A Top Priority: Family Planning Assistance for Rural America
T HE American people have been concerned about rural poverty for some time. As a nation, we took our first significant actions to correct the rural poverty situation in the 1860's [11, p. 1352]. One hundred and ten years later we find the problems are still with us. Through the years our farm programs have not been successful in eliminating the causes of rural poverty. Rural America has had a high rate of human fertility when compared with the urban sector. In 1960 the rural farm fertility rate for all women ever married was 50 percent higher than for women in urbanized areas. In the younger age group, 20 to 24 years, rural farm women had 1.29 children for every one born to urban women [16, p. 359]. Recently there have been serious discussions suggesting that this high rate of fertility is contributing significantly to the continuing economic plight of rural people. It is the purpose of this paper to point out the need for continuing discussion, study, and, eventually, adoption of a national family planning assistance program for the rural poor. The time has come to recognize that high fertility in rural America only magnifies the traditional indicators of rural poverty such as low income, inadequate educational opportunity, and insufficient health care. It is time to recognize the evidence that rural parents do want smaller families.
Family Planning and Poverty
Research on fertility shows that in the United States many of the historic differentials are disappearing. Yet there remain paradoxes one of which is that a disproportionate number of nonwhite families still remain very significantly outside the area of effective fertility control. In terms of family size preferences the author reviews the literature with particular emphasis on the results of the Growth of American Families (GAF) studies that showed that American married women thought 2 to 4 children were an "ideal" size family and that nonwhites wanted a significantly smaller average number of children than whites (2.7-3 children vs 3.1-3.5 for whites). It remains a fact however that the actual fertility levels are higher than the stated ideals or desires. The GAF data shows that 1 out of 5 couples with children have excess fertility which means the last child was unwanted by either the wife or the husband. To understand this apparent discrepancy one has to consider the current state of contraceptives and their usage in the United States. The author suggests that the motivation problems should also be seriously considered.
Analogy, Supposition, and Transcendentality in Narrative Argument
Rodden writes, “How do stories persuade us? How do they ‘move’—and move us? The short answer: by analogies.” Rodden’s claim is a natural first view, also held by others. This chapter considers the extent to which this view is true and helpful in understanding how fictional narratives, taken as wholes, may be argumentative, comparing it to the two principal (though not necessarily exclusive) alternatives that have been proposed: understanding fictional narratives as exhibiting the structure of suppositional argument, or the structure of a kind of transcendental argument. Three key aspects of understanding a fictional narrative as an argument from analogy are identified. First, the argument will be relativistic or depend in an essential way upon the circumstances or intentions of the auditor or author. Second, in view of the first aspect, the argument will be loose and subjective, and accordingly less likely to yield knowledge. Third, the argument will not exhibit a distinctive structure applicable only to fictional narratives. I find that the third, and sometimes the first and second, of these same three aspects apply to understanding fictional narratives as suppositional arguments. I present considerations that point to a way of establishing that some extended fictions exhibit the structure of a kind of transcendental argument that is neither relativistic nor subjective, is knowledge-generating, and is uniquely applicable to fictional narratives. This supports literary cognitivism—the thesis that “literary fiction can be a source of knowledge in a way that depends crucially on its being fictional.”