Global Trade: An Introduction to the History, Theory and Political Issues
The long history of trade is one of intercultural contact, competing theoretical paradigms, and controversy over the place of trade in national economic development strategies. Any theory of trade is necessarily a narrative about competition and the ways that humans have sought to exploit weaknesses in rivals, ameliorate the advantages of competitors and use the rewards gained by trade to realize the ambitions of elites. However, the dominant intellectual tradition that goes back as far as Adam Smith and David Ricardo holds that at least in theory, trade can benefit all parties involved if it is organized on a transparent and equitable basis. Controversies over what constitutes advantage and disadvantage in the governance of trade highlight the challenges that beset the global trading system today. The WTO remains mired in age old problems that arise when the strong bargain with the weak, and new problems that beset a governance system operating within a complex and incomplete system of international law.
Power and plenty: Trade, war and the world economy in the second millennium
Review of Kevin O'Rourke and Ronald Findlay "Power and plenty. Trade, war and world economy in the second millenium"
Deliberative Democracy and the Resource Curse: A Nationwide Experiment in Tanzania
Oil and gas discoveries in developing countries are often associated with short-sighted economic policies and, in response, calls to insulate resource management from populist impulses. We report on a randomized experiment testing methods to overcome this apparent tension between sound resource governance and democratic politics. Soon after Tanzania’s discovery of major natural gas reserves, we invited a nationally representative sample of voters to an intensive public deliberation of policy options featuring nationally recognized experts and small-group discussions. Democratic deliberation reinforced the public’s strong preference for rapid spending of gas revenues, but also increased support for various prudential and economically orthodox measures, including independent oversight of gas revenues, limits on government borrowing, and selling gas abroad rather than subsidizing fuel at home. These effects were driven by deliberation per se, rather than a pure information treatment, and show no evidence of contamination by facilitatoror peer-effects in group deliberations. www.cgdev.org Justin Sandefur, Nancy Birdsall, James Fishkin, and Mujobu Moyo