Co-governance Based on Abilities and Relations
The institutional arrangement of farmer cooperatives in the coastal areas of east China is characterized by a distinct shareholding from the very beginning. After describing some basic facts of institutional arrangement of farmer cooperatives in Zhejiang, the paper puts forward a framework from perspectives such as institutions, norms, trust and commitment for studying the residual control rights of cooperatives. The authors not only point out that the governance structures of farmer cooperatives in the coastal areas of China are the co-governance structure based on the abilities and relations, but also analyze the unique roles of abilities and relations in constructing the governance structure of farmer cooperative in China.
The Emergence of Non-Traditional Cooperative Structures: Public and Private Policy Issues
This paper examines new agricultural cooperative organizational models from an ownership rights perspective. We argue that new cooperative organizational models differ in the way ownership rights are assigned to the economic agents tied contractually to the firm - members, patrons, and investors. The paper proposes a typology of discrete organizational models, in which the traditional cooperative structure and the investor-oriented firm are characterized as polar forms. Five non-traditional models are described and analyzed with implications to both private and public policy.
The Use of Qualitative Information in Macro-Economic Policy Analysis
The majority of macro-economic policy models takes for granted that conflicts among objectives can be assessed by means of a tradeoff analysis. Such tradeoffs imply that sacrifices and benefits of various impacts of decisions can be measured on a cardinal scale, so that a conventional macro-economic utility or welfare analysis can be applied.