Australia's Nuclear Horizon: Moving Beyond the Drumbeat of Risk Inflation
The 2006 Switkowski review report commissioned by the Howard government highlighted some of the economic and foreign policy benefits that could flow from a major expansion of Australia's uranium export program. It also identified the long-term advantages for Australia's energy security flowing from the development of a national nuclear industry. The report has been condemned by anti-nuclear groups, who argue that proposals for Australia's continuing and, possibly, deeper involvement in the nuclear fuel cycle are unacceptable. The primary risk identified is that Australian uranium exports will contribute to global nuclear proliferation pressures, but claims concerning nuclear-related terrorism are also an increasingly common theme in anti-nuclear commentary. These arguments, in turn, are framed within a broader set of assumptions about the ‘immoral’ nature of any engagement in the nuclear fuel cycle. This article examines the most prominent claims put forward by anti-nuclear proponents and argues that many of them are based on an unnecessary inflation of risk.
Australia's engagement in the nuclear fuel cycle: the non-proliferation dimension
Australia's position on nuclear energy issues cannot be fully appreciated without understanding its commitment to non-proliferation. For 30 years, Australia's uranium exports have been contingent on states accepting some of the most stringent safeguards in the world. Successive Australian governments have argued that Australia's involvement in the nuclear fuel cycle as a supplier of uranium helps bolster the coherence of the non-proliferation regime by encouraging other states to follow strict preconditions for export. Yet, since 9/11, Australia's formal alliance with the USA has placed limits on the degree to which it has been willing to pursue non-proliferation policies at odds with Washington's approach.
Stemming the Tide: Arms Control in the Johnson Years
The author, a Nobel laureate, former chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and for many years a key participant in the formulation of U.S. arms control policies, draws on his personal diaries to offer an insider's account of the efforts made during the presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson to bring nuclear arms under international control. Seaborg also outlines both national and international issues that should be resolved in order to reduce the risk of nuclear war.