A Further Analysis of Provincial Trucking Regulation
Forcing what is essentially a hyperbolic relationship into a linear regression model can create a "hyperbolic bag." This bag takes on importance if it is systematically related to other variables in the regression model. For the case at hand, it appeared that using a linear model might overstate the effects of regulation on trucking rates because the provinces which regulate rates have either relatively short or relatively long average distances, while those which do not regulate rates have intermediate distances falling at the bottom of such a bag. The regression model was respecified to correct for this problem, and while the respecification appears unimportant, other questions are raised.
Regulatory failure and competition
Abstract. This paper examines the roles of direct regulation and competition as policy instruments in the planning and regulation of industry in Canada. The purpose of the paper is threefold: to develop a general framework which will facilitate the detection of the failure of direct regulation; to introduce various techniques which can be utilized to measure the cost of regulatory failure; and, to identify sectors of the economy in which the substitution of competition for direct regulation might be expected to provide significant improvement in economic performance. 
 
In the first section, traditional Canadian attitudes toward regulation and competition are reviewed. In the second section, the focus is directed to many dimensions of regulatory failure which have led to increasing disenchantment with direct regulation by economists; a framework is then introduced for detecting regulatory failure. In the final sections of this paper, some case studies-mainly in transportation industries-are presented to illustrate techniques which are available for measuring the economic costs of certain types of regulatory failure. Additionally, opportunities for the overcoming of regulatory failure by the substitution of competition for direct regulation are considered. 
 
Sommaire, L'auteur de cet expose examine les roles respectifs de la regie-mentation directe et de la concurrence en tant qu'instruments de politique pour planifier et reglementer l'industrie au Canada. Cette etude a un triple but: elaborer un cadre general qui facilitera la detection de l'echec de la reglementation directe; introduire differentes techniques qui pourront etre utilisees pour mesurer le cout de cet echec et identifier les secteurs de l'eco-nomie dans lesquels la substitution de la concurrence a la reglementation directe devrait assurer une amelioration sensible des performances economiques. L'auteur examine dans la premiere partie les attitudes canadiennes tradi-tionnelles vis-a-vis de la reglementation et de la concurrence. Dans la deuxieme partie, il insiste sur les differentes dimensions de l'echec de la reglementation qui ont amene les economistes a se detourner de plus en plus de la regie-mentation directe. Dans les demieres parties de son expose, il presente quelques cas d'espece—empruntes surtout a l'industrie du transport—pour illustrer les techniques actuelles permettant de mesurer les couts economiques de certains types d'echec dans la reglementation. II considere de plus les possibilites de surmonter cet echec en substituant la concurrence a la regie-mentation directe.
Ten Years of Public Interest Disclosure Legislation in the UK: Are Whistleblowers Adequately Protected?
Purpose The purpose of this article is to assess the operation of the UK’s Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 (PIDA 1998) during its first 10 years and to consider its implications for the whistleblowing process. Method The article sets the legislation into context by discussing the common law background. It then gives detailed consideration to the statutory provisions and how they have been interpreted by the courts and tribunals. Results In assessing the impact of the legislation’s approach to whistleblowing both in the UK and elsewhere, the author draws upon empirical research. Conclusion The author concludes that PIDA 1998 has not adequately protected whistleblowers and makes 12 recommendations for change. Despite the European Commission’s acknowledgement that whistleblowers can play a part in the fight against corruption, the author notes that common standards for their protection still seem a long way off.