Trademark Transactions in EU Law – Refining the Approach to Selective Distribution Networks and National Unfair Competition Law
Given the rudimentary nature of the current set of EU rules, the regulation of trademark transactions in the EU depends on a harmonious interplay of harmonized EU law on the one hand, and individual national laws on the other. This configuration of the system places a particular responsibility on the Court of Justice of the European Union. Interpreting harmonized EU rules, the Court ought to consider the impact of its decision on the proper functioning of national law. An overambitious approach seeking to maximize the harmonizing effect of the rudimentary set of EU norms will almost inevitably lead to unsatisfactory results. After a short overview of EU objects of property rules and present amendment proposals, two decisions of the CJEU will be brought into focus to illustrate this point. The decision in Copad/Dior gives rise to concerns about harmonized rules in the Trade Mark Directive becoming a straitjacket offering insufficient breathing space for the reconciliation of licensor, licensee and third party interests, while the case Martin Y Paz/Depuydt sheds light on the potential corrosive effect on national unfair competition law. The analysis shows the structural deficiencies of the current EU system and the need for additional fine-tuning based on both EU and national norms.
Adapting EU Trademark Law to New Technologies - Back to Basics?
In recent years, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has continuously expanded the scope and reach of trademark protection in the EU. With the challenges arising in the digital environment, however, this expansionist approach becomes more and more questionable. The current problems arising from keyword advertising shed light on areas of overbroad, excessive trademark protection created by the Court. Moreover, inconsistencies in the Court's system of infringement criteria clearly come to the fore. Against this background, the present analysis explores ways out of the dilemma. After a short introduction of basic notions of trademark law (section 1), the problematic expansion of trademark protection in recent years (sections 2 and 3), and current problems arising in the digital environment (section 4), will be analyzed in more detail. Addressing potential solutions, it will be argued that in spite of current difficulties, it would be naive to assume that the Court is prepared to restrict the scope of EU trademark law to traditional protection against confusion with only minor extensions concerning dilution (section 5). Instead, the need for an appropriate, more flexible limitation infrastructure will be emphasized (section 6 and concluding section 7).
The Illinois Legislature
It further provides that the county must have voted "for license" at the last general election on that subject. Also, that the petition, together with all names and addresses on it, must first be published in at least two issues of some newspaper published in the town where the petition was circulated, for at least ten days before the petition is acted upon. Any officer authorized to issue licenses violating the provisions of this act is liable to a fine of from $500 to $1000 and imprisonment in the county jail for from two to twelve months. The act does not repeal any local laws forbidding the sale of liquor, but is cumulative to all anti-liquor laws now in force. The final section is: "This Act being necessary for the public peace, health, and safety, shall take effect and be in force from and after December 31, 1913." The postponement of the time for going into effect was made io order not to interfere with licenses already issued and to give the liquor dealers time to adjust themselves to the provisions of the act. But the liquor people denied that the emergency clause could be attached to an act the operation of which was postponed nearly a year. They called attention to the omission of the word "immediate," and declared that the postponement was in itself sufficient evidence that it was not necessary for the "immmediate preservation of the public health, peace and safety." A petition for reference was circulated and the necessary number of signatures was secured. The attorney-general was first asked for his opinion as to whether the act was subject to the referendum. That officer stated that he could find no precedent for such a case. Basing his decision on reason and common sense he declared the act not subject to the referendum. The circuit court was then asked for a write of mandamus against the secretary of state to compel him to submit the act, but the court refused to grant it, saying that the attachment of the emergency clause was evidence that the legislature intended to prevent its submission. At this writing the question is pending on appeal before the supreme court.