Properties of the Histogram Location Approach and the Extent and Change of Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity in the EU
The histogram location approach has been proposed by Kahn (1997) to estimate the fraction of wage cuts prevented by downward nominal wage rigidity. In this paper, we analyze the validity of the approach by means of a simulation study which yielded evidence of unbiasedness but also of potential underestimation of rigidity parameter uncertainty and therefore of potential anticonservative inference. We apply the histogram location approach to estimate the extent of downward nominal wage rigidity across the EU for 1995-2001. Our data base is the User Data Base (UDB) of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP). The results show wide variation in the fraction of wage cuts prevented by nominal wage rigidity across the EU. The lowest rigidity parameters are found for the UK, Spain and Ireland, the largest for Portugal and Italy. Analyzing the change of rigidity between sub periods 1995-1997 and 1999-2001 even shows an widening of the differences in nominal wage rigidity. Due to the finding of large differences across the EU, the results imply that the costs of low inflation policies across the EU differ substantially.
A Tax Evasion - Bribery Game: Experimental Evidence from Ukraine
This paper examines the issue of tax evasion by enterprises through underreporting activity. We develop a view of this phenomenon as an equilibrium of the game between a businessman and an imperfectly monitored supervising official, in which a businessman can hide part of his profit and offer bribe to official. We determine conditions under which such tax evasion and bribery become wide-spread in the society, resulting in shadow economy. The game is put into an experimental setting in Kiev, Ukraine, with the emphasis of spreading of the tax evasion and bribery activity in the laboratory setting. We find that once it becomes known that substantial share of subjects playing the role of supervising officials agree to accept bribes from subjects playing the role of businessmen, the latter offer bribes more aggressively. Yet, this in turn does not affect the behavior of subjects playing the role of supervising officials.
International actors and trade unions during postsocialism and after: the case of Romania
Purpose 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of this paper is to explain why, in spite having a relatively powerful labour movement at the start of the economic transformation, Romania ended up with a highly deregulated system of industrial relations in the aftermath of the global economic crisis of 2009 and with trade unions which seem incapable to defend their interests. 
 
 
 
 
Design/methodology/approach 
 
 
 
 
The authors trace the changing role that Romanian trade unions had in national policy making and show that the beginning of 2000s represents a critical point for the power loss sustained by organised labour. 
 
 
 
 
Findings 
 
 
 
 
The authors argue that a key element for explaining labour’s decline is the growing pressure exercised by various international organisations for the adoption of deregulatory labour market reforms. While during the 1990s this pressure was circumvented by successive governments which peddled back and forth between union wage pressure and fiscal austerity measures, beginning with 2000s, EU accession conditionalities coupled with IMF and World Bank policy recommendations enabled the international deregulation agenda to be implemented without much opposition. 
 
 
 
 
Originality/value 
 
 
 
 
The paper brings new evidence on the impact of international actors on the Romanian collective bargaining and labour market institutions.