41882641
Using limited information to enhance group stability
The performance of individual agents in a group depends critically on the quality of information available to them about local and global goals and resources. In general, it is assumed that the more accurate and comprehensive the available information, the better is the expected performance of the individual and the group. This conclusion can be challenged in a number of scenarios. We investigate the use of limited information by agents in choosing betwen one of several different options, and conclude that if agents are kept ignorant about, or they deliberately ignore, any number of options, the group can converge faster to a stable and optimal configuration. We present a probabilistic analysis that sheds light on the observed phenomenon of quicker system convergence with less global information. This analysis suggests a desirable adaptive behavior on the part of individual agents. Experiments with agents following these adaptive behavior exhibits faster convergence. We also demonstrate how a couple of coalition formation schemes can improve the rate of convergence. A variable coalition formation mechanism is found to be more effective than a static one.
12119095
Correlating Internal Parameters and External Performance: Learning Soccer Agents
We have developed a Soccer simulator in Java, which allows us to evaluate agent behavioral strategies for effectively collaborating with other team members while countering threats posed by the opposing team. Whereas action selection mechanisms to decide when to shoot, pass, dribble, guard opponent, tackle, etc. are important from a player's viewpoint, learning the capabilities of individual opponents from repeated encounters can provide critical information for the success of a team. Each agent is described by a set of skill levels for different soccer skills. A soccer agent uses its incomplete perceptions, model of the changing environment, knowledge of the skill levels of its own team players, and estimated skill levels of the opponent team players to select the most prudent action. In this paper, we identify learning opportunities for soccer agents, and investigate some of these possibilities in detail. Initial experimental results demonstrate the advantage of learning agents.
43158386
Evolution and learning in multiagent systems
3526092
Selecting partners
1. I N T R O D U C T I O N In an open environment the goal of a self-interested agent would be to interact with or enter into partnership with those agents that will produce maximal local utility for this agent [5]. We assume that an agent can get one of several payoffs (utilities) for joining a particular coalition which is determined by a static probability distribution over the payoffs for each coalition. We consider choosing a single coalition to interact with repeatedly when the total number of interactions is known ahead of time.
15974834
Learning Pareto-optimal Solutions in 2x2 Conflict Games
Multiagent learning literature has investigated iterated two-player games to develop mechanisms that allow agents to learn to converge on Nash Equilibrium strategy profiles. Such equilibrium configurations imply that no player has the motivation to unilaterally change its strategy. Often, in general sum games, a higher payoff can be obtained by both players if one chooses not to respond myopically to the other player. By developing mutual trust, agents can avoid immediate best responses that will lead to a Nash Equilibrium with lesser payoff. In this paper we experiment with agents who select actions based on expected utility calculations that incorporate the observed frequencies of the actions of the opponent(s). We augment these stochastically greedy agents with an interesting action revelation strategy that involves strategic declaration of one's commitment to an action to avoid worst-case, pessimistic moves. We argue that in certain situations, such apparently risky action revelation can indeed produce better payoffs than a non-revealing approach. In particular, it is possible to obtain Pareto-optimal Nash Equilibrium outcomes. We improve on the outcome efficiency of a previous algorithm and present results over the set of structurally distinct two-person two-action conflict games where the players' preferences form a total order over the possible outcomes. We also present results on a large number of randomly generated payoff matrices of varying sizes and compare the payoffs of strategically revealing learners to payoffs at Nash equilibrium.
1062630
The Role of Commitment in Cooperative Negotiation
Cooperative information agents need mechanisms that enable them to work together effectively while solving common problems. We investigate the use of commitment by agents to proposed actions as a mechanism that allow agents to work concurrently on interdependent problems. Judicious use of commitment can not only increase the throughput of cooperative information systems, but also allow them to deal flexibly with dynamically changing environments. We use the domain of distributed scheduling to demonstrate that static commitment strategies are ineffective. Results from simulated experiments are used to identify the environmental features on which an adaptive commitment strategy should be predicated.
