Trade unions and the amendment of the labour code in Romania
Abstract Employment relations, as well as issues of social and labour-market reforms or the social dialogue, have been extensively treated by various researches interested in the East and Central European region. In this context, much attention has been paid to the changing roles of trade unions, the problem of re-making ancient structures perverted by their more or less collaboration with the Communist parties from the region and the emergence of new structures in search for legitimisation, the difficulties of trade unionism in articulating and representing interests, an aspect that is directly related to their organisational problems, the relations with the governmental authorities and with the employers' organisations in the tripartite framework, as well as the nature of the tripartism in reuniting social partners and state. This article focuses on national organised labour in Romania in relation to the 2005 Labour Code amendment. This specific level of national interest representation is privileged in order to highlight the peculiarities of recognised representative labour organisations in the post-Communist period. The main assumption is that trade unions are facing a particular policy interest with a shift from fragmentation and unstable co-operation to a ‘common position’. Thus this contribution assesses the determinants defining labour's collaboration while shedding light on state – trade union relations.
The European Economic and Social Committee after enlargement
This paper identifies the effects of the EU’s Eastern enlargement on the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC). We argue that it is not always possible to disentangle institutional change related to enlargement from institutional change related to the broader EESC’s objective of redefining its role as the bridge between Europe and civil society. At a first sight, enlargement does not seem to have particularly influenced the functioning and role of the EESC. Formally, hardly any legal provisions have been changed to adapt the EESC to enlargement, except for increasing the number of Committee members. New procedural arrangements have been adopted prior to enlargement and mainly due to the Committee’s intention to reshape its own role, independently of the enlargement challenge. Occasionally the prospect of enlargement contributed to some procedural changes. Yet this does not reveal the real picture of the day-to-day working of the Committee where New Member States representatives do not seem to find or to seek the opportunities to be active contributors and whose presence amongst the most influential Committee roles is still underrepresented. The EU15 representatives have to adapt to a more heterogeneous Committee. The EESC as all other EU institutions is completing a learning curve which is accompanied by a time lag. Once this curve is completed, the question to ask would be whether the EESC remains a largely consensual body or whether the full integration of the new members will require proper procedural change for business to run as smoothly as usual.
The Transformation of Work Processes in Emergent Capitalism: The Case of Hungary'
The removal of state support for enterprises and the intensification of competition following the liberalisation of markets in the former state socialist societies of Eastern Europe were expected to result in the major rationalization of employment and work organisation, especially where ownership and control had changed. This study of 271 production workers in 13 Hungarian enterprises shows that the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in the most severe financial difficulties had reduced total employment the most in the early 1990s, and that both this group of companies and those now privately controlled had reduced the proportion of indirect support workers more than had SOEs in better financial conditions and/or which were still being supported by the state. Production workers in the private firms also had more varied jobs, especially skilled ones, and more task discretion than most of those in SOEs. In general, both the crisis SOEs and the private firms distinguished more strongly between skilled workers and team leaders and less-skilled workers in terms of the jobs they had, their discretion over task performance, supervisor control and involvement than did the more financially stable SOEs. Most workers in this last group of companies were still organised in the `quasi-Taylorised' work systems with substantial delegated autonomy from supervisors characteristic of state socialism.