The Human Security Paradigm: Peace with Justice and Equality?
This chapter explores the possibilities of achieving global justice and peace. The author contends that the hopes for peace and the so-called ‘peace dividend’ following the end of the Cold War had the potential for nations to consider bold new attempts to define national and global security in a uni-polar world. The author also discusses a more sobering view that crafting a new approach to a changing world requires deliberate and concerted efforts. The chapter advances the notion of ‘human security’ that is advanced through: (1) protection—primarily the state-based responsibility to protect people from critical and pervasive threats, with institutions, civil society and nongovernmental actors, and the private sector also playing a key role in that protection and (2) empowering individuals and communities by developing their capabilities to make informed choices and to act on their own behalf. The author believes that at the core human security policies seek to enhance both individual and societal security by promoting “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear.” 
 
 
Keywords: 
 
justice; 
global justice; 
global security; 
war; 
peace; 
equality; 
human security; 
globalization
The Limits of the human security agenda: the case of Canada's response to the Timor crisis
Enthusiasts of human security argue that what is needed in the post‐Cold‐War period is a foreign policy agenda that is more ‘people‐centred’ than the state‐centred focus of security policy during the Cold War period. Among the most enthusiastic proponents of the human security paradigm in the 1990s was the Canadian government, which, in partnership with a number of other like‐minded governments, sought to press the human security agenda, taking a number of human security initiatives. However, since the late 1990s, we have seen a paradox: the concept has attracted increased attention from scholars while its salience among policy‐makers appears to be declining. Using the case of the Canadian government's policy towards the crisis in Timor in September 1999, we explore the difficulty that policy‐makers have had in moving human security from the rhetorical realm to the level of concrete policy that makes a difference to the safety of people whose security is threatened. We conclude that there was a significant gap between Canada's human security rhetoric and Ottawa's actual policy in Timor. While the Canadian government did eventually contribute troops to the International Force, East Timor (INTERFET), we show that Canada's response was slow, cautious, and minimalist. There was neither the willingness nor the capacity to be at the forefront of the efforts to send a robust force to East Timor. This case demonstrates some important limits of the human security agenda, and why this agenda remained so firmly in the realm of the rhetorical in the 1990s.
The Categorical Stability of Gambling Motives Among Community-Recruited Gamblers: A Longitudinal Assessment
Over the past decade, several motivational models have been proposed to explain the role of motives in gambling disorder. In the model captured by the four-factor Gambling Motives Questionnaire Financial (GMQ-F), gamblers are described as being primarily motivated to gamble for ‘coping’, ‘enhancement’, ‘social’, and ‘financial’ reasons. Although this model has received significant empirical support; to date, research assessing the role of motives in gambling disorder has been primarily cross-sectional in nature. Thus, the extent to which gambling motives remain stable over time has yet to be explored. In the current study, the stability versus fluidity of self-assessed gambling motives was investigated using the Quinte Longitudinal Study, a longitudinal dataset of gambling behaviour collected over 5 years. Gambling motives of 2795 gamblers were examined over all five annual assessments. The total proportion of gamblers who stayed in the same primary motive category across each of the 5 consecutive assessments was 22%, indicating substantial fluidity in category membership. Substantial movement between categories was seen for each GMQ-F group, as well as an additional group of non-classified motives. Logistic regression analyses suggest that greater resistance to gambling fallacies significantly predicted stability between the baseline assessment and a follow-up 1 year later, but gambling severity did not. Potential limitations in the study design and opportunities for future research are discussed.