Agricultural tariff rate quotas implementation in the EU 1997-2002; Do developing countries enjoy quota rent?
Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) have been introduced and legitimised as a market access instrument in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA). TRQs combine both restriction of imports, and safeguard of current or preferential agricultural trade flows. By restricting the market access through high level tariff beyond the quota, one can imagine that exporters enjoying low level tariff would take share of quota rent. Do developing exporting countries benefit from EU TRQs? Do they enjoy quota rents or guaranteed market access? What should be their interest to defend about TRQs at WTO agricultural negotiations? This article aims to present an analysis of the 87 EU's agricultural TRQs implementation from 1997 to 2002, in order to bring to the fore the effects of such an import instrument for exporting countries in competition on the import market. Some theoretical elements of the economy of TRQs are first presented in order to introduce the empirical work. The database built is then used to interpret EU agricultural TRQs implementation during the period 1997-2002, and the global results in terms of potential total rent that one can theoretically expect from TRQs is detailed by products grouping and export country grouping. A first examination of the database shows that while preference margin is potentially high for TRQs as a whole, potential rent is not so high. Moreover, this potential rent seems to be concentrated on only bananas and sugar, because TRQs are actually binding for those two commodities. A focus on those products indicates that only few exporting countries are susceptible to enjoy this potential rent: Latin American for bananas and ACP for sugar. However that does not signify that TRQs may be eliminated without big losses for exporters: they actually procure guaranteed EU's market shares protected from foreign competition.
Utilising agricultural tariff rate quotas as a development instrument
Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) were introduced as a new market access instrument in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. The purpose of this paper is to examine the case for using this instrument to target improved market access for developing country agricultural exports, using the EU as a case study. The paper first identifies how TRQs relate to the EU's hierarchy of agricultural trade preferences under various preferential access arrangements. It then examines the extent to which developing countries have been able to make use of existing TRQ access to the EU market. Developing countries wanting improved market access for their agricultural exports have the choice of negotiating lower MFN tariffs, entering free trade agreements or regional integration schemes, seeking improved preferential access under Generalised System of Preferences schemes, or pressing for the introduction of preferential TRQs under the GATT's special and differential treatment provisions. The final section of the paper discusses the merits and drawbacks of each of these strategies.
ISSUES IN REFORMING TARIFF-RATE IMPORT QUOTAS IN THE AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE IN THE WTO
Table of Contents: The Economics of Tariff Rate Quotas and the Effects of Trade Liberalization; TRQs and GATT Rules; An Overview of Tariffs, Quotas and Imports Worldwide; TRQs in the European Union; U.S. TRQs for Sugar, Tobacco and Peanuts; Dairy TRQs in the United States; Tariff Rate Quota Implementation and Administration by Developing Countries; Management of Tariff Rate Quotas in Korea and Japan; Tariff Rate Quota Administration in Canadian Agriculture; The Case of Australia and New Zealand Facing TRQs; The 1999 WTO Panel Report on the EU's Common Market Organization for Bananas; Assessment