Organizing Intelligence: An Introduction to the 1955 Report on Colonial Security
Abstract This article introduces, places in historical context and publishes selected extracts from chapter one of the Report on Colonial Security, which deals specifically with intelligence organisation both in London and overseas. Written by General Sir Gerald Templer in 1955, the report (particularly the intelligence aspects) is significant for the following reasons: it highlights the centralized and colonial intelligence failures in a particularly frank and candid manner; it details channels of communication and liaison between London and the colonies which remain classified elsewhere; and it had a substantial impact on the subsequent reorganisation and reform of intelligence in Whitehall and across the British Empire.
Building Stability Overseas: Three case studies in British defence diplomacy – Uganda, Rhodesia–Zimbabwe, and Sierra Leone
In 2011, the Department for International Development, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, and the Ministry of Defence launched the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS). This document sought to integrate cross-government activity as it related to conflict and security so as to ‘take fast, appropriate and effective action to prevent a crisis or stop it escalating and spreading’. At the heart of the strategy was the recognition that addressing instability and conflict overseas was morally right and in the UK's national interests. This confluence of foreign policy realism and ethical outlook most clearly found harmony in the acknowledgement that it was cheaper for the international community to avoid conflict than it was to try to manage it. Through an examination of three historical case studies (Uganda 1964–1972, Rhodesia–Zimbabwe 1979–1981, and Sierra Leone 2000–2007), this article seeks to demonstrate just how difficult this seemingly sensible strategic outlook is. In particular, the article shows there are historical parallels in British postcolonial history that very closely resemble contemporary policy choices; that these can be used to define what is different about past and present practice; and, which in turn, can be used to – at least tentatively – mark out the potential strengths and weaknesses in BSOS.
Arabia's Frontiers: The Story of Britain's Boundary Drawing in the Desert
List of maps Prologue Convention Abbreviations PART I GEOPOLITICAL SETTING Chapter 1. The Regional Powers: Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Britain Chapter 2. The Gulf PART 11 THE BLUE LINE Chapter 1. The 1913 Anglo-Ottoman Convention Chapter 2. The Violet Line PART III SUCCESSOR STATE Chapter 5. Britain's Relations with lbn Saud up to the End of World War 1 Chapter 6. Post-War Relations Chapter 7. Conflict with Yemen PART IV PRE-WORLD WAR 11 NEGOTIATIONS Chapter 8. Oil: The Casoc and Qatar Concession Boundaries Chapter 9. Negotiations Chapter 10. Aftermath: 1936-9 PART V A NEW CLAIM Chapter 11. Procrastination Chapter 12. The Oman Problem Chapter 13. Final Negotiations