The Economic Efficiency of Inter-Basin Agricultural Water Transfers in Utah: A Mathematical Programming Approach
Abstract : The economic efficiency of water development in Utah, including transfer systems, has seldom been examined, nor has the costs of public policies which result in deviations from efficient allocations. In order that public officials be better informed about water allocations, the present effort examines the efficient allocation of water in time frames up to 2020 under several alternative assumptions and calculates the cost of alternative policies.
Water Resources Planning to Satisfy Growing Demand in an Urbanizing Agricultural Region
Although it is conceded that an adequate supply of water is essential to economic growth and development, what constitutes an "adequate" supply is often controversial and difficult to determine. This problem can be solved by applying basic economic concepts: determining the value of water by estimating its supply and demand. This report demonstrates one method for doing this. The theory of the demand for irrigation water and its empirical application are discussed. An example problem based on data from one of the sub-regions of the study area (the Jordan River Basin of Utah) is presented to illustrate the method. The example problem is solved under alternative assumptions and constraints to demonstrate the sensitivity of the estimated demand for irrigation water to various assumed parameters. Input-output relationships of the production and other activities in each of four sub-regions are estimated using agricultural budgets. These are combined in a linear programming (LP) model for ease of computation. Constraints account for rotation possibilities and resource use. Primary resource inputs include land (by productivity class in each sub-region) and irrigation water. The primal problem is one of resource allocation to utilize the available supplies of water and land to maximize net return. The dual LP problem is one of resource valuation and assigns shadow prices to the resources. Parametric solution of the dual at varying levels of water availability estimate the relationship between the quantity of water and its economic value, or a demand function. The dual of the LP problem representing irrigation possibilities in the Jordan River Basin is solved at each basis change as the availability of water is varied. Diverted water is valued at a maximum of approximately $14 per acre-foot. Consumptively used it has a maximum value of over $36. At present levels of irrigation diversions the shadow price falls to less than $3 for diverted water or $6 for consumptively used water. Supply functions for irrigation and municipal and industrial (M & I) water uses are estimated by using a previously developed LP model. Lower bounds are placed on wetland diversions and basin outflow. Both M & I and irrigation diversions are varied to determine their shadow prices at all feasible levels of water supply without increasing imports. The estimated cost of supplying M & I water varies from under $70 to over $236 per acre-foot. The cost of supplying irrigation water varies from $.52 to over $112 per acre-foot. The optimal allocation of resources is estimated by combining the supply and demand models into a single LP problem. (A graphical solution is also presented.) M & I diversions are set at estimated 1965 levels and parametrically increased. Additional M & I diversions are met through a slight reduction in irrigation diversions and by developing groundwater and recharging groundwater aquifers. The model indicates that more than double current M & I diversions can be supplied in this manner with little or no reduction in irrigation use. It is concluded that there is sufficient water within the Jordan River Basin to satisfy M & I needs through at least 1990 if not to 2010 (depending on how fast M & I demand grows), even if irrigation diversions were maintained at 1965 levels. Additional inter-basin transfers are not an economical source of water now or in the foreseeable future. Both transfers from irrigation and development within the basin appear to be more optimum methods of meeting increased M & I demands. This is neither exotic nor technologically difficult (and should be studied in greater detail) but it does appear to be a much cheaper solution to the Jordan River Basin's impending water problem than inter-basin transfers.
Strategy and Manipulation in Medieval Elections
There are many goals in developing electoral protocols, including a desire for a system which is transparent, in that it is clear what the rule or procedure to follow is; nonmanipulable, in that it is not in a person’s best interest to misrepresent their preferences; honest, in the sense that it elects the ‘right’ candidate; and not open to strategizing, i.e., bribery or collusion. However, these desiderata are in tension with each other: Often, transparent electoral procedures are the least strategy resistant, and many honest procedures encourage manipulation. Thus a balance between these different goals must be sought. In modern times, since the seminal result on vote manipulation, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem [5, 6], much attention has been devoted to developing voting rules where manipulation is never in the best interest of the voters [4] or which are computationally too complex for the average bounded agent to be able to manipulate [1]. This focus on computational aspects of electoral methods is one of the hallmarks of modern studies on voting. But pursuit of these goals is not restricted to modern times: Those participating in elections in the Middle Ages also sought transparency, non-manipulability, honesty, and strategyproofness in so far as these properties can be consistently expressed in a single procedure. However, given the lack of computational sophistication in the Middle Ages, alternate approaches were needed in order to promote honesty, discourage strategizing, etc. These approaches can be classified as either external (constraints introduced outside of the electoral procedure, such as incentives for coming to consensus quickly) or internal (constraints introduced within the electoral procedure, such as voting rules which cannot be manipulated without adverse effects, or which are too difficult for the average bounded agent to manipulate). Surveying examples of both approaches in the context of medieval ecclesiastical and secular elections provides an interesting comparison to modern electoral procedures. Elections in the Middle Ages were used for the same reasons that they are today: To select suitable candidate(s) for a particular office, duty, or obligation. However, it is important to note that the term electio was used in the Middle Ages in a broader sense than our modern ‘election’. Its primary sense was ‘selection’ or ‘choice’, and only secondarily ‘election’ in the modern sense. Thus, many records which purportedly discuss elections are not discussing elections of the type which interests us. We can identify four categories of medieval electoral processes: (1) Election by an external authority having no direct interest in the election; (2) Indirect election, where electors name other electors who then select or elect the officials; (3) Election by lot; and (4) Election by ballot. Elections of the first and third types are generally computationally uninteresting; the first type corresponds to dictatorial voting rules, and the third type collapses to probability theory. In general, interesting voting methods are found only in the fourth type, election by ballot, though they can also occur in indirect election.