What’s the Matter with Being a Strategist (Now)?
American strategic competence is in decline. Twenty years after victory in the Cold War, a victory brought about by the shrewd use of state power and alliances while ably balancing international and domestic pressures, the United States now is struggling to find the right balance of military force and other forms of power in its current wars, while peering into an uncertain future. Commenting on American strategic competence, noted defense analyst Barry D. Watts argues, "US performance in Iraq provides ample evidence that it has been declining for some time."l This line of thought typically asserts that American strategic competence reached its apex between the victory in World War II; implementation of ASC 68, a 1950 report advocating ends, ways, and means of countering communism; and President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Solarium project, a 1953 evaluation of national security policy regarding the Soviet Union. Somewhere between the death of Josef Stalin and the rise of an era of limited war, the United States lost its strategic way. Given the diverse nature of today's threats, many observers look back with nostalgia on the clarity of the Soviet threat and the quality of the strategic thinking and planning that countered it. Rash comparisons between Cold War challenges--remembered as clearly identified, existential, and countered with bipartisan political support--and today's stew of pandemics, loose nuclear weapons, hackers, and undergoverned territories deserve closer scrutiny. Despite stark differences between the eras, there may be merit to the rising claim of strategic incompetence. From the Bay of Pigs to Vietnam to the inconclusive ceasefire terms at the end of the 1991 Gulf War, there is evidence that the strategic skill of the United States has been found wanting. If Watts is correct, that it is America's strategic competence that demands repair, then perhaps the effort to slow the erosion has already begun. A reversal of that trend is taking place, one that has gone unnoticed and will likely remain underappreciated for years to come--the return of the Army strategist. It would be ideal if this progress could be announced with the flamboyancy of a John Williams score in Star Wars: Return of the Jedi, but in reality this reversal is subtle, bureaucratic, and over a decade old. The US Army currently has more than 400 military strategists serving in the grades of captain to colonel, diligently assisting commanders from division to combatant command level. Strategists occupy key positions within the broader defense community, serving on the National Security Council, Joint Staff, Army Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and recently at the Treasury and State Departments. In a number of ways, these strategists owe their development, education, and assignments to a vision articulated more than 20 years ago. In 1989, General John R. Galvin, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and Commander-in-Chief, US European Command at the time, argued for the return of uniformed strategists in his article, "What's the Matter with Being a Strategist?" After succinctly defining the attributes of military strategists, General Galvin suggested that key elements of their development included advanced schooling, operational experience, and lifelong development. (2) His influential and timely argument helped stimulate a review of the requirement for military strategists conducted by the Army's Officer Personnel Management System Task Force XXI/3 in the late 1990s. This review resulted in the creation of the functional specialty supporting Army strategists, technically recognized as Functional Area (FA) 59, Strategic Plans and Policy officers. Despite the number of strategists and the breadth of their assignments, this functional specialty is still a relatively recent development. Since 1999, the Army has gradually formalized the development of the specialty and expanded the number of strategists. …
Strategic Art: The New Discipline for 21st Century Leaders
Dramatic changes in the international system have forced us to reevaluate old strategies and look for new reference points amid the still unsettled debris of the Old World order. At issue for strategic leaders and strategists is the role of the United States in the world and our capabilitiestodefend and promote our national interests in a newenvironmentwherethreats are both diffuse and uncertain, where conflict is inherent, yet unpredictable. These new patterns of uncertainty combined with declining resources pose difficult challenges to national security. . Meeting these challenges requires an integrated, systematic approach to the formulation and execution of strategy. This article is an appeal to strategists to match the success in the development of operationa I art and joint doctri ne with an equa Ily comprehensive approach to strategicart.1 Ifoperational art is an effective guide for the employment offorce, strategic art can be equally effective in guiding the formulation of national security strategy, national military strategy, and theater strategy, thereby linking the use of military forces to the larger political-militarycontext in which wars occur. I n other words, strategic art mustestablish the relationships between military power and other instruments of power. It must also guide combatant and theater commanders in fulfilling their strategic responsibilities. Strategic leadership is the effective practice of the strategic art. Strategists can think about and help devise strategies, but it is the strategic leader who practices the art and makes it happen. A successful search for strategy and the mastery of strategic art by our senior leaders, military and civilian, are vital to the nation. Identifying and mastering the components of strategic art offer no panaceas, but elevati ng the i mportance and ensuri ng the visibi I ity of these steps in the national security debate can serve as constructive counterpoints to such tendencies as political isolationism, militant economic protectionism, military unpreparedness, and emotion-based interventions.
Cultural constraints on the delivery of HIV/AIDS prevention in Ireland.
HIV appeared in Ireland following an opiate epidemic in the early 1980s. Initially, however, the gay community mounted the only response to the spread of the virus while the implementation of early actions by the government was hampered by the constructions of the disease within Irish society. This paper considers the influence of the religious hierarchy in both the development of AIDS policy and in the shaping of public perceptions of the disease and those affected. A qualitative methodology is used to examine the role of such cultural constraints in an evaluation of the social context within which the prevention of HIV infection occurs. Three key issues pertinent to the policy context in Ireland are explored in depth. These are the role of the Catholic Church, the influences on health education programmes, particularly information giving, and the development of services and other interventions. These findings are discussed within the social and political contexts in which health policy is formulated.