WMD Intelligence Analysis of Lessons from Iraq to Iran: Only Dot the I's - Don't Cross the T's
On January 29, 2010, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair gave evidence to the Iraq Enquiry in London, which was broadcast worldwide on satellite TV by the BBC. He emphasized the need to learn the lessons of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from the case of Iraq for the case of Iran. In his words “propping up one dictator to handle another dictator is not the way, we must get rid of the dictator.” More interesting is how many intelligence analysts are being instructed to dot the I’s but in the case of Iraq the analysis went to far and also crossed the T’s. Here is the previously untold story of what really happened.
Unscom and the Iraqi Biological Weapons Program: Implications for Arms Contro
V erification ofbiological weapons (BW) arms control agreements is one ofthe most difficult tasks in disarmament. While biological arms were outlawed 25 years ago by the multilateral Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), there is still no accepted verification mechanism for biological weapons disarmament. The discovery ofan enormous, diverse biological weapons program in Iraq sparked new interest in development ofa verification regime for the BWC. The investigation of Iraq's BW program also provides the first case history of an international BW arms control verification effort. The inquiry undertaken by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) demonstrates both the inherent difficulties ofsuch an investigation and the possibilities of success. The United Nation's actions in Iraq have made use of nearly all of the verification processes envisaged for the BWC, including information monitoring, remote sensing, inspections, on-site measures, and continuous monitoring. The UNSCOM case portrays examples ofthe real-world implementation ofBW verification techniques, including their accomplishments and failures. Specifically, the commission's efforts in Iraq have shown the value of a process or systematic approach to BW verification, rather than a reliance on discrete verification tools. Using a multifaceted verification strategy, UNSCOM has also proven the possibility ofdetecting a covert, well-hidden biological weapons program. Following the detection ofthe Iraqi BW program, UNSCOM is attempting to determine the full scope of the program in order to eliminate it.
Cultural constraints on the delivery of HIV/AIDS prevention in Ireland.
HIV appeared in Ireland following an opiate epidemic in the early 1980s. Initially, however, the gay community mounted the only response to the spread of the virus while the implementation of early actions by the government was hampered by the constructions of the disease within Irish society. This paper considers the influence of the religious hierarchy in both the development of AIDS policy and in the shaping of public perceptions of the disease and those affected. A qualitative methodology is used to examine the role of such cultural constraints in an evaluation of the social context within which the prevention of HIV infection occurs. Three key issues pertinent to the policy context in Ireland are explored in depth. These are the role of the Catholic Church, the influences on health education programmes, particularly information giving, and the development of services and other interventions. These findings are discussed within the social and political contexts in which health policy is formulated.