Democratic prospects: China and Taiwan
The contrast between democratic conditions and prospects in Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC) can be stated easily: Taiwan is already a democracy, the PRC isn't, and the prospects for China becoming democratic, much less a democracy, are poor. Would Taiwan have been better off under Beijing's rule since 1949, or has it prospered economically and politically by maintaining its separation and virtual independence? Even Mainlanders find it hard to disagree with the notion that Taiwan's separate development has been its salvation. Although Taiwan endured Leninist rule for decades, its economy expanded. Floating one hundred miles off the Fujian coast has spared the island a succession of traumas from which it will take the Mainland years to recover, and then only when Communist rule comes to an end. Of these traumas only the most damaging need be mentioned, all of them subsumed under Chairman Mao's celebrated justification and exhortation: 'A revolution is not a dinner party ... [I]t is an act of violence by which one class overthrows another'.
Chinese Power and the Idea of a Responsible State
The interrelated themes of power and responsibility are useful concepts for understanding Chinese foreign policy during a troubled yet remarkable half a century of Communist Party rule. Evaluations of the behaviour of the People's Republic of China (PRC) over these five decades have often related directly to concerns about the use the PRC has made of its material and ideological resources. Has Beijing worked to support the dominant norms of the international order, or has it striven to overturn them? Has it ever deserved to be called a "responsible power", a term defined by the dominant states, or has it acted irresponsibly? To place these questions more explicitly within an international relations framework, has China shown itself since 1949, and more especially during the period of reform and opening since 1979, as capable of being socialized into supporting global norms? Or, as realists would predict, have there been signs that its rising power over the past two decades has generated new tensions in the international system? Looking more to the future, what kind of challenge does its enhanced capabilities pose to the status quo?'
The Impact of the Law of the Sea Convention on the Regime for Islands: Problems for the Coastal State in Asserting Claims to “New-Born” Islands in Maritime Zones
ter-productive. The work of the Preparatory Commission will certainly suffer in consequence and the apparently perceived belief that in time, and before a longdelayed coming into force of the Convention, substantial re-negotiation of the Part XI provisions will be possible, may well be illusory. At the time of writing, 138 countries have signed the Convention and 14 have ratified.* What has been called "the convoluted compromise" over prospective Community participation will certainly be widely interpreted as an attempt by the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom to secure eventually a form of limited accession with major reservations.* Their stance will be subjected to criticism within the Community as well as in the General Assembly and the Preparatory Commission. This is a subject to which the writer hopes to return in a future article. For the moment, however, it is as well to note that the stance of these two countries is not to be identified with the US position although its adoption now makes even more remote the emergence of a deep sea-bed mining regime established by " . . . an international treaty of a universal character, generally agreed upon . . . " as required by the 1970 General Assembly Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed . . . Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction.*