Using the Natives against the Natives: Indigenes as ‘Counterinsurgents’ in the British Atlantic, 1500–1800
Taylor and Francis FDEF_A_439465.sgm 10.1080/1 702430903392877 Defence Studies 470-2436 (pr nt)/1743-9698 (online) Original Article 2 1 & F ancis -2 0 0 00March-June 2010 Way eLee wle @unc.e u A key component of most modern counterinsurgency efforts (hereafter, COIN) is not merely to pacify or appease a local population, but to actively use the locals as part of the solution. 1 Large portions of the US military’s new COIN manual discuss the issues involved with developing what it calls ‘Host Nation’ forces. 2 In any circumstance this is a complex problem, but it is even more complex when the ‘host nation’ is an indigenous people (as opposed to, e.g., colonists) whose social structure and military system is markedly different from the occupier. This paper examines how English or British administrators dealt with this problem in the early modern era in the two contexts of 16th-century Gaelic Ireland and Native North America – not asking just about the use of indigenous peoples as allies, but more specifically as allies in a counterinsurgent role – as like against like. English colonists and later British administrators pushing outwards into the Atlantic basin between 1500 and 1800 never had sufficient people or money relative to the scope of their ambitions, and the ‘Military Revolution’ notwithstanding, European military systems provided only limited solutions. 3 Improvements in European military technology and technique brought tactical superiority in most open-field confrontations, with famous exceptions like Hugh O’Neill, 2nd Earl of Tyrone’s early victories in Ireland in the 1590s, the Jacobite Highlanders’ successes in 1745–46, and Major-General Edward Braddock’s defeat on the Monongahela River (Pennsylvania) in 1755. Battlefield superiority, however, did not convey rapid strategic conquest capability over land in either Ireland or North America. In navigable waters western European superiority was more marked at both tactical and strategic levels. In the long run improved gunpowder weapons and drilled infantry proved adaptable to most
Restraining Atrocity: The Conduct of King Philip's War
OVER the centuries, warfare among European colonists and Native Americans has earned a reputation for excessive brutality. King Philip's War, 1675-76, with its horrors committed on both sides, was ultimately the war to end all wars in New England's battle for supremacy. For many historians an earlier conflict, the Pequot War of 1637, exemplifies the ruthlessness and lack of respect for their opponents that the Puritans would again reveal in King Philip's War. Descriptions of the carnage resulting from the burning of the Pequot fort, such as this from William Bradford, have been taken as evidence:
Persius and the Programmatic Satire: A Study in Form and Imagery
Introduction 1. Style and expression in Persius' fifth satire 2. The programmatic satire and the method of Persius I 3. The nature and sources of Persius' imagery 4. Persius' first satire: analysis 5. Grandeur and humility: Juvenal and the high style Appendixes Text Translation Index of modern authors Index locorum potiorum Index of images, topics and words.