Rwanda Smallholder Coffee Tree Maintenance and Cherry Processing Techniques: Results of a National Farm-level Survey, 2002
Food Security Research Project (FSRP) and Division of Agricultural Statistics (DSA) Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Forestry MINAGRI
Résumé des Observations tirées de Décaféiné? Situation, Tendances et Perspectives pour la Production du Café au Rwanda Analyse d’une Enquête sur les Ménages Ruraux, an 2002
Most Rwandan coffee is currently grown and processed the same way it was a decade ago. Consequently, Rwanda’s coffee production and marketing system has not been able to keep up with changes in the global market for high quality coffee. Given world market gluts of relatively poor quality coffee, Rwanda is now exporting a product that fetches low prices. Despite the challenges in coffee marketing and production, coffee remains one of Rwanda’s most important official sources of foreign exchange and the drop in production is of major concern to both the public and private sectors. In an effort to assist decision makers in the coffee sector better understand factors affecting farmers’ production decisions and their attitudes about coffee, the FSRP fielded a nationally representative survey in 2002. The survey results show that the sector appears to be at a turning point—significant numbers of farmers have moved away from coffee with more seemingly on the cusp of removing more trees, or “decaffeinating” their fields. While the overall picture presented in this report is one of decline, there are also some encouraging changes. Liberalization of coffee policies in the mid-1990s seems to have increased yields by taking the poorest fields out of production. Growing farmer interest in intercropping coffee with food crops suggests that there may be a means of stretching Rwanda’s most limiting resource—land area— thereby enabling farmers to achieve a better combination of food and cash crops. Also, the fact that the coffee sector survives at all in the face of numerous adversities is a weighty testament to its potential.
Livestock Aspects of Feed Grain Policy
It is a signal event that our topic should be included on this program. In recent years, the livestock and poultry economy has scarcely been considered in the making of price and income policy for feed grains. It has been disregarded by pragmatic policy makers. It has been almost equally bypassed by theoretical economists, who usually kibitz freely. Policy for support and target prices for corn, grain sorghums, and other feed grains has been made with an eye almost exclusively fixed on the producers of those crops. The target price has been set relatively high in order to protect crop farmers' income. The latest (and current) loan rate policy has been to hold the rate low. Although a low rate facilitates moving grain into livestock and poultry consumption when crops are abundant, it does nothing to provide buffer stocks for years when crops are short. In addition, a couple of years ago it became administrative policy to dispose of the stocks inherited from an earlier period, even subsidizing their sale abroad. But the foremost example of one-sidedness is the attitude toward release prices. In all the rhetoric heard recently about the peril of holding corn or sorghums in reserve, the scold has been that release prices would not be set high enough. What group can the spokesmen have had in mind? Feed producers, of course! Not feed consumers, that is, livestock and poultry men. It has been a one-sided consideration of a two-sided issue. If all groups are to have equal voice in policy making, how can livestock and poultry interests be so ostracized? The one-sidedness has more impact now that so much livestock and poultry production has become detached from feed supply on individual farms. The livestock-poultry economy is therefore more sensitive to the availability and price of feed. It is in fact a contradiction that historically, livestock and poultry got more attention when they were still closely connected with feed production on the farm. In the early years of farm programs, the "ever-normal granary" was consciously designed to level out the supply and price of feed for livestock and poultry. Now that livestock and poultry have become more commercial and more vulnerable to a volatile feed situation, feed price stabilization has been progressively removed from the councils of farm policy. And the ultimate contradiction is that the alleged price-depressing perils of a feed reserve have been proclaimed in disregard of the fact that the main defense of feed grain producers' incomes is the target price-direct payment mechanism, not support prices. If grains on reserve should cause market prices to be reduced below target level, producers would get bigger direct payments, that is, producers with a base on their farm are protected in that way. Admittedly, production outside such a base would not be eligible for payment.