Reason-Giving Versus Truth-Seeking: Reconceptualizing Indoctrination in Education
INTRODUCTION In the literature on indoctrination in education, indoctrination is often defined as having occurred when someone holds certain beliefs either non-evidentially or non-rationally. The emphasis in attempts to avoid indoctrination, then, is to teach students to provide reasons for their beliefs, rather than basing their views simply on unquestioned assumptions, or emotional commitments to certain beliefs. I find this notion problematic. To avoid indoctrination, we must not develop reason-givers; rather, I argue that we must develop what I shall call “truth-seekers.”
Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking: The 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism
Peirce delivered eight public lectures at Harvard between March 26 and May 14, 1903. In publicizing the series, William James conferred on these lectures the title "Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right Thinking." Turrisi has done a great service in providing a new edition of these lectures, which were previously published under Peirce's title "Lectures on Pragmatism" in the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce}vol. 5 (Harvard, 1934). This edition of the lectures should be considered a standard reference for Peirce studies until such time as they appear in the authoritative Peirce Edition. Its convenience and cost will make this volume a preferred classroom text for many years to come. Peirce composed his lectures in longhand while in Cambridge,
A Philosophical Objection to Faith Schools
This paper is a re-examination of the argument that faith schools ought to be abolished on the grounds that they are indoctrinatory. The premises of this argument are (1) that faith schools teach for belief in religious propositions, (2) that no religious proposition is known to be true, and (3) that teaching for belief in not-known-to-be-true propositions is indoctrinatory. I argue that the first two premises are true, but the third, as it stands, is false. However, the flaws in the third premise are relatively minor and the argument against faith schools can be reformulated to take account of them.