The Ashgate Research Companion to International Criminal Law: Critical Perspectives
International criminal law is at a crucial point in its history and development, and the time is right for practitioners, academics and students to take stock of the lessons learnt from the past fifteen years, as the international community moves towards an increasingly uni-polar international criminal legal order, with the International Criminal Court (ICC) at the helm. 
 
This unique research companion takes a critical approach to a wide variety of theoretical, practical, legal and policy issues surrounding and underpinning the operation of international criminal law as applied by international criminal tribunals. The book is divided into four main parts. The first part analyses international crimes and modes of liability, with a view to identifying areas which have been inconsistently or misguidedly interpreted, overlooked to date or are likely to be increasingly significant in future. 
 
The second part examines international criminal processes and procedures, and here the authors discuss issues such as victim participation and the rights of the accused. The third part is a discussion of complementarity and sentencing, while the final part of the book looks at international criminal justice in context. The authors raise issues which are likely to provide the most significant challenges and most promising opportunities for the continuing development of this body of law. 
As international criminal law becomes more established as a distinct discipline, it becomes imperative for international criminal scholarship to provide a degree of critical analysis, both of individual legal issues and of the international criminal project as a whole. This book represents an important collective effort to introduce an element of legal realism or critical legal studies into the academic discourse.
‘On Behalf of Africa’: Towards the Regionalization of Universal Jurisdiction?
Several times, the African Union has voiced concerns regarding the alleged “abuse” of the principle of universal jurisdiction. The Union refers in particular to the prosecution of ‘African leaders’ before European courts which, in the view of the Union, could endanger international law, order and security. Against this background, the author examines the exercise of universal jurisdiction in Africa as well as in Europe over accused from Africa. While there is support for the assumption that so-called low-cost accused are exposed disproportionally to universal jurisdiction, there is no evidence of a geographical or racial bias. The author points to three current trends in the exercise of universal jurisdiction: the decline of universal jurisdiction in Europe, the ‘reversion’ of universal jurisdiction and the regionalization of universal jurisdiction. The latter trend is demonstrated in particular by the prosecution of Hissene Habre ‘on behalf of Africa’ before the Extraordinary African Chambers in Senegal. The author suggests that the regionalization of universal jurisdiction may represent a novel mode of extraterritorial jurisdiction, which has the potential to ease European-African tensions in the area of international criminal justice.
Aristocratic Century: The sinews of power: political
In his excellent book on the Secretaries of State, Mark Thomson offered ‘the paradox of continuing domination of the aristocracy and the simultaneous insignificance of the House of Lords, per se ’. It is true that, by the beginning of the eighteenth century, the supremacy of the House of Commons in financial matters was a wellestablished convention. The claims of the Commons to an undisputed control over money matters, which had been urged before the Civil War, were resumed immediately after the Restoration and a protracted dispute with the House of Lords began. In 1661 the Lords resolved that there were no precedents in history for this new claim by the House of Commons. In 1671, the Commons retorted that taxation ought not to be questioned by the Lords and in 1678 they reiterated that supply was ‘the undoubted and sole right of the Commons’ and ‘ought not to be changed or altered by the House of Lords’. The Lords' attempt in 1692 to assess their own taxes was also abandoned, though they retired under cover of a rather insubstantial smoke-screen that they maintained their power of amendment to be a ‘fundamental, inherent and undoubted right from which their lordships can never depart’. That established, they departed. Geoffrey Holmes quotes a nice example from 1702 when the bishop of Carlisle found himself the only peer answering to a money bill, ‘no other lord in the House regarded what was doing, this being only (pro forma) to preserve a seeming right to dissent from, or amend, any part of a money bill’.