Taxation and Domestic Free Trade
In this paper it is argued that the domestic division of labor and trade is organized according to the same principle as the international division of labor and trade – the Ricardian comparative advantages. After all, the ultimate source of these comparative advantages is the individual. The comparative advantages of individuals then lend themselves to groups of people, companies, regions and countries. It is these that make it worthwhile for people to cooperate on any larger scale at all; we all rely on them and they imply that there is room for everyone in society. But just as tariffs ruin the international division of labor, taxes and similar domestic government interventionism destroy the domestic division of labor among people. This is illustrated by means of the ‘division of labor condition’, where taxes enter as a possible restriction to trade, thus creating a Darwinist society of the survival of the fittest. The least productive individuals and those who face the highest barriers to trade run the risk of ending up on the outskirts of society. The more productive ones will run the risk of overreaching as they are forced to perform more and more tasks themselves. The result is not only more home labor and more black markets, but also real barter and situations where nothing gets done at all. To restore the division of labor, and to make room for everyone who wants to participate in it, it is argued that removing barriers to domestic trade is the only possible option.
An assesment of the challenges facing property tax collection system: a case study of kinondoni municipal
Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for Award of the Degree of Master of Science in Accounting and Finance of 
Mzumbe University
Aristocratic Century: The sinews of power: political
In his excellent book on the Secretaries of State, Mark Thomson offered ‘the paradox of continuing domination of the aristocracy and the simultaneous insignificance of the House of Lords, per se ’. It is true that, by the beginning of the eighteenth century, the supremacy of the House of Commons in financial matters was a wellestablished convention. The claims of the Commons to an undisputed control over money matters, which had been urged before the Civil War, were resumed immediately after the Restoration and a protracted dispute with the House of Lords began. In 1661 the Lords resolved that there were no precedents in history for this new claim by the House of Commons. In 1671, the Commons retorted that taxation ought not to be questioned by the Lords and in 1678 they reiterated that supply was ‘the undoubted and sole right of the Commons’ and ‘ought not to be changed or altered by the House of Lords’. The Lords' attempt in 1692 to assess their own taxes was also abandoned, though they retired under cover of a rather insubstantial smoke-screen that they maintained their power of amendment to be a ‘fundamental, inherent and undoubted right from which their lordships can never depart’. That established, they departed. Geoffrey Holmes quotes a nice example from 1702 when the bishop of Carlisle found himself the only peer answering to a money bill, ‘no other lord in the House regarded what was doing, this being only (pro forma) to preserve a seeming right to dissent from, or amend, any part of a money bill’.