A methodology for cyber operations targeting and control of collateral damage in the context of lawful armed conflict
Throughout history, the law of warfare has evolved to protect non-combatants and limit collateral damage. The same legal and ethical constraints apply to the conduct of cyber warfare, where it is similarly desirable to limit the effects of offensive actions to specific locations and groups. However, conventional wisdom suggests that this is extremely difficult, if not impossible to accomplish in the cyber domain. In this paper, we argue to the contrary. It is possible to constrain the effects of cyber actions to specifically desired, legitimate targets while significantly limiting collateral damage and injury to non-combatants. To this end we present a generalized methodology for analysis of the targeting and effects of cyber operations with respect to principles of lawful conduct in armed conflict. This methodology includes a framework of effects categories, target attributes and control measures to direct and constrain cyber operations. It also includes a process for evaluating these effects and controls against the principles for lawful conduct in armed conflict. We illustrate the methodology in action by applying it to W32.Stuxnet, software widely considered to be a cyber weapon. Our results indicate that it is entirely possible to analyze complex cyber war problems, identify legally authorized courses of action, and focus effects on desired targets while greatly minimizing collateral damage.
Stuxnet and Strategy: A Special Operation in Cyberspace?
By L U K A S M I L E V S K I C yberpower has posed a challenge for strategists since its advent, and the questions have only grown more pressing with the revelation of the Stuxnet malware attacks on Iranian nuclear sites. Many interpretations currently abound in an attempt to provide a framework within which to think about Stuxnet and about cyberpower more generally. Stuxnet has been described as the digital equivalent of “fire and forget” missiles, and it has caused concerns that cyber war may achieve the same catastrophic results in the highly networked 21st century that superpower nuclear war would have had in the 20th.1 Neither comparison is particularly apt. Instead, the most constructive way of thinking about Stuxnet is to conceive of it as a special operation in cyberspace. The strengths and weaknesses of Stuxnet correspond to the strengths and
Extranasal type of nasal glioma
Summary A case of a rare congenital tumor; a nasal glioma of the extranasal type has been presented which seems sufficiently unusual to be worthy of reporting. The various theories as to the origin and nature of these lesions have been discussed in the paper by Hill6 and others, 1, 2, 5 but it is the belief of the authors that most or probably all of these lesions represent a congenital malformation.