Family and favour at the court of Jacob Zuma
Jacob Zuma’s role as both state and party president is significantly underpinned by those who pay court to him on the basis of personal loyalty, patriarchal fealty and hope for personal gain, his formal authority buttressed by political patronage and protection which extends to those close to him. However, Zuma combines his role of tribal patriarch with that of his role at the head of a shadow state, his ‘family’ extending beyond close relatives to include business associates with shady connections. Zuma is an accidental president who ascended to the office because he was not Thabo Mbeki. He may not be any more inclined to cohabit with the morally dubious than his predecessor (who, notoriously, shielded Chief of Police Jackie Selebi from investigation for linkages to organised crime). Nonetheless, it is difficult to believe that a man deemed by a court to have been in a corrupt relationship with Shabir Shaik (eventually sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for offences committed in connection with the notorious 1998 arms deal) and who was facing some 783 criminal charges involving fraud, corruption and racketeering would have secured the presidency had he not been able to place himself at the head of a ‘coalition of the aggrieved’ who wished to bring Mbeki’s rule and influence to an abrupt end. That this coalition was broad-based is generally accepted, receiving strong backing not merely from the organised left within the Tripartite Alliance but ethnic support from within the ANC of his home province. But in addition, he received strong support from black business interests. Mbeki may have been the chief champion of BEE, but his challenger received support from a motley group of business players, some of whom switched their support from Mbeki to Zuma when they identified him as the rising man; from established business persons from KwaZulu-Natal who had long been close to him; from those who had lost out or had felt disadvantaged under Mbeki; and not least, from major figures within the Indian business community (again, significantly rooted in KwaZulu-Natal). In addition, he was backed by powerful figures within the ANC who had either been convicted of criminal offences (such as Winnie Madikizela-Mandela) or who were under investigation for criminal acts, some of these for alleged involvement in tendering scams (such as Ngoako Ramathlodi and Angie Motsheka) (Southall 2009). In Zuma, powerful elements within the party saw a man who would not be overly troubled by ethical or legal concerns when it became time to cash in their cards for supporting him in his conjoined struggle for political survival and to stay out of jail. The evidence laid before the court in Shabir Shaik’s trial of Zuma’s heavy
1994-2014 – Telecommunications Governance in South Africa
Twenty years of telecommunications market governance under the African National Congress (ANC) has seen a dramatic rise in access to telephony in South Africa, attributable to two mobile network operators licensed by the National Party (NP): MTN and Vodacom. Otherwise, the regulatory state regime for telecommunications has performed poorly, with disappointing policy formulation, regulation, and collection of statistics. The balance of private and state investment has been uncertain, discouraging the former, especially through unexpected interventions concerning the three state-owned enterprises (SOEs): Infraco, Telkom, and Sentech. The incumbent operator, Telkom, admitted long-term abuse of dominance, lobbied against government policies and disappointed in its delivery of fixed services, while failing in wireless. The regulatory authorities, ICASA and SATRA, were untrusted and lacked the strength and legal tools to perform their complex duties. Neither government nor parliament analysed the failures and thus were unable to learn from the mistakes. Despite this, the limited competition of MTN and Vodacom, plus a few fibre-to-the-home (FTTH) providers, suggests a not unreasonable future for Internet service delivery.
The administration of the courts
Section 28 of Article VI of the State Constitution provides that the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals is the Chief Judge of the State and its chief judicial officer. The Chief Judge appoints a Chief Administrator of the Courts (or Chief Administrative Judge of the Courts if the appointee is a judge) with the advice and consent of the Administrative Board of the Courts. The Administrative Board consists of the Chief Judge as chair and the Presiding Justices of the four Appellate Divisions of the Supreme Court. The Chief Judge establishes statewide administrative standards and policies after consultation with the Administrative Board and approval by the Court of Appeals.