The Shape of Elite Opinion on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1992 to 2004
Research has demonstrated considerable diversity in the evolution of foreign policy beliefs of elite opinion leaders. Holsti and Rosenau's three-headed eagle, Wittkopf's four-headed eagle, and Rosati and Creed's six-headed eagle produced a number of categories that help to explain the significance of this diversity since the collapse of the Cold War consensus. This article expands upon this research by observing even greater complexity and diversity in the shape of foreign policy beliefs of elite opinion leaders since the end of the Cold War. Using a content analysis of national opinion and foreign policy journals between 1992 and 2004, it identifies and details nine foreign policy orientations (missionaries, hegemonists, globalizers, global capitalists, narrow realists, progressive internationalists, anti-imperialists, neighbors, and disengagers) held by elite opinion leaders. It also suggests that elites are altering their foreign policy orientations by absorbing profound global changes into their belief systems.
A Test of the “News Diversity” Standard
The present study adds to the framing literature by providing a test of Mauro Porto’s “News Diversity” standard for professional journalism: providing multiple, equally persuasive frames in every news story. What are the effects of multiple versus single media frames on a foreign policy issue, and how do they interact with people’s foreign policy values? Previous studies have looked at how single frames influence opinions, how frames interact with values, and a few studies have investigated the effects of two competing frames at varying levels of persuasiveness. None, however, have used four, equally strong frames on a foreign policy issue and measured their effects among those with differing foreign policy values. We found that exposure to only single frames tended to move participants away from their stated values and in the direction of the frame, while exposure to multiple, competing frames kept participants’ opinions closer to their stated values—without merely reinforcing previously held opinions.
The New Internationalisms
A m e r i c a in a New was writing before he went to ’Washington to serve as National Security Advisor to President Carter. The problems and challenges that the United States confronts do indeed seem different from the ones that dominated international politics for three decades after the end of World War 11. But in order to wrestle with those problems and meet those challenges successfully, the new Administration needs to borrow something from the past, namely a domestic consensus for its foreign policy. For almost a quarter century Americans were united in support of resistance to the spread of Communism, by war if necessary, under the leadership of a President with considerable leeway to conduct the nation’s business abroad. The cold war consensus is gone. What has taken its place? How do Americans see international politics? How do they define the requirements for the nation’s security? What constraints does public opinion place upon foreign policy? What do Americans consider their nation’s proper role in this new world? Is there any consensus on anything in our foreign policy? A good deal of evidence on these questions can be found in the 1976 Presidential campaign. The election is not the most obvious place to look; public opinion surveys give a more scientific picture of what people are thinking. But surveys almost invariably show popular inattention and indifference to foreign policy issues. Public opinion tends to crystallize in an election because the campaign takes on the structure of a debate. And political leaders draw their assessments of public opinion more from election campaigns than from polls. They shape their policies with an eye on elections of the past because they expect to run in elections of the future. The fear of being charged with “losing” Viemam especially haunted Democratic officeholders, including the President, in the 1960s because the Republicans had parlayed the charge that the Democrats had “lost” China into a vehicle for electoral success in the early 1950s. In what sense can campaigns be characterized as a debate? The two major-party candidates in a Presidential campaign usually avoid taking controversial stands. They concentrate on “valence” issues, those where everyone is on the same side; they extol peace, abhor corruption, and commit themselves to a policy of con-