Interventionism in US foreign policy from Bush to Obama
This chapter considers the evolution of US policy and practice towards foreign military intervention under Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama, and in terms of strategic intent finds no evidence of substantive change. Although the language of the ‘Global War on Terror’ has been replaced by one of a ‘transnational global conflict’ the underlying policy drivers remain the same: America’s security and related interests continue to shape its foreign policy and provide the justification for an exceptionalist interpretation of international law, to the disappointment of those who hoped Obama's election would usher in a new era of strengthened global norms. However, a change in US official thinking is evident in a greater appreciation of the limitations of certain forms of intervention, and in the emergence of alternative policy instruments to deliver US strategic objectives.
Blurred Lines: An Argument for a More Robust Legal Framework Governing the CIA Drone Program
Due to its basic organizational structure and failure to present itself formally as a recognizable armed force, al Qaeda lacks the legitimacy to participate in armed conflict and is not entitled to its concomitant privileges under international law. However, prominent academics argue that the same case can be made about the status of the reportedly civilian CIA employees who operate the armed, unmanned aerial drone counterterrorism strikes against al Qaeda militants. That has led many to question whether the CIA civilian drone operators who engage in armed attacks against members of al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associated forces might share the same legal status as the terrorists they combat. This Essay attempts to unpack that potential irony, laying out the legal framework that governs the law of armed conflict. More importantly, however, we propose possible courses of action that the Obama Administration could take to realign, revise, and strengthen the legal framework on which its highly effective drone program is based.
What Happened to Suicide Bombings in Israel? Insights from a Terror Stock Model
An analysis of three years of suicide bombing data in Israel reveals an increase in such attacks through March 2002 followed by a steep decline through the end of 2003. The authors propose a terror-stock model that treats the suicide bombing attack rate as a function of the number of terrorists available to plan and execute suicide bombings. The intent of Israeli tactics such as targeted killings and preemptive arrests is to reduce the capacity of terror organizations to commit attacks. When fit to the data, this model suggests that the targeted killing of terror suspects sparks estimated recruitment to the terror stock that increases rather than decreases the rate of suicide bombings. Surprisingly, only the deaths of suspected terrorists, and not Palestinian civilians, are associated with such estimated recruitment. Although Israeli actions have reduced the rate of suicide bombings over time, it is preventive arrests rather than targeted killings that seem more responsible for this outcome.