Borders and Orders in Europe: Limits of Nation- and State-Building in Estonia, Macedonia and Moldova
The breakdown of communist rule provided new opportunities for the restoration of statehood and for national self-determination. Estonia, Moldova and Macedonia have in common a 'minority' large enough potentially to claim a share in nation- and state-building rather than being granted minority rights. Numerous cases of ethnic strife within post-communist states and beyond their borders have demonstrated that domestic ethnicity can easily internationalize ethnic relations. In the 1990s, however, the EU has entered Rogers Brubaker's classic triangle (state-nation, minority and homeland) as a fourth variable rather than a constant. Evidently, a country's contractual relation with the EU and its location in a newly divided Europe are relevant for the effectiveness of the EU's expanding toolbox for conflict prevention. Moreover, a mode of EU enlargement strictly based on conditionality implies a separation of regions of 'insiders' and 'outsiders' where different norms and strategies apply to minority issues.
Ethnic Mobilization and Reactive Nationalism: The Case of Moldova
1. Introduction Until the October 1991 Soviet coup, Moldova, previously known as Bessarabia and the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic, had known independence only briefly, having been part of the Russian Empire, Romania, or the Soviet Union for almost its entire history. As a result of shifting foreign influences and borders, Moldova, like most modern political entities, has a multiethnic population. The conflicting perspectives and demands of Moldova's different ethnic groups underlie many of today's controversies.
Interdependence and manipulation in the Russian-Baltic relationship: 1993–97
Since Lithuania) the formal independence recognitions in 1991 of the the policy Baltic of states' the Russian (Estonia, Federation Latvia, Lithua i ) independence in 1991 the policy of the Russian Federation toward these states has been characterized by a steady pattern of intimidation and dominance, whether in terms of threats to slow down the removal of Russian troops, unilaterally demarcate borders, or to reassess economic ties to these countries. The Baltic states, for their parts, have sought to establish themselves as sovereign nation-states, to in effect pick up where they left off prior to being forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1 940. These states' overarching concern with security has led them to pursue membership in western economic (the European Union, or EU), human rights (the Council of Europe), and military (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO) organizations as security against Russia. The clash of Baltic and Russian Federation foreign policy goals has resulted in a diplomatic condition akin to the notion of "neither peace nor war." It is hypothesized here that the government of the Russian Federation has perceived the Baltic states to have retained their strategic importance to Russia despite the breakup of the Soviet Union, thereby leading Russia to attempt the reimposition of a patron-client condition upon them. This perception is based upon the Russians' own sense of their declining influence in international affairs and their loss of influence in their former sphere of influence in Eastern and Central Europe. Moreover, the sense of loss of influence has been compounded by Russian policymakers who consider the independence of the Baltics as nothing less than the separation of component parts from Russia proper (Russian control of this region variously dates as far back as the seventeenth century). Thus, the imposition of patron-client relationships would allow the Russian Federation to regain some of its former influence as a regional power and at minimal expense in domestic and foreign policy terms. The existence of patron-client relationships is indicated by the consistent pressures of Russian foreign policy for concessions from the three Baltic states particularly in the areas of: 1) troop withdrawals and basing rights; 2) dissuading these states from joining NATO; 3) social and political guarantees for ethnic Russians; and 4) the settlement of territorial disputes. The extent to which the Russian Federation has brought pressure to bear upon neighbouring states is significant not only within the sphere of Russian influence but also in terms of other regional powers which may face similar