Student Mobility in the EU – Recent Case Law, Reflections and Recommendations
Now more than ever, it appears that both societal and political factors are supporting and stimulating student mobility in all its shapes and forms, most notably through various initiatives on the European level. The Bologna Process, the European Qualifications Framework and the Lisbon Recognition Convention are all examples of this commitment undertaken by the Member States of the EU as well as other European nations. However, upon taking a closer look at the practical reality, we see that many obstacles remain to exist. As EU law currently stands after the Forster and Morgan and Bucher judgments, mobile students do not have a right to maintenance grants, neither from their host state or their home state. Furthermore, the European Court of Justice has – albeit reluctantly – allowed an exception to the principle of equal treatment on grounds of nationality with regards to access to higher education in the Bressol case. Although the recent, somewhat more restrictive attitude of the European Court can be defended and perhaps even welcomed, it does illustrate the need for a discussion and potential action on the European level by the political institutions. This contribution includes a discussion of the recent ECJ case law on student mobility and some reflections on the desirability, feasibility and potential form and content of such future action.
Higher Education, Equal Access, and Residence Conditions: Does EU Law Allow Member States to Charge Higher Fees to Students Not Previously Resident?
This article looks at the law and policy issues surrounding the practice of charging uniform fees for higher education to home students and students coming from other EU Member States. It begins with the observation that within the EU such fees are heavily subsidised by governments and therefore amount to a financial benefit (or a disguised grant) to students. In the light of this, this article suggests that restricting that subsidy to students resident prior to their studies would be not only compatible with recent case law on non-discrimination but would also fit better with the underlying logic of free movement, which denies any right to benefits for non-economic recent migrants. Secondly, it looks at the policy, and finds that while equal fees have a number of very positive social effects, they also carry moral and economic risks. A better approach, less distorting of the market for higher education and more consistent with the wider EU approach to welfare migration, might be to require exportability of subsidies from the student's state of origin.
The Illinois Legislature
It further provides that the county must have voted "for license" at the last general election on that subject. Also, that the petition, together with all names and addresses on it, must first be published in at least two issues of some newspaper published in the town where the petition was circulated, for at least ten days before the petition is acted upon. Any officer authorized to issue licenses violating the provisions of this act is liable to a fine of from $500 to $1000 and imprisonment in the county jail for from two to twelve months. The act does not repeal any local laws forbidding the sale of liquor, but is cumulative to all anti-liquor laws now in force. The final section is: "This Act being necessary for the public peace, health, and safety, shall take effect and be in force from and after December 31, 1913." The postponement of the time for going into effect was made io order not to interfere with licenses already issued and to give the liquor dealers time to adjust themselves to the provisions of the act. But the liquor people denied that the emergency clause could be attached to an act the operation of which was postponed nearly a year. They called attention to the omission of the word "immediate," and declared that the postponement was in itself sufficient evidence that it was not necessary for the "immmediate preservation of the public health, peace and safety." A petition for reference was circulated and the necessary number of signatures was secured. The attorney-general was first asked for his opinion as to whether the act was subject to the referendum. That officer stated that he could find no precedent for such a case. Basing his decision on reason and common sense he declared the act not subject to the referendum. The circuit court was then asked for a write of mandamus against the secretary of state to compel him to submit the act, but the court refused to grant it, saying that the attachment of the emergency clause was evidence that the legislature intended to prevent its submission. At this writing the question is pending on appeal before the supreme court.