Patent Infringement as Criminal Conduct
Criminal and civil law differ greatly in their use of the element of intent. The purposes of intent in each legal system are tailored to effectuate very different goals. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011), however, imported a criminal concept of intent — willful blindness — into the statute for patent infringement, a civil offense, despite these differences. This importation of a criminal law concept of intent into the patent statute is novel and calls for examination. This Article compares the purposes behind intent in criminal law with the purposes behind intent in patent law to demonstrate that this importation does not achieve the policy goals of the patent regime. Criminal law jurisprudence requires an intent element for three reasons: to ascribe a level of moral blameworthiness to an act, to separate criminal from civil liability, and to shield otherwise innocently acting defendants from criminal punishment. Patent infringement actions, by contrast, lack an intent element because they almost exclusively seek to remedy economic harms. The importation of criminal concepts of knowledge into the patent infringement statute may therefore lead to unwanted consequences, particularly, higher-than-warranted burdens of proof for patent holders. To this end, equating criminal mental states to civil ones risks treating patent infringement as criminal conduct. This Article concludes by proposing that courts should examine the purposes of mental state requirements on a statute-by-statute basis.
Boundaries of patent infringement law
In the modern global environment of rapid technological change and quickly evolving business practices, new issues frequently arise that challenge the operation of patent law. Understanding how patent law operates in this global environment is vital because the patent system plays an important role in the way new technology is developed and brought to market. The accepted rationale for the patent system is that it is an economic tool to incentivise innovation and thereby enhance social welfare. It follows, then, that if patent law handles emergent issues (or is likely to handle them) in ways that conflict with its underlying rationale, the development of new technology may be hindered. 
Six diverse emergent issues that challenge the operation of patent law in Australia are examined in this thesis. They take two forms: technological, originating from development of new technology; and legal, resulting from recent case law or legislative amendment (either foreign or domestic). Technological and legal issues arise frequently and it is impossible to evaluate them all. Thus, this thesis focuses specifically on issues that are relevant to aspects of Australian patent infringement law and are amenable to doctrinal legal analysis and qualitative economic reasoning. The aspects of patent infringement law examined are: standing to initiate infringement actions; infringement by exploitation; secondary infringement; innocent infringement; and false representations about patents. In addition, to give perspective on reasoning in this study and, in some circumstances to identify solutions to defects in the law, analysis of each issue also involves a foreign comparative law component. 
This study demonstrates that many of the emergent issues examined are not, or are unlikely to be, dealt with under current Australian patent law in a manner consistent with the justifications that underpin it. Accordingly, various refinements to the law are proposed to ensure the Australian patent system is kept up to date.
The honesty of thinking : reflections on critical thinking in Nietzsche's middle period and the later Heidegger
This dissertation engages with contemporary interpretations of Nietzsche and Heidegger on the issue of self-knowing with respect to the notions of honesty and authenticity. Accounting for the two philosophers' developing conceptions of these notions allows a response to interpreters who conceive the activity of self-knowing as a primarily personal problem. The alternative accounts proposed take as a point of departure transitional texts that reveal both thinkers to be engaged in processes of revision. The reading of honesty in Chapters 1 and 2 revolves around Nietzsche's groundwork on prejudice in Morgenrothe (1880-81), where he first problematizes the moral-historical forces entailed in actuating the 'will to truth'. The reading of authenticity in Chapters 3 and 4 revolves around Heidegger's lectures on what motivates one's thinking in Was heist Denken? (1951-52). The lectures call into question his previous formal suppositions on what calls forth one's 'will-to-have-a-conscience', in an interpretation of Parmenides on the issue of thought's linguistic determination, discussed further in the context of Unterwegs zur Sprache (1950-59). Chapter 5 shows how Heidegger's confrontation with Nietzsche contributed to his ongoing revisions to the notion of authenticity, and to the attending conceptions of critique and its authority. Particular attention is given to the specific purposes to which distinct Nietzschean foils are put near the confrontation's beginning--in Heidegger's lectures on Nietzsche's second Unzeitgemasse Betrachtung (1938), and in the monograph entitled Besinnung (1939) which they prepare--and near its end, in the interpretation of Also Sprach Zarathustra (1883-85) presented in the first half of Was heist Denken? Chapter 6 recapitulates the developments traced from the vantage point of the retrospective texts Die Zollikoner Seminare (1959-72) and the fifth Book of Die frohliche Wissenschaft (1887). Closing remarks are made in relation to recent empirical research on the socio-environmental structures involved in determining self-identity.