From a European to a common security and defence policy. IES WORKING PAPER 5/2010
The Lisbon Treaty has introduced significant changes in the field of EU security and 
defence. On the one hand, important institutional reforms, such as the creation of a 
renewed High Representative, have of course a great impact on this policy field. On the 
other hand, the Lisbon Treaty has also introduced specific innovations in the security and 
defence of the European Union. The mutual defence clause and the new mechanisms for 
flexible cooperation such as the permanent structured cooperation, are only some of the 
key innovations. Generally, the European Security and Defence Policy receives its own 
section in the Treaty on European Union and is rebranded as Common Security and Defence 
Policy. Thus, the Lisbon Treaty sets the objective for a common policy in this field. 
However, does this reform really provide for the means for the realization of such a 
common policy? Furthermore, does the Lisbon Treaty increase the importance of CSDP or is 
the increasing importance of this policy field just reflected in the Treaty text? These are 
the main questions that the present paper attempts to address through the analysis of the 
new institutional setting of the post-Lisbon security and defence policy, as well as through 
the examination of the specific innovations in this area.
The Treaty of Lisbon: A Revised Legal Framework for the Organisation and Functioning of the European Union
Leaving to one side the debate about the comparative merits of the Treaty of Lisbon vis-à-vis the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, this article seeks to present the overall legal framework for the organisation and functioning of the Union as it would look following the incorporation into the existing treaties of the amendments proposed in the new text. It is submitted that, on the whole, the substantive reforms introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon represent a significant step forward from the current treaty framework in terms of the coherence, efficiency and transparency of the Union’s objectives and action.
A Gambling Paradox: Why an Origin-Neutral “Zero-Quota” is Not a Quota Under GATS Article XVI
In US—Gambling, the Appellate Body held that an origin-neutral prohibition on remote gambling (which is how they mostly viewed the United States law) was “in effect” a “zero-quota”, and that such a “zero-quota” violated GATS Article XVI:2. That holding has been widely criticized, especially for what critics refer to as the Appellate Body’s “effects test”. This article argues that the Appellate Body’s “in effect” analysis is not an “effects test” and is not the real problem. The real mistake is regarding a so-called “zero-quota” as a quota under Article XVI. That is inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the word “quota” in such a context; it is at odds with the object and purpose of Article XVI; and it is likely to reduce Members’ willingness to make concessions.