Educational Doctrines And Social Work Values: Match or Mismatch?
Abstract The CSWE accreditation standard requiring deans and directors to demonstrate commitment to the ethical values of the profession again raises questions about what commitment to ethical values means and about how determinations of adherence will be made. In this paper, two contrasting educational doctrines found in universities are reviewed. Aspects of each are found in social work statements of value. Special attention is given to their conflicting conceptions of students and the ideal learning environment. Following this, a sample of social work values and procedures for determining adherence to them are reviewed. Suggestions for further study are given.
The Value Base of Social Work
Abstract Values may be conceived along three basic dimensions which would account for the major value orientations shared by social workers and related to all aspects of their professional practice. These are: preferred conceptions of people, preferred outcomes for people, and preferred instrumentalities for dealing with people. Distinguished from “knowledge,” and adequately refined, these categories of values might constitute a guide for planning and action in social work practice and education. The predictability of professional behavior which might then result would also define the expectations of clients and society with respect to what the social work profession stands for and what it does.
KANT'S SECOND THOUGHTS ON RACE
During the 1780s, as Kant was developing his universalistic moral theory, he published texts in which he defended the superiority of whites over non-whites. Whether commentators see this as evidence of inconsistent universalism or of consistent inegalitarianism, they generally assume that Kant's position on race remained stable during the 1780s and 1790s. Against this standard view, I argue on the basis of his texts that Kant radically changed his mind. I examine his 1780s race theory and his hierarchical conception of the races, and subsequently address the question of the significance of these views, especially in the light of Kant's own ethical theory. I then show that during the 1790s Kant restricts the role of the concept of race, and drops his hierarchical account of the races in favour of a more genuinely egalitarian and cosmopolitan view.