WMD Intelligence Analysis of Lessons from Iraq to Iran: Only Dot the I's - Don't Cross the T's
On January 29, 2010, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair gave evidence to the Iraq Enquiry in London, which was broadcast worldwide on satellite TV by the BBC. He emphasized the need to learn the lessons of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from the case of Iraq for the case of Iran. In his words “propping up one dictator to handle another dictator is not the way, we must get rid of the dictator.” More interesting is how many intelligence analysts are being instructed to dot the I’s but in the case of Iraq the analysis went to far and also crossed the T’s. Here is the previously untold story of what really happened.
Unscom and the Iraqi Biological Weapons Program: Implications for Arms Contro
V erification ofbiological weapons (BW) arms control agreements is one ofthe most difficult tasks in disarmament. While biological arms were outlawed 25 years ago by the multilateral Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), there is still no accepted verification mechanism for biological weapons disarmament. The discovery ofan enormous, diverse biological weapons program in Iraq sparked new interest in development ofa verification regime for the BWC. The investigation of Iraq's BW program also provides the first case history of an international BW arms control verification effort. The inquiry undertaken by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) demonstrates both the inherent difficulties ofsuch an investigation and the possibilities of success. The United Nation's actions in Iraq have made use of nearly all of the verification processes envisaged for the BWC, including information monitoring, remote sensing, inspections, on-site measures, and continuous monitoring. The UNSCOM case portrays examples ofthe real-world implementation ofBW verification techniques, including their accomplishments and failures. Specifically, the commission's efforts in Iraq have shown the value of a process or systematic approach to BW verification, rather than a reliance on discrete verification tools. Using a multifaceted verification strategy, UNSCOM has also proven the possibility ofdetecting a covert, well-hidden biological weapons program. Following the detection ofthe Iraqi BW program, UNSCOM is attempting to determine the full scope of the program in order to eliminate it.
Industrial Relations in 1988
Undoubtedly, the election of the Hawke Labor Government in 1983 marked a turning point in Australian industrial relations. To a large extent industrial turbulence receded, helped along by global econ omic instability and the influence ofthe Prices and Incomes Accord between the Australian Labor Party and the Australian Council of Trade Union (ACTU). Arguably, the apparent success of the Accord owed something to a widespread concern within unions that the election of a Liberal-National Party government at the federal level would have resulted in a major pro gram of economic regulation, especially in relation to the institutions ofthe labour market. During 1988, despite an increasingly buoyant economy, the continuing influence of these economic and political conditions ensured that the level of industrial disputation remained subdued by historical stan dards, though those opposed to the nascent corporate state or centralised wage fixing may have been heartened by signs that wage restraint was fraying at the...