What’s the Matter with Being a Strategist (Now)?
American strategic competence is in decline. Twenty years after victory in the Cold War, a victory brought about by the shrewd use of state power and alliances while ably balancing international and domestic pressures, the United States now is struggling to find the right balance of military force and other forms of power in its current wars, while peering into an uncertain future. Commenting on American strategic competence, noted defense analyst Barry D. Watts argues, "US performance in Iraq provides ample evidence that it has been declining for some time."l This line of thought typically asserts that American strategic competence reached its apex between the victory in World War II; implementation of ASC 68, a 1950 report advocating ends, ways, and means of countering communism; and President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Solarium project, a 1953 evaluation of national security policy regarding the Soviet Union. Somewhere between the death of Josef Stalin and the rise of an era of limited war, the United States lost its strategic way. Given the diverse nature of today's threats, many observers look back with nostalgia on the clarity of the Soviet threat and the quality of the strategic thinking and planning that countered it. Rash comparisons between Cold War challenges--remembered as clearly identified, existential, and countered with bipartisan political support--and today's stew of pandemics, loose nuclear weapons, hackers, and undergoverned territories deserve closer scrutiny. Despite stark differences between the eras, there may be merit to the rising claim of strategic incompetence. From the Bay of Pigs to Vietnam to the inconclusive ceasefire terms at the end of the 1991 Gulf War, there is evidence that the strategic skill of the United States has been found wanting. If Watts is correct, that it is America's strategic competence that demands repair, then perhaps the effort to slow the erosion has already begun. A reversal of that trend is taking place, one that has gone unnoticed and will likely remain underappreciated for years to come--the return of the Army strategist. It would be ideal if this progress could be announced with the flamboyancy of a John Williams score in Star Wars: Return of the Jedi, but in reality this reversal is subtle, bureaucratic, and over a decade old. The US Army currently has more than 400 military strategists serving in the grades of captain to colonel, diligently assisting commanders from division to combatant command level. Strategists occupy key positions within the broader defense community, serving on the National Security Council, Joint Staff, Army Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and recently at the Treasury and State Departments. In a number of ways, these strategists owe their development, education, and assignments to a vision articulated more than 20 years ago. In 1989, General John R. Galvin, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and Commander-in-Chief, US European Command at the time, argued for the return of uniformed strategists in his article, "What's the Matter with Being a Strategist?" After succinctly defining the attributes of military strategists, General Galvin suggested that key elements of their development included advanced schooling, operational experience, and lifelong development. (2) His influential and timely argument helped stimulate a review of the requirement for military strategists conducted by the Army's Officer Personnel Management System Task Force XXI/3 in the late 1990s. This review resulted in the creation of the functional specialty supporting Army strategists, technically recognized as Functional Area (FA) 59, Strategic Plans and Policy officers. Despite the number of strategists and the breadth of their assignments, this functional specialty is still a relatively recent development. Since 1999, the Army has gradually formalized the development of the specialty and expanded the number of strategists. …
Revisiting a School of Military Government: How Reanimating a World War II-Era Institution Could Professionalize Military Nation Building
In the last decade, the United States has found itself fully immersed in nation building, despite its alleged distaste for such endeavors. U.S. military forces in particular have been at the center of these efforts, building schools in Iraq, staffing Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) throughout Afghanistan and training soldiers in Mozambique. U.S. Army platoon leaders hand out micro grants to small business owners and help stand up city councils. Civil servants who once trained for peacetime development work now find themselves mediating tribal disputes in remote mountain provinces. Regardless of the efficacy of such efforts, public statements by both President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton suggest that nation building and related activities are preferred solutions in the war against terrorism. Yet despite the enormous complexity and ambition of such efforts, there remains a gap in the training and education for nation building.This paper details the U.S. Army-established School of Military Government and its related Civil Affairs Training Program that prepared forces for occupational duties in Europe and Asia. It highlights the demonstrated effectiveness both of its curriculum and approach to education and of its impact on the occupation of Germany and Japan, which offer important lessons for today’s military faced with similar challenges. If nation building, particularly with economic growth as a key component, is to assume a greater role as a component of foreign policy or national security strategy, it needs to consume a greater role of our planning, analysis, and organizational design. Civil Affairs and several other functional areas within the military play a significant role in aspects of nation building today and would benefit from education focused on such matters. Other beneficial initiatives would include creating a mechanism for drawing experts into and out of the military to serve as nation-builders at a level commensurate with their experience, providing a more effective and less expensive option than hiring contractors.
The mark of sexual preference in the interpretation of texts: preface to a homosexual reading.
Since reading is an interaction or confrontation between the reader and the text-an interaction that depends upon the background and perspectives of the reader as well as on the text being read-we can assume that the dynamics of sexuality and sexual object choice will influence how readers ascribe meaning to literary texts. In fact, although other aspects of our identities come into play when we read, sexual identity is unique and central because of the role that it plays in the creation of subjectivity. Specifically, male homosexuality informs and structures the reading of texts. But what does it be a homosexual reader or to effectuate a homosexual reading of a particular text?