British foreign policy and the Ruhr Occupation crisis 1922-1924.
This thesis provides a comprehensive examination of British policy during the Ruhr occupation crisis of 1922-1924. It addresses central questions raised in the historiography of the 1920s, shedding light both on Britain's policy and that of other powers, particularly France. Based on a thorough examination of the British archives, analysis also focuses on the process of policy-formation, revealing the significance for this of administrative and personal relationships and of domestic political constraints. The thesis begins with an analysis of Britain's role at the onset of the crisis. It evaluates the influence on Britain's policy both of the international situation and of internal factors after the collapse of the Lloyd George coalition. Britain's ambiguous position of benevolent neutrality from January to April 1923 is then analysed and its inadequacy demonstrated by revealing the contradictions involved when implementing it on the spot in the Rhineland and Ruhr. The thesis explores the search for alternatives during the summer of 1923, when policy-makers tentatively tried to encourage negotiations, but in fact simply compounded Britain's difficulties. Discussion then moves to events in the autumn of 1923. Once German passive resistance ceased the European situation became more fluid. Britain was at last able to pursue an effective policy. She distanced herself from events on the spot and played an important role both in establishing international enquiries to investigate reparations, and in ensuring that the experts' reports (particularly those of the Dawes Committee) were adopted at the London Conference in 1924. This thesis explores Britain's attitude to reparations and to broader questions of post-war European reconstruction and stability, revealing the dilemmas caused by Britain's underlying strategic and economic weakness after the war. It highlights the difficulties Britain encountered when dealing with her European neighbours and provides a valuable insight into the complexity of British foreign policy during this brief but crucial period.
Ménage à Trois: The Negotiations for an Anglo-French-Belgian Alliance in 1922
as the first World War drew to a close, a new question emerged: whether the wartime alliance against Germany would continue in any form. For a devastated France, bled white in men and money, eyeing her potentially far stronger eastern neighbour, there was no doubt that it must. Once the Versailles Treaty was completed on terms less than satisfactory to France, her policy was dominated by dependence upon a reluctant Britain against Germany. Similarly, Belgium, shattered by the failure of her special Great Power guarantee to prevent invasion in 1914, wished to rest for her security upon both Britain and France against Germany, partly to escape domination by either and partly to placate both Flemish and Walloon sensibilities.
Woodrow Wilson: The Essential Political Writings
Chapter 1 Preface Chapter 2 Introduction to Wilson's Political Thought Part 3 Progress and the Organic State Chapter 4 The State (chapters 1, 2, 13, 16) Chapter 5 "Christ's Army" Chapter 6 "Christian Progress" Part 7 Political Liberty and the Scope and Ends of Government Chapter 8 "Socialism and Democracy" Chapter 9 "A Calendar of Great Americans" Chapter 10 "Address on Thomas Jefferson" Chapter 11 "The Authors and Signers of the Declaration of Independence" Chapter 12 The New Freedom (chapters 1, 2) Part 13 Institutional Reform Chapter 14 "Cabinet Government in the United States" Chapter 15 Congressional Government (chapter 2 & conclusion) Chapter 16 Constitutional Government in the United States (chapters 3, 8) Chapter 17 "Wanted - A Party" Part 18 Political and Administrative Leadership Chapter 19 "Leaders of Men" Chapter 20 "The Study of Administration" Part 21 Foreign Policy Chapter 22 "War Message to Congress" Chapter 23 "Fourteen Points" Part 24 Appendix A. Chronology of Wilson's Academic Work and Other Selected Events Part 25 Appendix B. Selected Bibliography