Foreign Policy from Khatami to Ahmadinejad There is One Foreign Policy in Iran, which is Khamenei's Foreign Policy
This Article is part of an MA thesis: "Iran Wilayat al Faqih System of Governance and Public Policymaking" which tried to investigate the challenges that public policy in Iran is facing under Wilayat al Faqih system of governance. The article here deals with foreign policy making in Iran f rom Khatami to Ahmadinejad in regards to both Iran regional roleand Iran-U.S . relations. It sheds light on the challenges that are facing Iranian foreign policy making which can affect both the regime and the ideology of Wilayat al Faqih itself. It also, discusses series of problems that are challenging the authority of the supreme leader which resulted in a power struggle between the supreme leader (representative of the Wilayat al Faqih institution) and the president (representative of the Republican institution) inside the system of governance when it comes to policymaking. The contradictory roles between both is a result of the president limited power in formulating foreign policies, together with his ideological preferences that is different from the supreme leader. The Article concludes by stating that such power struggle between the offices may impact Iran's domestic policies but not Iranian foreign policies, as Iran is becoming a regional power.
The role of Islam in foreign policymaking
Religion has often been an ignored dimension of statecraft, particularly so by realist or neorealist schools. This article explores the question of how a number of states, in which all or a considerable part of the population is Muslim, incorporate Islam as a guiding principle into their broader foreign policy. In this regard, it reviews a selected number of foreign policy cases using individual, domestic and international levels of analysis in which diverse Islamic incentives from major theoretical perspectives interplay with foreign policy. Its ultimate objective is to provide a deeper synthesis of the literature on Islam in foreign policymaking and relating it to major IR theories.
Whose Agenda Is Served by the Idea of a Shia Crescent
After the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, it became evident that Iraq’s Shia majority would dominate the future government if a free election was going to be held. In 2004, Jordan’s King Abdullah, anxiously warned of the prospect of a “Shia crescent” spanning Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. This idea was then picked up by others in the Arab world, especially Egypt’s President Mubarak and some elements within the Saudi government, to reaffirm the Iranian ambitions and portray its threats with regard to the Middle East. This article seeks to unearth the main causes of promoting the idea of a revived Shiism by some Arab countries, and argue that it was basically proposed out of the fear that what the American occupation of Iraq unleashed in the region would drastically change the old Arab order in which Sunni governments were dominant. While Iran downplayed the idea and perceived it as a new American conspiracy, it was grabbed by the Bush administration to intensify its pressures on Iran. It also sought to rally support in the Arab world for US Middle East policy in general, and its failed policy toward Iraq in particular. Thus, to answer the above mentioned question, a close attention would be paid to both the Arab and Iranian agenda in the Middle East after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in order to establish which entities benefit most from the perception of a Shia crescent.