Law and the Open Internet
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is poised to issue a new set of internet access regulations and policies. These would prohibit broadband service providers, such as AT&T or Comcast, from “discriminating” against unaffiliated content providers. The FCC’s proceedings, and the network neutrality debate, concentrate on two economic questions (i) whether to broadband service providers can or will steer traffic to affiliated content limiting consumer access and (ii) how to preserve the Internet’s capacity for creativity and innovation. Despite economics’ prominence in the debate, economic theory cannot answer these questions. Theoretical models of vertical foreclosure are ambiguous and inconclusive and empirical data nonexistent. And, the debate misapplies normative, legal concepts of “discrimination” and “equal treatment” onto internet traffic management engineering. These concepts worked in a circuit switched telephone network in which “equality” can exist at switch points, but make little sense in the packet-switched internet in which “equality of outcomes” of internet experience is what matters.With its narrow focus, the debate has also missed that actual internet disputes, such as the BitTorrent-Comcast Order, involve many legal concerns, such as privacy, that have little to do with “discrimination” as such. Policymakers lack theoretical understanding and empirical knowledge concerning internet industrial organization. We, therefore, argue for a “bottom up” approach to regulation, analogous to fair use in copyright law, with case-specific adjudications creating a common law of acceptable network practice.
The Legacy of the Federal Communications Commission’s Computer Inquiries
I. INTRODUCTION II. COMPUTER I (1966) A. The Setting 1. A Better Mouse Trap 2. Western Union 3. Big Iron and New Networks B. The Issue C. The Policy 1. Classification 2. Regulation 3. Safeguard: Maximum Separation D. Legacy of Computer I III. COMPUTER II (1976) A. The Setting B. The Issue C. The Resolution 1. Basic versus Enhanced Service Dichotomy a. Basic Services b. Enhanced Services c. Adjunct Services d. Protocol Processing e. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and "Information Services" 2. Safeguards a. Maximum Separation to Structural Separation b. Unbundling D. Layers E. Legacy of Computer II IV. COMPUTER III (1985) A. The Setting B. The Issue C. The Resolution 1. Comparatively Efficient Interconnection 2. Open Network Architecture 3. Litigation 4. Enforcement D. Legacy of Computer III V. CONCLUSION I. INTRODUCTION In the 1960s, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") awoke to the reality of powerful computers running communications networks, and communications networks over which humans interacted with really powerful computers. Computer services were a disruptive technology. They were substitute services for traditional incumbent communication services. They were highly competitive, highly innovative, and had low barriers to entry. They showed every promise of playing a vital role in the United States economy. In addition, these computer network services were dependent upon the underlying communications network. Thus, the unregulated computer services were simultaneously substitute services for the traditional regulated communications networks and also dependent upon them. Meanwhile, the communication network services were using gigantic mainframe computers ("big iron") to run their networks. During network peaks, mainframe computers were preoccupied with operating the networks. During off-peaks, these computers had excess capacity. The telephone companies knew a good thing when they saw it and wanted to get into the computer services market, taking advantage, in part, of their inexpensive excess off-peak mainframe capacity. Thus, the telephone companies became simultaneously the supplier of the crucial transmission capacity and a competitor in the computer services market. The FCC has struggled with the regulatory treatment of computer networks over communications networks ever since. In 1986, the Commission stated: The regulatory issues spawned by the technical confluence of regulated communications services and unregulated [computer networks] have been among the most important matters this Commission has dealt with over the past 20 years. Indeed, during this period, we have addressed these issues, in one proceeding or another, on a virtually continuous basis, as we have sought to revise and refine our regulatory approach in light of rapidly changing technological and marketplace developments. (1) The history of the FCC and the computer networks, particularly the Internet, is now thirty-five years old. To say that the FCC does not regulate the Internet is to miss the lessons of this history. While it is true that computer networks are unregulated, computer networks were very much a part of the Commission's policy. They were the intended direct beneficiaries of the Computer Inquiries. Safeguards were imposed on common carriers for the benefit of computer networks. In addition, this is not a history of technologically biased regulation, segregating one computer from another based on the technology employed. Rather, this is a market policy, segregating competitive markets from noncompetitive markets. Finally, the conceptual framework follows a Layered Model of Regulation. …
Law as Palimpsest: Conceptualizing Contingency in Judicial Opinions (forthcoming 2009)
Metaphors create conceptualizations, and for decades legal academics have employed metaphors to shape understandings of legal problems. But no metaphor in current use successfully conceptualizes the contingency of judicial opinions and the complexity of the relationship between opinions and precedent. This Article seeks to fill this void by introducing a new metaphor, the palimpsest, into the realm of legal analysis. A palimpsest is a writing surface that can be cleared away for reuse, like a personal blackboard. What distinguishes a palimpsest from other writing surfaces is that its removed contents do not disappear, but remain, obscured yet recoverable: A writing on a palimpsest never goes away. This Article argues that thinking of judicial opinions as being part of a shared, ever-evolving palimpsest underscores the fact that they are ultimately contingent and serves as a reminder of the multiple levels of interconnectedness between them and the cases they cite. Precedents—like the underlayers of a palimpsest—never go away, and they inform and shape the application of opinions in ways far more significant than simply serving as points of reference. A palimpsestic approach to understanding judicial decisionmaking also helps to explain why even the oldest, most reviled cases remain part of our national psyche—like underlayers of a palimpsest, they can never truly disappear, and their continued presence forces us to grapple with their existence. Finally, considering judicial opinions as part of a shared palimpsest reminds us that even the most troubling opinion is ultimately contingent, its application subject to reexamination and revision by future courts and future generations. Just as such an opinion replaces its precedents, it too will one day be replaced, like each of a palimpsest’s layers. 2 Law as Palimpsest [Vol. __:__ Law as Palimpsest: Conceptualizing Contingency in Judicial Opinions