ARMAMENT ESCALATION AND REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST
This paper is a critical evaluation of the challenges of the insecurity posed by the production of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the Middle East. It argues that the insecurity in the Middle East particularly arise as a result of the alteration of the regional military balance, destruction as a result of covert means and as a result of defense mechanism which has consistently endangered the lives and properties of the inhabitants of the Region. The paper concludes that unless the crisis between the Israelis and the Arab World is resolved and Arabs are prepared to accept the existence of the State of Israel and as long as the Israelis face what they regard as an existential threat, they are going to be reluctant to surrender what they see as an ultimate guarantor of their security. Keywords : Proliferation, security, defence, destruction.
Security implications of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
The issue of the proliferation of nuclear weapons has been given  widespread international focus arising from the incessant security  imbalance in the world. This is so because these weapons have posed a  nuclear threat to both the “Superpowers” and the rest countries of the  world, knowing fully well that the nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them could inflict terrible damage on the world. Our review of relevant  literature on this research problem indicates the existence of a yawning gap that we feel a further research can help to fill. The researcher has  resorted to the use of the system and security theories for our analysis. In a political system such as ours, we need to bear in mind the fact that when there is a nuclear crisis in Japan, North Korea, Ukrain, etc. The political  system is affected in one way or the other and the issue of security cannot be separated from human existence. We have therefore analyzed the  proliferation of nuclear weapons from the context. The paper concludes that all countries should oppose the production, acquisition, or trade in  separated plutonium or highly-enriched uranium and by supporting efforts in the conference on disarmament and elsewhere to achieve an equitable global ban on such materials. Keywords : Security, weapons of mass of destruction, proliferation,  superpowers
Cytoplsmic uridine phosphorylase of rat liver. Characterization and kinetics.
Abstract Uridine phosphorylase (uridine:orthophosphate ribosyltransferase, EC 2.4.2.3) of rat liver cytoplasm has been purified 1900-fold. Initial velocity patterns of the phosphorolysis of uridine or deoxyuridine and of the synthesis of uridine indicated a sequential mechanism. Product inhibition patterns with uracil or ribose 1-phosphate as inhibitors were consistent with an "ordered Bi Bi" reaction in which inorganic phosphate is the first substrate to bind to the enzyme and ribose 1-phosphate the last product to leave the enzyme. The most highly purified enzyme fractions still retained uridine-, deoxyuridine-, and thymidine-cleaving activities in the ratio of 10:7:1 at pH 7.4. The fractions separated into a major and a minor band of protein on electrophoresis in phosphate buffer. Aging of the enzyme with loss of activity resulted in an increase in the proportion of the minor band. The pH optimum of the enzyme for uridine cleavage was 8.2, for deoxyuridine cleavage, 6.5, and for uridine synthesis, 8.5. Uridine or deoxyuridine synthesis was inhibited 50% in the presence of 1 mm uracil. The enzyme did not catalyze the direct transfer of ribose from uridine to uracil in the absence of phosphate. Uridine protected the enzyme to a greater degree than phosphate against inhibition by o-iodosobenzoate. Thus, at least one sulfhydryl group and possibly three are present at or near the active site. Uridine cleavage, uridine synthesis, and deoxyuridine cleavage were inhibited by deoxyglucosylthymine. The phosphorolysis of deoxyuridine and thymidine by thymidine phosphorylase, also purified from rat liver cytoplasm, was not inhibited by deoxyglucosylthymine. The molecular weights of both uridine and thymidine phosphorylases were estimated to be 110,000.