Estimation of genetic parameters for racing performances in German trotters after consideration of individual races.
INTRODUCTION The estimation of breeding values of German trotters has changed last year from BLUP sire model using traits such as average racing time per year and money earnings per year (Katona and Distl, 1989; Schmitt, 1996) to a multiple trait BLUP animal model which utilises individual race results for the traits rank at finish, racing time and earnings (Röhe et al., 2001). In several genetic evaluation procedures in Europe annual records of racing perfomances are used for estimation of breeding values (e. g. Langlois et al., 1997; Arnason, 1999). The main disadvantage of using annual records is that all available information, for example level of a race, driver, starting lane or race track, cannot be considered because they change from race to race. The environmental effects can be estimated much more accurately by using individual race results. That means, track conditions at each single record can be estimated directly and no pre-adjustment of records for these effects are necessary. Also, the effect of every single race can be estimated when using individual records of trotters. The genetic-statistical model of Röhe et al. (2001) included only the effect race track. In order to avoid possible bias it would be better to consider the effect of every single race instead of the effect race track. The inclusion of the race effect may also improve the genetic-statistical estimation for the trait rank at finish. The objectives of this study were (1) creation of a more appropriate genetic statistical model for evaluation of breeding values, (2) comparison of two different genetic statistical models regarding the individual race effect as fixed as well as ignoring this effect and (3) estimation of genetic parameters for the German trotter population using the most appropriate multiple-trait genetic model.
Agricultural and Food Science in Finland
A study was carried out to examine the effect of ammonium ferric hexacyanoferrate (AFCF) on the transfer of radiocaesium from grass silage to the tissues of male lambs. During ensiling, a formic acid based additive and AFCF were sprayed on grass contaminated with Cs and the mixture was allowed to incubate for 45 days. A dose of 21 mg AFCF d, fed to sheep offered contaminated silage for fourteen days, reduced Cs transfer to muscle by 45% compared to that of control sheep. An equivalent dose of AFCF administered in a capsule reduced transfer by only 3%. In another experiment, AFCF intake of 50, 100 and 150 mg d for ten days reduced Cs transfer to sheep muscle by 75, 82 and 86%, respectively. In control lambs, of average live weight 38 and 47 kg, the feed to muscle Cs transfer coefficient averaged 0.15 d kg, but equilibrium between tissue and feed Cs had probably not been reached due to the short feeding period. Increasing doses of AFCF from 0 to 150 mg d increased the faecal/urinary Cs ratio from 2 to 42.
The Posse Comitatus Act: Liberation from the Lawyers
"Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." --Posse Comitatus Act (1) Much has been written about the Posse Comitatus Act. As a few others have noted, much of this commentary is "just plain nonsense." (2) The majority opinion, however, including that of the Department of Defense, maintains that this 19th-century law strictly limits almost all DOD participation in any activity related to "law enforcement" or "homeland security." (3) This fundamental mischaracterization, while understandable, is potentially dangerous to national security and has done nothing to protect civil liberties. So how did a racist law from the bitter Reconstruction period morph, in many minds, into shorthand for the respected principle that Americans do not want a military national police force? In a nutshell: deliberate mischaracterization by the original supporters who hid behind patriotic language to strip the freed slaves of their nascent civil and voting rights; excessive focus on the false historical arguments as opposed to the law's actual text and ugly history; and some bad policy that misused a few key court decisions, and part of a statute, in a way that limited DOD efforts in the "war on drugs" at a time when Congress was pushing expanded participation. This article introduces the actual history and meaning of the Posse Comitatus Act, distinguishing clearly between the law and a misleading DOD regulation that requires an army of lawyers to navigate. Despite what you've heard, the Posse Comitatus Act is not a significant impediment to DOD participation in law enforcement or homeland security. The Act's Uninspiring Pedigree General Acceptance of Army Participation in Law Enforcement (1787-1861) While the nation's founders were deeply concerned with the abuses of the British army during the colonial period and military interference in civil affairs, the majority was even more concerned about a weak national government incapable of securing life, liberty, and property. Some vocal patriots sought to avoid a standing army and any federal control over the state militias; however, in the end, theirs was the minority view. The new Constitution did not contain the explicit limits and outright bans desired by some, even though the pro-Constitution Federalists explicitly argued that the standing army could assist in law enforcement efforts. The framers even debated the federal government's power to call out the posse comitatus (literally meaning the power or authority of the county) and did not prohibit this established feature of the common law. Clearly, the Posse Comitatus Act did not originate from the prevailing opinion during the revolutionary period. Legislative and executive actions in the early days of the American republic confirm that the use of federal troops or federalized militia to preserve domestic order, either as part of a posse comitatus or otherwise, was an accepted feature of American life under the new Constitution. In 1794, President Washington led federal troops into western Pennsylvania because unruly farmers refused to pay a whiskey excise tax. President Jefferson issued a broad proclamation that relied upon the Chief Executive's authority to call on the entire populace, military and civilian, to serve as a grand posse comitatus to counter Aaron Burr's planned expedition against Spanish territory. In 1832, President Jackson initially sent military forces toward South Carolina under a Jefferson-like posse comitatus theory to prevent secession. In an 1851 report to the Senate, President Fillmore stated that he had the inherent power to use regular troops to enforce the laws and that all citizens could be called into a posse by the marshal. …