2403961
Learning Mutual Trust
The multiagent learning literature has looked at iterated two-player games to develop mechanisms that allow agents to learn to converge on Nash Equilibrium strategy profiles. An equilibrium configuration implies that there is no motivation for one player to change its strategy if the other does not. Often, in general sum games, a higher payoff can be obtained by both players if one chooses not to respond optimally to the other player. By developing mutual trust, agents can avoid iterated best responses that will lead to a lesser payoff Nash Equilibrium. In this paper we consider 1-level agents (modelers) who select actions based on expected utility considering probability distributions over the actions of the opponent(s). We show that in certain situations, such stochastically-greedy agents can perform better (by developing mutually trusting behavior) than those that explicitly attempt to converge to Nash Equilibrium. We also experiment with an interesting action revealation strategy that can give the revealer better payoff on convergence than a non-revealing approach. By revealing, the revealer enables the opponent to agree to a more trusted equilibrium.
12119095
Correlating Internal Parameters and External Performance: Learning Soccer Agents
We have developed a Soccer simulator in Java, which allows us to evaluate agent behavioral strategies for effectively collaborating with other team members while countering threats posed by the opposing team. Whereas action selection mechanisms to decide when to shoot, pass, dribble, guard opponent, tackle, etc. are important from a player's viewpoint, learning the capabilities of individual opponents from repeated encounters can provide critical information for the success of a team. Each agent is described by a set of skill levels for different soccer skills. A soccer agent uses its incomplete perceptions, model of the changing environment, knowledge of the skill levels of its own team players, and estimated skill levels of the opponent team players to select the most prudent action. In this paper, we identify learning opportunities for soccer agents, and investigate some of these possibilities in detail. Initial experimental results demonstrate the advantage of learning agents.
3526092
Selecting partners
1. I N T R O D U C T I O N In an open environment the goal of a self-interested agent would be to interact with or enter into partnership with those agents that will produce maximal local utility for this agent [5]. We assume that an agent can get one of several payoffs (utilities) for joining a particular coalition which is determined by a static probability distribution over the payoffs for each coalition. We consider choosing a single coalition to interact with repeatedly when the total number of interactions is known ahead of time.
1062630
The Role of Commitment in Cooperative Negotiation
Cooperative information agents need mechanisms that enable them to work together effectively while solving common problems. We investigate the use of commitment by agents to proposed actions as a mechanism that allow agents to work concurrently on interdependent problems. Judicious use of commitment can not only increase the throughput of cooperative information systems, but also allow them to deal flexibly with dynamically changing environments. We use the domain of distributed scheduling to demonstrate that static commitment strategies are ineffective. Results from simulated experiments are used to identify the environmental features on which an adaptive commitment strategy should be predicated.
15974834
Learning Pareto-optimal Solutions in 2x2 Conflict Games
Multiagent learning literature has investigated iterated two-player games to develop mechanisms that allow agents to learn to converge on Nash Equilibrium strategy profiles. Such equilibrium configurations imply that no player has the motivation to unilaterally change its strategy. Often, in general sum games, a higher payoff can be obtained by both players if one chooses not to respond myopically to the other player. By developing mutual trust, agents can avoid immediate best responses that will lead to a Nash Equilibrium with lesser payoff. In this paper we experiment with agents who select actions based on expected utility calculations that incorporate the observed frequencies of the actions of the opponent(s). We augment these stochastically greedy agents with an interesting action revelation strategy that involves strategic declaration of one's commitment to an action to avoid worst-case, pessimistic moves. We argue that in certain situations, such apparently risky action revelation can indeed produce better payoffs than a non-revealing approach. In particular, it is possible to obtain Pareto-optimal Nash Equilibrium outcomes. We improve on the outcome efficiency of a previous algorithm and present results over the set of structurally distinct two-person two-action conflict games where the players' preferences form a total order over the possible outcomes. We also present results on a large number of randomly generated payoff matrices of varying sizes and compare the payoffs of strategically revealing learners to payoffs at Nash equilibrium.
