The Limits of Dissensus: The Case of “Intelligent Design”
Although dissensus is a natural component of argumentation and testimony, there are limits as to what can be considered acceptable contrarian or arguments. In science, dissenting arguments are limited by the extent of their fidelity to known facts and theories. Dissensus is therefore limited by how consistent a new theory or hypothesis is with an established body of knowledge, as well as other criteria any good theory must meet. In the case of the so-called “intelligent design” controversy, the supposed “dissensus” is really an attempt at imposing inappropriate forms of argument. Using this case study as an example, questions on what are the limits of dissensus will be raised and examined.
Commentary on Andrew Kidd: "The Limits of Dissensus: The Case of 'Intelligent Design'"
Kidd describes two methods of reasoning supposedly employed by Darwin, both put forward by Darwin’s contemporaries in Victorian England. These are “analogical deduction,” which he attributes to John Herschel, and “consilience of inductions,” ascribed to William Whewell. Kidd then attempts to show that the arguments of intelligent design theorists do not conform to these methods of reasoning. Kidd’s critique of intelligent design would be more effective if he could tell us why anyone writing today should be guided by the canons of these eminent Victorians. He introduces his discussion with the sentence “Before looking at the arguments of the intelligent design advocates, we should first examine the initial arguments used by the scientists they are responding to” (p. 1). But why should we? Surely the design arguments stand or fall on their own. To fault them for not employing the same methods of reasoning as their opponents seems to beg the question in favor of the latter. Kidd needs to do more to show that these methods have the universal validity he seems to attribute to them. What, exactly, is analogical deduction? Kidd’s example is Darwin’s comparison between natural selection in the wild and artificial selection in domestication. I can see how this is an analogy. In what sense is it deductive? Later we read: “The use of such deductive analogies by Dembski differs greatly from their use by Herschel and Darwin, however, in that they [sic] are not axiomatic; they make no attempt to deduce their hypotheses upon [sic] laws which may be inferred from observations…” (p. 3). If a hypothesis is deduced, in what sense is it hypothetical? The appropriate role of analogy would seem to be in suggesting hypotheses. Once one has a hypothesis, one can see what follows from it together with other statements one believes. That is the role of deduction. If one of these deductive consequences conflicts with experience, either the hypothesis or one of these other beliefs has to be given up. Where one’s hypotheses come from is of little consequence. They may as well be arrived at by consulting sacred texts or a Ouija board. Or from analogical thinking. But, I repeat, this process does not appear to be deductive in any way. Perhaps Kidd is trying to address this problem when he says that according to Herschel “scientific theories are axiomatic, and that laws governing natural processes can be discerned through empirical understanding” (p. 2). But this unclear statement is pretty much all we get. Is some kind of special insight or intuition being postulated here?
An Essay on the Nature and Significance of the Normative Nature of Economics
It is conventional in economics to distinguish between the normative and the positive. The normative has to do with goodness and badness, and with what ought and ought not to be done;1 and the positive has to do with objective description and/or explanation, with what is and with what is necessary given some normative end. The normative has to do with desirability; the positive has to do with truth (in the sense of either descriptive accuracy or serviceability of a means to a given end).2