Simulating the Impacts of Rural Social Cash Transfers and Farmer's Subsidies in Malawi and Ghana
A considerable body of experimental economics research examines the impacts of cash transfer programmes. In many developing countries, though, cash transfers are relatively minor compared to other transfer mechanisms in terms of their claim on public resources. In Malawi, fertilizer subsidies dwarf cash transfers, while next door in Zambia, the government pays farmers prices well above market levels for their maize. Yet no study to our knowledge has attempted to compare the full impact of social cash transfers and other kinds of transfers on rural incomes and welfare in low-income countries. (?)
A simulation impact evaluation of rural income transfers in Malawi and Ghana
We use a disaggregated rural economy-wide modelling framework to simulate and compare the impacts of an input subsidy, cash transfer, and output price support on production and welfare in rural Malawi and Ghana. Household groups in the models are defined by their eligibility for current transfers. Simulations are calibrated to official government spending. No intervention appears as unequivocally superior. The impacts and efficiency of each transfer mechanism are shaped by the structure of the economy, market conditions, and programme design.
Corporations and the Market for Law
The state competition for corporate law has long been studied as a distinct phenomenon. Under the traditional view, corporations are subject to a unique choice-of-law rule, the internal affairs doctrine (IAD). This rule is explained as a historical accident, or by the special logistics of the corporate contract. The resulting market for corporate law appears to have special characteristics, particularly including the dominance by the single state of Delaware. This paper challenges the traditional view. It shows that the corporate law market is best understood as a special application of the general market for law. Any differences are matters of degree rather than kind, and are explained by considerations underlying enforcement of all choice-of-law contracts rather than by factors unique to corporations. It follows that theories of corporate competition that ignore the broader law market context are incomplete, and that the competition for corporate law carries lessons for the law market generally. Moreover, the connection between the corporate and other law markets has implications for the nature of corporate law, the constitutional status of the IAD, the scope of the IAD, and for the relationship between state and federal law.