Collusive Practices Inside a Business Network: The Case of Information Exchange
Business networks are systems of business cooperation integrating several firms that have at the same time cooperation and competition relationships, what makes them a relevant phenomenon for Competition Law. This paper analyses whether some agreements between network members may infringe Art. 101.1 TFEU, taking as an example one of the most important features of business networks – the information exchanges inside them. To this aim, it delimits the different kinds information exchanges taking place in horizontal or vertical networks, identifies the most relevant cases for Competition Law, and proposes an adequate assessment methodology that takes into account the existence and features of the network. The paper therefore concludes that competition law rules cannot be automatically applied when the cooperating companies belong to a business network, and that an accurate competitive analysis in these cases has to consider also the existence, aims, interests, and organizational and functional needs of the network
The Gary Dinners and the Meaning of Concerted Action
Between 1907 and 1911, executives of American steel manufacturers gathered in a series of social events and meetings that became known as the Gary dinners. At the meetings, the participants announced the prices they intended to charge, but made no promises that they would adhere to those prices. The architect of the dinners, Judge Elbert H. Gary, chairman of the board of the United States Steel Corporation, saw them as a lawful way to stabilize steel prices by fostering information-sharing and an ethos of cooperation. The government agreed that the dinners stabilized prices, but took a different view of their legality: it brought suit in 1911, asking the court to dissolve U.S. Steel as an illegal monopoly. In 1915, the trial court held that the dinners amounted to price fixing, but that U.S. Steel's resort to them only proved that the firm could not control steel prices on its own and therefore could not have monopolized the industry. In 1920, the Supreme Court affirmed. Commentators have long questioned the holding that U.S. Steel lacked monopoly power. In this essay, however, I focus on the intermediate conclusion that the dinners involved concerted action. I describe the legal and historical circumstances in which the dinners occurred and what happened at them. I then examine how the courts analyzed the dinners and extract some lessons that might help modern courts clarify the boundaries of the Sherman Act's agreement requirement.
Application of resource allocation optimisation to provide profitable options for dairy production systems
A linear program (LP) model analysed resource use on a 100 ha dairy farm. A single optimum-profit combination was established for resources which were either optimised or constrained. It was found that, with a fixed herd of 320 milking cows, when production increased from 305 kg milksolids per cow (kg MS/cow) to 415 kg MS/cow, cash profit increased by 65%. This required additional supplements. If, however, feed demand and supply were optimised at 415 kg MS/cow, the LP reduced milking cow number rather than buy in feed to meet the increased feed demand from higher production per cow. At all production levels chosen between 305 and 415 kgMS/cow, it was most economic to dry off and cull cows early in dry summers to optimise feed demand vs. feed grown; use nitrogen (N) fertiliser to avoid a feed deficit only when response rates of better than 10 kgDM to 1 kg N could be expected; not use N for growing supplements to harvest. Pasture cover, within defined constraint levels, provided a buffer for feed demand and supply fluctuations. The study highlights the importance of assessing production, income and cost in an integrated framework to identify the point at which individual resources become limiting.