Measurement Of Employment And Unemployment In India: Some Issues
This paper offers a review of the concepts and definitions used in the NSS Employment-Unemployment Surveys (EUS, for short) which have remained virtually unchanged since they were introduced in the NSS 27th Round (1972-73) based on the analysis and recommendations in the Report of the Expert Group on Unemployment Estimate – better known as the Dantwala Committee Report (GOI, 1970). It also examines critically the employment-unemployment estimates derived/derivable from EUS and the use of such estimates for planning and policy.
Trends and Patterns in Labour Quality in India at Sectoral Level
In this paper aggregate labour quality and the first order quality indices of education, age and gender have been estimated using the JGF (1987) methodology for the Indian economy, its broad sectors, disaggregated 27 Indian industries and for the organized and unorganized manufacturing industries. The objective is to find out the changes which have taken place in different labour characteristics over time. It is important as all employed persons are not homogeneous and any change over time in its characteristics has its effect on its marginal product and hence on productivity and growth of GDP. The period covered for the analysis is 1980-81 to 2014-15, which is divided into three-sub-periods, 1980-81 to 1993-94, 1994-95 to 2002-03 and 2003-04 to 2014-15, and the period covered for the organized and unorganized manufacturing industries labour quality indices is 2000-01 to 2014-15. The main results of the analysis are (a) growth of aggregate index of labour quality in India during the period of 1980-2014 grew at an annual average growth rate of 1.4%, which is almost comparable to the growth in persons employed and could contribute significantly to the growth of GDP; (b) the main driver of its growth has been the growth in the education Index which contributed 1.23 percentage points to its growth; (c) growth of aggregate labour quality during 1980-2014 is relatively high in Mining, Electricity, Manufacturing and Services sectors and is low in Agriculture and Construction; and (d) the growth of labour quality is higher in organized manufacturing as compared to unorganized manufacturing.
Strategy and Manipulation in Medieval Elections
There are many goals in developing electoral protocols, including a desire for a system which is transparent, in that it is clear what the rule or procedure to follow is; nonmanipulable, in that it is not in a person’s best interest to misrepresent their preferences; honest, in the sense that it elects the ‘right’ candidate; and not open to strategizing, i.e., bribery or collusion. However, these desiderata are in tension with each other: Often, transparent electoral procedures are the least strategy resistant, and many honest procedures encourage manipulation. Thus a balance between these different goals must be sought. In modern times, since the seminal result on vote manipulation, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem [5, 6], much attention has been devoted to developing voting rules where manipulation is never in the best interest of the voters [4] or which are computationally too complex for the average bounded agent to be able to manipulate [1]. This focus on computational aspects of electoral methods is one of the hallmarks of modern studies on voting. But pursuit of these goals is not restricted to modern times: Those participating in elections in the Middle Ages also sought transparency, non-manipulability, honesty, and strategyproofness in so far as these properties can be consistently expressed in a single procedure. However, given the lack of computational sophistication in the Middle Ages, alternate approaches were needed in order to promote honesty, discourage strategizing, etc. These approaches can be classified as either external (constraints introduced outside of the electoral procedure, such as incentives for coming to consensus quickly) or internal (constraints introduced within the electoral procedure, such as voting rules which cannot be manipulated without adverse effects, or which are too difficult for the average bounded agent to manipulate). Surveying examples of both approaches in the context of medieval ecclesiastical and secular elections provides an interesting comparison to modern electoral procedures. Elections in the Middle Ages were used for the same reasons that they are today: To select suitable candidate(s) for a particular office, duty, or obligation. However, it is important to note that the term electio was used in the Middle Ages in a broader sense than our modern ‘election’. Its primary sense was ‘selection’ or ‘choice’, and only secondarily ‘election’ in the modern sense. Thus, many records which purportedly discuss elections are not discussing elections of the type which interests us. We can identify four categories of medieval electoral processes: (1) Election by an external authority having no direct interest in the election; (2) Indirect election, where electors name other electors who then select or elect the officials; (3) Election by lot; and (4) Election by ballot. Elections of the first and third types are generally computationally uninteresting; the first type corresponds to dictatorial voting rules, and the third type collapses to probability theory. In general, interesting voting methods are found only in the fourth type, election by ballot, though they can also occur in indirect election.