Nataf’s Theorem, Taylor’s Expansion and Homogeneity in Consumer Demand
Macrorelations should obey Nataf’s specification requirements to be decomposable into microrelations. Taylor expansions can command such obedience and indicate the omissions if approximations are used. This paper discusses in section 3 how additional restrictions such as equilibrium conditions can be incorporated in a Taylor framework to increase the variety of possible specifications. In section 4 it is shown how this variety shrinks if the condition of homogeneity must be satisfied. As such it may help to clarify some points of Gorman’s (1981) general theorems on Engel curves. At the same time an inaccuracy in his paper is indicated.
Inductive analysis from empirical income distributions
According to Lange (1968) the first econometric study has been Pareto’s analysis of the personal income distribution. It appeared first in the Giornale degli Economisti of January 1895. Over the last twenty five years the personal income distribution has also been one of the topics of interest of Cramer, see Cramer (1969,1976,1978) and Ransom and Cramer (1983). Most authors deal with the problem from a normative point of view. They compare the given distribution with some preconceived idea of how the distribution should look like. Cramer is more at home among positivists who aim at a concise description of actual distributions.
Corporations and the Market for Law
The state competition for corporate law has long been studied as a distinct phenomenon. Under the traditional view, corporations are subject to a unique choice-of-law rule, the internal affairs doctrine (IAD). This rule is explained as a historical accident, or by the special logistics of the corporate contract. The resulting market for corporate law appears to have special characteristics, particularly including the dominance by the single state of Delaware. This paper challenges the traditional view. It shows that the corporate law market is best understood as a special application of the general market for law. Any differences are matters of degree rather than kind, and are explained by considerations underlying enforcement of all choice-of-law contracts rather than by factors unique to corporations. It follows that theories of corporate competition that ignore the broader law market context are incomplete, and that the competition for corporate law carries lessons for the law market generally. Moreover, the connection between the corporate and other law markets has implications for the nature of corporate law, the constitutional status of the IAD, the scope of the IAD, and for the relationship between state and federal law.