A methodology for cyber operations targeting and control of collateral damage in the context of lawful armed conflict
Throughout history, the law of warfare has evolved to protect non-combatants and limit collateral damage. The same legal and ethical constraints apply to the conduct of cyber warfare, where it is similarly desirable to limit the effects of offensive actions to specific locations and groups. However, conventional wisdom suggests that this is extremely difficult, if not impossible to accomplish in the cyber domain. In this paper, we argue to the contrary. It is possible to constrain the effects of cyber actions to specifically desired, legitimate targets while significantly limiting collateral damage and injury to non-combatants. To this end we present a generalized methodology for analysis of the targeting and effects of cyber operations with respect to principles of lawful conduct in armed conflict. This methodology includes a framework of effects categories, target attributes and control measures to direct and constrain cyber operations. It also includes a process for evaluating these effects and controls against the principles for lawful conduct in armed conflict. We illustrate the methodology in action by applying it to W32.Stuxnet, software widely considered to be a cyber weapon. Our results indicate that it is entirely possible to analyze complex cyber war problems, identify legally authorized courses of action, and focus effects on desired targets while greatly minimizing collateral damage.
Key terrain in cyberspace: Seeking the high ground
In military doctrine, key terrain refers to areas which, if seized, afford an advantage to an attacker or defender. When applied to geographic terrain, this definition is clear. Key terrain might include a hill that overlooks a valley an enemy wants to control or a crossing point over a river that must be traversed before launching an attack. By definition, dominance of key terrain is likely to decide the overall outcome of a battle. While cyber key terrain is similar to geographic key terrain in some ways, there are also significant and often counterintuitive differences. Some consider cyber terrain to be tied to a physical location and to be represented in cyberspace by routers, switches, cables, and other devices. We will argue that key terrain in cyberspace exists at all of the cyberspace planes, which include the geographic, physical, logical, cyber persona, and supervisory planes [1]. In many cases, features of cyber terrain will not be tied to a specific location, or the geographic location will be irrelevant. In this paper we deconstruct and analyze cyber key terrain, provide a generalized framework for critical analysis, and draw parallels between cyber and physical key terrain while providing examples of key terrain in cyber operations. During a cyber operation, an analysis of key terrain will aid in the strategy and tactics of both the offense and the defense. During peacetime, an understanding of cyber key terrain can be employed broadly, ranging from helping a system administrator focus scarce resources to defend his network all the way to allowing nation-state militaries to develop long-lasting and effective doctrine.
Numerical tools applied to power reactor noise analysis
In order to be able to calculate the space- and frequency-dependent neutron noise in real inhomogeneous systems in two-group theory, a code was developed for the calculation of the Green's function (dynamic transfer function) of such systems. This paper reports on the development as well as the test and application of the numerical tools employed. The code that was developed yields the space-dependence of the fluctuations of the neutron flux induced by fluctuating properties of the medium in the two-group diffusion approximation and in a two-dimensional representation of heterogeneous systems, for both critical systems and non-critical systems with an external source. Some applications of these tools to power reactor noise analysis are then described, including the unfolding of the parameters of the noise source from the induced neutron noise, measured at a few discrete locations throughout the core. Other concrete applications concern the study of the space-dependence of the Decay Ratio in Boiling Water Reactors, the noise-based estimation of the Moderator Temperature Coefficient of reactivity in Pressurized Water Reactors, the modeling of the beam- and shell-mode core-barrel vibrations in Pressurized Water Reactors, and the investigation of the validity of the point-kinetic approximation in subcritical systems driven by an external source. In most of these applications, calculations performed using the code are compared with at-power plant measurements. Power reactor noise analysis applications of the above type, i.e. core monitoring without disturbing plant operation, is of particular interest in the framework of the extensive program of power uprates worldwide.