“Just in Case”: Extended Nuclear Deterrence in the Defense of Australia
This paper examines the foundations and rationale for Australian reliance on US assurances of extended nuclear deterrence. The Australian model of extended nuclear deterrence is marked by its lack of public presence, a lack of certainty about its standing and character in US eyes, its lack of a direct nuclear threat, and its resurgence at a time when nuclear abolition possibilities are being embraced by the leader of the deterrence provider. Australian policy amounts to a claim that the nuclear guarantee is necessary “just in case”– though without any plausible specifics. The fundamental questions remain – for Australia as for other recipients of extended nuclear deterrence assurances – what threats, what probabilities, what alternatives?
Australia's Nuclear Dilemma: Dependence, Deterrence or Denial?
Australian defence planners attach a great deal of importance to the concept of self-reliance in defence. But when it comes to the most destructive weapons of all—nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles—Australia is entirely dependent on extended deterrence provided by US nuclear forces. As the strategic balance of the region changes, and as nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles threaten to proliferate within Australia’s strategic environment, new questions arise about the suitability of Australia’s strategic approach. This article explores the limitations of Australia’s current approach to nuclear deterrence, and some of the hard choices that Australian policy-makers face if they wish to preserve a credible nuclear strategy in the uncertain decades ahead.
After Proliferation: What to Do If More States Go Nuclear
Spurred by the progress of weapons pro grams in North Korea and Iran, nuclear proliferation is once again at the top of the U.S. national security agenda. Practically all of the discussion about the issue has centered on how to prevent proliferation. Hawks have pushed for regime change or military strikes, whereas doves have favored arms control and negotiation. Even though none of these measures is likely to solve the problem, few observers have spent much time considering what a postproliferation world would look like. Those who have done so can be divided into pessimists and optimists. The pes simists assume that the dangers of a nuclear confrontation will increase exponentially as the number of nuclear powers grows and that a future catastrophe is all but certain. Since little can be done to avert such a terrible outcome or mitigate its consequences, the argument goes, efforts to stop proliferation in the first place must be redoubled. The optimists, by contrast, assume that the stability that nuclear weapons seem to have brought to the superpowers' Cold War confrontation will be replicated. Far from being a sure disaster, they argue, the spread of nuclear weapons could be a relatively cheap and easy (albeit nerve-racking) solution to the age-old problem of war. Actually, however, a postproliferation future is likely to be far more complex than either the pessimists or the optimists believe. In a multipolar nuclear world, international politics will continue but in an environment dominated by fear and uncertainty, with new dangers and new possibilities for miscommunication adding to and complicating familiar ones. As a result, many of the military plans, de fense policies, and national security doctrines that officials in the United States and other countries now take for granted are likely to become obsolete and will need to be revised significantly.