James Couzens, Andrew Mellon, the 'Greatest Tax Suit in the History of the World,' and Creation of the Joint Committee on Taxation and Its Staff
In early 1924, James Couzens was a Republican Senator from Michigan and reportedly the richest member of Congress. Andrew Mellon was beginning his fourth year as Secretary of the Treasury — a service that would eventually span 11 years under three Republican Administrations — and one of the wealthiest persons in the entire country. This article describes how a feud between these two men, an ensuing investigation led by Couzens of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) (predecessor to the modern-day IRS), and a tax case against Couzens that was described as the “greatest tax suit in the history of the world,” helped lead to creation of the U.S. Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) and its staff. The events — filled with political intrigue, backstabbing (real or imagined), and unintended consequences — antagonized Congress’s relationship with the executive branch, but improved cooperation between the House and Senate, and both were instrumental in the JCT’s creation. The story also helps to explain certain of the unique characteristics of the JCT and its staff since their formation. Finally, the article describes how creation of the JCT became entangled with two of the most contentious tax issues of the day — the publicity of tax return information and the depletion allowance for oil and gas production — and played a role in changing the law in both areas. Although the feud and its aftermath were direct factors in the JCT’s creation, the development of the modern income tax during roughly its first decade was an essential ingredient. The decisions made by Congress, the Treasury, and the BIR during that period, and their later understanding (or misunderstanding) of the law and its effects, set the stage for the feud and subsequent events. Thus, in addition to detailing the largely untold story of the origins of an important Congressional committee and its staff, this article explains and analyzes key, early portions of our nation’s 100-year-old law as well as the sometimes flawed decision-making process — involving an intriguing mix of policy, politics, and personality — that helped produce this new institution of government.
Legislative Gridlock and Nonpartisan Staff
This essay explores a recent proposal to reduce Congressional gridlock by using nonpartisan committee staff. It first describes past and present practice to have such staff serve the committees and a number of legislative support organizations. It then presents and tests a theoretical case of nonpartisan staff reducing gridlock that is premised on such staff having an expertise distinct from that of partisans and sufficient influence to affect legislative outcomes. The essay shows that the meaning of “nonpartisan” is somewhat nebulous and incomplete, which may make it difficult to identify, select, and retain persons with the attributes necessary to support the theoretical case. Staff incentives during Congressional service may further undermine the existence of those attributes. Finally, the essay suggests that the two components of the theoretical case — a distinctive expertise and sufficient Congressional influence — may to some extent be incompatible with one another. If nonpartisan staff must be “neutral” on policy issues in order to maintain their influence in Congress’s partisan environment, they may, in effect, be forced to surrender some of their expertise — their ability to analyze and persuade (in a manner different from partisans) why certain policy options are preferable to others. This “muted” expertise may impair their effect on reducing gridlock.
Did we modernize congress
Representative Kefauver analyses progress made by 1946 act and demands public support of job still to be done.