Deflation and the Fisher equation
So, according to Irving Fisher, one reason to worry about deflation is that the federal funds rate is expected to be held near zero as the economy grows out of this recession.
Unlikely Estimates of the Ex Ante Real Interest Rate: Another Dismal Performance from the Dismal Science1
The ex ante real rate of interest is one of the most important concepts in economics and finance. Because the universally-used Fisher theory of interest requires positive ex ante real interest rates, empirical estimates of the ex ante real interest rate derived from the Fisher theory of interest should also be positive. Unfortunately, virtually all estimates of the ex ante real interest rate published in economic journals and textbooks or used in macroeconomic models and policy discussions for the past 35 years contain negative values for extended time periods and, thus, are theoretically flawed. Moreover, the procedures generally used to estimate ex ante real interest rates were shown to produce biased estimates of the ex ante real rate over 30 years ago. In this article, we document this puzzling chasm between the Fisherian theory that mandates positive ex ante real interest rates and the practice of macroeconomists who generate and use ex ante real interest rate estimates that violate this theory. We explore the reasons that this problem exists and assess some alternative approaches for estimating the ex ante real interest rate to determine whether they might resolve this problem.
Are Commodity Prices More Volatile Now? A Long-Run Perspective
Soaring commodity prices in 2007 and 2008 raised concerns that volatility was also rising, which would have implications for welfare and therefore for the design of public policy interventions. The literature focuses on trends in commodity prices rather than their volatility characteristics. This paper contributes by examining commodity price volatility with a newly compiled monthly panel dataset on 45 individual commodity prices from the end of the 18th century until today. The main conclusions are: the timing and number of breaks in volatility vary considerably across individual commodities, cautioning against generalizations based on the use of commodity price indices; the three most significant breaks common to most commodities are the two world wars and the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system; and structural breaks marking increased price volatility are followed by breaks marking declines in volatility so that there is no upward or downward trend in volatility over time.