Law and the Open Internet
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is poised to issue a new set of internet access regulations and policies. These would prohibit broadband service providers, such as AT&T or Comcast, from “discriminating” against unaffiliated content providers. The FCC’s proceedings, and the network neutrality debate, concentrate on two economic questions (i) whether to broadband service providers can or will steer traffic to affiliated content limiting consumer access and (ii) how to preserve the Internet’s capacity for creativity and innovation. Despite economics’ prominence in the debate, economic theory cannot answer these questions. Theoretical models of vertical foreclosure are ambiguous and inconclusive and empirical data nonexistent. And, the debate misapplies normative, legal concepts of “discrimination” and “equal treatment” onto internet traffic management engineering. These concepts worked in a circuit switched telephone network in which “equality” can exist at switch points, but make little sense in the packet-switched internet in which “equality of outcomes” of internet experience is what matters.With its narrow focus, the debate has also missed that actual internet disputes, such as the BitTorrent-Comcast Order, involve many legal concerns, such as privacy, that have little to do with “discrimination” as such. Policymakers lack theoretical understanding and empirical knowledge concerning internet industrial organization. We, therefore, argue for a “bottom up” approach to regulation, analogous to fair use in copyright law, with case-specific adjudications creating a common law of acceptable network practice.
The Rest is Silence: 'Chevron' Deference, Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences
Should agencies receive Chevron deference when interpreting the reach of their own jurisdiction? This article argues that, in general, they should not. We begin by identifying and detailing the various different types of jurisdictional questions that may arise in statutory interpretation. The article then surveys how the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have analyzed these different aspects of the jurisdiction problem, with a particular attention to statutory silences. The Court's Chevron jurisprudence strongly suggest that deference to agency determinations of their own jurisdiction should be disfavored, particularly where a statute is silent (and not merely ambiguous) about the existence of agency jurisdiction. In particular, we argue that courts should deny Chevron deference regardless of whether an agency is asserting or disclaiming jurisdiction. This no-deference rule should apply in both existence- and scope-of-power cases, but courts should continue to show deference where agencies assert the existence of a factual predicate that triggers jurisdiction. We support our proposal with arguments drawing on both traditional administrative law norms and public choice analyses of the incentives faced by agencies and other relevant actors. While there are strong counterarguments to our proposal - particularly the potential difficulty in distinguishing between jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional questions - this article maintains that denying deference in the jurisdictional context is desirable and consistent with Chevron principles.
La inseguridad jurídica en normas de contratación estatal
It is established by different studies that the issue of government procurement has been marred by several factors, the test objective to publicize these factors, we take as starting point the constant conflict between the branches of government to try and organize this subject; will collect and analyze diverse regulatory and case material in order to achieve evidence and demonstrate the different concepts of constant change that produces excessive regulation of the subject procurement and is in turn causing rapid changes that result in legal uncertainty for our law on the Contract Status.