Doctrinal Cycles and the Dual-Crisis of 1979
Though presidential doctrines claim to be broad, forward-looking articulations of national security principles, they are in fact reactive and narrow. They emerge following crises and can subsequently constrain security policy, creating ideal conditions for new crises to emerge. This paper thus argues that in the pursuit of security, presidential doctrines can perpetuate a cycle of instability. Using the Nixon Doctrine as the present case study reveals that the strategy first came as a response to the failure in Vietnam, then rendered the US unable to foresee or manage the events of 1979: the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. These crises subsequently forced a wholesale reassessment of security in the form of the Carter Doctrine. In examining this period of US–Middle East relations, the constricting, reactive nature of doctrines and the concomitant cycles of instability become self-evident.
The Middle East Crisis
On 6 October 1973, Egypt and Syria launched simultaneous attacks against Israel beginning the fourth and largest Arab—Israeli war. Over the next three weeks the fight for territory in the Middle East, through a series of outside interventions, posed a multiple threat to the foundations of international peace and prosperity. For the United States and Soviet Union, the conflict quickly turned into a major test of their new relationship, as they took opposite sides launching massive re-supply efforts to the Israelis and Arabs. When their joint efforts to negotiate a ceasefire broke down, the superpowers became engaged in a sharp trial of wills. In response to a Soviet threat to directly intervene, on the evening of 24 October, the United States put its forces, including nuclear facilities, throughout the world on a high state of alert. Although the measures lasted for just a few hours, for many, it marked the most perilous moment of the Cold War after the Cuban missile crisis.
Developers of the hepatitis B vaccine.
air at VA facilities, one of the many pieces of unfinished business beyond those major issues that we discussed in our Commentary. We agree that all facilities where current and past military personnel serve and receive treatment should be 100% smoke-free and note the recent Institute of Medicine report Combating Tobacco in Military and Veteran Populations. The report, which was commissioned by the Department of Defense (DOD) in 2007, calls for the DOD to set a timeline to eliminate smoking on military installations. The report also recommends that the DOD stop selling tobacco products in military commissaries and exchanges, prohibit tobacco use anywhere on military installations, and treat tobacco use in the same way as other health-related behaviors, such as alcohol abuse and poor physical fitness. We join Matthews and the Institute of Medicine in urging the VA and the DOD to take more immediate steps to protect the health of the men and women who serve in the armed services, as well as the civilians (such as Dr Matthews) working to serve them.