Compelling Other Governments to Capitulate: An End-State to the Use of Military Force
Abstract : There is not a clearly defined framework within the national security dialogue of the United States, which sufficiently details compelling another government to capitulate as an end-state to the use of military force. When deciding to use military force the U.S. should consider all options. One option is to force a belligerent government to capitulate. Governmental capitulation is defined as the situation in a country at the national level, where the ruling authorities have relinquished power and do not control the country. The military is destroyed or rendered incapable of conducting medium or large- scale operations. The populace is subjected to martial law by an occupying force. My research revealed how the roots of strategy, diplomacy, peace, and security intertwine to reveal models or frameworks that best detail what courses of action can be taken when nations are faced with threats to national security. Part of this research included historical examples where governmental capitulation was achieved and produced long-term peace and stability. It includes examples where governmental capitulation was not achieved and peace and stability were not secured. This thesis outlines a model for planning and analyzing the conditions for governmental capitulation to be used as part of the national security dialogue prior to commitment of U.S. Armed Forces.
The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory (Leavenworth Papers, Number 21)
Abstract : Armies appear to learn more from defeat than victory. In this regard, armed forces that win quickly, decisively, and with relative ease face a unique challenge in attempting to learn from victory. The Israel Defense Forces certainly fell into this category after their dramatic victory over the combined armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in the Six Day War of June 1967. This study analyzes the problems that beset Israel in the aftermath of its decisive victory in the Six Day War over the Arabs. In the 1973 War, Anwar Sadat, Egypt's president, was able to exploit Israeli vulnerabilities to achieve political success through a limited war. An important lesson emerges from this conflict. A weaker adversary can match his strengths against the weaknesses of a superior foe in a conventional conflict to attain strategic success. Such a strategic triumph for the weaker adversary can occur despite serious difficulties in operational and tactical performance. The author suggests a striking parallel between the military triumphs of Israel in 1967 and the United States in 1991. In both cases, success led to high expectations. The public and the armed forces came to expect a quick and decisive victory with few casualties. In this environment, a politically astute opponent can exploit military vulnerabilities to his strategic advantage. Sadat offers a compelling example of how this can be done.
Cambodian refugee health care beliefs and practices.
Since 1975, when refugees from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia first began coming to the United States, many articles have been written about Southeast Asian or Indochinese refugees and health care. A careful review of the literature shows that most of these articles have one thing in common: they are written primarily about Vietnamese and do not address the unique health care beliefs and practices of Lao or Cambodian refugees.1 Although some beliefs and practices are common to most Southeast Asians, many are not. Understanding at least that differences exist, and hopefully what some specific differences are, will allow nurses and others to give better care to the various people commonly grouped together as Southeast Asians. This article will introduce readers to some Cambodian beliefs and practices related to health care. Of the principle refugee groups admitted to the U.S. since 1975, the Cambodians are presenting the greatest challenges to health care providers. Cambodians are usually poorly understood by Americans, their health status statistics are hidden among the broad category of "Asian-Pacific Islanders" or "Indochinese Refugees," and cultural and institutional barriers combine to make access to care an overwhelming problem. The end results, of course, are more problems and more expense for the Cambodians, increased stress placed on an already terribly overstressed people, and ultimately greater demands and expense placed on the health care system. One of the most common misunderstandings about Cambodians is that they (and Lao) are basically the same as the Vietnamese. "They speak the same dialect don't they?" There are some similarities, but there are also very significant differences.