Would Moral Machines Close the Responsibility Gap?
Questions about moral machines are ever present in contemporary discourse about robots and artificial intelligence. What would a machine that acts morally be like? Is it actually possible to build one? Should we work toward this goal and why? Would observable moral behavior be sufficient for a machine to count as a moral being, or would it need some 'subjective' foundation in its inner workings? In other words: Would it be enough for a 'moral machine' to behave as if it were sensitive to our moral affairs, or would it have to be able to sense and understand our moral concerns? The present paper focuses on a few selected aspects connecting moral machines to the so called responsibility gap. By introducing a number of clarifications and a certain perspective on the issues at hand, the question of whether a technological issue should be addressed by approximating machines to humans is answered in the negative. A reflection and debate on these and further similar issues would, therefore, have to shift its focus from the isolated technological artifacts to the much wider contexts of application and socio technological interactions.