Going 'Belt and Braces': Domestic Effects of Euro-Crisis Law
This paper considers the effect of the recent EU measures relating to strengthened economic governance both at the EU level and the level of national (constitutional) law. We first explain the scope of EU competence in economic policy and its effects on Member State competence. We will then examine how this competence has been exercised during the past few years, in particular from the point of view of the domestic effects of the six-pack and two-pack, which constitute the ‘Belt’ needed to maintain stability in the euro area and thus hold the ‘trousers’ (economic policy decision-making) up. We then turn to the Fiscal Compact and the budgetary framework directive and their effects at national level, constituting the ‘Braces’ intended to ensure healthy national budgetary policies. The relevant question remains to be whether the current 'belt and braces' rules are the appropriate approach for preventing new crises. There are both legal and political reasons for reconsidering some of the solutions made during the crisis. Maybe the trousers are just too loose?
‘A Missing Piece of European Emergency Law: Legal Certainty and Individuals’ Expectations in the EU Response to the Crisis’
The principle of legal certainty and legitimate expectations as a legal tool for individuals in EU law – the mixed nature of EU emergency law: the ‘conferral principle’ limitation and the ways to expand executive powers in the EU response to the crisis ( Pringle , ESMA , BPP , OMT ) – the existence of legal certainty failures in that response: unpredictable and disjointed legislation and adjudication – arguments blurring legal certainty as the standard of review for EU emergency law: conditionality, international law and indirect legislation – the self-restraint attitude of the European Court of Justice and the risks of leaving litigation under the sole remit of national courts: normalising emergency powers and EU law autonomy at stake
Bailouts, Budget Constraints, and Leviathans
Recent research on federations, particularly in the developing world, emphasizes the importance of hard budget constraints and a strong central government to attenuate intergovernmental economic conflicts. Such research fails on two counts. First, it does not explain how hard budget constraints emerge or become self-enforcing. Second, it does not take into account the insight of the market-preserving federalism literature that central governments strong enough to impose restraint on regions are likely too powerful to be checked in a manner consistent with the longterm health of markets. Unfortunately, the market-preserving federalism literature itself provides little insight into how to move from a market-distorting to a market-preserving equilibrium. This article answers these theoretical shortcomings with reference to the evolution of political competition at the regional level and the representation of those regions at the national level. More specifically, whereas regional competition determines the subnational demand for soft budget constraints, the coalition of those regions at the national level determines the likelihood of their provision. Empirically, the research relies on a case study of the state debt crisis of the 1840s when the United States made a definitive movement toward market-preserving federalism.