Changing Laodicean Politics in Japan-I : What China Can Learn from Japan's Experience
Introduction As the second decade of the 21st century approaches, China has been in the spotlight among academics, media, businesses, and politics. The book, When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order by Martin Jacques, represents an excellent example. From the book title, one can assume what Jacques discusses in his book. Sound familiar? Yes, this is déjà vu all over again. About three decades ago, the book, Japan as Number One: Lessons for America by Ezra Vogel, also discusses Japan, addressing how it was going to overtake the United States. Vogel’s expression – Japan as number one – became a famous phrase in contemporary Japanese history describing Japan’s economic superpower during its heyday. Furthermore, since the 1980s some naïve scholars called Japan Pax Nipponica, expecting that Japan would dominate the “Pacific Century” in the 21st century. Recently, a similar term -“Asian Century,” referred to an irreversible political and economic shift from the global power from West to East (i.e., from the US to China), coined by a scholar in Europe. Yet, the “Pacific Century” is no longer a credible reality for Japan. Unfortunately, Japan’s phenomenon is lasted only decades, basically disappearing from the front page of media attention, as well as, fervent discussions among political leaders, academic cycles, and business communities. As the financial and economic crises have loomed, Japan is no longer viewed as a model to be followed, respected, and appreciated. What happened inside Japanese politics? How did Japan slip from “number one” to number “nothing?” Why did the Japanese take so long to change the regime in the 2009 election? What can China learn from Japan’s experiences? This paper analyzes contemporary Japanese politics, especially political reforms since the 1980s, which ultimately lead to the end of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 8 domination. After more than 20 years of the bursting of the Japanese bubble economy, to change and to reform LDP, is too difficult, too little, and too late. In addition to the incomplete series of reforms and the ill-fated domestic policies implemented by political leaders, the never-ending corruption scandal cycle
The Rise and Fall of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party
THE SUMMER 2009 ELECTORAL victory of the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) over the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) holds historical significance, not only for political scientists but also for the people of Japan, and possibly for the country’s Asian neighbors and the United States as well. The LDP can boast of being the most successful political party operating in a democracy since the mid-twentieth century. The party held power nearly continuously from its formation in 1955, a scant three years after the end of the U.S. occupation. In the House of Representatives (the lower but substantially more powerful house in Japan’s bicameral system), the LDP compiled an amazing record: the party did not lose a single election in more than a half century, until August 30, 2009, when the Democracy Party of Japan won a stunning upset victory. Generations of Japanese have grown up knowing no governing party other than the LDP. The only interruption to the party’s rule was a brief ten-month period in 1993–94, when a small group split from the LDP to seize power as part of a disparate coalition that did little more than pass an electoral reform bill before falling apart. Much more significant than that episode, this electoral result seems likely to have important implications for the way in which Japan’s democracy works. Nearly 60 percent of LDP incumbents were turned out, and many sitting and former ministers, even a former prime minister, lost their seats. For the DPJ, on the other hand, election night brought only smiles. The party captured an amazing 308 of the 480 seats in the Diet—an all-time record—and only seven DPJ district candidates did not find their way into the Diet. The DPJ more than doubled the LDP’s 119 seats. What makes this election result even more surprising is that in the last House of Representatives election in 2005, the LDP engineered its greatest triumph
Efficacy of Biodentine as an Apical Plug in Nonvital Permanent Teeth with Open Apices: An In Vitro Study
The aim of this study was to evaluate the apical microleakage of Biodentine and MTA orthograde apical plugs and to compare the effect of thickness of these biomaterials on their sealing ability. A total of eighty maxillary anterior teeth were used. The apices were removed by cutting with a diamond disc (Jota, Germany) 2 mm from the apical root end in an attempt to standardize the working length of all specimens to 15 ± 1 mm. Both materials were placed in 1–4 mm thickness as apical plugs root canal. Root canal leakage was evaluated by the fluid filtration technique. One-way ANOVA was used in order to determine normality of dispersal distribution of parameters; thereafter, results were analyzed by Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. Overall, between microleakage values of MTA and Biodentine regardless of apical plug thickness, no difference was observed. In terms of plug thickness, a statistically significant difference was observed between the subgroups of MTA and Biodentine (p < 0.05). The apical sealing ability of Biodentine was comparable to MTA at any apical plug thickness.