The Rights To Punish and Resist Punishment in Hobbes's Leviathan
Received: October 31, 1989 First Revision Received: July 9, 1990 Second Revision Received: August 9, 1990 Accepted for Publication: August 21, 1990 NOTE: I thank Stanley Anderson and Naomi Rosenberg for very helpful readings of an early version. Peter Digeser read more than one draft, his keen judgment repeatedly saving me from myself. Dean Mann and John Moore, as well as anonymous referees at the Western Political Quarterly, made incisive critiques of the penultimate draft. I alone, of course, am responsible for the flaws that remain. This work has been supported by a grant from the Research Committee of the Academic Senate at the University of California, Santa Barbara. I am grateful to Robert Faulkner, John Rogers, Brad Wilson, and Michael Zuckert for creating occasions on which to present versions of this paper. Questions about Hobbes's declaration of a preservationist right to resist unexceptionable punishment, administered by an unexceptionable government, must of course be distinguished from what Francisco Suarez called "the well-worn question of whether or not it is permissible for a private individual or his subjects to kill a tyrannical king" (1944b: 705-III.iv.1). To be sure, some will consider resistance to either kind of government, for any reason, primafacie contempt for Romans 13:2 ("Whatsoever ... resisteth the [higher powers], resisteth the ordinance of God"). Hobbes does not mention Romans 13:1-7 in the vicinity of his declarations of the right to resist (cf. Lev, 42, 100, 308 [589]). 2 Where it is said that "the essence [of a body politic] . . . is the not-resistance of the members" (II, i, 18); see also Elements (El), II, i, 7. On a relevant difference between De Cive (DC) and the Elements, see note 52, below. Tuck (1979: 119-30) traces the emergence of the right to resist in Hobbes's texts.
The Creation and Maintenance of Government: A Neglected Dimension of Hobbes's Leviathan
Philosophical preoccupation with moral, legal, and hypothetical problems have led us to neglect those practical (or strategic) dimensions of Leviathan in which Hobbes confronts the problems of how order can actually be politically created from disorder and how, once begun, the germ of order can be perpetuated in stable political society. The possibilities of political creation reside in the idea of confederation and, importantly, in men's fundamental manipulability. The consequent maintenance of political order depends, for Hobbes, on creating conditions in which, without excessive or unnecessary resort to force, men can be made to forebear conflict among themselves and resistance to government. Those conditions, as in the case of political creation, depend upon appearances, illusion, and political manipulation.
Italian Influence on the Development of Calvinist Scholasticism
THIS ARTICLE TRIES to show that the rise of Calvinist scholasticism, which was the most important development in Calvinist theology during the second half of the sixteenth century, stemmed largely from several converging Italian influences, particularly from the writings of Peter Martyr Vermigli and Jerome Zanchi. Here Calvinist theology refers not only to the personal thought of John Calvin but also to the teachings of the founders of the Reformed or Calvinist tradition as it spread out from Geneva and Switzerland to France, Germany, England, Scotland, Poland, and the Low Countries. In this context Calvin emerges as the brightest star in a galaxy of Reformed theologians which includes Heinrich Bullinger, Pierre Viret, Theodore Beza and Wolfgang Musculus as well as Martyr, Zanchi and others. These theologians were often more influential than Calvin himself at a given place or time or on a given point of doctrine. Bullinger, Martyr, and Martin Bucer were all more important for spreading Calvinist ideas to Edwardian England than was John Calvin. Early Elizabethan Protestantism looked more to Zurich than to Geneva, as did early Polish Calvinism. German Calvinism owed more to Heidelberg than to Geneva.' These leaders developed their theologies sometimes in mutual dependence, sometimes with surprising independence. By no means was their relation to Calvin simply that of disciple to master, for each gave a personal nuance to his style of Calvinism. Thus the sixteenth century Jesuit Cornelius Schulting states on the opening page of his five volume polemic against Calvin and Peter Martyr that Martyr was clearer and far more learned than Calvin.2 Recently John Bray has pointed out that research in seventeenth century Calvinism leads "to the conclusion that the impact of Calvin upon the Calvinistic movement has been greatly over-rated. It may well be that some of