Thailand: The Politics of Continuity
Since the 1932 revolution when constitutional rule replaced the absolute monarchy, Thailand has intermittently experimented with democratic government. The Kingdom's most recent attempt began in June 1968 with the promulgation of the eighth post-revolution Constitution. The Constitution called for national elections, held on February 10, 1969, for the House of Representatives, the lower house in the bicameral legislature.' Under the leadership of Prime Minister Thanom Kittakachorn, the Thai government mobilized some 250,000 rural and urban officials and spent approximately 102 million baht ($5,100,000) in order to carry out the elections. The massive organizational effort resulted in elections which were considered by spokesmen for both government and opposition parties to be the most orderly and least corrupt in Thai history. Isolated incidents of double voting by military units, bribery, and ballot box stuffing were reported informally, yet only twelve nullification suits, a very small number of protests in comparison with past elections, were filed officially with the Minister of Interior. Although political parties had been banned since 1958, thirteen parties managed to organize, register and engage in campaigning. Of these, the pro-government United Thai People's Party (UTPP) and the opposition Democrat Party merit particular attention. The organizers of the UTPP were comprised of the persons in the most powerful political institutions of Thailand. In addition to the Prime Minister, Party leaders included the most prominent civilian and military cabinet members and the Army, Navy, and Air Force Commanders-in-Chief. At election rallies in the Kingdom's 71 provincial constituencies, the UTPP candidates stressed: 1) the need for strong centralized leadership to ensure continued stability in the Kingdom; 2) the ability of the existing military regime to meet the dangers of Communism; 3) the success of the government's economic development program; and 4) the advantages UTPP candidates would have in terms of access to government funds for local development projects. The Democrat Party, the oldest and most influential of the opposition parties, was led by former Prime Minister Seni Pramoj. In contrast to the UTPP which was able to field a full slate of 219 candidates, the Democrat
Rural Taxation in Thailand
THE THAI ECONOMY has recorded impressive progress in the past decade. During the period from I958 to i962, the gross domestic product at constant prices grew at an average rate of 6.5 per cent per annum. From i962 to i968, this rate of growth accelerated to an average slightly above 8 per cent per annum. Despite this strong overall performance, there remain certain unsatisfactory aspects of the pattern of development. Perhaps foremost among these has been the degree to which economic gains have failed to find adequate reflection in the rural areas of the country. Sharp differences persist between the standards of living in rural and urban areas (most notably the metropolitan center of Bangkok-Thonburi).' In this article, the Thai system of taxing the agricultural sector is analyzed to isolate its effect on rural development. The first part describes the system of rural taxation; this is followed by an analysis of its effect on rural development; and the article concludes with a consideration of policy alternatives. Under the present system, the burden of taxation on the rural community in Thailand may be divided into three categories: a direct tax burden in the form of the local (land) development tax;2 a hidden tax burden in the form of the rice premium-an export tax on the main product of Thai agriculture;3 and a share of all other indirect taxes such as sales taxes and import duties. In the eyes of the farmer, the local development tax represents his major tax payment. The burden of this direct taxation is rather light; in i966 it was only about five baht4 per person
Significance of Intracountry Variations for Asian Agricultural Prospects: Central and Northeastern Thailand
Introduction: In considering Asian agricultural prospects, why might intracountry variations be of interest? The answer to this question includes concerns for efficiency, equity and politics.' First, intracountry variations may reflect inefficiencies in resource allocation which limit current income levels and the rate of economic growth. Such inefficiencies could be important because of the existence of phenomena which could not be accommodated efficiently even in the abstract model of perfect competition with no government, and because of distortions which may be introduced by government actions. The phenomena in the first case include technological externalities (negative or positive effects which are not transmitted through the price system, such as may occur in research, education or smog production), increasing returns to scale over an output range which is large relative to the relevant market (such as may occur in the production of automobiles or of transportation systems), the existence of Samuelsonian public goods (for which more for one person does not imply less for another, such as national defense), and the existence of Tobinesque discrepancies between aggregate private and social time preferences.2 One further phenomenon which cannot be treated adequately in the abstract model of perfect competition, but which is almost different in kind from those mentioned above, is the existence of time. Real world economic phenomena are observed in a process of continual dynamic adjustment in which the speed of information dispersion, for example, is very importantnot in comparative static equilibria.3 Distortions which are in-