. Based on an analysis of the concept of toleration and its paradoxes, it shows that toleration is a ‘normatively dependent concept’ that needs to take recourse to a conception of justice in order to solve these paradoxes. At the center of this conception of justice lies a principle of reciprocal and general justification with the help of which a distinction between moral norms and ethical values is possible. While the former are strictly binding and define the realm of the tolerable, the latter are subject to reasonable disagreement that calls for toleration. Essentially, the virtue of tolerance is the capacity and willingness to accept the principle and criteria of justification of generally binding norms in an ethically pluralist society.This virtue is analyzed with respect to its normative and epistemological components. Finally, the idea of a ‘tolerant character’ is discussed.
Two weddings and a lawsuit: Marriage litigation in fourteenth-century Portugal
Based on one of the few surviving records of marriage cases brought before
 ecclesiastical courts in fourteenth-century Portugal, this article offers a rare
 glimpse of marriage practice in a small village in a remote corner of Western Europe
 and the complex ties that bound its inhabitants and which secular and ecclesiastical
 authorities sought to regulate. Clear parallels can be drawn with the patterns of
 marriage litigation observed in England and Northern France, but evidence also
 suggests that royal legislation played an important part in the resolution of marital
 disputes and in the shaping of conjugal behaviour.