Conflict and reconstruction : roles for the World Bank
For only the first few years after the establishment of the World Bank, the institution's lending and analytic activities concentrated on post Second World War reconstruction rather than development. After several decades of dedication to development, reconstruction after conflict or state collapse has reemerged as an important area of Bank operations. In recent years a growing number of states have experienced erosion or collapse of governance, extended civil war, even genocide. These societies face problems of rehabilitation and reconstruction far more complex than repair and replacement of physical capital. The crises they produce create humanitarian disasters that often spill over into neighboring states, undo years of investment, send countries into arrears, destroy infrastructure (including some previously financed by the Bank), and later in the reconstruction period claim large international assistance. To promote implementation of this policy the Bank should establish a special unit devoted to the problems of failing states and post conflict recovery. The unit would undertake analysis, information gathering, staff orientation, project support, and coordination with other agencies. It would undertake to clarify, evaluate, and assist in the development of an expanded and regularized Bank role with respect to failing, failed, or recovering states. This study attempts to cull from 13 country experiences, ranging from some that have been undergoing reconstruction for some years already, to others barely emergent from destructive crisis (Angola, Mozambique), to others still in the midst of civil deterioration (Burundi, Sierra Leone). Given the brief time available for its preparation, the study should be read as a prologue to further in-depth examination of the various problems faced in these and other countries and the implications for the Bank's new reconstruction role.
Uganda: the Making of a Constitution
The Government of Uganda headed by President Yoweri Museveni, which came to power in January 1986, has made impressive progress since then in bringing about peace and national reconcilication, and in restoring the rule of law. It has turned the economy round from what might be described as ‘free fall’ to steady growth, albeit still heavily dependent on foreign aid. It has returned expropriated properties to their Asian owners, and has begun to attract foreign investment. Above all it has restored hope and given Ugandans back their pride. These are no means achievements, and place the country firmly among the few in Africa in recent years which have managed to bring about a real improvement in the overall quality of life for their citizens, albeit from a very low base. This would in itself be sufficient reason for looking more closely at what has been happening there. But, after all the disappointments of the past, it is also legitimate to ask whether these dramatic improvements are likely to be sustainable.
Complexity, Network-Decisions And Alternative Risk Premia: Some New Theories Of Structural Change And Portfolio Decisions.
Structural Change is the basis for many decisions such as government fiscal and monetary policies, government interventions, corporate-expenditure decisions, corporate strategic decisions, portfolio management decisions in finance; household allocation decisions, etc.. Structural change in industries and national economies is increasingly more difficult to detect partly because of the growth and dominance of Complex Systems and “Networks” in modern industries and economies – such Networks and Complex Systems include GVCs (global value chains), retail store networks; franchising networks; internet networks; services networks; credit-chains in industries; online social networks; etc.. The relationship between Complexity and Structural Change is well established in the physics, applied math and economic dynamics literatures. Traditional definitions and modeling of structural change have erroneously focused on changes in labor, technological progress, market share, and or capital – which are grossly inadequate in the new economy and post- global financial crisis (as confirmed by changes in the global retailing and housing industries and other industries). Also the modeling of structural change seems to be constrained by the availability of data, and often omits the relationship between structural change on one hand, and globalization, financial stability and international financial contagion. This article: i) introduces the Operations Strategy Model of structural change, explains how it differs from the Lewis Model of Structural Change; and explains the often omitted relationship between operations strategy (of companies and government agencies) and structural change; ii) introduces other new Complexity-based models/theories of Structural Change in industries; iii) reviews the relationships among Operations Research, Complexity and Structural Change; iv) explains the symbiotic relationship between structural change on one hand, and economic growth, financial stability, financial contagion and globalization; v) discusses the significant gap between academic research and practice and explains some issues and factors that should be considered in the development and testing of structural change models; vi) explains how alternative risk premia can be generated from new models of Structural Change.