Trade fragmentation and coordination in bilateral oligopolies
This paper studies a strategic market game where agents fragment their bids on different markets. Simple conditions for existence of an interior equilibrium point are provided. In equilibrium, all agents are active on the same markets and prices are identical across markets, so that all equilibria are equivalent to an equilibrium where all agents trade on a single market.
Convergence to no arbitrage equilibria in market games
For market games which feature multiple posts for each commodity we show the following: (i) the 'law of one price' obtains asymptotically as the number of market participants becomes infinite, irrespectively of the characteristics of market participants; (ii) as the number of markets increases the set of equilibria is nested upwards.
The economic health of dentistry: past, present, and future.
Important changes in dentistry during the past two decades include a declining caries incidence, an increase in the number of dentists, greater competition for patients, and the spread of retail dentistry and alternative plans for financing and delivering dental services. Dire predictions about the effects of these changes often have not been based on facts. This article uses available data to examine the profession's economic prospects.