Nauru in the Arc of Instability: Too Many Degrees of Freedom?
ously in any credible “arc of instability”, even one whose span includes the remotest region on earth. Yet, for its own special reasons, Nauru deserves some mention in the arc of instability if only to demonstrate its idiosyncratic contribution to this image of a putative zone of unstable states to Australia’s north threatening the Commonwealth’s security. There are, perhaps, a variety of explanations for Nauru’s inclusion in this arc of instability. A principal one is a propensity in the popular media to conflate such terms as “failed state” and “rogue state” thus including Nauru with a wide range of states that have abused their sovereign obligations. A less visible factor is the human tendency to try to find symmetry at the expense of consistency when explaining diverse events under a single rubric. Thus, to use a phrase like “arc of instability” encourages the search for examples to make such an arc complete or continuous. Another rationale may be an expectation of what Nauru is to become as the island’s one significant natural resource – phosphate – runs out. At least until very recently, Nauru has probably been more “roguish” than “failed” but it would seem that Australia has not found Nauru’s willingness to sell its sovereignty necessarily all that threatening; at least when it agrees to process would-be refugees targeting Australia. This chapter presents an overview of Nauru’s inclusion in the arc of instability against a perspective of responsible state behavior. The logic of this approach is grounded largely in the ambiguity surrounding the linkages that make the arc of instability a coherent and useful concept. If there is one constancy that unites countries as disparate as Indonesia, the Solomons and Nauru in a concept such as the arc of instability, it lies in their inability or unwillingness to manage fully the demands of sovereignty. Whether the grounds for this failure to meet expectations of responsible state behavior stems from a lack of will or a lack of means may not be material for those adversely affected although it will affect the response. In the case of Nauru, the question of state responsibility goes back more than just to the origins of the minuscule republic since the same can be said of all the other states in this arc. It also goes to the special, almost unique, circumstances that appeared to give Nauru every advantage to be an effective state despite its small size (Figure 11.1). Linking Nauru’s own special circumstances in managing state responsibility with Australia’s perception of an arc of instability is the island’s long ties to Australia. The primary association was Nauru’s quasi-colonial subordination to Australia under the mandate/trusteeship systems. This United Nations’ moderated relationship enabled Nauru to hasten the pace of national self-determination at a time that was especially congenial in terms of international expectations of smaller polities. The minimal 11. NAURU IN THE ARC OF INSTABILITY: TOO MANY DEGREES OF FREEDOM? RICHARD HERR AND DONALD POTTER
When is blacklisting effective? Stigma, sanctions and legitimacy: the reputational and financial costs of being blacklisted
ABSTRACT Blacklisting is a policy tool that is used extensively in the international political economy, and blacklists have been invoked following the Panama Papers scandal, Russia's annexation of Crimea and the Democratic Republic of North Korea's proliferation activities. To analyse the principal mechanisms at work in what is an understudied tool of global governance, this paper compares the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s and the Financial Action Task Force's blacklisting of secrecy havens in the years 2000–2009. We show that blacklisting can be used to impose both reputational and financial costs on a state and highlight three factors that contribute to a blacklist's effectiveness: the stigma attached to the act that led to the blacklisting, the nature of any sanctions that it imposes and the blacklist's legitimacy. The blacklisting of Liechtenstein and Nauru highlight the interplay between these factors, but they also raise questions about the legitimacy of blacklisting itself.
Variations of sulphur dioxide at the cloud top of Venus’s dynamic atmosphere
A pulse of sulphur dioxide in Venus’s upper atmosphere was observed by the Pioneer Venus spacecraft in the 1970s and 1980s and attributed to volcanism. Recent sulphur dioxide measurements from Venus Express indicate decadal-scale fluctuations in sulphur dioxide above Venus’s cloud tops in an atmosphere that is more dynamic than expected. Sulphur dioxide is a million times more abundant in the atmosphere of Venus than that of Earth, possibly as a result of volcanism on Venus within the past billion years1,2. A tenfold decrease in sulphur dioxide column density above Venus’s clouds measured by the Pioneer Venus spacecraft during the 1970s and 1980s has been interpreted as decline following an episode of volcanogenic upwelling from the lower atmosphere3,4. Here we report that the sulphur dioxide column density above Venus’s clouds decreased by an order of magnitude between 2007 and 2012 using ultraviolet spectrometer data from the SPICAV instrument onboard the Venus Express spacecraft. This decline is similar to observations during the 1980s. We also report strong latitudinal and temporal variability in sulphur dioxide column density that is consistent with supply fluctuations from the lower atmosphere. We suggest that episodic sulphur dioxide injections to the cloud tops may be caused either by periods of increased buoyancy of volcanic plumes, or, in the absence of active volcanism, by long-period oscillations of the general atmospheric circulation. The 30-year observational record from Pioneer Venus and Venus Express confirms that episodic injections of sulphur dioxide above the clouds recur on decadal timescales, suggesting a more variable atmosphere than expected.