Exchange Market Pressure and the Credibility of Macau's Currency Board
In this study, we assess the credibility of the currency board arrangement (CBA) of the Macau Special Administrative Region by studying the relationship between exchange market pressure (EMP) and the anchors of a rule-based CBA, namely, interest rate arbitrage, exchange rate arbitrage and economic discipline. A pure CBA signals its credibility by allowing the first two anchors to function automatically and by pursuing sound fiscal policies. The analysis’ results suggest that Macau’s CBA has been characterised by a state of low volatility since late 1992, with the brief exception of the East Asian financial crisis period. The paper’s main finding is that fiscal fundamentals seem to have a more pronounced role in reducing EMP’s variability during periods of low volatility whilst interest rate arbitrage is more important in periods of high volatility. We conclude that Macau’s CBA is credible at present as reflected in the low frequency of observed EMP, in the narrowing of Macau’s interest rate differential vis-a-vis U.S. interest rates and in Macau’s substantial fiscal reserves.
Exchange Market Pressure in Central Europe: An Application of the Girton-Roper Model
This paper applies the Girton-Roper model of exchange market pressure (EMP) on four Central European economies (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) over the period 1995-2008. The results suggest that there is a strong negative relation between domestic credit and EMP in all countries. We also found evidence of positive effect of domestic income on EMP in most of the countries. The paper reveals that EMP in the Czech Republic and Hungary was mostly absorbed by changes of exchange rate while changes in reserves absorbed EMP in Slovakia. The levels of EMP estimated do not pose a significant threat for fulfilment of the exchange rate stability convergence criterion.
Deliberative Democracy and the Resource Curse: A Nationwide Experiment in Tanzania
Oil and gas discoveries in developing countries are often associated with short-sighted economic policies and, in response, calls to insulate resource management from populist impulses. We report on a randomized experiment testing methods to overcome this apparent tension between sound resource governance and democratic politics. Soon after Tanzania’s discovery of major natural gas reserves, we invited a nationally representative sample of voters to an intensive public deliberation of policy options featuring nationally recognized experts and small-group discussions. Democratic deliberation reinforced the public’s strong preference for rapid spending of gas revenues, but also increased support for various prudential and economically orthodox measures, including independent oversight of gas revenues, limits on government borrowing, and selling gas abroad rather than subsidizing fuel at home. These effects were driven by deliberation per se, rather than a pure information treatment, and show no evidence of contamination by facilitatoror peer-effects in group deliberations. www.cgdev.org Justin Sandefur, Nancy Birdsall, James Fishkin, and Mujobu Moyo