EVERWORSE: WHAT'S WRONG WITH SELECTING FOR DISABILITY?
the fortunes and characteristics of their future children; all they need do is time conception in the hope that birth will occur with the sun in a suitably propitious constellation. But the astrologers are not to be believed. Instead, prospective parents are turning to new reproductive technologies, including pre implantation genetic screening and embryo selection, as a means to exert some influence over the characteristics of future offspring. Although the significance of genetics is often exaggerated our genes are not our destiny genetic selection has a far better claim to efficacy than astrological selection. We distinguish three applications of genetic selection: selection on non disease characteristics; selection against disease or disability; and selection for disease or disability. Selection on non disease characteristics (whether aimed at enhance ment, such as selection for high IQ, or simply at satisfying parental preferences for a baby of a particular sex or with a particular eye color) is the most controversial application of genetic selection, evoking fears of eugenics, designer babies, and toxic parental expectations.1 Although selection against genetic disease or dis ability has its critics,2 it is already widely accepted in actual medical practice. But it is the third application, selection for disability, that comes closest to being uncontroversial, striking many people as just obviously wrong. In this paper we challenge the moral consensus against selection for disability. Our discussion will concern only those disabilities that are compatible with a life worth living from the point of view of the disabled individual. We will argue that an influential, impersonal argument against selection for disability falls to a counterexample. We will then show how the reach of the counterexample can be broadened to make trouble for anyone who objects to selection for disability. If we are right about the problems for objections to selection for disability, the question arises as to why such objections are so widespread. We suggest that intuitions are being skewed against selection for disability by certain quirks in