Banking on Baghdad: Financial Change in Postwar Iraq; Strategic Insights, v. 3, issue 5 (May, 2004)
Abstract : April 2004 represents an important milestone in Iraqi history--the one year mark after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime. Assuming the insurrection and increased hostilities surrounding this date will abate, this represents a fitting time to assess the Iraqi government's likely strategy for restoring the country's economic health. That strategy was outlined in January 2004 by central bank governor Sinan Shabibi and finance minister Kamel Gailani. Their vision for Iraq is in accordance with the Bush Administration's neoliberal model and provides substance to some of the vague principles laid down by the Administration in the spring and summer of 2003. The strategy encompasses the creation of: (a) openness and transparency of Iraq's institutions; (b) strong incentives for private sector development; (c) close economic and financial integration with the international community, (d) international standards and best practices; and (e) a social safety net that addresses the needs of all Iraqis. While many factors within this framework will play a key role in the economy's recovery, emphasis on free markets and private sector investment suggest the creation of a viable efficient financial system will be the key to the country's economic recovery. In this regard, a recent United Nations' needs assessment notes that: With a dysfunctional financial system featuring a poorly organized regulatory framework and ineffective institutions, the task of rebuilding a sound and safe modern financial sector in Iraq is daunting. It should start with the banking sector, which is currently the essential component of the financial system and should cover the sector's legal and regulatory aspects as well as its main institutions. This would be a long term process that will require significant resources, technical as well as financial.
Neoliberalism in a Conflict State: The Viability of Economic Shock Therapy in Iraq; Strategic Insights, v. 3, issue 7 (July2004)
Abstract : The quotes above are reflective of the expectations and frustrations experienced by both Americans and Iraqis over the future course of Iraq's economic system. For many in the Bush administration the answer is quite simple: free markets, increased globalization and reduced government interference in the marketplace -the basic neoliberal [4] economic agenda- are the ticket to rapid Iraqi economic recovery and prosperity. For many Iraqis, even some in key ministries, neoliberalism, especially in its "shock therapy" form, is just another reckless western experiment imposed on the country for reasons that are unclear. Even in the early summer of 2003 the neoliberal debates were coming to the fore: The big debates will be between those in Washington who want to press ahead with a dogmatic neoliberal approach and those in the field who see the necessity often for political reasons, to go step-by step, acknowledging a large amount of uncertainty about what institutional changes are necessary or even desired by the Iraqis. On the Iraqi side, advocates for the adoption of an Islamic economic system will be more and more vocal if the neoliberal reforms do not show quick dividends.[5] The sections below examine the evolution of neoliberalism in Iraq since the summer of 2003. What aspects of the neoliberal agenda were introduced into the country? What are their strengths and limitations? Based on this assessment, several conclusions are drawn concerning the applicability of the neoliberal reforms in the Iraqi context.
Turkish Political Culture and Civil Society : an Unsettling Coupling?
This paper attempts to analyze Turkish politics in the post-1980 period with a special reference to the relationship among the state elites, political elites and societal actors and its impact on the constitution of civil society in Turkey. After the 1980 military intervention, the political and economic realms of Turkey witnessed a relative degree of liberalization through Uzal's neo-liberal policies. The January 24 economic decisions paved the way for economic liberalization as well as letting new economic and societal actors emerge. These new economic actors were different from the prevailing economic actors which used to enjoy having a considerable amount of opportunity spaces in the economic sphere. Together with the Uzal governments, Islamic segments started to become powerful in both political and economic realms. This paper analyses the chief traits of Turkish politics and economics and their impact upon civil society aftermath the 1980 coup in general, and the relationship and/or interaction among the state elites, political elites and societal actors in particular. The engagements of newly-emerging societal and economic actors into Turkish political scene and the challenge of these actors against the so-called 'Kemalist-Republican' elites are also illustrated in the paper. Moreover, state-Islam interaction, politics-Islam interaction as well as Kemalism-newly-emerging societal and economic actors interaction will be studied with a special emphasis to the post-1980 period. The major argument of the paper is that, in Turkey, both civil society issues and political issues reveal outcomes which are primarily shaped by the nature of the relationship between state elites and political elites in general and by Turkish political culture in particular.