Judicial Capacity and the Conditional Spending Paradox
This Article examines the spending power and anti-commandeering principle through the lens of the author's judicial capacity model of Supreme Court decision-making. Taking the Court's recent decision in NFIB v. Sebelius as a jumping off point, this examination yields three important payoffs: First, it helps to explain the Court's historically broad interpretation of the spending power. Second, it refutes the conventional wisdom that this broad interpretation cannot be reconciled with the anti-commandeering principle -- a view the Article dubs the "conditional spending paradox." Third, it offers a rigorous theoretical basis for predicting that NFIB's spending power holding will be short-lived. This account obviously has significant implications for the spending power and anti-commandeering doctrine. It also contributes to a broader understanding of the influence of judicial capacity on the substance of constitutional law.
The Coercion Doctrine Invigorated: Conditional Spending Since NFIB v. Sebelius
The federal government has long utilized the practice of attaching conditions to the receipt of its funds. In the few instances that the Supreme Court had reviewed state challenges to conditions, it had ultimately set only minimal limitations on Congress’ spending power. That is why, when the Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius was delivered, a host of scholarly predictions emerged. Some thought the ruling would prompt an unraveling of other conditional spending programs. Others anticipated more indirect, structural changes to flow from the decision. I find that elements of both have occurred. Over the past seven years, federal and state actions have revealed an interesting mix of results. A surge of recent legal challenges have relied on NFIB’s coercion doctrine, but the courts have consistently rejected those challenges. Congress has also been careful when designing new programs to avoid the sort of federal coercion that was struck by the Court in NFIB. CONDITIONAL SPENDING SINCE NFIB V. SEBELIUS 3 Table of
The Challenges of Reforming Intellectual Property Protection for Computer Software
This article examines three critical, interrelated challenges for reforming legal protection for computer software: (1) analyzing the market failures that might justify government intervention to define (or alter) the legal entitlements granted for software innovations; (2) predicting the likely path of computer technology; and (3) anticipating and navigating potential impediments to legislative reform of legal protection for software. It warns that patent protection for computer software poses serious potential problems and should be addressed before powerful economic interests vest in large software patent portfolios.