Military newspapers and the Habsburg officers' ideology after 1868
The Habsburg officer corps of the late nineteenth century played a significant role in sustaining the feudal anachronism of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Despite its constant appeals to tradition, it was in fact a product of the struggles to reform the army. The tensions that resulted are evident in the military press of the reform period and left their mark on the officers’ ideology.
The Army Question in Hungarian Politics 1867-1918
The constitutional question, kozjogi kerdes acquired paramount importance, becoming almost an obsession in public life. The constitutional and the army questions were intertwined, something that, under Marxist influence, has not received due emphasis from historians since the Second World War. The 1867 Settlement itself was driven by the military demands of the Empire's great-power status. Some disaffection with the Settlement manifested itself in Hungary as early as 1867, and undoubtedly the provisions concerning the common Imperial Army were felt to be the least desirable part of it. The dominance of the army question coincided with, and largely explains, the rise of Count Albert Apponyi, a supporter of the 1867 Settlement. The party structure in the House of Representatives resolves the paradox that a Sixty-sevener brought the army question into prominence. Hungarian politics periodically went through convulsions over titles, hyphens, flags, badges, uniform and the language of command. Keywords:Albert Apponyi; army questions; constitutional question; Hungarian politics
PLEASURE, POWER, AND THE PURSUIT OF COMMUNISM: SOVIET YOUTH AND STATE-SPONSORED POPULAR CULTURE DURING THE EARLY COLD WAR, 1945-1968
art, with certain students accused of “showing political immaturity, failing to understand the Party’s positions on art.” This episode constituted part of a broader crackdown on abstract art by the Khrushchev administration from late 1962, precipitated the the Soviet leader’s derision of such art forms in December 1962 at the Manege exhibit. Such instances demonstrate the limitations of the top-level promotion of youth grassroots initiative, as the Khrushchev leadership reigned in youth autonomy when it threatened to go beyond the boundaries of the permissible. The dates cited above have particular resonance, since both 1957-58 and 1962-63 represent two periods when those at the top of the Party hierarchy moved away from pursuing a more pluralistic, tolerant policy course, due to anxiety inspired by both sharpening Cold War hostilities and domestic developments. In these periods, official rhetoric censured what it labeled as 639 TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 13, d. 546, ll. 56-57. This is likely related to criticism of the Party associated with the fallout from the Secret Speech and the Hungary invasion. For more, see Polly Jones, “From the Secret Speech to the Burial of Stalin: Real and Ideal Responses to De-Stalinization,” in Jones ed., The Dilemmas, 41-63. 640 TsAOPIM, f. 6083, op. 1, d. 52, ll. 166-67. 641 Susan E. Reid, “In the Name of the People: The Manege Affair Revisited,” Kritika 6.4 (Fall 2005): 673716. 642 On these anxieties, see Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer, 156-88.