Questions Relating to the Competence of the Security Council
It has been said that international law is “more than any other law, a regulation of competencies.” 1 As such the question of competence has been a prominent one in any international organization. For example, more than one hundred questions were raised as to the competence of particular organs of the League of Nations during its life time,2 and it is not surprising that the United Nations has had to consider the same question on many occasions, especially in its early stage of existence, as it appears that it “is natural for institutions in their infancy to be faced with disputes in regard to their jurisdiction.”3 Indeed, the question of competence has been and is not only a major legal question,4 but also the most important question in the operations of the United Nations, in that all its actions emanate from either explicit or implicit recognition of its own competence. As early as 1950, a special committee of the American Society of International Law pointed out that “in many cases the Members concerned almost automatically challenged the competence of the United Nations in order to delay action or to channel the discussion away from the merits of the case. There are in consequence several hundreds of cases in which the competence of the Organization has been challenged.” 5 The prominence of questions relating to competence of the various organs of the United Nations and related agencies is also reflected in the advisory opinions given by the International Court of Justice. All but one 1 of the questions submitted to the Court for advisory opinion have touched upon the question of competence in one way or another.2
The United Nations and Domestic Jurisdiction
Referring to “domestic jurisdiction” as used in the League Covenant, Professor J. L. Brierly characterized it as “a new catchword,” capable of proving as great a hindrance to the orderly development of international law as “sovereignty” and “state equality” had been in the past, and about which “little seems to be known except its extreme sanctity.” Since these words were written, the Covenant of the League of Nations has been replaced by the Charter of the United Nations as the basic law of the organization of the world community. The concept of a reserved domestic jurisdiction is still with us. In fact, Article 2, paragraph 7, of the Charter gives it a broader definition and a wider range of application than did Article 15, paragraph 8, of the Covenant. What is the meaning of the domestic jurisdiction principle as set forth in the Charter? What effect has it had in practice on the working and development of the United Nations?
The Categorical Stability of Gambling Motives Among Community-Recruited Gamblers: A Longitudinal Assessment
Over the past decade, several motivational models have been proposed to explain the role of motives in gambling disorder. In the model captured by the four-factor Gambling Motives Questionnaire Financial (GMQ-F), gamblers are described as being primarily motivated to gamble for ‘coping’, ‘enhancement’, ‘social’, and ‘financial’ reasons. Although this model has received significant empirical support; to date, research assessing the role of motives in gambling disorder has been primarily cross-sectional in nature. Thus, the extent to which gambling motives remain stable over time has yet to be explored. In the current study, the stability versus fluidity of self-assessed gambling motives was investigated using the Quinte Longitudinal Study, a longitudinal dataset of gambling behaviour collected over 5 years. Gambling motives of 2795 gamblers were examined over all five annual assessments. The total proportion of gamblers who stayed in the same primary motive category across each of the 5 consecutive assessments was 22%, indicating substantial fluidity in category membership. Substantial movement between categories was seen for each GMQ-F group, as well as an additional group of non-classified motives. Logistic regression analyses suggest that greater resistance to gambling fallacies significantly predicted stability between the baseline assessment and a follow-up 1 year later, but gambling severity did not. Potential limitations in the study design and opportunities for future research are discussed.