Property Rights and Welfare Economics: Miller et al. v. Schoene Revisited
The authors of the present comments have directed their attention to several points in our analysis of the case of Miller et al. v. Schoene. The purpose of our attempt at a diagrammatic exposition of the case was to ultimately illuminate the nature of choices open to society in utility space. While both have valid criticisms, it is unfortunate that neither attempted to fully explore and demonstrate the implications of their recommendations and suggestions on the grand utility frontiers. Following their lead we will specificially respond to their several comments sequentially:
The Law and Economics of Cedar-Apple Rust: State Action and Just Compensation in Miller v. Schoene
Miller v. Schoene approved the uncompensated destruction of cedar trees that were alternate hosts to a fungus that damaged apples but not cedars. Supreme Court Justice Harlan F. Stones opinion noted that deciding for either cedar or apple growers would amount to action by the state. Scholars have claimed that Miller marked the demise of the public/private distinction in constitutional law. This article presents historical evidence to the contrary. A widely-accepted standardhigher commercial valuecommonly decided whose interests should prevail in such controversies. The analysis also shows that moral hazard explains why cedar owners were denied just compensation, which orchardists had originally been willing to tax themselves to pay. Cedar owners whose land actually gained in value when their trees were cut down nonetheless availed themselves of damages.
The Use of Qualitative Information in Macro-Economic Policy Analysis
The majority of macro-economic policy models takes for granted that conflicts among objectives can be assessed by means of a tradeoff analysis. Such tradeoffs imply that sacrifices and benefits of various impacts of decisions can be measured on a cardinal scale, so that a conventional macro-economic utility or welfare analysis can be applied.