Metodologie per la stima degli affitti figurativi ed impatto sulla distribuzione del reddito
In the relevant literature it is well established that imputed rents – a non-monetary income source for all households whose living accommodation is not rented at a market price - has to be accounted for in order to provide a more accurate and comparable measure of the total disposable household income. A more controversial issue is about the choice among distinct estimation approaches and how to operationalise them. This paper aims to analyse the impact of different estimation methods for imputed rents on the distribution of disposable income as well as on inequality measures, using data from EUSILC. Subjective rents – self-assessed values by the respondents - are compared with predicted values coming from econometric techniques, i.e. an hedonic regression model,being both methods coherent with the ‘rental equivalence value’ approach. Three main issues are assessed: i) pros and cons of each method; ii) if the tenure discount (the length of tenure), which turns to be a relevant factor in determining the observed values of the market rents, has to be taken into explicit account in predicting imputed rents; iii) how to prevent biases on model predictions eventually arising if a selection process between tenants at a market price and households living with different accommodation occurs.
Global Projections of Household Numbers Using Age Determined Ratios
A new method based upon age determined population ratios is described and used to estimate household population intensities (households per person). Using an additive and a bounded model household projections are given to 2050 for the world and to 2030 for seven fertility transition subgroups (cohorts) of the countries of the world. Based upon United Nations 2002 Revision data, from an estimated 1.56 billion households at 2000, household growth to 2030 is projected to be an additional 1.1 billion households, whether population increase is 1.3 billion persons under the United Nations low fertility variant or 2.7 billion persons under the high fertility variant. At that date over one third of all households are projected to be Chinese or Indian. By 2050 it is projected that there will be 3.3 billion households with a 95 per cent confidence interval on modelling error only of ± 0.5 billion. This compares with 3.2 billion in the Habitat: Global Report on Human Settlements 1996. The apparent similarity of total household growth under various scenarios conceals a wide range in the growth of household intensities across fertility transition cohorts. It is suggested that models, projections and error be reviewed biennially and that household and population projections be produced jointly.
Strategy and Manipulation in Medieval Elections
There are many goals in developing electoral protocols, including a desire for a system which is transparent, in that it is clear what the rule or procedure to follow is; nonmanipulable, in that it is not in a person’s best interest to misrepresent their preferences; honest, in the sense that it elects the ‘right’ candidate; and not open to strategizing, i.e., bribery or collusion. However, these desiderata are in tension with each other: Often, transparent electoral procedures are the least strategy resistant, and many honest procedures encourage manipulation. Thus a balance between these different goals must be sought. In modern times, since the seminal result on vote manipulation, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem [5, 6], much attention has been devoted to developing voting rules where manipulation is never in the best interest of the voters [4] or which are computationally too complex for the average bounded agent to be able to manipulate [1]. This focus on computational aspects of electoral methods is one of the hallmarks of modern studies on voting. But pursuit of these goals is not restricted to modern times: Those participating in elections in the Middle Ages also sought transparency, non-manipulability, honesty, and strategyproofness in so far as these properties can be consistently expressed in a single procedure. However, given the lack of computational sophistication in the Middle Ages, alternate approaches were needed in order to promote honesty, discourage strategizing, etc. These approaches can be classified as either external (constraints introduced outside of the electoral procedure, such as incentives for coming to consensus quickly) or internal (constraints introduced within the electoral procedure, such as voting rules which cannot be manipulated without adverse effects, or which are too difficult for the average bounded agent to manipulate). Surveying examples of both approaches in the context of medieval ecclesiastical and secular elections provides an interesting comparison to modern electoral procedures. Elections in the Middle Ages were used for the same reasons that they are today: To select suitable candidate(s) for a particular office, duty, or obligation. However, it is important to note that the term electio was used in the Middle Ages in a broader sense than our modern ‘election’. Its primary sense was ‘selection’ or ‘choice’, and only secondarily ‘election’ in the modern sense. Thus, many records which purportedly discuss elections are not discussing elections of the type which interests us. We can identify four categories of medieval electoral processes: (1) Election by an external authority having no direct interest in the election; (2) Indirect election, where electors name other electors who then select or elect the officials; (3) Election by lot; and (4) Election by ballot. Elections of the first and third types are generally computationally uninteresting; the first type corresponds to dictatorial voting rules, and the third type collapses to probability theory. In general, interesting voting methods are found only in the fourth type, election by ballot, though they can also occur in indirect election.