Deregulation and natural gas trade relationships: lessons from the Alberta-California experience
In 1978 the US government moved to deregulate the American natural gas industry. The market changes that resulted from this initial step took time to ripple their way out to regional and subnational gas trading relationships. This ripple effect required subnational governments (state and provincial regulators) to rethink their gas regulatory policies. This article examines the restructuring of the Alberta-California gas trade. It explores how changes in US policy forced California and Alberta regulators to recast their policies. It concludes with several lessons that can be drawn from this case about the complex challenge of restructuring international gas trading relationships.
The unexpected effects of gas market liberalisation: inherited devices and new practices
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés. The unexpected effects of gas market liberalisation: inherited devices and new practices Thomas Reverdy
The resource rent for Norwegian natural gas
Natural gas is a non-renewable resource. This means that both for society and for a private producer there is an additional cost beyond the costs of extraction and transportation. This cost is called the Hotelling rent or the (marginal) resource rent, and reflects that increased present extraction affects the possibility and profitability of future extraction. First, this is a cost due to the limited volume of natural gas, and second because increased extraction today accelerates extraction from more expensive fields if natural gas is extracted from fields with increasing unit costs. The resource rent at time t is the value of getting one more unit of the resource at time t, evaluated at time t. The magnitude of the resource rent depends upon cumulative extraction, the rate of interest and future costs and demand.