The Stability of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The Clash between State and Antistate Actors
T he September 11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. mainland have transformed calculations about the threats posed by nonstate actors, especially those who largely are inspired by a global, antistate ideology such as al-Qaeda's panIslamist vision. Since 11 September 2001 the old threat of nuclear holocaust has acquired a new dimension-the possible possession and use of nuclear weapons by terrorists and extremist movements. Structural designs for nuclear weapons and other such materials were confiscated from underground hideouts of the alQaeda terrorist group in Afghanistan. The stability and instability of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan also has been a major issue of concern since the late 1980s. Proponents of nuclear deterrence in South Asia who argue that the introduction of nuclear weapons has prevented the outbreak of a largescale conflict between India and Pakistan, generally belong to the "State-as-arational-actor" school of thought. Others worry about the new threat against the stability of nuclear deterrence in South Asia posed by the intrusion of nonstate actors, or perhaps, more accurately, "antistate actors." Many perceive their agendas as "irrational" in their ideological orientation (Wahabism today as was Maoism in the 1960s).' Because their ultimate stated objective is to destroy the modern international system--a system based on nation-states-they should, therefore, be described as antistate actors in nature and purpose. Why should we pay greater attention to the role and perspective of antistate actors in our discussion of the stability of nuclear deterrence in South Asia?
The imbalance of terror
This new, previously unrecognizable terror has a name: asymmetric warfare, which now has a horrific shape. To where is the new world leading? The messages are confusing but they are reshaping international relations.
Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy
From the Publisher: 
Book Introduction: 
 
The fight for the future makes daily headlines. Its battles are not between the armies of leading states, nor are its weapons the large, expensive tanks, planes and fleets of regular armed forces. Rather, the combatants come from bomb-making terrorist groups like Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda, drug smuggling cartels like those in Colombia and Mexico, and militant anarchists like the Black Bloc that ran amok during the Battle of Seattle. Other protagonists are civil-society activists fighting for democracy and human rights-from Burma to the Balkans. What all have in common is that they operate in small, dispersed units that can deploy niimbly-anywhere, anytime. They know how to penetrate and disrupt, as well as elude and evade. All feature network forms of organization, doctrine, strategy, and technology attuned to the information age. And, from the Intifadah to the drug war, they are proving very hard to beat; some may actually be winning. This is the story we have to tell. 
 
Author Bios: DAVID F. RONFELDT (Ph.D., Political Science, Stanford University) is a senior social scientist at RAND whose research focus includes information revolution, netwar, cyberocracy, strategic swarming and the rise of transnational networks of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). JOHN ARQUILLA (Ph.D., Political Science, Stanford University) is a RAND consultant and a professor of foreign policy at the United States Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.