Some Fundamentals of the Economic Role of Government
The objective of this chapter is to answer the question, ‘What are the most fundamental things that can be said about the economic role of government?’ The question should be understood, first, to ask what can be said of government at the truly most fundamental level and, second, to require a positive, non-normative answer. The chapter constitutes a precis, as it were, of my answer. The answer is subjective, but it is intended to be non-normative.
Economic Activity and Institutions
This paper is one of two working papers concerning the waste management sector transition project run from MERIT under the direction of Rene Kemp. This paper examines some of the numerous meanings and interpretations associated with the words “institution” and “institutions” and the different levels at which the two notions are employed. Institutionalism, institutionalization, institutional change and related terms are discussed followed by an examination of the links between “institutionalism” and the discipline of economics. The analytical, policy and political implications of the institutionalist approach are discussed and ways in which the institutionalist approach may be applied to changes in the economy during transitions are explored.
Deliberative Democracy and the Resource Curse: A Nationwide Experiment in Tanzania
Oil and gas discoveries in developing countries are often associated with short-sighted economic policies and, in response, calls to insulate resource management from populist impulses. We report on a randomized experiment testing methods to overcome this apparent tension between sound resource governance and democratic politics. Soon after Tanzania’s discovery of major natural gas reserves, we invited a nationally representative sample of voters to an intensive public deliberation of policy options featuring nationally recognized experts and small-group discussions. Democratic deliberation reinforced the public’s strong preference for rapid spending of gas revenues, but also increased support for various prudential and economically orthodox measures, including independent oversight of gas revenues, limits on government borrowing, and selling gas abroad rather than subsidizing fuel at home. These effects were driven by deliberation per se, rather than a pure information treatment, and show no evidence of contamination by facilitatoror peer-effects in group deliberations. www.cgdev.org Justin Sandefur, Nancy Birdsall, James Fishkin, and Mujobu Moyo