Deregulation and natural gas trade relationships: lessons from the Alberta-California experience
In 1978 the US government moved to deregulate the American natural gas industry. The market changes that resulted from this initial step took time to ripple their way out to regional and subnational gas trading relationships. This ripple effect required subnational governments (state and provincial regulators) to rethink their gas regulatory policies. This article examines the restructuring of the Alberta-California gas trade. It explores how changes in US policy forced California and Alberta regulators to recast their policies. It concludes with several lessons that can be drawn from this case about the complex challenge of restructuring international gas trading relationships.
Natural Gas in the Internal Market: A Review of Energy Policy
Energy policy for natural gas in the internal market - an overview aims and means of European energy policy in the light of the completion of the internal market the development of European energy policy - from the ECSC-Treaty to the internal market could the energy mix be optimized through competition or regulation? the structure of national gas industries and instruments of regulation - the French gas industry, the British gas industry, the German gas industry, experiences with natural gas regulation and competition in the US Federal System - lessons for Europe models of the organization and accompanying regulation of gas markets in Europe European energy policy in community law the prospects for third party access in European gas markets compulsory open access in the gas industry - the special case of the Mediterranean countries orgnization of supply markets for natural gas in Europe, and" critical review of legal and policy arguments driving the discussion on third party access regional and local distribution systems for natural gas.
Distortionary Taxes and the Provision of Public Goods
When comparing marginal costs and benefits of a public project, most economists think in terms of adding together the marginal costs of production plus marginal costs of additional distortionary taxation. This paper clarifies how the "revenue effect" offsets the "distortionary effect." For Cobb-Douglas utility with a marginal increase in a proportional wage tax, they exactly offset each other and the Samuelson rule is unaffected. Also, with a preexisting wage tax, an incremental lump-sum tax has only this "revenue effect:" it increases labor supply, increases tax revenue from the preexisting wage tax, and thus makes the project easier to fund. In our numerical example, the incremental lump-sum tax costs taxpayers only $.77 per dollar raised.