Trade fragmentation and coordination in bilateral oligopolies
This paper studies a strategic market game where agents fragment their bids on different markets. Simple conditions for existence of an interior equilibrium point are provided. In equilibrium, all agents are active on the same markets and prices are identical across markets, so that all equilibria are equivalent to an equilibrium where all agents trade on a single market.
"Nice" Trivial Equilibria in Strategic Market Games
An example of an exchange economy is provided, satisfying all of the assumptions of Dubey and Shubik (1978), for which the trivial Nash equilibrium is the unique equilibrium point of the associated market game. From this example, we are led to propose an argument, related to the intensity of competition, explaining whv there could be no trade at an equilibrium point. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
Nonobstetric lower genital tract injuries in rural India
To study the impact of nonobstetric genital tract injury (NOGTI) in rural India.