Cyber Attacks as "Force" under UN Charter Article 2(4)
I a 2010 article in Foreign Affairs, Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn revealed that in 2008 the Department of Defense suffered “the most significant breach of U.S. military computers ever” when a flash drive inserted into a US military laptop surreptitiously introduced malicious software into US Central Command’s classified and unclassified computer systems.1 Lynn explains that the US government is developing defensive systems to protect military and civilian electronic infrastructure from intrusions and, potentially worse, disruptions and destruction, and it is developing its own cyber-strategy “to defend the United States in the digital age.”2 To what extent is existing international law, including the UN Charter, adequate to regulate cyber attacks and related offensive and defensive activities today and in the future? By “cyber attacks” I mean efforts to alter, disrupt, degrade or destroy computer systems or networks or the information or programs on them.3 This article examines one slice of that legal puzzle: the UN Charter’s prohibitions of the threat or use of “force” contained in Article 2(4).4 Other writings in this volume deal with questions such as Article 51’s self-defense provisions and questions of State responsibility, and there are other international legal prohibitions and regulations that are relevant as well. But Article 2(4) is a good place to start
Serangan Siber Sebagai Penggunaan Kekuatan Bersenjata dalam Perspektif Hukum Keamanan Nasional Indonesia (Cyber Attacks as the Use of Force in the Perspective of Indonesia National Security Law)
Cyber Attack is part of use of force. The scope of use of cyber force in this article is limited to use by state against another state. The increasing of cyber attack grow within the awareness of every country in the world including Indonesia in matters of strategy and regulated their National Security Law. Interpreted cyber attack as some forms of offensive attacks will be challenging. The reason why will be difficult to regulate is that the factual bases for there have to be casualties, physical destruction and attribution will be addressed. Furthermore Indonesia needs to develop new policy and regulated cyber attack in Indonesia National Security Law.
Police and Political Violence in the 1960s and 1970s: Germany and Italy in a Comparative Perspective
Notwithstanding the significant differences between the German and Italian police models (federal and civil vs. centralised and militarised), in both countries the confrontation with the protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s had a profound impact on police conceptions and public order strategies. Police forces in some German federal states (West Berlin) followed a hard line until the late 1960s, while in others (Munich, Hamburg) reforms to the Weimar-centred police intervention tactics took place beginning in the early to mid-1960s. In Italy, traditional police conceptions and strategies remained largely unchanged and re-emerged in 1968. Here, a movement from within the police led to the demilitarisation and unionisation of the state police in 1981. In both countries, fighting left-wing terrorism in the 1970s stimulated technical modernisation and enhanced the centralisation of the police. In critical response to police tactics, in the late 1970s Germany police matters were increasingly perceived as a concern not only of the state but of civil society—even if policing remained a highly contested terrain. In Italy, such matters largely remained state concerns in which only politicians and internal security specialists were entitled to intervene.