A Dynamic Model of Collective Bargaining
We use high-low search algorithms to compute equilibria in a multi-period model of collective bargaining. In this model, a group of workers bargains collectively with a firm which knows the per period incremental value v of each worker. The workers don't know their individual values, but use high-low search to learn them, given the known distribution of values in the group. In the first period the workers make a common wage demand w1 and then the firm chooses a cutoff level y for the workers they will hire (i.e., those with v≥ y). Since y is observable through numbers hired, workers may update their beliefs about their values, based on whether or not they were hired. In later periods workers with common beliefs make common wage demands. The main question addressed in the paper is how the firm can choose the hiring cutoff level to hinder the workers' learning process. We find (Theorem 1) that the firm's equilibrium strategy is to (i) hire some workers at a loss, and also (ii) to forego some profitable hirings. However (Theorem 2) the equilibrium outcome involves only the first kind of strategic loss by the firm. We also find (Theorem 3) that the firm's profit is less than when the worker optimizes against a predictable myopic firm (which chooses y=w1). Thus the firm would wish to commit to the myopic hiring strategy if it were possible.
Operations research applications of dichotomous search
An object is searched for in {1,⋯,N}. Queries for the object are sequentially conducted. A query at x reveals whether the object’s location is greater than x. The objective is to find the object within a minimal expected number of queries. This problem is called the “dichotomous search” problem and has many versions. This paper surveys dichotomous search problems with the emphasis on Operations Research applications.
Fiscal Transparency in EU Accession Countries Progress and Future Challenges
This paper discusses the findings of fiscal transparency reports on standards and codes (ROSCs) for most EU accession candidate countries. Emphasis is given to the need to establish effective and accountable medium-term budget frameworks to establish policy credibility and anchor adjustment programs to meet EU fiscal goals. Adoption of budgeting and accounting standards consistent with the IMF Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001 framework will also help link budget decisions to EU standards of fiscal reporting. More consistent and comprehensive coverage of off-budget activities is needed for assessing fiscal risk and sustainability. Finally, local government issues need to be addressed by many of these countries since EU fiscal goals are set with reference to general government. Progress in all of these areas can be monitored by keeping fiscal ROSC assessments up to date.