Properties of the Histogram Location Approach and the Extent and Change of Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity in the EU
The histogram location approach has been proposed by Kahn (1997) to estimate the fraction of wage cuts prevented by downward nominal wage rigidity. In this paper, we analyze the validity of the approach by means of a simulation study which yielded evidence of unbiasedness but also of potential underestimation of rigidity parameter uncertainty and therefore of potential anticonservative inference. We apply the histogram location approach to estimate the extent of downward nominal wage rigidity across the EU for 1995-2001. Our data base is the User Data Base (UDB) of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). The results show wide variation in the fraction of wage cuts prevented by nominal wage rigidity across the EU. The lowest rigidity parameters are found for the UK, Spain and Ireland, the largest for Portugal and Italy. Analyzing the change of rigidity between sub periods 1995-1997 and 1999-2001 even shows an widening of the differences in nominal wage rigidity. Due to the finding of large differences across the EU, the results imply that the costs of low inflation policies across the EU differ substantially.
A Tax Evasion - Bribery Game: Experimental Evidence from Ukraine
This paper examines the issue of tax evasion by enterprises through underreporting activity. We develop a view of this phenomenon as an equilibrium of the game between a businessman and an imperfectly monitored supervising official, in which a businessman can hide part of his profit and offer bribe to official. We determine conditions under which such tax evasion and bribery become wide-spread in the society, resulting in shadow economy. The game is put into an experimental setting in Kiev, Ukraine, with the emphasis of spreading of the tax evasion and bribery activity in the laboratory setting. We find that once it becomes known that substantial share of subjects playing the role of supervising officials agree to accept bribes from subjects playing the role of businessmen, the latter offer bribes more aggressively. Yet, this in turn does not affect the behavior of subjects playing the role of supervising officials.
Reforming the Russian legal system
Preface 1. Pre-revolutionary Russian law 2. The Bolshevik experience 3. The history of legal reform 4. Forging a new constitution 5. Citizens and the state: the debate over the Procuracy 6. In search of a just system: the courts and judicial reform 7. Law and the transition to a market economy 8. Legal reform in the republics 9. Legal reform and the transition to democracy in Russia Appendix Notes Index.