The Limits of Dissensus: The Case of “Intelligent Design”
Although dissensus is a natural component of argumentation and testimony, there are limits as to what can be considered acceptable contrarian or arguments. In science, dissenting arguments are limited by the extent of their fidelity to known facts and theories. Dissensus is therefore limited by how consistent a new theory or hypothesis is with an established body of knowledge, as well as other criteria any good theory must meet. In the case of the so-called “intelligent design” controversy, the supposed “dissensus” is really an attempt at imposing inappropriate forms of argument. Using this case study as an example, questions on what are the limits of dissensus will be raised and examined.
Toulmin's Model of Argument and the Question of Relativism
In The Uses of Argument, Toulmin proposed a distinction between fielddependent and field-invariant standards for argument appraisal that gave rise to a relativistic understanding of his theory. The main goal of this paper is to show that epistemological relativism is not a necessary consequence of Toulmin’s model of argument. To this end, I will analyze the role that fields are to play within this model, given a proposed conception of one of its key elements: the warrant of an argument. 1. TOULMIN’S MODEL OF ARGUMENT In Human Understanding, S. E. Toulmin criticised not only dogmatism, but also relativism, as the counterpart of the same misconception of rationality, namely, rationality as adherence to a deductivist ideal of knowledge. In 1958, Toulmin had already developed an alternative to deductivism in The Uses of Argument. In this work, Toulmin proposed a new conception of logic based on the distinction between field-dependent and field-invariant criteria for argument evaluation. Despite Toulmin’s aim, the idea of field-dependent criteria gave rise to a relativistic reading of his theory of argument. The main goal of this paper is to show that epistemological relativism is not a necessary consequence of the model of argument that Toulmin proposed in 1958. I wish to show that, rather, it is a good way to fight it. According to Toulmin, every argument is composed of a claim, the reason for that claim and the warrant that licenses the step from this reason to that claim. In principle, this is the simplest form of argument. But Toulmin observes that in everyday arguments, we can also distinguish three more elements: backings, rebuttals and modal qualifiers. Backings are defined as “other assurances” that stand “behind our © 2006 Springer. D. Hitchcock and B. Verheij (eds.), Arguing on the Toulmin Model: New Essays in Argument Analysis and Evaluation, – 71 71 85. 1 What I call “reasons” were named “data” in Toulmin (1958), and “ground”, in Toulmin, Rieke and Janik (1979).
A TALE OF TWO CONTROVERSIES: DISSONANCE IN THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF RATIONALITY
. The relation between rationality in science and rationality in moral discourse is of interest to philosophers and sociologists of science, to educators and moral philosophers. Apparently conflicting conceptions of rationality can be detected at the core of two current socio-educational controversies: the creationievolution controversy and that concerning “moral education.” This paper takes as its starting point the recorded views of participants in these controversies; exhibits the contradictions and their effect on the public; relates these contradictions to developments in the philosophy and history of science; and suggests, in a preliminary way, one approach for dealing with the problem.