COMPARATIVE ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS ON THE EVOLUTION OF TOURISM TRAFFIC IN PRAHOVA AND BRASOV COUNTIES
The paper analyzes the comparative development of tourist traffic in the counties of Prahova and Brasov, the main indicators for assessing values, numbers of tourist arrivals and overnights number, being studied as econometric time series. The economic crisis triggered worldwide began before 2009 also in travel industry, has important effects at national level in Romania territorial. Studied in this context is the tendency of tourist movement in Prahova and Brasov counties, and recording developments oscillatory growing up in 2008 and a significant decrease in the year 2009. Conclusions of the analyzed phenomena show that the results are the effects of the emergence of financial bottlenecks that led to a significant drop in income population and therefore in important reduction of the tourist arrivals and of the overnight stays in these counties. However, it is expected a revival of tourist traffic in Prahova and Brasov counties, after economic recovery of Romania.
Tourism Implications in Economic Growth. A Cybernetic Approach
Economists, mathematicians, statistics specialists have given rise to an actual theory of economic growth that makes up the background for the interdisciplinary theory of economic modeling, by founding and drawing up static or dynamic models, economic-mathematical or economic-environmental models. Among all these approaches, the tertiary or service field has become dominant in the post-war period, with the service market ranking ever more importantly, encompassing extremely varied activities, heterogeneous in terms of content, yet taking distinct manifest shapes. In the same time, in a systemic approach, the services-field is a complex and dynamic cybernetic system with its own structure interconnected within the cybernetic system of the national/world economy.
Strategy and Manipulation in Medieval Elections
There are many goals in developing electoral protocols, including a desire for a system which is transparent, in that it is clear what the rule or procedure to follow is; nonmanipulable, in that it is not in a person’s best interest to misrepresent their preferences; honest, in the sense that it elects the ‘right’ candidate; and not open to strategizing, i.e., bribery or collusion. However, these desiderata are in tension with each other: Often, transparent electoral procedures are the least strategy resistant, and many honest procedures encourage manipulation. Thus a balance between these different goals must be sought. In modern times, since the seminal result on vote manipulation, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem [5, 6], much attention has been devoted to developing voting rules where manipulation is never in the best interest of the voters [4] or which are computationally too complex for the average bounded agent to be able to manipulate [1]. This focus on computational aspects of electoral methods is one of the hallmarks of modern studies on voting. But pursuit of these goals is not restricted to modern times: Those participating in elections in the Middle Ages also sought transparency, non-manipulability, honesty, and strategyproofness in so far as these properties can be consistently expressed in a single procedure. However, given the lack of computational sophistication in the Middle Ages, alternate approaches were needed in order to promote honesty, discourage strategizing, etc. These approaches can be classified as either external (constraints introduced outside of the electoral procedure, such as incentives for coming to consensus quickly) or internal (constraints introduced within the electoral procedure, such as voting rules which cannot be manipulated without adverse effects, or which are too difficult for the average bounded agent to manipulate). Surveying examples of both approaches in the context of medieval ecclesiastical and secular elections provides an interesting comparison to modern electoral procedures. Elections in the Middle Ages were used for the same reasons that they are today: To select suitable candidate(s) for a particular office, duty, or obligation. However, it is important to note that the term electio was used in the Middle Ages in a broader sense than our modern ‘election’. Its primary sense was ‘selection’ or ‘choice’, and only secondarily ‘election’ in the modern sense. Thus, many records which purportedly discuss elections are not discussing elections of the type which interests us. We can identify four categories of medieval electoral processes: (1) Election by an external authority having no direct interest in the election; (2) Indirect election, where electors name other electors who then select or elect the officials; (3) Election by lot; and (4) Election by ballot. Elections of the first and third types are generally computationally uninteresting; the first type corresponds to dictatorial voting rules, and the third type collapses to probability theory. In general, interesting voting methods are found only in the fourth type, election by ballot, though they can also occur in indirect election.