The Lion & The Ringmaster: Croatia's Accession to the European Union
July 1, 2013 marked Croatia's official induction into the European Union. For Croatia this was the culmination of a long negotiation process filled with concessions and challenges. This situation inspired the question of how Croatia's alliance with the EU has affected the state? In order to analyze this relationship the aspects of Croatian identity and sovereignty were explored, in addition to the EU's principles and problems regarding member and candidate states. The evidence found within this investigation came from a number of literary sources ranging from the academic to official government documents. Furthermore, nine interviews were conducted within Croatia, which explored how the EU's influence has affected the Croatian state. Through this research it was conclusively found that Croatia's alliance with the EU creates problems and exasperates existing issues within the country. Furthermore, this situation showcases a pattern of discrimination within the EU that benefits Western European EU states at the expense of its Central and Eastern counterparts. As a result, the recommendations would be to promote awareness of the double standards and discriminations occurring within the EU, which victimize Central and Eastern European states, so that these countries may be able to preserve their identity and sovereignty.
European integration and the Western Balkans: lessons, prospects and obstacles
European integration is almost universally recognized as the key strategy for achieving the twin goals of peace and prosperity in the Western Balkans. European policy-makers trust that greater European involvement in the Western Balkans can have positive and long-lasting effects on the management of ethnopolitical conflict. The European Commission identified the prospect of EU membership as ‘the ultimate conflict prevention strategy’ and committed itself to maintain and increase its proactive presence in the region. The academic near-consensus is that the Western Balkans’ greater involvement in European institutions is the necessary condition for stabilization. But whether the focus is placed on Europe’s entry into the Western Balkans, or the Western Balkans’ entry into Europe, most observers agree on the positive effects of increased links between these two still quite distinct areas. Perhaps most importantly, these views are also shared by many politicians and citizens in the region, who are for once united in considering access to European political, economic and financial institutions as the long-term answer to fragmentation, conflict and economic backwardness. Opinion polls regularly show levels of popular support for European integration ranging between 75 and 85 per cent. This paper dissects the optimist view that integration into European institutions represents the best conflict management/development approach for theWestern Balkans. The focus is not on the details of the various programmes of EU assistance to the region, but on the ‘big picture’, that is, the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the European integration strategy. First, I begin
Europeanisation, euroscepticism and party systems: Party‐based euroscepticism in the candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe
Abstract In this article, we assume that we can usefully examine the emergence of party‐based Euroscepticism in the party systems of the candidate states and that we can account for (some of) the differences between the states by looking at their party systems. In order to do this we begin by offering a definition of Euroscepticism that differentiates between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ variants. We map these types of Euroscepticism in parties in the candidate states of central and Eastern Europe. Looking at the nature of party systems we suggest that there is a need to rethink how we conceptualise and categorise them if we are to extend our Western models to central and Eastern Europe, and we offer some suggestions of how this might be done. Using these models of party systems in relation to the candidate states of central and Eastern Europe we examine how this relates to the incidences of party‐based Euroscepticism and reflect on the issues involved in applying West European models to East European cases.