Uzbek Gas for Export: Will Political Maneuvering between China and Russia Result in Higher Export Price?
The main research question is “Will political maneuvering between China and Russia result in higher export price for Uzbek gas?” In 2008, the price of gas exports from Uzbekistan was US$160 per 1,000 cubic meters. On the other hand Gazprom used to charge its European customers an average of US$350 per 1,000 cubic meters. 
 
On July 1, 2008, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan has begun laying their respective stretches of the Turkmenistan-China gas pipeline. The construction began at the settlement of Saet in the Bukhara region. The cost of the Uzbek stretch of the gas pipeline is estimated to be over USD 2 billion. The total cost of the 1,818-kilometer long gas pipeline Turkmenistan-China is about USD7 billion. If implemented, the Turkmenistan-China pipeline might undermine Russia’s ability to manipulate the Central Asian gas market and stir up energy competition between Russia and China. It should be noted that with estimated natural gas reserves of 66.2 trillion cubic feet (Tcf), Uzbekistan is the third largest natural gas producer in the Commonwealth of Independent States (after Russia and Turkmenistan) and one of the top fifteen natural gas-producing countries in the world. 
 
According to the schedule approved by the decree of the Uzbek President, the first line of the gas pipeline and compressor station is expected to be completed by the end of 2009. According to schedule, the first stage will end in January 2010. The second line of the gas pipeline and two more compressor stations are expected to be launched by January 2012. 
 
Gazprom’s reaction to this development was almost immediate. Therefore, the purchase prices in these countries more than doubled in 2009 compared to the levels at which Gazprom has bought gas in 2008 
 
The conclusion of the research is that alternative pipeline to China will strengthen the bargaining power of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan and may result in higher export gas prices. However, given the fact that Chinese themselves are unwilling to match the price that Europeans are paying for gas, the increase will not be very significant. Therefore, Uzbekistan, as well other Central Asian countries, should continue their efforts to construct and participate in other alternative gas pipelines, such as Trans-Caspian, Nabucco, Trans-Afghan, and Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline projects.
Why have China and Russia become Uzbekistan’s biggest energy partners? Exploring the role of exogenous and endogenous factors
In the 1990s, there was an expectation that Uzbekistan, along with other countries in Central Asia, would gradually move towards the West by distancing itself from the sphere of Russian influence. However, in spite of the West’s significant investment in the region’s economies and attempts to enter the local markets through both bilateral and multilateral channels, this shift never materialised. In fact, since the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Uzbekistan’s trade cooperation with Russia has remained robust, and only in 2014 did China overtook Russia as Uzbekistan’s biggest trading partner. This article aims to understand why Russia and China have become Uzbekistan’s biggest economic partners, especially in the energy sector. To understand this, I believe that it is important to analyse the nature of both domestic and international factors and their interaction. First of all, there are international factors: globalisation, the rise of China and an increase in global demand for natural resources; the role of the China-initiated the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Silk Road Economic Belt; and Russia’s attempt to reclaim its “great power” status since 2000 and Putin’s attempt to build and expand the Eurasian Economic Union. Second, there are domestic factors: understanding Russia’s and China’s foreign trade policy linked not only with economic growth but also with the structure of foreign economic policy decision-making, or “power vertical,” among other domestic elements. This article will draw on Critical International Political Economy (CIPE) to argue that this tradition is well equipped and offers an important framework to understand foreign economic policy of powers such as Russia and China. The CIPE does not simply combine the domestic and international factors but also insists on their indivisibility and engages with cultural, ideological and social elements in their historical contingency.
Influence of inducers and inhibitors on the metabolism in vitro and neurochemical effects in vivo of MDMA.
(S)-(+)- and (R)-(-)-3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) were metabolized in vitro by rat liver microsomes via N-demethylation to 3,4-methylenedioxyamphetamine (MDA). Whereas no difference was found in the biotransformation of the two enantiomers in the male rat or in the phenobarbital (PB) treated animals of either sex, more than twice as much MDA was formed from (S)-(+)- than from (R)-(-)-MDMA in the untreated female rat. Although 3-methylcholanthrene (3MC) pretreated rat liver microsomes were less active than those from the untreated rats of the same sex, they formed more MDA from (+)- than from (-)-MDMA. The enantioselective metabolism thus appears to be associated with the relative abundance of individual cytochrome P-450 isozymes. (S)-(+)- and (R)-(-)-MDMA.HCl (20 mg/kg) were about equipotent in depleting serotonin (5-HT) levels in the frontal cortex at 3 hrs and 1 wk following oral administration to female rats. Pretreatment of rats with SKF-525A attenuated and that with PB enhanced the 5-HT depleting potential of either isomer at 3 hrs. The 5-HT depleting potency of (+)-MDMA was significantly greater than that of its (-)-antipode at 3 hr in PB pretreated, but not in SKF-525A pretreated animals. The results suggest that the neurochemical effects of MDMA are caused by the formation of an active metabolite in vivo, and since both enantiomers were N-demethylated in vitro to approximately the same extent by PB pretreated rat liver microsomes, the active metabolite may be other than MDA.