The relationship between china and Siberia/Russian Far East: Economic cooperation and security conflicts
This paper analyzes the current relationship between China and Siberia/Russian Far East from the economic and political‐security perspectives. The relationship between China and Siberia/Russian Far East is that of cooperation and conflict. China gains natural resources and energy from Siberia/Russian Far East, while Siberia/Russian Far East secures consumer goods, food and labor to fill its shortage from China. The two regions are in an economically complementary relationship. However, they show differences in their interests in issues such as the Tuman River Development Project. If their economic cooperation could be called the “bright” side of their relationship, there exists the “dark” side of their relationship, which is the border dispute. The paper argues that as a way to reduce conflict and increase cooperation in Northeast Asia, a multilateral security/economic organization, tentatively called the “Organization for Security and Cooperation in Northeast Asia,” should soon be established.
The Russian Far East's Economic Integration with Northeast Asia: Problems and Prospects
T ^ HE END OF THE COLD WAR and the normalization of relations between Russia and China were perceived as opening up new opportunities for the Russian Far East's integration into the Northeast Asian region. Some analysts anticipated that a revival of economic, touristic and other links between the Russian Far East and three of its neighbours,Japan, China and South Korea, would mitigate tensions in their relations and help establish a solid foundation for bilateral and multilateral regional interaction. It was hoped that growing foreign economic ties would have positive security effects on the Russian Far East raising its level of economic development and reducing its dependence on the military and defence industry. Russian analysts anticipated that their country's increasing economic ties with Northeast Asia would maintain its presence and influence at a time of a decline in its military power. These expectations have been largely disappointed. Trade, investment and other links between the Russian Far East and its neighbours have grown, but not as much as originally anticipated. This paper explores the incentives for and obstacles to the Russian Far East's economic integration with Northeast Asia. It analyzes the reasons for its limited success and the security and economic implications. It argues that Russia's incomplete reform and failure to create an attractive trade and investment climate is one of the main barriers to the Russian Far East's economic integration with the Northeast Asian region.
Strengthening Central CCP Control of Leadership Selection: The 1990 Nomenklatura
In the aftermath of their suppression of the democracy movement in June 1989, China's leaders concluded that the Chinese Communist Party's leadership selection system was in serious trouble. The actions of intellectuals and the media during the May-June crisis, measures proposed by former Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang for cadre reform and the results of an earlier decision to decentralize the nomenklatura convinced authorities in Beijing that Party control of leadership selection had decayed and that decentralization of personnel decisions had gone too far. During the next few years China's post-4 June leadership took steps to rectify these problems. One of these was to revise the central Party's nomenklatura, which they subsequently re-issued in 1990.