Ethanol and Biodiesel in Canada: Can They Help Meet Canada's Kyoto Commitment?
The Canadian government ratified the Kyoto Protocol in December 2002. The protocol calls for greenhouse gas emissions to be reduced by 6 percent below the 1990 level (approximately 35 percent below what they are expected to be in a business-as-usual situation) by 2008â€“2012. To help meet this target, both federal and provincial governments in Canada have developed programs (in some cases mandates) for ethanol and biodiesel production and use in fuel blends. Various subsidy schemes have been designed to stimulate development of a biofuels industry in Canada. While the programs have been promoted on the basis of environmental concerns, a major driver has been the search for new markets for Canadian agricultural commodities that face chronically depressed prices. The purposes of this article are to review the current state of policies, programs and production of ethanol and biodiesel in Canada and to assess the prospect of these biofuels to significantly reduce production of greenhouse gases in Canada.
A Canadian Ethanol Feedstock Study to Benchmark the Relative Performance of Triticale: II. Grain Quality and Ethanol Production
Published in Agron. J. 105:1707–1720 (2013) doi:10.2134/agronj2013.0193 Available freely online through the author-supported open access option. Copyright © 2013 by the American Society of Agronomy, 5585 Guilford Road, Madison, WI 53711. All rights reserved. No part of this periodical may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. G fuel ethanol production has now reached 75 billion L yr–1, and Canada’s contribution is approximately 2 billion L yr–1 (Canadian Renewable Fuels Association, 2010; Klein et al., 2004). Some economists have argued that ethanol fuel production from grain feedstocks relies too heavily on government programs to offset what is considered to be an inefficient system incapable of adequately reducing greenhouse gas emission targets (Freeze and Peters, 1999; Klein et al., 2004). Others have argued that ethanol should only be produced using crop biomass and residues (Canadian Renewable Fuels Association, 2010), considered by many as agricultural waste (Freeze and Peters, 1999). However, the dramatic rise in plant construction and output, including seven ethanol plants operating in western Canada with a collective annual output of 0.5 billion L (Canadian Renewable Fuels Association, 2010), suggests that the economics may not be as important as provincial and federal policies targeting energy diversity, agricultural benefits, and rural renewal (Coad and Bristow, 2011; Klein et al., 2004). Studies also report that >60% of crop residues must be retained to adequately maintain proper C cycling in the soil in wheat production systems (Freeze and Peters, 1999). Therefore, if crop residue exports are limited to 40% to maintain soil quality, ethanol production from grain is probably needed at some level to meet the increasing long-term demand for ethanol. Furthermore, grain-based ethanol production provides grain growers the opportunity to sell their grain into dual markets, which enhances marketing options for cereal production. Today, a producer of CWSWS and CPS wheat, which are preferred for wheat ethanol feedstocks, can choose to sell into a milling market or contract the production to an ethanol plant. ABSTRACT
Do Arab public opinion support policies of regional powers in MENA? View from Tunisia
ABSTRACT The Arab Uprisings and subsequent events continue to transform policies of regional and major powers toward the Middle East and North Africa. These powers have shown different approaches toward the Uprisings, ranging from support for the status quo to endorsing regime changes. Their policies have also exerted a significant impact on the course of events. Despite this growing importance and implications of policies of regional powers on the Uprisings and the Syrian conflict, we still do not know much about how the public assesses these policies and to what extent domestic cleavages shape these assessments. Using a nationally representative original survey conducted in 2014 in Tunisia, this study examines the perceptions of the policies of France, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia towards the Uprisings and the Syrian conflict. It finds that French and Turkish policies about the Uprisings have garnered substantial support among citizens, whereas most citizens negatively assess the Saudi policies. On the other hand, the majority of Tunisians negatively assess all these countries’ policies toward the Syrian conflict. Another major finding suggests that political identity reflecting secular/religious cleavages shapes how citizens view the policies of these three countries toward both issues, but its effect is higher in assessing the Uprisings.