12476704
Strategic bidding for multiple units in simultaneous and sequential auctions
A buyer may be interested in buying a bundle of items, where any one item in the bundle may not be of particular interest. The emergence of online auctions allows such users to obtain bundles by bidding on different simultaneous or sequentially run auctions. Because the number of auctions and the number of combinations to form the bundles may be large, the bundle bidding problem becomes intractable and the user is likely to make suboptimal decision given time constraints and information overload. We believe that an automated agent that can take user preferences and budgetary constraints and can strategically bid on behalf of a user can significantly enhance user profit and satisfaction. Our first step to build such an agent is to consider bundles containing many units of a single a item and auctions that sell only multiple units of one item type. We assume that users obtain goods over several days. Expectations of auctions and their outcome in the future allow the agent to bid strategically on currently open auctions. The agent decides how many items to bid for in the current auctions, and the maximum price to bid for each item. We evaluate our proposed strategy in different configurations: number of items sold, number of auctions opened, expected closing prices, etc. The agent produces greater returns in situations where future auctions can provide better profit, and where not too many agents use our proposed strategy.
3526092
Selecting partners
1. I N T R O D U C T I O N In an open environment the goal of a self-interested agent would be to interact with or enter into partnership with those agents that will produce maximal local utility for this agent [5]. We assume that an agent can get one of several payoffs (utilities) for joining a particular coalition which is determined by a static probability distribution over the payoffs for each coalition. We consider choosing a single coalition to interact with repeatedly when the total number of interactions is known ahead of time.
43158386
Evolution and learning in multiagent systems
12119095
Correlating Internal Parameters and External Performance: Learning Soccer Agents
We have developed a Soccer simulator in Java, which allows us to evaluate agent behavioral strategies for effectively collaborating with other team members while countering threats posed by the opposing team. Whereas action selection mechanisms to decide when to shoot, pass, dribble, guard opponent, tackle, etc. are important from a player's viewpoint, learning the capabilities of individual opponents from repeated encounters can provide critical information for the success of a team. Each agent is described by a set of skill levels for different soccer skills. A soccer agent uses its incomplete perceptions, model of the changing environment, knowledge of the skill levels of its own team players, and estimated skill levels of the opponent team players to select the most prudent action. In this paper, we identify learning opportunities for soccer agents, and investigate some of these possibilities in detail. Initial experimental results demonstrate the advantage of learning agents.
15974834
Learning Pareto-optimal Solutions in 2x2 Conflict Games
Multiagent learning literature has investigated iterated two-player games to develop mechanisms that allow agents to learn to converge on Nash Equilibrium strategy profiles. Such equilibrium configurations imply that no player has the motivation to unilaterally change its strategy. Often, in general sum games, a higher payoff can be obtained by both players if one chooses not to respond myopically to the other player. By developing mutual trust, agents can avoid immediate best responses that will lead to a Nash Equilibrium with lesser payoff. In this paper we experiment with agents who select actions based on expected utility calculations that incorporate the observed frequencies of the actions of the opponent(s). We augment these stochastically greedy agents with an interesting action revelation strategy that involves strategic declaration of one's commitment to an action to avoid worst-case, pessimistic moves. We argue that in certain situations, such apparently risky action revelation can indeed produce better payoffs than a non-revealing approach. In particular, it is possible to obtain Pareto-optimal Nash Equilibrium outcomes. We improve on the outcome efficiency of a previous algorithm and present results over the set of structurally distinct two-person two-action conflict games where the players' preferences form a total order over the possible outcomes. We also present results on a large number of randomly generated payoff matrices of varying sizes and compare the payoffs of strategically revealing learners to payoffs at Nash equilibrium.
1062630
The Role of Commitment in Cooperative Negotiation
Cooperative information agents need mechanisms that enable them to work together effectively while solving common problems. We investigate the use of commitment by agents to proposed actions as a mechanism that allow agents to work concurrently on interdependent problems. Judicious use of commitment can not only increase the throughput of cooperative information systems, but also allow them to deal flexibly with dynamically changing environments. We use the domain of distributed scheduling to demonstrate that static commitment strategies are ineffective. Results from simulated experiments are used to identify the environmental features on which an adaptive commitment strategy should be predicated.
