The Unique Significance and Origin of the Cretaceous-Tertiary Boundary: Historical Context and Burdens of Proof
The abruptness and intensity of the Cretaceous-Tertiary boundary have been deemphasized by some authors over recent years, mainly by those skeptical of an impact origin for the boundary. However, it was recognized at the birth of stratigraphy as both abrupt and of major importance. It was used to define the change from the Mesozoic to the Cenozoic; the boundary has become continually more precisely defined and its global sequences more correlatable. It is now unique in being an event boundary marked by an iridium-bearing layer of global extent, rather than an arbitrary boundary in a sequence of little change. The Permian-Triassic boundary, in contrast, is arbitrary and the transition is not yet proven to be abrupt, the extinctions that define it perhaps having taken place in pulses over several millions of years. Some of those who have denied the importance (and in some cases even the existence) of an impact in the Cretaceous-Tertiary extinctions have placed burdens of proof on the impact hypothesis that they do not place on strictly terrestrial mechanisms. Terrestrial mechanisms have always been unsatisfactory (or at least unconvincing for global, massive, multienvironment faunal change) and are now even more so. Some authors have required of the impact hypothesis attributes that are not inherent in it, including particular patterns of extinction selectivity and timing.
Notes on geochronologic and chronostratigraphic units
There is no need to regard the term “geochronology” as a redundant synonym of either “geologic time scale” or “radiometric dating.” This term may reasonably be used in reference to all principles and methods employed in geology to determine the relative and numerical ages of all kinds of rocks. The term “chronostratigraphy” would best be restricted to the process of defining the formal subdivisions of the geologic time scale.

“Geochronologic unit” is best used as a general category term. It includes aurichronologic units (spans of time defined operationally by golden spikes), geochronometric units (spans of time defined theoretically in terms of absolute numerical age before present), and biochronologic units (spans of time defined theoretically by paleobiological events). A chronostratigraphic unit is a set of material, existing, stratified rock that was formed during a given span of time (geochronologic unit). Therefore, a geochronologic unit must be defined before the corresponding chronostratigraphic unit can even be conceptualized.

Chronostratigraphic units are generally not isochronous bodies of rock, because owing to the unconformities that exist over any appreciable geographic area, their upper and lower material boundaries are not everywhere synchronous. Thus, particular systems, series, and stages are material stratigraphic units of geographically variable time value within the maximum temporal limits of the corresponding periods, epochs, and ages.

Geochronologic boundaries that have been formally ratified serve a conventional function, and will rarely if ever need to be redefined. We can continue to discover and debate important events in Earth history without insisting that such events must be used to constantly redefine the boundaries of our global temporal pigeonholes.
The data privacy / national security balancing paradigm as applied in the USA and Europe: Achieving an acceptable balance
...................................................................................................................... iii Summary ..................................................................................................................... ix Overall Introduction.................................................................................................... 1 Chapter One ................................................................................................................. 7 The Privacy/National Security Balance from a European Perspective .................. 7 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 7 Section I: The Council of Europe ............................................................................ 13 1.0 The Basis for the Data Privacy/National Security Balance .......................... 13 2.0 The Influence of the ECHR on National Legal Systems .............................. 14 3.0 The Jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the Data Privacy/National Security Balance ................................................................................................................. 27 4.0 Shortcomings in the Jurisprudence of the ECtHR The Application of the Margin of Appreciation ........................................................................................ 43 Section II: The European Union .............................................................................. 67 1.0 The European Union and Human Rights Protection in the Context of the data privacy/national security balance ......................................................................... 73 2.0 The Growing Involvement of the EU in Human Rights Protection, particularly in data protection and the circumstances influencing this. ............... 77 3.0 Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC and the Alteration of the Data Privacy/National Security Balance ....................................................................... 79 4.0 Features of Directive 2006/24/EC ................................................................ 81 5.0 Responses to Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC .................................... 82 6.0 Institutional Responses to Directive 2006/24/EC......................................... 94 7.0 Judgment of the CJEU (Grand Chamber) on the Validity of Directive 2006/24/EC......................................................................................................... 103 8.0 The Ruling of the CJEU ............................................................................. 105 9.0 Significance of the Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger Judgment and its Context ............................................................................................................... 109 10.0 Consequences of the Digital Rights Ireland Judgment for Data Privacy/National Security in Europe .................................................................. 114 11.0 Judgments of the CJEU in the Google Spain and Schrems Cases .............. 122 12.0 Developments following the Invalidation of the Safe Harbour Agreement 131 13.0 Impact of the CJEU decisions in the Digital Rights Ireland, Google Spain, and Schrems cases on the data privacy/national security balance ...................... 135 14.0 The Alternative Data Privacy/National Security Balance: Circumventing vi Data Privacy Protections in the EU: The Mass Surveillance of Personal Data by Spy Agencies in some EU Member States ..........................................................135 15.0 Two Parallel Systems of Surveillance .........................................................146 16.0 The Council of Europe Versus The European Union: Which Regime Provides Greater Protection For Data Privacy Rights? .......................................148 17.0 Contrasting the European and U.S. positions on the Balancing of Data Privacy Rights against National Security Interests .............................................153 18.0 Conclusion ...................................................................................................156 Chapter Two .............................................................................................................165 The Privacy/Security Balance in the U.S. pre-9/11 ................................................165 1.0 Introduction .................................................................................................165 2.0 U.S. Understandings of the Right to Privacy and Particularly Data Privacy .............................................................................................................................168 3.0 Major Interferences with data privacy for national security reasons pre-9/11 in the context of the data privacy/national security balance, with emphasis on the background and role of the NSA. ........................................................................179 4.0 Major Scandals Relating to Data Retention: Privacy Rights Illegally Infringed by the Executive and its Agencies .......................................................186 5.0 Church Committee Report and the Balance Between National Security and Personal Liberties Pre-9/11 .................................................................................191 6.0 Judicial Oversight of Surveillance in the name of National Security: Implications for the Data Privacy/National Security Balance. ............................194 7.0 FISA: Adjusting the Data Privacy/National Security Balance? Restricting the Interpretation of Personal Data in the Context of Intelligence Surveillance by the Executive Branch in the name of National Security ...........................................197 8.0 Balancing Rights which are Qualitatively Different: Philosophical Issues Underlying the Data Privacy/National Security Balancing Paradigm ................209 9.0 Two Data Privacy/National Security Balancing Systems Pre-9/11:The Influence of NSA Surveillance Activity. The Legal and the Actual Balances....220 10.0 Conclusion ...................................................................................................224 Chapter Three ...........................................................................................................229 The Privacy/Security Balance in the U.S. Post-9/11 ..............................................229 1.0 Introduction ...................................................................................................229 2.0 Background ...................................................................................................230 3.0 The Administration's Defence of Its Surveillance Policies and a Scholarly Response .............................................................................................................244 4.0 Ideological Context of the Patriot Act ...........................................................252 5.0 Provisions of the Patriot Act .........................................................................253