A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF GROSS NPA OF STATE BANK GROUP & FOREIGN BANKS
Gross NPAs of State Bank Group exhibit an increasing trend but incase of Foreign Banks gross NPAs continue to rise up to the year 2009 and thereafter it falls. Advancement in technology, telecommunications and markets have changed the way banks collect, measure and manage their risks. As risk management becomes more sophisticated, the simple and static rules of 1998 Accord are becoming less relevant, Which needed a new capital framework and ways to manage risks. To solve these problems, Basel-II framework is an indicator approach for risk management. The study is based on secondary data. The scope of the study is limited to five years data.
EVALUATING THE PERFORMANCE OF INDIAN PUBLIC SECTOR BANKS AND PRIVATE SECTOR BANKS - A COMPARATIVE STUDY
The economic reforms in India started in early nineties, but their outcome is visible now. Major changes took place in the functioning of Banks in India only after liberalization, globalisation and privatisation. It has become very mandatory to study and to make a comparative analysis of services of Public sector Banks and Private Sector banks. Increased competition, new information technologies and thereby declining processing costs, the erosion of product and geographic boundaries, and less restrictive governmental regulations have all played a major role for Public Sector Banks in India to forcefully compete with Private and Foreign Banks. this paper an attempt to analyze how efficiently Public and Private sector banks have been managing NPA. We have used statistical tools for projection of trend. Index Terms—NPA, Profitability, Public Sector banks, private Sector banks. The last d ecade has seen many positive developments in the Indian banking sector. The policy makers, which comprise the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), Ministry of Finance and related government and financial sector regulatory entities, have made several notable efforts to improve regulation in the sector. The sector now compares favourably with banking sectors in the region on metrics like growth, profitability and non-performing assets (NPAs). A few banks have established an outstanding track record of innovation, growth and value creation. Banking in India was defined under Section 5(A) as "any company which transacts banking, business" and the purpose of banking business defined under Section 5(B),"accepting deposits of money from public for the purpose of lending or investing, repayable on demand through cheque/draft or otherwise". In the process of doing the above-mentioned primary functions, they are also permitted to do other types of business referred to as Utility Services for their customers (Banking Regulation Act, 1949). During Bruisers' time, three Presidencies' Banks were opened in Bengal (1809), Bombay (1840) and Madras (1843) with powers to issue Notes. In the year 1921, due to banking crisis during First World War, the three Presidency Banks merged to form Imperial Bank of India. In the year 1955, after Independence, Imperial Bank of India was nationalized and renamed as State Bank of India (SBI) with a primary mandate to go to rural areas by opening at least 400 branches immediately. In the year 1957, the seven banks that were earlier catering to the rulers of different areas or States viz., Patiala, Bikaner, Jaipur, Indore, Saurashtra,
Strategy and Manipulation in Medieval Elections
There are many goals in developing electoral protocols, including a desire for a system which is transparent, in that it is clear what the rule or procedure to follow is; nonmanipulable, in that it is not in a person’s best interest to misrepresent their preferences; honest, in the sense that it elects the ‘right’ candidate; and not open to strategizing, i.e., bribery or collusion. However, these desiderata are in tension with each other: Often, transparent electoral procedures are the least strategy resistant, and many honest procedures encourage manipulation. Thus a balance between these different goals must be sought. In modern times, since the seminal result on vote manipulation, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem [5, 6], much attention has been devoted to developing voting rules where manipulation is never in the best interest of the voters [4] or which are computationally too complex for the average bounded agent to be able to manipulate [1]. This focus on computational aspects of electoral methods is one of the hallmarks of modern studies on voting. But pursuit of these goals is not restricted to modern times: Those participating in elections in the Middle Ages also sought transparency, non-manipulability, honesty, and strategyproofness in so far as these properties can be consistently expressed in a single procedure. However, given the lack of computational sophistication in the Middle Ages, alternate approaches were needed in order to promote honesty, discourage strategizing, etc. These approaches can be classified as either external (constraints introduced outside of the electoral procedure, such as incentives for coming to consensus quickly) or internal (constraints introduced within the electoral procedure, such as voting rules which cannot be manipulated without adverse effects, or which are too difficult for the average bounded agent to manipulate). Surveying examples of both approaches in the context of medieval ecclesiastical and secular elections provides an interesting comparison to modern electoral procedures. Elections in the Middle Ages were used for the same reasons that they are today: To select suitable candidate(s) for a particular office, duty, or obligation. However, it is important to note that the term electio was used in the Middle Ages in a broader sense than our modern ‘election’. Its primary sense was ‘selection’ or ‘choice’, and only secondarily ‘election’ in the modern sense. Thus, many records which purportedly discuss elections are not discussing elections of the type which interests us. We can identify four categories of medieval electoral processes: (1) Election by an external authority having no direct interest in the election; (2) Indirect election, where electors name other electors who then select or elect the officials; (3) Election by lot; and (4) Election by ballot. Elections of the first and third types are generally computationally uninteresting; the first type corresponds to dictatorial voting rules, and the third type collapses to probability theory. In general, interesting voting methods are found only in the fourth type, election by ballot, though they can also occur in indirect election.