NSA Metadata Collection and the Fourth Amendment
The Snowden disclosures have sparked public controversy and provoked constitutional challenges in federal courts. This Note aims to contribute to that debate in two ways. First, it collects information scattered across numerous government documents — some of which Edward Snowden has disclosed, others of which the government has declassified — to tell the story of the NSA’s telephony metadata collection program since September 11, 2001. Second, it assesses the government’s argument that call record data lacks protection under the Fourth Amendment. In particular, this Note asks whether the NSA’s prolonged collection of telephony metadata is consistent with Fourth Amendment doctrine in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in United States v. Jones, in which the Court raised serious doubts about the constitutionality of unfettered metadata collection and analysis.
The data privacy / national security balancing paradigm as applied in the USA and Europe: Achieving an acceptable balance
...................................................................................................................... iii Summary ..................................................................................................................... ix Overall Introduction.................................................................................................... 1 Chapter One ................................................................................................................. 7 The Privacy/National Security Balance from a European Perspective .................. 7 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 7 Section I: The Council of Europe ............................................................................ 13 1.0 The Basis for the Data Privacy/National Security Balance .......................... 13 2.0 The Influence of the ECHR on National Legal Systems .............................. 14 3.0 The Jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the Data Privacy/National Security Balance ................................................................................................................. 27 4.0 Shortcomings in the Jurisprudence of the ECtHR The Application of the Margin of Appreciation ........................................................................................ 43 Section II: The European Union .............................................................................. 67 1.0 The European Union and Human Rights Protection in the Context of the data privacy/national security balance ......................................................................... 73 2.0 The Growing Involvement of the EU in Human Rights Protection, particularly in data protection and the circumstances influencing this. ............... 77 3.0 Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC and the Alteration of the Data Privacy/National Security Balance ....................................................................... 79 4.0 Features of Directive 2006/24/EC ................................................................ 81 5.0 Responses to Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC .................................... 82 6.0 Institutional Responses to Directive 2006/24/EC......................................... 94 7.0 Judgment of the CJEU (Grand Chamber) on the Validity of Directive 2006/24/EC......................................................................................................... 103 8.0 The Ruling of the CJEU ............................................................................. 105 9.0 Significance of the Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger Judgment and its Context ............................................................................................................... 109 10.0 Consequences of the Digital Rights Ireland Judgment for Data Privacy/National Security in Europe .................................................................. 114 11.0 Judgments of the CJEU in the Google Spain and Schrems Cases .............. 122 12.0 Developments following the Invalidation of the Safe Harbour Agreement 131 13.0 Impact of the CJEU decisions in the Digital Rights Ireland, Google Spain, and Schrems cases on the data privacy/national security balance ...................... 135 14.0 The Alternative Data Privacy/National Security Balance: Circumventing vi Data Privacy Protections in the EU: The Mass Surveillance of Personal Data by Spy Agencies in some EU Member States ..........................................................135 15.0 Two Parallel Systems of Surveillance .........................................................146 16.0 The Council of Europe Versus The European Union: Which Regime Provides Greater Protection For Data Privacy Rights? .......................................148 17.0 Contrasting the European and U.S. positions on the Balancing of Data Privacy Rights against National Security Interests .............................................153 18.0 Conclusion ...................................................................................................156 Chapter Two .............................................................................................................165 The Privacy/Security Balance in the U.S. pre-9/11 ................................................165 1.0 Introduction .................................................................................................165 2.0 U.S. Understandings of the Right to Privacy and Particularly Data Privacy .............................................................................................................................168 3.0 Major Interferences with data privacy for national security reasons pre-9/11 in the context of the data privacy/national security balance, with emphasis on the background and role of the NSA. ........................................................................179 4.0 Major Scandals Relating to Data Retention: Privacy Rights Illegally Infringed by the Executive and its Agencies .......................................................186 5.0 Church Committee Report and the Balance Between National Security and Personal Liberties Pre-9/11 .................................................................................191 6.0 Judicial Oversight of Surveillance in the name of National Security: Implications for the Data Privacy/National Security Balance. ............................194 7.0 FISA: Adjusting the Data Privacy/National Security Balance? Restricting the Interpretation of Personal Data in the Context of Intelligence Surveillance by the Executive Branch in the name of National Security ...........................................197 8.0 Balancing Rights which are Qualitatively Different: Philosophical Issues Underlying the Data Privacy/National Security Balancing Paradigm ................209 9.0 Two Data Privacy/National Security Balancing Systems Pre-9/11:The Influence of NSA Surveillance Activity. The Legal and the Actual Balances....220 10.0 Conclusion ...................................................................................................224 Chapter Three ...........................................................................................................229 The Privacy/Security Balance in the U.S. Post-9/11 ..............................................229 1.0 Introduction ...................................................................................................229 2.0 Background ...................................................................................................230 3.0 The Administration's Defence of Its Surveillance Policies and a Scholarly Response .............................................................................................................244 4.0 Ideological Context of the Patriot Act ...........................................................252 5.0 Provisions of the Patriot Act .........................................................................253
The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice System: Information Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemptions
When criminal justice scholars think of privacy, they think of the Fourth Amendment. But lately its domain has become far less absolute. The United States federal code currently contains over twenty separate statutes that restrict both acquisition and release of covered information. Largely enacted in the latter part of the twentieth century, these statutes address matters vital to modern existence. They control police access to drivers’ licenses, education records, health histories, telephone calls, e-mail messages, and even video rentals. They conform to no common template, but rather enlist a variety of procedural tools to serve as safeguards – ranging from warrants and court orders to subpoenas and demand letters. But across this remarkable diversity, there is one feature that all of the statutes share in common: each contains a provision exempting law enforcement from its general terms.Yet despite the appearance of law enforcement exemptions in every generally applicable privacy statute on the federal books, they have garnered virtually no scholarly attention. Privacy scholars have primarily busied themselves with mainstream consumer interests, and criminal justice scholars have chiefly focused on the Fourth Amendment. As a result, these exemptions have gone largely unnoticed and unexamined. At the same time, at least four Supreme Court justices recently suggested in United States v. Jones that the proper scope of privacy protection might be a topic better left to legislatures than courts.In response to these concerns, this article examines, comprehensively and in depth, the specific operation of privacy statutes with regard to law enforcement. In its most elemental form, this article answers the question: what does the federal statutory approach to regulating privacy from the police look like, and in what ways does that mimic, overlap with, or differ from the Fourth Amendment constitutional approach? In answering this question, this article also engages in the deeper democratic debate over constitutional versus statutory approaches to controlling the police, using the lessons garnered from examining existing privacy regulations to better inform the secondary argument about who does it best.