“Just in Case”: Extended Nuclear Deterrence in the Defense of Australia
This paper examines the foundations and rationale for Australian reliance on US assurances of extended nuclear deterrence. The Australian model of extended nuclear deterrence is marked by its lack of public presence, a lack of certainty about its standing and character in US eyes, its lack of a direct nuclear threat, and its resurgence at a time when nuclear abolition possibilities are being embraced by the leader of the deterrence provider. Australian policy amounts to a claim that the nuclear guarantee is necessary “just in case”– though without any plausible specifics. The fundamental questions remain – for Australia as for other recipients of extended nuclear deterrence assurances – what threats, what probabilities, what alternatives?
The Credibility of America's Extended Nuclear Deterrent - The Case of the Republic of Turkey
Abstract : In 2009 the United States completed an 80 percent reduction of its operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons from Cold War highs. Since 1991 the United States has also reduced its nonstrategic nuclear weapons by over 90 percent. Additionally, the United States removed much of its nuclear arsenal from alert status and continues to decrease its nuclear weapons stockpiles. However, nuclear weapons may still play an important role in deterring an adversary attack against the United States as well as providing a nuclear umbrella to allies. An extended nuclear deterrent for protecting allies may also contribute significantly to nonproliferation efforts- the nuclear umbrella provides allies an assurance so they do not perceive the need to develop nuclear weapons arsenals for themselves. This study explores the impact of US nuclear weapon policy on the current and future effectiveness of extended nuclear deterrence for the Republic of Turkey. It concludes that the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence for Turkey depends on many factors and not just the quality and quantity of the US nuclear arsenal.
Nuclear Proliferation: A Historical Overview
Abstract : A great deal of analysis has focused on the intentions of nuclear proliferators. Instead, this analysis focuses on capabilities. Our purpose is to understand how individual countries have developed their technical potential to produce nuclear weapons. The analysis reported here surveys the experience of 52 countries over 57 years as they have taken steps to develop nuclear related technical capabilities. For each country, key decision points in the development of those capabilities have been gathered, catalogued, and referenced. Those decisions relate to three key attributes: access to fissile material, weapons design and engineering, and treaty status. Each attribute has a spectrum of capability associated with it. The actual technical potential of a country to produce nuclear weapons is a function of its place on these spectrums. As further explained in the body of the report, we distinguish four basic levels of weapons potential: nil, modest, high, and for serial production.