A Brief History of Hell
Before we begin our examination of the arguments given against hell, it will be helpful to trace the development of eschatological thinking, from the earliest recorded speculations about the next world to contemporary attitudes. In this historical prelude we will chronicle the interplay of the various motifs--justice, love, punishment, and reformation--which characterize the modern debate. We will discover that both belief in and denial of hell have ancient pedigrees, and that the philosophical motivations for contemporary positions find their genesis in arguments of centuries past.
The Problem of Hell
The doctrine of hell presents the most intractable version of the problem of evil, for though it might be argued that ordinary pain and evil can somehow be compensated for by the course of future experience, the pain and suffering of hell leads nowhere. This work develops an understanding of hell that is common to a broad variety of religious perspectives, and argues that the usual understandings of hell are incapable of solving the problem of hell. Kvanvig first argues that the traditional understanding of hell found in Christianity suffers from moral and epistemological inadequacies. Historically, these shortcomings lead to alternatives to the traditional doctrine of hell, such as universalism, annihilationism, or the second chance doctrine. Kvanvig shows, however, that the typical alternatives to the traditional understanding are inadequate as well. He argues that both the traditional understanding and the typical alternatives fail to solve the problem of hell because they share the common flaw of being constructed on a retributive model of hell. Kvanvig then develops a philosophical account of hell which does not depend on a retributive model and argues that it is adequate on both philosophical and theological grounds.
The humean obstacle to evidential arguments from suffering: On avoiding the evils of “appearance”
Many of us - believers as well as nonbelievers, car mechanics as well as philosophers - have at some times in our lives felt instances of suffering in this world to be evidence against theism, according to which the universe is the creation of a wholly good Being who loves his creatures, and who lacks nothing in wisdom and power. If it has proven hard to turn this feeling into a good argument, it has, perhaps, proven just as hard to get rid of it. Indeed, the most logically sophisticated responses to the "problem of evil" can leave one wondering whether our intuitive perplexities have not been lost in the gears of the formal machinery brought to bear on them. Maybe this is an unavoidable epiphenomenon of analysis; nevertheless, I want to try to mitigate it here. For this reason (and a second forthcoming one), my springboard will be William Rowe's recent formulation of the case from suffering against theism} Rowe exemplifies the recent turn away from "logical" (or "deductive," or "demonstrative s ) formulations, construing the case instead as "evidential" (or "inductive," or "probabilistic") in nature. The crux of his argument is that much suffering "does not appear to serve any outweighing good." This "does not appear" defence is succinct and non-technical, affording considerable insight into our ordinary intuitions, but also making itself easy prey to misconstrual. I shall thus be amplifying Rowe's argument and defending it against specious criticisms, as well as - ultimately rebutting it. This close attention to Rowe and his critics, however, is not an endin-itself. It is a means of elucidating and vindicating a perspective from which we can see why a theist should, as Hume puts it, "never retract his belief'' on account of the suffering atheologians are inclined to adduce as evidence against theism. Vindicating this perspective requires coming to close grips with the most lucid atheological evidential case one can find - and this is my second reason for taking Rowe's work as a springboard.