The Esteem Theory of Norms
When esteem is costless to supply, does it provide an effectivemeans of enforcing norms for public goods production? I examine thebasic mechanics of an enforcement-through-esteem model. Whileesteem may enforce norms to considerable degree, systematicunderenforcement remains the general result, even in very basicsettings with a minimum of transactions costs. I also examine whyesteem has positive value in equilibrium if it can be producedcostlessly (i.e., why esteem remains scarce), and what collectiveaction problems plague the supply of esteem.
Theory and Evidence on the Role of Social Norms in Voting
This paper investigates social norms and voting behavior. I argue that social norms create incentives for signaling, i.e., voting for the purpose of being seen at the voting act. Empirical evidence on signaling can be gained by looking at the introduction of optional postal voting in Switzerland. Even though the possibility of mail voting reduced voting costs substantially, it didn't increase turnout. Consistent with my model's predictions, voter turnout decreased more in the smaller communities, but in the meantime, the share of cooperators (= interested voters) was more positively affected there. Therefore, modern voting tools may decrease average turnout, but nevertheless, increase the quality of the voting outcome. Current models predict the opposite, but ignore the effect of different voting systems on the incentive for signaling.
The Butcher of Amritsar: General Reginald Dyer
Chapter 1: Simla Chapter 2: Cork Chapter 3: Ireland and Burma Chapter 4: The Black Mountain Chapter 5: The Relief of Chitral Chapter 6: Staff College Chapter 7: Instructor Chapter 8: The Zakka Khel Chapter 9: Hong Kong Chapter 10: The First World War Chapter 11: Seistan Chapter 12: The Sarhadd Chapter 13: Pyrrhic Victory Chapter 14: Abbottabad