Securing solidarity between generations: inter-generational cohesion in the face of demographic change, with particular focus on individual and familial factors and their relation to societal development ; preparatory expertise for the International Plan of Action on Ageing 2002
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Tesch-Römer, C., Motel-Klingebiel, A., & Kondratowitz, H.-J. v. (2000). Securing solidarity between generations: intergenerational cohesion in the face of demographic change, with particular focus on individual and familial factors and their relation to societal development ; preparatory expertise for the International Plan of Action on Ageing 2002. (DZA Diskussionspapiere, 34). Berlin: Deutsches Zentrum für Altersfragen. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168ssoar-370082
Soziale Beziehungen und Unterstützungsnetzwerke
Die primaren Unterstutzungspersonen der Alteren sind Familienmitglieder — vor allem (Ehe-)Partner und Kinder. Eine Reihe von Entwicklungen deutet jedoch darauf hin, das sich dies zukunftig andern konnte: In demographischer Hinsicht konnen die Zunahme der Scheidungen und die hoheren Quoten von Alleinlebenden und Unverheirateten sowie der Ruckgang der Zahl der Kinder und die steigende Kinderlosigkeit das Unterstutzungspotential fur die zukunftigen Alteren reduzieren (vgl. z.B. Galler 1990; Schneekloth 1996) und in der Konsequenz zu neuartigen Beziehungsmustern auch im Alter fuhren. Verscharft wird die Situation durch die steigende Lebenserwartung, die eine Zunahme der Pravalenz und Dauer der Unterstutzungs- und Pflegebedurftigkeit mit sich bringen konnte (vgl. Dinkel 1992; Kramer 1992).1 In soziologischer Perspektive konnen Individualisierung und Pluralisierung der Lebensformen (z.B. Beck-Gernsheim 1993), aber auch der Ausbau sozialstaatlicher Leistungen als Substitution von vormals in der Familie erbrachten Unterstutzungsleistungen und damit als Bedeutungsverlust der Familie bzw. Abnahme familialer Bindungen und Verpflichtungen interpretiert werden (z.B. Hoffmann-Nowotny 1988). Schlieslich konnten sich auch die steigende Erwerbsbeteiligung der Frauen, ein spateres Ausscheiden aus dem Erwerbsleben oder die vielfach geforderte hohere Mobilitat und Flexibilitat der Erwerbstatigen in geringeren familialen Betreuungsleistungen niederschlagen (z.B. Cantor 1991). Die zukunftigen Alteren wurden demzufolge uber ein kleineres und moglicherweise weniger verlasliches familiales Unterstutzungspotential verfugen. Im Zwischenbericht der Enquete-Kommission Demographischer Wandel (Deutscher Bundestag 1994: 73; 84ff.) wurde aus der Diskussion solcher Tendenzen bereits gefolgert, das die Angebote an staatlichen und privaten Dienstleistungen sowie unterstutzende Vermittlungs-, Beratungs- und Betreuungsangebote fur Betroffene und potentielle Helfer ausgebaut werden mussen, um die entstehenden Lucken zu schliesen.
Strategy and Manipulation in Medieval Elections
There are many goals in developing electoral protocols, including a desire for a system which is transparent, in that it is clear what the rule or procedure to follow is; nonmanipulable, in that it is not in a person’s best interest to misrepresent their preferences; honest, in the sense that it elects the ‘right’ candidate; and not open to strategizing, i.e., bribery or collusion. However, these desiderata are in tension with each other: Often, transparent electoral procedures are the least strategy resistant, and many honest procedures encourage manipulation. Thus a balance between these different goals must be sought. In modern times, since the seminal result on vote manipulation, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem [5, 6], much attention has been devoted to developing voting rules where manipulation is never in the best interest of the voters [4] or which are computationally too complex for the average bounded agent to be able to manipulate [1]. This focus on computational aspects of electoral methods is one of the hallmarks of modern studies on voting. But pursuit of these goals is not restricted to modern times: Those participating in elections in the Middle Ages also sought transparency, non-manipulability, honesty, and strategyproofness in so far as these properties can be consistently expressed in a single procedure. However, given the lack of computational sophistication in the Middle Ages, alternate approaches were needed in order to promote honesty, discourage strategizing, etc. These approaches can be classified as either external (constraints introduced outside of the electoral procedure, such as incentives for coming to consensus quickly) or internal (constraints introduced within the electoral procedure, such as voting rules which cannot be manipulated without adverse effects, or which are too difficult for the average bounded agent to manipulate). Surveying examples of both approaches in the context of medieval ecclesiastical and secular elections provides an interesting comparison to modern electoral procedures. Elections in the Middle Ages were used for the same reasons that they are today: To select suitable candidate(s) for a particular office, duty, or obligation. However, it is important to note that the term electio was used in the Middle Ages in a broader sense than our modern ‘election’. Its primary sense was ‘selection’ or ‘choice’, and only secondarily ‘election’ in the modern sense. Thus, many records which purportedly discuss elections are not discussing elections of the type which interests us. We can identify four categories of medieval electoral processes: (1) Election by an external authority having no direct interest in the election; (2) Indirect election, where electors name other electors who then select or elect the officials; (3) Election by lot; and (4) Election by ballot. Elections of the first and third types are generally computationally uninteresting; the first type corresponds to dictatorial voting rules, and the third type collapses to probability theory. In general, interesting voting methods are found only in the fourth type, election by ballot, though they can also occur in indirect election.