A conceptual note on accounting for budget internalities in public policy making
In a recent paper, Fleming, Heinecke and Dollery (2007) developed the government failure taxonomic system advanced by Charles Wolf into a conceptual framework to incorporate positive and negative internalities for analyzing public programs and policies. However, their paper unfortunately ignored the treatment of budget internalities, often an important question in real-world policy applications. This neglect is remedied in the present note by extending the analytical framework to include this important type of internal cost.
THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY: ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION IN AUSTRALIA
The paper examines the existing scope and role of regulations in Australia. While there are many benefits from regulation, there is also a myriad of, often underplayed, costs associated with regulations. While compliance costs are large, probably the most significant costs arise from behavioural responses to regulations that reduce efficiency or compromise social goals. These adverse effects are often unanticipated and arise from complex interactions between regulations. The main reasons for regulatory failure are excessive ambition (underestimating the deficiencies of the regulatory ‘solution’), capture of regulatory agencies, and poor regulatory processes and institutions. The paper offers some guidelines for producing better regulation.
Participation Improves Collective Decisions (When It Involves Deliberation): Experimental Evidence From Kenya
Abstract Citizen participation in decision making has been widely lauded as a method for improving societal outcomes. Deliberative discussion, in particular, is believed to be more transformative than a mere aggregation of individual preferences, leading to more socially optimal decision making and behavior. I report the results from a laboratory experiment with 570 subjects in Nairobi, directly testing the effect of participation in deliberative group decision making on collective outcomes. Participants engage in a group task to earn compensation toward a shared group fund. Randomly assigned treatments vary according to whether decision making over the task to be completed involves: (1) external assignment; (2) non-deliberative majority voting; or (3) consensus through deliberative discussion. I find that deliberation improves collective decision making. Deliberation is also associated with changes in preferences, greater agreement with decision outcomes, and greater perceived fairness. Evidence for behavior change is weaker, but there is some support for further research into the relationship between preference change and behavior change.