MODELING COURT DELAY
Quantitative modeling using operations research and related techniques has much less promise for mitigating court delay than proponents anticipate. Results to date have been discouraging, largely because trial court process is exceptionally difficult to model. There is no consistent sequence or path, and critical discretionary decisions are made by professionals based on individualized criteria that are hard to code. Also, participants (litigants and lawyers) are not part of the organization in any normal sense: Their very purpose is conflict, and they are as likely to try to subvert the court operation as support it. Manipulating court incentive structures is a more promising management approach.
Delays in Youth Justice
To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federally-funded grant final report available electronically in addition to traditional paper copies. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. The causes of delay in the youth justice system are complex. No single approach is likely to be effective in restoring the timeliness of the process. Researchers have successfully linked court delays to a wide range of factors, including resources and workload, jurisdiction size, case characteristics (e.g., offense type and severity), various procedural factors, management and organization, and the informal norms and values of a court. More research is needed, however, on the factors that facilitate or impede the timely processing of delinquency cases. The literature from criminal (adult) courts may be of limited value in understanding youth justice delays, as the individualized approach of juvenile court proceedings is more complicated and often takes more time at intake, detention, adjudication, and disposition. There are two basic approaches to controlling processing delays in the youth justice system: 1) managerial; and 2) legal/professional. The first approach is probably most important. It is essential to confront the organizational elements that contribute to delay. Unlike adult defendants in criminal courts, juveniles do not have a Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial under the U.S. Constitution. A few states have provided something close to juvenile speedy trial rights for juveniles using statutes, court rules, or both. Other states have formally endorsed various administrative standards for the timely processing of juvenile cases. These standards are seldom mandatory, however, and wide variations remain within and across jurisdictions in juvenile delinquency case processing time. This study reviews the literature on court processing delay and the types of delay that most often affect delinquency cases in juvenile and family courts. It places the concept of court delay in a legal, social, and organizational context and describes the wide range of approaches used to prevent or control unwanted delay, including legislation, court rules, and professional standards. The analysis also describes the results of three case studies conducted in juvenile courts in the jurisdictions were selected because they each used a different approach to controlling and reducing unwanted juvenile court delays and they were all regarded as effective by their peers, according to a series of interviews conducted by the researchers with juvenile court leaders …
The Illinois Legislature
It further provides that the county must have voted "for license" at the last general election on that subject. Also, that the petition, together with all names and addresses on it, must first be published in at least two issues of some newspaper published in the town where the petition was circulated, for at least ten days before the petition is acted upon. Any officer authorized to issue licenses violating the provisions of this act is liable to a fine of from $500 to $1000 and imprisonment in the county jail for from two to twelve months. The act does not repeal any local laws forbidding the sale of liquor, but is cumulative to all anti-liquor laws now in force. The final section is: "This Act being necessary for the public peace, health, and safety, shall take effect and be in force from and after December 31, 1913." The postponement of the time for going into effect was made io order not to interfere with licenses already issued and to give the liquor dealers time to adjust themselves to the provisions of the act. But the liquor people denied that the emergency clause could be attached to an act the operation of which was postponed nearly a year. They called attention to the omission of the word "immediate," and declared that the postponement was in itself sufficient evidence that it was not necessary for the "immmediate preservation of the public health, peace and safety." A petition for reference was circulated and the necessary number of signatures was secured. The attorney-general was first asked for his opinion as to whether the act was subject to the referendum. That officer stated that he could find no precedent for such a case. Basing his decision on reason and common sense he declared the act not subject to the referendum. The circuit court was then asked for a write of mandamus against the secretary of state to compel him to submit the act, but the court refused to grant it, saying that the attachment of the emergency clause was evidence that the legislature intended to prevent its submission. At this writing the question is pending on appeal before the supreme court.