The pioneer revisits her classic
Governing Nonprofit Organizations: Federal and State Law and Regulation. Marion R. Fremont-Smith. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004. 550 pp. $95.00 cloth.
The Social Marketing of Giving
Abstract Despite significant government efforts to bolster individual philanthropy, giving by individuals (as a percentage of household income) has remained remarkably static and participation in many western countries is declining. This article explores the role that governments might play in facilitating growth, from a social marketing perspective. Drawing on research from multiple domains this article proposes an easily accessible and actionable framework (1) to inform public policy and (2) to guide further impactful academic research, with the objective of increasing both participation in, and the monetary value of, individual giving.
Are Judges Really More Principled than Voters
CHRIS EISGRUBER'S Constitutional Self-GovernmentI articulately lays out a familiar, respectable, and (I argue) misguided argument for giving federal judges broad discretion to read what they take to be our moral convictions into the United States Constitution. The argument relies heavily on Ronald Dworkin's famous case for a "moral" reading of the United States Constitution.2 However, Dworkin's argument is the lineal descendant of a much older and more explicitly anti-democratic theory that was less concerned with judicial review and more concerned with social classes. According to this older theory, only a landed aristocracy could truly represent the permanent interests of the nation, because only this social class was sufficiently independent of economic need to be impartial about moral principles. Persons without land would be driven by their immediate appetites to sell their allegiance to the highest bidder without regard to the long-term interest of the nation. Therefore, it was in the interest of the nation, including commoners, to give the landed gentry special power to govern the nation, usually by special representation in a legislative assembly. Eisgruber and Dworkin have substituted the life tenure and unchanging salary of Article III judges for the real property of the landed gentry, but, mutatis mutandi, the logic of their argument is the same as the old Tory case for the House of Lords. Article III courts are "forumns of principle," because the Constitution guarantees that they enjoy "social prestige and a comfortable salary" regardless of their decisions. 3 Thus, judges, like the landed gentry, do not stand to gain or lose any material benefit from their exercise of power: They can deliberate freely about the meaning of moral principle "on the basis of the