Just War Theory and the 2003 Decision to Invade Iraq
Abstract : In American history few foreign policy decisions have been as controversial as the Bush Administration's choice to invade Iraq in 2003. This decision had many supporters but it also had significant, forceful opposition from both domestic and international opponents. The intellectual under-pinning for the opposition largely came from the philosophical doctrine of Just War Theory and the international law it informed. Accepting that war itself is terribly destructive and should be avoided if possible, this theory holds that a nation s decision to go to war is nonetheless justified only if certain criteria are met. This paper briefly discusses the historical origins of Just War Theory, concisely reviews the tenets of Just War Theory as they stand today, and examines if the Bush Administration adhered to the Jus Ad Bellum tenets of Just War Theory prior to its decision to invade Iraq.
What Future for the UN Charter System of War Prevention?
President George W. Bush historically challenged the United Nations Security Council when he uttered some memorable words in the course of his September 12, 2002, speech to the General Assembly: “Will the UN serve the purpose of its founding, or will it be irrelevant?” In the aftermath of the Iraq war there are at least two answers to this question. The answer of the U.S. government would be to suggest that the United Nations turned out to be irrelevant due to its failure to endorse recourse to war against the Iraq of Saddam Hussein. The answer of those who opposed the war is that the UN Security Council served the purpose of its founding by its refusal to endorse recourse to a war that could not be persuasively reconciled with the UN Charter and international law. This difference of assessment is not just factual, whether Iraq was a threat and whether the inspection process was succeeding at a reasonable pace; it was also conceptual, even jurisprudential. The resolution of this latter debate is likely to shape the future role of the United Nations, as well as influence the attitude of the most powerful sovereign state as to the relationship between international law generally and the use of force as an instrument of foreign policy.
In Defense of International Rules on the Use of Force
The Nuremberg principles that emerged at the end of World War II were hailed as a momentous advance toward an effective rule of law in international society. They affirmed in unmistakable terms that aggressive war is illegal and that persons responsible for such wars are guilty of an international crime. These principles were first expressed in the London agreement of 1945, by which the leading victorious allied states-the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France-established the International Military Tribunal to try the leaders of Nazi Germany for their role in planning and waging the war.1 An eleven-power agreement established a similar international tribunal in Tokyo to try Japanese officials and military leaders for their part in the Far Eastern war.2 Both tribunals convicted a number of defendants and imposed sentences of death or long imprisonment.3 The legal principles