The armed forces in Myanmar politics : a terminating role?
While Myanmar's constitution under which the current government of President Thein Sein was created in 2011 has all the characteristics expected of a modern republic, the continued autonomy and political role of the armed forces are perceived by opponents of the regime as an anomaly. Despite this apparent anomaly, the speed and thoroughness with which the transition from military authoritarian rule to most, if not all, of the features expected of a system of ""democratic"" rule has surprised most observers and analysts of the current Myanmar situation. The root of their surprise comes from their seeing the transformation as being driven by either endogenous or exogenous forces outside the historical experience and understandings of the leadership of the Myanmar armed forces. However, it is in the history of the armed forces and its role in protecting the state from threats to its internal security, territorial integrity, and external security that the basis of the transformation can be found. Also, ensuring the continued viability of the armed forces and the security of its leadership and integrity is also a continuous concern. The twenty years between the annulled 1990 general election won by the NLD, and the 2010 general election, boycotted by the NLD and won by the army-generated USDP, were spent by the armed forces creating the conditions which allowed the later transition from military to constitutional rule to take place.
Thinking about Transitional Justice in Myanmar
In recent decades, transitional justice has featured on the political agenda of many post-authoritarian states. In Myanmar, where a partial but palpable transition is currently taking place, accounting for a dark past and securing a democratic future are key demands of opposition groups. However, elite-led reforms implemented after a March 2011 switch to quasi-civilian rule pay little attention to justice. This article thus surveys the possibilities for transitional justice in Myanmar, highlighting six major options: criminal prosecutions, a truth commission, a lustration programme, a reparations programme, a memory project and symbolic measures. Procedurally, the paper argues for local leadership supported by external engagement designed to ensure that basic global standards are met. Substantively, it explores tensions within transitional justice and across the wider reform process when such an agenda is pursued. To close, it holds that, while transitional justice may take years to gain a secure foothold in Myanmar, robust foundations should be laid now.
The Internet and the Changing Beijing-Taipei Relations: Toward Unification or Fragmentation?
Information and its technologies facilitate the exercise of what has been called “soft power,” a concept that differentiates information from the conventional dimensions of “hard power,” which is mainly associated with military force and economic influence. Soft power, according to Nye, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense of the United States, means that “A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness. In this sense it is just as important to set the agenda in world politics and attract others as it is to force them to change through the threat or use of military or economic weapons.”1