Family and favour at the court of Jacob Zuma
Jacob Zuma’s role as both state and party president is significantly underpinned by those who pay court to him on the basis of personal loyalty, patriarchal fealty and hope for personal gain, his formal authority buttressed by political patronage and protection which extends to those close to him. However, Zuma combines his role of tribal patriarch with that of his role at the head of a shadow state, his ‘family’ extending beyond close relatives to include business associates with shady connections. Zuma is an accidental president who ascended to the office because he was not Thabo Mbeki. He may not be any more inclined to cohabit with the morally dubious than his predecessor (who, notoriously, shielded Chief of Police Jackie Selebi from investigation for linkages to organised crime). Nonetheless, it is difficult to believe that a man deemed by a court to have been in a corrupt relationship with Shabir Shaik (eventually sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for offences committed in connection with the notorious 1998 arms deal) and who was facing some 783 criminal charges involving fraud, corruption and racketeering would have secured the presidency had he not been able to place himself at the head of a ‘coalition of the aggrieved’ who wished to bring Mbeki’s rule and influence to an abrupt end. That this coalition was broad-based is generally accepted, receiving strong backing not merely from the organised left within the Tripartite Alliance but ethnic support from within the ANC of his home province. But in addition, he received strong support from black business interests. Mbeki may have been the chief champion of BEE, but his challenger received support from a motley group of business players, some of whom switched their support from Mbeki to Zuma when they identified him as the rising man; from established business persons from KwaZulu-Natal who had long been close to him; from those who had lost out or had felt disadvantaged under Mbeki; and not least, from major figures within the Indian business community (again, significantly rooted in KwaZulu-Natal). In addition, he was backed by powerful figures within the ANC who had either been convicted of criminal offences (such as Winnie Madikizela-Mandela) or who were under investigation for criminal acts, some of these for alleged involvement in tendering scams (such as Ngoako Ramathlodi and Angie Motsheka) (Southall 2009). In Zuma, powerful elements within the party saw a man who would not be overly troubled by ethical or legal concerns when it became time to cash in their cards for supporting him in his conjoined struggle for political survival and to stay out of jail. The evidence laid before the court in Shabir Shaik’s trial of Zuma’s heavy
Understanding the ‘Zuma Tsunami’
Jacob Zuma's defeat of Thabo Mbeki's bid to serve a third term as the president of the African National Congress (ANC) at the party's 52nd National Conference in Polokwane in December 2007 provoked a torrent of analysis. In large part, this was because Zuma himself was a highly controversial and contradictory figure. On the one hand, the ANC's new president was at the time having to fight against myriad charges of corruption through the courts; on the other, although highly patriarchal and conservative, he had earned the backing of the political left within the Tripartite Alliance and, apparently, the enthusiastic support of many among the poor. This article identifies eight ways in which the ‘Zuma tsunami’ was represented in the public discourse in South Africa, identifying their sources, motivations, limitations and overlaps, and concludes that the confusion around the issue of ‘what Zuma means’ represents a moment of extreme political fluidity within the ANC.
Migration, Labor Mobility, and Relocation Assistance: The Case of the American Indian
This article, an example of "indirect" program evaluation, utilizes a 1/100 public use sample of American households from the 1970 U.S. census to examine family welfare levels among three categories of Indian families: (1) nonmigrant families living in traditional areas of Indian population concentration; (2) families in areas not receiving relocation assistance through the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA); and (3) migrant families moving to urban areas with BIA relocation assistance. The article concludes that the population of migrants receiving relocation assistance has a substantially higher level of economic welfare in both absolute and relative terms and that earnings are the principal source of increased welfare. It is suggested that such assistance might be utilized on a wider basis to assist other migrating populations.