Falling Masts, Rising Masters: The Ethnography of Virtue in Caesar's Account of the Veneti
����� �� CAESAR’S ACCOUNT OF THE REVOLT of the Veneti and neighboring tribes along the northwest coast of Gaul (BGall. 3.8‐15) contains a clear assertion of Rome’s superiority in virtus over her foes. While the account of the Veneti has sparked considerable debate over Caesar’s political motivations and Venetic topography, 1 the passage’s literary themes merit study in their own right. This paper examines the respective roles of technology and virtus in Caesar’s presentation of the Venetic defeat. The first section establishes that Caesar conceived of the sea battle fought against the Veneti as a contest about virtus. The next section argues that the technology of enemy boat design detailed in an ethnographic passage is represented by Caesar as a source of Venetic strength in place of true fighting spirit. This naval ethnography, dismissed by several commentators as an afterthought awkwardly inserted into the text, 2 is, on the contrary, the cornerstone of a sophisticated exposition on the theme of native technological strength failing to compensate for a lack of virtus. Caesar’s presentation of the final defeat of the Veneti at sea, the subject of the third section, exposes native weakness in a remarkable scene wherein falling masts and sudden calm metaphorically cast enemy failure within a gendered opposition of hard and soft.
Roman light infantry and the art of combat: the nature and experience of skirmishing and non-pitched battle in Roman warfare 264 BC – AD 235
Summary 
This thesis is an evaluation of Roman light infantry and non-pitched battle combat in the Roman army, from the years 264 BC – AD 235. This study incorporates a thorough etymological assessment of the Latin and Greek vocabulary of light infantry, and how the ancient sources use these terms. Building on this assessment, this thesis then includes a discussion on defining Roman light infantry. From this follows an analysis of the various modes of combat of these troops, including skirmishing, ambushing, small-scale engagements. A ‘face of battle’ approach (after John Keegan) assessing the nature and experience of the various forms of warfare mentioned above is also included.
PLEASURE, POWER, AND THE PURSUIT OF COMMUNISM: SOVIET YOUTH AND STATE-SPONSORED POPULAR CULTURE DURING THE EARLY COLD WAR, 1945-1968
art, with certain students accused of “showing political immaturity, failing to understand the Party’s positions on art.” This episode constituted part of a broader crackdown on abstract art by the Khrushchev administration from late 1962, precipitated the the Soviet leader’s derision of such art forms in December 1962 at the Manege exhibit. Such instances demonstrate the limitations of the top-level promotion of youth grassroots initiative, as the Khrushchev leadership reigned in youth autonomy when it threatened to go beyond the boundaries of the permissible. The dates cited above have particular resonance, since both 1957-58 and 1962-63 represent two periods when those at the top of the Party hierarchy moved away from pursuing a more pluralistic, tolerant policy course, due to anxiety inspired by both sharpening Cold War hostilities and domestic developments. In these periods, official rhetoric censured what it labeled as 639 TsAOPIM, f. 635, op. 13, d. 546, ll. 56-57. This is likely related to criticism of the Party associated with the fallout from the Secret Speech and the Hungary invasion. For more, see Polly Jones, “From the Secret Speech to the Burial of Stalin: Real and Ideal Responses to De-Stalinization,” in Jones ed., The Dilemmas, 41-63. 640 TsAOPIM, f. 6083, op. 1, d. 52, ll. 166-67. 641 Susan E. Reid, “In the Name of the People: The Manege Affair Revisited,” Kritika 6.4 (Fall 2005): 673716. 642 On these anxieties, see Dobson, Khrushchev’s Cold Summer, 156-88.