Australia's Nuclear Horizon: Moving Beyond the Drumbeat of Risk Inflation
The 2006 Switkowski review report commissioned by the Howard government highlighted some of the economic and foreign policy benefits that could flow from a major expansion of Australia's uranium export program. It also identified the long-term advantages for Australia's energy security flowing from the development of a national nuclear industry. The report has been condemned by anti-nuclear groups, who argue that proposals for Australia's continuing and, possibly, deeper involvement in the nuclear fuel cycle are unacceptable. The primary risk identified is that Australian uranium exports will contribute to global nuclear proliferation pressures, but claims concerning nuclear-related terrorism are also an increasingly common theme in anti-nuclear commentary. These arguments, in turn, are framed within a broader set of assumptions about the ‘immoral’ nature of any engagement in the nuclear fuel cycle. This article examines the most prominent claims put forward by anti-nuclear proponents and argues that many of them are based on an unnecessary inflation of risk.
Australia's engagement in the nuclear fuel cycle: the non-proliferation dimension
Australia's position on nuclear energy issues cannot be fully appreciated without understanding its commitment to non-proliferation. For 30 years, Australia's uranium exports have been contingent on states accepting some of the most stringent safeguards in the world. Successive Australian governments have argued that Australia's involvement in the nuclear fuel cycle as a supplier of uranium helps bolster the coherence of the non-proliferation regime by encouraging other states to follow strict preconditions for export. Yet, since 9/11, Australia's formal alliance with the USA has placed limits on the degree to which it has been willing to pursue non-proliferation policies at odds with Washington's approach.
Police and Political Violence in the 1960s and 1970s: Germany and Italy in a Comparative Perspective
Notwithstanding the significant differences between the German and Italian police models (federal and civil vs. centralised and militarised), in both countries the confrontation with the protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s had a profound impact on police conceptions and public order strategies. Police forces in some German federal states (West Berlin) followed a hard line until the late 1960s, while in others (Munich, Hamburg) reforms to the Weimar-centred police intervention tactics took place beginning in the early to mid-1960s. In Italy, traditional police conceptions and strategies remained largely unchanged and re-emerged in 1968. Here, a movement from within the police led to the demilitarisation and unionisation of the state police in 1981. In both countries, fighting left-wing terrorism in the 1970s stimulated technical modernisation and enhanced the centralisation of the police. In critical response to police tactics, in the late 1970s Germany police matters were increasingly perceived as a concern not only of the state but of civil society—even if policing remained a highly contested terrain. In Italy, such matters largely remained state concerns in which only politicians and internal security specialists were entitled to intervene.