7580001
Evolutionary Tournament-Based Comparison of Learning and Non-Learning Strategies for Iterated Games
Evolutionary tournaments have been used as a tool for comparing strategies. For instance, in the late 1970’s, Axelro d organized tournaments to compare strategies for playing th e iterated prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game. While these tournaments and later research have provided us with a better understanding of successful strategies for iterated PD, ou r understanding is less clear about strategies for playing it erated versions of arbitrary single-stage games. While solut ion concepts like Nash equilibria has been proposed for general sum games, learning strategies like fictitious play may be pr eferred for playing against sub-rational players. In this pa per, we discuss the relative performance of both learning and non learning strategies that embody some of the above approache s on an experimental testbed of all possible structurally dis tinct 2x2 conflicted games with ordinal payoffs. This set of bimatrices provides a baseline, neutral testbed for comparin g strategies. We discuss the testbed, our choice of represent ative learning and non-learning strategies and relative ran kings of these strategies ranked by cumulative score in tournamen ts. We also study the performance of the strategies in an evolutionary tournament. Finally, we provide some analysis of th e observed results to highlight the advantage of learning str ategies.
12119095
Correlating Internal Parameters and External Performance: Learning Soccer Agents
We have developed a Soccer simulator in Java, which allows us to evaluate agent behavioral strategies for effectively collaborating with other team members while countering threats posed by the opposing team. Whereas action selection mechanisms to decide when to shoot, pass, dribble, guard opponent, tackle, etc. are important from a player's viewpoint, learning the capabilities of individual opponents from repeated encounters can provide critical information for the success of a team. Each agent is described by a set of skill levels for different soccer skills. A soccer agent uses its incomplete perceptions, model of the changing environment, knowledge of the skill levels of its own team players, and estimated skill levels of the opponent team players to select the most prudent action. In this paper, we identify learning opportunities for soccer agents, and investigate some of these possibilities in detail. Initial experimental results demonstrate the advantage of learning agents.
43158386
Evolution and learning in multiagent systems
1062630
The Role of Commitment in Cooperative Negotiation
Cooperative information agents need mechanisms that enable them to work together effectively while solving common problems. We investigate the use of commitment by agents to proposed actions as a mechanism that allow agents to work concurrently on interdependent problems. Judicious use of commitment can not only increase the throughput of cooperative information systems, but also allow them to deal flexibly with dynamically changing environments. We use the domain of distributed scheduling to demonstrate that static commitment strategies are ineffective. Results from simulated experiments are used to identify the environmental features on which an adaptive commitment strategy should be predicated.
15974834
Learning Pareto-optimal Solutions in 2x2 Conflict Games
Multiagent learning literature has investigated iterated two-player games to develop mechanisms that allow agents to learn to converge on Nash Equilibrium strategy profiles. Such equilibrium configurations imply that no player has the motivation to unilaterally change its strategy. Often, in general sum games, a higher payoff can be obtained by both players if one chooses not to respond myopically to the other player. By developing mutual trust, agents can avoid immediate best responses that will lead to a Nash Equilibrium with lesser payoff. In this paper we experiment with agents who select actions based on expected utility calculations that incorporate the observed frequencies of the actions of the opponent(s). We augment these stochastically greedy agents with an interesting action revelation strategy that involves strategic declaration of one's commitment to an action to avoid worst-case, pessimistic moves. We argue that in certain situations, such apparently risky action revelation can indeed produce better payoffs than a non-revealing approach. In particular, it is possible to obtain Pareto-optimal Nash Equilibrium outcomes. We improve on the outcome efficiency of a previous algorithm and present results over the set of structurally distinct two-person two-action conflict games where the players' preferences form a total order over the possible outcomes. We also present results on a large number of randomly generated payoff matrices of varying sizes and compare the payoffs of strategically revealing learners to payoffs at Nash equilibrium.
3526092
Selecting partners
1. I N T R O D U C T I O N In an open environment the goal of a self-interested agent would be to interact with or enter into partnership with those agents that will produce maximal local utility for this agent [5]. We assume that an agent can get one of several payoffs (utilities) for joining a particular coalition which is determined by a static probability distribution over the payoffs for each coalition. We consider choosing a single coalition to interact with repeatedly when the total number of interactions is known ahead of time.
