Inward FDI in Germany and its policy context
With a stable economic and political system, open capital markets, the largest domestic market in Europe, and European Union (EU) membership, Germany has attracted competitive and export-oriented multinational enterprises (MNEs) since the 1960s. In the 1990s —after German unification and the opening up of Eastern Europe— inward foreign direct investment (IFDI) grew more slowly than expected despite the increased market potential. In recent years, the German economy strengthened and the wage and cost gaps against its main competitors narrowed, contributing to higher IFDI. With the financial and economic crises, German IFDI declined considerably in 2008 but started to rise again in 2009. At the end of 2008, Germany ranked among the top four developed countries as host for IFDI. Germany's open investment regime was tightened in 2009, in reaction to the emergence of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). Trends and developments Country-level developments The successful reintegration of Germany into the world economy after the Second World War, as well as the European unification process, stimulated IFDI in Germany. Already in the 1960s, many of the largest MNEs worldwide (like General Motors or IBM) had established affiliates in Germany. In 1990, the year of the German reunification, the consolidated primary and secondary IFDI stock amounted to US$ 111 billion. 1 Since then, it has risen six-fold, to reach US$ 666 * Thomas Jost (thomas.jost@h-ab.de) is Professor of Economics at the University of Applied Sciences Aschaffenburg. The author wishes to thank Alexandra Angress, Jörn Kleinert and Beatrix Stejskal-Passler for their helpful comments. The views expressed by the author of this Profile do not necessarily reflect opinions of Columbia University, its partners and supporters. Columbia FDI Profiles is a peer-reviewed series. 1 The German inward FDI stock figures that are used most for analysis in this article are consolidated primary and secondary direct investment stock figures. This is a very special calculation done by Deutsche Bundesbank, looking through dependent (majority foreign owned) holding companies in Germany and including their direct investment enterprises in Germany. These figures are not comparable with the figures of most other countries, taking only primary FDI into account. The primary FDI stock in Germany is much higher than the consolidated primary and secondary one, because FDI in dependent holding companies is much higher than the FDI stock in their direct investment enterprises, which replace the dependent holding companies by consolidation. The reason for this is that the holding companies receive …
Sovereign Investment: Concerns and Policy Reactions
Sovereign Investment: Concerns and Policy Reactions provides the first major holistic examination and interdisciplinary analysis of sovereign wealth funds. Sovereign wealth funds currently hold three trillion dollars' worth of investments, almost twice the amount in all the hedge funds worldwide, and are predicted to hold nine trillion more by 2015. This relatively new and rapidly expanding phenomenon remains relatively unregulated, but the International Monetary Fund and the G7 aim to establish temporary and voluntary rules to introduce transparency and uniformity until more permanent regulatory structures are instituted. What permanent rules and procedures should govern sovereign wealth funds? What bodies should enforce them? Do the current provisional rules answer the national security concerns of host countries? Editors Karl P. Sauvant, Lisa Sachs, and Wouter P.F. Schmit Jongbloed address these questions in a collection of essays by leading authorities from the IMF, academic institutions, law firms, multi-national corporations, and think tanks. Together, these authors analyze how sovereign wealth funds have helped to limit the effects of the current global economic crisis, and what rules can govern their operation in the future. Available in OSO: Contributors to this volume - Jose E. Alvarez, New York University School of Law Rolando Avendano, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Alexander A. Berengaut, Covington & Burling LLP Julien Chaisse, Chinese University of Hong Kong Mark Clodfelter, Foley Hoag LLP Udaibir S. Das, International Monetary Fund Patrick DeSouza, Plain Sight Group of Companies David Fagan, Covington & Burling LLP David Gaukrodger, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Steven Globerman, Western Washington University Kathryn Gordon, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Mark Gordon, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz Stephany Griffith-Jones, Columbia University Francesca Mariana Soria Guerrero, Winston & Strawn LLP Philippe Gugler, University of Fribourg Thomas Jost, University of Applied Sciences Aschaffenburg Alan Larson, Covington & Burling LLP Adnan Mazarei, International Monetary Fund James Mendenhall, Sidley Austin LLP Sabastian V. Niles, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz Jose Antonio Ocampo, Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs Katharina Pistor, Columbia Law School Mark E. Plotkin, Covington & Burling LLP W. Michael Reisman, Yale Law School Alan M. Rugman, Henley Business School of the University of Reading Jeffrey D. Sachs, Columbia University Lisa E. Sachs, Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment A. Edward Safarian, Rotman School of Business, University of Toronto Javier Santiso, ESADE Business School Karl P. Sauvant, Vale Columbia Center at Columbia Law School Wouter P.F. Schmit Jongbloed, Columbia Law School Daniel M. Shapiro, Simon Fraser University Maya Steinitz, The University of Iowa College of Law Paola Subacchi, Chatham House at the Royal Institute of International Affairs Edwin M. Truman, Peterson Institute for International Economics
Sovereign Wealth Funds
Diese Arbeit ist ein umfassender empirischer Uberblick, der Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) in einem politisch- okonomischen Kontext untersucht. Als SWFs bezeichnet man staatliche Investmentfonds oder Agenturen, die nationale Uberschusse organisatorisch getrennt von traditionellen Wahrungsreservenverwaltung verwalten. Diese Devisenreserven die sich ausschlieslich aus Exporteinkunften speisen, werden mehrheitlich in internationale Markte investiert. SWFs gehoren mittlerweile neben Pensionsfonds zu den grosten Akteuren am globalen Finanzmarkt. Durch ihr beachtliches Kapitalvolumen von mehreren Billionen US Dollar beeinflussen SWFs die Stabilitat im internationalen Finanzgeschehen. Trotz der Finanzkrise 2008, die das Volumen einiger SWFs deutlich reduziert hat, werden SWFs weiterhin am Finanzmarkt eine leitende Rolle spielen. 
 
Unter SWFs versteht man einen Sammelbegriff fur eine heterogene Gruppe von Akteuren. Es gibt nicht nur Ahnlichkeiten zwischen SWFs untereinander, sondern auch Uberschneidungen mit verwandten Akteuren wie beispielsweise Zentralbanken oder Pensionsfonds. Trotz dieser Gemeinsamkeiten sollte man SWFs gegenuber anderen Akteuren besser ausdifferenzieren. 
 
Daher ist eine wissenschaftlich fundierte Einordnung entscheidend um etwaige Auswirkungen, die SWFs auf internationale Finanzmarkte haben, abschatzen zu konnen. Aus diesem Grunde ist es angebracht das Phanomen SWF aus einer international politik-okonomischen Perspektive zu betrachten, da rein okonomische Annaherungen politische Gesichtspunkte nicht ausreichend mit einbeziehen.