Creating a Geographically Linked Brand for High-Quality Beef: A Case Study
Worldwide, a segment of consumers can afford to pay substantial price premiums for very high quality agricultural products with attributes those consumers value. At the same time, many U.S. farmers are producing these high-quality products but are not using market mechanisms that allow them to take fullest advantage of price premiums. This paper describes a pilot program developed to commercialize an origin-based collective brand for very high quality beef. We hypothesize that, if successful, the program would create potential for cattle producers to take fuller advantage of price premiums often captured elsewhere in the marketing channel. Specifically, the pilot program analyzed two mechanisms for differentiating and marketing very high quality beef: a certification mark (a type of U.S. trademark that links products to their geographic origin) and a USDA Process Verification Program (a federal program that allows producers to provide documented assurances to their customers that a stated set of minimum production standards are met). This paper describes how we identified target markets, defined product specifications and determined potential supply, protected property rights using the U.S. trademark system, prepared documentation for a USDA process verification program, and attempted to commercialize Iowa-80 Beef. We also discuss the costs and feasibility of small firms or producer groups obtaining and maintaining a certification mark and a process verification program. Finally, we discuss the challenges and lessons learned from attempting to brand and commercialize very high quality beef.
Tennessee Beef Producers' Willingness to Participate in a Tennessee Branded Beef Program
Growing interest in producing locally produced beef to capture more value-added has been expressed by the Tennessee beef industry. This study measures Tennessee cattle producer willingness to supply beef to a Tennessee branded beef (TBB) program. Data from a 2016 survey of Tennessee beef cattle producers were used to estimate a probit for interest in TBB participation and a Tobit for cattle live weight that interested producers would supply. Over 70 percent were interested in participating, with age, income, production practices used, and risk attitudes influencing interest. Liveweight supply was influenced by producer age, animal units, production practices, and perceived barriers.
Strategy and Manipulation in Medieval Elections
There are many goals in developing electoral protocols, including a desire for a system which is transparent, in that it is clear what the rule or procedure to follow is; nonmanipulable, in that it is not in a person’s best interest to misrepresent their preferences; honest, in the sense that it elects the ‘right’ candidate; and not open to strategizing, i.e., bribery or collusion. However, these desiderata are in tension with each other: Often, transparent electoral procedures are the least strategy resistant, and many honest procedures encourage manipulation. Thus a balance between these different goals must be sought. In modern times, since the seminal result on vote manipulation, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem [5, 6], much attention has been devoted to developing voting rules where manipulation is never in the best interest of the voters [4] or which are computationally too complex for the average bounded agent to be able to manipulate [1]. This focus on computational aspects of electoral methods is one of the hallmarks of modern studies on voting. But pursuit of these goals is not restricted to modern times: Those participating in elections in the Middle Ages also sought transparency, non-manipulability, honesty, and strategyproofness in so far as these properties can be consistently expressed in a single procedure. However, given the lack of computational sophistication in the Middle Ages, alternate approaches were needed in order to promote honesty, discourage strategizing, etc. These approaches can be classified as either external (constraints introduced outside of the electoral procedure, such as incentives for coming to consensus quickly) or internal (constraints introduced within the electoral procedure, such as voting rules which cannot be manipulated without adverse effects, or which are too difficult for the average bounded agent to manipulate). Surveying examples of both approaches in the context of medieval ecclesiastical and secular elections provides an interesting comparison to modern electoral procedures. Elections in the Middle Ages were used for the same reasons that they are today: To select suitable candidate(s) for a particular office, duty, or obligation. However, it is important to note that the term electio was used in the Middle Ages in a broader sense than our modern ‘election’. Its primary sense was ‘selection’ or ‘choice’, and only secondarily ‘election’ in the modern sense. Thus, many records which purportedly discuss elections are not discussing elections of the type which interests us. We can identify four categories of medieval electoral processes: (1) Election by an external authority having no direct interest in the election; (2) Indirect election, where electors name other electors who then select or elect the officials; (3) Election by lot; and (4) Election by ballot. Elections of the first and third types are generally computationally uninteresting; the first type corresponds to dictatorial voting rules, and the third type collapses to probability theory. In general, interesting voting methods are found only in the fourth type, election by ballot, though they can also occur in indirect election.