On the Optimal Timing of Foreign Aid
We offer a dynamic formulation of the aid process, in which questions of timing are central. It is shown that in most cases it is optimal to give the aid partly in a lump, at the outset, and partly as a flow, over time. However, if the donor and recipient cooperate, stock and flow aid may be of opposite sign. It is shown also that when marginal utility is of constant elasticity, the rate of flow of aid increases (decreases) if and only if the initial world stock of capital is less than (greater than) its steady-state value.
The political economy of the international debt crisis
The international debt crisis has for the most part been viewed in the literature as a macroeconomic phenomenon.1 The “crisis” has however involved interplay among private banks, debtor country governments, creditor country governments, international institutions, and interest groups in the countries concerned. This paper models the “crisis” from a perspective that takes account of individual behavioral incentives2 and shows how debt negotiations (with diverse features such as conditionality provisions,3 swap programs with side payments in kind,4 etc.), the involvement of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the active role played by the U.S. Treasury, can be given coherent microfoundations based on self-interest.
Money Laundering Control in the Caribbean
Money Laundering-Methods, Risks, and Consequences Offshore Financial Havens and Money Laundering The Evolution of Money Laundering Control - A Historical Examination of Regional and International Initiatives Making Crime a Non-Profit Activity - Confiscation and Forfeiture Criminal Liability for Money Laundering The Civil Law Dimension The Prevention and Detection of Money Laundering International Co-operation The Long Arm of American Anti-Money Laundering Laws The Impact of "Name-Calling" on the Future of Caribbean Money Laundering Control.