Ciudades y poder político en al-Andalus. Una hipótesis sobre el origen de las revueltas urbanas en Murcia en el siglo XIII
Throughout the 13th century a succession of urban revolts took place in al-Andalus, which caused the withdrawal of the Almohad Empire and the establishment of the third taifas, initially led by Muhammad b. Yūsuf b. Hūd al-Mutawakkil. The inability of this emir to hold together this newly-built state, and the continuous insurrections inside and utside of Murcia have led historians to investigate the nature of political power during this period. This article examines each one of these proposals and, on the basis of an analysis of some socio-economic aspects relating to Murcia (being a representative city of al-Andalus and capital of the hūdi movement during the first half of the thirteenth century), proposes a hypothesis on the nature of its power.
AZIZ B. JATTAB, DESTACADA PERSONALIDAD POLÍTICA, CIENTÍFICA Y LITERARIA MURCIANA DEL SIGLO XIII
One of the person in charge of the andalusi cultural prestige increase in the XIII Century, regarded as decadent, was Aziz B. Jattab, in one of the regions with the highest cultural level, Murcia. 
He was a great man of letters and sciences praised by his contemporaries. He abandoned these activities to become a politician. He held political trades during the government of Ibn Hud in Murcia. After his death, Aziz B. Jattab obtained the control of Murcia, but some people disapprove this situation, so they called Mardanis in order to oust Jattab.
PLEASURE, POWER, AND THE PURSUIT OF COMMUNISM: SOVIET YOUTH AND STATE-SPONSORED POPULAR CULTURE DURING THE EARLY COLD WAR, 1945-1968
art, with certain students accused of “showing political immaturity, failing to understand the Party’s positions on art.” This episode constituted part of a broader crackdown on abstract art by the Khrushchev administration from late 1962, precipitated the the Soviet leader’s derision of such art forms in December 1962 at the Manege exhibit. Such instances demonstrate the limitations of the top-level promotion of youth grassroots initiative, as the Khrushchev leadership reigned in youth autonomy when it threatened to go beyond the boundaries of the permissible. The dates cited above have particular resonance, since both 1957-58 and 1962-63 represent two periods when those at the top of the Party hierarchy moved away from pursuing a more pluralistic, tolerant policy course, due to anxiety inspired by both sharpening Cold War hostilities and domestic developments. In these periods, official rhetoric censured what it labeled as 639 TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 13, d. 546, ll. 56-57. This is likely related to criticism of the Party associated with the fallout from the Secret Speech and the Hungary invasion. For more, see Polly Jones, “From the Secret Speech to the Burial of Stalin: Real and Ideal Responses to De-Stalinization,” in Jones ed., The Dilemmas, 41-63. 640 TsAOPIM, f. 6083, op. 1, d. 52, ll. 166-67. 641 Susan E. Reid, “In the Name of the People: The Manege Affair Revisited,” Kritika 6.4 (Fall 2005): 673716. 642 On these anxieties, see Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer, 156-88.