Eichen im Aargau – eine besondere Verantwortung für das Fricktal | Oak in the canton of Argovia – a special responsibility for the Fricktal
A targeted nurturing of oak in the canton of Argovia goes against the natural development of forest stands where the dominant, naturally occurring species is beech. Because of this, afforestation with oak is both work intensive and costly and is therefore concentrated on sites where silvicultural, economical and ecological aspects have been taken into account. With the help of a simple model showing areas where, above all, oak is nurtured, comprehensively mapped forest stands were classed according to competitiveness and correlated to thermal levels, that represent an important site factor for oak. One important aspect surrounding the issue is the preservation of genetic resources and an adequate supply of appropriate seed from chosen autochthonal, indigenous oak stands. In addition, the endangered population of middle spotted woodpecker, which is tied to widespread sites of aged oak-rich deciduous stands, should be fostered. Taking ecological priorities into account a possible area to nurture oak has bee...
Autochthon oder allochthon? Ein molekulargenetischer Ansatz am Beispiel der Eichen (Quercus spp.) in der Schweiz
Autochthonous forests are considered to be valuable genetic resources, and their conservation is incorporated into many national forest programmes. The methods applied so far often do not allow to distinguish between autochthonous and allochthonous stands. Therefore, alternative methods are needed. In this study, we analyse spatial patterns of variation of chloroplast DNA to estimate the extent of the human influence on oak stands in Switzerland.
The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral Convictions into Law
Professor Michael Perry's new book, Morality, Politics, and Law, is an ambitious attempt to address the extent to which moral and religious beliefs in a pluralistic society, such as ours, can legitimately influence law. He departs from the common opinion in legal circles that moral beliefs are a matter of taste or "values," and defends an older conception that it is possible to attain moral "knowledge." ' He also departs from the "liberal political-philosophical project," 2 which claims that it is possible (and desirable) for governments to steer a neutral course between competing moral understandings of the good. This, he suggests, is an illusion, and a disguise for the imposition of a particular moral structure without opportunity for open deliberation and reflection. Professor Perry brings some refreshing common sense to these riddles of moral philosophy. His "naturalist" approach has obvious roots in Aristotle-not a bad place to begin thinking about ethics. His dismissal of