Automating Partial Period Bond Valuation With Excels Day Counting Functions
An Excel model for calculating the actual price of bonds under a 30 day/month, 360 day/year day counting assumption by nesting the DAYS360 function within the PV function is developed. When programmed into an Excel spreadsheet, the model can accommodate annual and semiannual payment bonds sold on or between interest dates using six fundamental inputs, including the bond’s par value, maturity date, annual stated rate of interest, and payment frequency, the annual market rate of interest, and the settlement date. Thus, the model can be applied across the business curriculum in a variety of introductory and more advanced level courses.
Accounting for Bonds With Accrued Interest in Conformity With Brokers' Valuation Formulas
This article explains how to apply brokers' valuation methods to accounting for bonds when interest payments do not coincide with settlement or balance sheet dates. We show how to calculate a bond's present value on these dates using a simple approach that conforms with the method used by brokerage institutions to compute the bond's “actual price.” We then clarify how a broker subtracts accrued interest from this actual price to arrive at the quoted price, and how this quoted price relates to the bond's carrying amount and “fair value” (per SFAS Nos. 107, 115 and 124). We also precisely compute the change in a bond's carrying amount over fractional periods after settlement and around balance sheet dates. Finally, we demonstrate how to integrate these refinements into intermediate textbook illustrations. Throughout, we provide instructions for computing bond valuations using spreadsheet application functions.
Livestock Aspects of Feed Grain Policy
It is a signal event that our topic should be included on this program. In recent years, the livestock and poultry economy has scarcely been considered in the making of price and income policy for feed grains. It has been disregarded by pragmatic policy makers. It has been almost equally bypassed by theoretical economists, who usually kibitz freely. Policy for support and target prices for corn, grain sorghums, and other feed grains has been made with an eye almost exclusively fixed on the producers of those crops. The target price has been set relatively high in order to protect crop farmers' income. The latest (and current) loan rate policy has been to hold the rate low. Although a low rate facilitates moving grain into livestock and poultry consumption when crops are abundant, it does nothing to provide buffer stocks for years when crops are short. In addition, a couple of years ago it became administrative policy to dispose of the stocks inherited from an earlier period, even subsidizing their sale abroad. But the foremost example of one-sidedness is the attitude toward release prices. In all the rhetoric heard recently about the peril of holding corn or sorghums in reserve, the scold has been that release prices would not be set high enough. What group can the spokesmen have had in mind? Feed producers, of course! Not feed consumers, that is, livestock and poultry men. It has been a one-sided consideration of a two-sided issue. If all groups are to have equal voice in policy making, how can livestock and poultry interests be so ostracized? The one-sidedness has more impact now that so much livestock and poultry production has become detached from feed supply on individual farms. The livestock-poultry economy is therefore more sensitive to the availability and price of feed. It is in fact a contradiction that historically, livestock and poultry got more attention when they were still closely connected with feed production on the farm. In the early years of farm programs, the "ever-normal granary" was consciously designed to level out the supply and price of feed for livestock and poultry. Now that livestock and poultry have become more commercial and more vulnerable to a volatile feed situation, feed price stabilization has been progressively removed from the councils of farm policy. And the ultimate contradiction is that the alleged price-depressing perils of a feed reserve have been proclaimed in disregard of the fact that the main defense of feed grain producers' incomes is the target price-direct payment mechanism, not support prices. If grains on reserve should cause market prices to be reduced below target level, producers would get bigger direct payments, that is, producers with a base on their farm are protected in that way. Admittedly, production outside such a base would not be eligible for payment.