Flexible Choice-of-Law Rules: Panacea or Oxymoron?
Flexibility is not an acknowledged legal concept, however, and there is no common understanding what fl exibility really means. In fact, the term “fl exibility” is hardly ever defi ned, it is not used uniformly and it may consequently carry rather different meanings depending on the context.2 Furthermore, the doctrinal viability of fl exibility normally remains unexplained. I have previously discussed related general aspects in an article which was published in 2011.3 Based on feedback which I have received in the meantime and further research, this article refi nes my conclusions and – more importantly – explores the signifi cance of fl exibility in the choice-of-law context. To set the scene the fi rst section provides a brief introduction to the potential meanings of “fl exibility” and how this term is used in the legal discourse.4
The Verdict of Quiescent Years: Mr. Hill and the Conflict of Laws
" ROFEsSOR ALFRED HILL recently weighed some ideas about conflict of laws |--advanced by this writer and found them wanting.1 His critique seems to I. require an answer, though I approach the task with some reluctance. I do not relish the defensive attitude that is inevitable in responses to criticism; I do not care for the excessive use of the first person singular that is unavoidable in such discourse except by resort to more distasteful alternatives. Moreover, in this instance I lack spirit for the kind of thrust and parry that sometimes characterizes such professorial encounters. I have no zeal to mount my typewriter and charge into the fray. The truth is that I am delighted that so competent a scholar as Professor Hill has taken note of what I have had to say, and has taken the trouble to articulate and publish his disagreement. In his negative reaction I am sure he is by no means alone, but others have, for the most part, been content simply to disagree and let it go at that. I welcome Mr. Hill's critical analysis; it is better to die by the sword than to be ignored into limbo.2 Mr. Hill's analysis is responsible, informed, and fair. His discussion is free from personalities in the invidious sense. He very courteously gave me a copy of the manuscript prior to publication; not only so, but we spent a full day discussing it together, with the result that some misunderstandings were clarified and (I believe) he modified his original reactions to some extent. It is perfectly clear that he is interested in sound legal scholarship rather than in scoring points in an academic fencing match. I hope that in this response I can maintain the same level of objective discussion. A prefatory word about my role as a conflict-of-laws pundit, as I conceive it: People doubtless write law-review articles for a variety of reasons. I do so, primarily, as a means of working through problems that arise in the teaching
The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice ten years on: Successes and future challenges under the Stockholm Programme. CEPS Paperbacks. June 2010
This book celebrates the tenth anniversary of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) by bringing together the views of key practitioners and policy-makers who have played an outstanding role in thinking about and shaping EU policies on freedom, security and justice. 
 
Ten years ago, the member states transferred competences to the EU for law and policy-making in the fields of immigration, asylum and border controls, and began the transfer process for criminal justice and policing. This decade of European cooperation on AFSJ policies has experienced very dynamic convergence, the enactment of a large body of European law and the setting-up of numerous EU agencies working in these domains. Such dynamism in policy-making has not been without challenges and vulnerabilities, however. As this collective volume shows, the main dilemmas that lie ahead relate to an effective (while more plural) institutional framework under the Treaty of Lisbon, stronger judicial scrutiny through a greater role for national courts and the Court of Justice in Luxembourg, better mechanisms for evaluating and monitoring the implementation of EU AFSJ law and a more solid fundamental rights strategy. The contributions in this volume address the progress achieved so far in these policy areas, identify the challenges for future European cooperation in the AFSJ and put forward possible paths for making more progress in the next generation of the EU’s AFSJ.