Use of force
Use of force is a politically sensitive and legally undetermined topic. It is therefore not surprising that it constitutes a highly controversial issue. During the Cold War, various critical debates about the legality of military interventions (Korea, Vietnam, Nicaragua, Palestine, Afghanistan) were prevalent. These controversies did not disappear in the 1990s (Yugoslavia) nor in the 2000s (Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel/Lebanon, Russia/Georgia, among others). A general assessment of the numerous books and articles dedicated to this issue reveals a deep ambivalence. On the one hand, no one really contests that the use of force is strictly forbidden in contemporary international law. This prohibition is recognized as a core rule of the law of nations, and even a rule of imperative international law (jus cogens). Indeed, it seems difficult to conceive any kind of legal order without at least affirming that its subjects cannot attack one another. The prohibition of the use of force is also logically linked to the notion of external sovereignty, aiming both at protecting the identity and the personality of every state and at preserving individuals “from the scourge of war” (preamble of the UN Charter). On the other hand, there are, to say the least, a great variety of interpretations of the rule. Are collective security and self-defense the only exceptions in allowing states to use force? Is the Security Council the only authority able to authorize states to use force? Under what conditions are states able to invoke self-defense? Those questions seem difficult to address, as the conventional sources are rather limited: Article 2(4) and Chapters VII and VIII of the UN Charter are far from providing explicit answers to all the questions raised. Thus, the answers can be found mainly in customary international law, with all the difficulties surrounding the task of establishing that law.
Iraq and the Use of Force in International Law
1. Introduction: The Vision of the New World Order and its Collapse 2. Iraq and Kuwait 1990/1 3. Forcible Humanitarian Action and the Aerial Exclusion Zones 4. The Use of Force in Relation to Iraqi Disarmament Obligations 1991-1998 5. Resolution 1441 (2002) and the 2003 Invasion of Iraq 6. The Role of International Law in UK Decision-Making 7. Conclusion: The Use of Force in International Law after Iraq
Tethering the Administrative State: The Case Against Chevron Deference for FCC Jurisdictional Claims
Like many other agencies, the Federal Communications Commission has seen significant regulatory growth under President Obama. But unlike health care, financial reform, and other areas, this growth has come without statutory guidance from Congress. The FCC’s assertion of jurisdiction over broadband service is reminiscent of its earlier attempts to regulate cable and to deregulate telephone service, efforts that courts have viewed skeptically in the absence of specific statutory authorization. But this skepticism is in tension with Chevron, which grants agencies substantial deference to interpret ambiguities in the statutes that they administer. This article argues that Chevron deference should not extend to agency jurisdictional claims, such as the FCC’s claim to authority over broadband. For both constitutional and policy reasons, courts should distinguish between agency action that fills a gap in a statutory scheme and action that defines the outer boundary of that scheme. As the Commission’s net neutrality project winds its way through the judicial system, courts should not allow the agency to define the limits of its own authority, and should instead search closely for a grant of authority from Congress.