China: Building an innovator
When it comes to translating its own research into practical applications, China falls short. A forum in Shanghai put the spotlight on ambitious plans to accelerate the process.
Patent statistics: A good indicator for innovation in China? Patent subsidy program impacts on patent quality
Using a merged dataset of Chinese patent data and industrial survey data, we make a bibliometric analysis of patenting activities of Chinese large and medium-sized enterprises under local patent subsidy programs and test whether patent statistics are a good indicator of innovation in China. Our empirical results show that patent count is correlated with R&D input and financial output, which suggests that patent statistics are meaningful indicators. However, patent subsidy programs increase patent counts more than 30%. We emphasize the necessity of adjustments and provide a novel method of using the number of nouns in claims to quantify the claim scope, thereby overcoming the shortcomings of Chinese patent data that have no citations or lack well-documented patent claim information. We extend prior studies on patent subsidy programs by providing a detailed clarification of policy designs and their impacts and by evaluating policy impacts on both the quantity and quality of patent applications.
Quality and Value of Chinese Patenting: An International Perspective
This paper presents a novel analysis of the international dimension of the rapid growth of Chinese patenting and advances an econometric model to scrutinize the determinants of patent granting, prior-art searches, opposition to patents granted, and patent renewal decisions. Our results provide support for the “strategic patenting” hypothesis on the lower value and quality of Chinese patents compared to other patents on average, though a few caveats are in order. On the one hand, I find that the probability of grant for foreign multinational firms is negative although their patents are relative strong regarding the prior art. The low value effect on opposition and renewal decision is moderate. On the other hand, for Chinese indigenous patenting, I do not find ample evidence that there is lower probability of grant, but I do find support that these patents lack adequate prior art research, receive more oppositions, and have shorter renewal life cycle compared to other Chinese patents and other patents on average. The size and experience of the patent owner positively mediate these effects. Hence, the findings are consistent with the assumption that large and younger patenters concentrated in a few industries are responsible for the bulk of strategic patenting.