The Siege of Rome in 87 B. C.
IN THE year 88 B.C. Sulla had regained the coveted command against Mithridates by leading four legions to Rome and capturing the city by armed force'-a first in Roman history, surprising even to old Marius. This march aroused hostility to Sulla among all classes, even the many senators who shared the political profits of the march: the elimination of Marius and Sulpicius, the denial of equal suffrage to the Italians who had secured citizenship through the Social War, and the re-establishment of the ancient senatorial probouleutic power (App. BC 1. 59. 265-66). After Sulla's departure for the eastern war in early 87, one of the consuls of the year, Cinna, revived the Sulpician bill to distribute the novi cives among all the tribes, instead of restricting them to a limited number of tribes which voted last (in comitia with consecutive voting). Cinna perceived that bearing the banner of the irate novi cives as well as proposing recall of the exiles, including Marius himself, could pay high political dividends. His colleague, Octavius, however, took a staunch optimate line in defense of Sulla's arrangements, protecting the extremely oligarchic status quo. A bloody clash occurred between the followers of the two. Seeing the defeat, indeed, the slaughter of his partisans, Cinna fled the city. Soon afterward, the senate deposed Cinna from office (an unprecedented and illegal act) and his place was taken by Cornelius Merula, the flamen dialis. Cinna assumed the role of (live) martyr for the novi cives and champion of the people's rights (as a consul deposed without a vote of the people [App. BC 1. 65. 296-66. 300]). He easily collected money and men, including even the legion left behind by Sulla. The exiled Marius, long awaiting an opportunity for action (App. BC 1. 62. 281), joined Cinna in the attempt to repeat Sulla's military coup. Meanwhile, the regime in Rome, threatened by these activities, had been compelled to appeal to Pompeius Strabo,2 the only commander in Italy with a large regular armv; for, in general, the plebs urbana was an infrequent and unsatisfactory source of soldiers.3 Strabo had resumed control of his army in late 88, following the murder of the consul Pompeius Rufus, who had briefly superseded the proconsul. Although Strabo and the regime viewed each other with suspicion and distaste,4 he nevertheless brought his formi-
The Demography of Roman Italy: Population Dynamics in an Ancient Conquest Society 201 BCE-14 CE
Part I. Economic and Ecological Parameters: 1. Introduction 2. Framing the economic setting: structure and development 3. Climate and climatic change Part II. The Demographic Parameters: Mortality, Fertility and Migration: 4. Mortality 5. Fertility 6. Migration Part III. Population Size: 7. Counting Romans 8. Archaeology and population: demography from potsherds? 9. Summary and conclusion Appendix 1 Appendix 2.
Ideological Quietism? Ideology and Party Politics in Britain
Ideology and political parties are frequently depicted as disparate entities, with scholars citing a range of exogenous and endogenous changes to demonstrate the decreasing relevance of ideology to party politics. This article moves away from such accounts by looking at the role of actors, and specifically party leaders, in contributing to perceptions of ideological decline. Through an examination of the rhetoric of Labour and Conservative Party leaders in Britain between 1946 and 1997, this article contends that politicians have engaged in, what is termed here, ‘ideological quietism’. In this sense, parties have not abandoned ideology but have made rhetorical shifts indicative of ideological decline.