No news is good news? Making the Finnish public image of Russia
Abstract
Finland and the Russian Federation share significant overlaps in history. With the exception of a couple of conflicts, the relationship between the two is commonly described as friendly. With a common border of more than 1,300 km, Finland has always been closely tied to its eastern neighbor. Despite the physical proximity, the Cold War era closure of the border increased the mental distance between the two sides, and fostered an image of the other colored largely by attitudinal stereotypes. For a long time, the tightly secured border was deemed as a necessary construction, which allowed cross-border flows and influence to be managed and filtered. The resulting ‘us’ versus ‘them’ mentality etched in the minds of many has proven to be far more deeply rooted and harder to erase than the political border per se. In an attempt to trace the development of the portrayed image of Russia, this article analyzes the opinion columns featured in the main Finnish newspaper Helsingin Sanomat during 1990–2010. The analysis suggests that little effort has been made to improve the popular geopolitical image of Russia. While understanding the potential of having Russia as a neighbor, many Finns continue to actively reconfirm the elements in the neighbor, which should be let go in order move beyond stereotypes. This tendency is only reinforced by the load of the language used, which seems to inhibit people from critically evaluating the opinions and views that they hold.
Beyond East–West: Marginality and National Dignity in Finnish Identity Construction
Since the end of the Cold War it has become common for Finnish academics and politicians alike to frame debates about Finnish national identity in terms of locating Finland somewhere along a continuum between East and West. Indeed, for politicians, properly locating oneself (and therefore Finland) along this continuum has often been seen as central to the winning and losing of elections. For example, the 1994 referendum on EU membership was largely interpreted precisely as an opportunity to relocate Finland further to the West. Indeed, the tendency to depict Finnish history in terms of a series of “Westernizing” moves has been notable, but has also betrayed some of the politicized elements of this view. However, this framing of Finnish national identity discourse is not only sometimes politicized but arguably is also too simplified and results in blindness towards other identity narratives that have also been important through Finnish history, and that are also evident (but rarely recognized) today as well. In this article we aim to highlight one of these that we argue has played a key role in locating Finland in the world and in formulating notions of what Finland is about, what historical role and mission it has been understood as destined to play, and what futures for the nation have been conceptualized as possible and as providing a source of subjectivity and national dignity.
PLEASURE, POWER, AND THE PURSUIT OF COMMUNISM: SOVIET YOUTH AND STATE-SPONSORED POPULAR CULTURE DURING THE EARLY COLD WAR, 1945-1968
art, with certain students accused of “showing political immaturity, failing to understand the Party’s positions on art.” This episode constituted part of a broader crackdown on abstract art by the Khrushchev administration from late 1962, precipitated the the Soviet leader’s derision of such art forms in December 1962 at the Manege exhibit. Such instances demonstrate the limitations of the top-level promotion of youth grassroots initiative, as the Khrushchev leadership reigned in youth autonomy when it threatened to go beyond the boundaries of the permissible. The dates cited above have particular resonance, since both 1957-58 and 1962-63 represent two periods when those at the top of the Party hierarchy moved away from pursuing a more pluralistic, tolerant policy course, due to anxiety inspired by both sharpening Cold War hostilities and domestic developments. In these periods, official rhetoric censured what it labeled as 639 TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 13, d. 546, ll. 56-57. This is likely related to criticism of the Party associated with the fallout from the Secret Speech and the Hungary invasion. For more, see Polly Jones, “From the Secret Speech to the Burial of Stalin: Real and Ideal Responses to De-Stalinization,” in Jones ed., The Dilemmas, 41-63. 640 TsAOPIM, f. 6083, op. 1, d. 52, ll. 166-67. 641 Susan E. Reid, “In the Name of the People: The Manege Affair Revisited,” Kritika 6.4 (Fall 2005): 673716. 642 On these anxieties, see Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer, 156-88.