Global imbalances: Strategic prospects for the US and the world
McKinnon, R., Schnabl, G. (2008): China’s fi nancial conundrum and global imbalances, URL: http://www.ccer.edu.cn/download/9506-1.pdf Palley, T. (2005): Th e China currency problem, June 2005, URL: http://www.thomaspalley.com/ docs/research/ChinaCurrencyProblem_Keidel.pdf Prasad, E., Wei, S.J. (2005): Th e Chinese approach to capital infl ows, International Monetary Fund Research Department, Washington, D.C. State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) (several years): Annual report, Beijing. Stiglitz, J.E. (2006): Making Globalisation Work, New York: Norton. Summers, L.H. (2004): Th e U.S. current account defi cit and the global economy, International Monetary Fund Multimedia Service Division, Washington D.C. World Fact Book (2008), Washington, D.C. Zhang, M., Xu, Y. (2008): Estimation of hot money in China, Research Centre for International Finance Working Paper, No. 0814.
Global imbalances: recent developments and prospects
In a speech given in March 2005 (Bernanke, 2005), I discussed a number of important and interrelated developments in the global economy, including the substantial expansion of the current account deficit in the United States, the equally impressive rise in the current account surpluses of many emerging-market economies, and a worldwide decline in long-term real interest rates. I argued that these developments could be explained, in part, by the emergence of a global saving glut, driven by the transformation of many emerging-market economies--notably, rapidly growing East Asian economies and oil-producing countries--from net borrowers to large net lenders on international capital markets. Today I will review those developments and provide an update. I will also consider policy implications and prospects for the future.
Deliberative Democracy and the Resource Curse: A Nationwide Experiment in Tanzania
Oil and gas discoveries in developing countries are often associated with short-sighted economic policies and, in response, calls to insulate resource management from populist impulses. We report on a randomized experiment testing methods to overcome this apparent tension between sound resource governance and democratic politics. Soon after Tanzania’s discovery of major natural gas reserves, we invited a nationally representative sample of voters to an intensive public deliberation of policy options featuring nationally recognized experts and small-group discussions. Democratic deliberation reinforced the public’s strong preference for rapid spending of gas revenues, but also increased support for various prudential and economically orthodox measures, including independent oversight of gas revenues, limits on government borrowing, and selling gas abroad rather than subsidizing fuel at home. These effects were driven by deliberation per se, rather than a pure information treatment, and show no evidence of contamination by facilitatoror peer-effects in group deliberations. www.cgdev.org Justin Sandefur, Nancy Birdsall, James Fishkin, and Mujobu Moyo