Organizational Disruption and Change in Mozambique's Peace Process
Mozambique returned to peace after a brutal civil war, despite imperfect disarmament. Many accounts make some appeal to the motivations of the parties to seek peace as a case of ‘political will’. While these explanations are not false, an approach that looks to the Renamo insurgency's organizational structure can flesh out explanations of how changing attitudes moved the insurgency as well as illuminate points at which outside peacekeepers may find leverage. In particular, the UN mission capitalized on Renamo's difficulties and exploited its military focus and narrow political base by widely dispersing Renamo combatants during demobilization and fostering political party structures. These tactics helped to disrupt Renamo's ability to act as a spoiler.
War and Gropings towards Peace
Traditionally, the onset of civil war in Mozambique has been explained in terms of first Rhodesian, and then South African, destabilisation. Although to a large extent this explanation is true, it is important to recognise that the conflict gathered a new internal dynamic as the post-independence regime quickly became associated with excess revolutionary zeal in the policies adopted, both at home and abroad, and the manner in which they were carried out.
Tethering the Administrative State: The Case Against Chevron Deference for FCC Jurisdictional Claims
Like many other agencies, the Federal Communications Commission has seen significant regulatory growth under President Obama. But unlike health care, financial reform, and other areas, this growth has come without statutory guidance from Congress. The FCC’s assertion of jurisdiction over broadband service is reminiscent of its earlier attempts to regulate cable and to deregulate telephone service, efforts that courts have viewed skeptically in the absence of specific statutory authorization. But this skepticism is in tension with Chevron, which grants agencies substantial deference to interpret ambiguities in the statutes that they administer. This article argues that Chevron deference should not extend to agency jurisdictional claims, such as the FCC’s claim to authority over broadband. For both constitutional and policy reasons, courts should distinguish between agency action that fills a gap in a statutory scheme and action that defines the outer boundary of that scheme. As the Commission’s net neutrality project winds its way through the judicial system, courts should not allow the agency to define the limits of its own authority, and should instead search closely for a grant of authority from Congress.