Economic impacts of California's golf course facilities in 2000.
People spent $4.350 billion at California golf course facilities in 2000. The total sales, income, and tax impacts on the state economy were $7.872 billion, $4.546 billion, and $1.370 billion in 2000. Direct sales of $4.251 billion directly supported 62,173 jobs, and , through indirect and induced sales impacts, an additional 37,609 jobs.
Economic Impacts of the Florida Golf Course Industry
Executive Summary Economic impacts of the Florida golf industry were estimated for year 2000 based upon a survey of golf courses, together with other published data and regional economic models. A survey questionnaire was mailed to 1,334 golf courses. Responses were received from 223 firms, representing a 17 percent response rate, and results for survey respondents were extrapolated to estimate values for the entire population. The respondent golf courses were classified as private (50%), semi-private (27%), public (14%), municipal (9%), resort (5%), and military (1%). Residential developments were part of 54 percent of Florida golf courses, with some 756,000 residential units, which had an average value of $366,000 and a total value of $158Bn. Florida golf courses had 27,718 golf holes. Total annual revenues amounted to $4.44 billion (Bn), including membership and initiation fees (38%), playing fees (27%), food and beverage services (18%), retail sales (6%), lodging (4%), and miscellaneous other activities (9%). The revenues for year 2000 were 49 percent higher than a previous estimate of $3.0Bn in 1991–92, representing an average annual growth rate of 5 percent in nominal dollar terms. Florida counties with golf course revenues in excess of $100 million (Mn) were Results were also summarized for 8 economic regions of Florida. Golf industry employment was 73,000 persons, including clubhouse personnel (68%), and golf course maintenance personnel (32%), with 71 percent as full-time and 29 percent as part-time, temporary or seasonal employees. Annual expenses amounted to $3.70Bn, including golf course maintenance (29%), food and beverage service (20%), golf operations (13%), administrative overhead (12%), clubhouse (10%), capital (9%), tennis, fitness and other recreation services (4%), and miscellaneous other expenses (4%). Charitable contributions made by golf courses amounted to $12Mn in cash and $25Mn in-kind. The book value of assets owned by golf courses was $10.8Bn, including land (58%), buildings and installations (26%), vehicles and equipment (10%) and golf course irrigation systems (6%). Area owned by golf courses was 205,000 acres, with 147,000 acres in maintained turf, and 140,000 acres irrigated. Bermudagrass was the predominant type of turfgrass used on golf courses, representing 93 percent of maintained turf area. Water used for irrigation amounted to 173 billion gallons, of which recycled water was the dominant source (49%), with lesser amounts from surface waters (29%) and wells (21%). Compared to 5 years ago, water use per acre was increased by 9 percent of firms, decreased by 42 percent, and …
The uprising of the marginalised: a socio-economic perspective of the Syrian uprising
More than three years after the outbreak of protests in a number of Arab countries, the role of socio-economic factors in these events is attracting more attention. One of the cases that needs more research is Syria. More than three years into the Syrian uprising, the socio-economic roots of the protest movement that became one of the bloodiest civil conflicts in the history of the Middle East need to be examined. While it has been observed that the Syrian uprising, contrary to some ‘Arab Spring’ countries, has been an uprising of more marginalised social groups with a strong role played by poorer segments in the society, particularly rural and rural-to-urban migrants, the socio-economic explanation for this is still underdeveloped. This paper aims at contributing to a better understanding of this issue by examining the political and socio-economic compromise that underlined the rule of the Ba’th party in Syria for four decades and unpacking how a combination of internal and external shifts that started in the 1990s and intensified in the 2000s led to the erosion of this compromise, providing the background to the events that began in 2011.