On the Optimal Timing of Foreign Aid
We offer a dynamic formulation of the aid process, in which questions of timing are central. It is shown that in most cases it is optimal to give the aid partly in a lump, at the outset, and partly as a flow, over time. However, if the donor and recipient cooperate, stock and flow aid may be of opposite sign. It is shown also that when marginal utility is of constant elasticity, the rate of flow of aid increases (decreases) if and only if the initial world stock of capital is less than (greater than) its steady-state value.
A dynamic model of the distribution of wealth among households and nations
Stiglitz once showed that, in general, aggregate wealth is asymptotically uniformally distributed among individuals. However, in his formulation household saving is not the outcome of utility maximization over time. Constructing a simple dynamic general equilibrium model in which household saving is choice-theoretically determined, we show that given initial holdings of wealth there is a unique and stable steady state distribution of wealth and that the distribution of wealth becomes more even (resp. uneven) as time goes by if the total wealth is initially greater (resp. smaller) than its steady state level. We also study the response of the steady state equilibrium to the changes in initial distribution of wealth and the rate of time preference, and to several types of technological improvements.
Same-Sex Marriage in the United States
This Chapter gives a brief analysis of the status of same-sex marriage in the United States prior to the US Supreme Court decisions of 2013 and the status of litigation and political reforms triggered in part by these court decisions. It shows that marriage is a central institution in the country’s rationale of family law in ways that separate it from other western countries that have allowed same-sex marriage.