The Efficacy of Censorship as a Response to Terrorism
This chapter discusses the use of law and intimidation and direct censorship in relation to the purported strategic needs of terrorism and counter-terrorism. It explains the role of the media and the strategic efficacy of censorship in insurgent terrorism, which includes subnational and transnational actors attempting to gain political power. The chapter further explains the role of the media and the strategic efficacy of censorship in state terrorism, where terrorism is deployed to sustain and strengthen political power. The role of the media and the strategic efficacy of censorship in counter-terrorism are also analyzed. The chapter talks about the strategic relationship between insurgent terrorism and counter-terrorism where the media and the efficacy of media censorship are a strategic response against terrorism as opposed to their being a tool of terrorism, which is sometimes the case in state terrorism.
The E-Marketing Strategy of Hamas
Given the growth of Internet research in recent years, it is rather surprising that research of online terrorism and countermeasures has been lacking theoretical and conceptual frameworks. The present study suggests applying the concepts and models taken from e-marketing to the study of terrorist websites. This work proves that when Hamas builds an array of sites in the Internet, it complies with the same rules that the Western business world follows. Chaffey et al. (2000) constructed a model comprised of eight decision points in the process of building a business-oriented Internet site. Although the model was developed for commercial purposes, the present study demonstrates how it could be used as an analytic framework to study terrorist websites. As shown, most of the decision points in the model were relevant to the Palestinian Information Center group of websites. Understanding the e-marketing strategy of Hamas will allow the construction of a competing marketing strategy in order to market rival ideological consumer products.
The Impact of the Law of the Sea Convention on the Regime for Islands: Problems for the Coastal State in Asserting Claims to “New-Born” Islands in Maritime Zones
ter-productive. The work of the Preparatory Commission will certainly suffer in consequence and the apparently perceived belief that in time, and before a longdelayed coming into force of the Convention, substantial re-negotiation of the Part XI provisions will be possible, may well be illusory. At the time of writing, 138 countries have signed the Convention and 14 have ratified.* What has been called "the convoluted compromise" over prospective Community participation will certainly be widely interpreted as an attempt by the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom to secure eventually a form of limited accession with major reservations.* Their stance will be subjected to criticism within the Community as well as in the General Assembly and the Preparatory Commission. This is a subject to which the writer hopes to return in a future article. For the moment, however, it is as well to note that the stance of these two countries is not to be identified with the US position although its adoption now makes even more remote the emergence of a deep sea-bed mining regime established by " . . . an international treaty of a universal character, generally agreed upon . . . " as required by the 1970 General Assembly Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed . . . Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction.*