Cyber Attacks as "Force" under UN Charter Article 2(4)
I a 2010 article in Foreign Affairs, Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn revealed that in 2008 the Department of Defense suffered “the most significant breach of U.S. military computers ever” when a flash drive inserted into a US military laptop surreptitiously introduced malicious software into US Central Command’s classified and unclassified computer systems.1 Lynn explains that the US government is developing defensive systems to protect military and civilian electronic infrastructure from intrusions and, potentially worse, disruptions and destruction, and it is developing its own cyber-strategy “to defend the United States in the digital age.”2 To what extent is existing international law, including the UN Charter, adequate to regulate cyber attacks and related offensive and defensive activities today and in the future? By “cyber attacks” I mean efforts to alter, disrupt, degrade or destroy computer systems or networks or the information or programs on them.3 This article examines one slice of that legal puzzle: the UN Charter’s prohibitions of the threat or use of “force” contained in Article 2(4).4 Other writings in this volume deal with questions such as Article 51’s self-defense provisions and questions of State responsibility, and there are other international legal prohibitions and regulations that are relevant as well. But Article 2(4) is a good place to start
Unpacking Cyberwar: The Sufficiency of the Law of Armed Conflict in the Cyber Domain
Abstract : The term cyberwar is common in today s discussions of the national security challenges facing the United States and its allies. Understanding what law applies within the cyber domain is critical for all operational planners, whether or not they are directly involved in cyber operations. This article discusses the basics of how the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) affects cyber operations. It does not address the full spectrum of cyber operations, namely, defensive cyber operations and cyber exploitation (espionage activities). The focus is offensive cyber operations and the efficacy of existing international law in governing the use of cyber capabilities. First, offensive cyber operations (hereafter referred to as cyber operations) are discussed generically as they pertain to military operations. Next, the triggering effects of certain activities rising to the level of use of force or armed attack are considered considered. Lastly, the article examines the law that applies to cyber activity during armed conflicts. In conclusion, the analysis of cyberwar reinforces the theory that although means and methods may change, the underlying rules regulating military operations adapt well to the evolution of warfare. Ultimately, the Law of Armed Conflict is sufficient to deal with the novel aspects of operations in the cyber domain.
Analysis: The Agenda 2007 Proposals: Evolution or Revolution?
On 10 February 2004 the Commission published its proposal for the financial perspective 2007-2013. A week later it adopted the third report on economic and social cohesion. These two documents form the basis of the so-called ‘Agenda 2007 reforms’. They will be the greatest challenge for the enlarged EU after the intergovernmental conference, since they will determine the financial basis for EU policy-making until the middle of the next decade. The Agenda 2007 proposals certainly hint at courageous reforms, because they place a previously unheard-of emphasis on performance and quality. Under the proposals, structural operations should generate value for money, and the funds should focus on projects which generate added value at a European level. Overall the Commission’s proposals point in the right direction, because they balance, on the one hand, solidarity for the new Member States and weak regions in the old Member States with, on the other hand, investments in future tasks. Moreover, they constitute a paradigm shift. For the first time, the Common Agricultural Policy will not be the dominant expenditure category. Now it is up to the Member States to examine the proposals politically and find a compromise between sometimes very divergent interests. It is to be hoped that, during the debate over expenditure limits and division of funds, national interests do not outweigh European interests.