How “political” is Quong’s political liberalism?
In this short paper I ask to what extent the sharp contrast between the 
 political and the comprehensive, on which political liberals such as Rawls 
 and Quong place primary emphasis, caters to a truly “political” conception of 
 liberalism. I argue that Quong’s own take on this point is more distinctively 
 “political” than Rawls’s, in that it assigns far less weight to citizens’ 
 comprehensive doctrines. Indeed, I suggest that Quong’s exclusion of 
 comprehensive doctrines (exemplified by his worries about an “overlapping 
 consensus”) has more radical implications than Quong himself seems to think. 
 In doing so, I offer a streamlined version of Quong’s critique, which 
 encompasses two more or less direct criticisms of Rawls’s doctrine of the 
 overlapping consensus. I will call them the “sincerity objection” and the 
 “liberal objection”.
The Place of Comprehensive Doctrines in Political Liberalism: On Some Common Misgivings About the Subject and Function of the Overlapping Consensus
In this paper I argue that Rawlsians have largely misunderstood the idea of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, thereby failing to delineate in an appropriate way the place of comprehensive doctrines in political liberalism. My argument rests on two core claims. The first claim is that (i) political liberalism is committed to three theses about the overlapping consensus. The first thesis concerns the subject of the overlapping consensus; the second thesis concerns the function of the overlapping consensus; the third thesis explains how the overlapping consensus can serve its function in accordance with political liberalism’s commitment to epistemic neutrality. The second claim on which my argument relies is empirical: (ii) Rawlsians typically deny at least one of the three theses to which political liberalism is committed. Based on (i) and (ii), I conclude that Rawlsians have hitherto provided unconvincing accounts of the place of comprehensive doctrines in political liberalism.
The Idea of Democracy
Introduction Part I. The Point of Democracy: 1. Tocqueville and democracy Stephen Holmes 1a. Tocqueville, commerce and democracy Debra Satz 2. Making truth safe for democracy David Estlund 2a. Could political truth be a hazard for democracy? David Copp 3. Democratic rights at national and workplace levels Richard J. Arneson 3a. Justified to whom? Robert Sugden Part II. Democracy and Preferences: 4. Public choice versus democracy Russell Hardin 4a. Social choice and democracy Thomas Christiano 5. Democracy and shifting preferences Cass R. Sunstein 5a. Must preferences be respected in a democracy? John Ferejohn Part III. Democracy and Public Reason: 6. The domain of the political and overlapping consensus John Rawls 6a. Moral pluralism and political consensus Joshua Cohen 6b. The moral commitments of liberalism Jean Hampton 7. Constituting democracy David Gauthier 7a. On contractarian constitutional democracy Christopher W. Morris Part IV. Democracy and Economics: 8. The possibility of market socialism John E. Roemer 8a. Alternative conceptions of feasibility Michael S. McPherson 9. A political and economic case for the democratic enterprise Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis 9a. Contested power Karl Ove Moene Part V. Democracy: Case Studies: 10. Capitalist development and democracy: empirical research on the social origins of democracy John D. Stephens 10a. Comments on John D. Stephens 'Capitalist development and democracy' Pranab Bardhan.