State Supreme Courts and the Effects of Statutory Constraint
Do state supreme court judges render decisions according to their ideological preferences, or are they constrained by the language of state statutes? Using data from the Judge-Level State Supreme Court Database, the authors analyze the votes of individual judges from 1995 to 1998 to determine whether their behavior is constrained by legislation. The results indicate that more detailed language (resulting in statutes with higher word counts) significantly limits the discretion afforded to liberal judges while simultaneously facilitating the ideological voting of their conservative colleagues.
Placing State Supreme Courts in State Politics
This essay places state supreme courts in state politics by tracking some of the major lines of research on these important institutions, documenting the importance of state supreme courts, and illustrating important variations among state supreme courts on a host of factors, including docket composition, the exercise of judicial review, litigant patterns, and turnover rates. Through analyses of original data on separation-of-powers relationships in the abortion controversy, it also provides a brief empirical demonstration of how courts influence and are influenced by the political and policy processes operating in the states, and how comparative research helps resolve fundamental controversies in political science. We conclude that there is a remarkable and unfortunate asymmetry between the political importance of state supreme courts and the attention given to them by the research community. Moreover, by capitalizing on the analytical advantages of comparative state judicial politics scholarship, scholars will be able to solve some of the most complex puzzles in the study of state politics.
Judicial politics in Britain: Patrolling the boundaries
This study considers judicial policy‐making in Great Britain by noting the peculiarly British institutional restraints on judicial action of parliamentary sovereignty, the resulting subordination of all courts to the legislative branch and the absence of a codified charter of rights or constitution. Though there is no judicial power to annul legislative or executive actions, British courts and judges still play a small, but significant, role in policy‐making through the common law and, in particular, through judicial review of adminstrative actions. A written bill of rights would likely draw courts further into the the political arena and politicise the appointment of judges.