The CESL as a European Brand - Paypalizing European Contract Law
According to the Commission, the main political goal behind the Common European Sales Law (CESL) is advancing cross-border trade between EU member states, thereby helping to further establish and strengthen a common market within the EU. The CESL is chosen and even symbolized by an already legendary blue button that consumers have to push in order to opt into the new European law. However, the blue button is more than a mere technicality: It aims at increasing consumer trust in cross-border trade by using the (expectedly) positive signaling effect of the European brand. Thus, if traders know that consumers are more likely to engage in cross-border trade on the basis of the CESL than by relying on a national contract law, offering to contract on this basis will be attractive to them for precisely this reason. If a CESL offer can be expected to increase consumers’ trust in a prospective transaction, traders will be able to use such an offer as a marketing instrument. A similar branding strategy is known from the US online payment service PayPal who has established its “payment trust button” already a decade ago. The present article deals with the question to what extent PayPal’s success story can be transferred to European contract law and what lessons the European legislator can learn from it. Could the CESL with its blue button potentially become a new, PayPal-like mechanism for consumer protection by creating and strengthening consumer trust in cross-border trade?
Incorporating under European Law: The Societas Europaea as a Vehicle for Legal Arbitrage
After a slow start, the European Company (Societas Europaea — SE) has become increasingly popular. Besides documenting the growth of this new company type, we examine whether firms choose to incorporate in the SE corporate form because they engage in ‘legal arbitrage’ by exploiting differences in legal rules between jurisdictions. We specify a number of hypotheses on particular legal arbitrage motives. To validate our hypotheses, we use a broad telephone survey among SE users in Germany as well as a simple country-level regression model based on a unique, hand-collected dataset on SE incorporations. We find strong evidence that firms use the SE to mitigate the effect of mandatory co-determination rules. Establishing a one-tier board structure (in jurisdictions that impose a two-tier structure on their national public companies) and taking advantage of the SE’s mobility for tax purposes also seem to be driving SE formations. By contrast, our analysis fails to support the suggestion that firms use the SE to shop for the most favourable national company law to fill the gaps in the SE Regulation.
Experience with the SE in Germany
Reichert discusses the application of the SE Regulation and Directive in Germany from several perspectives.