Restrained Policy and Careless Execution: Allied Strategic Bombing on the Netherlands in the Second World War
AbstractThis article examines the nature of Allied strategic bombing on the Netherlands in the Second World War. It discusses the endless controversy on strategic bombing, and adds the policy of bombing occupied countries, especially the Dutch involvement in bombing policy development, a quantitative analysis of bombing on the Netherlands, and three case studies to the existing narrative. The paper concludes that Allied bombing policy towards the Netherlands sought to maintain a balance between the usefulness of bombing and the risk of collateral damage. Further, it reveals the absolute magnitude of the bombing campaign in the Netherlands, which contrasts with existing history. This article concludes that the nature of strategic bombing on the Netherlands, notwithstanding the fact of sincere intentions and restrained policies, was that the execution of the bombardments regu- larly failed to attain the defined bombing goals. These failures caused extensive collateral damage, as illustrated by three case st...
Bargaining and Bombing During World War II in Europe
The Second World War is often regarded as a virtually total conflict, with few mutual restraints to bind the belligerents to less than maximum use of their destructive capabilities. While it is generally remembered that poison gas and bacteriological weapons were not used, these limits are usually cited as great exceptions to the rule. Relatively little notice has been taken of the restraints in Europe on the use of conventional high-explosive and incendiary bombs in aerial bombardment, restraints which remained in effect for an unexpectedly long time after the start of the war.
Analysis: The Agenda 2007 Proposals: Evolution or Revolution?
On 10 February 2004 the Commission published its proposal for the financial perspective 2007-2013. A week later it adopted the third report on economic and social cohesion. These two documents form the basis of the so-called ‘Agenda 2007 reforms’. They will be the greatest challenge for the enlarged EU after the intergovernmental conference, since they will determine the financial basis for EU policy-making until the middle of the next decade. The Agenda 2007 proposals certainly hint at courageous reforms, because they place a previously unheard-of emphasis on performance and quality. Under the proposals, structural operations should generate value for money, and the funds should focus on projects which generate added value at a European level. Overall the Commission’s proposals point in the right direction, because they balance, on the one hand, solidarity for the new Member States and weak regions in the old Member States with, on the other hand, investments in future tasks. Moreover, they constitute a paradigm shift. For the first time, the Common Agricultural Policy will not be the dominant expenditure category. Now it is up to the Member States to examine the proposals politically and find a compromise between sometimes very divergent interests. It is to be hoped that, during the debate over expenditure limits and division of funds, national interests do not outweigh European interests.