Counter-proliferating the rogue states
President George W. Bush, in his State of the Union speech in January 2002, described Iran, Iraq and North Korea as an “axis of evil” and accused them of seeking to acquire and develop weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, biological). Further, Under Secretary of State John Bolton said that Cuba, Libya and Syria could be grouped with these as “rogue states”. In doing so, the mere alleged acquisition, without any stated intent, of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) weapons and delivery systems was designated a threat to local, regional and global stability and security, given the terror and fear they invoked. The ensuing policy agenda and process of arms control (non-proliferation) and disarmament (counter-proliferation) was based on the vulnerability management of these capabilities. This was premised on the refusal of the labelled rogue states to accept the international norms of recognized arms control practices of diplomacy, international negotiation, compliance, regulation, transparency and verification. It is upon this assumption that the crux of the argument exists of a clear case for pre-emptive or preventive armed force against rogue states. On this basis, this article will, through its analysis, settle the outstanding question of whether war against rogue states can be considered a just war, based upon historical precedents. The first of such wars against a rogue state is that waged against Iraq (2003), where the alleged Iraqi WMD capability has not yet been shown to exist. Approaching this mandates rethinking basic notions and mannerisms of international defense and security. America cannot act as world policeman indefinitely. This projects the need for an alternative to unilateral counter-proliferation by way of pre-emptive military action; namely a “Hague Style Convention on Proliferation” to reintroduce the international community of nations to a self-regulatory multi-polar approach towards arms control and disarmament. Given the options, it is clear that there is a consensus to the ends. While the means to the end might be arguable, there is Defense & Security Analysis Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 343–354, December 2004
How They Lost: Doctrines, Strategies and Outcomes of the Vietnam War
WITH THE SURRENDER Of the Saigon government to Hanoi's tanks on 30 April 1975 and the defeat of the American goal of keeping South Vietnam free from communism, one would hope that some of the more fundamental lessons apparent in the disaster would be forthcoming. Unfortunately it is not easy to be optimistic about this. Everywhere we see the tendency to forget Vietnam. President Ford told the people, as South Vietnam collapsed, that the war was over for America. The country certainly shows no desire to buck the President on this. The news media have dropped Vietnam (with help from Hanoi, of course, which this past summer expelled the last U.S. correspondents from Saigon). In Washington the government, faced with the press of problems on the Middle East, d6tente, strategic arms, energy and inflati on, fights fire after fire. By default Professor Samuel Huntington's admonition apparently is being followed: "Our policymakers may best meet future crises and dilemma," he advised a conference in 1968, "if they simply blot out of their minds any recollection of this one."' Yet if Santayana's warning about the dangers of ignoring the past holds any truth, we must try to get to the basis of the disaster before it all washes away, before the fundamental lessons of the American involvement and misadventure in this extraordinary war are lost. The final outcome was not inevitable. Until shortly after the January 1973 Vietnam accords, the American government's intelligence and operational communities were generally convinced-and I believe they were right-that South Vietnam was stronger, more stable, better defended and better led than at any time since independence in June 1954.
African Democratisation and the Leninist Option
The political openings that took place in the early 1990s, followed by a wave of elections across Africa, were widely interpreted as the beginning of a transition to democracy. Few persons knowledgeable about the continent assumed that this process would be easy. The obstacles, it was recognised, were legion, ranging from the nature of the existing régimes to the difficult economic circumstances confronted by virtually all countries. Nevertheless, the overall assessment remained optimistic. Slowly, imperfectly, with set-backs, Africa would move in the direction of democracy, and western liberal democracy at that. It is time to reassess the validity of such expectations, not least since much of what has happened in Africa on the political front during the past five years could easily be interpreted as indicating the persistence of authoritarianism, the spread of ethnic conflict, or the continuation of a process of state disintegration. Indeed, there is a real danger that attempts to analyse how close African countries are coming to democracy, or how far away they remain, may in the end blind us to the real significance of the available data. Hence the need to re-examine why the idea that Africa is experiencing a democratic transition, however, imperfect, gained ground.