The Stability of Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The Clash between State and Antistate Actors
T he September 11 terrorist attacks on the U.S. mainland have transformed calculations about the threats posed by nonstate actors, especially those who largely are inspired by a global, antistate ideology such as al-Qaeda's panIslamist vision. Since 11 September 2001 the old threat of nuclear holocaust has acquired a new dimension-the possible possession and use of nuclear weapons by terrorists and extremist movements. Structural designs for nuclear weapons and other such materials were confiscated from underground hideouts of the alQaeda terrorist group in Afghanistan. The stability and instability of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan also has been a major issue of concern since the late 1980s. Proponents of nuclear deterrence in South Asia who argue that the introduction of nuclear weapons has prevented the outbreak of a largescale conflict between India and Pakistan, generally belong to the "State-as-arational-actor" school of thought. Others worry about the new threat against the stability of nuclear deterrence in South Asia posed by the intrusion of nonstate actors, or perhaps, more accurately, "antistate actors." Many perceive their agendas as "irrational" in their ideological orientation (Wahabism today as was Maoism in the 1960s).' Because their ultimate stated objective is to destroy the modern international system--a system based on nation-states-they should, therefore, be described as antistate actors in nature and purpose. Why should we pay greater attention to the role and perspective of antistate actors in our discussion of the stability of nuclear deterrence in South Asia?
Deterring violent non-state actors: dilemmas and implications

Purpose
This paper aims to address the limitations of classical deterrence theory in dealing with violent non-state actors (VNSAs).


Design/methodology/approach
The study uses qualitative methods.


Findings
It suggests that two measures must be applied; the first one is to rephrase the assumptions of the theory towards a broader definition. The second one is to theorize certain approaches for deterring VNSAs which shall remain a key component in, but not the cornerstone of, national security strategies.


Originality/value
In the aftermath of 9/11 attacks and US war on terrorism, the need arose to “revisit” the “Deterrence Theory” to address several changes such as rogue states, cyber threats and VNSAs, especially after the end of the Cold War, when the theory was originally developed. The recent research on VNSAs relates to the fourth wave of deterrence, which highlights its proper role in a new security environment.

The Internet and the Changing Beijing-Taipei Relations: Toward Unification or Fragmentation?
Information and its technologies facilitate the exercise of what has been called “soft power,” a concept that differentiates information from the conventional dimensions of “hard power,” which is mainly associated with military force and economic influence. Soft power, according to Nye, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense of the United States, means that “A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness. In this sense it is just as important to set the agenda in world politics and attract others as it is to force them to change through the threat or use of military or economic weapons.”1