The Political Issue of the Ascension of Isaiah: A Response to Enrico Norelli
Enrico Norelli argued in 2003 that the references to martyrdom in the Ascension of Isaiah are symbolic rather than actual. This article challenges his reliance on the Mishnah in support of the assertion that Isaiah dies as a martyr in the contest between true and false prophecy in the second-century church. It argues that the progress of thought in chs. 1–5 suggests that martyrdom is more obviously an actual and recent feature of the authors’ experience than a merely symbolic entity. The martyrdom of Ignatius is further considered in this context. This result is the insistence that the Ascension of Isaiah has a strong ‘political’ dimension in both of its halves. Such evidence must be inserted into the evaluation of the emerging Christian movement, not least in its response to both Jews and the Romans as factors external to, yet bearing on, the church, at the time of writing.
Disjunction of Heavenly and Earthly Times in the Ascension of Isaiah
In the Ascension of Isaiah, the descent and ascent of the Beloved decisively bisects heavenly time around a past crisis, but earthly time runs through five periods with the crisis at the future overthrow of Beliar. The disjunction between these two views of time defines a soteriology of glory, summoning the reader to live in the experience of heavenly glory and to eschew Beliar's earthly glory.
PLEASURE, POWER, AND THE PURSUIT OF COMMUNISM: SOVIET YOUTH AND STATE-SPONSORED POPULAR CULTURE DURING THE EARLY COLD WAR, 1945-1968
art, with certain students accused of “showing political immaturity, failing to understand the Party’s positions on art.” This episode constituted part of a broader crackdown on abstract art by the Khrushchev administration from late 1962, precipitated the the Soviet leader’s derision of such art forms in December 1962 at the Manege exhibit. Such instances demonstrate the limitations of the top-level promotion of youth grassroots initiative, as the Khrushchev leadership reigned in youth autonomy when it threatened to go beyond the boundaries of the permissible. The dates cited above have particular resonance, since both 1957-58 and 1962-63 represent two periods when those at the top of the Party hierarchy moved away from pursuing a more pluralistic, tolerant policy course, due to anxiety inspired by both sharpening Cold War hostilities and domestic developments. In these periods, official rhetoric censured what it labeled as 639 TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 13, d. 546, ll. 56-57. This is likely related to criticism of the Party associated with the fallout from the Secret Speech and the Hungary invasion. For more, see Polly Jones, “From the Secret Speech to the Burial of Stalin: Real and Ideal Responses to De-Stalinization,” in Jones ed., The Dilemmas, 41-63. 640 TsAOPIM, f. 6083, op. 1, d. 52, ll. 166-67. 641 Susan E. Reid, “In the Name of the People: The Manege Affair Revisited,” Kritika 6.4 (Fall 2005): 673716. 642 On these anxieties, see Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer, 156-88.