The Banking Firm: The Role of Signaling with Collaterals
In this paper we challenge basic results of signaling models. In our banking model each project of a borrower is described by a continuous density of outcomes. Different density functions are classified according to second stochastisch dominance. Combining these features we find that in a banking model collateral is no longer in a position to signal the degree of riskiness of the borrower to the lender. In most cases the equilibrium is a pooling equilibrium.
The Gravity Equation with Micro-Founded Trade Costs
Gravity Equations are broadly used to estimate the impacts of trade impediments on trade flows. It is often stated that results are implausibly high. In theoretical foundations of the gravity equation, trade costs usually enter as icebergmelting-costs. This paper offers an alternative approach to model trade costs. From a microeconomic point of view, trade costs should depend on trade input prices and - which is new - the underlying trade volume. If trade costs are determined by the trade volume, and average trade costs are falling with the trade volume (e.g. due to economies of scale in the trade sector), empirical results from gravity equations are likely to be biased.
The uprising of the marginalised: a socio-economic perspective of the Syrian uprising
More than three years after the outbreak of protests in a number of Arab countries, the role of socio-economic factors in these events is attracting more attention. One of the cases that needs more research is Syria. More than three years into the Syrian uprising, the socio-economic roots of the protest movement that became one of the bloodiest civil conflicts in the history of the Middle East need to be examined. While it has been observed that the Syrian uprising, contrary to some ‘Arab Spring’ countries, has been an uprising of more marginalised social groups with a strong role played by poorer segments in the society, particularly rural and rural-to-urban migrants, the socio-economic explanation for this is still underdeveloped. This paper aims at contributing to a better understanding of this issue by examining the political and socio-economic compromise that underlined the rule of the Ba’th party in Syria for four decades and unpacking how a combination of internal and external shifts that started in the 1990s and intensified in the 2000s led to the erosion of this compromise, providing the background to the events that began in 2011.