Which Rules for the Global Order? The Global Dimension of the Russian-EU Relationship – The Case of International Crises
Both the European Union and Russia have demonstrated aspirations to shape the international order on a global level. The EU has been the most prominent exponent and promoter of a solidarist vision of the International Society (IS), whereas the Russian Federation has belonged to the proponents of a pluralist international order. This article therefore analyses how both actors have attempted to reconcile their respective visions of the IS and what the consequences for the global order have been. It argues that rules and norms have formed the core of the IS and have directly influenced the international order. Three major international crises (Iranian, Middle Eastern and Kosovo) have been chosen as case studies. The selected crises have touch upon crucial rules and norms: the use of force, the scope of non-military coercion, the non-intervention principle, human rights and the inclusion-exclusion issue. The extent of cooperation between Russia and the EU in particular crises has varied. Both actors have been able to overcome some of their differences and reconcile their positions. However, it seems that the differences between Russia and the EU regarding the rules and norms of the IS have been too broad to allow for a common normative base of an emerging global order. Despite general agreement on common interests, the detailed content of norms and rules has remained the source of disputes and has slowed down (or has even made impossible) the practical application of a common approach. Therefore, Russian-EU relations in a global dimension should be expected to prolong the process of emergence of a post-unilateral international order, rather than provide a basis for it.
The ‘R’ in BRICs: is Russia an emerging power?
The concept of emerging powers presupposes several features shared by the states in question including regional preponderance, aspiration to a global role and the contesting of US unipolarity. This article assesses the role of Russia as an emerging power. It asks how Russians interpret the international system, what kind of system they would prefer, what they are trying to do in the current system and why, and how these considerations affect their relations with the US hegemony, other centres of power such as the EU, and other emerging powers. The author discusses the structural, liberal and regional interpretations of state behaviour and how they relate to the Russian model, arguing that Russia's policy is strongly affected by its domestic economic and political context. Russia is highly responsive to trends in the former Soviet Union and regions it perceives to be in its own space (e.g. EU and NATO Europe and north-east Asia). In the larger international system, Russia's approach is a mix of partnership or acquiescence on matters of vital interest to the hegemonic power, and more competitive behaviour on issues deemed central to Russian but peripheral to US interests. The article concludes that Russia is not an emerging power in the conventional sense. Its foreign policy is dominated by efforts to reverse the decline of the 1980s and 1990s. This entails fostering international conditions conducive to allowing reconsolidation without external hindrance. Its second major priority is regional: to restore Russian influence over the former Soviet states. In essence, Russian policy aims to limit further losses and promote conditions that will allow it to re-emerge as a great power.
Analysis: The Agenda 2007 Proposals: Evolution or Revolution?
On 10 February 2004 the Commission published its proposal for the financial perspective 2007-2013. A week later it adopted the third report on economic and social cohesion. These two documents form the basis of the so-called ‘Agenda 2007 reforms’. They will be the greatest challenge for the enlarged EU after the intergovernmental conference, since they will determine the financial basis for EU policy-making until the middle of the next decade. The Agenda 2007 proposals certainly hint at courageous reforms, because they place a previously unheard-of emphasis on performance and quality. Under the proposals, structural operations should generate value for money, and the funds should focus on projects which generate added value at a European level. Overall the Commission’s proposals point in the right direction, because they balance, on the one hand, solidarity for the new Member States and weak regions in the old Member States with, on the other hand, investments in future tasks. Moreover, they constitute a paradigm shift. For the first time, the Common Agricultural Policy will not be the dominant expenditure category. Now it is up to the Member States to examine the proposals politically and find a compromise between sometimes very divergent interests. It is to be hoped that, during the debate over expenditure limits and division of funds, national interests do not outweigh European interests.