Operation Smallbridge: Chester Ronning, the Second Indochina War, and the Challenge to the United States in Asia
In 1966 Canadian diplomats and politicians sought to bring the United States and North Vietnam to the negotiating table. Canada9s secret search for peace, code-named Operation Smallbridge, was led by retired
 diplomat Chester Ronning, who twice traveled to North Vietnam. Although Ronning9s first mission convinced him that Hanoi was willing to discuss terms, U.S. escalation of the war continued. On his second
 mission, Ronning discovered that Washington9s rejection of Hanoi9s overture had hardened the official attitude in North Vietnam. Ronning may have exaggerated the breakthrough from his earlier visit, and
 his efforts may have unrealistically raised expectations for a settlement. Instead of bringing the adversaries closer together, Operation Smallbridge inadvertently made the Vietnam conflict and its belligerents
 more intractable and the prospects for a peaceful political solution more unlikely.
A Decision Delayed: Britain's Withdrawal from South East Asia Reconsidered, 1961–68
This article seeks to explore the background to the Wilson Government's decisions of 1967‐68 to pull back British forces from South East Asia and leave the Singapore base. It challenges assumptions that this was a reluctant step on the part of several Labour ministers, who some have alleged were wedded to a sentimental and romantic attachment to a British ‘world power’ role. Instead, by analysing official thinking behind the creation of Malaysia in 1963, and tracing back to the previous Conservative administration important continuities in attitudes toward South East Asian commitments and the necessity for cut‐backs, the article argues that the most important inhibitor on early British withdrawal was the Malaysia‐Indonesia confrontation, and the related desire of the United States to see Britain retain a presence in the region. Once in office, Labour ministers were prepared to see British forces withdraw when conditions were right, and after the summer of 1966, with the end of the confrontation and American attitudes having become more resigned to British departure, the way was clear for the key decisions to be taken.
Analysis: The Agenda 2007 Proposals: Evolution or Revolution?
On 10 February 2004 the Commission published its proposal for the financial perspective 2007-2013. A week later it adopted the third report on economic and social cohesion. These two documents form the basis of the so-called ‘Agenda 2007 reforms’. They will be the greatest challenge for the enlarged EU after the intergovernmental conference, since they will determine the financial basis for EU policy-making until the middle of the next decade. The Agenda 2007 proposals certainly hint at courageous reforms, because they place a previously unheard-of emphasis on performance and quality. Under the proposals, structural operations should generate value for money, and the funds should focus on projects which generate added value at a European level. Overall the Commission’s proposals point in the right direction, because they balance, on the one hand, solidarity for the new Member States and weak regions in the old Member States with, on the other hand, investments in future tasks. Moreover, they constitute a paradigm shift. For the first time, the Common Agricultural Policy will not be the dominant expenditure category. Now it is up to the Member States to examine the proposals politically and find a compromise between sometimes very divergent interests. It is to be hoped that, during the debate over expenditure limits and division of funds, national interests do not outweigh European interests.