Al Qaeda in Africa: The Creeping Menace to Sub-Sahara's 500 Million Muslims
ABSTRACT Since 2005, Al Qaeda has co-opted as franchises three armed and violent African Islamist movements that had established footholds in both East and West Africa. These movements have been able to exploit anarchy, instability, hopeless poverty, corruption, and ethnic exclusion to impose medieval Islamic governance that sub-Saharan Africans reject but cannot defeat without outside help. The countries currently directly affected are Somalia, Mali, and Nigeria. African governments understand the dangers to their sovereignty presented by Al Qaeda affiliates and have demonstrated determination to do whatever is necessary to stamp them out. All African governments welcome American assistance in their resistance to Islamist extremism, but the United States needs to be careful about keeping its military footprint in Africa as small as possible.
Tracking Islamist Militia and Rebel Groups
Abstract : Using data from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset (ACLED) from 1997 to 2012, this brief outlines the geography of Islamist militancy on the African continent and provides an analysis of commonalities and differences across distinct militant Islamist groups. The analysis shows that the levels of violent Islamist activity in Africa have risen sharply in recent years, both in absolute and proportional terms. While much of this increase has been driven by the intensification of conflict in a small number of key countries, there is also evidence for the geographic spread of violent Islamist activity both south- and eastward on the continent. Differences within and across violent Islamist groups reveal differential objectives, strategies, and modalities of violence across Africa. With ongoing conflicts in Somalia, Nigeria, and Mali among the most violent in Africa -- and evidence of the spread of violent Islamist activity across Africa -- violent Islamist groups, their activities, and objectives are likely to remain extremely influential both nationally and internationally.
Continuity, Legitimacy, and Agricultural Development: Conclusions
This chapter aims at bringing together the principal conclusions of the volume, emphasising some particular aspects and questions. Policy continuity in relation to the late 1980s was rightly defined by the Aylwin government policymakers as an essential instrument for further agricultural growth. But in a democratic environment the Aylwin policies, in part precisely because of their strong element of continuity, could be implemented only if they were perceived as legitimate by the majority of the rural population, and by the poor in particular. This means that substantial improvements in agricultural income distribution, and in the quantity and quality of the social services provided to the rural poor, were unavoidable. In order to achieve legitimacy it was, and is, necessary to introduce changes. A lucid, creative combination of continuity and change was the only guarantee of success for the Aylwin policies, and for those of future democratic administrations. Continuity and legitimacy are the fundamental pillars for democratic agricultural development.