French Security Policy in Transition: Dynamics of Continuity and Change
Abstract : Since 1989, French defense and security policy has been undercut by changes in the external environment and domestic pressures to deal with the challenge of economic modernization. The Soviet revolution of 1989, the reunification of Germany, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the experience of coalition warfare during the Gulf War-all have challenged the assumptions and realities underlying the Gaullist synthesis. Above all, the French position on security independence has been put into question. The main hope has been for a European Alliance to supplant the American one over time in the face of a gradual process of change within Europe but change has not been gradual within Europe. The European Union is challenged by discontent within Western Europe. A new Central Europe has emerged that has yet to find its place in European or global politics. A new Russia is emergent in which nationalism is defining an assertive role for the Russians within Europe, but at the same time the economic weakness of Russia limits its ability to play such a role.
U.S. and NATO Force Structure and Military Operations in the Mediterranean
As instruments of national policy, military forces fulfill a wide variety of military and political functions. During the cold war, however, military functions of U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces not associated with the Soviet Union and political functions other than deterrence of the Soviet Union and, for the United States, reassuring our allies, were much overlooked, U.S. and NATO forces in and committed to the Mediterranean region, as elsewhere, were sized and structured for the purpose of defeating Soviet forces. Possessing such a capability was counted on to deter Soviet military aggression and coercion and to prevent NATO states from being intimidated by Soviet military power, U.S. forward deployed forces and reinforcement plans were intended to demonstrate to both the Soviets and our allies the firm U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe, thereby contributing to the deterrence of the former and the reassurance of the latter. Forward deployment also facilitated crisis management and a rapid transition to hostilities, if necessary, for contingencies involving the Soviet Union or others. Non-Soviet contingencies, however, did not have to command much attention in force planning during the cold war. As "lesser included cases," the force requirements they generated were small and readily satisfied by the forces needed to meet the Soviet threat. Political functions other than deterrence and reassurance also could be safely ignored because they were fulfilled automatically by the forces maintained for Soviet-related purposes. With the Soviet threat gone and Russia no more than a latent threat in the Mediterranean region, the United States and NATO can no longer take for granted the full range of their forces' political and military functions. The NATO Strategic Concept recognizes this explicitly by pointing out that, henceforth, risks to NATO's security will be "multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional." Nowhere do risks to NATO have more facets and come from more directions than in the Mediterranean region. For thousands of years, the Mediterranean has been a strategic whole where events in one area inevitably affect the states and peoples elsewhere. Here, East meets West and North meets South, empires have risen and fallen, usually by force of arms, and the three great religions of the West confront each other. Today, the Mediterranean region is rife with local disputes that are territorial, ethnic, or religious in origin. Territorial disputes exist between the following: Morocco and the Polisario Liberation Front over Western Sahara; Morocco and Spain over Ceuta and Melilla; Spain and the United Kingdom over Gibraltar; Israel and its neighbors and the Palestinians over the occupied territories and Israel's very existence; Syria and Turkey over the Hatay Region; Greece and Turkey and Greek and Turkish Cypriots over Cyprus's future; Kurds and the governments of Turkey and Iraq; various Lebanese groups; and various groups within the former Yugoslavia. Active ethnic disputes include those between Turks and Kurds, Turks and Bulgars, Turks and Greeks, Greeks and Albanians, Albanians and Serbs, Serbs and Croats, Serbs and Bosnians, Croats and Bosnians, and Basques and Spaniards. Religious rivalries exist between Suni and Shi'ite Moslems, moderate and fundamentalist Moslems, Moslems and Jews, orthodox and non-Orthodox Jews, Moslems and Christians, and eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic Christians. Although many of these disputes do not pose problems directly for the United States and NATO states, others do. Any assault on the territorial integrity of Turkey, for example, would trigger NATO commitments to common defense. Disputes between Greece and Turkey disrupt NATO planning and exercises. Instability or conflict in oil- and gas-producing regions of North Africa could threaten Europe's vital energy supplies. Social disorder and economic deprivation in North Africa and the former Yugoslavia have generated migration to Europe and could produce a flood of refugees. …
Iran: Soviet Interests, US Concerns
PROLOGUE The invasion began early one August morning. Invoking Article Six of the 1921 Treaty of Friendship, which states, "The Soviet Government shall have the right to send its army into Persia in order to take the necessary military steps in its own defense," the Soviets sent their forces marching toward Tehran. Although tensions in the region had been mounting steadily and strong Soviet diplomatic protests had reached Tehran earlier in the month, the Iranians were surprised by the attack. The invasion carefully followed the plan laid out several months earlier by the Soviet General Staff. A two-pronged attack into the northwestern Azerbaijan Province quickly enveloped Tabriz, Iran's second-largest city, before progressing onward toward Zanjan, Qazvin, and ultimately to the western approaches to Tehran. Another two-pronged attack was launched simultaneously against Khorasan Province in the northeast. Iran's third-largest city, Mashhad, quickly fell to the Soviets. A third Soviet force, along the eastern Caspian Sea coast, complemented this effort against Mashhad and helped cut off Tehran from the east. All told, 40,000 Soviet troops participated in the initial attack, with the occupation force quickly swelling to nearly 100,000 combat troops. Soviet air forces supported the advancing ground armies and also conducted a highly effective, largely unchallenged air campaign of terror against virtually all major northern Iranian towns and cities, including Tehran itself. These indiscriminate air attacks added to the atmosphere of panic and intimidation. In the face of this swift and powerful ground and air onslaught, Iranian resistance caved in. Within a week, the major northern cities were under Soviet control. Within two weeks, Tehran was effectively cut off from both east and west and the Iranian Majlis (Parliament) was urging the central government to accept Soviet terms. Within three weeks, as Soviet troops reached the outskirts of Tehran, Iran's senior leadership prepared to flee the country and leave behind a new regime--one willing to accept Soviet domination over northern Iran. Fiction? Prediction? No--history. The year was 1941. In August, the British and the Soviets--concerned over the Shah's pro-Nazi leanings and in need of a secure supply corridor to assist the Soviet war effort against Germany--had given Iran's monarch, Reza Shah Pahlavi, an ultimatum to evict all German nationals from Iran. The Shah, convinced that the British would never invade and that the Soviets were too preoccupied resisting German advances to open another front, refused. (1) The rest is history. (See the map on p. 7.) On 25 August, Soviet forces attacked from the north while British forces invaded from the south. By 30 August, both were sufficiently entrenched to begin delivering new ultimatums to Tehran. By 9 September, the Majlis was willing to accept Moscow's and London's terms, even though Reza Shah remained defiant. On 15 September, Soviet forces advanced on Tehran from the east and west while British troops moved up from the south. The next day, Reza Shah abdicated in favor of his son Mohammed Reza Pahlavi (who remained on the Peacock Throne for the next 38 years). [ILLUSTRATION OMITTED] In announcing his country's invasion to the Iranian Prime Minister on 25 August 1941, the Soviet Ambassador to Iran assured the Iranians in writing that the USSR respected Iran's sovereignty: The military measures now undertaken by the Soviet government are directed exclusively against the danger produced by alien activity in Iran. As soon as the dangers threatening the interests of Iran and the U.S.S.R. have been averted, the Soviet government will, in accordance with the undertakings given in the Soviet-Iranian Agreement of 1921, immediately withdraw its troops from the boundaries of Iran. (2) The Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and Iran, commonly known has the Tri-Partite Treaty, signed in Tehran on 29 January 1942, further assured Iran's independence after the war. …