On the bargaining set of three-player games
The description and the characterization of the (Aumann-Maschler) bargaining set are known, but its determination is still hard given a generic transferable utility cooperative game. We provide here an exhaustive determination of the bargaining set of any three-player game, balanced or not, superadditive or not.
The bargaining set of four-person balanced games
Abstract. It is well known that in three-person transferable-utility cooperative games the bargaining set ℳi1 and the core coincide for any coalition structure, provided the latter solution is not empty. In contrast, five-person totally-balanced games are discussed in the literature in which the bargaining set ℳi1 (for the grand coalition) is larger then the core. This paper answers the equivalence question in the remaining four-person case. We prove that in any four-person game and for arbitrary coalition structure, whenever the core is not empty, it coincides with the bargaining set ℳi1. Our discussion employs a generalization of balancedness to games with coalition structures.
Regional strategies for the minerals industries of the states of the SADCC
The SADCC has been in existence for eleven years but little progress has been made in regional coordination of the minerals sector even though this sector is the most important exporter of the region. There is however scope for minerals development at the regional level.