How “political” is Quong’s political liberalism?
In this short paper I ask to what extent the sharp contrast between the 
 political and the comprehensive, on which political liberals such as Rawls 
 and Quong place primary emphasis, caters to a truly “political” conception of 
 liberalism. I argue that Quong’s own take on this point is more distinctively 
 “political” than Rawls’s, in that it assigns far less weight to citizens’ 
 comprehensive doctrines. Indeed, I suggest that Quong’s exclusion of 
 comprehensive doctrines (exemplified by his worries about an “overlapping 
 consensus”) has more radical implications than Quong himself seems to think. 
 In doing so, I offer a streamlined version of Quong’s critique, which 
 encompasses two more or less direct criticisms of Rawls’s doctrine of the 
 overlapping consensus. I will call them the “sincerity objection” and the 
 “liberal objection”.
Reconciliation through the public use of reason: Remarks on John Rawls's political liberalism
L'A. critique la conception de la justice de J. Rawls qui, fondee sur des principes deontologiques, ne fait pas de distinction entre les questions de justification et les questions d'acceptation, d'une part, et l'autonomie privee et l'autonomie publique, d'autre part. Dans l'article suivant intitule «Reply to Habermas» («The Journal of Philosophy», vol. 42, n°3, mars 1995, pp. 132-180), J. Rawls explique la signification de son liberalisme politique
The honesty of thinking : reflections on critical thinking in Nietzsche's middle period and the later Heidegger
This dissertation engages with contemporary interpretations of Nietzsche and Heidegger on the issue of self-knowing with respect to the notions of honesty and authenticity. Accounting for the two philosophers' developing conceptions of these notions allows a response to interpreters who conceive the activity of self-knowing as a primarily personal problem. The alternative accounts proposed take as a point of departure transitional texts that reveal both thinkers to be engaged in processes of revision. The reading of honesty in Chapters 1 and 2 revolves around Nietzsche's groundwork on prejudice in Morgenrothe (1880-81), where he first problematizes the moral-historical forces entailed in actuating the 'will to truth'. The reading of authenticity in Chapters 3 and 4 revolves around Heidegger's lectures on what motivates one's thinking in Was heist Denken? (1951-52). The lectures call into question his previous formal suppositions on what calls forth one's 'will-to-have-a-conscience', in an interpretation of Parmenides on the issue of thought's linguistic determination, discussed further in the context of Unterwegs zur Sprache (1950-59). Chapter 5 shows how Heidegger's confrontation with Nietzsche contributed to his ongoing revisions to the notion of authenticity, and to the attending conceptions of critique and its authority. Particular attention is given to the specific purposes to which distinct Nietzschean foils are put near the confrontation's beginning--in Heidegger's lectures on Nietzsche's second Unzeitgemasse Betrachtung (1938), and in the monograph entitled Besinnung (1939) which they prepare--and near its end, in the interpretation of Also Sprach Zarathustra (1883-85) presented in the first half of Was heist Denken? Chapter 6 recapitulates the developments traced from the vantage point of the retrospective texts Die Zollikoner Seminare (1959-72) and the fifth Book of Die frohliche Wissenschaft (1887). Closing remarks are made in relation to recent empirical research on the socio-environmental structures involved in determining self-identity.