WMD Intelligence Analysis of Lessons from Iraq to Iran: Only Dot the I's - Don't Cross the T's
On January 29, 2010, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair gave evidence to the Iraq Enquiry in London, which was broadcast worldwide on satellite TV by the BBC. He emphasized the need to learn the lessons of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) from the case of Iraq for the case of Iran. In his words “propping up one dictator to handle another dictator is not the way, we must get rid of the dictator.” More interesting is how many intelligence analysts are being instructed to dot the I’s but in the case of Iraq the analysis went to far and also crossed the T’s. Here is the previously untold story of what really happened.
Unscom and the Iraqi Biological Weapons Program: Implications for Arms Contro
V erification ofbiological weapons (BW) arms control agreements is one ofthe most difficult tasks in disarmament. While biological arms were outlawed 25 years ago by the multilateral Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), there is still no accepted verification mechanism for biological weapons disarmament. The discovery ofan enormous, diverse biological weapons program in Iraq sparked new interest in development ofa verification regime for the BWC. The investigation of Iraq's BW program also provides the first case history of an international BW arms control verification effort. The inquiry undertaken by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) demonstrates both the inherent difficulties ofsuch an investigation and the possibilities of success. The United Nation's actions in Iraq have made use of nearly all of the verification processes envisaged for the BWC, including information monitoring, remote sensing, inspections, on-site measures, and continuous monitoring. The UNSCOM case portrays examples ofthe real-world implementation ofBW verification techniques, including their accomplishments and failures. Specifically, the commission's efforts in Iraq have shown the value of a process or systematic approach to BW verification, rather than a reliance on discrete verification tools. Using a multifaceted verification strategy, UNSCOM has also proven the possibility ofdetecting a covert, well-hidden biological weapons program. Following the detection ofthe Iraqi BW program, UNSCOM is attempting to determine the full scope of the program in order to eliminate it.
Pecuniary Externalities: The Convergence of Directed Technological Change and the Emergence of Innovation Systems
The new understanding of the characteristics of knowledge indivisibility and knowledge appropriability makes it possible to appreciate the key role pecuniary externalities play both in the generation and in the exploitation of technological knowledge. Pecuniary externalities affect access to external knowledge and its localized appropriation, by the intensive use of idiosyncratic factors and the introduction of biased technological change. Their combined effect shapes the convergence of the directed features of the knowledge generated at the firm level and explains the path dependent emergence of local and technological innovation systems and the dynamics of innovation cascades.