A Closed Book? British Intelligence and East Asia, 1945–1950
This article focuses on British intelligence in China, Japan, and Korea from the end of the Second World War to the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. It seeks to ascertain whether the collection of secret intelligence and its subsequent interpretation provided an accurate picture of Soviet and local communist intentions in East Asia. Since the war against Japan began, the region was largely an American responsibility and remained so after 1945 when they occupied Japan, Korea below the 38th parallel, and sent forces to China. Much of the intelligence effort for East Asia also devolved upon the Americans. Yet, the British retained an intelligence interest there not least because of their extensive commercial assets in China and the region's proximity to Britain's imperial position in Southeast Asia. That interest gathered pace after growing Communist threats inside China and Korea. However, the available intelligence resources for the Far East as a whole were scarce, making it difficult to piece together a clear picture of fast moving events in East Asia.
The British Intelligence Community in Singapore, 1946-1959: Local Security, Regional Co-ordination and the Cold War in the Far East
Singapore was the stronghold of British intelligence in the Far East during the Cold War. The small city-colony played host to a diverse range of British intelligence organisations including regional outposts of MI5 and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), specialist technical intelligence centres, open source reporting centres and the police Special Branch. These intelligence outfits operated across three levels: the local, the regional and the national. This thesis investigates the British intelligence milieu in Singapore, focusing upon its organisation and status; its working culture and operations; and its impact or influence. In so doing, the thesis interrogates to what extent we can speak of a definable British intelligence ‘community’ in Singapore during the early Cold War. It concludes that there were instead two distinct communities: a local intelligence community, and a regional-national one. Nevertheless, there were two core similarities. Security intelligence was at the forefront of both communities as the most appropriate response to the nature of the Cold War both within Singapore and the Southeast Asian region. Secondly, both intelligence communities played a significant role not just in shaping official perceptions but as avenues for covert policy implementation. At the regional level, intelligence activities enabled Britain to fight the Cold War through clandestine measures, fulfilling the key policy goal of providing containment without (extensive) commitments. Locally, security intelligence was a major driving force in the engagement between the Singapore government, communist ‘terrorists’ and anti-colonial nationalists. This thesis is not just about British intelligence in the Cold War. It also provides original insight into Singapore’s transition to self-government between 1946 and 1959 by focusing on the crucial role played by Special Branch. Intelligence services were vital in ensuring that Singapore was rendered ‘safe’ for decolonisation, and their activities indicate continuity between colonial and post-colonial government in Singapore.
Continents of Liberty: Emerson and Gerald Vizenor’s Chair of Tears
Ralph Waldo Emerson protested what came to be known as the Trail of Tears in a public letter to President Martin Van Buren in 1838. Th e Cherokee Nation, he argued, had been cheated by a “sham treaty” (Emerson, “Letter” 50), the will of the people ignored, and a false acquiescence to removal written into law. In making a passionate appeal to the highest “chair” of the land, Emerson underscored the great political and moral stakes involved: