Effectiveness of the Special Economic Zone policy over the Export Processing Zone structure in India: trade performance at the aggregate level
Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of recent India's Special Economic Zone (SEZ) policy over Export Processing Zone structure is analysed in this article by aggregating data of seven conventional SEZs from 1986–1987 to 2007–2008. The study reveals that introduction of SEZs in place of its predecessor, the Export Processing Zone, is having a significant and positive impact on its trade performance at the aggregate level. However, in terms of contribution to national trade, the Indian SEZs are lagging way behind the expectations of policymakers. Furthermore, the SEZ policy does not seem to be successful in diversifying the exports basket, which in turn has affected the direction of exports by the SEZs. Moreover, these zones were found to be highly susceptible to external shocks. Thus, we strongly argue in favour of a care in deciding the sectoral choice of SEZs and careful scrutiny of its approval across major Indian states.
Trade Performance of SEZs in India
The performance of seven conventional Indian special economic zones (SEZs) at the disaggregate level is analysed within the framework of the zone-trade performance index, for the period between 1986–87 and 2007–08. The analysis reveals variations in performance across zones as well as within the zones over the reference period. The variations in performance are found to be statistically significant as well. The zones specifically located in economically developed states performed better than the zones in other states. This reveals the pressing problem of regional disparities finding reflection in the SEZs structure and calls for policy intervention. Further, zones are found to be equally sensitive to external economic fluctuations. On the positive side, the introduction of the SEZs policy in 2000–01 has had a favourable impact on the performance of these enclaves.
Strategy and Manipulation in Medieval Elections
There are many goals in developing electoral protocols, including a desire for a system which is transparent, in that it is clear what the rule or procedure to follow is; nonmanipulable, in that it is not in a person’s best interest to misrepresent their preferences; honest, in the sense that it elects the ‘right’ candidate; and not open to strategizing, i.e., bribery or collusion. However, these desiderata are in tension with each other: Often, transparent electoral procedures are the least strategy resistant, and many honest procedures encourage manipulation. Thus a balance between these different goals must be sought. In modern times, since the seminal result on vote manipulation, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem [5, 6], much attention has been devoted to developing voting rules where manipulation is never in the best interest of the voters [4] or which are computationally too complex for the average bounded agent to be able to manipulate [1]. This focus on computational aspects of electoral methods is one of the hallmarks of modern studies on voting. But pursuit of these goals is not restricted to modern times: Those participating in elections in the Middle Ages also sought transparency, non-manipulability, honesty, and strategyproofness in so far as these properties can be consistently expressed in a single procedure. However, given the lack of computational sophistication in the Middle Ages, alternate approaches were needed in order to promote honesty, discourage strategizing, etc. These approaches can be classified as either external (constraints introduced outside of the electoral procedure, such as incentives for coming to consensus quickly) or internal (constraints introduced within the electoral procedure, such as voting rules which cannot be manipulated without adverse effects, or which are too difficult for the average bounded agent to manipulate). Surveying examples of both approaches in the context of medieval ecclesiastical and secular elections provides an interesting comparison to modern electoral procedures. Elections in the Middle Ages were used for the same reasons that they are today: To select suitable candidate(s) for a particular office, duty, or obligation. However, it is important to note that the term electio was used in the Middle Ages in a broader sense than our modern ‘election’. Its primary sense was ‘selection’ or ‘choice’, and only secondarily ‘election’ in the modern sense. Thus, many records which purportedly discuss elections are not discussing elections of the type which interests us. We can identify four categories of medieval electoral processes: (1) Election by an external authority having no direct interest in the election; (2) Indirect election, where electors name other electors who then select or elect the officials; (3) Election by lot; and (4) Election by ballot. Elections of the first and third types are generally computationally uninteresting; the first type corresponds to dictatorial voting rules, and the third type collapses to probability theory. In general, interesting voting methods are found only in the fourth type, election by ballot, though they can also occur in indirect election.