Strike or not to Strike Options on the Table to Stop Iran from Going Nuclear
Latterly, various experts and political analysts have been hotly debating in the world press whether the West should strike Iran in order tostop its nuclear program. The first part of the article deals with argumentation whether to strike Iran in order to stop its nuclear programand simultaneously presents variant viewpoints on what specific threat nuclear-armed Iran poses. The second half of the article discussesa possible course of action the United States might take to curb Iran and consequential events. The article aims to arrive at a less destructivesolution to the problem.The article directs to the conclusion that Iran’s aggressive foreign policy bears defensive nature driven by the self-survival instinct of anisolated country. The nuclear program also serves this very purpose to provide more security guarantees for the regime, minimize therisk of external strike and increase its bargaining power during the negotiations. Currently, the regional spoiler role is the only one to beplayed by Iran, enabling this developing and unformed economy country to resemble a great power player. Thus, if the United States doeswish to neutralize nuclear-armed Iran and consequential threats, it should stop to isolate the latter from regional politics and let it becomeone of the building blocks of regional political security architecture, as this could assure Iran in the possibility of maintaining its securitywithout going nuclear.
Iran's Foreign Policy Strategy after Saddam
During President Mahmud Ahmadinejad’s first term, Iranian foreign policy had two key enduring components. First, Tehran sought to deal with Iran’s new security dilemma brought about by the U.S. presence in both Iraq and Afghanistan after 2003. Iran responded with an ‘‘accommodating policy,’’ which consisted of expanding cooperation after Saddam’s fall with the main Arab world actors, principally Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and seeking direct talks with the United States. This included Iran’s engagement in direct talks with Coalition Forces regarding the prevailing security situations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In this way, Iran hoped to avoid both a new round of rivalry with its Arab neighbors and a new security dilemma in its relations with the United States. The second component was to seek an ‘‘alliance policy’’ while regionalizing the nuclear issue, in which Iran sought to tie and interweave the nuclear issue with broader regional dynamics such as Israel’s undeclared nuclear arsenal and the Arab-Israeli conflict. By building relationships with friendly states (e.g., Syria) and political movements (e.g., Hezbollah or Shi‘ite factions in Iraq), Iran tried to deter the U.S. or Israeli military threat in the short term and to prevent the institutionalization of a U.S. role in its backyard in the long term. The prevailing view in the United States is that Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy and Iran’s increasing presence in the region has been offensive, expansionist, opportunistic, and often ideological. Though Iran has occasionally taken advantage of new opportunities, these characterizations have been exaggerated in the United States. Instead, Iran’s action should be perceived in a more
Assessing sex offenders.
26 26 Unfortunately, the incidence of sexual assault has increased over the past decade, and the long-term management of sex offenders has been fervently debated in our society. In the United States, approximately 234,000 sexual offenders are under the custody of correctional agencies each day, and more than half are under conditional supervision in the community. Sexual victimization is routinely prosecuted, but sex offenders have a high rate of recidivism and are up to 10 times more likely to be re-arrested for another violent sexual assault than individuals convicted of other crimes. With state legislatures increasingly passing legislation to allow for the civil commitment of repeat sexual offenders to mental health facilities and the creation of sex offender registries, psychiatrists have found themselves thrust into this nexus of society and the legal system. Forensic psychiatrists are often asked to evaluate individuals accused or convicted of sexual offenses for a variety of purposes, including the assessment of dangerousness, risk for recidivism, involuntary commitment, inclusion in a state’s sex offender registry, competency, and criminal responsibility. Like most other forensic evaluations, the assessment of sexual offenders involves performing a comprehensive psychiatric evaluation, reviewing available police reports and criminal history, and contacting available collateral sources of information to verify information provided by the defendant. In addition, the accurate assessment of individuals involved in sexual crimes requires a detailed sexual [ f o r e n s i c f i l e s ]