The Suppressed Misappropriation Origins of Trademark Antidilution Law: The Landgericht Elberfeld's Odol Opinion and Frank Schechter's The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection
Frank Schechter’s 1927 article "The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection", which remains the most cited law review article ever written on trademark law, is generally recognized as the origin of the concept of trademark dilution. Yet as is less well recognized, Schechter’s discussion of trademark dilution in "Rational Basis" relied heavily, though cagily, on the true origin of the concept: the 1924 Odol opinion of the German Landgericht Elberfeld. "Rational Basis" quotes extensively from the Odol opinion and borrows much of the opinion’s argument and terminology. Yet Schechter suppressed and apparently deliberately deleted from his quotation of the opinion its central holding, that "[i]t is opposed to good morals to appropriate thus the fruits of another’s labor in the consciousness that that other will or may thereby be damaged." This brief essay, a chapter in the forthcoming "Intellectual Property at the Edge: The Contested Contours of IP" (Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss and Jane C. Ginsburg eds. 2013), argues that Schechter deliberately sought in Rational Basis to obscure the true nature of the Odol case and of antidilution protection, and that even a century later, his effort at obfuscation remains more or less a success, at least in the United States. What Schechter sought to obscure in "Rational Basis" is that the Odol case was not, strictly speaking, a trademark case. Rather, it was a misappropriation case that happened to involve a trademark. Schechter sought to suppress this basic truth — that the concept of trademark dilution is essentially a misappropriation concept — in order to sell his proposed doctrinal reforms to an American audience altogether suspicious of misappropriation doctrine and increasingly under the sway of American Legal Realism. To do so required a great deal of finesse, or to but it more bluntly, of dissembling, and "Rational Basis" is full of it. Due both to its frequent misdirection and ambiguity and to its emphatic suppression of any suggestion that trademark dilution is a form of misappropriation, "Rational Basis" has remained an altogether open text. Concepts like "blurring" and "tarnishment" have rushed in to fill the void left in the absence of misappropriation. Even now, in the face of ever more scholarly and judicial commentary recognizing that dilution is essentially a form of "free-riding," and likely one that typically inflicts no substantial harm on the misappropriated mark, the obfuscatory nature of Schechter’s text enables the concept of dilution to survive — and thrive — behind a fog of indeterminacy.
Applying the law on trade mark dilution
The origins of EU trade mark dilution law are controversial and the action today is difficult for courts to understand and apply in practice. This article looks at the origins of the action in the Odel case and in US legal writing, before turning to the challenges facing the modern practitioner dealing with dilution cases in the EU courts today. Particular analysis is given to the criterion of “uniqueness”, now best understood as a unique reputation for certain products or services. In addition, the article examines the criterion of a “change in the economic behaviour of consumers” in the light of the Intel and Wolf Head judgments of the CJEU.
Common Law Property Metaphors on the Internet: The Real Problem with the Doctrine of Cybertrespass
The doctrine of cybertrespass represents one of the most recent attempts by courts to apply concepts and principles from the real world to the virtual world of the Internet. A creation of state common law, the doctrine essentially involved extending the tort of trespass to chattels to the electronic world. Consequently, unauthorized electronic interferences are deemed trespassory intrusions and rendered actionable. The present paper aims to undertake a conceptual study of the evolution of the doctrine, examining the doctrinal modifications courts were required to make to mould the doctrine to meet the specificities of cyberspace. It then uses cybertrespass to examine the implications of transposing property metaphors to the world of the Internet, characterized by the absence of resource rivalry and the reality of positive value enhancement through increased usage (i.e., a network effect, whereby participation in use by many is a condition for value in use by any). It is argued that the transposition of proprietary concepts to the Internet is done for purely instrumental reasons - reasons that derive neither from the nature of the resource nor its usage. The paper then evaluates whether such an instrumental use of proprietary concepts on the Internet has any effect on the meaning ordinarily attributed to the concept of property and the identification of property as an independent institution of moral significance. It concludes by showing that the relative neglect that doctrines such as cybertrespass have for identifying the boundaries of the res over which the property right is to operate, is capable of undermining the minimum core of any understanding of property as an independent institution.