Mistakes and Myths: The Allies, Germany, and the Versailles Treaty, 1918–1921*
For nearly forty years, historians of twentieth-century diplomacy have argued that the Versailles treaty was more reasonable than its reputation suggests and that it did not of itself cause the Depression, the rise of Hitler, or World War II. Their efforts have had little effect, despite Margaret MacMillan’s best-selling Paris 1919. The distorted view of The Economic Consequences of the Peace and J. M. Keynes’s other works still dominates both the Anglo-American historical profession and the English-speaking educated public, though Zara Steiner pointed out in The Lights That Failed that the Versailles treaty was the mildest of the 1919–20 settlements. Despite scholarly opinion, condemnation of the Versailles treaty continues without cease. The latest addition to an immense literature, The Versailles Treaty and Its Legacy, by Edward M. Bennett and the late Norman A. Graebner,
'Had we known how bad things were in Germany, we might have got stiffer terms': Great Britain and the German Armistice
In 1914 British policy makers began the war determined to enhance their postwar security against both their enemies and their allies. Britain went to war against Germany in August 1914 ostensibly to liberate Belgium from German military occupation. But British war aims soon assumed an ideological dimension that continued to color them throughout the war. Even before 1914 many British politicians had been suspicious of Germany's growing power, fearing that it might be dangerous because it was unchecked by a democratic electorate. Once the fighting began, British policy makers quickly conceived of the war as a crusade. Britain was fighting not to crush the German people, but to bring about a change in Germany's constitutional arrangements. They were engaged in a war to destroy the control of the Prussian military caste over the German state. As Lord Kitchener, the secretary of state for war, remarked in March 1916, “The only really satisfactory termination of the war would be brought about by an internal revolution in Germany.”
Continents of Liberty: Emerson and Gerald Vizenor’s Chair of Tears
Ralph Waldo Emerson protested what came to be known as the Trail of Tears in a public letter to President Martin Van Buren in 1838. Th e Cherokee Nation, he argued, had been cheated by a “sham treaty” (Emerson, “Letter” 50), the will of the people ignored, and a false acquiescence to removal written into law. In making a passionate appeal to the highest “chair” of the land, Emerson underscored the great political and moral stakes involved: