Corporate Watch, Consumer Responsibility, and Economic Democracy: Forms of political action in the orbit of Basic Income *
The political power of private corporations has grown in the last decades as much as the inability of the States to interfere in their businesses. The control of the public sphere has shifted to the hands of private factions that deprive citizens of their right to control their rulers, a process that mines, even more, their freedom and autonomy to decide on their own lives. This leads to an inexorably extension of the two great threats to individual liberty and autonomy that have been identified by political theory along its history: the dominium and the imperium. The dominium extends because, with a major force every day, the big private powers impose to actors forms of production and of distribution that leave them with a barely audible voice 1 . The imperium extends because, with the advance of those private powers, the States, far in their captivity from devoting themselves to the task of promoting the public good, do nothing but guarantee the statu quo, embracing the action of big corporations and using their coercive apparatus when called to do so.
Better to shop than to vote
This paper begins by reflecting on the current generalised political apathy signalled by low voter turnout and falling party membership. It would appear that people are exercising political choices not at the ballot box but by means of consumer activism. Corporations respond to consumer pressure in a way that governments do not, and are gradually assuming the role of global political actors. But this is a dangerous state of affairs for several reasons. In the first place, social welfare can never be the core activity of corporations. Corporate social motives are commercial, and there is a danger that their social policy decisions will be driven by the logic of the market place rather than social need. Recession, for instance, will curtail their social responsiveness, as will decisions to relocate. It is also the case that partnerships between governments and corporates run the risk of removing checks on the growth and abuse of corporate power. And finally, what price does society have to pay for the growth of corporate benevolence?
The Timing of Tax Transparency
Fairness in the administration of the tax law is the subject of intense debate in the United States. As recent headlines reveal, the Internal Revenue Service has been accused of failing to enforce the tax law equitably in its review of tax-exempt status applications by political organizations, the international tax structures of multinational corporations, and the estate tax returns of millionaires, among other areas. Many have argued that greater “tax transparency” would better empower the public to hold the IRS accountable and the IRS to defend itself against accusations of malfeasance. Mandatory public disclosure of taxpayers’ tax return information is often proposed as a way to achieve greater tax transparency. Yet, in addition to concerns regarding exposure of personal and proprietary information, broad public disclosure measures pose potential threats to the taxing authority’s ability to enforce the tax law.Given the competing values of accountability and enforcement, what tax return information should be observable by the public? This Article argues that timing matters. The IRS continually engages in enforcement actions ex post, after taxpayers have pursued transactions and claimed tax positions, such as by conducting audits or settlements. But it also frequently engages in actions ex ante, before taxpayers pursue transactions and claim tax positions, by issuing advance tax rulings to and entering into agreements with specific taxpayers. While current law appears to require public disclosure of certain types of ex ante tax administration, many forms of ex ante tax administration remain concealed from public view. This Article argues that documents related to a specific taxpayer’s tax affairs that reflect ex ante tax administration should be publicly accessible as a means of accountability, but that documents that reflect ex post tax actions should remain private in order to preserve effective tax enforcement. Further, this Article proposes that the public should have access not only to ex ante tax administration actions where the taxing authority grants taxpayers’ requests, but also to those actions where the taxing authority denies such requests, even if it does so without issuing an official written determination, a concept it defines as “dual tax transparency.”The Article then applies this analysis to several types of ex ante tax administration that are currently obscured by the curtain of tax privacy: withdrawn private letter ruling requests, adverse tax-exempt determination letters and advance pricing agreements. It concludes by exploring approaches to improving the accountability of the IRS regarding its ex post tax enforcement other than public disclosure of tax return information.