Recession or depression? part II
The economic performance during the current recession is sharply different from the 1929-33 episode in most key respects, but not in all...
The Strategy and Consistency of Federal Reserve Monetary Policy, 1919–1933
List of figures List of tables Preface 1. Introduction 2. The objectives of monetary policy, 1924-33 3. Member bank borrowing and the Fed's policy strategy 4. Policy disagreements within the Federal reserve system: the effects of institutional change 5. Conclusion References Index.
Decidability of some intuitionistic predicate theories
Suppose T is a first order intuitionistic theory (more precisely, a theory of Heyting's predicate calculus, e.g., abelian groups, one unary function, dense linear order, etc.) presented to us by a set of axioms (denoted also by) T. Question. Is T decidable? One knows that if the classical counterpart of T (i.e., take the same axioms but with the classical predicate calculus as the underlying logic) is not decidable, then T cannot be decidable. The problem remains for theories whose classical counterpart is decidable. In [8], sufficient conditions for undecidability were given, and several intuitionistic theories such as abelian groups and unary functions (both with decidable equality) were shown to be undecidable. In this note we show decidability results (see Theorems 1 and 2 below), and compare these results with the undecidability results previously obtained. The method we use is the reduction-method, described fully in [12] and widely applied in [3], which is applied here roughly as follows: Let T be a given theory of Heyting's predicate calculus. We know that Heyting's predicate calculus is complete for the Kripke-model type of semantics. We choose a class M of Kripke models for which T is complete, i.e., all axioms of T are valid in any model of the class and whenever φ is not a theorem of T, φ is false in some model of M.