The Eleventh Central Committee : Continuity or Change ?
After the Seventh Party Congress in 1945, party congresses have been landmarks in the listory of the party and the republic. During ~he first six congresses held in the short span ~f seven years, the main focus was on consolidation of’ the ideological and organizational bases under the guidance of the Soviet Union, and on tiie attainment of the bourgeoisdemocratic revolution under the leadership of the Kuomintang (KMT). Chiang Kai-shek’s Shanghai coup of 1927 and the succeeding civil war resulted in fundamental changes in the revolutionary situation in China and CPC’s strategy to attain bourgeois-democratic revolution. This new strategy was more Chinese than Soviet, which resulted in the two-line struggles within the party. The Seventh Party Congress held in 1945 marked the consolidation of the Maoist line
The “Next Generation” of Chinese Communist Leaders
The question of who will succeed Mao Tse-tung is a fascinating and important question. The related question of the composite group of leaders which will emerge in about a decade is, if less fascinating, of at least equal importance, particularly given the increasing complexities of an industrialising society on the China mainland. Are we actually nearing a period when the present hierarchy will begin to fade away? Seemingly we are, as a quick flashback to 1949 will illustrate. When the Chinese Communists came to power thirteen years ago, they were rightfully considered a young group of leaders. Their triumphant general in the field, Lin Piao, was just over forty, Chou En-lai just over fifty, and Mao himself in his mid-fifties. Among his international peers, Mao was fifteen years younger than Stalin, eleven younger than Attlee, and almost ten younger than Truman. To emphasise their youth hi another way, only two men among the forty-four elected as full Central Committee (CQ members hi 1945 died a natural death from that time until 1960.
The New Chinese Communist
A Major obstacle to analysis of Communist movements is the, absence of firsthand evidence on attitudes and motivations affecting tension and cohesion. The refusal of four thousand members of the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Communist Youth Corps to return to the mainland after the Korean War offered an unusually large and representative cross-section of these two organizations for systematic interrogation. The results of such an interrogation conducted by the author in April 1954, while in no way conclusive, provide suggestive statistical and analytical information concerning the composition and motivations of the post-Yenan Chinese Communist. According to official Communist figures, the Chinese Communist Party numbered approximately three million in December 1948 and more than five million in June 1950. This increase of two million members in eighteen months represents the most rapid expansion of Party rolls in the history of the Chinese Communist movement. It occurred after victory was in sight, but before rigorous measures to consolidate control erupted in the “Three Anti” and “Five Anti” movements of 1951. Those who joined the Party during this period form a group strikingly different from the elite of the Chinese Communist movement, which is composed of devoted revolutionaries trained in the rigorous experiences of the Long March and the wartime days of Yenan.