French Security Policy in Transition: Dynamics of Continuity and Change
Abstract : Since 1989, French defense and security policy has been undercut by changes in the external environment and domestic pressures to deal with the challenge of economic modernization. The Soviet revolution of 1989, the reunification of Germany, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the experience of coalition warfare during the Gulf War-all have challenged the assumptions and realities underlying the Gaullist synthesis. Above all, the French position on security independence has been put into question. The main hope has been for a European Alliance to supplant the American one over time in the face of a gradual process of change within Europe but change has not been gradual within Europe. The European Union is challenged by discontent within Western Europe. A new Central Europe has emerged that has yet to find its place in European or global politics. A new Russia is emergent in which nationalism is defining an assertive role for the Russians within Europe, but at the same time the economic weakness of Russia limits its ability to play such a role.
NATO: From Berlin to Bosnia, Trans-Atlantic Security in Transition
"THE BONFIRE OF THE CERTAINTIES" In mid-September 1994, North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces deployed to Poland alongside troops from seven former Warsaw Pact members to conduct the first joint peacekeeping exercise under the mantle of the newly formed "Partnership for Peace." Exercise "Co-operative Bridge 94," as it was called, involved less than 1,000 military personnel--not a particularly significant deployment in purely military terms. But in political terms, it was, according to General George Joulwan, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, "a truly historic occasion." (1) As German Defense Minister Volker Riihe noted, "Anyone who knows even a little bit about history knows this is not a routine event when Polish and German soldiers are working together." (2) Certainly this was not a "routine" event by any standard. It was, in fact, an event that less than five years ago would have been considered unthinkable. But since the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989--described at the time by a NATO officer as "the bonfire of the certainties" (3)--events in Europe have moved so rapidly that even the unthinkable has become reality in security affairs. During this period, even the "routine" functioning of the Alliance has ceased to be routine, and the nature of the American leadership role has been called into question on both sides of the Atlantic. From the fall of the Berlin Wall through the first use of NATO forces in combat in Bosnia in 1994, NATO has found itself in a race to keep up with these dramatic changes in the trans-Atlantic security environment. The growth of a NATO role in peace support operations such as those in Bosnia, and, within the NATO framework, the development of the NACC (North Atlantic Cooperation Council) Ad Hoc Group on Peacekeeping and the Partnership for Peace (PFP), are examples of this phenomenon. Yet the pace of these breathtaking developments has not been maintained without cost. The ability of NATO, NACC and the PFP to play an effective role in promoting peace and stability in Eurasia has been complicated by the rapid and sometimes disjointed manner in which these institutions have been forced to evolve. Indeed, while many of NATO's new "partners" have expressed concern that the "Partnership" has not evolved far enough or fast enough, a convincing case can be made that the events of the past five years may have outstripped the capabilities of trans-Atlantic and European security institutions--and the political will of their members--to adapt to them. The resulting roles and limits associated with potential NATO, NACC, and PFP involvement in future operations can best be understood in the context of NATO's original attempts to respond to the unanticipated requirements for a revision of the Alliance role in meeting the security and defense requirements of its members in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. ... AND THE WALLS CAME TUMBLING DOWN NATO itself was certainly not prepared for the pace of change that followed the fail of the Berlin wall and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. In the fail of 1989, as the Berlin Wall was coming down, a survey of over 30 NATO and SHAPE staff officers could find only 2 who were willing to consider adopting a new NATO strategy to replace MC 14-3's twin pillars of "forward defense and flexible response" within the next decade in response to the changes underway in Europe. "After all," it was explained, "MC 14-3 took seven years--and the withdrawal of France from NATO's integrated military structures--to gain Alliance approval even when there was consensus about the nature of the threat." It would be "too difficult" to attempt to craft a new strategy--NATO would just have to make do with the old. (4) Yet little over half a year later, the NATO heads of state held a momentous meeting in London; there, noting that "the walls that once confined people and ideas are collapsing," they directed the Alliance to undertake a "fundamental" revision of NATO's strategy and to "build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe" by reaching out to NATO's former adversaries in the East and extending to them "the hand of friendship. …
FURUTA INEQUALITY AND ITS RELATED TOPICS
This article is devoted to a brief survey of Furuta inequality and its related topics. It consists of 4 sections: 1. From Lowner-Heinz inequality to Furuta inequality, 2. Ando-Hiai inequality, 3. Grand Furuta inequality, and 4. Chaotic order.