43158386
Evolution and learning in multiagent systems
16584682
You are what you say: privacy risks of public mentions
In today's data-rich networked world, people express many aspects of their lives online. It is common to segregate different aspects in different places: you might write opinionated rants about movies in your blog under a pseudonym while participating in a forum or web site for scholarly discussion of medical ethics under your real name. However, it may be possible to link these separate identities, because the movies, journal articles, or authors you mention are from a sparse relation space whose properties (e.g., many items related to by only a few users) allow re-identification. This re-identification violates people's intentions to separate aspects of their life and can have negative consequences; it also may allow other privacy violations, such as obtaining a stronger identifier like name and address.This paper examines this general problem in a specific setting: re-identification of users from a public web movie forum in a private movie ratings dataset. We present three major results. First, we develop algorithms that can re-identify a large proportion of public users in a sparse relation space. Second, we evaluate whether private dataset owners can protect user privacy by hiding data; we show that this requires extensive and undesirable changes to the dataset, making it impractical. Third, we evaluate two methods for users in a public forum to protect their own privacy, suppression and misdirection. Suppression doesn't work here either. However, we show that a simple misdirection strategy works well: mention a few popular items that you haven't rated.
37914727
Fractional Cascading Revisited
We present an alternative implementation of the fractional cascading data structure of Chazelle and Guibas (Algorithmica1 (1986), 133-162) that performs iterative search for a key in multiple ordered lists. The construction of our data structure uses randomization and simplifies the algorithm of Chazelle and Guibas, vastly making it practical to implement. Although our bounds are asymptotically similar to the earlier ones, there are improvements in the constant factors. Our analysis is novel and captures some of the inherent difficulties associated with the fractional cascading data structure. In particular, we use tools from branching process theory and derive some useful asymptotic bounds. The probability of deviation from the expected performance bounds decreases exponentially with number of keys. Also, under a restricted model, we obtain efficient bounds for updates in the data structure.
10126037
PDM sorting algorithms that take a small number of passes
We live in an era of data explosion that necessitates the discovery of novel out-of-core techniques. The I/O bottleneck has to be dealt with in developing out-of-core methods. The parallel disk model (PDM) has been proposed to alleviate the I/O bottleneck. Sorting is an important problem that has ubiquitous applications. Several asymptotically optimal PDM sorting algorithms are known and now the focus has shifted to developing algorithms for problem sizes of practical interest. In this paper we present several novel algorithms for sorting on the PDM that take only a small number of passes through the data. We also present a generalization of the zero-one principle for sorting. A shuffling lemma is presented as well. These lemmas should be of independent interest for average case analysis of sorting algorithms as well as for the analysis of randomized sorting algorithms.
1681173
Optimal proxy cache allocation for efficient streaming media distribution
We address the problem of efficiently streaming a set of heterogeneous videos from a remote server through a proxy to multiple asynchronous clients so that they can experience playback with low startup delays. We determine the optimal proxy prefix cache allocation to the videos that minimizes the aggregate network bandwidth cost. We integrate proxy caching with traditional server-based reactive transmission schemes such as hatching, patching and stream merging to develop a set of proxy-assisted delivery schemes. We quantitatively explore the impact of the choice of transmission scheme, cache allocation policy, proxy cache size, and availability of unicast versus multicast capability, on the resulting transmission cost. Our evaluations show that even a relatively small prefix cache (10%-20% of the video repository) is sufficient to realize substantial savings in transmission cost. We find that carefully designed proxy-assisted reactive transmission schemes can produce significant cost savings even in a predominantly unicast environment such as the Internet.
16079000
Searching for optimal coalition structures
Coalition formation has been a very active area of research in multiagent systems. Most of this research has concentrated on decentralized procedures that allow self-interested agents to negotiate the formation of coalitions and division of coalition payoffs. A different line of research has addressed the problem of finding the optimal division of agents into coalitions such that the sum total of the the payoffs to all the coalitions is maximized (Larson and Sandholm, 1999). This is the optimal coalition structure identification problem. Deterministic search algorithms have been proposed and evaluated under the assumption that the performance of a coalition is independent of other coalitions. We use an order-based genetic algorithm (OBGA) as a stochastic search process to identify the optimal coalition structure. We compare the performance of the OBGA with a representative deterministic algorithm presented in the literature. Though the OBGA has no performance guarantees, it is found to dominate the deterministic algorithm in a significant number of problem settings. An additional advantage of the OBGA is its scalability to larger problem sizes and to problems where performance of a coalition depends on other coalitions in the environment.