14171501
A tale of two representations
Attribute based concept learning has been an active area of machine learning research over the past decade. A number of proposed concept learners are rule-based systems, whose eeciency depends largely on the representation of the rules. We analyze two attribute-value rule representations for the compactness of concept deenition. A spectrum of concepts, with diierent numbers of conjuncts and disjuncts in their deenition, is used to evaluate the eeectiveness of the chosen representations. Our analysis shows that neither of the representations is dominant over the other, and it is beneecial to switch representations with varying concept complexity. Experimental veriication of the predicted tradeoo is provided. The relatively novel of the two representations is found to be better, in general, at concisely representing concepts than the more commonly used representation. We present a formula to choose between these representations, which uses an estimate of the complexity of the concept to be learnt.
17321203
On a Simple, Practical, Optimal, Output-Sensitive Randomized Planar Convex Hull Algorithm
In this paper we present a truly practical and provably optimalO(nlogh) time output-sensitive algorithm for the planar convex hull problem. The basic algorithm is similar to the algorithm presented by2, where the median-finding step is replaced by an approximate median. We analyze two such schemes and show that for both methods, the algorithm runs in expectedO(nlogh) time. We further show that the probability of deviation from expected running time approaches 0 rapidly with increasing values ofnandhfor any input. Our experiments suggest that this algorithm is a practical alternative to the worst-caseO(nlogn) algorithms such as Graham's and is especially faster for small output-sizes. Our approach bears some resemblance to a recent algorithm of13, but our analysis is substantially different.
10420740
Accurate, scalable in-network identification of p2p traffic using application signatures
The ability to accurately identify the network traffic associated with different P2P applications is important to a broad range of network operations including application-specific traffic engineering, capacity planning, provisioning, service differentiation,etc. However, traditional traffic to higher-level application mapping techniques such as default server TCP or UDP network-port baseddisambiguation is highly inaccurate for some P2P applications.In this paper, we provide an efficient approach for identifying the P2P application traffic through application level signatures. We firstidentify the application level signatures by examining some available documentations, and packet-level traces. We then utilize the identified signatures to develop online filters that can efficiently and accurately track the P2P traffic even on high-speed network links.We examine the performance of our application-level identification approach using five popular P2P protocols. Our measurements show thatour technique achieves less than 5% false positive and false negative ratios in most cases. We also show that our approach only requires the examination of the very first few packets (less than 10packets) to identify a P2P connection, which makes our approach highly scalable. Our technique can significantly improve the P2P traffic volume estimates over what pure network port based approaches provide. For instance, we were able to identify 3 times as much traffic for the popular Kazaa P2P protocol, compared to the traditional port-based approach.
14273924
The Success and Failure of Tag-Mediated Evolution of Cooperation
Use of tags to limit partner selection for playing has been shown to produce stable cooperation in agent populations playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game. There is, however, a lack of understanding of how and why tags facilitate such cooperation. We start with an empirical investigation that identifies the key dynamics that result in sustainable cooperation in PD. Sufficiently long tags are needed to achieve this effect. A theoretical analysis shows that multiple simulation parameters including tag length, mutation rate and population size will have significant effect on sustaining cooperation. Experiments partially validate these observations. Additionally, we claim that tags only promote mimicking and not coordinated behavior in general, i.e., tags can promote cooperation only if cooperation requires identical actions from all group members. We illustrate the failure of the tag model to sustain cooperation by experimenting with domains where agents need to take complementary actions to maximize payoff.
16723670
PLEASE: A Prototype Learning System Using Genetic Algorithms
Prototypes have been proposed as representation of concepts that are used eeec-tively by humans. Developing computational schemes for generating prototypes from examples , however, has proved to be a dii-cult problem. We present a novel genetic algorithm based prototype learning system, PLEASE, for constructing appropriate prototypes from classiied training instances. After constructing a set of prototypes for each of the possible classes, the class of a new input instance is determined by the nearest prototype to this instance. Attributes are assumed to be ordinal in nature and prototypes are represented as sets of feature-value pairs. A genetic algorithm is used to evolve the number of prototypes per class and their positions on the input space. We present experimental results on a series of artiicial problems of varying complexity. PLEASE performs competitively with several nearest neighbor clas-siication algorithms on the problem set. An analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the initial version of our system motivates the need for additional operators. The inclusion of these operators substantially improves the performance of the system on particularly diicult problems.