From Secessionist Mobilization to Sub-state Nationalism? Assessing the Impact of Consociationalism and Devolution on Irish Nationalism in Northern Ireland
Survey evidence has demonstrated that support for a united Ireland from Catholics in Northern Ireland is markedly declining. Simultaneously, electoral support for the secessionist Sinn Féin party has substantially risen in the region since 1998. Critics have attributed Sinn Féin's electoral growth to consociational power sharing, which they argue rewards ethnic hardline parties. At the same time, many of these critics predicted that consociationalism would exacerbate secessionist sentiment within nationalism, a prognostication now contradicted by survey data. In analysing this paradox, we argue that there is not a switching of identities—from Irish nationalism to UK unionism—but the repositioning of Irish nationalism from a secessionist movement to a sub-state nationalism mobilizing for more resources within devolution. In explaining this, we illuminate how consociationalism allied to devolution can, if the right endogenous and exogenous supporting factors are mobilized, lead to the repositioning of identities within a regional rather than zero-sum national context.
The Slow Growth of Sinn Féin: From Minor Player to Centre Stage?
In this paper we ask if Sinn Fein could truly break the mould of Irish politics by moving to overtake Fianna Fail or the Labour party and become a mainstream party, or is it likely to remain at best a cameo player, which may have some relevance because of its coalition or blackmail potential. We can attempt to answer this question, which essentially looks to the future by examining the nature of Sinn Fein as it stands. We have some expectations of mainstream and minor parties in Ireland, which may differ from mainstream and minor parties in other countries. Mainstream parties tend to be heterogeneous in their support base; so the three established parties in Ireland tend to have broadly stable support across class, gender and age. Their support also tends to be reasonably evenly divided throughout the country, rather than focused in a small number of strongholds, often associated with individual politicians. Because minor parties often depend on a small number of notable political figures, the political organisation is often personalised and less rule-based than in major parties. Minor parties tend to be ideologically on the fringes, whereas mainstream parties tend to be more centrist, or more difficult to pin down in policy terms. By looking at how Sinn Fein performs on these areas, we can make a better informed judgement as to whether Sinn Fein is likely to move centre stage.
A Positive Choice, or Anyone but Fianna Fáil?
This chapter explores the motives, expectations and mood of voters in 2011, and draws on the results from an unprecedented number of campaign polls as well as the Lansdowne/RTE exit poll, carried out with voters as they left the polling station, to answer a number of questions about voting behaviour in this election. The first question must be about the collapse of Fianna Fail. The scale of the losses suffered by that party is almost without precedent in a mature democracy, but the root cause is a simple one to identify, and it is argued here that the outcome was in essence a classic example of voters exacting punishment for what was widely seen as a succession of bad economic decisions. Fianna Fail (and the Greens) destroyed the economy, and the voters went some way to destroying those parties in revenge. Such an explanation, however, does nothing to tell us why voters who left Fianna Fail, and others, chose the alternatives they did: why Fine Gael rather than Labour, or why an Independent, or Sinn Fain, rather than either of the more established opposition parties? This leads into the second question: how did voters decide on the alternative to Fianna Fail, and how far were voters in 2011 motivated in ways different from those of previous elections?