«Исламское государство» в контексте политических изменений на Ближнем Востоке
The article "The Islamic State phenomenon in the framework of the political changes in the Middle East" is dedicated to the "Islamic State", one of the most powerful and dangerous extremist organizations. Author realizes in this article: research of the genesis and causes of appearance of the movement "Islamic State"; analysis of the sociopolitical and geopolitical situation of the Iraqi Sunni community after the American invasion of 2003; bringing to the light factors of the high scale propagation of the Islamic extremism in Syria and Iraq; research of the military and political potential of the "Islamic State" and factors which could impede its expansion. Author considers "Islamic State" as an emergent phenomenon giving huge impact on the political situation in the Middle East. It provoked repartition of the old frontiers existed since the Sykes-Pico treaty of 1916. To the author's opinion oppression of the Iraqi Sunni community by the government of Nuri al-Maliki was the main cause of the Sunni revolt in Summer of 2014. Sunni tribes of Northern Iraq and former Baath party members were the driving forces of the revolt but then Jihadi extremists hijacked this revolt. To the author's mind elimination of the "Islamic State" is impossible without reconciliation between various religious communities in Syria and Iraq.
Стратегия интеграционных процессов в сфере науки и образования
В статье дана оценка перспектив развития интеграционных процессов науки и образования в российских вузах.
The Power Equation: Using Tribal Politics in Counterinsurgency
FOUR SHORT YEARS AGO, the sheik standing beside me clothed in a fine wool dishdasha robe had received yearly patronage from Saddam Hussein's political machine, doled money out to his tribe as he saw fit, and, as his father had before him, maintained his family's power in the tribe. Through his contacts and tribal alliances, he ensured that the men of his tribe had jobs or commissions in the army, that their children were accepted into good schools, and that their families got more than their fair share of government subsidies. In March 2003, with the toppling of Saddam's regime, the sheik's power relationships changed. When the corruption and terror of Saddam's dictatorship ended, so did the informal networks it had used and supported. The sheik could no longer dole out money. His ability to influence, coerce, and condemn declined. With his power nearly gone and an American-led coalition seemingly the reason for his loss, the sheik allowed his tribe to participate in the growing insurgent movement. The area in which the sheik lived was the most dangerous in our zone. We expected regular mortar, rocket, and IED attacks. Then one day in January 2005, an Apache helicopter hovered over the courtyard of the sheik's home, pointing its 30-millimeter chain gun at him. Marines were searching the sheik's house. His two sons sat blindfolded in the back of a truck, waiting to be sent to a detention facility, while I arrested him for being a financier and coordinator of insurgent activity in my area of operations (AO). Three weeks later, we released the sheik. He had agreed to stop attacks from inside his tribal boundaries, and in return, I would facilitate several construction contracts and notify him of which men I had targeted for detention. Five weeks after the sheik's initial arrest, attacks from his tribal area ceased. What had once been the most dangerous area in my zone became one of the safest. What Changed and Why? The events above occurred between Fox Company, 2d Battalion, 24th Marines, and the Caragoul tribe in an AO of 150-square-kilometers centered in the town of Yusufiyah, located 15 miles south of Baghdhad in North Babil, Iraq. The Caragoul tribal area ran 10+ miles along the western side of the Euphrates River from Sadr al Yusufiyah to the town of Lutafiyah. Lush farmland, a large canal network, and numerous small villages and hamlets blanketed the terrain. The area had also been the site of the headquarters of a Republican Guard division and two large ammunition manufacturing and storage facilities. The Caragoul tribe was Sunni; however, the population in the larger company zone was 60 percent Sunni and 40 percent Shi'a. Almost all of the operations Fox Company planned and the enemy activity it responded to were occasioned by three of the seven tribes in Fox's AO. The Caragoul, the focus of this story, were the primary coordinators and financiers of insurgent activity. The Janabi tribe were mainly low-level fighters and concentrated close to the company's forward operating base in Yusufiyah. The Janabi were our first target. Upon initiating offensive operations in our area, we detained many of their young adult males. Our aggressive action suppressed much of the Janabi's insurgent activity in our zone. The third "enemy" tribe, the Zobai, were dispersed, with their tribal leadership based outside our zone. They remained regular belligerents throughout our tour. Our success was a direct result of our ability to exercise power across a continuum, thereby demonstrating that we had ample military and political resources and commitment. For three months we targeted the tribes persistently with cordon-and-searches, vehicle checkpoints, and battalion-size operations. As the number and pace of our operations increased, so did our number of insurgent detainees. The increase led to more accurate and timely intelligence, which in turn enabled the targeting of even more insurgents. …