The Saint Pierre and Miquelon dispute: Towards a further redefinition of French fishing rights in the Northwest Atlantic
Abstract The Canada-France dispute concerning the extent of maritime jurisdiction around the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon is distinct from other maritime boundary disputes. The French claim creates a large enclave within Canada's 200 nautical mile zone, raises questions about the extent of maritime jurisdiction which dependent islands can claim, and involves historic fishing rights governed by treaty. After reviewing the redefinition and relocation of these rights, attention is turned to what has happened since 1977. It is argued that the effect of the boundary settlement to be decided by an international tribunal will be critical to both Canadian and French fisheries. Whatever the tribunal's decision, it will be another step in the redefinition of the French fishing rights in the Northwest Atlantic but it will not be the last. It is likely to be followed by a renegotiation of the 1972 fisheries agreement which continues to govern French fishing rights in the Canadian exclusive fishing zone.
Maritime Boundaries, Jurisdictional Disputes, and Offshore Hydrocarbon Exploration in Eastern Canada
Abstract: With the development of hydrocarbon exploration off the east coast of Canada, maritime boundary disputes and jurisdictional problems have developed at the international, federal-provincial, and interprovincial levels. This paper traces the evolution of maritime boundaries off the east coast in the past fifteen years and their effects on oil and gas exploration. It pinpoints the boundary problems that remain. It also shows how the federal and provincial governments in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland have attempted to set aside jurisdictional problems with the conclusion of bilateral offshore management agreements, which have served both to clarify maritime boundaries and to pinpoint areas of dispute. Abstract: De pair avec l’extension de la prospection d’hydrocarbures au large de la côte orientale du Canada, il s’est déclenché aux niveaux international, fédéral-provincial et inter-provincial des différends au sujet des frontières maritimes et des conflits de compétence. Cet article trace l’évolution des frontières maritirnes au large de la côte orientale durant les quinze dernières années et leur effet sur la prospection pétrolière et gazière pour définir enfin les problèmes frontaliers qui subsistent toujours. L’article montre de quelle façon le gouvernement fédéral et celui des provinces de Nouvelle-Ecosse et de Terre-Neuve ont essayé d’écarter les conflits de compétence en signant un accord bilatéral d’exploitation des ressources petrolières au large des côtes lequel a servi à démêler les frontières maritimes tout en y précisant les zones de désaccord.
Common Property Resources and Factor Allocation
Two recent articles by Professors H. Scott Gordon and Anthony Scott present an interesting analysis of the conditions for economic maximization in a renewable resource industry the primary raw material for which is drawn from the public domain. While their criticism of the concepts which now govern fishery conservation programmes will be generally accepted among the handful of economists dealing with the fishing industry, some aspects of the problem call for additional consideration. In this paper I should like to elaborate and modify the general outlines of the analysis, largely in terms of a specific and important case: the Pacific halibut fishery. As Gordon and Scott point out, the core of the “over-fishing” problem inheres in the fact that the basic resource is incapable of ownership in any meaningful sense. When the demand for a given species exceeds the level at which supplies can be drawn from local waters at relatively constant costs, further exploitation of the fishery gives rise to higher costs at both intensive and extensive margins. The catch per unit of fishing effort will decline in the closer, more populous grounds as stocks are reduced, and greater costs must be incurred in pushing fishing activities to more distant grounds. If the grounds could be and were privately owned, the incremental income resulting from, say, secular growth in demand would, of course, accrue as rent in a purely Ricardian sense. Since they are not, and since there are no substantive barriers to the entry of new vessels, the increasing aggregate returns will simply be dissipated in excess capacity and higher monetary and real costs. If the reduction in stocks, viewed with grave alarm by biologist and legislator alike, now gives rise to restrictions on the catch designed to hold fish populations at some predetermined level or to rebuild them, the increases in price, aggregate returns, and excess capacity will continue. There is obviously no assurance that the final effect on economic output over time relative to total factor inputs is the same, better, or worse than in the absence of such restrictions.