Tariffs, The Terms of Trade and Domestic Prices in a Monetary Economy: A Further Analysis
The purpose of this note is to re-examine the recent Batra-Ramachandran (B-R, 1980) investigation of the effects of tariffs in a monetary economy. In particular, we show that under flexible exchange rates the Metzler condition is necessary and sufficient for avoiding the Metzler tariff paradox, as in the usual barter model, thus extending B-R's discussion. Furthermore, we show that the Metzler condition is sufficient for both a tariff-induced appreciation of the exchange rate (under flexible exchange rates) and a tariff-induced payments surplus (under fixed exchange rates). These results can be contrasted with B-R's negative contention that such effects are "indeterminate". This note thus reconciles B-R's results with those we reported elsewhere (Anderson and Takayama 1978).
M e t l z e r 's Paradox and the Optimum Ta r i f f in a Monetary Economy
We augment the standard two country, two-commodity and two-factor trade model by allowing for money to exist as an additional asset. We find that it is possi ble for an increase in the domestic tariff to worsen the terms of trade if the i m p o r table sector is severely distorted by the existence of money. More o v e r, the Metzler condition is no longer both necessary and sufficient to rule out the Metzler paradox. Finally, we show that the conventional formula for the optimum tariff , derived in barter trade models, has a downward (upward) bias if money is more (less) efficacious in the importable sector. “In the real world there is no simple dividing line between trade and monetary issues.” K r ugman and Obstfeld
Judicial Review, Socio-Economic Rights and the Human Rights Act
INTRODUCTION 1 THE ROLE OF COURTS IN THE PROTECTION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC PERSPECTIVES I. The Indivisibility of Human Rights II. The Protection of Socio-economic Rights in Domestic Courts III. Conclusion 2 THE REGIONAL PROTECTION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS: EUROPE I. Introduction II. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 1950 III. The Protection of Socio-economic Rights in the ECHR IV. The Protection of Socio-economic Rights in EC/EU Law V. Conclusion 3 COURTS, THE UK CONSTITUTION AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT 1998 I. Introduction II. Reading and Giving Effect to ECHR Rights in UK Courts III. Conclusion 4 JUDICIAL REVIEW: DEFERENCE, RESOURCES AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT I. Introduction II. The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review III. Public Law, Deference and the Human Rights Act IV. Conclusion 5 FROM NEED TO 'CHOICE' IN PUBLIC SERVICES: THE BOUNDARIES OF JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN PRIORITISATION DISPUTES I. Introduction II. NHS Rationing: The Role of Courts in Disputes over Access to Medical Services III. Local Authority Resource Allocation Disputes IV. Interpreting Local Authority Statutory Duties Post-HRA V. Conclusion 6 ARTICLES 3 AND 8 ECHR: FAILURE TO PROVIDE AND POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS IN THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC SPHERE I. Introduction II. Anufrijeva, Article 8 ECHR and Maladministration in the Provision of Welfare III. Article 3 ECHR: Respect for Dignity IV. Conclusion 7 ARTICLE 14 ECHR AND THE UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC GOODS AND SERVICES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM I. Introduction II. Socio-economic Entitlements and the Limits of Substantive Fairness in Article 14 ECHR III. Carson's Case: Refusal of Up-rated Payments to Pensioners Abroad 283 IV. Reynolds' Case: The Intensity of Scrutiny in Other 'Status Disputes' V. Equality and Human Rights VI. Conclusion 8 ARTICLE 6 ECHR: JUDICIAL REVIEW, DUE PROCESS AND THE PROTECTION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS I. Introduction II. What is a Civil Right for the Purposes of Article 6 ECHR? III. The Quality of Administrative Justice: The Scope of Article IV. Conclusion