Law and Literature: Its Possibilities and Limitations [法律与文学：可能性及其限度]
Law and Literature is an academic movement originated from American law schools in 1970s, and developed into a school or a field of legal studies. Yet there were also a lot suspicions and criticisms that accompanied its development. Law and Literature is an intellectually constructed union of some different disciplines’ studies, without any universal methodology. As both object and approach of Law and Literature studies, literature has two implications. In the narrow sense of the word, literature and law are two kinds of comparative tools of social control. The long-standing tensions between them restrict their cooperation. In the narrow sense of the word, literature contains law: Legal works are parts of the ubiquitous texts. The normally logical attribution and empirically social attribution of Law and Literature studies have specified its fate of neither prosperity nor perishment. The Law and Literature movement in America provides various possibilities and inspirations for the innovation of Chinese legal studies.
The City and the Poet
t Professor of Law, Yale Law School. I thank Ina Bort, Peter Brooks, Robert Burt, Gene Coakley, Ariela Dubler, Robert Ferguson, Oren Izenberg, Carol Rose, Catherine Sharkey, and participants in workshops at Columbia University and Tel Aviv University. Jessica BulmanPozen, Aaron Crowell, Matthew Fagin, Cary Franklin, Michael Gottlieb, and Allegra di Bonaventura Hogan provided excellent research assistance. 1835
What Difference Does it Make? Gender and Jury Selection
This Article critically examines the arguments for extending a Supreme Court holding, which declared the use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors based on their race violated the Equal Protection Clause, to gender and the arguments for eliminating peremptory challenges altogether. The author reviews the history of women’s exclusion from jury service, the development of the Supreme Court holding, and recent cases regarding whether the Supreme Court holding should be extended to gender. Furthermore, it discusses theoretical and empirical aspects of the role of gender in the jury process and examines problems inherent to the Supreme Court holding generally as applied to gender discrimination. Lastly, this Article proposes an argument for proportional representation to protect gender equality in jury selection in contrast of gender exclusion.