ESTRUCTURA DE PRESTACIÓN DE LOS SERVICIOS PÚBLICOS DOMICILIARIOS (SPD) DE ENERGÍA ELÉCTRICA EN BOGOTÁ Y LA COSTA ATLÁNTICA
The structure of the article is directed to evaluate the provision of the services public home of energy by the municipal public enterprises EPM of Bogota and the Atlantic coast from the address and the presence of Chilean and Spanish, capital through (Emgesa and Endesa) companies within the Countess and (Electricaribe and Electro costa) within the framework of Union Fenosa located respectively in the mentioned regions. Unlike the rest of the EPMs providers of public utilities in the country, having dabbled in companies of State regime which combines with the privately run public holding, in a present, in which is questioned the viability and sustainability of a business such as this, which requires large investments they share. The systemic analysis responds to the economic and legal elements to consider the matter, while the organizational composition of them is unknown.
El mito de las privatizaciones y la experiencia chilena
In order to examine the Chilean experience the author analyses the privatization process of companies and State Wealth in Latin America. In the case of the Chilean model the negative effects of the privatization exceeds its positive consequences and disputes the neo-liberal theory that is apparent in each one, a source of economic efficiency and welfare for all. In the context of a new technological and scientific revolution, the role of the new economic classification and the world system of power, the neo-liberal reforms are basically, a political project that signifies the radicalization of the economic dependency and of the political structure of the peripheral world to the major developed societies and to its transnational companies. This confirms the interpretation of Stiglitz, who was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics.
Government Concession Contracts in Chile: The Role of Competition in the Bidding Process
Over the last 12 years, Chile has been very successful in attracting private participation in the provision of public infrastructure. Private capital has gone into road infrastructure, ports, and airports all over the country in the form of concessions. The aim of the 1991 Concession Law and that of the specific contracts associated with each project has been to provide much‐needed infrastructure efficiently, without committing government resources better employed elsewhere. Using the contracts of four infrastructure projects involving the private sector in Chile, we show that, even though these projects and the concessions program are positively evaluated, design flaws in the auction setup directly or indirectly reduced competition in the bidding process, negatively affected performance, created incentives for ex post renegotiation, and precluded welfare maximization.