Stability Maintenance and Chinese Media: Beyond Political Communication?
Introduction to Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 2/2015: Stability Maintenance and Chinese Media
Opportunistic Bargaining: Negotiating Distribution in China

 Using a detailed case study of house eviction in peri-urban China as well as original data from an online survey experiment, this article explores the opportunistic bargaining phenomenon in China in which citizens leverage the policy priorities of authorities with tactics that are not approved by the state to bargain for goals beyond those promised by the state. We find that opportunistic bargaining is widely accepted by Chinese citizens and that such an inclination is encouraged by successful precedents and clear signals of an opening through which to leverage government policy priorities; however, it is dampened by unclear signals and failed precedents. We also find that opportunistic bargainers tend to hold more negative perceptions of the current regime and are less likely to abide by state rules or social norms. The characteristics of opportunistic bargaining appear to be the opposite of the dominant “rightful resistance” framework.
Guiding Hand: The Role of the CCP Central Propaganda Department in the Current Era
The Central Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a central, guiding, role over the whole of Chinese society in the current era. The Central Propaganda Department oversees the Propaganda and Education System (xuanjiao xitong) which monitors, instructs and censors all of China’s newspapers and magazines, film, television and radio broadcasting, the Internet, the publishing industry, and all aspects of cultural and information production from the highest to the lowest levels of society. In this paper I outline the structure and role of the Central Propaganda Department and the system of thought control it oversees. I consider some recent innovations in the system in the last fifteen years; which combine with traditional methods for a more strengthened approach to control. I examine ongoing preoccupations in the thought work of China’s propaganda high priests. And finally, I argue that contrary to assumptions made by earlier researchers, the Central Propaganda Department and China’s propaganda system have experienced a rebirth, not a decline, in the period since 1989.