What To Do about Bilateral Credit Limits in the LVTS When a Closure Is Anticipated: Risk versus Liquidity Sharing among LVTS Participants
The authors examine the effect of a trade-off between shared credit risk and liquidity efficiency, among participants in Tranche 2 of the Large Value Transfer System (LVTS T2), on their decisions to leave open, or close, their bilateral credit limits (BCLs) to a participant at risk of imminent closure. The authors' analysis considers a network of three banks, in a settlement system similar to the LVTS T2. Although it is widely believed that closure of one bank is imminent, the exact timing of the closure - during or after the settlement cycle - is uncertain. The other two banks face an "open or close" choice regarding their BCLs to the problem participant. Based on the expected net payoff of each choice, which includes the value of network externalities, the analysis shows that, when the expected credit loss is sufficiently low, an open-BCL pure-strategy Nash equilibrium can exist and can be Pareto efficient. This result dispels the generality of the frequent assertion that participants in the LVTS T2 will close their BCLs to a participant that is subject to imminent closure.
Unanticipated Defaults and Losses in Canada's Large-Value Payments System, Revisited
Recent work at the Bank of Canada studied the impact of default in Canada's large-value payments system, and concluded that participants could readily manage their potential losses (McVanel 2005). In an extension of that work, the authors use a much larger set of daily payments data - with three times as many observations - to examine the simulated losses of private sector participants and the Bank from defaults in the payments system. They also gauge the upper bound of possible losses in the period April 2004 to April 2006. The authors conclude that losses from a participant failure in the large-value payments system are very likely to be small and readily manageable, as in McVanel (2005). For one or two small participants, under some (probably extreme) conditions, losses could be significant, but not solvency threatening. In sum, the risk controls of the large-value payments system allow and encourage participants to keep potential losses manageable.
Illiquidity in the Interbank Payment System Following Wide-Scale Disruptions
We show how the interbank payment system can become illiquid following wide-scale disruptions. Two forces are at play in such disruptions-operational problems and changes in participants' behavior. We model the interbank payment system as an n-player game and utilize the concept of a potential function to describe the process by which one of multiple equilibria emerges after a wide-scale disruption. If the disruption is large enough, hits a key geographic area, or hits a "too-big-to-fail" participant, then the coordination of payment processing can break down, and central bank intervention might be required to reestablish the socially efficient equilibrium. We also explore how the network topology of the underlying payment flow among banks affects the resiliency of coordination. The paper provides a theoretical framework to analyze the effects of events such as the September 11 attacks.