Historical mass, power, schedule, and cost growth for NASA science instruments
In the early stages of NASA instrument development, science instruments are typically the most nascent part of any NASA mission development. As the building of spacecraft become less challenging for a mature industry, NASA's continual need to push the cutting edge of science requires the revolutionary and evolutionary development of instruments to meet science requirements. Instruments then face substantial issues that can result in significant increases in mass, power, cost, and schedule. Although previous studies have identified such issues, there are few industry standard reserve/contingency design and programmatic guidelines for instruments. This paper compares historical mass, power, cost, and schedule growth to industry reserve guidelines while offering potential recommendations to minimize instrument mass, power, cost, and schedule growth for future missions.
Instrument first, spacecraft second (IFSS): Options for implementing a new paradigm
NASA science instruments have had a history of developmental delays. These development delays can lead to cost growth for the overall mission, as shown in recent studies of NASA missions and a larger historical data set. An analysis was conducted to assess if a new mission development process, labeled instrument first, spacecraft second (IFSS), could provide reduced cost and schedule growth in future missions by minimizing the impact of instrument development issues on mission development. A cost and schedule analysis was conducted for representative Tier 2 and Tier 3 Earth Science Decadal Survey missions to quantify the benefits. The results indicate that the savings resulting from such an approach is on the order of $2.5B, making more funding available for future missions, while providing a less volatile and more manageable mission portfolio. This paper reviews the results of this analysis and assesses the implications of implementing such a mission development process by showing the approach on specific mission development examples.
The effect of schedule constraints on the success of planetary missions
Abstract Previous studies have shown that planetary missions have a significantly higher failure rate than earth-orbiting missions. One contributor to this higher failure rate appears to be schedule restrictions imposed on planetary missions by their fixed launch dates as opposed to the more relaxed launch schedules enjoyed in many cases by Earth-orbiting missions. Data will be presented showing the failure rates, planned vs. actual schedules, and other factors of planetary vs. Earth-orbiting missions that will test this hypothesis. Specific examples of this relationship will also be shown to further illustrate the correlation between fixed launch windows and an increased chance of mission failure.