Did Mark Antony Contemplate an Alliance with His Political Enemies in July 44 B. C. E.?
T HIS PAPER SEEKS TO DISPEL the prevailing view that Mark Antony signaled a willingness to draw closer to his political enemies in the Senate in late July 44 B.C.E. Cicero informs us that rumors of a possible reconciliation between Antony and the "Liberators" Brutus and Cassius were brought to him on 7 August when he was waiting not far from Rhegium (on the "toe" of Italy) to continue his voyage to Greece (Att. 16.7.1; Phil. 1.7-8). The story has also made its way into Plutarch (Cic. 43.4). Scholars lay particular stress on Cicero's remark that he first began to think of returning to Rome after he read a transcript of a speech (contio) by Antony that was brought to him by some townsmen of Rhegium. Unfortunately Cicero tells us nothing specific about the contents of that speech, but modern accounts characterize it as having an "unexpectedly moderate tone,'" one that was "friendly and favourable to the Liberators."2 This interpretation rests on the assumption that in his speech Antony extended an olive branch to Brutus and Cassius. According to the standard reconstruction of events in late July, Antony was forced to adopt a radical shift in policy in the direction of drawing closer to the Senate. He did so, it is argued, out of a need to form a new political alliance as a counterweight to the threat posed by the surging popularity of Julius Caesar's chief heir Octavian, the future emperor Augustus. The precipitating factor that supposedly influenced Antony to change political course is said to be the success of Octavian's games in honor of Caesar and Venus Genetrix (20-c. 28 July),3 during which the appearance of a daylight comet (the sidus Iulium) was interpreted as a sign of Caesar's apotheosis.4
Utinam Avum Tuum Meminisses! Threats and Allusions in the First Philippic
In sections 34-35 of the First Philippic, Cicero makes a powerful threat against Antony by engaging in allusive role-play that makes dual use of Marcus Antonius orator as an exemplum. Cicero first declares himself Antonius to Antony’s Cinna, thus acknowledging the limitations of rhetoric in the face of violence and indicating that he is prepared to accept a martyr’s role. Second, Cicero invites conflation of himself with Marius/Cinna and Antony to his grandfather Antonius, thereby declaring that Cicero had decided to oppose Antony and work towards Antony’s destruction. This role-play represents not only a powerful warning to Antony, but also a sign of Cicero’s change in attitude towards Antony, an attitudinal change reinforced by Cicero’s wordplay on reversio. The allusive threats in sections 34-35 also indicate that Cicero had decided by no later than 2 September 44, and not with the dissemination of the Second Philippic, that there would be no reconciliation between himself and Antony.
PLEASURE, POWER, AND THE PURSUIT OF COMMUNISM: SOVIET YOUTH AND STATE-SPONSORED POPULAR CULTURE DURING THE EARLY COLD WAR, 1945-1968
art, with certain students accused of “showing political immaturity, failing to understand the Party’s positions on art.” This episode constituted part of a broader crackdown on abstract art by the Khrushchev administration from late 1962, precipitated the the Soviet leader’s derision of such art forms in December 1962 at the Manege exhibit. Such instances demonstrate the limitations of the top-level promotion of youth grassroots initiative, as the Khrushchev leadership reigned in youth autonomy when it threatened to go beyond the boundaries of the permissible. The dates cited above have particular resonance, since both 1957-58 and 1962-63 represent two periods when those at the top of the Party hierarchy moved away from pursuing a more pluralistic, tolerant policy course, due to anxiety inspired by both sharpening Cold War hostilities and domestic developments. In these periods, official rhetoric censured what it labeled as 639 TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 13, d. 546, ll. 56-57. This is likely related to criticism of the Party associated with the fallout from the Secret Speech and the Hungary invasion. For more, see Polly Jones, “From the Secret Speech to the Burial of Stalin: Real and Ideal Responses to De-Stalinization,” in Jones ed., The Dilemmas, 41-63. 640 TsAOPIM, f. 6083, op. 1, d. 52, ll. 166-67. 641 Susan E. Reid, “In the Name of the People: The Manege Affair Revisited,” Kritika 6.4 (Fall 2005): 673716. 642 On these anxieties, see Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer, 156-88.