The North African Franchise: AQIM's Threat to U.S. Security; Strategic Insights, v. 8, issue 5 (December 2009)
Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is a growing and evolving North African franchise of Al Qaeda. While the group carries out a significant number of attacks within the Sahel, they have not executed attacks in the United States or Europe. There is significant research concerning the historical development of AQIM . However, there is a dearth of literature on the threat that this group poses to the United States. The purpose of this paper is to fill this research gap and evaluate the threat that AQIM poses to US security. My analysis will demonstrate that AQIM’s operations in Europe and Iraq are a security threat to US facilities and personnel. Moreover, this paper will demonstrate that AQIM has both the intent and capability to conduct attacks against US targets in Europe, Iraq and Afghanistan.
Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb: A “Glocal” Organization
There are many conditions that push local terrorists groups toward internationalization. Similarly, many local conditions and roots seem to continue to influence groups. The current literature on terrorist groups has sometimes neglected to analyze this double phenomenon of internationalization and local roots. With a concrete assessment of the recent violence in Algeria, this article demonstrates that GSPC/Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb is a good example of this dual nature, mixing local and global (e.g., “glocal” 1 ), traditional and imported practices, and high- and low-tech technologies.
Spain's Dual Security Dilemma: Strategic Challenges of Basque and Islamist Terror During the Aznar and Zapatero Eras
While global terror has emerged as today’s dominant issue, countries have grappled with terrorist attacks for generations.1 Violent movements and the terrorist attacks they inspire have bedeviled policy makers in Algeria, Colombia, England, India, Israel, Russia, Spain, and Sri Lanka for many decades. The case of Spain is especially complex, because it comprises simultaneous terror threats from two networks (Basque and Islamist) that radically diverge in their origins, goals, and methods. In this essay I compare the security problems created by the Basque terrorist group ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna) with those posed by Islamist al Qaeda affiliates in Spain. Though diminished by ETA’s 22 March 2006 announcement of a “permanent cease-fire,” Basque and Islamist terror groups continue to compromise Spanish security. ETA has directed attacks against the Spanish state for more than forty years and is responsible for more than eight hundred deaths; Islamists loyal to al Qaeda executed the single worst terror attack in modern Europe on 11 March 2004 when ten cell-phone-triggered bombs exploded on four commuter trains, killing 192 people and wounding 1,500 others. Basque and Islamist terrorism continues to haunt the Spanish political scene, and the terrorism issue has accelerated partisan divisions. The Socialist Party’s electoral victory on 14 March 2004 was widely inter-