RMA, European Militaries and the Limits of Modernization
The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is synonymous with the US Military and its transformation following the end of the Cold War, which would see operational platforms networked, flexible and for use in joint operations. The role of technology in general and information and communication technology (ICT) in particular meant that the deployable platforms and possibly even networks would transform the way that the US went to war. This chapter looks at those who stand beside the US military most often in combat: the European allies. The focus here is on how RMA, as it was understood and conveyed in the US, shaped the thinking and doctrine of European militaries. In Europe, the term RMA and even the concept are seen as belonging to the US, grand power and an overwhelming reliance on technological superiority to achieve military victory. European militaries have focused more on the notion of transformation, innovation and modernization to mean how any such benefits of RMA could be adapted or utilized in European military operations and in connection to European military operations with the US where compatibility is an important command factor. If RMA points the way towards military victory on the battlefield, why then have Europeans not taken the opportunity to follow their North American ally?
Too Far Ahead? The US Bid for Military Superiority and Its Implications for European Allies
Since the early 1990s, the US has made an unprecedented effort to keep—and actually increase—the military superiority gained during the Cold War. Buzzwords like “Revolution in Military Affairs” and “Defence Transformation” have marked the American defence policy at the turn of the century. To put it bluntly, this commitment was epitomized over the years by constantly high defence budgets, but most importantly by a procurement policy markedly inclined towards innovation and an ongoing attempt at doctrinal adaptation. On the other hand, America’s European partners have been mostly reluctant to follow the US example: not only they have kept their budgets to a minimum, but (with a few exceptions) they have also shown little interest in innovations. As a result, the power asymmetry between the two shores of the Atlantic has grown to the point of endangering the effectiveness of the Transatlantic alliance. The aim of this chapter is threefold: firstly, to illustrate the US defence policy in the past 25 years; secondly, to ponder how NATO has been affected by this; thirdly, to discuss the problems this state of affairs entails for the US and its allies.
When Reason Fails: Portraits of Armies at War: America, Britain, Israel, and the Future@@@The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology
Part 1 Introduction: the sources of military change, T. Farrell, R. Terriff military change in historical perspective, Black J. Part 2 Culture: the spread of western military models to Ottoman Turkey and Meiji Japan, Goldman, E. O. world culture and the Irish army, 1922-1942, T. Farrell US ideas and military change in NATO, T. Terriff. Part 3 Politics: the US military's "two-front war", 1963-1988, C.M. Cameron US military responses to post-Cold War missions, D.D. Avant, H.J. Lebovic post-Cold War change in the Russian military, J. Mathers. Part 4 New technology: the British army and the tank, J. Stone creating a US military revolution, W. Owens complexity and a midrange theory of networked militaries, C.C. Demchak military change in the new millennium, T. Farrell, T. Terriff.