Formal and informal relations in the period of transition
Formal and informal relations in Soviet industrial production informal relations in the Soviet system of production on a particular kind of love and the specificity of Soviet production the mechanism of paternalistic management of the enterprise - the limits of paternalism paternalism in Russian enterprises - our understanding the position of women in production middle management in industrial production in the transition to the market we didn't make the plan payment systems and the restructuring of production relations in Russia.
Institutional change of business networks: Russian transition revisited
Dynamics has been a key issue for investigations of business networks. This paper concentrates on rules that shape business interaction between actors: institutions. It makes an attempt to develop further the model of industrial business networks that consists of the governance structure and the production system (Johanson & Mattsson 1992) by involving institutional aspects. The aim of the paper is to analyse institutional change forces (i.e. formal and informal rules) and their influence on network structures. Institutional change of business networks is discussed in general terms, but it is investigated in particular in the Russian context: here most dramatic changes have been witnessed as new markets are being created. The paper directs attention to the dynamic forces (interplay of formal and informal rules; co-operation and competition; dyadic and network changes) and the relevance of time. The paper is mainly conceptual in character, but it summarises relevant empirical studies. The time span of more than a decade between the end of Soviet era and today’s Russian market conditions allows us to make already some conclusions about the dynamics, showing major results of the interplay of formal and informal institutional rules. It is believed that the analysis of institutional change and economic transition will increase our understanding on business markets (what is a market) and their dynamics (how are markets created) more generally.
Deliberative Democracy and the Resource Curse: A Nationwide Experiment in Tanzania
Oil and gas discoveries in developing countries are often associated with short-sighted economic policies and, in response, calls to insulate resource management from populist impulses. We report on a randomized experiment testing methods to overcome this apparent tension between sound resource governance and democratic politics. Soon after Tanzania’s discovery of major natural gas reserves, we invited a nationally representative sample of voters to an intensive public deliberation of policy options featuring nationally recognized experts and small-group discussions. Democratic deliberation reinforced the public’s strong preference for rapid spending of gas revenues, but also increased support for various prudential and economically orthodox measures, including independent oversight of gas revenues, limits on government borrowing, and selling gas abroad rather than subsidizing fuel at home. These effects were driven by deliberation per se, rather than a pure information treatment, and show no evidence of contamination by facilitatoror peer-effects in group deliberations. www.cgdev.org Justin Sandefur, Nancy Birdsall, James Fishkin, and Mujobu Moyo