The North Korean model: Gaps and questions
Abstract North Korea has articulated a comprehensive strategy for economic, political, military, ideological and cultural independence, with sustained high growth ( juche ). Self-reliance, not self-sufficiency, is the stated goal and has been achieved to a high degree, especially in food, machines-tools and energy, in spite of the country having no oil. The political system is highly authoritarian and male-dominated, with special emphasis on the cult of Kim II Sung. The regime is highly secretive and information is unsystematic. There are exceptional methodological problems in evaluating the evidence. Korea is probably the most successful economy in any post-revolutionary society, but the relationship between authoritarian politics (in extreme isolation) and social and economic achievement is obscure. Important lessons can e learnt from the Korean ‘model’ but the problem is how to learn them.
Economic comparison of North and South Korea
Summary This study limits itself to the comparison of some economic statistics of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK). In a first section it discusses the reliability of the available data and considers various factors concerning the comparability of today’s economic achievements in North and South Korea. In the second part overall economic indicators (GNP/NI per capita, growth rates, industrial struc­ ture of GNP) and output data are analyzed. After adjustments for certain exchange rates and the socialist definition of Nl an estimated DPRK per capita N1 of 375 US dollars for 1970 corresponds to a ROK per capita Nl of 110 US dollars for the same year. This very rough indication of the North’s economic superiority over the South is confirmed by the more relevant comparison of per capita output data for electricity, coal, oil (combined to a total of energy production), steel, iron, cement, chemical fertilizer, rice, meat, and textile fabrics. In 1970 the DPRK had reached a clearly and sometimes several times higher level than the ROK in all of these data of production per person. The tsetsefly and the sleeping sickness it transmits are still a major obstacle impeding modern agricultural progress in many developing countries. Jahnke uses detailed field studies to illustrate the economic, ecological and sociological com­ ponents entailed in attempts to combat this problem.
An Estimate of North Korea's National Income
I orth Korea is one of the most secretive countries, even by communist standards. Consequently, most of her published economic data, which are scant to begin with and have become progressively scarcer since 1964, are in rates and percentages with no references to absolute figures. Notable exceptions to these practices have been the annual revenue and expenditure of budget and state investment for capital construction, which are disclosed in North Korean wons. Of course, there had been no way of estimating the ratio of budget or fixed investment to gross output value of social production (GVSP) or to national income. A ray of hope was thrown on the possibility of estimating national accounts in absolute levels by a disclosure of North Korean Premier Kim Il-sung in December 1967. In a speech at the Supreme People's Assembly he claimed that national income per capita of North Korea in 1966 was 500 wons-1.2 times the per capita national income of 1962.' The purpose of this paper is to estimate national income and GVSP in North Korean wons between 1946 and 1966 on the basis of Kim's disclosure and published indices of these national accounts. Not only will this enable us to compare the published budget sizes and fixed investments with our computed national accounts, but also furnished some insight into the absolute levels of the components of national accounts such as output values of industry, agriculture and other sectors. In this study we shall also discuss