The Contemporary Presidency The Administrator as Outsider: James Jones as National Security Advisor
I'm the national security adviser. When you come down there, come see me. --James Jones (Woodward 2010, 138) The relationship between U.S. President Barack Obama and his departing national security adviser, James Jones, was doomed from the start. --Destler (2010, 1) On October 8, 2010, James Jones resigned as national security advisor (NSA) to President Barack Obama. Jones's resignation came as no surprise to many in the media as speculation over the NSA's standing and future within the administration had reached a fever pitch with the release of Bob Woodward's Obama's Wars (2010) earlier that fall. Jones had intended to serve no more than two years, but his resignation came early amidst a growing sense that he had lost favor within the administration. Jones's brief tenure as NSA began with great promise and ended with barely a whimper. The former Marine commandant assumed the position of NSA in January 2009 and received significant acclaim. Indeed, the retired general was seen by many as providing essential foreign policy experience, knowledge, and gravitas to the Obama administration. Commentators were also quick to predict that Jones would effectively coordinate the interagency process and be able to manage any personality conflicts between incoming Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. Jones possessed a reputation as a strong-willed, effective, intelligent, and organized manager. The general also was lauded for his willingness to provide his opinions when solicited (Barry 2008). Yet, for all of the initial promise, James Jones would become one of the weakest and most isolated NSAs since the creation of the National Security Council (NSC) in 1947. "The harshest and most telling critique of Gen. James Jones' tenure as national security adviser is that his absence will barely be noticed" (Kaplan 2010, 1). Jones, while praised by President Obama upon his resignation in October 2010, had all but disappeared from public view. Jones was replaced by his deputy, Tom Donilon, who by all accounts was much more of an administration insider and confidant of the president. Jones's short and unhappy stint as NSA provides scholars of U.S. foreign policy with a valuable opportunity to continue the study of one of the more prominent and influential positions within the U.S. foreign policy-making community. Scholars have examined the role of the NSA and NSC in order to develop a greater understanding of the U.S. foreign policy decision-making process (see Best 2001; Bock 1987; Brzezinski 1987; Crabb and Mulcahy 1991; Destler 1977, 1980; Inderfurth and Johnson 2004; Menges 1988; Mulcahy 1986; Prados 1991; Rodman 2009; Rothkopf 2005; Shoemaker 1992; Zegart 1999). Ivo Daadler and I. M. Destler's 2009 book In the Shadow of the Oval Office: Profiles of the National Security Advisers and the Presidents They Served--From ffFK to George W. Bush and John Burke's research (2005a, 2005b, 2009a, 2009b) on honest brokerage at the NSC each attempted to categorize national security advisors and determine what role they played in their respective administrations. Various case studies have also applied typologies and models of NSC advisor roles to individual NSAs as well (e.g., Burke 2005a, 2005b; Mulcahy 1995). However, James Jones's role as NSA remains largely unexamined from a formal political science framework. Scholars of U.S. foreign policy making are thus confronted with a basic research question. What role did James Jones play as NSA? My central argument is that James Jones performed in the administrator role as NSA. Jones managed the day-to-day operations of the NSC, delegated the coordination of the interagency process to his deputy, Tom Donilon, and did not generate policy options. Furthermore, Jones never developed a close advisory relationship with the president and also failed to enter Obama's circle of trusted political aides. …
National Security Management: What Presidents have Wrought
It was the third week of March 1980 and for the internationally minded the headlines leaped out from the page. The New York Times proclaimed a "U.S. Foreign Policy in Deep -Disarray"; the Washington Post reported "Errors and Crises: A Foreign Policy against the Ropes." The subheads were no less damning: "Europe: Allies View Carter White House as Unpredictable and Insensitive"; or "Pakistan: The Policy Shift by Washington Was Too Sharp and Too Fast." All reinforced what was becoming a near-universal critique-that the conduct of American foreign relations lacked both continuity and coherence at a time when the need for both qualities seemed particularly urgent. In April, President Jimmy Carter sought to recoup his fortunes, and those of his nation, by ordering a secret raid to rescue fifty-three American hostages held captive in Teheran. The mission failed, and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance resigned in protest. U.S. allies were further shaken: they had just agreed to economic measures against Iran on the understanding that military force would not be employed. At home, Carter got considerable credit for trying, and his choice of Senator Edmund Muskie as Vance's replacement was widely applauded. But the general foreign-policy malaise nonetheless deepened in the months ahead, as did the impression of governmental disarray. Criticism naturally focused on the Carter administration, on the president himself and his principal advisers. And, in consequence, people turned, with
Fascism and the right in Europe, 1919-1945
This new text places interwar European fascism squarely in its historical context and analyses its relationship with other right wing, authoritarian movements and regimes. Beginning with the ideological roots of fascism in pre-1914 Europe, Martin Blinkhorn turns to the problem-torn Europe of 1919 to 1939 in order to explain why fascism emerged and why, in some settings, it flourished while in others it did not. In doing so he considers not just the 'major' fascist movements and regimes of Italy and Germany but the entire range of fascist and authoritarian ideas, movements and regimes present in the Europe of 1919-1945.