How “political” is Quong’s political liberalism?
In this short paper I ask to what extent the sharp contrast between the 
 political and the comprehensive, on which political liberals such as Rawls 
 and Quong place primary emphasis, caters to a truly “political” conception of 
 liberalism. I argue that Quong’s own take on this point is more distinctively 
 “political” than Rawls’s, in that it assigns far less weight to citizens’ 
 comprehensive doctrines. Indeed, I suggest that Quong’s exclusion of 
 comprehensive doctrines (exemplified by his worries about an “overlapping 
 consensus”) has more radical implications than Quong himself seems to think. 
 In doing so, I offer a streamlined version of Quong’s critique, which 
 encompasses two more or less direct criticisms of Rawls’s doctrine of the 
 overlapping consensus. I will call them the “sincerity objection” and the 
 “liberal objection”.
Liberalism Without Perfection: Replies to Lister, Kulenović, Zoffoli, Zelić, and Baccarini
I would like to begin by thanking all the contributors to this symposium, 
 especially Elvio Baccarini, who hosted the conference at the University of 
 Rijeka where several of the papers in this symposium were initially 
 presented. I’ve learned a great deal from these essays, and I’m very 
 fortunate for my work to be the subject of such careful and perceptive 
 philosophical attention. Below I offer some replies to each contributor, 
 though I do not address all the important points raised in each paper.
Contemporary Theories of Liberalism: Public Reason as a Post-Enlightenment Project
Liberalism and Reason Pluralistic Liberalism Making Do without Public Reason? Hobbesian-Inspired Liberalism Public Reason out of Individual Reason Collective Reason Deeping the Social Roots of Public Reason Deliberative Democracy Public Reason and Political Consensus Political Democracy Public Reason through Aggregation Rawls's Political Liberalism Public Reason as the Domain of the Political Justificatory Liberalism and Adjudicative Democracy Public Reason and Umpiring