Unraveling the Japan-South Korea ““Virtual Alliance””: Populism and Historical Revisionism in the Face of Conflicting Regional Strategies
Domestic politics combined with strategic repositioning toward the U.S. set back ties between Japan and South Korea in 2004––05. Despite the North Korean nuclear crisis and the challenge of shifting great power relations in Asia, as well as closer economic and cultural bilateral ties, politicized forces are pulling the two countries apart.
Built to last: The Dokdo territorial controversy. The baseline conditions in domestic politics and international security of Japan and South Korea
The baseline conditions in domestic politics and international security of Japan and South Korea compel these countries to deal with historical issues in provocative terms, with each side alienating the other. The current status of the Dokdo controversy between Japan and South Korea has remained largely unchanged since 1965, when the two countries signed the diplomatic normalization treaty: Japan continues its protest that South Korea has unlawfully occupied the islands, and South Korea responds that there is no dispute to be settled with Japan regarding the sovereign status of the islands. The path dependency from the past and domestic political institutions continue to deprive top decision makers in Japan and South Korea of political autonomy to move beyond the 1965 formula in addressing the issue of Dokdo in productive and forward-looking ways. Resolving the controversy would require a critical rupture in order to transform the current baseline conditions inherent in the Dokdo issue.
Japan's Images of China in the 1990s: Are They Ready for China's ‘Smile Diplomacy’ or Bush's ‘Strong Diplomacy’?
Both the US and China are pressing Japan to tilt its foreign policy in their direction. Japan's response depends on views of China, which turned negative as assumptions proved incorrect. Early expectations were challenged in 1990–94, despite hopes of becoming a bridge between the US and China, and were dashed from 1995. The struggle among four schools of thought intensified. The full engagement group lost the most ground. The predominantly engagement, potential threat group was attacked as the mainstream, but it survived as the best option for global political leverage. The predominantly containment, possible engagement group gained as China allowed rising nationalism to target Japan. The full containment group also gained, boosted by Japanese nationalism anxious to rationalize the war era. More than reacting to Chinese or US actions, Japanese views are driven by instability in national identity. The US should be wary of encouraging containment of China because of its impact on rising Japanese nationalism.