The US Approach toward Islamic Militancy: Current Policies in Historical Perspective
Following the events of 9/11, the US declared a global war on terror and a new strategy based on preemption for defeating Muslim extremism and terrorism. However, the new US strategy so far has not been more successful than earlier strategies in combating either Muslim extremism or international terrorism. Arguably, it may even have contributed to the strengthening of the appeal of Islamic extremism and certain terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. The principal reason for this lack of success has been the historically inconsistent and contradictory approach of the US to dealing with the problem of Muslim militancy and its manipulation of it for short-term objectives.
Crusades, Just Wars, and the Bush Doctrine
The Bush Doctrine has been described in various ways by Jonathan Monten, Francois Heisbourg, John Lewis Gaddis, Max Boot and Robert Jervis: as “democratic idealism,” as “democratic globalism,” and even as “messianic universalism.” The Bush Doctrine includes the following ideas: the war on terrorism is a clash of civilizations in which liberty and democracy are opposed to totalitarianism; preemptive wars are necessary because deterrence and retaliatory defense are inadequate to deal with terrorism and the ideology of “Islamo-fascism;” unilateral action by the United States is morally required because the U.S. is both a military and moral leader of the world; it is acceptable to fight wars that seek to spread liberal-democratic values because liberal democracies are peaceful and stable; and complete victory is the only acceptable outcome in the war on terrorism.
A work in progress: The bush doctrine and its consequences
The U.S. strategic revision remains a work in progress. The United States and its allies can, and should, together redefine “imminent threat” in the post‐September 11 world while fleshing out the doctrinal and operational implications of new strategic approaches.