TOLERATION AND POLITICAL CONFLICT
1 B. Williams, ‘Tolerating the Intolerable’, in Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline, Selected, edited with an introduction by A.W. Moore, Princeton/Oxford, Princeton Universitity Press, 2006, pp. 126-134, 126. 2 C. McKinnon, Toleration. A criticical introduction, London/New York, Routledge, 2006, pp. 6-7; cf. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Oxford/New York, Oxford University Press, 1973, pp. 126-1130. 3 A.E. Galeotti, Toleration as Recognition, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 20; cf. R.H. Dees, Trust and Toleration, London/New York, Routledge, 2004, p. 4. 4 H. Paetzold, ‘Review essay. Respect and toleration considered’, in Philosophy and Social Criticism 34 (2008) 941-954, p. 951. TOLERATION AND POLITICAL CONFLICT
Tolerance as a Virtue of Justice
Abstract This article argues that the civic virtue of tolerance has to be understood as a virtue of justice. Based on an analysis of the concept of toleration and its paradoxes, it shows that toleration is a ‘normatively dependent concept’ that needs to take recourse to a conception of justice in order to solve these paradoxes. At the center of this conception of justice lies a principle of reciprocal and general justification with the help of which a distinction between moral norms and ethical values is possible. While the former are strictly binding and define the realm of the tolerable, the latter are subject to reasonable disagreement that calls for toleration. Essentially, the virtue of tolerance is the capacity and willingness to accept the principle and criteria of justification of generally binding norms in an ethically pluralist society.This virtue is analyzed with respect to its normative and epistemological components. Finally, the idea of a ‘tolerant character’ is discussed.
The Law of Failure
If a broker-dealer liquidates in federal bankruptcy court, why does an insurance company liquidate in state court, and a bank outside of court altogether? Why do some businesses re-organize under state law 'assignments', rather than the more well-known Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code? Why do some laws use the language of bankruptcy but without advancing policy goals of the Bankruptcy Code? In this illuminating work, Stephen J. Lubben tackles these questions and many others related to the collective law of business insolvency in the United States. In the first book of its kind, Lubben notes the broad similarities between the many insolvency systems in the United States while describing the fundamental differences lurking therein. By considering the whole sweep of these laws - running the gamut from Chapter 11 to obscure receivership provisions of the National Bank Act - readers will acquire a fundamental understanding of the 'law of failure'.