Security cooperation, counterterrorism, and EU–North Africa cross-border security relations, a legal perspective
The EU is clearly in the process of developing an external dimension to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). This paper focuses on ex. Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM) provisions. These developments pose specific legal basis issues for the EU, given its complex EU–member state legal relationship, and the inter-institutional balance, all reflected in the treaty framework post-Lisbon. New Court of Justice rulings are now emerging which will assist in this issue. Equally the approach to be taken in developing these relationships will be crucial. This paper proposes the adoption of an Onuf style constructivism in order to best capture the reality of the process that is developing, and has developed for the ex. PJCCM measures internally. This then needs to be allied with a constitutionalism model to ensure a balanced development of all three aspects of the AFSJ.
Mapping out the institutional geography of external security in the EU
The growth of European Union (EU) competences in the field of external security in the last decade has produced a substantial increase in the number of EU institutions and bureaucratic actors engaged in the planning and management of these policies. Moreover, the expansion of competences in such a sovereign sensitive area comes up against the persistent intergovernmental nature of the security sector. This has resulted, on the one hand, in a complex institutional architecture with heavy demands in terms of coordination, and on the other hand, in a stark differentiation and stratification of the legal regimes with a potential to impact on policy outcomes. This state of uncertainty is particularly relevant when looking at relations with countries bordering the Union, as the long-standing web of interactions there has developed a more complex institutional environment. While most of the scholarly literature focuses on single institutional sectors or policies (Common Security and Defence Policy, European Neighbourhood Policy, or the external side of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice), this study seeks to address the issue with a comprehensive analysis of the institutional framework that has emerged in the last decade, more notably, since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. The article provides, first, an overview of the EU’s institutional actors responsible for security policies in the regions bordering the EU, and second, an examination of the different mechanisms established to address the coordination issue. Finally, this study will argue that the traditional military dimension is but one, and certainly not the most developed, of the security instruments employed by the EU. At another level, it will be argued that the shift of focus from the military to other security tools has altered the institutional balance in the security sector, substantially adding to the relative influential weight of the Commission.
Spain's Dual Security Dilemma: Strategic Challenges of Basque and Islamist Terror During the Aznar and Zapatero Eras
While global terror has emerged as today’s dominant issue, countries have grappled with terrorist attacks for generations.1 Violent movements and the terrorist attacks they inspire have bedeviled policy makers in Algeria, Colombia, England, India, Israel, Russia, Spain, and Sri Lanka for many decades. The case of Spain is especially complex, because it comprises simultaneous terror threats from two networks (Basque and Islamist) that radically diverge in their origins, goals, and methods. In this essay I compare the security problems created by the Basque terrorist group ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna) with those posed by Islamist al Qaeda affiliates in Spain. Though diminished by ETA’s 22 March 2006 announcement of a “permanent cease-fire,” Basque and Islamist terror groups continue to compromise Spanish security. ETA has directed attacks against the Spanish state for more than forty years and is responsible for more than eight hundred deaths; Islamists loyal to al Qaeda executed the single worst terror attack in modern Europe on 11 March 2004 when ten cell-phone-triggered bombs exploded on four commuter trains, killing 192 people and wounding 1,500 others. Basque and Islamist terrorism continues to haunt the Spanish political scene, and the terrorism issue has accelerated partisan divisions. The Socialist Party’s electoral victory on 14 March 2004 was widely inter-