The Esteem Theory of Norms
When esteem is costless to supply, does it provide an effectivemeans of enforcing norms for public goods production? I examine thebasic mechanics of an enforcement-through-esteem model. Whileesteem may enforce norms to considerable degree, systematicunderenforcement remains the general result, even in very basicsettings with a minimum of transactions costs. I also examine whyesteem has positive value in equilibrium if it can be producedcostlessly (i.e., why esteem remains scarce), and what collectiveaction problems plague the supply of esteem.
Psychic Punishment Costs and Deterrence
In this paper we analyze criminal deterrence in the presence of specific psychic costs of punishments. We consider a dynamic model with three players, analyzing the choices of a representative lawmaker, potential criminal and judge. In our setting the lawmaker decides whether to introduce a fixed punishment enhancement above a chosen threshold of crime level, depending on its popularity among the voters. In reaction, the judge, who is influenced by her own preferences as well as the opinion of her peer group, might change the probability of punishment, through affecting the standard of reasonable doubt. Our results suggest that large discontinuous and mandatory increases in punishment can have unintended effects that are contrary to the stated goal of such punishment enhancements. In equilibrium, when either the judge or her peer group is "anti-punishment" enough, the level of criminal activity might increase in response to the punishment enhancement. This perverse effect is less likely to occur if there is a higher number of peer groups within the "elite", so that a greater extent of self-selection by judges can occur. Our results have relevance for a number of areas outside the traditional criminal justice system as well, such as special courts (such as ecclesiastical or military courts), or the strictness and enforcement of regulations.
Self-Censorship in Public Discourse
Uncertainty about what motivates “senders” of public messages leads “receivers” to “read between the lines” to discern the sender's deepest commitments. Anticipating this, senders “write between the lines,” editing their expressions so as to further their own ends. I examine how this interactive process of inference and deceit affects the quality and extent of public deliberations on sensitive issues. A principle conclusion is that genuine moral discourse on difficult social issues can become impossible when the risks of upsetting some portion of one's audience are too great. Reliance on euphemism and platitude should be expected in this strategic climate. Groups may embark on a tragic course of action, believed by many at the outset to be ill-conceived, but that has become impossible to criticize.