Romans as ΒΑΡΒΑΡΟΙ: Three Polybian Speeches and the Politics of Cultural Indeterminacy
T HE SPEECHES IN POLYBIUs' HISTORIES provide important insights into what is perhaps the most controversial topic in Polybian studies: the Greek historian's attitudes towards Rome. A great deal of modern scholarly debate has revolved around mutually exclusive interpretations that Polybius was essentially either pro-Roman or anti-Roman.' A close reading of the Histories suggests a more nuanced approach to the question of Polybius' views on Rome. Viewing Polybius' barbarian category in relation to his representations of the Romans provides a key to the historian's stance(s) on Rome, and here his speeches are of the utmost importance. The objectives of the present study are to analyze Polybius' "barbarology" vis-'a-vis Rome, with a special focus on the medium of the reported speech, and to explore its implications regarding the political predicament of Greek statesmen of the second century in the face of Roman power. In only one passage in the Histories (12.4b.2-3, discussed in Section II below), does the Achaean historian say in his own voice that the Romans were a barbarian people. Yet in three reported speeches, Polybius allows his historical agents Agelaus, Lyciscus, and a Greek ambassador, probably the Rhodian statesman Thrasycrates, to call the Romans "barbarians."2 Without discounting the historicity of these ambassadors' charges against the Romans, I shall argue that Polybius employs these speeches as a vehicle for indirect expression of hostility towards Rome, a hostility conforming to widespread Greek public opinion at the time of composition of the Histories.3 I refer to this Greek view of the Romans as fdpfa3pot, according to
War and imperialism in Republican Rome, 327-70 B.C.
ROMAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS WAR ECONOMIC MOTIVES FOR WAR AND EXPANSION EXPANSION AS A ROMAN AIM ANNEXATION IMPERIALISM AND SELF-DEFENCE ADDITIONAL NOTES
Hellenistic kings, War, and the Economy
My title links together kings, war, and the economy, and the linkage is deliberate. I do not of course wish to suggest that Hellenistic kings did nothing but fight wars, that they were responsible for all the wars in the period, that royal wars were nothing but a form of economic activity, or that the economy of the kings was dependent purely on the fruits of military success, though there would be an element of truth in all these propositions. But I wish to react against the frequent tendency to separate topics that are related, the tendency to treat notions relating to what kings were or should be as something distinct from what they actually did, and the tendency to treat political and military history on the one hand as something separate from economic and social history on the other. A number of provisos should be made at the outset. The title promises more than the paper can deliver; in particular, more will be said about kings and war than about kings and the economy. The subject is handled at a probably excessive level of generalization and abstraction. I talk about Hellenistic kings in general, but in practice it would obviously be necessary to draw distinctions between different dynasties, different times and places, and individual rulers, and some of those distinctions I shall indicate. Conclusions are provisional and subject to modification and considerable expansion in detail. Finally, two points of terminology. I use the word ‘Hellenistic’ for no better reason than out of the force of acquired habit, but of course the word and the concept are modern inventions that were unknown to the ancient world.