Deflation and the Fisher equation
So, according to Irving Fisher, one reason to worry about deflation is that the federal funds rate is expected to be held near zero as the economy grows out of this recession.
Suspicious Estimates of Ex Ante Real Interest Rates: Evidence of Macroeconomic Malpractice?
The ex ante real rate of interest is an important concept in economics and finance. These disciplines treat Irving Fischer’s theory of interest as canonical; it is used universally. In the world as we know it, the Fisher theory requires positive ex ante real interest rates. Consequently, empirical estimates of the ex ante real interest rate derived from the Fisher theory of interest should also be positive. Virtually all estimates of the ex ante real interest rate published in economic journals and/or used in macroeconomic models and policy discussions for the past 35 years, however, contain negative values for extended time periods. These negative ex ante real interest rate estimates would thus seem to be theoretically flawed. Moreover, it was shown more than 30 years ago that the procedures generally used to estimate ex ante real interest rates produce biased estimates. We document this problem, explore why it exists, and assess alternative approaches for estimating the ex ante real interest rate.
Seven faces of "the peril"
In this paper the author discusses the possibility that the U.S. economy may become enmeshed in a Japanese-style deflationary outcome within the next several years. To frame the discussion, the author relies on an analysis that emphasizes two possible long-run steady states for the economy: one that is consistent with monetary policy as it has typically been implemented in the United States in recent years and one that is consistent with the low nominal interest rate, deflationary regime observed in Japan during the same period. The data considered seem to be quite consistent with the two steady-state possibilities. The author describes and critiques seven stories that are told in monetary policy circles regarding this analysis and emphasizes two main conclusions: (i) The Federal Open Market Committee's "extended period" language may be increasing the probability of a Japanese-style outcome for the United States and (ii), on balance, the U.S. quantitative easing program offers the best tool to avoid such an outcome.