The Interagency Process Behind US Policy on Taiwan
Abstract : How the US government interacts with Taiwan on economic, political, and security issues has long been a mystery to me. The US does not maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, which is a breakaway province of China, and the unresolved status of Taiwan is the main challenge to US relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC). This paper will endeavor to shed light on how the current interagency process on US-Taiwan relations came into being since the US, under the Nixon Administration, began normalizing relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC). It will examine the bilateral documents and US laws that are the foundation of US-Taiwan relations, focusing on the roles played by the people, organizations, and processes that formulate and implement US policy regarding Taiwan. US arms sales to Taiwan are now at an all time high, will illustrate the complexities of this interagency process.
Research note on the Taiwan relations act: Executive and legislative differences
Since the enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, the executive branch and the legislative branch have diverged on US‐Taiwan relations. As the executive branch created its version of the TRA, the Congress exerted its influence by adding security provisions. Yielding to the influence of Congress, President Carter accepted and signed into law the TRA. The 1982 Joint Communique contradicts the TRA. President Reagan signed this Communique which pledges that the US will decrease its arms sales to Taiwan. However, the TRA binds the US, by law, to sell a sufficient amount of defensive weapons to Taiwan for its security. How can the US provide sufficient amounts of defensive weapons to Taiwan if the US is decreasing its arms sales to Taiwan? The security provisions that Congress placed in the TRA comes into conflict with a presidential foreign policy statement. This paper finds that there is and has been a divergence of actions that occur even though the rhetoric and statements made by both sides seem simi...
Use of a specific antiserum for renin detection in human kidney.
The use of anti-human renin antibodies made possible the intrarenal localization of renin in human kidney by immunofluorescence. In normal kidney, only some juxtaglomerular apparatus (JGA) were fluorescent. In these JGA, granular or diffuse fluorescence was only seen in afferent arterioles and was not present in all cells. In the ischemic areas of partially infarcted kidney, fluorescence was seen in all JGA and in interlobular arteries. In these arteries the most eccentric cells were often the most positive. In the nonischemic areas of the same kidneys, fluorescence was not seen in JGA, but was observed in proximal tubular cells, suggesting the reabsorption of filtered renin at this site.