Merging the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF): A Strategic Imperative
Abstract : Afghanistan has provided the International community the opportunity to demonstrate the power of democratic nations in fighting tyranny. NATO's International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) has played a critical role in Afghanistan since the first international peace keepers arrived in 2002. The American presence under Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) has another national agenda in Afghanistan. Tension between these operations as to scope force structure and mission adds an interesting international dynamic to these military missions. The US advocates merger of OEF and ISAF with the caveat that this consolidation must have two points as a mandate: first a mission to destroy Al-Qaeda and Taliban forces and second to assist the Afghanistan government with opium eradication. Given the opposition by many European capitals to a direct combat role for ISAF progress toward a consolidated NATO command has been difficult. That being said ISAF has made progress with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the recent decision by the Alliance to expand NATO presence by over 10,000 troops is proving successful in creating a more stable Afghanistan. The merging of OEF and ISAF will provide the U.S. with the strategic flexibility to draw-down forces in Afghanistan to meet further National Security threats.
Afghanistan Four Years On: An Assessment
"The transformation of a traditional society could only be achieved extremely slowly, and certainly not by wrecking its existing structure and relationships. Even in the Soviet Union there had been the 'great mistakes' of the 1920s and 1930s. As a Soviet official in Moscow was also reported as saying [in 1981], 'If there is one country in the world where we would not like to try scientific socialism at this point in time, it is Afghanistan.'" --Martin Ewans, Afghanistan (2001) In Spring 2004, Parameters published "Afghanistan: From Here to Eternity?" which explored the situation in Afghanistan in early 2003, or a little over one year after the Taliban regime was removed from power. The tone of the piece was guardedly pessimistic and in effect reminded readers that though there had been progress, the possibility remained that overenthusiastic and emotional responses by the international community in the follow-on phase of the campaign could scuttle that success. That article also laid out a number of challenges that would have to be addressed to avoid what the critics increasingly referred to as "another Vietnam." In 2005, the situation in Afghanistan has progressed to the point where guarded optimism is justified. Unfortunately, the perception of the situation on the ground has become distorted through the prism of American partisan politics, particularly during the run-up to the 2004 election. The focus of this rhetoric was and remains issues related to narcotics production and a number of spin-off arguments related to it. Afghanistan is apparently no longer looked at as "another Vietnam"; now it is perhaps "another Colombia." (1) Though the narcotics issue is critical to the future of Afghanistan, public discussion of it in American fora has overridden acknowledgment of other areas of success, areas which are in fact more important than any single issue and which will, in the long run, have a positive effect on counternarcotics operations in the region anyway. This article examines how the situation in Afghanistan has dramatically changed since 2003, and why. It will also suggest that there are new areas for concern which policymakers may wish to focus on beyond the currently salient narcotics problem. Where Did We Stand in 2003? Combined Forces Command Afghanistan or "CFC Alpha" (CFC-A) is the American-led Coalition headquarters for Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. Established in late 2003 to rationalize a convoluted command structure, CFC-A is now the focal point of the Coalition military effort. The situation in-country in July 2003, according to CFC-A, was characterized by these elements: a Coalition force with a counterterrorist focus; an enemy which had sanctuary in Afghanistan conducting operations against Coalition forces; a neutral population; an Afghan National Army that was in training; only four Provincial Reconstruction Teams; and minimal support from Pakistan. There was no constitution, no political process, and minimal sovereignty was exercised by Afghanistan. (2) With the exception of the overly simplified portrayal of the enemy forces, these points were generally accurate, (3) but they require some elaboration. In 2003, the primary problem was the embryonic nature of the interim and transitional Afghan governments and the possibility that fragile structure could be destabilized and toppled before it could get to work. Connected to this was the questionable legitimacy of the government's leader, President Hamid Karzai. On the ground, Karzai was variously portrayed as a pawn of the United States or in the pocket of southern anti-Taliban fighters of Pashtun ethnicity, or implicitly controlled by the Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance exerted explicit control over Kabul and the associated political processes by dint of its 27,000-man military contingent based in the city and its environs. There was no countervailing federal governmental coercive power in Kabul, let alone throughout the rest of the country. …
Book Review: The U.N. Convention on Torture and the prospects for enforcement
Preface. Abbreviations. 1.The Scope of the Torture Convention. 2. The Nature of the Obligations Incurred by States Under Article 2 of the Torture Convention. 3. The Problems of Enforcement of Human Rights. 4. A Commentary on the Enforcement Mechanisms by the States Parties of the Torture Convention. 5. Commentary on the International Machinery for the Supervision of the Implementation of the Torture Convention. 6. General Conclusions. Bibliography. Appendix I.