Unraveling the Japan-South Korea ““Virtual Alliance””: Populism and Historical Revisionism in the Face of Conflicting Regional Strategies
Domestic politics combined with strategic repositioning toward the U.S. set back ties between Japan and South Korea in 2004––05. Despite the North Korean nuclear crisis and the challenge of shifting great power relations in Asia, as well as closer economic and cultural bilateral ties, politicized forces are pulling the two countries apart.
South Korean Strategic Thought toward Russia
For South Koreans, it remains easier to criticize Japan than any other country. After all, it occupied Korea from 1910 to 1945 and has failed, even after normalization of relations in 1965, to show the remorse sought by the Korean nation. Indeed, satisfaction with the results of normalization with the Soviet Union/Russia and then with China have left many Koreans careful to avoid criticisms that might strain relations anew, but a different logic operates for Japan. Yet, after the cold war, as regional experts looked for ways to gain leverage in the region, successive Korean presidents recognized the disadvantage of one-sidedly pointing the finger at Japan. Repeatedly, efforts were made to put relations on a firmer footing and make strategic use of Japan, as had been done at times during the cold war by presidents whose dictatorial power could dismiss public opinion. We can see evidence of this in the maneuvering at the end of the cold war that led to nordpolitik, early attempts to set a new course on the basis of normalized relations with all regional powers that was interrupted by the first North Korean nuclear crisis, responses to the difficult environment of the Asian financial crisis, the hopeful mood of the Sunshine Policy, and the turbulent early days of the second North Korean nuclear crisis. With each new challenge, decisions had to be taken on the priority of Japan and whether to approach it more strategically.
Flawed regionalism: Reconceptualizing Northeast Asia in the 1990s
Abstract The goal of regionalism in Northeast Asia seemed within reach early in the 1990s, but plans clashed and territories failed in their objectives. This paper reviews the shared dreams in Russia, China, and Japan and identifies some of the problems that left plans in tatters by 1994. It summarizes the principal misjudgments during the start‐up phase both in the three national capitals and in three local areas. While local areas acted impulsively with unrealistic expectations, the national capitals hesitated without leading the way or let one‐sided national interests overwhelm regional planning. The preconditions to regionalism are still not in place. Efforts to find a new, realistic model point to the need to address the great power balance, localist‐nationalist contradictions, mutual understanding, and multilateralism, including a division of labor acceptable to all sides.