Economic Analysis of Irrigated Irish Potato Production in Plateau State
The study examined the economics of irrigated Irish potato production in Plateau State. A multistage sampling technique using purposive and systematic random sampling was used to obtain data from a sample size of 120 respondents using structured questionnaires. Data were analyzed using Descriptive Statistics, Gross Margin Analysis, Benefit –Cost Analysis and Sensitivity Analysis. Results reveals that majority of the farmers were educated (64.17%) adults (58.33%) with long years (97%) of experience in Irish potato irrigation farming, and owned an average of 0.7 hectares of irrigated farm land each. Cost and Return analysis revealed that costs of seeds, labor and chemical fertilizers made up the highest (89.40%) portion of the average total variable cost of production. Results also revealed that irrigated Irish potato production in Plateau State is a profitably lucrative enterprise with a robust economic viability as shown by values  of Gross Margin ( N 655,637.88), benefit–Cost Ratio (2.64) and Sensitivity Analysis ratio (2.16). The study recommends expansion in irrigated Irish potato farm lands in addition to adoption of technologies that will minimize cost of seeds, labor and chemical fertilizers. Keywords: Gross Margin, Benefit, Cost, Sensitivity, Profitability.
Evaluation of a Greenhouse under Tropical Conditions Using Irish Potato (Solanum Tuberosum) as the Test Crop
Abstract Irish potato is a tuberous staple food predominantly grown in Plateau State, a temperate climate. As a result of the high demand for Irish potato, there is a shortage in its supply in Nigeria. The shortage in its supply could be attributed to climate change and the fall in the production level. This study sought to establish the potential of a greenhouse (GH) for the production of Irish potato in the tropics. The experiments were carried out in the rainy and dry seasons of 2015/2016 and 2016/2017. Nicola, Diamant, Batita, New Seed and Okonkwo varieties of Irish potato were cultivated inside and outside the greenhouse. Thirty seedlings of each variety were planted using Completely Randomised Experimental Design. Greenhouse performance was evaluated in terms of air temperature, relative humidity, vapour pressure deficit, yield, stem diameter, stem height and dry matter content. The result of the analysis of variance revealed that the mean greenhouse and open-field temperature, relative humidity and vapour pressure deficit differed significantly at 0.01 during the rainy and dry season. The yield and growth data in and outside the greenhouse were significantly different at 0.01. Diamant, Batista and Okonkwo varieties are recommended for GH production.
Strategy and Manipulation in Medieval Elections
There are many goals in developing electoral protocols, including a desire for a system which is transparent, in that it is clear what the rule or procedure to follow is; nonmanipulable, in that it is not in a person’s best interest to misrepresent their preferences; honest, in the sense that it elects the ‘right’ candidate; and not open to strategizing, i.e., bribery or collusion. However, these desiderata are in tension with each other: Often, transparent electoral procedures are the least strategy resistant, and many honest procedures encourage manipulation. Thus a balance between these different goals must be sought. In modern times, since the seminal result on vote manipulation, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem [5, 6], much attention has been devoted to developing voting rules where manipulation is never in the best interest of the voters [4] or which are computationally too complex for the average bounded agent to be able to manipulate [1]. This focus on computational aspects of electoral methods is one of the hallmarks of modern studies on voting. But pursuit of these goals is not restricted to modern times: Those participating in elections in the Middle Ages also sought transparency, non-manipulability, honesty, and strategyproofness in so far as these properties can be consistently expressed in a single procedure. However, given the lack of computational sophistication in the Middle Ages, alternate approaches were needed in order to promote honesty, discourage strategizing, etc. These approaches can be classified as either external (constraints introduced outside of the electoral procedure, such as incentives for coming to consensus quickly) or internal (constraints introduced within the electoral procedure, such as voting rules which cannot be manipulated without adverse effects, or which are too difficult for the average bounded agent to manipulate). Surveying examples of both approaches in the context of medieval ecclesiastical and secular elections provides an interesting comparison to modern electoral procedures. Elections in the Middle Ages were used for the same reasons that they are today: To select suitable candidate(s) for a particular office, duty, or obligation. However, it is important to note that the term electio was used in the Middle Ages in a broader sense than our modern ‘election’. Its primary sense was ‘selection’ or ‘choice’, and only secondarily ‘election’ in the modern sense. Thus, many records which purportedly discuss elections are not discussing elections of the type which interests us. We can identify four categories of medieval electoral processes: (1) Election by an external authority having no direct interest in the election; (2) Indirect election, where electors name other electors who then select or elect the officials; (3) Election by lot; and (4) Election by ballot. Elections of the first and third types are generally computationally uninteresting; the first type corresponds to dictatorial voting rules, and the third type collapses to probability theory. In general, interesting voting methods are found only in the fourth type, election by ballot, though they can also occur in indirect election.