The Policy Dynamics of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System
Since 1977, oil produced in northern Alaska has posed a major environmental threat across large areas of Alaska while simultaneously playing a dominant role in the economy of Alaska. This enduring dilemma was created by the building of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System to transport oil produced on the North Slope of Alaska, a region containing the largest oil field ever developed in North America. The Trans-Alaska Pipeline System transports oil through an 800-mile pipeline and ocean-going oil tankers. This complex technological system poses an enduring risk of environmentally damaging oil spills in Alaska. This study applies the punctuated equilibrium theory of policy change to examine the processes and enduring consequences of the national policy reforms that allowed the building of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System.
Moving Alaskan Oil to Market: Canadian National Interests and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, 1968–73
On 18 July 1968, Robert Anderson, chairman of the Atlantic Richfield Company, announced that "one of the largest petroleum accumulations known to the world today" had been discovered on the north slope of Alaska. (1) Estimated to contain between five and ten billion barrels of oil, the Prudhoe Bay location would, according to Mr. Anderson, soon undergo "commercial development," and "pipeline and transportation studies would begin immediately." (2) Within two weeks, Atlantic Richfield and Humble Oil and Refining Company had awarded a contract to Houston's Pipeline Technologies, Inc., "to study the feasibility of transporting... recently discovered Arctic oil to market by a pipeline to a port in southern Alaska." (3) By mid-February 1969, Atlantic Richfield, Humble, and the British Petroleum Oil Corporation jointly declared that it was their intention to proceed with the construction of a $900 million dollar pipeline that would "run about 800 miles in a generally southern direction from the Prudhoe Bay area on the Arctic Ocean across Alaska's Brooks [Mountain] Range to the Gulf of Alaska on the state's southern coastline." (4) The oil would then be transported by tanker to select refinery and distribution sites along the U.S. west coast, particularly in the state of Washington. (5) The trio of oil corporations, while strongly indicating a preference for a trans-Alaska pipeline/tanker transportation scheme, nonetheless noted that "planning studies on alternate routes are continuing." (6) The possibility that large quantities of Prudhoe Bay oil would soon be transported on an ongoing basis by tanker along the Canadian west coast was not received enthusiastically by the Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau. Canadian authorities were particularly concerned over the passage of tankers through the environmentally delicate and economically important Juan de Fuca Strait and the Strait of Georgia en route to refineries in northwestern Washington State. According to Donald Macdonald, the minister responsible, the proposed transit through the Straits involved "the consequent risk of disastrous oil spills to Vancouver Island and the British Columbia mainland." (7) This possibility was compounded by two disconcerting realities then confronting the Trudeau government. First, the routing of tankers from Alaska to Washington State would be exclusively within American territorial and international waters. As such, not only would Ottawa be unable to subject these ships to Canadian maritime laws and regulations, but it would also have no legal leverage with which to challenge the proposed routing. Second, there was no jointly coordinated vessel management regulatory arrangement between Canada and the United States to oversee the safe passage of ships through the Juan de Fuca Strait and the Strait of Georgia. Fearful of the environmental and economic risks posed to the coastal waters and lands of British Columbia by a tanker accident and oil spill, Ottawa moved to dissuade the United States from pursuing this option. This article reviews the strategy and position taken by Ottawa to prevent American oil tanker traffic along Canada's west coast and, in particular, it closely examines Ottawa's attempts from 1971 to 1973 to convince American government and business officials that an alternate transportation route, namely an overland pipeline through Canada's Mackenzie Valley region, was a more attractive choice. (8) Finally, the reasons behind the Nixon administration's decision to reject the routing scheme touted by the Trudeau government--and by definition authorize the trans-Alaska pipeline/tanker route--will be detailed and considered. Canadian and American National Interests In order to convince Washington that the industry-favored trans-Alaska plan should not be given regulatory approval (by the Department of the Interior) or political authorization (by Congress and the White House), Canada decided to pursue two courses of action simultaneously: first, to diplomatically protest, publicly and privately, the use of very large crude carriers (VLCC) for the shipment of Prudhoe Bay oil from Valdez to American west-coast terminals; and, second, to promote vigorously an alternative route for the transportation of Alaskan oil--a Mackenzie Valley pipeline. …
Analysis of the Ionospheric Effect for Time Offsets per GPS Code Measurements
This paper shows the analysis results of time offsets using P1, P2 and P3 code in GPS time transfer. The r2cggtts program has been used in GNSS Time Transfer and use the P3 ionosphere free combination of P1 and P2 code measurements. We modified the r2cggtts program in order to calculate and write all kinds of time offsets P3 as well as P1 and P2. The result of the modified r2cggtts program shows that time offsets using P1 and P2 are of wide distribution comparing to time offsets using P3. In order to Figure out the error factors for wide distributions of P1 and P2, we analyze and present the relation between the elevation angle and time offsets in this paper.