Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design
Constitutional dictatorship, far from being a contradiction in terms, has been an important feature of republican governments since Roman times. This essay describes the basic idea of a constitutional dictatorship, and discusses those elements of constitutional dictatorship that already exist in the American constitutional system, particularly in the modern presidency. A constitutional dictatorship is a system (or subsystem) of constitutional government that bestows on a certain individual or institution the right to make binding rules, directives, and decisions and apply them to concrete circumstances unhindered by timely legal checks to their authority. The Roman dictatorship limited the time of the dictatorship and separated the institution that declared the emergency from the person who exercised power. The American pattern has been quite different. Generally speaking, the President announces the existence of a crisis or emergency, and, at the President's request, the Congress generally bestows new statutory grants of power. These new powers are usually never repealed and are banked away for future use, sometimes in very different contexts. The American pattern of constitutional dictatorship does not involve the executive claiming the right to transcend the law; instead Congress grants ever more practically unreviewable discretion to the executive. In addition, a significant feature of American constitutionalism is the rise of "distributed dictatorships," in which executive power is spread among a number of de facto dictators, each with its own special expertise. The modern administrative state increasingly spreads unreviewable power among a variety of different agencies, czars, and bureaucrats. The Federal Reserve's response to the recent economic crisis and the Centers for Disease Control's powers to impose quarantines are examples. The essay concludes with some suggestions for counteracting the more dangerous tendencies in the American pattern of constitutional dictatorship. Although emergencies often cannot be foreseen in advance, the structural features of emergency power must be designed in advance to preserve republican government.
Ultima Ratio as a Constitutional Principle
The paper argues the criminal law notion of ultima ratio is an instance of a broader constitutional law principle of proportionality. However, ultima ratio is not the only principle relevant in a constitutional assessment of criminalization. The role of ultima ratio is to impose limitations on criminalization. But constitutional doctrines also exist which call for criminalization and might even be seen as establishing a criminalization obligation. The paper examines three constitutional counter weights to ultima ratio. The first of these is discussed in the context of state constitutions. This is the cluster of the interrelated constitutional doctrines of the horizontal effect of fundamental rights and the protective duty of the state, as well as the understanding of collective security as a basic right. These doctrines are analyzed in the light of the praxis of the German Constitutional Court and the Finnish Constitutional Law Committee. The two other constitutional counterweights are discussed at the level of the transnational, European constitution. These are the principles of precaution and effectiveness.Este articulo defiende que el concepto de ultima ratio es una instancia mas amplia del principio de proporcionalidad dentro del derecho constitucional. Sin embargo, el ultima ratio no es el unico principio relevante en la valoracion constitucional de la criminalizacion. El papel del ultima ratio es imponer limites a la criminalizacion. Pero tambien existen doctrinas constitucionales que exigen la criminalizacion e incluso dan pie a entender que obligan a establecer una pena. El documento examina tres contrapesos constitucionales al ultima ratio. En primer lugar, se analiza en el contexto de las constituciones estatales. Este es el conjunto de las doctrinas constitucionales interrelacionadas entre el efecto horizontal de los derechos fundamentales y el deber de proteccion del Estado, asi como la asuncion de la seguridad colectiva como un derecho fundamental. Estas doctrinas se analizan a la luz de la praxis de la Corte Constitucional de Alemania y del Comite de Derecho Constitucional Finlandes. Los otros dos contrapesos constitucionales, los principios de precaucion y eficiencia, se discuten en el ambito de la constitucion transnacional europea.
The Internet and the Changing Beijing-Taipei Relations: Toward Unification or Fragmentation?
Information and its technologies facilitate the exercise of what has been called “soft power,” a concept that differentiates information from the conventional dimensions of “hard power,” which is mainly associated with military force and economic influence. Soft power, according to Nye, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense of the United States, means that “A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness. In this sense it is just as important to set the agenda in world politics and attract others as it is to force them to change through the threat or use of military or economic weapons.”1