The spatial politics of F.A. Hayek's Road to Serfdom
Abstract This paper re-examines Hayek's Road to Serfdom in historical context. Of particular interest is Hayek's claim that “left” and “right” socialism of the 1930s had much in common. In making this argument, Hayek held that all socialism implied planning at the expense of consumer sovereignty. We first agree to plan, but if we are then unable to agree on its contents, someone imposes a specific course of action on us. Hayek was strenuously opposed at the time by Abba Lerner and E.F.M. Durbin, who held that we can conceptualize, and perhaps put into place, a sort of socialism which yields to the will of consumer preferences.
Blundering into Wisdom? The Missing Elements of Hayek's Spontaneous Order Liberalism
This paper discusses F. A. Hayek's theory of spontaneous order and cultural evolution. After briefly outlining the main elements of Hayek's approach, we review some of the criticisms addressed to his evolutionary theory. In particular, we discuss a number of paradoxes generated by his view of spontaneous cultural evolution. In our view, these paradoxes result from an insufficiently specified theoretical environment in which cultural and social evolution are taking place. Namely, Hayek does not spend much time discussing the precise nature of political markets that are nonetheless crucial for the persistence and the change of institutional outcomes. Likewise, Hayek places himself outside of his own theory of cultural evolution, for he lacks a model of how ideas and intellectuals affect the choice of one of the multiple evolutionary equilibria. We outline one such model, which uses the notion of sympathy as its main driving mechanism. Taken together, we claim that an explicit analysis of politics and a model of influence of ideas would have helped to resolve some of the key incongruities in Hayek's evolutionary work.
Civil Service Attitudes and the Economic Planning of the Attlee Government
In its manifesto for the 1945 general election, the Labour Party declared its intention to 'plan from the ground up' and promised 'a firm constructive hand on our whole productive machinery'.' When a Labour government was returned with an overwhelming majority in the House of Commons, this commitment to plan the British economy had to be implemented, along with many others in an ambitious programme. The Attlee government faced many problems in its attempt to establish effective economic planning. These included severe economic dislocation, recovery from which would be greatly affected by factors beyond its control, such as the level of economic activity in the USA; uncertainty within the government as to the form planning should take; and weaknesses and gaps in the controls with which plans could be implemented. This article examines the effect of one particular problem: the attitude of the civil servants who had to put the policy into practice. It will be argued that the civil service, by its reluctance to reappraise its traditional assumptions and methods of operation and to adjust them in the light of the new role demanded of it by peace-time economic management, contributed significantly to the initial weakness of the planning process. In particular, emphasis will be placed on the role played by the civil service in designing the machinery for devising and implementing plans, a machine whose inadequacies were to damage the credibility of the government and of planning itself. It is not intended to suggest that the actions of the civil service reflected an attempt deliberately to sabotage planning by a body ideologically disinclined to see it succeed. Undoubtedly some officials held such views, but equally there were those whose enthusiasm for a planned economy was as great as that of its keenest advocates in the government. It was