The Passion for Reason
Moral values play a great role in legal argumentation and decision making. To be sure, both are based on such institutional sources as statutes, precedents, legislative history etc. Yet, even justice is obviously relevant in legal reasoning. This has been the case since times immemorial, e.g. in Rome (where the common law, ius gentium was supposed to express justice), England (law and equity) and also Scandinavia (“lov” and “dom”). In modem law, the statutes are sometimes “read” in the way alien to a layman, in order to obtain reasonable decisions.
Juristic Definition of Law
The jurists often think that the application of law ought to be strictwithout arbitrary corrections. Otherwise, instead of the rule of law there would exist the rule of officials or of judges. But at the same time, jurists are of the opinion that sometimes they ought to correct valid law in order to secure the adequacy of law to life. Otherwise they would risk the wellknown reproach summum ius summa iniuria. Thus, it seems that the application of law cannot be simultaneously accommodated to both tasks set by jurists. This is the first juristic antinomy. It can be solved, however, by showing the possibility of a compromise between these tasks.' Jurists often think that the general theory of law ought to examine the subject which they commonly call "valid law." But many authors have shown that a general theory of valid law in this sense is impossible.2 Thus, it seems that the general theory of law cannot realize the task set by jurists. This is the second juristic antinomy.3 I will try to solve it thus: a definition of law will be suggested concordant with juristic intuitions and, at the same time, calling "legal" only phenomena about which one can establish scientific generalizations. We will see that this definition refers to the same compromise which enables us to solve the first juristic antinomy. Thus, both antinomies will be discussed in the same paper.
The Illinois Legislature
It further provides that the county must have voted "for license" at the last general election on that subject. Also, that the petition, together with all names and addresses on it, must first be published in at least two issues of some newspaper published in the town where the petition was circulated, for at least ten days before the petition is acted upon. Any officer authorized to issue licenses violating the provisions of this act is liable to a fine of from $500 to $1000 and imprisonment in the county jail for from two to twelve months. The act does not repeal any local laws forbidding the sale of liquor, but is cumulative to all anti-liquor laws now in force. The final section is: "This Act being necessary for the public peace, health, and safety, shall take effect and be in force from and after December 31, 1913." The postponement of the time for going into effect was made io order not to interfere with licenses already issued and to give the liquor dealers time to adjust themselves to the provisions of the act. But the liquor people denied that the emergency clause could be attached to an act the operation of which was postponed nearly a year. They called attention to the omission of the word "immediate," and declared that the postponement was in itself sufficient evidence that it was not necessary for the "immmediate preservation of the public health, peace and safety." A petition for reference was circulated and the necessary number of signatures was secured. The attorney-general was first asked for his opinion as to whether the act was subject to the referendum. That officer stated that he could find no precedent for such a case. Basing his decision on reason and common sense he declared the act not subject to the referendum. The circuit court was then asked for a write of mandamus against the secretary of state to compel him to submit the act, but the court refused to grant it, saying that the attachment of the emergency clause was evidence that the legislature intended to prevent its submission. At this writing the question is pending on appeal before the supreme court.