6555481
An Efficient Protocol for Negotiation over Multiple Indivisible Resources
We study the problem of autonomous agents negotiating the allocation of multiple indivisible resources. It is difficult to reach optimal outcomes in bilateral or multi-lateral negotiations over multiple resources when the agents' preferences for the resources are not common knowledge. Self-interested agents often end up negotiating inefficient agreements in such situations. We present a protocol for negotiation over multiple indivisible resources which can be used by rational agents to reach efficient outcomes. Our proposed protocol enables the negotiating agents to identify efficient solutions using systematic distributed search that visits only a subspace of the whole solution space.
1062630
The Role of Commitment in Cooperative Negotiation
Cooperative information agents need mechanisms that enable them to work together effectively while solving common problems. We investigate the use of commitment by agents to proposed actions as a mechanism that allow agents to work concurrently on interdependent problems. Judicious use of commitment can not only increase the throughput of cooperative information systems, but also allow them to deal flexibly with dynamically changing environments. We use the domain of distributed scheduling to demonstrate that static commitment strategies are ineffective. Results from simulated experiments are used to identify the environmental features on which an adaptive commitment strategy should be predicated.
12119095
Correlating Internal Parameters and External Performance: Learning Soccer Agents
We have developed a Soccer simulator in Java, which allows us to evaluate agent behavioral strategies for effectively collaborating with other team members while countering threats posed by the opposing team. Whereas action selection mechanisms to decide when to shoot, pass, dribble, guard opponent, tackle, etc. are important from a player's viewpoint, learning the capabilities of individual opponents from repeated encounters can provide critical information for the success of a team. Each agent is described by a set of skill levels for different soccer skills. A soccer agent uses its incomplete perceptions, model of the changing environment, knowledge of the skill levels of its own team players, and estimated skill levels of the opponent team players to select the most prudent action. In this paper, we identify learning opportunities for soccer agents, and investigate some of these possibilities in detail. Initial experimental results demonstrate the advantage of learning agents.
3526092
Selecting partners
1. I N T R O D U C T I O N In an open environment the goal of a self-interested agent would be to interact with or enter into partnership with those agents that will produce maximal local utility for this agent [5]. We assume that an agent can get one of several payoffs (utilities) for joining a particular coalition which is determined by a static probability distribution over the payoffs for each coalition. We consider choosing a single coalition to interact with repeatedly when the total number of interactions is known ahead of time.
43158386
Evolution and learning in multiagent systems
15974834
Learning Pareto-optimal Solutions in 2x2 Conflict Games
Multiagent learning literature has investigated iterated two-player games to develop mechanisms that allow agents to learn to converge on Nash Equilibrium strategy profiles. Such equilibrium configurations imply that no player has the motivation to unilaterally change its strategy. Often, in general sum games, a higher payoff can be obtained by both players if one chooses not to respond myopically to the other player. By developing mutual trust, agents can avoid immediate best responses that will lead to a Nash Equilibrium with lesser payoff. In this paper we experiment with agents who select actions based on expected utility calculations that incorporate the observed frequencies of the actions of the opponent(s). We augment these stochastically greedy agents with an interesting action revelation strategy that involves strategic declaration of one's commitment to an action to avoid worst-case, pessimistic moves. We argue that in certain situations, such apparently risky action revelation can indeed produce better payoffs than a non-revealing approach. In particular, it is possible to obtain Pareto-optimal Nash Equilibrium outcomes. We improve on the outcome efficiency of a previous algorithm and present results over the set of structurally distinct two-person two-action conflict games where the players' preferences form a total order over the possible outcomes. We also present results on a large number of randomly generated payoff matrices of varying sizes and compare the payoffs of strategically revealing learners to payoffs at Nash equilibrium.
13878075
Optimal sequencing of individually rational contracts
Multiagent researchers have worked on the problem of determining optimal contracts between self-interested agents. In particular, Sandholm et al. [1,8] have both theoretically and experimentally studied the necessity and usefulness of different contract types under the assumption of individually myopically rational contracting. We study a variant of sequential contracting where the goal is to maximize social welfare through a fixed-length sequence of individually rational contracts. The space of possible contract sequences is exponential. We compare a greedy deterministic heuristic with a stochastic genetic algorithm based approach for this optimal sequential contract selection problem. We focus on sub-additive domains where individually rational contracts are feasible with side payments. We show that the GA-based approach consistently outperforms the deterministic heuristic by generating larger social welfare.
9417710
Using real-valued genetic algorithms to evolve rule sets for classification
In this paper, we use a genetic algorithm to evolve a set of classification rules with real-valued attributes. We show how real-valued attribute ranges could be encoded with real-valued genes and present a new uniform method for representing don't cares in the rules. We view supervised classification as an optimization problem, and evolve rule sets that maximize the number of correct classifications of input instances. We use a variant of the Pitt approach to genetic-based machine learning system with a novel conflict resolution mechanism between competing rules within the same rule set. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed approach on a benchmark wine classifier system.<<ETX>>
3054792
Towards a theory of cache-efficient algorithms
We present a model that enables us to analyze the running time of an algorithm on a computer with a memory hierarchy with limited associativity, in terms of various cache parameters. Our cache model, an extension of Aggarwal and Vitter's I/O model, enables us to establish useful relationships between the cache complexity and the I/O complexity of computations. As a corollary, we obtain cache-efficient algorithms in the single-level cache model for fundamental problems like sorting, FFT, and an important subclass of permutations. We also analyze the average-case cache behavior of mergesort, show that ignoring associativity concerns could lead to inferior performance, and present supporting experimental evidence.We further extend our model to multiple levels of cache with limited associativity and present optimal algorithms for matrix transpose and sorting. Our techniques may be used for systematic exploitation of the memory hierarchy starting from the algorithm design stage, and for dealing with the hitherto unresolved problem of limited associativity.
16079000
Searching for optimal coalition structures
Coalition formation has been a very active area of research in multiagent systems. Most of this research has concentrated on decentralized procedures that allow self-interested agents to negotiate the formation of coalitions and division of coalition payoffs. A different line of research has addressed the problem of finding the optimal division of agents into coalitions such that the sum total of the the payoffs to all the coalitions is maximized (Larson and Sandholm, 1999). This is the optimal coalition structure identification problem. Deterministic search algorithms have been proposed and evaluated under the assumption that the performance of a coalition is independent of other coalitions. We use an order-based genetic algorithm (OBGA) as a stochastic search process to identify the optimal coalition structure. We compare the performance of the OBGA with a representative deterministic algorithm presented in the literature. Though the OBGA has no performance guarantees, it is found to dominate the deterministic algorithm in a significant number of problem settings. An additional advantage of the OBGA is its scalability to larger problem sizes and to problems where performance of a coalition depends on other coalitions in the environment.
33712953
Fractional Cascading Simplified
We give an alternate implementation of the fractional cascading data-structure of Chazelle and Guibas to do iterative search for a key in multiple ordered lists. The construction of our data-structure uses randomization and simplifies the algorithm of Chazelle and Guibas vastly making it practical to implement. Although our bounds are asymptotically similar to the earlier ones, there are improvements in the constant factors. Our analysis is novel and captures some of the inherent difficulties associated with the fractional casading data structure. In particular, we use tools from branching process theory and derive some useful asymptotic bounds. The probability of deviation from the expected performance bounds decreases rapidly with number of keys.