Do Fences Make Good Neighbours? An Analysis of Israel's Security Policy Choices
Is Israeli security best assured by strategic contraction or expansion? Does Israel's decision to build a security fence and the nation's security policies of contracting, rather than expanding, mark a major strategic shift in policy to make Israel more secure in the long run? Or should more attention be focused on the 2006 invasion of Lebanon as signalling a return to the older security policies based on expansion of the country's security sphere, placing Israel more in context with the American-led war on terrorism, with an emphasis on pre-emption to eliminate short-run terrorist threats? This article analyses Israel's recent security policy choices, especially the decision to erect the wall separating Israelis from Palestinians, combined with the unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in August 2005, followed by the decision to return to Gaza and invade Lebanon in July 2006. Did these events represent the failure of Israeli security initiatives of the early 2000s and a return to old security dynamics of expansion vs. contraction?
Israeli National Security, 1973-96
This article focuses on the main Israeli decision makers, reviews their perceptions of the changing strategic environment, and analyzes the dilemmas and policies with respect to Israel's main national security components. A review of the period shows much continuity: (1) the pattern of decision making remained highly centralized; (2) many of the Israeli leaders were socialized in the defense establishment; (3) Yitzhak Rabin was the towering figure for most of the period; (4) the main elements of Israeli strategic thinking (deterence, early warning, decisive victory, and self-reliance) remained constant; (5) Israel did not succumb to the temptation to adopt an open nuclear strategy; (6) the Israeli level of threat perception became lower primarily because of the emergence of a more benign international environment. We see in the 1990s a slight departure from past premises and policies, although all in all, it can be said that Israel has not fundamentally changed its security doctrine during the period reviewed here.
Contours of Israel's New Strategic Thinking
As Kenneth Waltz put it, states operate in a "self-help" system in which threats to national security are omnipresent. Small states, in particular, have difficulties meeting challenges from powerful aggressors, since such states are by definition limited in their ability to build sizable and well-equipped military machines.I Generally, small states have little leeway; their military and diplomatic margins are thin. A few small states reconcile themselves to "defensive nihilism," the abandonment of hope to establish an effective defense.2 A few others, such as Switzerland and Sweden, adopt postures of self-reliance, attempting to meet security challenges without outside help. This is also known as internal balancing; it describes the way a state aggregates power. Other small states augment their military capability by allying themselves with other countries. The mobilization of other countries' resources in confronting external threats is termed external balancing.3 Alliances, however, can constrain a state's freedom of action. In many cases, a small state's room to maneuver is also constricted by the prevailing structure of the international system and its regional subsystem. Most small states attempt to devise strategic doctrines based on a mix of external and internal balancing in order to maximize military power and the freedom to use it. Israel is an example of such a small state. This article analyzes the ways in which the international and regional environments, and internal developments