14171501
A tale of two representations
Attribute based concept learning has been an active area of machine learning research over the past decade. A number of proposed concept learners are rule-based systems, whose eeciency depends largely on the representation of the rules. We analyze two attribute-value rule representations for the compactness of concept deenition. A spectrum of concepts, with diierent numbers of conjuncts and disjuncts in their deenition, is used to evaluate the eeectiveness of the chosen representations. Our analysis shows that neither of the representations is dominant over the other, and it is beneecial to switch representations with varying concept complexity. Experimental veriication of the predicted tradeoo is provided. The relatively novel of the two representations is found to be better, in general, at concisely representing concepts than the more commonly used representation. We present a formula to choose between these representations, which uses an estimate of the complexity of the concept to be learnt.
16584682
You are what you say: privacy risks of public mentions
In today's data-rich networked world, people express many aspects of their lives online. It is common to segregate different aspects in different places: you might write opinionated rants about movies in your blog under a pseudonym while participating in a forum or web site for scholarly discussion of medical ethics under your real name. However, it may be possible to link these separate identities, because the movies, journal articles, or authors you mention are from a sparse relation space whose properties (e.g., many items related to by only a few users) allow re-identification. This re-identification violates people's intentions to separate aspects of their life and can have negative consequences; it also may allow other privacy violations, such as obtaining a stronger identifier like name and address.This paper examines this general problem in a specific setting: re-identification of users from a public web movie forum in a private movie ratings dataset. We present three major results. First, we develop algorithms that can re-identify a large proportion of public users in a sparse relation space. Second, we evaluate whether private dataset owners can protect user privacy by hiding data; we show that this requires extensive and undesirable changes to the dataset, making it impractical. Third, we evaluate two methods for users in a public forum to protect their own privacy, suppression and misdirection. Suppression doesn't work here either. However, we show that a simple misdirection strategy works well: mention a few popular items that you haven't rated.
207161230
FeedMe: a collaborative alert filtering system
As the number of alerts generated by collaborative applications grows, users receive more unwanted alerts. FeedMe is a general alert management system based on XML feed protocols such as RSS and ATOM. In addition to traditional rule-based alert filtering, FeedMe uses techniques from machine-learning to infer alert preferences based on user feedback. In this paper, we present and evaluate a new collaborative naïve Bayes filtering algorithm. Using FeedMe, we collected alert ratings from 33 users over 29 days. We used the data to design and verify the accuracy of the filtering algorithm and provide insights into alert prediction.
2420350
Smooth workload adaptive broadcast
The high-bandwidth requirements and long-lived characteristics of digital video make transmission bandwidth usage a key limiting factor in the widespread streaming of such content over the Internet. A challenging problem is to develop bandwidth-efficient techniques for delivering popular videos to a large, asynchronous client population with time-varying demand characteristics. In this paper, we propose smooth workload adaptive broadcast to address the above issues. A key component of our scheme is Flexible Periodic Broadcast (FPB). By introducing a feedback control loop into FPB, and enhancing FPB using techniques such as parsimonious transmission, smooth workload adaptive broadcast provides instantaneous or near-instantaneous playback services and can smoothly adapt to workload changes. Furthermore, FPB, as proposed in this paper, is bandwidth efficient and exhibits the periodic smooth channel transition property.
13878075
Optimal sequencing of individually rational contracts
Multiagent researchers have worked on the problem of determining optimal contracts between self-interested agents. In particular, Sandholm et al. [1,8] have both theoretically and experimentally studied the necessity and usefulness of different contract types under the assumption of individually myopically rational contracting. We study a variant of sequential contracting where the goal is to maximize social welfare through a fixed-length sequence of individually rational contracts. The space of possible contract sequences is exponential. We compare a greedy deterministic heuristic with a stochastic genetic algorithm based approach for this optimal sequential contract selection problem. We focus on sub-additive domains where individually rational contracts are feasible with side payments. We show that the GA-based approach consistently outperforms the deterministic heuristic by generating larger social welfare.