Tighter Price Cap Regulation on Consumer Surplus and Utility
Kang, Weisman, and Zhang (2000) demonstrated that, under a tighter price cap, consumer welfare increases with the independence of demands. Conversely, the tighter price cap may negatively impact consumer welfare in situations involving interdependent demands. This paper identifies an overlooked property of Kang et al. (2000), namely, that the cross-price effects should be symmetrical without an income effect and demand functions of a Hicksian type. This paper reveals the invariant conclusion that consumers always benefit from a tighter price cap. Besides, it further derives the effects of the tighter price cap on consumer utility, and concludes that the net price elasticity of demand is the key to the effect of the average revenue constraint.
Tighter Average Revenue Regulation Can Reduce Consumer Welfare
A monopolist producing for two markets is subject to an average revenue constraint, a form of regulation which is relevant to some U.K. utilities. Where marginal costs of serving the two markets differ, tighter regulation may cause one of the prices to rise as shown by I. Bradley and C. Price (1988). A simple linear example demonstrates that total consumer surplus may fall as regulation becomes more stringent. Copyright 1995 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Superior regulatory regimes in theory and practice
A substantial body of recent research finds thatprice-cap regulation is superior tocost-based regulation in that many of the distortions associated with the latter are reduced or eliminated entirely. We prove that the hybrid application ofcost-based and price-cap regulation that characterizes current regulatory practice in the United States telecommunications industry may generate qualitative distortions greater in magnitude than those realized undercost-based regulation. It follows thatprice-based regulation in practice may be welfare-inferior tocost-based regulation. The analysis further reveals that the firm subject to this modified form ofprice-based regulation may have incentives to engage in pure waste.