SOFT LAW SEBAGAI SEBUAH STRATEGI : STUD KASUS PIAGAM ASEAN (ASEAN CHARTER)
Abstrak One indicator of the effectiveness of cooperation can be seen from: whether the agreement is soft law or hard law. Cooperation with soft law form  tends to be ineffective because there is no binding consequences, while  hard law form tend to be effective because the consequences are binding. Interestingly, countries drafting their cooperation in the form of soft law, at the expense of the effectiveness of their cooperation. By taking a case study of the ASEAN  Charter, this article came to the conclusion that soft law chosen as a strategy to secure national interests when cooperation assessed no longer profitable. Key Word: Hard Law, Soft Law, Strategy
Legal Issue in the Matter of Cross-Border Insolvency in Indonesia Based on Law No. 37 Of 2004 on the Insolvency and Postponement of Debt Payment Obligation
The issue of cross-border insolvency is growing rapidly in line of the global economic movement. The foreign elements on insolvency process raises question on the States’ jurisdiction, the Court’s authority to adjudicate the case of cross-border insolvency, the recognition of Indonesia’s court decision on insolvency in another State, as well as the issue of Curator’s authority to cooperate with another State officials. In Indonesian insolvency law, the issue of cross-border insolvency is limitedly regulated and unable to resolve the arising legal issues. The inconsistency of the application on territoriality and universality principle in Law No. 37 of 2004 on the Insolvency and Postponement of Debt Payment Obligation causes the difficulty on executing the insolvency assets in another State’s territory and vice versa. Thus, an adequate cross-border insolvency legal framework is required to provide legal certainty for the business actors in Indonesia by adopting the existing legal framework through international agreements and reforming the Indonesian insolvency law.
Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency
In many areas of regulation, mandating disclosure of information about a firm’s products, services, production processes, or governance is said to improve the efficiency and rationality of market decisions, avoid fraud, and advance public regulatory goals, all without intruding significantly upon the autonomy of market actors. Yet the idea of regulating through information disclosure has made barely a cameo appearance in the field of labor and employment law. This article begins to fill that void. Mandatory disclosure is no panacea; it may be an overused policy tool in many areas. But in the law of work, mandatory disclosure can play a supportive role both within the ambit of existing substantive mandates and among the many terms and conditions that are above or beyond the reach of substantive mandates. Within the domain of mandatory legal rights or minimum terms, mandatory disclosure may help to improve compliance. Within the large domain that is left to private ordering, mandatory disclosure can improve the operation of labor markets by better informing employees’ choices among and bar-gains with employers. And where neither mandates nor markets meet public aspirations for more socially responsible, fair, and egalitarian workplaces, mandatory disclosure may help to press firms to reach beyond compliance by strengthening and broadening the factual foundation for the reputational rewards and sanctions that are an increasingly significant driver in organizational behavior.