The Federalist and Executive Power
Occasionally, the United States is confronted with the dilemma that, in emergencies, presidents may find it necessary to take actions that ignore constitutional restraints and break the law. In such cases, a strict adherence to the law might constrain the president from acting quickly to protect national security. Some have argued that the president has the constitutional authority to take whatever actions are deemed to be necessary, regardless of the law, and that this authority is available indefinitely as long as it is exercised under the commander in chief authority conferred in Article II. After reviewing the arguments in The Federalist, this paper argues that in crises presidents may legitimately take extraordinary actions outside their constitutional authority, but their actions are legitimate only insofar as they are transparent and presidents seek congressional sanction as soon as the immediate emergency has passed.
The Pacificus-Helvidius Debates of 1793–1794: Toward the Completion of the American Founding
Washington's Neutrality Proclamation, 22 April 1793 Defence of the President's Neutrality Proclamation (Alexander Hamilton), May 1793 Pacificus Number I (Alexander Hamilton), 29 June 29 1793 Pacificus Number I1 (Alexander Hamilton), 3 July 3 1793 Pacificus Number 111 (Alexander Hamilton), 6 July 1793 Pacificus Number IV (Alexander Hamilton), 10 July 10 1793 Pacificus Number V (Alexander Hamilton), 13-17 July 1793 Pacificus Number VI (Alexander Hamilton), 17 July 1793 Pacificus Number VII (Alexander Hamilton), 27 July 1793 'Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 7 July 1793 Helvidius Number I (James Madison), 24 August 1793 Helvidius Number I1 (James Madison), 31 August 1793 Helvidius Number 111 (James Madison), 7 September 1793 Helvidius Number IV (James Madison), 14 September 1793 Helvidius Number V (James Madison), 18 September 1793 Americanus Number I (Alexander Hamilton), 31 January 1794 Americanus Number I1 (Alexander Hamilton), 7 February 1794 Index.
A Matter of Direction: The Reagan Administration, the Signing Statement, and Legislative History
In 1986, Attorney General Edwin Meese announced to a gathering at the National Press Club that a deal with the West Publishing Company to have the signing statement published in the United States Code, Congressional and Administrative News. The announcement mostly went unnoticed until November 1986, when the administration used the signing statement to change an important part of the Immigration Reform and Control Act. Following that event, a flurry of articles appeared in law journals assessing whether the signing statement was constitutionally permissible and whether it would influence judicial decisionmaking. Little attention was paid then, as now, regarding what influenced the unusual move in the first place. In this paper, using information gleaned from interviews with Reagan Justice Department officials as well as documents released December 2005 in preparation for the Alito confirmation hearings, I discuss what external circumstances likely influenced the decision and I dispel the argument that the primary motivation was to influence judges. Instead, the signing statement was designed first to influence executive branch agents.