Transparency in Philanthropy: An Analysis of Accountability, Fallacy, and Volunteerism
This book explores how degrees of transparency in philanthropy currently fit with accountability under existing federal law, including applications of quid pro quo economic benefit arguments and stakeholder "rights" theories. The book also analyzes and ultimately rejects the most commonly asserted calls for changing the law to mandate more transparency from foundations, including broad notions of judging accountability and effectiveness, correcting "power asymmetry," foundations’ abilities to affect public good, and simply because doing so is good/moral/pure in its own right. Finally, it advocates that foundations do more to consider ways in which greater voluntary transparency can serve their individual strategic and operational objectives.
Essential Policy and Practice Considerations for Facilitating Social Enterprise: Commitment, Connections, Harm, and Accountability
There are numerous opportunities for policy interventions to clarify, enable, or perhaps even inhibit social entrepreneurship. As one example, consider the emergence and expansive growth of available social business forms, particularly of the benefit corporation, which substantially modified traditional conceptions of fiduciary duties perhaps to the point of elimination. Other policy efforts or possibilities include financing mechanisms involving public money, tax favored treatment, exemptions from securities requirements, and affording bid procurement preferences on government contracts. 
As an essential precursor to material policy concessions to social entrepreneurship, especially to the extent it or its enterprises compete with or seek to distinguish themselves from other market participants, several determinations must be made. These determinations have two key roles: (a) shaping whether to provide the relevant incentives or make the applicable concessions and, if so, (b) how far to go to ensure a reasonably commensurate relationship between benefits and burdens for enterprises, movements, and society. 
Four essential sets of questions should shape, or in some cases even dictate, how those roles are defined. Beyond policy, these sets of questions have practical implications for those who invest in, operate, and interact with social ventures. Lack of mutual clarity about any or all of these risks longer term problems for the enterprises and those involved with them but more importantly for the social benefits being sought. 
• What should the underlying commitment be to pursuing social results: devotion or does mere tolerance suffice? 
• What should the relationship be between the effort dedicated to social returns and the actually realized result? 
• What attention should be given to or require about social harms that might be associated with, connected to, or caused by actions taken in the pursuit of social good? 
• What form(s) should accountability take and what consequences, if any, should be expected for failure – not just non-compliance but less than optimal outcomes? 
Clarity on these matters can also help regulators and enforcement personnel as they evaluate whether/how to proceed with guidance or actions. Resolving ambiguities that exist could facilitate more and faster adoption of social business forms and other efforts to achieve worthy objectives of the social entrepreneurship movement. 
In some ways, this analysis also involves bringing clarity and discipline to whether “impact” and “intent to have impact” are the same or even similar.
Do Potential People Have Moral Rights?
By a potential person I shall mean an entity which is not now a person but which is capable of developing into a person, given certain biologically and/or technologically possible conditions. This is admittedly a narrower sense than some would attach to the term ‘potential'. After all, people of the twenty-fifth century, if such there will be, are in some sense potential people now, even though the specific biological entities from which they will develop, i.e. the particular gametes or concepti, do not yet exist. For there do exist, in the reproductive capacities of people now living and in the earth's resources, conditions adequate to produce these future people eventually, provided of course that various possible catastrophes are avoided. Indeed, in some sense of ‘potential’ there have been countless billions of potential people from the beginning of time. But I am concerned not with such remote potentialities but with currently existing entities that are capable of developing into people.