Douglas, Gesell, and the Economic Ethics of Ezra Pound
The poet Ezra Pound (1885-1972) was a moralist who regarded economics as key to understanding human society, and thereby to solve most social problems. He became a prolific writer of economic texts, in which he espoused the ideas of two economists: Major Clifford Douglas’ social credit and national dividend, and Silvio Gesell’s perishable currency. Pound’s economic thought reflects deep philosophical and moral roots. However, it is unfortunate that, of Pound’s economic lessons, the morally most compelling ones are also those less economically sound.
Approaching Pound’s Fascism: Development of an Ideologue
This chapter analyzes some of the longer-term drivers for Pound’s turn toward European fascism between the wars, especially with respect to his artistic experiences and interest in ‘social credit’ economics. Critical discussions of Pound’s work on the ‘Malatesta Cantos’ is presented for its influence upon his later politics, as is his Fascist ‘conversion’ during winter 1932–33 — culminating with his only meeting with Mussolini on 30 January 1933 — reflected in his 1935 (but written in February 1933) study, Jefferson and/or Mussolini.
Deliberative Democracy and the Resource Curse: A Nationwide Experiment in Tanzania
Oil and gas discoveries in developing countries are often associated with short-sighted economic policies and, in response, calls to insulate resource management from populist impulses. We report on a randomized experiment testing methods to overcome this apparent tension between sound resource governance and democratic politics. Soon after Tanzania’s discovery of major natural gas reserves, we invited a nationally representative sample of voters to an intensive public deliberation of policy options featuring nationally recognized experts and small-group discussions. Democratic deliberation reinforced the public’s strong preference for rapid spending of gas revenues, but also increased support for various prudential and economically orthodox measures, including independent oversight of gas revenues, limits on government borrowing, and selling gas abroad rather than subsidizing fuel at home. These effects were driven by deliberation per se, rather than a pure information treatment, and show no evidence of contamination by facilitatoror peer-effects in group deliberations. www.cgdev.org Justin Sandefur, Nancy Birdsall, James Fishkin, and Mujobu Moyo