A Dynamic Model of Collective Bargaining
We use high-low search algorithms to compute equilibria in a multi-period model of collective bargaining. In this model, a group of workers bargains collectively with a firm which knows the per period incremental value v of each worker. The workers don't know their individual values, but use high-low search to learn them, given the known distribution of values in the group. In the first period the workers make a common wage demand w1 and then the firm chooses a cutoff level y for the workers they will hire (i.e., those with v≥ y). Since y is observable through numbers hired, workers may update their beliefs about their values, based on whether or not they were hired. In later periods workers with common beliefs make common wage demands. The main question addressed in the paper is how the firm can choose the hiring cutoff level to hinder the workers' learning process. We find (Theorem 1) that the firm's equilibrium strategy is to (i) hire some workers at a loss, and also (ii) to forego some profitable hirings. However (Theorem 2) the equilibrium outcome involves only the first kind of strategic loss by the firm. We also find (Theorem 3) that the firm's profit is less than when the worker optimizes against a predictable myopic firm (which chooses y=w1). Thus the firm would wish to commit to the myopic hiring strategy if it were possible.
A High-Low Search Algorithm for a Newsboy Problem with Delayed Information Feedback
This paper outlines a new approach to the problem of demand uncertainty. It deals with setting optimal supply levels when demand is unknown. The novel feature of this approach is that information is obtained by observing sales. This information is used to determine future supply levels. Thus, supply levels are chosen with a view to current profit and future information. The technical apparatus is based on an extension of the theory of high-low search. We derive an algorithm to determine a sequence of supply quantities which minimizes total costs of over-and undersupply in the most adverse demand conditions. We calculate the value of perfect information, indicating how much a rational risk averse decision maker would be willing to pay to know demand exactly.
An assessment of the Impact of Devolution on Women Empowerment in Nakuru County
-Women have been grossly marginalized in organs of decision-making and governance structures. The Constitution of Kenya has sought to bridge this gap by providing both women and men the right to equal treatment, including the right to equal opportunities in political, economic, cultural and social spheres. However, gender equality has not been achieved and women are still lagging in terms of decision making processes. The main objective of the study was to detemine the impact of devolution on women empowerment in Nakuru County. The study found that substantive women representation, development of programs and accessibility of services had a positive effect on the women empowerment in Nakuru County. The study also found out that increased accessibility of Services by women influenced women empowerment, this study also concludes that the introduction of development programs had the greatest impact on women empowerment in Nakuru County. The study recommends that more programs targeting women should be introduced as these have the greatest impact on women empowerment. The findings may be used to make conclusions and recommendations.