The Arabism Debate and the Arab Uprisings
This article explores how the Arab Uprisings have affected academic debates over the importance of Arab identity in regional and domestic politics. Does the spreading of protest from one Arab state to another in 2011 indicate Arabism's continued salience, or does the subsequent rise of regional sectarianism represent its death-knell? Are older debates between ‘New Arabists’ and ‘post-Arabists’ still relevant or is a new framework needed that better reflects the post-2011 Arab world?
The Shia Revival
THE MOST SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT in the Middle East today is the rise of sectarian conflict. This is a process that has begun in Iraq, but it will not end there. In Iraq it has become the single most important determinant of that country's future. However, it has already spread beyond Iraq, threatening stability in Lebanon as it shapes regional alignments and the regional balance of power. The rise of sectarianism is an outcome of the Shia revival that followed the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. The war broke down the Sunni minority regime that had ruled that country for decades and empowered Shias, producing the first Arab Shia government in history and setting in motion a region-wide Shia revival. What began in Iraq quickly translated into a regional political dynamic as Shias everywhere looked to Iraq with hope for positive changes in their own countries. In the wake of regime change in Iraq, the Shia have made their mark on regional politics. From Lebanon to the Persian Gulf, through peaceful elections and bloody conflicts, the Shia are making their presence felt. Shia politics were initially supportive of developments in Iraq. Senior Iraqi Shia leaders endorsed the political system the United States introduced to Iraq. Iraqi elections also received support from Iranian and Lebanese Shia religious leaders. Following the elections, Shias joined the American-backed government in Baghdad, and Shias joined the new Iraqi security forces in droves. Post-Saddam Iraq presented an opportunity for creating stable relations between the United States and Iraqi Shias and, by extension, with the Shia populations across the region. Shiism split off from Sunnism in the seventh century over a disagreement about who the Prophet Muhammad's legitimate successors were. Over time, the two sects developed their own distinct conception of Islamic teachings and practices much as Catholicism and Protestantism have in Christianity since the medieval period. Shias are a minority of 10-15 percent of the world's 1.3 billion Muslims. The overwhelming majority of Shias live in the arc from Lebanon to Pakistan--some 140 million people in all. They account for about 90 percent of Iranians, 65 percent of Iraqis, 40-45 percent of Lebanese, and a sizable portion of the people living in the Persian Gulf region (and around the region in East Africa, India, and Tajikistan). There are small Shia communities in southern and western Africa, South and North America, and Europe--mostly migrants. Iran is today the largest Shia country followed by Pakistan. Most Shias live from Iran to the east, where Arab Shias constitute only a minority of the faith. However, importantly, in the strategic arc stretching from Pakistan to Lebanon, there are as many Shias as there are Sunnis, and in the Persian Gulf region Shias clearly predominate. However, despite this demographic weight, Shias have been by and large an invisible political force, excluded from power whether in the majority or minority. In the Middle East, the Sunnis had come to believe in their manifest destiny to rule. Iraq made Shia empowerment possible and, by the same token, challenged the Sunni conception of the sectarian balance of power in the region. The fury of the Sunni insurgency in Iraq, the cool reception for Iraq's new government in the Arab world, and the vehement anti-Shiism on display in the Arab Street all reflect anger at the rise of the Shia. Whereas Sunnis reacted angrily to regime change in Iraq, Shias were far more willing to give the United States the benefit of the doubt. In Iraq, following the lead of their most senior spiritual leader, the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Shias refrained from either resisting U.S. occupation or responding to the Sunni insurgency's provocations. Armed with religious decrees, Shias then joined the revamped security services and wholeheartedly participated in elections. Even conservative ayatollahs in Iran supported the elections, and Iran itself was the first of Iraq's neighbors to recognize the new Iraqi government and extend support to it. …
Warm Hands in Cold Age – On the Need of a New World Order of Care
The world is aging as fertility and mortality are both decreasing. This article focuses on practical care work for the elderly. Such work is done primarily by women even though a larger portion than previously is paid rather than unpaid. All over the world, most elderly care work is organized within the family, most often unpaid. Men receive more care from partners than women, while women receive more care from female relatives. When care work is paid, the payment is generally low. A comparison between Germany, Spain, and Sweden demonstrates similar gender patterns, even though the role of the state in supporting care differs considerably as do care workers' conditions. The sustainability of today's distribution and organization of care work is questioned as the need for care increases, and the possibility of more equal sharing of care work between women and men is explored.