Comparative U.S.-Israeli Homeland Security
Abstract : This report examines the premise that there are lessons from Israeli experience that might enhance the United States' homeland security efforts. The research for this study included a literature review and field interviews with American and Israeli leaders in Washington, D.C., and Israel during the summer of 2005. The report addresses the common and unique threats facing each state and related homeland security issues and policies. It begins with the threats experienced by each nation, examining the respective homeland security organizational structures and ways of preventing attacks and responding to attacks that do occur. The report then compares each country's homeland security program. Where appropriate, personal observations derived from the authors' interviews in each country are included. The final section addresses a series of lessons the United States might consider in its efforts to improve its homeland security, as well as a discussion of where it might not be advantageous or feasible to follow the Israeli model. The United States and Israel each face a number of threats to their homeland -- some shared, some unique to each state. Some threats common to both the United States and Israel include the following: Terrorism and the Global War on Terror, State Aggression by Sovereign Powers, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Trans-Border Issues. The report discusses the organizational structures that the United States and Israel employ to respond to threats, the countries' efforts at preventing terrorist attacks, and comparative efforts to respond to an attack. The research and field interviews conducted by the authors to identify lessons from Israeli experience resulted in the following recommendations: know your adversary, interagency cooperation, tight internal security, profiling, protected spaces, barriers, information sharing, public education, offensive military action, security decision making, compromise and appeasement, and advanced technology.
BALTIC JOURNAL OF LAW & POLITICS
The EU lacks the legal ideology as a social instrument that could satisfy the spirit of liberal democracy and would help to consolidate different societies to a solid European demos. Although the existence of an ideological system alone does not guarantee social consensus, it helps to manage dissension within the limits of particular values and norms. It is because a legal ideology provides the structure for social thought that individuals and social groups are able to interpret the nature of emerging conflicts and the interests they support. Brought to you by | Vytautas Magnus University Authenticated Download Date | 2/7/18 10:11 AM BALTIC JOURNAL OF LAW & POLITICS ISSN 2029-0454 VOLUME 10, NUMBER 1 2017 184 The article demonstrates that the neoliberal way of thinking that prevails in contemporary Europe does not meet the spirit of the constitutionalism of the EU Member States; the article introduces some aspects of Aharon Barak’s legal ideology that could be relevant for the formation and development of European demos and constitutionalism. In order to achieve this aim, the research is focused on issues that emerge in the area of three main pillars of constitutionalism: (1) adherence to the rule of law, (2) limited and accountable government, and (3) protection of fundamental human rights.
Protection of the Marine Environment: The International and National Regulation of Deep Seabed Mining Activities
This chapter provides an overview of the international and national regulatory framework pertaining to deep seabed mining activities. It begins by discussing the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the backdrop for all marine activities – be they national or international – and examines the obligations of states to protect the marine environment from the harmful effects arising from deep seabed mining. Next, the chapter examines the international regime for deep seabed mining (i.e. “activities in the Area”), explaining the “common heritage of mankind” status of the Area (i.e. the international seabed); the functions of the International Seabed Authority (ISA), the international organization established to govern deep seabed mining in the Area; and the concept of state sponsorship of non-state entities (i.e. private actors) for deep seabed mining in the Area. The chapter follows with a discussion of the development of national legislation to regulate deep seabed mining, examining efforts in the Pacific region where many prospective deep-sea mining sites are located. This includes a look at the legislative regimes of several Pacific Island nations, namely, Papua New Guinea, Tonga and the Cook Islands, for whom deep seabed mining may soon become a reality – as well as New Zealand and Japan, countries with comparatively developed rule of law and legislative regimes that have undertaken or considered deep seabed mining in their national waters. Overall, the chapter critically describes and evaluates the current regulatory status in the international and national seabed areas and highlights some salient gaps that require urgent attention in order to ensure marine environmental protection and mitigate impacts on humans.