Canada's Addiction to American Security: The Illusion of Choice in the War on Terrorism
1. America's Addiction to Security and Public Safety Despite the absence of another terrorist attack on U.S. soil since 9/11, American officials are becoming increasingly addicted to achieving perfect security and absolute safety in the midst of an unwinnable war on terrorism. Success will remain elusive because, over time, more groups and individuals with expanding lists of grievances will acquire the power to inflict levels of damage considered by political leaders to be unacceptable. In essence war is becoming privatized (Nye 2004) (3) through the democratization of technology and knowledge (Friedman, 2001), (4) miniaturization of weaponry and lethality, increasing accessibility and transferability of weapons of mass destruction, and a rising number of competing terrorist groups with religious, political and financial motivations to terrorize. Even more disturbing are trends towards the privatization of political power. The Madrid train bombings in March 2004 revealed that a relatively straightforward attack by a small group of terrorists could have a significant impact on the outcome of a democratic election and play a major role in the immediate withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq. The Philippine government withdrew their troops in July 2004 in response to the kidnapping of a single truck driver in Baghdad. These "successes" reveal that terrorists have acquired a measure of political power that far exceeds the influence of hundreds of thousands of anti-war protesters in Spain and the Philippines who were demanding the same outcome (an early withdrawal from Iraq), but failed. Mass protests in Katmandu after the murder of twelve Nepalese workers in Baghdad provoked both an apology from the government in Nepal for failing to secure their release, and an explanation from officials that they received no offer from the kidnappers--the implication being that had such an offer been made the government would almost certainly have negotiated with the terrorists. The Kuwaiti government paid a $500,000 ransom for the release of seven Indian and Kenyan employees of a Kuwaiti company involved in post-war reconstruction in Iraq. (5) Several Egyptian, Jordanian, and Turkish companies agreed to cut short their constructions operations in Iraq in exchange for the release of kidnapped employees. (6) In August 2004, terrorists threatened to kill two French journalists as a protest against legislation in France banning the wearing of Muslim headscarves in public schools. The kidnappings provoked a flurry of French diplomatic activity resulting in the release of the hostages in December, 2004. (7) Apparently even the strongest critics of the U.S.-UK led war in Iraq are not immune from kidnapping and extortion. More recently, the Italian government was forced to address accusations that $1 million was paid for the release of two aid workers in October 2004, and significantly more to obtain the release of Italian reporter, Giuliana Sgrena, after a controversial rescue operation in March 2005. (8) Negotiating with terrorists is standard operating procedure for governments eager to avoid a public backlash against policies that are too closely associated with an unpopular war, and an even less popular American president. But these concessions (and others to follow) will guarantee that more kidnappings, bombings and killings will occur as coalitions of insurgents and terrorists cooperate to build on political victories and financial windfalls. (9) Consider the following illustration of the privatization of political power in Iraq today--the overwhelming consensus across the international community is that success in Iraq requires an end to the insurgency and a credible and sustained effort by a broad-based, "multilateral" coalition of states supporting an unwavering commitment to post-conflict reconstruction, counter-insurgency, liberalization, and democratization. Yet despite this multilateral consensus, supported by unanimously endorsed UN Security Council Resolutions 1483 and 1511, unilateral self-interests motivated by domestic political imperatives to protect their own citizens and troops remain the most powerful determinants of whether states join (or remain in) the U. …
COLD TERROR: How Canada Nurtures and Exports Terrorism around the World [THE 9/11 INVESTIGATIONS: Staff Reports of the 9/11 Commission Excerpts from the House-Senate Joint Inquiry Report on 9/11]
