The Netherlands: A No-Nonsense Approach to Civil Procedure Reform
In the Netherlands, significant changes to the procedural regulations and other policy reforms have thoroughly reshaped the legal system over the past decades. Much more attention than before is directed to gathering data and to conducting empirical research in order to assess some of these changes. The role of the judge regarding case management seems to be of greater significance today than in the early 1990s. Judges have the authority to control the progress of lawsuits. It is now common for judges to schedule oral hearings at an early point in time at which the judge will order the parties themselves to appear in court in order to discuss the case. In the Dutch legal system, some preliminary steps have also been taken to promote mediation.
Rechtspraak: productiviteit in perspectief
Dit onderzoek richt zich op de vraag hoe de productiviteit van de 19 
rechtbanken en 5 gerechtshoven zich in de periode 2002-2005 heeft ontwikkeld. 
Per saldo blijkt de productiviteit over die periode bij zowel de rechtbanken 
als de gerechtshoven te zijn gestegen. Zowel over de jaren als tussen de 
gerechten zijn niettemin flinke productiviteitverschillen zichtbaar. 
 
Hiervoor zijn verscheidene verklaringen. Zo blijken de schaal van productie 
en de voorraad en instroom van zaken van belang, maar ook hoe middelen worden 
ingezet en zijn georganiseerd. 
De relatie tussen productiviteit en een aantal beschikbare proces- en 
kwaliteitsindicatoren is eveneens onderzocht. Toch blijven er veel 
ontwikkelingen en verschillen onverklaard. 
 
In de discussie over de organisatie van de rechtspraak (bijvoorbeeld over 
wenselijke schaalgrootte en samenwerking), de financiering ervan (bijvoorbeeld 
de kostprijzen) en de 'best practices' komt dit onderzoek goed van pas. 
Daarnaast kunnen de in dit rapport gevonden verbanden tussen ingezette middelen 
en afgehandelde zaken per gerecht een beter inzicht geven in de werking van de 
justitiele keten.
Using the Concept of Legal Culture
Forthcoming in the Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 2004 USING THE CONCEPT OF LEGAL CULTURE David Nelken * 1.The Meaning of Legal Culture Legal culture, in its most general sense, is one way of describing relatively stable patterns of legally oriented social behaviour and attitudes. The identifying elements of legal culture range from facts about institutions such as the number and role of lawyers or the ways judges are appointed and controlled, to various forms of behaviour such as litigation or prison rates, and, at the other extreme, more nebulous aspects of ideas, values, aspirations and mentalities. Like culture itself, legal culture is about who we are not just what we do. Enquiries into legal culture try to understand puzzling features of the role and the rule of law within given societies. Why do the UK and Denmark complain most about the imposition of EU law but then turn out to be the countries which have the best records of obedience? Conversely, why does Italy, whose public opinion is most in favour of Europe, have such a high rate of non compliance? Why does Holland, otherwise so similar, have such a low litigation rate compared to neighbouring Germany? Why in the United States and the UK does it often takes a sex scandal to create official interest in doing something about corruption, whereas in Latin countries it takes a major corruption scandal to excite interest in marital unfaithfulness!? Such contrasts can lead us to reconsider broader theoretical issues in the study of law and society. How does the importance of 'enforcement' as an aspect of law vary in different societies? What can be learned, and what is likely to be obscured, by defining 'law' in terms of litigation rates? How do shame and guilt cultures condition the boundaries of law and in what ways does law help shape those self -same boundaries? These few examples are enough to suggest that findings about legal culture can have both theoretical and policy implications. But there may even be more straightforwardly practical Distinguished Professor of Legal Institutions and Social Change, University of Macerata, Italy; Distinguished Research Professor of Law, Unversity of Wales Cardiff; and Visiting Professor of Law, LSE. This is a revised version of a paper that was presented as a keynote address to the Australian Association of Legal and Social Philosophy conference (July 18-20 2003). I should like to thank Professor Peter Crane and Professor Tom Campbell for their kind invitation, Professor Dimity Kingsford -Smith for graciously suggesting the idea, and Professor Jeremy Webber for his ‘reply’ to the paper.