French Security Policy in Transition: Dynamics of Continuity and Change
Abstract : Since 1989, French defense and security policy has been undercut by changes in the external environment and domestic pressures to deal with the challenge of economic modernization. The Soviet revolution of 1989, the reunification of Germany, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the experience of coalition warfare during the Gulf War-all have challenged the assumptions and realities underlying the Gaullist synthesis. Above all, the French position on security independence has been put into question. The main hope has been for a European Alliance to supplant the American one over time in the face of a gradual process of change within Europe but change has not been gradual within Europe. The European Union is challenged by discontent within Western Europe. A new Central Europe has emerged that has yet to find its place in European or global politics. A new Russia is emergent in which nationalism is defining an assertive role for the Russians within Europe, but at the same time the economic weakness of Russia limits its ability to play such a role.
SDI and Arms Control
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S Strategic Defense Initiative, or SDI, and the pursuit of defenses to protect against ballistic missile attack are issues of significant debate. Some praise the proposal, first made in a presidential address to the nation on 23 March 1983, as a grand vision that will abolish nuclear blackmail by adopting a totally defensive posture. Others condemn it as being destabilizing, a Pandora's box of strategic transition that could precipitate armed conflict. To date, the focus primarily has been on questions of technology. Are defenses feasible? Will they work? How effective can they be? In addition, many have addressed the impact of defenses on US-Soviet stability. Will SDI defenses seem threatening? Will they destabilize the strategic equation? Is a shift toward defense necessarily away from offense? Perhaps the real questions to ask concern the strategic direction currently being pursued, how strategic defense will or should interact with strategic offense, and the relationship of strategic defense to arms control. The vision of SDI originally portrayed in March 1983--ultimately eliminating the threat of strategic nuclear missiles--is now a longer-term goal. Now deterrence is, as before, the byword; perfect defenses are recognized as being unattainable, and continued dependence on offensive ballistic missiles is envisioned. These considerations, once accepted, may precipitate further nuclear arms control agreements--with SDI as the catalyst. Earlier arms control agreements, although they placed modest limitations on nuclear forces, generally did not achieve significant reductions. The major exception was the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which essentially eliminated a class of weapons by regulating the development, testing, and deployment of ABM systems. In more recent years, however--since the SDI program has been in place--progress on arms control has improved. I. The Strategic Defense Initiative In the crescendo to his 1983 announcement, President Reagan touched on some major themes relating to US strategy: Since the advent of nuclear weapons, those steps [steps taken to counter the Soviet threat] have been directed toward deterrence of aggression through the promise of retaliation--the notion that no rational nation would launch an attack that would inevitably result in unacceptable losses to themselves.... Up until now we have increasingly based our strategy of deterrence upon the threat of retaliation. But what if ... we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies? (1) Was the President proposing a major shift in US national strategy or policy? Exactly how did the President envision this proposal fitting into the national strategy of the United States? Was it a modification of the concept of deterrence--signaling a shift from offensive deterrence to defensive deterrence? Or was he proposing no more than a new weapon system to be added to the inventory of existing systems? In addition to raising such questions, the speech also alluded to the notion of eventually refuting traditional offensive deterrence. The President noted the importance of ongoing arms control efforts to achieve major arms reductions, but went on to say, "Nevertheless it will still be necessary to rely on the specter of retaliation ... and that is a sad commentary." He continued by acknowledging, "Defensive systems have limitations.... [I]f paired with offensive systems, they can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy and no one wants that." (2) Statements such as these did not suggest a long-term commitment to current offensive systems. In fact, the President's call to "render these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete" and to "eliminate the weapons themselves" (3) exhibited his frustration with continuing a strategy that ultimately threatened mutual annihilation. …
Complexity, Network-Decisions And Alternative Risk Premia: Some New Theories Of Structural Change And Portfolio Decisions.
Structural Change is the basis for many decisions such as government fiscal and monetary policies, government interventions, corporate-expenditure decisions, corporate strategic decisions, portfolio management decisions in finance; household allocation decisions, etc.. Structural change in industries and national economies is increasingly more difficult to detect partly because of the growth and dominance of Complex Systems and “Networks” in modern industries and economies – such Networks and Complex Systems include GVCs (global value chains), retail store networks; franchising networks; internet networks; services networks; credit-chains in industries; online social networks; etc.. The relationship between Complexity and Structural Change is well established in the physics, applied math and economic dynamics literatures. Traditional definitions and modeling of structural change have erroneously focused on changes in labor, technological progress, market share, and or capital – which are grossly inadequate in the new economy and post- global financial crisis (as confirmed by changes in the global retailing and housing industries and other industries). Also the modeling of structural change seems to be constrained by the availability of data, and often omits the relationship between structural change on one hand, and globalization, financial stability and international financial contagion. This article: i) introduces the Operations Strategy Model of structural change, explains how it differs from the Lewis Model of Structural Change; and explains the often omitted relationship between operations strategy (of companies and government agencies) and structural change; ii) introduces other new Complexity-based models/theories of Structural Change in industries; iii) reviews the relationships among Operations Research, Complexity and Structural Change; iv) explains the symbiotic relationship between structural change on one hand, and economic growth, financial stability, financial contagion and globalization; v) discusses the significant gap between academic research and practice and explains some issues and factors that should be considered in the development and testing of structural change models; vi) explains how alternative risk premia can be generated from new models of Structural Change.