Classification of Contractual Agreements in Comparative and Islamic Jurisdictions: Does it Make Any Sense?
Abstract Comparative legal systems differ in the organization of the manifestation of parties’ expressions when making legal transactions where an external action does not reflect the real intention of this party. Most jurisdictions, including Islamic law, follow the objective theory of agreements while the Conterminal legal system adopts the subjective approach. Despite the fact that many scholars spent much efforts to clarify this classification, the importance of this classification may be modest; these legal systems organize some basic doctrines, with regard to the formation of a contract (namely: the revocability of offer, the need for communication of acceptance and the rules of interoperation), in a manner that may contradict with its general theory of making agreement. In other words, the organization of these doctrines has very little significant differences in result between these legal systems. Islamic law has the same result as well. This article aims at explaining these doctrines and differences.
A Reply to Professors Gould and Yamey
In replying to Professor Gould and Professor Yamey, I must necessarily assume that the reader is generally familiar with the main outlines of my previous article.1 It may be useful, nevertheless, to restate the core of my argument very briefly. In the previous article, I urged the legality of certain types of price fixing and market division, both horizontal and vertical. Professors Gould and Yamey are concerned here only with one aspect of that article's thesis: my assertion that vertical price fixing or resale price maintenance, when it is not used as the tool of a cartel among resellers or among manufacturers, can only result from the manufacturer's desire to increase efficiency, and, further, that courts should accept that motivation as conclusive of the effect of such resale price maintenance. (Hereafter, unless otherwise indicated, references to resale price maintenance, or r.p.m., should be taken to indicate only this variety of manufacturer-desired r.p.m.) In its briefest terms, my argument runs as follows: No manufacturer will desire r.p.m. for the mere purpose of-giving his resellers a greaterthan-competitive return. The extra return would be money out of his pocket and we may safely assume that manufacturers are rarely moved to engage in that variety of philanthropy. The manufacturer who imposes r.p.m., therefore, must be attempting to purchase something for it. What he gets is usually increased activity by the reseller in providing information, promotional services, and the like. These are means of increasing distributive efficiency and should be permitted on grounds of efficient resource allocation. The case is no different than if the manufacturer owned the resellers and required his reseller employees to perform the same functions. R.p.m. is simply a partial integration and is often more efficient than full integration by ownership or contract.2 Since we have isolated a practice which is engaged in for the pur-
The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice ten years on: Successes and future challenges under the Stockholm Programme. CEPS Paperbacks. June 2010
This book celebrates the tenth anniversary of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) by bringing together the views of key practitioners and policy-makers who have played an outstanding role in thinking about and shaping EU policies on freedom, security and justice. 
 
Ten years ago, the member states transferred competences to the EU for law and policy-making in the fields of immigration, asylum and border controls, and began the transfer process for criminal justice and policing. This decade of European cooperation on AFSJ policies has experienced very dynamic convergence, the enactment of a large body of European law and the setting-up of numerous EU agencies working in these domains. Such dynamism in policy-making has not been without challenges and vulnerabilities, however. As this collective volume shows, the main dilemmas that lie ahead relate to an effective (while more plural) institutional framework under the Treaty of Lisbon, stronger judicial scrutiny through a greater role for national courts and the Court of Justice in Luxembourg, better mechanisms for evaluating and monitoring the implementation of EU AFSJ law and a more solid fundamental rights strategy. The contributions in this volume address the progress achieved so far in these policy areas, identify the challenges for future European cooperation in the AFSJ and put forward possible paths for making more progress in the next generation of the EU’s AFSJ.