London Zoo and the Victorians, 1848 1859. By Takashi Ito. (Suffolk, England: Boydell Press, 2014. Pp. 204. $90.00.
defined his position over the Suez Canal in opposition to that of Chamberlain, thereby precluding negotiation. The same could be said of Thatcher (the Falklands) Major (the First Gulf War) Blair (the Second Gulf War) and Cameron (Libya/Syria) Each position of strength distances itself from the perception of "weakness" that Chamberlain is argued to have demonstrated. The memory of Chamberlain's failure (and, indeed, Churchill's subsequent success) Hughes suggests, acted as a driver for foreign policy in the postwar period. It was without a doubt a powerful rhetorical position to adopt given that it enabled postwar prime ministers to associate themselves with Churchill's position, thereby demonstrating strength and courage in the face of an enemy. It must be noted that taking appeasement as simply a single act of substantial failure belies a more nuanced understanding of Chamberlain's position and attitude towards Hitler. However, given the subsequent rhetorical use of appeasement as something against which stronger leaders could define their position does not prevent Hughes (or other scholars) from using this understanding of appeasement. Put simply, regardless of the realities of Chamberlain's position, the memory of substantive failure is sufficient for modern day politicians to exploit in justifying subsequent actions in Suez, the Falklands, and the Gulf. Hughes successfully explores these dimensions of British foreign policy with a wide breadth of scholarly evidence. Indeed, evidence of his scholarship has a commanding representation within the book, occupying a significant part of the pages. He presents the argument in a manner likely to retain the interest of the reader whilst resisting the temptations towards over simplification. It is a highly interesting book that would be of interest to scholars and students alike.