Fichte's Deduction of the Moral Law
It is often assumed that Fichte's aim in Part I of the System of Ethics is to provide a deduction of the moral law, the very thing which Kant after years of unsuccessful attempts deemed impossible. On this familiar reading, what Kant eventually viewed as an underivable "fact" (Factum) the authority of the moral law, is what Fichte traces to its highest ground in what he calls the principle of the I as such. However, scholars have largely overlooked a passage in the System of Ethics where Fichte explicitly invokes Kant's doctrine of the fact of reason with approval, claiming that consciousness of the moral law grounds our belief in freedom (GA I/5:65) On the reading I defend in this paper, Fichte's invocation of the Factum is consistent with the structure of Part I when we distinguish (a) the feeling of moral compulsion from (b) the moral law itself.