A Closed Book? British Intelligence and East Asia, 1945–1950
This article focuses on British intelligence in China, Japan, and Korea from the end of the Second World War to the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. It seeks to ascertain whether the collection of secret intelligence and its subsequent interpretation provided an accurate picture of Soviet and local communist intentions in East Asia. Since the war against Japan began, the region was largely an American responsibility and remained so after 1945 when they occupied Japan, Korea below the 38th parallel, and sent forces to China. Much of the intelligence effort for East Asia also devolved upon the Americans. Yet, the British retained an intelligence interest there not least because of their extensive commercial assets in China and the region's proximity to Britain's imperial position in Southeast Asia. That interest gathered pace after growing Communist threats inside China and Korea. However, the available intelligence resources for the Far East as a whole were scarce, making it difficult to piece together a clear picture of fast moving events in East Asia.
The Chinese Civil War
In the quarter-century Chinese Civil War, Mao Tse-tung’s ill-equipped, poorly trained million-man peasant army defeated Chiang Kai-shek’s modern, well-equipped, three-million-man armored force. Although Mao and Chiang both sought to rebuild a self-respecting, independent China within their shared strategic culture, their contrasting strategies epitomize the poles of Shih-theory—Shih and Li.
Experience of using rating scales for the assessment of vocational trainees in general practice.
For two years trainers in the northern half of the south western region have been asked to assess their trainees with a condensed version of the new Manchester rating scales for vocational training in general practice and to send copies to the regional adviser. The condensed version retains the 23 scales but does not include the subscales. Trainers' workshops and comments from individuals suggested that no radical improvements to the scales were required and that they were an adequate statement of what was required from trainees. The response rate of 89% for returning at least one assessment and 38% for returning all three suggested that use of this condensed version would be more feasible than using the full version of the scales. Analysis of 86 first assessments and 48 sets of three assessments showed a range of variation both in trainee ratings and use of individual scales that was consistent with expectations. A lack of significant rank correlations between the scales indicated that each of the scales measured a different characteristic of behaviour. We suggest that the most useful way to achieve systematic assessment of vocational trainees is by the use of the 23 main rating scales, with regional variations where appropriate.