Peasants into Soviets : Reconstructing Komsomol Identity in the Russian Countryside of the 1920s
Growing up in the village of Bogorodskoe, Penza province, Aleksei Soldatov loved school, but he had to quit when he finished grammar school to help support his family. After six years of war and revolution, Aleksei’s household was unexceptional: it had no father or older brother. The fourteen-year-old described his oppressive isolated life as that of a “monk,” filled with hard work and devoid of friends and fun. In his narrative, his dismal life took a turn for the better when, following his sister’s footsteps, he joined the local Politprosvet. At first, he couldn’t understand what they were discussing. A few weeks later, he joined a new Komsomol cell established five versts from his home. There, he began to understand the new language and rediscovered reading. Soon, he organized a village reading room and became its librarian (izbach). To his family’s dismay, throughout 1924 and 1925 he did little farming; instead, he read magazines and newspapers and familiarized himself with current events and with Party and Komsomol life in order to answer the many questions readers asked him. While continuing to work as village librarian, when a Komsomol cell was founded in his own village, he became its secretary, head of its political reading circle, and Pioneer group leader. At the ripe age of eighteen, he could say:
The Teikovo Cotton Workers' Strike of April 1932: Class, Gender and Identity Politics in Stalin's Russia
In April 1932, Nikolai Shvernik, the head of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, informed Stalin and Lazar Kaganovich that Soviet workers were rebelling against "starvation" rations implemented on the first of the month. Shvernik did not offer details about the most serious episode of unrest-a wave of strikes by over sixteen thousand textile workers in the Ivanovo Industrial Region (IPO)-because Kaganovich himself orchestrated the suppression of the protests. Although Stalin already knew from OGPU (secret police) reports that his policies had alienated the working class, Shvernik emphasized that the recent unrest was marked by political overtones: "In all the cases cited, counterrevolutionary and Trotskyite elements attempted to exploit the temporary difficulties in worker supply."' Although the IPO strikes were never publicized, they served as the subtext of speeches at the national trade union congress that met that month in Moscow. During appearances before delegates, Shvernik ridiculed officials from the towns where the strikes occurred, Ian Rudzutak, the head of the party's Central Control Commission, admitted that workers were "steeped in foul moods," and Kaganovich attributed the crisis of morale to the "petty-bourgeois" attitudes of new workers, the persistence of "bourgeois influences" among experienced workers, and the "subversive work" of "class-alien elements" who allegedly had infiltrated Soviet enterprises.2 Meanwhile, rumors of unrest stoked the flames of opposition within the party. Circulated surreptitiously among Communists in 1932, Riutin's platform argued that the regime
The Posse Comitatus Act: Liberation from the Lawyers
"Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." --Posse Comitatus Act (1) Much has been written about the Posse Comitatus Act. As a few others have noted, much of this commentary is "just plain nonsense." (2) The majority opinion, however, including that of the Department of Defense, maintains that this 19th-century law strictly limits almost all DOD participation in any activity related to "law enforcement" or "homeland security." (3) This fundamental mischaracterization, while understandable, is potentially dangerous to national security and has done nothing to protect civil liberties. So how did a racist law from the bitter Reconstruction period morph, in many minds, into shorthand for the respected principle that Americans do not want a military national police force? In a nutshell: deliberate mischaracterization by the original supporters who hid behind patriotic language to strip the freed slaves of their nascent civil and voting rights; excessive focus on the false historical arguments as opposed to the law's actual text and ugly history; and some bad policy that misused a few key court decisions, and part of a statute, in a way that limited DOD efforts in the "war on drugs" at a time when Congress was pushing expanded participation. This article introduces the actual history and meaning of the Posse Comitatus Act, distinguishing clearly between the law and a misleading DOD regulation that requires an army of lawyers to navigate. Despite what you've heard, the Posse Comitatus Act is not a significant impediment to DOD participation in law enforcement or homeland security. The Act's Uninspiring Pedigree General Acceptance of Army Participation in Law Enforcement (1787-1861) While the nation's founders were deeply concerned with the abuses of the British army during the colonial period and military interference in civil affairs, the majority was even more concerned about a weak national government incapable of securing life, liberty, and property. Some vocal patriots sought to avoid a standing army and any federal control over the state militias; however, in the end, theirs was the minority view. The new Constitution did not contain the explicit limits and outright bans desired by some, even though the pro-Constitution Federalists explicitly argued that the standing army could assist in law enforcement efforts. The framers even debated the federal government's power to call out the posse comitatus (literally meaning the power or authority of the county) and did not prohibit this established feature of the common law. Clearly, the Posse Comitatus Act did not originate from the prevailing opinion during the revolutionary period. Legislative and executive actions in the early days of the American republic confirm that the use of federal troops or federalized militia to preserve domestic order, either as part of a posse comitatus or otherwise, was an accepted feature of American life under the new Constitution. In 1794, President Washington led federal troops into western Pennsylvania because unruly farmers refused to pay a whiskey excise tax. President Jefferson issued a broad proclamation that relied upon the Chief Executive's authority to call on the entire populace, military and civilian, to serve as a grand posse comitatus to counter Aaron Burr's planned expedition against Spanish territory. In 1832, President Jackson initially sent military forces toward South Carolina under a Jefferson-like posse comitatus theory to prevent secession. In an 1851 report to the Senate, President Fillmore stated that he had the inherent power to use regular troops to enforce the laws and that all citizens could be called into a posse by the marshal. …