Legitimacy in WTO law and investment arbitration: the role of the contracting parties
International trade and investment law is characterized by two distinct models: the constitutional law model as found in the World Trade Organization (WTO), 1 where the remedy is “the bringing into conformity of the measure”, and the tort law model, where international law standards establish the threshold for delictive behavior, to be remedied by damages. 2 Both models represent rules-based approaches to the peaceful settlement of disputes, replacing power diplomacy. They may be considered as the finest examples of the efficient application of rules of international law. Both subsystems of international law are creations of treaties, which serve to control unreasonable political actors and positively affect regulatory governance even on a domestic level. The development of the former GATT and present WTO law is driven and controlled by the contracting parties, through the adoption of panel reports based on rather precise behavioral rules, which leads to an “authentic” interpretation of such rules by its members. 3 In contrast, standards contained in international investment agreements (IIAs) are the result of a “dilatory formula compromise”, i.e., a formal compromise without agreement on its precise content, due to historical reasons. They have been developed through interpretation by arbitral tribunals and scholarly writings in order to achieve a sufficient level of precision to provide for legal certainty and predictability. However, this occurs without further involvement of the contracting parties, which raises legitimacy issues. 4
Outward FDI does not necessarily cost domestic employment of MNEs at home: Evidence from Japanese MNEs
Whether outward foreign direct investment (FDI) projects boost or shrink domestic employment of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in home countries has long been a subject of debate. On the one hand, when MNEs implement projects abroad, it is often to replace their exports of goods and tradable services with FDI in production abroad to serve foreign markets, which reduces employment at home. 1 On the other hand, MNEs’ foreign operations may enhance production efficiency and global market access, generating greater demand for their final outputs. As a result, MNEs need to hire more employees in several production-related activities that are retained in their home countries to serve the additional foreign customers. 2 Reflecting these countervailing forces, numerous empirical studies have reported mixed and/or inconclusive findings on this subject. 3
The data privacy / national security balancing paradigm as applied in the USA and Europe: Achieving an acceptable balance
...................................................................................................................... iii Summary ..................................................................................................................... ix Overall Introduction.................................................................................................... 1 Chapter One ................................................................................................................. 7 The Privacy/National Security Balance from a European Perspective .................. 7 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 7 Section I: The Council of Europe ............................................................................ 13 1.0 The Basis for the Data Privacy/National Security Balance .......................... 13 2.0 The Influence of the ECHR on National Legal Systems .............................. 14 3.0 The Jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the Data Privacy/National Security Balance ................................................................................................................. 27 4.0 Shortcomings in the Jurisprudence of the ECtHR The Application of the Margin of Appreciation ........................................................................................ 43 Section II: The European Union .............................................................................. 67 1.0 The European Union and Human Rights Protection in the Context of the data privacy/national security balance ......................................................................... 73 2.0 The Growing Involvement of the EU in Human Rights Protection, particularly in data protection and the circumstances influencing this. ............... 77 3.0 Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC and the Alteration of the Data Privacy/National Security Balance ....................................................................... 79 4.0 Features of Directive 2006/24/EC ................................................................ 81 5.0 Responses to Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC .................................... 82 6.0 Institutional Responses to Directive 2006/24/EC......................................... 94 7.0 Judgment of the CJEU (Grand Chamber) on the Validity of Directive 2006/24/EC......................................................................................................... 103 8.0 The Ruling of the CJEU ............................................................................. 105 9.0 Significance of the Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger Judgment and its Context ............................................................................................................... 109 10.0 Consequences of the Digital Rights Ireland Judgment for Data Privacy/National Security in Europe .................................................................. 114 11.0 Judgments of the CJEU in the Google Spain and Schrems Cases .............. 122 12.0 Developments following the Invalidation of the Safe Harbour Agreement 131 13.0 Impact of the CJEU decisions in the Digital Rights Ireland, Google Spain, and Schrems cases on the data privacy/national security balance ...................... 135 14.0 The Alternative Data Privacy/National Security Balance: Circumventing vi Data Privacy Protections in the EU: The Mass Surveillance of Personal Data by Spy Agencies in some EU Member States ..........................................................135 15.0 Two Parallel Systems of Surveillance .........................................................146 16.0 The Council of Europe Versus The European Union: Which Regime Provides Greater Protection For Data Privacy Rights? .......................................148 17.0 Contrasting the European and U.S. positions on the Balancing of Data Privacy Rights against National Security Interests .............................................153 18.0 Conclusion ...................................................................................................156 Chapter Two .............................................................................................................165 The Privacy/Security Balance in the U.S. pre-9/11 ................................................165 1.0 Introduction .................................................................................................165 2.0 U.S. Understandings of the Right to Privacy and Particularly Data Privacy .............................................................................................................................168 3.0 Major Interferences with data privacy for national security reasons pre-9/11 in the context of the data privacy/national security balance, with emphasis on the background and role of the NSA. ........................................................................179 4.0 Major Scandals Relating to Data Retention: Privacy Rights Illegally Infringed by the Executive and its Agencies .......................................................186 5.0 Church Committee Report and the Balance Between National Security and Personal Liberties Pre-9/11 .................................................................................191 6.0 Judicial Oversight of Surveillance in the name of National Security: Implications for the Data Privacy/National Security Balance. ............................194 7.0 FISA: Adjusting the Data Privacy/National Security Balance? Restricting the Interpretation of Personal Data in the Context of Intelligence Surveillance by the Executive Branch in the name of National Security ...........................................197 8.0 Balancing Rights which are Qualitatively Different: Philosophical Issues Underlying the Data Privacy/National Security Balancing Paradigm ................209 9.0 Two Data Privacy/National Security Balancing Systems Pre-9/11:The Influence of NSA Surveillance Activity. The Legal and the Actual Balances....220 10.0 Conclusion ...................................................................................................224 Chapter Three ...........................................................................................................229 The Privacy/Security Balance in the U.S. Post-9/11 ..............................................229 1.0 Introduction ...................................................................................................229 2.0 Background ...................................................................................................230 3.0 The Administration's Defence of Its Surveillance Policies and a Scholarly Response .............................................................................................................244 4.0 Ideological Context of the Patriot Act ...........................................................252 5.0 Provisions of the Patriot Act .........................................................................253