Red DIME: Dissecting the Bolshevik Liquidation Campaign in the Ferghana Valley Against the Basmachi Resistance
Abstract : This monograph delves into the Bolshevik campaign to liquidate the Basmachi Resistance in the Ferghana Valley Section of Central Asia. The Bolsheviks employed a precursor to the modern day D.I.M.E construct to overcome early policy missteps. The author uses archival documents from the Ferghana Oblast State Archives that he gathered during his Fulbright Scholar research during 2002-2003. By utilizing illustrative examples of Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic initiatives, it is possible to learn about the evolution of policy as the Bolshevik authorities struggled to regain the initiative against the Basmachi Resistance. These lessons of the Bolshevik counterinsurgency against the native Basmachi resistance remain remarkably applicable as governments face similar challenges in the 21st Century.
Fighting in the Mountains and Among the People: Imperial Russian and Early Soviet Population-Centric Counterinsurgency
Abstract : This monograph examines the imperial Russian campaign to quell rebellion in the North Caucasus from 1801 to 1864 and the Bolshevik suppression of the Basmachi rebellion in Central Asia from 1919 to 1933. The Caucasian War and the Basmachi rebellion featured Muslim insurgent movements that exploited inaccessible mountain terrain and relied upon the local population for recruitment and support. The imperial Russians and Bolsheviks both struggled to adapt their civil and military operations to defeat an elusive enemy and establish control over a diverse and fractured society. The analysis tests the effectiveness of key principles found in population-centric counterinsurgency theory and doctrine in the imperial Russian and Bolshevik counterinsurgent operations. The evidence suggests that the synchronization of military and nonmilitary operations through unity of effort contributed to Russian and Bolshevik victory by isolating the insurgent forces from the local population. The analysis also identifies significant risks and costs associated with employing a population-centric approach to counterinsurgency.
Soviet Policy in Central Asia
T 1HE present article is concerned with Soviet policy in the five contiguous republics of Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan. According to Soviet regional classification Central Asia consists only of the first four of these, Kazakhstan being regarded as a separate region; but for the sake of simplicity the term Central Asia will be used to apply to all five. The importance attached by the Soviet Government to Central Asia can be gauged by the extent to which it figures not only in literature intended for internal consumption but also in external propaganda and particularly in that directed towards the Middle East and South Asia. The distinctive character of the people, their history, and their culture, as well as the geographical position and resources of the region present certain features which are of considerable interest and importance to the West. Almost all the factual information contained in the present study is taken from Soviet sources; for Soviet publications-that is to say, those directed to the people of the USSR, rather than propaganda directed to foreign countries-constitute the most important source of detailed information. Other sources such as reports of occasional travellers and refugees are limited in scope and are usually biased. Soviet sources are, of course, biased too in the sense that they often conceal or attempt to conceal relevant facts; but, since their policy of concealment varies according to circumstances, it is possible, by careful and cumulative study of Soviet publications over a period, to construct something like a coherent picture of the real situation. Unlike travellers and refugees, the Soviet authorities do have access to all or most of the facts, and a source that has access to the facts is potentially more useful than one which has not. Soviet reporting on current developments in Central Asia is by no means .confined to favourable circumstances; it includes a great deal about the difficulties with which the authorities are confronted and particularly about the opposition they are still encountering. The primary object of Soviet policy in Central Asia is to raise the productivity and economic potential of a region which is not only rich in natural resources but is also relatively remote from Western striking power. A secondary object, and one which may be in cold storage at present, is the use of Central Asia as a vantage point from which Communist influence can be extended into the Middle East and South Asia.