Law and the Open Internet
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is poised to issue a new set of internet access regulations and policies. These would prohibit broadband service providers, such as AT&T or Comcast, from “discriminating” against unaffiliated content providers. The FCC’s proceedings, and the network neutrality debate, concentrate on two economic questions (i) whether to broadband service providers can or will steer traffic to affiliated content limiting consumer access and (ii) how to preserve the Internet’s capacity for creativity and innovation. Despite economics’ prominence in the debate, economic theory cannot answer these questions. Theoretical models of vertical foreclosure are ambiguous and inconclusive and empirical data nonexistent. And, the debate misapplies normative, legal concepts of “discrimination” and “equal treatment” onto internet traffic management engineering. These concepts worked in a circuit switched telephone network in which “equality” can exist at switch points, but make little sense in the packet-switched internet in which “equality of outcomes” of internet experience is what matters.With its narrow focus, the debate has also missed that actual internet disputes, such as the BitTorrent-Comcast Order, involve many legal concerns, such as privacy, that have little to do with “discrimination” as such. Policymakers lack theoretical understanding and empirical knowledge concerning internet industrial organization. We, therefore, argue for a “bottom up” approach to regulation, analogous to fair use in copyright law, with case-specific adjudications creating a common law of acceptable network practice.
Is zero rating the end of net neutrality and the open internet? An analysis of business practices and policy approaches
The open internet and net neutrality are intertwined. People debate whether net neutrality safeguards part of the open internet or not. The commercial aspect is paramount. Zero rating is one of these practices that is often discussed, especially in relation to developing countries.
 The open internet regulation addresses commercial practices. It is, however, vague and can be interpreted in multiple ways. To answer the question if zero rating is going against net neutrality or if it enables net neutrality, five case studies were analysed and 18 experts interviewed. To
 support the case studies, documents were analysed. In certain circumstances, it is useful to zero rate information. Zero rating mostly violates net neutrality and the open internet, because of its imbedded discrimination. Some zero rating offers are beneficial and do not harm competition.
 This mostly concerns offers evolving around e-learning, health and government information.
Does Video Delivered over a Telephone Network Require a Cable Franchise?
The current wave of telecommunications reform stands to significantly affect the provision of video over telephone networks. Several states have enacted legislation to promote the provision of video services by competitors, including telephone companies, and federal legislation regarding video franchising is also under consideration. We examine whether, on legal or policy grounds, video services provided over a telephone network should be regulated as a traditional cable service or whether a different approach is warranted. We evaluate the history of cable regulation and the services that Congress envisioned to be regulated when it first drafted legislation establishing a regulatory framework for cable television services in 1984. We then examine numerous differences between video services delivered over a telephone network and those that Congress envisioned when regulating cable television service in 1984 and in subsequent years when it revised the Cable Act of 1984. Finally, we find that municipal franchise requirements for video services provided over telephone networks would reduce consumer welfare. We estimate that, upon ubiquitous deployment by telephone companies of fiber networks to provide video service, cable customers living in areas not yet overbuilt by a wireline distributor of multi-channel video programming would enjoy the benefits of lower prices of roughly $7.15 per month, or $85.80 per year. A five-year net present value of the annualized savings would be roughly $26.52 billion (assuming a five percent discount rate). To the extent that direct broadcast satellite operators respond to lower cable prices with price reductions of their own, the net present value of the welfare benefits from telephone company entry into the market for multi-channel video programming distribution would increase by roughly 50 percent, to nearly $40 billion. We estimate that, even without considering any welfare gains owing to higher quality, these consumer welfare gains from entry exceed the potential loss in franchise fee revenues to municipalities by a factor of nearly three to one.