Military Politics, Ethnicity and Conflict in Indonesia.
This paper outlines the history of the military in Indonesia and its role in politics, as well as in perpetrating violence. Since its inception at the time of Indonesian independence, the military has had a defined role in both defence and politics, particularly during the Sukarno (1945-1965) and Suharto eras (1966-1998). While this role has been somewhat reduced in the Reform era (beginning mid-1998) through various stages of military reform, many of the underlying principles of the involvement of the military in politics still remain in reality. Given the historical dual roles of the military, it has been able to set agendas and perpetrate violence without civilian oversight. In Papua, this has led to various acts of violence perpetrated by the military and the police, often tapping into local ethno-religious relations. However, this has been less overt than the violence occurring in Aceh. In Aceh, the initial response of the military in the 1950s to Acehnese resistance was more accommodating and less violent than the military operations in the 1970s to the 1990s. While the negotiations in the 1950s were a drawn-out process, it enabled a peaceful agreement to be reached without extensive use of force. However, in later periods the orchestrated use of violence in Aceh left locals seeing the military from Java as colonisers. Furthermore, these repressive strategies did not elicit peace agreements but rather stimulated further rebellion, which some argue was part of a broader military strategy of creating tension and maintaining a role for the military in domestic security provision. In Maluku, clashes between the military and police, as well as bias on the part of different sections of the armed forces towards each of the warring communal groups, increased the levels of violence and prolonged the conflict. Today, the role of the military in politics has been significantly reduced by disbanding the political sections of the military in the regions and a number of other reforms. However, many of the original principles of the functions of the military remain, whereby they can still be involved in politics and elections by resigning from their military posts.
Beyond the Overall Economic Downturn: Evidence on Sector-Specific Effects of Violent Conflict from Indonesia
This paper analyses the impact of violent conflict on economic growth using micro-level data from Indonesia. We compile a panel dataset at district level for the period 2002-2008, and disentangle the overall negative economic effect of violent conflict into its sectoral components. Our results reveal substantial differences across sectors, with the most detrimental impact evident in manufacturing industries and the service sectors. Further, the short-run impacts on growth appear to be only temporal, and some evidence for the 'phoenix effect' in the early post-conflict period is found. The construction sector, in particular, recovers soon once conflict ends, while manufacturing industries and the finance sector appear especially reliant on a lasting peace. A series of alternative specifications confirm the main findings of the analysis.
Political Awakening in West New Guinea
ON AUGUST I5, i962, an agreement between Indonesia and the Netherlands ended a thirteen-year dispute over the status of West Irian (West New Guinea). The agreement provided for a transfer of administration by the Netherlands to Indonesia after an interim United Nations period and contained provisions for realizing the "act of self-determination" granted to the Papuan inhabitants "before the end of i969."1 However, the Netherlands administration had begun to implement its promises of self-determination during the last few years, and it claims that the small Papuan elite which has emerged reflects a genuine Papuan political consciousness. This article is concerned with the development of that consciousness. West Irian covers some i6iooo square miles of territory, most of which is dense swamp and rugged mountain. Contact with the outside world has been minimal. The designation of its people as "Papuan" was made by outsiders; its meaning is obscure; it may come from the time when slaveraiding expeditions from sultanates in the Moluccas collected their human cargo from the "Papuan islands." The Dutch East India Company considered New Guinea a backwater and merely a convenient barrier against intruders into its lucrative spice trade. Effective Dutch occupation could not be claimed until i898 when posts were established at Manokwari in the north and at Fak-Fak in the southwest. Nevertheless, West Irian remained an almost forgotten land until the Pacific war. Administrative control was haphazard and limited to a few scattered posts along the fringes. So primitive were the inhabitants and so easy was it for the colonial government to attract semi-skilled and skilled personnel from other areas in Indonesia that village teachers, hospital attendants, and even policemen came almost exclusively from Ambon, Menado, and the Kei and Tanimbar islands.2 In this primitive society such men were part of the ruling caste, participating in a system of "double colonialism." The expression Papua bodok (stupid Papuan) was employed by some of these outsiders whose air of superiority gradually came to be resented by the Papuans. On the other hand, Papuans used the term