From a European to a common security and defence policy. IES WORKING PAPER 5/2010
The Lisbon Treaty has introduced significant changes in the field of EU security and 
defence. On the one hand, important institutional reforms, such as the creation of a 
renewed High Representative, have of course a great impact on this policy field. On the 
other hand, the Lisbon Treaty has also introduced specific innovations in the security and 
defence of the European Union. The mutual defence clause and the new mechanisms for 
flexible cooperation such as the permanent structured cooperation, are only some of the 
key innovations. Generally, the European Security and Defence Policy receives its own 
section in the Treaty on European Union and is rebranded as Common Security and Defence 
Policy. Thus, the Lisbon Treaty sets the objective for a common policy in this field. 
However, does this reform really provide for the means for the realization of such a 
common policy? Furthermore, does the Lisbon Treaty increase the importance of CSDP or is 
the increasing importance of this policy field just reflected in the Treaty text? These are 
the main questions that the present paper attempts to address through the analysis of the 
new institutional setting of the post-Lisbon security and defence policy, as well as through 
the examination of the specific innovations in this area.
The budget of the European Union
The budget of European Union is the act which each year authorizes the funding of all Community activities and operations. It allocates resources in a manner which reflects current priorities and policies. The paper presents mainly the following aspects: how is the European Union budget draw up, what is the budget used for and how is the budget spent and monitored
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services (DS 285)
Abstract The controversial gambling decision of the Appellate Body is mostly important because of examination of the nature of Access under Article XVI GATS, the relationship of that Article to Articles XIV and XVII GATS, and the parallels with Articles III, XI, and XX GATT. Notably, the Appellate Body took the position that an apparant internal regulatory measure, which, nonetheless, had equivalent effect to a zero quota, violated Article XVI GATS. A similar measure in the area of goods would have been examined under Article III GATT and require a showing of discrimination. The facts of the case would have allowed the decision to be based on Article XVII GATS. Most of this paper deals with this issue. We agree with this interpretation of Article XVI by the Appellate Body but are critical of its hermeneutics, suffering from a textual fetish and a policy phobia. Some other elements in the decision are also examined critically.