Gender Regimes and Welfare States in France: A historical perspective
This paper has a twofold aim. First, we will analyze the system of family benefits in relation with the income tax system in France through the adoption of a historical and gender perspective. While typologies of welfare states frequently neglect taxation, in our view, one must take family taxation into account because it provides incentives and disincentives for paid income. Moreover, in the case of France, a close relationship exists between family benefits and taxation on income, one that stems from certain discussions—discussions led to the birth of the French system.Second, we will demonstrate how and to what extent France has moved away from the male-breadwinner model. However, any decline of the malebreadwinner model does not, in turn, indicate a corresponding shift toward a dual caregiver model. Indeed, the current French model has ambiguous effects on gender relations.
Pour défendre le quotient familial
[spa] Para defender el cociente familiar . El sistema frances del cociente familiar permite una distribution equitaviva del impuesto a las ganancias entre las familias, segun los criterios que a continuation se detal- lan. A niveles de vida identicos (medidos por los ingresos por Unidad de Consumo), dos familias de distinta talla so- portan la misma carga fiscal. Sin embargo, las presta- ciones por salario familiar son mucho menos importantes que el presupuesto real necesario para criar a los nirios. Asi, salvo para las familias de muy escasos ingresos, el hecho de tener hijos, representa una baja del nivel de vida tanto mâs significativa cuanto que la familia es acomoda- da. No obstante, el sistema del cociente familiar es criti- cado por algunos autores quienes, inspirândose en ejemplos extranjeros, preconizan una disminucion de la reduccion de impuestos que se les adjudica a las familias acomodadas. Taies sumas, serian utilizadas, por ejemplo, con el fin de aumentar las prestaciones familiares o disminuir el impuesto de otras categorias de contribuyentes De hecho, taies reformas acentuarian aun la disparidad de nivel de vida entre las familias desahogadas con ninos y las parejas o los solteros sin hijos, de identicos ingresos de base. Estas reformas se verian orientadas de manera contraria a la de la logica del sistema fiscal frances. Lo que caracteriza el sistema de deducciones fiscales y sociales poco progresivo en Francia, no es el cociente familiar sino el peso elevado de las cotizaciones sociales con respect al de los impuestos directos. [fre] Pour defendre le quotient familial . Le systeme francais du quotient familial assure une repartition equitable de l'impot sur le revenu entre les familles au sens suivant : a niveaux de vie identiques (mesures par le revenu par Unite de Consommation), deux familles de taille differente supportent la meme charge fiscale. Toutefois, les prestations familiales etant beaucoup plus faibles que le cout des enfants, avoir des enfants represente, sauf pour les familles de tres faible revenu, une baisse de niveau de vie, d'autant plus forte que la famille est aisee. Le systeme du quotient familial est cependant critique par certains auteurs qui, s'inspirant des exemples etrangers, preconisent une diminution de la reduction d'impot . ree aux familles aisees ; ces economies seraient utilisees par exemple pour augmenter les prestations familiales ou diminuer l'impot d'autres categories de contribuables. . En fait, de telles reformes accentueraient encore l'ecart de niveau de vie entre les familles aisees avec enfants et les couples ou celibataires sans enfants de meme revenu primaire. Elles iraient a rencontre de la logique du systeme fiscal francais. Ce qui rend le systeme de prelevements fiscaux et sociaux peu progressif en France n'est pas le quotient familial, mais le poids eleve des cotisations sociales par rapport a celui de l'impot direct. [eng] In Defence of the Famiiy Quotient Tax System . The family quotient is used to determine individual income tax according to the taxpayer's filing status (family status and dependency exemptions). The French family quotient system ensures a fair breakdown of income tax between families in the following way : two families of different sizes have the same tax burdens when their standards of living are the same (as measured by income in Consumption Units). However, as family benefits are a lot lower than the cost of children, the fact of having children leads to a drop in the standard of living except in the case of extremely low-income families. This drop is sharper when the family is well-off. The family quotient system is criticized by certain authors who have drawn their inspiration from . other countries' examples and advocate reducing the tax credit allocated to well-off families. These savings would be used for such purposes as increasing family benefits or reducing the tax burden of other categories of taxpayers. . In fact, such reforms would emphasize the difference between the standards of living of well-off families with children and childless couples or single people with the same primary income. They would run counter to the logic of the French tax system. It is not the family quotient that makes the French tax and social security levies system fairly unprogressive, but the high weight of social contributions compared to direct taxes.
Trade, exchange rate, and agricultural pricing policies in Thailand
Thailand is still largely an agricultural country. In 1984, agricultural work was still the main source of earnings for more than 70 percent of the population. For much of the 25 year period covered by this report, government intervention in the prices of rice, maize, and natural rubber was extensive. For these products, intervention took the form of explicit export taxes and restrictive quotas. Sugar, on the other hand, was imported until 1960. For many years prior to that, government policy was to encourage growers and thus achieve self-sufficiency. One conclusion of this study is that the Thai sugar industry would have shrunk dramatically if the government had refrained from intervention. Intervention in the prices of rice and natural rubber had the effect of penalizing farm producers by reducing their output prices. There was, as a consequence a shift of resources towards Thailand's small industrial sector. In 1981, the Thai government lifted its quota restrictions, and liberalized its trade by eliminating its intervention in the maize, rice, sugar and natural rubber markets. Unfortunately for export growers, however, the gradual elimination of intervention was overshadowed by sharp declines in the world prices of Thailand's major agricultural exports.