Maremoto de 1960, sacrificio humano y restablecimiento del equilibrio en el Wallmapu
The sacrifice of the mapuche boy Jose Painecur in the event of the 1960´s seaquake is analyzed related to the mapuche culture vision about the death and the own law exercise, in a context of interculturality and of colonization from the chilean occidental society. The perceptions of the press, the judicial system, social sciences, and the mapuche agents about the case of sacrifice, are presented in an multiple overview in order to show a distinction between the mapuche culture and the chilean occidental culture, especially in the principles of balance and reciprocity with nature, the origin of mapuche own law in it and the function of their own cultural agents in the political and spiritual fields. From this last version, the case is presented by the authors as a transcendental action of reestablishment of balance of the mapuche world.
Sociedad mapuche y sociedad chilena: la deuda histórica
El articulo presenta una vision historica de la sociedad mapuche y del vinculo “interetnico”; y por otro lado se refiere a los diversos modos de comprension de “Chile”, para examinar el tema de la existencia o no de una “deuda historica” con la sociedad mapuche. Remarca que con el advenimiento de la Republica, los mapuche dejaron de ser vistos como un pueblo o nacion y comienzan a ser tratados como chilenos, con lo que se puso fin a la politica colonial de los parlamentos. Frente a esto, la sociedad mapuche no logro articular un frente comun para encarar el nuevo momento historico. Agrega que la “Pacificacion de la Araucania” y la “politica reduccional” funcionaron no como un proyecto de “inclusion”, sino de “exclusion”. Tras presentar los enfoques de los recientes gobiernos en lo concerniente al tema, y el de los historiadores Gonzalo Vial, Vitale y Perez, concluye con una propuesta que pasa por separarse de la cultura dominante, y elaborar un politica “sensible a las diferencias”.
Sobre “Sociología de la Cultura: la deconstrucción de lo mapuche”, de Aldo Mascareño
he demise of Chile’s Concertación coalition has been predicted often over the past dozen years during which it has governed. Even the coalition’s leaders have issued premature announcements of its death (Latin America Adviser 2002; El Mercurio 2003a). Some observers of Chilean politics, therefore, might regard the dissolution of the Concertación as both a foregone conclusion and an overdetermined event –that is, as the product of so many factors, all working toward the same end, that it is impossible to assign responsibility among them. We share the opinion that the Concertación may well dissolve before Chile’s next election, but not for the reasons commonly cited. Our argument is based, instead, on the structure of Chilean political careers, which in turn is connected inextricably with Chile’s unusual electoral rules. Harbingers of the Concertación’s demise point out that the Chilean economy has slowed somewhat since the coalition’s early years in government during the 1990s. Moreover, the coalition itself was initially galvanized around opposition to the Pinochet regime of the 1970s and 1980s, so as time passes, the compelling force of that initial motivation might naturally weaken. In addition, the Concertación, and even its component parties —most notably the Christian Democrats— are internally divided over social issues, such as the legal status of divorce and access to birth control. Finally, by the 2005 elections, the Concertación will have held the presidency and a majority in the Chamber of Deputies (the legislative house elected by popular vote) for 16 years. By the standards of multiparty coalitions anywhere, much less among Latin America’s presidential systems, the Concertación is geriatric, bearing the scars of miscellaneous corruption charges against members, including the stripping of parliamentary rights from five of the coalition’s deputies in 2002, and the general disillusionment that goes with holding the reins of power for so long. One might conclude, then, that the coalition is simply ready to expire. Any of these forces, or some combination of them, could indeed undermine the Concertación, but we do not regard these factors as necessarily devastating to the coalition’s survival for a number of reasons. In the first place, the Chilean economy has come through the last five years in far better shape than that of any of its Southern Cone neighbors, and employment and growth figures rebounded in first months of 2003. The Concertación may well be in a position in 2005 to claim credit for good economic stewardship. Next, many of the issues surrounding the nondemocratic legacy of the Pinochet era —including the renowned