Game Theory Model for Intrusion Prevention in Computer Networks
No system is completely secure, but it’s possible to analyze system vulnerabilities, take security measures and thus reduce the likelihood of system intrusions. One tool to reduce this probability of intrusion is to implement intrusion prevention systems, which analyze network traffic to determine anomalous behavior and take security measures with the agents that exhibit these behaviors. This document proposes a game theory model based in an evaluation of works related in the area that could be the basis of an algorithm for the prevention of intrusions in networks.
Inducing data loss in Zigbee networks via join/association handshake spoofing
Zigbee is an IEEE 802.15.4-based specification for low-power wireless mesh networks. Being a protocol with several known vulnerabilities, it continues to attract extensive research interest due to its potential applications in the Internet-of-Things (IoT). One of Zigbee's weak points lies in the network coordinator's initial handshake with a joining device, which is unencrypted. Our paper proposes a denial-of-service attack which exploits this fact to convince an end device to send its data to a rogue device on a different channel rather than the actual coordinator. Because the resource limitations of Zigbee devices generally preclude permanent storage, this is likely to result in loss of the transmitted data. We successfully demonstrate our attack and propose a solution that uses challenge-response based authentication to mitigate the attack.
Contractor Failure: Analysis
The possibility exists for any construction contractor to fail to filfill the contract requirements associated with a facility. Contractor failure occurs when a contractor is unable to perform his/her contractual duties, thus requiring the facility owner to invoke the contract's nonperformance clause. This paper provides aggregate contractor business failure statistics and outlines potential causes for failure. A framework to identify and quantify the associated costs is also introduced. Several case studies are presented to examine the cause and cost of failure and the means by which the facilities were completed. Alternatives available for project completion when contractor failure occurs are discussed. Recommendations to identify and monitor contractors at high risk for failure are outlined as well. This paper provides facility owners with a greater awareness of the possibility of contractor failure, how to quantify costs of contractor failure, and avoidance techniques.