Scientific and Legal Developments in Fire and Arson Investigation Expertise in Texas v. Willingham
The forensic sciences, as a form of professional knowledge, are changing with new advancements in technology and continuing research and development. With the National Academy of Science's recent call for more research and testing of the forensic sciences, the criminal justice system is faced with the challenges of handling cases where convictions are based on outdated or discredited evidence. In light of technological advancements in the field, this article examines the evolution of fire- and arson-investigation knowledge over the course of a highly publicized capital murder case. The history of arson investigation is discussed, as is the legal admissibility of such expert testimony. Arson investigation expertise stems from non-scientific or experience-based origins, yet is conveyed in court as scientific fact. The article identifies the dangers of admitting such testimony into court without scrutiny. The lack of scientific validation of investigative methods, overreaching scientific claims based on case facts and witness statements, and fire investigators' susceptibility to contextual bias are discussed. The article raises questions as to whether and how the legal system has propagated the misuse of arson investigation testimony and how outdated understandings of evidence may impact the identification of future miscarriages of justice.
Is the Expert Admissibility Game Fixed?: Judicial Gatekeeping of Fire and Arson Evidence
Anecdotal evidence claims that in criminal cases, trial judges admit the prosecution's expert witnesses more readily than the defendants', and in civil cases the reverse is true; judges exclude plaintiffs' experts more often than civil defendants' experts. This occurs despite the fact that, with few exceptions, the same rules of admissibility apply to all parties and, in most jurisdictions, across criminal and civil cases. This article empirically tests this differential by reviewing judicial decisions to admit or exclude evidence holding the type of expert testimony constant, fire and arson evidence, across criminal and civil cases in the United States. The study examines the admissibility of fire and arson investigation experts in criminal and civil cases across all legal parties in fifty‐seven federal and state opinions in the United States. The findings offer empirical support of a bias in criminal cases and in civil cases which present expert witnesses at trial, and is less pronounced, but still evident, on appeal. Specifically, the role of the party that offers the evidence has a profound effect on whether arson evidence is admitted, even when factors around the judge's political affiliation, attorney experience, expert qualifications, and rules of evidence are taken into account.
An Empirical Assessment of Presentation Formats for Trace Evidence with a Relatively Large and Quantifiable Random Match Probability
Since the early 1970s, academics have debated the wisdom of an explicit use of statistical information concerning the probability of a coincidental match in the presentation of forensic match evidence at trial. Critics pointed to the dangers of such numbers, arguing that jurors would misunderstand the numbers and exaggerate their importance in the case, being seduced into ignoring the other unquantified evidence. Data from a pool of people called for jury service in Kane County, Illinois, support the conclusion reached in most previous empirical research: Jurors tend to undervalue the scientific evidence when measured against a Bayesian norm. More importantly, the present results indicate that a careful use of Bayesian methods in the courtroom can assist the jury in reaching more accurate verdicts, a conclusion with less support in previous studies. This study also suggests that it may be possible in some contexts to achieve comparable improvements in accuracy by giving juries less information than is conventionally given to them. The significance of this last result, however, is more ambiguous.