Deselecting Biased Juries
Critics of peremptory-challenge systems commonly contend that they inevitably inflict inequality harm on many excused persons and should be abolished. Ironically, the Supreme Court fueled this argument with its decision in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), by raising and endorsing the inequality claim sua sponte and then purporting to solve it with an approach that preserved peremptories. But the article shows that something other than inequality harm to excused persons is actually the central problem. The Court in the Batson cases only obliquely confronted it, because constitutional rulings cannot appropriately resolve it. That problem is the harm to disadvantaged litigants when their opponents use peremptories to secure a one-sided jury. The problem can arise often -- whenever a venire is slanted in favor of one of the parties. The advantaged litigant can use peremptories to seat a large group of favorable jurors regardless of how the disadvantaged litigant exercises its peremptories. However, there is a remedy. Peremptory systems reflect the idea that parties acting in their self-interests can help pursue group neutrality on a jury. Similarly, by conferring on litigants a right to stop peremptories at any time, states can enlist them to determine when opposing parties are using peremptories to promote group bias.
The Impact of Jury Race in Criminal Trials
This paper examines the impact of jury racial composition on trial outcomes using a unique data set of felony trials in Florida between 2000 and 2010. We utilize a research design that exploits day-to-day variation in the composition of the jury pool to isolate quasi-random variation in the composition of the seated jury, finding evidence that: (i) juries formed from all-white jury pools convict black defendants significantly (16 percentage points) more often than white defendants and (ii) this gap in conviction rates is entirely eliminated when the jury pool includes at least one black member. The impact of jury race is much greater than what a simple correlation of the race of the seated jury and conviction rates would suggest. These findings imply that the application of justice is highly uneven and raise obvious concerns about the fairness of trials in jurisdictions with a small proportion of blacks in the jury pool.
Tethering the Administrative State: The Case Against Chevron Deference for FCC Jurisdictional Claims
Like many other agencies, the Federal Communications Commission has seen significant regulatory growth under President Obama. But unlike health care, financial reform, and other areas, this growth has come without statutory guidance from Congress. The FCC’s assertion of jurisdiction over broadband service is reminiscent of its earlier attempts to regulate cable and to deregulate telephone service, efforts that courts have viewed skeptically in the absence of specific statutory authorization. But this skepticism is in tension with Chevron, which grants agencies substantial deference to interpret ambiguities in the statutes that they administer. This article argues that Chevron deference should not extend to agency jurisdictional claims, such as the FCC’s claim to authority over broadband. For both constitutional and policy reasons, courts should distinguish between agency action that fills a gap in a statutory scheme and action that defines the outer boundary of that scheme. As the Commission’s net neutrality project winds its way through the judicial system, courts should not allow the agency to define the limits of its own authority, and should instead search closely for a grant of authority from Congress.