COLD TERROR How Canada Nurtures and Exports Terrorism Around the World Stewart Bell Toronto: Wiley, 2004. xxviii, 244pp, $36.99 cloth (ISBN 0-470-83463-3)THE 9/11 INVESTIGATIONS Staff Reports of the 9/11 Commission Excerpts from the House-Senate Joint Inquiry Report on 9/11 Edited by Steven Strasser New York: PublicAffairs, 2004. 580pp, $22.95 paper (ISBN 1-58648-279-3)Anyone interested in the world of intelligence should read The 9/11 Investigations. It offers remarkable insight on the events of 11 September 2001, as well as the dynamics within the US intelligence community.The book is a compilation of statements, testimonies, and excerpts from inquiries, edited by Steven Strasser and introduced by Craig Whitney of the New York Times. It also contains a glossary of terms, a select chronology of terrorist attacks, and reproductions of key government documents, including the now-infamous 6 August 2001 presidential daily briefing entitled "Bin Laden determined to strike the US." Those anxious about combing through the official 585-page 9/11 Commission Report will welcome this volume for its clarity. Those interested in historical context will appreciate Whitney's deft analysis of the commission and its findings compared to congressional inquiries on Pearl Harbor, the assassination of John F. Kennedy, Cuba, and Vietnam. Everyone worried about terrorism will be engrossed by the look inside the machinations of national security.Formally named the national commission on terrorist attacks upon the United States, the 9/11 commission was a bipartisan, independent panel created by congress and authorized by President Bush in November 2002. Between March 2003 and June 2004 it held 12 public hearings. It also heard testimony from top government officials, including the president and vice president. The 9/11 commission's final report was released in July 2004 in what was widely seen as a strong indictment of the US intelligence community.As Whitney details, this was not the first inquiry into 9/11. The house-senate joint inquiry convened in February 2002 to investigate the performance of intelligence agencies. After nine public hearings, 13 closed sessions, and over 300 interviews, it revealed severe shortcomings-especially with respect to interagency cooperation. However, the joint inquiry's final report, released in December 2002, was heavily censored. Moreover, it failed to delineate clear responsibility for intelligence failures, leaving the public and key members of congress unsatisfied.Whitney notes that the Bush administration opposed a more complete investigation. In October 2001, Republicans in the house defeated motions to create an independent inquiry with subpoena powers, citing national security concerns. By December, senators lieberman and McCain renewed the motion, but the Bush administration favoured the joint inquiry by congressional select subcommittees. However, by July 2002 considerable failures within the US intelligence community were already revealed, and under intense public pressure, Republicans agreed to support another, more open investigation. After several months of negotiations, in November 2002 the White House finally agreed. President Bush backed an independent and public inquiry provided that it finish within 18 months-before the 2004 elections. It did, and the 9/11 commission's final report painted a "picture of institutional dysfunction" within the intelligence community, concluding that the US government had no way of knowing what it actually knew.Based on this contention, The 9/11 Investigations dissects and condenses the commission's findings into two parts. The first contains staff statements and testimony-12 sections in total-covering terrorist entry into the United States, identification and watch-listing, aviation security, and the four flights on 9/11. There are also staff statements with excerpts of testimony from 14 top Clinton and Bush administration officials on diplomacy, the military, intelligence policy, national policy coordination, law enforcement and counterterrorism, threats and responses, the performance of the intelligence community, and reforming intelligence collection. …
Police and Political Violence in the 1960s and 1970s: Germany and Italy in a Comparative Perspective
Notwithstanding the significant differences between the German and Italian police models (federal and civil vs. centralised and militarised), in both countries the confrontation with the protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s had a profound impact on police conceptions and public order strategies. Police forces in some German federal states (West Berlin) followed a hard line until the late 1960s, while in others (Munich, Hamburg) reforms to the Weimar-centred police intervention tactics took place beginning in the early to mid-1960s. In Italy, traditional police conceptions and strategies remained largely unchanged and re-emerged in 1968. Here, a movement from within the police led to the demilitarisation and unionisation of the state police in 1981. In both countries, fighting left-wing terrorism in the 1970s stimulated technical modernisation and enhanced the centralisation of the police. In critical response to police tactics, in the late 1970s Germany police matters were increasingly perceived as a concern not only of the state but of civil society—even if policing remained a highly contested terrain. In Italy, such matters largely remained state concerns in which only politicians and internal security specialists were entitled to intervene.