A New Outside Option Value for Networks: The Kappa-Value – Measuring Distribution of Power of Political Agreements
In an economic or social situation where agents have to group in order to achieve common goals, how can we calculate the coalitional rents of the agents arising from the coalition formation? Once we have formalized the situation via a TU-game and a network describing the economic structure, we can apply different allocation rules to assign the coalitional rents to the agents. We specifically analyze situations where parties with a specific vote distribution in a parliament have to build agreements in order to reach some required quorum. In this situation, we want to measure the (relative) distribution of power. We analyze the allocation rules called Position value (Meessen (1988) and Borm et al. (1992)) and graph-chi-value (Casajus (2009)). Applying the generalized framework (Gomez et al. (2008)), a framework where coalitions are not established yet, we fi nd that the graph-chi-value does not differ for networks referring to the same coalition while the Position value takes into account the specific role of an agent within the network, i.e. the communication path. We define and characterize a new outside option sensitive value, the Kappa-value, which takes into account both outside options and the role of an agent within the network.
The Shapley Value for n-Person Games in Generalized Characteristic Function Form
Abstract This paper is a first study of n -person games in coalitional form in which the characteristic functions are defined on all possible orders in coalitions of players. Such an approach seems to be useful in modeling some economic situations as well as some subtle relations between players in coalitions. Our main objective in this paper is to introduce axiomatically a unique value on the more general class of games indicated above. For the classical cooperative TU games our value coincides with the well-known Shapley value. We also discuss probabilistic values on the space of generalized games.
THE ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE AND COLONIALISM: REASONS FOR AFRICA’S UNDERDEVELOPMENT?
It is probably an understatement to assert that Africa, the world’s second largest continent, is underdeveloped compared with other continents. Two major exogenous factors often cited for Africa’s development crisis are the so called ‘dual historical injustices’ – the Atlantic slave trade and colonialism. It is often pointed out that while the former almost completely arrested and retarded Africa’s demographical growth for more than three centuries, evoked a perennial state of acrimony and warfare and created a tense and unprecedented atmosphere of insecurity which hindered economic activities and stifled local entrepreneurship and technological drive and dislocated Africa’s socio-economic and political structures and institutions; the latter tied African countries to the apron strings of western imperial powers thereby rendering the pre-conditions necessary for socio-economic and political transformation unachievable. This paper contends that while the history of Africa’s underdevelopment may be traceable to the Atlantic slave trade and colonialism, African leaders had made enormous contributions to the continent’s underdevelopment and backwardness. The paper concludes that irresponsible and irresponsive leadership, vampirism and prodigality, corruption, lack of respect for democratic ideals, insecurity, endemic civil wars, nepotism, etc are the fundamental causes of Africa’s underdevelopment.