The Fourth Earl of Dorset and the Personal Rule of Charles I
The assembly of the Long Parliament in November 1640 witnessed an outburst of passionate hostility toward recent royal policies in church and state. “The Common-wealth hath bin miserably torne and macerated,” declared Harbottle Grimston, “and all the proprieties and liberties shaken: the Church distracted, the Gospell and Professors of it persecuted, and the whole Kingdome over-run with multitudes and swarmes of projecting cater-wormes and caterpillars, the worst of all the Aegyptian plagues.” Yet, as Kevin Sharpe has recently reminded us, “to those on the road during the 1630s, the journey seemed far from a headlong rush towards conflict.” Sir Henry Wotton could write in 1633 that “we know not what a Rebel is; what a Plotter against the Common-weal: nor what that is, which Grammarian[s] call Treason: the names themselves are antiquated with the things.” To resolve this flat contradiction requires much further research into the politics and government of Charles I's Personal Rule. In particular, a clear picture of the political behavior, relationships, and attitudes of many public figures is still lacking. This article therefore presents a case study of one prominent individual: Edward Sackville, fourth earl of Dorset, privy councillor and lord chamberlain to Henrietta Maria. These offices gave Dorset an exceptional opportunity during the 1630s to “see more clearly into [the king's] intents and actions.” Moreover, both official sources and personal correspondence should reveal his activities during the Personal Rule and his attitudes toward it. What follows will examine in turn Dorset's duties as the queen's lord chamberlain, the political influence that this office conferred, his work as a privy councillor, his relations with various factions, and his private opinions of the regime and of Charles I and Henrietta Maria.
Lost Londons: Change, Crime, and Control in the Capital City, 1550-1660
Introduction: rhetorics and records Part I. Change: 1. Troubled times 2. Mapping troubles 3. Streets Part II. Crime: 4. Crime: worlds 5. Crime: words Part III. Control: 6. Court days 7. Bodies 8. Policing: people and policy 9. Policing: night battles 10. Policing: process and prosecution 11. Policing: knowledge Conclusion.
The Posse Comitatus Act: Liberation from the Lawyers
"Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both." --Posse Comitatus Act (1) Much has been written about the Posse Comitatus Act. As a few others have noted, much of this commentary is "just plain nonsense." (2) The majority opinion, however, including that of the Department of Defense, maintains that this 19th-century law strictly limits almost all DOD participation in any activity related to "law enforcement" or "homeland security." (3) This fundamental mischaracterization, while understandable, is potentially dangerous to national security and has done nothing to protect civil liberties. So how did a racist law from the bitter Reconstruction period morph, in many minds, into shorthand for the respected principle that Americans do not want a military national police force? In a nutshell: deliberate mischaracterization by the original supporters who hid behind patriotic language to strip the freed slaves of their nascent civil and voting rights; excessive focus on the false historical arguments as opposed to the law's actual text and ugly history; and some bad policy that misused a few key court decisions, and part of a statute, in a way that limited DOD efforts in the "war on drugs" at a time when Congress was pushing expanded participation. This article introduces the actual history and meaning of the Posse Comitatus Act, distinguishing clearly between the law and a misleading DOD regulation that requires an army of lawyers to navigate. Despite what you've heard, the Posse Comitatus Act is not a significant impediment to DOD participation in law enforcement or homeland security. The Act's Uninspiring Pedigree General Acceptance of Army Participation in Law Enforcement (1787-1861) While the nation's founders were deeply concerned with the abuses of the British army during the colonial period and military interference in civil affairs, the majority was even more concerned about a weak national government incapable of securing life, liberty, and property. Some vocal patriots sought to avoid a standing army and any federal control over the state militias; however, in the end, theirs was the minority view. The new Constitution did not contain the explicit limits and outright bans desired by some, even though the pro-Constitution Federalists explicitly argued that the standing army could assist in law enforcement efforts. The framers even debated the federal government's power to call out the posse comitatus (literally meaning the power or authority of the county) and did not prohibit this established feature of the common law. Clearly, the Posse Comitatus Act did not originate from the prevailing opinion during the revolutionary period. Legislative and executive actions in the early days of the American republic confirm that the use of federal troops or federalized militia to preserve domestic order, either as part of a posse comitatus or otherwise, was an accepted feature of American life under the new Constitution. In 1794, President Washington led federal troops into western Pennsylvania because unruly farmers refused to pay a whiskey excise tax. President Jefferson issued a broad proclamation that relied upon the Chief Executive's authority to call on the entire populace, military and civilian, to serve as a grand posse comitatus to counter Aaron Burr's planned expedition against Spanish territory. In 1832, President Jackson initially sent military forces toward South Carolina under a Jefferson-like posse comitatus theory to prevent secession. In an 1851 report to the Senate, President Fillmore stated that he had the inherent power to use regular troops to enforce the laws and that all citizens could be called into a posse by the marshal. …