A Stealth Cyber Attack Detection Strategy for DC Microgrids
This paper proposes a cooperative mechanism for detecting potentially deceptive cyber attacks that attempt to disregard average voltage regulation and current sharing in cyber physical dc microgrids. Considering a set of conventional cyber attacks, the detection becomes fairly easy for distributed observer based techniques. However, a well planned set of balanced attacks, termed as the stealth attack, can bypass the conventional observer based detection theory as the control objectives are met without any physical error involved. In this paper, we discuss the formulation and associated scope of instability from stealth attacks to deceive distributed observers realizing the necessary and sufficient conditions to model such attacks. To address this issue, a novel cooperative vulnerability factor (CVF) framework for each agent is introduced, which accurately identifies the attacked agent(s) under various scenarios. To facilitate detection under worst cases, the CVFs from the secondary voltage control sublayer is strategically cross coupled to the current sublayer, which ultimately disorients the control objectives in the presence of stealth attacks and provides a clear norm for triggering defense mechanisms. Finally, the performance of the proposed detection strategy is simulated in MATLAB/SIMULINK environment and experimentally validated for false data injection and stealth attacks on sensors and communication links.
IEEE Transactions on Power Electronics