Malebranche’s Influence on Leibniz’s Writings on China
Leibniz deserves the honor, frequently bestowed upon him, as the single most important early European interpreter of Chinese philosophy. Yet the story commonly told about this period of philosophical discussion of Chinese philosophy underestimates the importance of Malebranche’s brief encounter with Chinese philosophy and its influence on Leibniz’ interpretation of Chinese thought. In this article, evidence is provided of this influence by first discussing Leibniz’ writings on China prior to his encounter with Malebranche’s Dialogue between a Christian Philosopher and a Chinese Philosopher on the Existence and Nature of God, and then comparing that early work with the Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese, which Leibniz wrote almost immediately after reading Malebranche’s Dialogue.
Jonathan Edwards's Judeo-centric and cosmic vision of the Millennial Kingdom
iii Acknowledgment v Lay Summary vi
Perception and Immateriality in The Nouveaux Essais
"JE M'ATTACHE SUR TOUT A vindiquer l ' immateriali t6 de l ' a m e . " It was in these terms that Leibniz stated his purpose in writing the Nouveaux Essais in a letter to Jaquelot on 28 April 1704,1 by which time a complete draf t of the work was nearly finished. As a description of the Nouveaux Essais this remark may seem curious, and it could not possibly explain the form in which Leibniz chose to write against Locke. At first sight the Nouveaux Essais looks very unlike a sustained and unified address to the task of vindicating the soul 's immateriali ty. In the main body of the work only a page is devoted to refuting Locke 's argument that the soul 's immateriality cannot be demonstrated a priori, and an analysis o f the first draft reveals that originally Leibniz did not even intend to devote a separate section of the dialogue to this question. 2 The Nouveaux Essais gives the impression of being an unusually loose critique, which deals with a wide selection of unconnected issues: as Gibson observes, Leibniz seems to be simply setting down his own views under the stimulus afforded by the thought of another. 3 Indeed the work answers Leibniz 's account of the unsystematic way in which he wrote it, for he himself admits that it was completely unplanned. 4 However, al though Leibniz 's statement of his purpose in the work cannot explain the form of his refutat ion of Locke, it can at least be made intelligible as a description of it. In this paper I wish to analyze some of the main ways in which Leibniz 's concern with what he regarded as a major issue in natural theology can be seen to dominate this work. Since the Nouveaux Essais looks so little like an explicit a t tempt to vindicate the soul 's immateriali ty, its approach must be indirect: the t reatment of issues apparently unconnected with this doctrine must in fact be an indirect fulfillment of his dominant purpose. Now if the fo rm of the Nouveaux Essais is determined by the nature of Locke 's own thought, then obviously for Leibniz there is a persistent a t tempt throughout Locke ' s Essay to undermine the soul 's immateria!ity. 5 In other words,