Commentary: In Response to the Paper by Oran R. Young, How Can International Regimes Solve Environmental Problems? (see pp. 9–29)
The terrain, wonderfully covered by Oran Young, is a dichotomized world consisting of stories wishing to be theories. On the one side we find the economizers – disembedded consequentialists acting according to something called ‘collective action theory.’ On the other side we have the socially embedded citizens of the world intent on practicing what is good (or right). Young helps us to see that both ‘theories’ (and I use that term with great resistance) are ample enough to accommodate almost anything that might appear threatening. We have, in other words, accommodating metaphors whose adherents can pick and choose among confirming signals (assiduously watched for), and can fail to notice disconfirming signals with alacrity. Philosophers would mumble something about verificationist tendencies. As Shackle would put it, ‘what is seen is built upon what is thought (Shackle 1992, p. 66).’ To be fair here, economists have perfected the craft of seeing only what is thought so my comment should not be considered a criticism of political scientists and others who worry about international regimes.
Visa-Free Movement and Intercultural Communication: Expectations and Experiences of Kenyans in Ghana
University of Ghana http://ugspace.ug.edu.gh
Veblen on Scientific Creativity: The Influence of Charles S. Peirce
Thorstein Veblen's analysis of scientific method focuses on the nature of scientific creativity. His primary interest was how scientists create hypotheses. An essential task in organizing his analysis is to recognize its fundamental similarity to Charles S. Peirce's theory of inquiry. Once Veblen's conceptualization of scientific inquiry is organized according to Peirce's systematic views on science, Veblen's views are seen to be ordered around the question: How do scientists create? To show that Veblen succeeds in developing a theory of inquiry that focuses on the problem of creativity, it is necessary to show the parallels between his theory and Peirce's. Veblen was a student of Peirce's at Johns Hopkins, but there is little evidence of the latter's influence on him. Nonetheless, I will show that knowledge of Peirce's analysis of creative scientific inquiry advances the understanding of Veblen's philosophy of science; and Veblen's theory of inquiry offers economists a promising logic of inquiry, one that guides and spurs creative advance. After analyzing the parallels between Veblen's and Peirce's views of scientific creativity, I will explain in my conclusion how this novel understanding of Veblen clarifies the fundamental difference between institu