The Adversarial Stackelberg Value in Quantitative Games
In this paper, we study the notion of adversarial Stackelberg value for two player non zero sum games played on bi weighted graphs with the mean payoff and the discounted sum functions. The adversarial Stackelberg value of Player 0 is the largest value that Player 0 can obtain when announcing her strategy to Player 1 which in turn responds with any of his best response. For the mean payoff function, we show that the adversarial Stackelberg value is not always achievable but epsilon optimal strategies exist. We show how to compute this value and prove that the associated threshold problem is in NP. For the discounted sum payoff function, we draw a link with the target discounted sum problem which explains why the problem is difficult to solve for this payoff function. We also provide solutions to related gap problems.
ICALP