Freedom of Contract in the EU and China
In modern contract law, freedom of contract is of an underlying principle that people have struggled for centuries. Both China and Europe fully realized its value, although in distinct ways that are deeply rooted in the two regionsâ€™ historical and cultural backgrounds. In Europe, freedom of contract is restricted by principles of good faith, fair dealing, social justice and fundamental rights, whereas in China, except for those limitations set by the Europe, the traditional notion of contract voluntariness is rather limited by the collective interests and interests of the state. This paper is intending to describe the different understandings of freedom of contract in the EU and China.
What Is the Harmony Approach
Chinese people, like their Western counterparts, are unfamiliar with terms such as “restorative justice” or “repairing the harm.” Nevertheless, they are probably one of the most largely populated nations in the world that has embraced both the ideas and practices of mediation. Resolving conflict through mediation is currently a practice across the criminal justice spectrum. Although it might be overshadowed by this study’s singular focus on mediation practices in the field, the fact is that various mediation practices are taking place throughout the punishment-based justice system. The story is fundamentally about repairing harm in the Chinese societal and legal landscape. This chapter explains why it is “about repairing the harm” and why I view it in this way.
The Theory of Contract Law: The Unity of Contract Law
Introduction At the close of the twentieth century, the situation of contract law presents the following contrast. On the one hand, in both the common law and civil law the definitions of and mutual connections between the various principles of contract law are for the most part well-settled and no longer subject to controversy. Indeed, despite differences in formulation, the main elements of the law of contract are strikingly similar in both legal systems, and these systems, whether directly or by derivation, prevail throughout most of the contemporary world. The authoritative public articulation of the law of contract has achieved a certain apparent completeness and acceptability. The same cannot be said, however, of efforts to understand the law at a reflective level. In common law jurisdictions at least, there is at present no generally accepted theory or even family of theories of contract. To the contrary, there exist only a multiplicity of competing theoretical approaches, each of which, by its very terms, purports to provide a comprehensive yet distinctive understanding of contract but which, precisely for this reason, is incompatible with the others. Moreover, we seem to lack a suitable criterion by which to adjudicate among them, let alone to combine them in an ordered and integrated whole. The point has come when we appear to doubt the value and indeed the very possibility of a coherent and morally plausible general theory of contract, one that could gain wide acceptance.