29616158
Improved decremental algorithms for maintaining transitive closure and all-pairs shortest paths
This paper presents improved algorithms for the following problem: given an unweighted directed graph G(V,E) and a sequence of on-line shortest-path/reachability queries interspersed with edge-deletions, develop a data-structure that can answer each query in optimal time, and can be updated efficiently after each edge-deletion. The central idea underlying our algorithms is a scheme for implicitly storing all-pairs reachability/shortest-path information, and an efficient way to maintain this information. Our algorithms are randomized and have one-sided inverse polynomial error for query.
10126037
PDM sorting algorithms that take a small number of passes
We live in an era of data explosion that necessitates the discovery of novel out-of-core techniques. The I/O bottleneck has to be dealt with in developing out-of-core methods. The parallel disk model (PDM) has been proposed to alleviate the I/O bottleneck. Sorting is an important problem that has ubiquitous applications. Several asymptotically optimal PDM sorting algorithms are known and now the focus has shifted to developing algorithms for problem sizes of practical interest. In this paper we present several novel algorithms for sorting on the PDM that take only a small number of passes through the data. We also present a generalization of the zero-one principle for sorting. A shuffling lemma is presented as well. These lemmas should be of independent interest for average case analysis of sorting algorithms as well as for the analysis of randomized sorting algorithms.
3054792
Towards a theory of cache-efficient algorithms
We present a model that enables us to analyze the running time of an algorithm on a computer with a memory hierarchy with limited associativity, in terms of various cache parameters. Our cache model, an extension of Aggarwal and Vitter's I/O model, enables us to establish useful relationships between the cache complexity and the I/O complexity of computations. As a corollary, we obtain cache-efficient algorithms in the single-level cache model for fundamental problems like sorting, FFT, and an important subclass of permutations. We also analyze the average-case cache behavior of mergesort, show that ignoring associativity concerns could lead to inferior performance, and present supporting experimental evidence.We further extend our model to multiple levels of cache with limited associativity and present optimal algorithms for matrix transpose and sorting. Our techniques may be used for systematic exploitation of the memory hierarchy starting from the algorithm design stage, and for dealing with the hitherto unresolved problem of limited associativity.
14273924
The Success and Failure of Tag-Mediated Evolution of Cooperation
Use of tags to limit partner selection for playing has been shown to produce stable cooperation in agent populations playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game. There is, however, a lack of understanding of how and why tags facilitate such cooperation. We start with an empirical investigation that identifies the key dynamics that result in sustainable cooperation in PD. Sufficiently long tags are needed to achieve this effect. A theoretical analysis shows that multiple simulation parameters including tag length, mutation rate and population size will have significant effect on sustaining cooperation. Experiments partially validate these observations. Additionally, we claim that tags only promote mimicking and not coordinated behavior in general, i.e., tags can promote cooperation only if cooperation requires identical actions from all group members. We illustrate the failure of the tag model to sustain cooperation by experimenting with domains where agents need to take complementary actions to maximize payoff.
31766769
Improved selection in totally monotone arrays
This paper's main result is an -time algorithm for computing the kth smallest entry in each row of an m×n totally monotone array. (A two-dimensional array A={a[i, j]} is totally monotone if for all i1<i2 and j1<j2, a[i1, j1]<a[i1, j2] implies a[i2, j1]<a[i2, j2].) For large values of k (in particular, for k=⌈n/2⌉), this algorithm is significantly faster than the O(k(m + n))-time algorithm for the same problem due to Kravets and Park. An immediate consequence of this result is an O(n3/2lg1/2 n)-time algorithm for computing the kth nearest neighbor of each vertex of a convex n-gon. In addition to the main result, we also give an O(n lg m)-time algorithm for computing an approximate median in each row of an m×n totally monotone array; this approximate median is an entry whose rank in its row lies between ⌊n/4⌋ and ⌈3n/4⌉ − 1.