Autonomy of Common European Sales Law in Lithuania
Sį dokumentą lietuvių kalba galima rasti adresu: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2243074 Private law is the area of law in which the resistance to unification in Europe is probably the strongest. Private law codification initiative, which began in 1989, after more than twenty years was recently reduced to optional non binding common sales law draft, which is gradually making its way through the EU institutions’ legislative process. Choice of EU regulation as a form indicates that the willingness to reach objective results is strong enough, but the reasoning in support of this project faces equally strong argument against it. Lithuanian experience expands this discussion in several important respects. Rome I Regulation Article 6.2. deadlock solution is specifically beneficial for smaller countries, where market participants have less bargaining power. In addition, an optional supplementary regulatory framework that the parties could choose, would allow testing existing legal systems by competition. Lithuania's recent reform experience suggests that the draft regulation provides for a smooth change in Europe. Multilingualism, some of the Common European Sales Law solutions, radically different from the Lithuanian national legal provisions will certainly require revision of the existing concepts, but that is not a reason not to try to improve the EU's common private law.
Codification: The Civilian Experience Reconsidered on the Eve of a Common European Sales Law
This essay, after determining the characteristics constituting a codification, sets out the historical conditions for the creation of national codifications in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. It then deals with a number of myths and misconceptions associated with codifications. The Proposal for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law has now firmly placed the issue of codification on the European legal agenda. The essay therefore attempts to assess its chances of success against the background of the historical experiences; thus, it considers the arguments that have, in the past, been advanced in favour of codifications of private law and also looks at other factors that have contributed to their success. All in all, the auspices for a European Code of Contract Law, let alone a Civil Code, are far from ideal.This publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively.
Deliberative Democracy and the Resource Curse: A Nationwide Experiment in Tanzania
Oil and gas discoveries in developing countries are often associated with short-sighted economic policies and, in response, calls to insulate resource management from populist impulses. We report on a randomized experiment testing methods to overcome this apparent tension between sound resource governance and democratic politics. Soon after Tanzania’s discovery of major natural gas reserves, we invited a nationally representative sample of voters to an intensive public deliberation of policy options featuring nationally recognized experts and small-group discussions. Democratic deliberation reinforced the public’s strong preference for rapid spending of gas revenues, but also increased support for various prudential and economically orthodox measures, including independent oversight of gas revenues, limits on government borrowing, and selling gas abroad rather than subsidizing fuel at home. These effects were driven by deliberation per se, rather than a pure information treatment, and show no evidence of contamination by facilitatoror peer-effects in group deliberations. www.cgdev.org Justin Sandefur, Nancy Birdsall, James Fishkin, and Mujobu Moyo