[Re-signification of the human in the context of the "ciborgzation": a look at the human being-machine relationship in intensive care].
This study discusses the human being-machine relationship in the process called "cyborgzation" of the nurse who works in intensive care, based on post-structuralist Cultural Studies and highlighting Haraway's concept of cyborg. In it, manuals used by nurses in Intensive Care Units have been examined as cultural texts. This cultural analysis tries to decode the various senses of "human" and "machine", with the aim of recognizing processes that turn nurses into cyborgs. The argument is that intensive care nurses fall into a process of "technology embodiment" that turns the body-professional into a hybrid that makes possible to disqualify, at the same time, notions such as machine and body "proper", since it is the hybridization between one and the other that counts there. Like cyborgs, intensive care nurses learn to "be with" the machine, and this connection limits the specificity of their actions. It is suggested that processes of "cyborgzation" such as this are useful for questioning - and to deal with in different ways - the senses of "human" and "humanity" that support a major part of knowledge/action in health.
Bastards, Brains, Boobs and Performance: A Retrospective Account
iv INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER 1: PERFORMING ILLNESS 4 Introduction 4 “You Have Breast Cancer:” What it Really Means 6 Effects of Inconsistency 10 Determination 15 Keeping Up Appearances 17 The Detriment of Being Genuine 22 Conclusions 28 CHAPTER 2: CYBORGIZATION OF THE BODY 31 The Bastard Child 31 Something Other 32 Our Techno Selves 35 Cyborgs, Bodies and Brains 39 Happy Breastless Needles and Interns 44 Conclusions 50 AFTERMATH 54 REFERENCES CITED 51
Analogy, Supposition, and Transcendentality in Narrative Argument
Rodden writes, “How do stories persuade us? How do they ‘move’—and move us? The short answer: by analogies.” Rodden’s claim is a natural first view, also held by others. This chapter considers the extent to which this view is true and helpful in understanding how fictional narratives, taken as wholes, may be argumentative, comparing it to the two principal (though not necessarily exclusive) alternatives that have been proposed: understanding fictional narratives as exhibiting the structure of suppositional argument, or the structure of a kind of transcendental argument. Three key aspects of understanding a fictional narrative as an argument from analogy are identified. First, the argument will be relativistic or depend in an essential way upon the circumstances or intentions of the auditor or author. Second, in view of the first aspect, the argument will be loose and subjective, and accordingly less likely to yield knowledge. Third, the argument will not exhibit a distinctive structure applicable only to fictional narratives. I find that the third, and sometimes the first and second, of these same three aspects apply to understanding fictional narratives as suppositional arguments. I present considerations that point to a way of establishing that some extended fictions exhibit the structure of a kind of transcendental argument that is neither relativistic nor subjective, is knowledge-generating, and is uniquely applicable to fictional narratives. This supports literary cognitivism—the thesis that “literary fiction can be a source of knowledge in a way that depends crucially on its being fictional.”