The US-Russia Relations after the 'Reset': Pragmatism or a New Confrontation?
The US-Russia relations are entering a new political season in a shape which is far from being perfect. The “reset” is over, and throughout the years 2011 and especially 2012 the relations have worsened again. Political leadership of both countries is irritated and disappointed with each other. Unlike the last four years, neither Russia nor the US will invest much political capital in their relations improvement, and their relative priority will decrease in both countries’ foreign policies. The share of contradictions in the relations surpasses that of positive cooperation again. Yet, the paper argues, a new worsening of the US-Russia relations or their new stagnation over the next years is in neither side’s interests. The US and Russia still do have an important positive agenda to work on, which is crucial for both sides’ vital national interests. It includes, above all, Afghanistan and the Asia Pacific. The major impediment of progress on both dimensions, the author claims, will be in the near- and middle term future a lack of political will on both sides to move the relations forward.
View from Russia
Abstract The Soviet leadership had no idea of the potential repercussions when it took its momentous decision to construct the Krasnoyarsk radar in violation of the Anti‐Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. In this article, the internal Soviet politics behind the Krasnoyarsk installation are discussed for the first time. The economic rationale operated in favor of construction at Krasnoyarsk. In addition, a radar deployed in the area would have provided more comprehensive coverage of the northeast direction. Taken together, all this created a strong temptation to circumvent the ban imposed by the ABM Treaty. The Soviets were forced to react when they saw that the Krasnoyarsk case provided the United States with the opportunity for a perfectly legal withdrawal from the treaty.
Missile Defence: Towards Practical Cooperation with Russia
The combination of impressive and gradually growing missile capabilities with a suspected nuclear-weapons programme makes Iran a serious concern for the Middle East and beyond. Increasingly, these worries appear to be shared by Russia. While the Russian military continues to state that acquisition by Tehran of a strategic capability is still distant, and thus continues to oppose American proposals to create defences against it, Russian participation in a defence system intended to protect Europe and other regions is once again high on the US–Russian and NATO–Russian agendas. Moscow has indicated that it might be prepared to accept and, under the right conditions, even join an ‘anti-Iranian’ common missile-defence system. But while there appear to be no impediments to Moscow agreeing to participate in a system that would protect Europe, or even the Middle East and the Gulf, involvement in a larger-scale system capable of intercepting strategic missiles is hardly possible. At least in the near term, it would be necessary to consciously limit the scope and capability of any joint system.