Recontracting and competition
We characterize the set of Walrasian allocations of an economy as the set of allocations which can be supported by abstract equilibria that satisfy a recontracting condition which reflects the idea that agents can freely trade with each other. An alternative (and weaker) recontracting condition characterizes the core. The results are extended to production economies by extending the definition of the recontracting condition to include the possibility of agents to recontract with firms. However, no optimization requirement is imposed on firms. In pure exchange economies, an abstract equilibrium is a feasible allocation and a list of choice sets, one for each agent, that satisfy the following conditions: an agent's choice set is a subset of the commodity space that includes his endowment; and each agent's equilibrium bundle is a maximal element in his choice set, with respect to his preferences. The recontracting condition requires that any agent can buy bundles from any other agent's choice set by offering the other agent a bundle he prefers to his equilibrium bundle.
Public sector science and "the strategy of the commons"
Summary form only given, as follows. This paper provides a game-theoretical explanation for the puzzling behavior of large firms and private sector consortia (incumbents) whom, while sponsoring university research labs, at the same time require all inventions generated by the sponsored labs be licensed openly on a purely nonexclusive basis. Under certain conditions, this results in an intellectual property 'commons' with the consequence that no firm has the incentive to innovate, despite the potential profitability of the new technology. The strategy of spoiling incentives to innovate by eliminating exclusive intellectual property rights-the strategy of the common-is motivated by a fear of cannibalization and supported by a credible threat: The authors show that the degree of cannibalization to which the new technology exposes the old market is responsible for this market failure and they characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium in which the strategy of the commons is played. Within this framework, they also investigate welfare implications as well as strategy and policy issues.
17 &mgr;m pixel 640 x 480 microbolometer FPA development at BAE Systems
BAE Systems has developed an advanced 640 x 480 focal plane array (FPA) with a 17 &mgr;m pixel pitch. Sensitivity of ≤ 50 mK was demonstrated and the FPAs were used in imaging demonstrations. Successful scaling of BAE Systems' patented single contact per pixel, single-level microbolometer process to 17 &mgr;m pitch provides a path toward next generation microbolometer imaging systems.