New Realities: Energy Security In The 2010s and Implications for The U.S. Military
Abstract : Global energy markets are undergoing dramatic shifts. Developing countries are beginning to outpace their more developed counterparts in energy demand, the result not simply of higher economic growth rates in the former, but also due to increased efficiency in the latter. Traditional producers of hydrocarbons in places such as Latin America, Eurasia, North Africa, and the Middle East face a host of political, economic, technical, and societal challenges that could potentially lead to major disruptions in the global energy supply. Meanwhile, the unconventional fossil fuels revolution has led to major changes in the flow of the global energy supply, seemingly overnight. All of these changes will have implications for U.S. security generally and the U.S. military specifically. Evolving energy-based U.S. national interests in Africa or the Middle East may shape the degree to which the U.S. military becomes involved in political or humanitarian crises in those regions. Tightening energy supplies may alter fundamentally the way in which the United States wields military force in a contingency operation. And closer to home, increasingly vulnerable domestic energy infrastructure may undermine military installation operations and security. To further investigate the changes among energy producers and consumers and to subsequently assess the implications for the U.S. military, the Strategic Studies Institute the research arm of the U.S. Army War College organized a conference in November 2013 entitled, New Realities: Energy Security in the 2010s and Implications for the U.S. Military. That event, which included North American and European experts from government, the military, academia, the private sector, and think tanks, was hosted by the Reserve Officers Association in Washington, DC, and funded through the generous support of the U.S. Army War College Foundation.
‘Advice is judged by results, not by intentions’: why Gordon Brown is wrong about Africa
Chancellor Gordon Brown has declared that 2005 will be a milestone in the United Kingdom's campaign to meet the UN Millennium Goals. Owing to Britain's chairmanship of both the G8 and the European Union in 2005, Brown believes that an opportunity to raise the continent's star in global politics presents itself. This comes after the launch in 2004 of the Blair Commission for Africa and a recent spate of high profile interventions by assorted politicians and famous musicians. It also follows a trend begun at the G8 meetings where Africa is placed on the G8 agenda. Such an interest in the continent is to be welcomed. Yet this article contends that Gordon Brown's assumptions regarding Africa's troubles, and the ingredients found within his proposals, are mistaken and need rethinking. The article argues that Brown's approach to Africa's problems is based on incomplete information or a misreading of the situation, and by default may serve to prolong Africa's crises rather than alleviate them.
Briefing: the pan-Sahel initiative
THOSE DENIZENS OF WASHINGTON SOMETIMES DESCRIBED AS STRATEGISTS, policy-wonks and Beltway insiders are, most unusually, developing a keen interest in West Africa. Part of the reason is oil.' Another part is the conviction that Africa is a key new front in the war on terrorism.2 Regarding the latter, the main threat is perceived to exist in the Horn (where Somalia offers an unhealthy mix of lawlessness, Islam and unpleasant memories of an earlier US failure) and East Africa (scene of terrorist attacks on US embassies in 1998 and of attacks on Israeli targets in 2002). Within the US Department of Defense, the Horn of Africa is the fief of Central Command (CENTCOM), the structure headquartered in Tampa, Florida, that covers the Middle East, including Iraq and Afghanistan. The rest of Africa, meanwhile, falls under the European Command (EUCOM), whose headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, oversee US military activity in 93 countries involving some 120,000 troops. Hence, it is EUCOM that has responsibility for fighting the war on terrorism in North and West Africa and in the space between, the Sahara desert. Key to this is the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI). PSI first came to public attention in November 2002, when the State Department issued a press release announcing that two officials from the Office of Counterterrorism had visited Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger to discuss with officials there a scheme that would be aimed at fighting terrorism, controlling illicit trade and enhancing regional security. Subsequently, little was heard of the scheme until November 2003, when PSI began implementation. Funded by the State Department to the tune of $7.75 million, including $6.5 million in fiscal year 2004 small change in Washington, but a substantial amount for such poor countries as those of the Sahel the heart of PSI consists of training military units from the four partner countries, mostly by soldiers from US Special Forces from EUCOM. Also involved in some aspects of the scheme are US marines, with some logistical work being sub-contracted to the private security company Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE), well known from peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s. It is notable that since PSI got going in 2003, US participants increasingly describe it as a means of actually tracking down suspected or known