An Analytical Framework for Further Research
If the Doha Round proceeds in the same way as its predecessor, informing the negotiating process with research results will not be easy. The Uruguay Round made erratic progress. A Draft Final Act had been produced by the end of 1991, but the agricultural proposals were rejected by the European Union (EU) (Croome 1995: 328). There followed two years in which most of the “action” took place in bilateral talks between the EU and the United States (USA) from which other states were largely excluded. Even when the formal negotiations were re-launched in July 1993, there were at least three tracks: the discussion in the formal General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) groups; the personal “facilitating” of the new GATT Director General, Peter Sutherland, who ‘kept up a punishing series of whirlwind visits to top-level political leaders in the major countries’ (Croome 1995: 349), and bilateral negotiations between the EU and USA, with their respective chief negotiators, Sir Leon Brittan and Mickey Kantor, having from November ‘a crucial series of meetings ... that were to continue with only short breaks over a period of more than three weeks’ (Croome 1995: 364).
THE PROGRESSIVE TARIFF REDUCTION SCHEME
As economists have known since Adam Smith, free trade should benefit all nations by allowing them to take advantage of gains from specialization.1 Indeed, the benefits of trade are supposed to justify unilateral liberalization: as the late British economist Joan Robinson once remarked, if your trading partner throws rocks into his harbor, that is no reason to throw rocks into your own. While unilateral liberalization has occurred in many countries to varying degrees, it has obviously not led to global free trade. Rich countries apply an average tariff of 5.2%, and poor countries apply an average tariff of 14%.2 Some countries choose to protect important industries as an integral part of their development strategy.3 For other countries, even if liberalization were to make the country better off as a whole – in the sense that there are more winners than losers in the long run and the winners could, in principle, compensate the losers – it may still be politically unfeasible, if those losers have political power and cannot be effectively compensated. (Part of the problem is making a credible commitment to compensate in the future.) The persistence of protection suggests that, in most countries, political leaders continue to find that the balance of economic and political-economy considerations falls in favor of protection.
Immune dysfunction following infection with chicken anemia agent and infectious bursal disease virus. II. Alterations of in vitro lymphoproliferation and in vivo immune responses.
To determine the functional impact of alterations in lymphocyte concentrations and ratios following infection with chicken anemia agent (CAA) alone or in combination with infectious bursal disease virus (IBDV) on the immune system of young chickens, in vitro lymphoproliferation assays and in vivo responses to vaccination with several common viral agents were assessed at various time intervals post-inoculation (PI). Concanavalin A (Con A), phytohemagglutinin (PHA) and pokeweed mitogen (PWM) stimulation of splenic lymphocytes (SPL) collected from control birds could not be detected until 10-14 days PI. Infection with CAA was characterized by significantly higher PWM stimulation of SPL at 17 days PI and significantly lower PWM stimulation of peripheral blood lymphocytes (PBL) at 14 days PI, compared with uninfected controls. Concanavalin A and PWM stimulation of SPL was significantly increased in birds inoculated with IBDV alone. Lymphocytes harvested from birds inoculated simultaneously with CAA and IBDV had significantly lower responses. Effects on humoral and cell-mediated immunity following CAA and/or IBDV were determined by evaluating vaccination responses to Newcastle disease virus (NDV), fowl pox virus (FPV) and infectious laryngotracheitis virus (ILTV) during the acute phase of CAA infection (2 weeks PI). Vaccination of birds 2 weeks following CAA infection at 1 day of age resulted in decreased protection against NDV (85.7%) and ILTV (7.1%) challenge compared with protection rates in control birds (100% and 53.3% respectively). Infectious bursal disease virus infection was associated with decreased protection against NDV (60%) only. Concomitant infection at 1 day of age resulted in a greater reduction in NDV challenge protection (33.3%), slightly decreased FPV protection (87.5%), increased numbers of persistent FPV vaccination lesions and increased protection against ILTV challenge (71.4%). Vaccination of birds 2 weeks following CAA infection at 2 weeks of age resulted in slightly decreased NDV humoral antibody, development of persistent FPV vaccination lesions (17%) and increased immunity to ILTV challenge compared with control birds (83.3% vs. 66.7%). Chickens inoculated with IBDV alone displayed a more severe depression in NDV antibody titers and only a slight decrease in ILTV protection. Vaccination following concomitant infection at 2 weeks of age resulted in a higher percentage of FPV persistent vaccination lesions (39%) and greatly enhanced immunity to ILTV challenge (100%).