The Limits of Dissensus: The Case of “Intelligent Design”
Although dissensus is a natural component of argumentation and testimony, there are limits as to what can be considered acceptable contrarian or arguments. In science, dissenting arguments are limited by the extent of their fidelity to known facts and theories. Dissensus is therefore limited by how consistent a new theory or hypothesis is with an established body of knowledge, as well as other criteria any good theory must meet. In the case of the so-called “intelligent design” controversy, the supposed “dissensus” is really an attempt at imposing inappropriate forms of argument. Using this case study as an example, questions on what are the limits of dissensus will be raised and examined.
Intelligent Design, Darwinism, and the Philosophy of Public Education
The present issue of Rhetoric & Public Affairs is dedicated to exploring the question of Intelligent Design (ID). ID is at once an argument against the orthodox Darwinian claim that mindless forcesÂ—principally variation, inheritance, natural selection, and sufficient timeÂ—can account for the principal features of the biological world; a critique of the prevailing philosophy of science that limits explanation to purely physical or material causes; and a public movement to make Darwinism, its evidence, philosophic presuppositions, and rhetorical tactics a matter of informed, broad, and spirited public discussion. Central to all three aspects of IDÂ— as argument, critique, and movement for public debate over DarwinismÂ—is its claim that if science education is to be other than state-sponsored propaganda a clear and principled distinction must be drawn between empirical science and the patently materialist philosophy that drives contemporary Darwinian theories of origin and development.1 Because the ID movement is just now coming into public awarenessÂ—chiefly through the tireless publication, speaking, and debating of its leader, Berkeley law professor Phillip Johnson, and the publication of Lehigh University biochemist Mike Behe's Darwin's Black BoxÂ—its more detailed technical arguments are not yet well known.2 Since a central aim of Rhetoric & Public Affairs is to engage public issues and not just wait for them to happen (and to awaken the postmodern university from its theory-induced spectatorish political torpor) our current issue provides Intelligent Design a forum. Our aim is not to advocate ID but to advance public understanding of the nature of science, science policy, and the rhetoric of science. The best plan for the present issue would have been to offer equal time to representatives of Darwinism. Because of limitations of space, and because the Darwinian position is well known, we have given the floor to the "newcomers"Â—though intelligent design is hardly newÂ—and have invited six respondents representing a variety of
Do Potential People Have Moral Rights?
By a potential person I shall mean an entity which is not now a person but which is capable of developing into a person, given certain biologically and/or technologically possible conditions. This is admittedly a narrower sense than some would attach to the term ‘potential'. After all, people of the twenty-fifth century, if such there will be, are in some sense potential people now, even though the specific biological entities from which they will develop, i.e. the particular gametes or concepti, do not yet exist. For there do exist, in the reproductive capacities of people now living and in the earth's resources, conditions adequate to produce these future people eventually, provided of course that various possible catastrophes are avoided. Indeed, in some sense of ‘potential’ there have been countless billions of potential people from the beginning of time. But I am concerned not with such remote potentialities but with currently existing entities that are capable of developing into people.