The Ironic Politics of Richard Rorty
developments within the field of philosophy in recent years, and the implications of those developments for political thought and practice, might do well to begin with the works of Richard Rorty.' Rorty's writings do a great deal to clarify and synthesize themes from a wide range of important thinkers, including Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida, Habermas, Dewey, and Kuhn. Since much of his work consists of attempts to locate and explain his own writings in reference to these other thinkers, it provides a reference point from which to map current disputes within the postmodern movement.2 Also, Rorty's self-consciously American range of allusions and his jargon-free writing style make him more accessible to many than the works of continental philosophers. The attempt to understand Rorty's thinking does, however, present certain difficulties, despite his use of clear, even blunt language. Certain of his political views, for instance, carry connotations of human nature and natural rights which seem incompatible with his overall anti-essentialist outlook. A related difficulty is the question of whether Rorty's own writings reflect the sort of rhetorical strategies which, he argues, should replace the rigid and universalistic logics of traditional philosophy. Since Rorty's recent books consist of articles and lectures composed throughout the 1980s for various purposes, I shall attempt in this essay to provide a systematic outline of Rorty's major themes.3 In the first section I shall explore his views of reality and science, self and society, including his response to charges of "relativity" as self-refuting
Philosophical pragmatism and religious belief : interpreting Christian non-realism through John Dewey and Richard Rorty
In this thesis I consider the account of religious non-realism in the work of Don Cupitt and in other prominent writers belonging to the 'Sea of Faith' network. I argue that the appropriate context of the non-realists understanding of religious belief is provided by philosophical pragmatism as this is presented in the work of John Dewey and Richard Rorty. This context outlines important aspects of the 'Sea of Faith' religious non-realists' self-understanding; and provides them with an argumentative resource which they can employ against alternative critical-realist approaches to religious belief I show that John Dewey's understanding of religious faith coheres with many of the ideas expressed by religious non-realists and that Rorty's pragmatism provides religious non-realism with a contemporary philosophical articulation of its theology. In order to defend this assertion I argue that Rorty's pragmatism does not necessarily lead to radical subjectivism nor to a dangerous political ideology as some interpreters have suggested. Further, I argue that his ideas are open to theological appropriation and that his rejection of religious belief is tempered by a tolerance toward those who still find a use for it. Rorty, I claim, has such a use. He employs the term 'God' as a backdrop against which he can present his own account of a pragmatic culture. I show that his work contains positive references to the influence that religious belief has had on the development of such a culture and argue that this pragmatic culture fits well with a non-realist understanding of religious belief
Shoeless Joe: Fantasy and the Humor of Fellow-Feeling
In his essay on Jean Paul Friedrich Richter, Thomas Carlyle writes of a humor that manifests itself in smile rather than laughter. "Richter is a man of mirth," says Carlyle, whose humor is "capricious . . . quaint . . . [and] heartfelt" (15). The three adjectives represent for Carlyle the essence of what he terms "true humor" because they suggest Richter's enormous respect for humanity. "True humor," he goes on to say, "springs not more from the head than from the heart; it is not contempt, its essence is love; it issues not in laughter, but in still smiles, which lie far deeper" (17). These smiles are not Hobbesian smirks of superiority1 but genuine signs of compassion for, sympathy toward, and empathy with the object of the humor. Carlyle further provides a direct link between humor and both pathos and nobility; the link is the smile of the caring man. For Carlyle, this smile is one of "fellow-feeling":