Information and the Existence of Stationary Markovian Equilibrium
We describe conditions for the existence of a stationary Markovian equilibrium when total production or total endowment is a random variable. Apart from regularity assumptions, there are two crucial conditions: (i) low information—agents are ignorant of both total endowment and their own endowments when they make decisions in a given period, and (ii) proportional endowments—the endowment of each agent is in proportion, possibly random, to the total endowment. When these conditions hold, there is a stationary equilibrium. When they do not hold, such an equilibrium need not exist.
Martin Shubik’s Curriculum Vitae

We mourn the loss of Martin Shubik (1926–2018), a gifted scholar and a dear friend. Through his remarkable ideas and insights, Shubik helped founding and shaping the CONVIVIUM with his guidance, advice, and inaugural contribution “Accounting and Economic Theory: Past, Present, and Future” (DOI: https://doi.org/10.2202/2152-2820.1012). At the time of his passing on August 22, 2018, editorial work on this symposium on his last book with Eric Smith, ‘The Guidance of an Enterprise Economy’, has been underway. It is now published to honour him and his outstanding contributions to economics, management science, game theory, and accounting scholarship. This article summarizes these contributions through his lifetime work.
Strategic market game: A dynamic programming application to money, banking and insurance☆
A series of models (kept simple in order to stress the structure of the models and the nature of the questions) are described and problems are posed pertaining to a dynamic economy with various possibilities for the issuance of fiat money, credit and insurance.