Judicial Activism and the Supreme Court of India
The Supreme Court of India has emerged as the most powerful organ of State and amongst the foremost constitutional courts in the world through the instrument of Public Interest Litigation (PIL), the exercise of writ jurisdiction and the expansive interpretation of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution of India. Judicial activism impinging on every facet of governance has become the norm in recent times. This paper traces the evolution of judicial activism since Independence through pronouncements of the Supreme Court. It brings out distinct phases in this evolution – the initial phase of judicial restraint, the first phase of an activist judiciary where the Supreme Court primarily was concerned with protection of fundamental rights and humane treatment of citizens; the second phase where the Supreme Court took keen interest in preservation and protection of the environment; the third phase where the Supreme Court extended its reach into the socio-economic arena and the fourth phase when issues of transparency and probity in governance led to interventions by the Supreme Court. The paper illustrates through judgements of the Supreme Court that the instrument of the PIL and the exercise of writ jurisdiction by the Supreme Court go beyond the traditional postulates of judicial processes and political theory on separation of powers between the organs of State.
An Intellectual History of Judicial Activism
Over the past six decades, the term "judicial activism" has become an immensely popular tool for criticizing judges' behavior. Despite the term's prominence, however, its meaning is obscure, and its origins have been forgotten. This article seeks to correct such deficiencies through a detailed conceptual and historical analysis of judicial activism. First, the article analyzes legal rhetoric, describing the post-war origins of the phrase "judicial activism," its eighteenth- and nineteenth-century prehistory, and its rise to prominence in the late twentieth-century. Second, the article rejects as incoherent modern definitions of judicial activism, and instead describes a functional "concept" of activism based on unenforced norms of judicial propriety. Because judges make many decisions without supervision by other public officials, debates over judicial role are crucial to our legal system's operation. These debates - regardless of whether they use the word "activism" - illustrate why the concept of judicial activism remains inescapably important. Third, the article offers a two-part, common-law method of determining whether particular decisions or judges are activist. This method contrasts with other ways of evaluating activism such as textualism, originalism, and jurisprudential theory. If widely adopted, the proposed approach to judicial activism might yield clearer perceptions of judicial behavior and might reduce destructive schisms between expert and non-expert discussions of judicial role.
The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review
This Essay states the general case against judicial review of legislation clearly and in a way that is uncluttered by discussions of particular decisions or the history of its emergence in particular systems of constitutional law. The Essay criticizes judicial review on two main grounds. First, it argues that there is no reason to suppose that rights are better protected by this practice than they would be by democratic legislatures. Second, it argues that, quite apart from the outcomes it generates, judicial review is democratically illegitimate. The second argument is familiar; the first argument less so. However, the case against judicial review is not absolute or unconditional. In this Essay, it is premised on a number of conditions, including that the society in question has good working democratic institutions and that most of its citizens take rights seriously (even if they may disagree about what rights they have). The Essay ends by considering what follows from the failure of these conditions. author. University Professor in the School of Law, Columbia University. (From July 2006, Professor of Law, New York University.) Earlier versions of this Essay were presented at the Colloquium in Legal and Social Philosophy at University College London, at a law faculty workshop at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and at a constitutional law conference at Harvard Law School. I am particularly grateful to Ronald Dworkin, Ruth Gavison, and Seana Shiffrin for their formal comments on those occasions and also to James Allan, Aharon Barak, Richard Bellamy, Aileen Cavanagh, Arthur Chaskalson, Michael Dorf, Richard Fallon, Charles Fried, Andrew Geddis, Stephen Guest, Ian Haney-Lopez, Alon Harel, David Heyd, Sam Issacharoff, Elena Kagan, Kenneth Keith, Michael Klarman, John Manning, Andrei Marmor, Frank Michelman, Henry Monaghan, Veronique Munoz-Darde, John Morley, Matthew Palmer, Richard Pildes, Joseph Raz, Carol Sanger, David Wiggins, and Jo Wolff for their suggestions and criticisms. Hundreds of others have argued with me about this issue over the years: This Essay is dedicated to all of them, collegially and with thanks. WALDRON 3/23/2006 6:53:29 PM the core of the case against judicial review