Degressive proportionality - source, findings and discussion of the Cambridge Compromise. Mathematical Economics, 2011, Nr 7 (14), s. 39-50
The principle of degressive proportionality in relation to the division of indivisible goods in the past few years – especially since the signing of the Treaty of Lisbon – has been one of the topics frequently appearing in studies of economists, mathematicians, lawyers and people involved in politics. It combines a purely theoretical and easily definable question with a very important practical problem that concerns primarily members of the European Union and countries aspiring to become one. The article shall include a debate and discussion of the findings of the Cambridge Compromise concerning proposals to solve the problem of allocating seats in the European Parliament.
Base Sequence of Degressively Proportional Divisions
Abstract The distribution of seats in the European Parliament in accordance with the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty is of a degressively proportional nature. 751 seats are distributed among the 27 Member States with the use of a principle which is in some way a response to the need of constructing a division that ensures adequate representation of the smallest members of the community. There are many feasible solutions however - unfortunately, no unambiguous manner of such allocation has yet been put forward. Therefore, the current seat distribution has been chosen through political negotiations. It turns out that a number of seats are not subject to such negotiations. When performing the distribution and preserving boundary conditions, a certain number of seats gets allocated to individual countries independently of negotiations, but only through the application of the principle of degressive proportionality. This paper explores the problem of determining the scale of actual political negotiations. It presents the minimum and maximum number of mandates which can be granted to specific Member States. This paper determines certain situations in which the boundary conditions, supporting the principle of degressive proportionality are contradictory.
The minimum-based procedure: A principled way to allocate seats in the European Parliament
This work proposes the minimum-based procedure for the allocation of seats in the European Parliament taking into account the criticism of the Cambridge Compromise proposal. The procedure is underpinned by the (base + strict prop) system which only allocates a minimum number of seats to the Member States. The degree (effective maximum number) and type (distribution of remaining seats) of degressivity remain essentially a political decision.