Effective Defense Support for Public Diplomacy (DSPD) with a Sub-Saharan Africa Target Audience: A Case Study of the African Crisis Response Force Proposal
Abstract : The aim of this thesis is to evaluate the effectiveness of Department of Defense (DoD) Defense Support for Public Diplomacy (DSPD) sources and messages using the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) as a controlled comparison case study. The ACRF case can provide useful lessons for USAFRICOM on how to communicate more effectively with its African partners. From a more narrow DSPD perspective, the absence of an explicit adversary in Africa means that military tactics there should be focused on capturing human terrain through the robust utilization of information operations rather than more conventional stratagems. To accomplish this, the DoD needs to understand how to communicate effectively with Africans. The command's focus on interagency cooperation and building partnerships with African states makes successful Information Operations even more critical and the role of DPSD even more central to ensuring that DoD actions align with and complement other elements of national power to synchronize an American grand strategy in Africa. The focus in this thesis is on informational causal mechanisms, defined as the "physical, social, or psychological processes through which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities." Using Wilbur Schramm's disaggregation of communications into a source and message, the case studies will treat the ACRF's and related DSPD sources and messages as independent variables, and the acceptance or rejection of ACRF as the dependent variable. The target audience is composed of the state-level actors who possessed the ability to accept or reject the ACRF proposal.
African Crisis Response Initiative: A Refocus
Abstract : Since the end of the Cold War the growth and stability of individual nations highlight Africa's complexity, diversity, and rapid change. Throughout the last ten years, the United States National policy towards the region has been fairly consistent. Limited US interests focus on the promotion of security, economic prosperity, and democracy. However, in the 21st century the United States will play a more vital role, as a hegemonic power, in attempts to bring stability and development to Africa using limited military resources. In 1996 the Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) was implemented to enhance the indigenous African capacity to conduct peacekeeping operations. This US training initiative provides for peacekeeping training and limited non-lethal equipment for battalion sized units in selected countries. Since the ACRI concept is viewed as a flagship initiative for military to military engagement within the region, it is now time to consider building on the initial success of the program. A reorientation of the program to focus on sub-regional organizations with the regional capacity to conduct the full range of peacekeeping through peace-enforcement operations may be warranted.
An African Rapid-Deployment Force
Speed is the essence of war Take advantage of the enemy's unpreparedness; travel by unexpected routes and strike him where he has taken no precautions. -un Tzu, The Art of War IN RECENT YEARS, the concept of speedy deployment of military forces to world trouble spots has taken on new meaning, largely due to advances in military technology and the reality of the "global village." Modem communications have turned all the nations of the world into neighbors, with shared responsibilities for peace and security. Conflicts such as the Gulf War, the Bosnian tragedy and the internecine slaughter in Rwanda and Burundi have pricked the international conscience and heightened a growing international and regional sense of communal liability. This in turn has emphasized a more respectable role for armed forcespreventing, or at least minimizing, armed conflict. With this interest in military "fire fighting" or "fire prevention," an old concept has gained new popularity: the rapid deployment force (RDF). Over the past three decades or more, Africa, particularly, has shown itself to be singularly susceptible to military intervention, which has been carried out primarily by non-African powers. However, with South Africa's democratization and its return to the respectable international community, Organization for African Unity (OAU) members have a growing awareness that Africa itself could provide an RDF for action on that continent.l It would be reasonable to consider the viability of an indigenous RDF for Africa, with a view to employing it in operations where quick intervention is necessary to prevent conflict or establish peace. A brief historical perspective would be useful before defining rapid deployment. The possible roles of an African RDF must be identified, and the most suitable type of force for rapid deployment must be examined, in conjunction with its collateral utility. Finally, some attention must be given to international force composition and its proposed command and control (C2) structure. Historical Perspective Since the former European colonies of Africa began obtaining their modem independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the continent has been in a state of almost constant upheaval. The combined Anglo-French airborne and amphibious assault on the Suez in 1956 signalled the start of what became regular interventions by former colonial powers in African affairs. More than 30 interventionist operations have taken place in Africa since 1956.2 As in the Suez, some of these operations were uninvited. Others were conducted at the express request or with the consent of the African country concerned. In 1964, for example, the then Republic of Congo (now Zaire) allowed Belgium to intervene to save more than 1,900 Belgian and US hostages being held by secessionist Simba rebels in the cities of Stanleyville (Kisangani) and Paulis (Isiro). A Belgian parachute battalion was flown 11,500 km by 14 US Air Force C-130 Hercules aircraft. The battalion parachuted in to carry out a remarkably successful operation, as shown in Figure 1.3 When the Kenyan army mutinied in 1964, the Kenyan government asked the British to intervene. Royal Marines and other light troops stopped the mutiny in a very short time. Similarly, when Swaziland experienced unrest in the 1960s, it was the British, with an airlifted light infantry battalion, who restored and maintained order for the Swazi government. During the 1978 attempt at secession by the Zairese province of Shaba, French paratroopers jumped in at Kolwezi to rescue hostages and repel the rebels.4 In many former French colonies in Central Africa, French paratroopers and the Foreign Legion have carried out successful interventionist actions. In 1990, when US citizens in Liberia were threatened by upheaval there, US Marines, transported by helicopters from ship to shore, carried out the rescue. …