16584682
You are what you say: privacy risks of public mentions
In today's data-rich networked world, people express many aspects of their lives online. It is common to segregate different aspects in different places: you might write opinionated rants about movies in your blog under a pseudonym while participating in a forum or web site for scholarly discussion of medical ethics under your real name. However, it may be possible to link these separate identities, because the movies, journal articles, or authors you mention are from a sparse relation space whose properties (e.g., many items related to by only a few users) allow re-identification. This re-identification violates people's intentions to separate aspects of their life and can have negative consequences; it also may allow other privacy violations, such as obtaining a stronger identifier like name and address.This paper examines this general problem in a specific setting: re-identification of users from a public web movie forum in a private movie ratings dataset. We present three major results. First, we develop algorithms that can re-identify a large proportion of public users in a sparse relation space. Second, we evaluate whether private dataset owners can protect user privacy by hiding data; we show that this requires extensive and undesirable changes to the dataset, making it impractical. Third, we evaluate two methods for users in a public forum to protect their own privacy, suppression and misdirection. Suppression doesn't work here either. However, we show that a simple misdirection strategy works well: mention a few popular items that you haven't rated.
207161263
tagging, communities, vocabulary, evolution
A tagging community's vocabulary of tags forms the basis for social navigation and shared expression.We present a user-centric model of vocabulary evolution in tagging communities based on community influence and personal tendency. We evaluate our model in an emergent tagging system by introducing tagging features into the MovieLens recommender system.We explore four tag selection algorithms for displaying tags applied by other community members. We analyze the algorithms 'effect on vocabulary evolution, tag utility, tag adoption, and user satisfaction.
482217
Believing others: pro and cons
Under the assumption that agents remain in the system for significant time periods, or that the agent composition changes only slowly Sen (1996) has previously presented a prescriptive strategy for promoting and sustaining cooperation among self-interested agents. The adaptive, probabilistic policy prescribed promotes reciprocative cooperation that improves both individual and group performance in the long run. In the short run, however, selfish agents could still exploit reciprocative agents. In this paper we evaluate the hypothesis that the exploitative tendencies of selfish agents can be effectively curbed if reciprocative agents share their "opinions" of other agents. Since the true nature of agents are not known a priori and is learned from experience, believing others can also pose other hazards. We provide a learned trust-based evaluation function that is shown to resist both individual and concerted deception on the part of selfish agents.
5984823
The evolution and stability of cooperative traits
Recent works in multi-agent systems have identified agent behaviors that can develop and sustain mutually beneficial cooperative relationships with like-minded agents and can resist exploitation from selfish agents. Researchers have proposed the use of a probabilistic reciprocity scheme that uses summary information from past interactions to decide whether or not to honor a request for help from another agent. This behavior has been found to be close to optimal in homogeneous groups and outperform exploiters in mixed groups. A major shortcoming of these experiments, however, is that the composition of the group in term of agent behaviors is fixed. We believe that real-life rational agents, on the contrary, will change their behaviors based on observed performances of different behavioral traits with the goal of maximizing performance. In this paper, we present results from experiments on two distinct domains with population groups whose behavioral composition changes based on the performance of the agents. Based on the experimental results, we identify ecological niches for variants of exploitative selfish agents and robust reciprocative agents.
6639322
Emergence of Norms through Social Learning
Behavioral norms are key ingredients that allow agent coordination where societal laws do not sufficiently constrain agent behaviors. Whereas social laws need to be enforced in a top-down manner, norms evolve in a bottom-up manner and are typically more self-enforcing. While effective norms can significantly enhance performance of individual agents and agent societies, there has been little work in multiagent systems on the formation of social norms. We propose a model that supports the emergence of social norms via learning from interaction experiences. In our model, individual agents repeatedly interact with other agents in the society over instances of a given scenario. Each interaction is framed as a stage game. An agent learns its policy to play the game over repeated interactions with multiple agents. We term this mode of learning social learning, which is distinct from an agent learning from repeated interactions against the same player. We are particularly interested in situations where multiple action combinations yield the same optimal payoff. The key research question is to find out if the entire population learns to converge to a consistent norm. In addition to studying such emergence of social norms among homogeneous learners via social learning, we study the effects of heterogeneous learners, population size, multiple social groups, etc.
15486536
Learning to commit in repeated games
Learning to converge to an efficient, i.e., Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium of the repeated game is an open problem in multiagent learning. Our goal is to facilitate the learning of efficient outcomes in repeated plays of incomplete information games when only opponent's actions but not its payoffs are observable. We use a two-stage protocol that allows a player to unilaterally commit to an action, allowing the other player to choose an action knowing the action chosen by the committed player. The motivation behind commitment is to promote trust between the players and prevent them from mutually harmful choices made to preclude worst-case outcomes. Our agents learn whether commitment is beneficial or not. Interestingly, the decision to commit can be thought of as expanding the action space and our proposed protocol can be incorporated by any learning strategies used for playing repeated games. We show the improvement of the outcome efficiency of standard learning algorithms when using our proposed commitment protocol. We propose convergence to pareto optimal Nash equilibrium of repeated games as desirable learning outcomes. The performance evaluation in this paper uses a similarly motivated metric that measures the percentage of Nash equilibria for repated games that dominate the observed outcome.
12702435
Robustness of reputation-based trust: boolean case
We consider the problem of user agents selecting processor agents to processor tasks. We assume that processor agents are drawn from two populations: high and low-performing processors with different averages but similar variance in performance. For selecting a processor, a user agent queries other user agents for their high/low rating of different processors. We assume that a known percentage of "liar" users, who give inverse estimates of processors. We develop a trust mechanism that determines the number of users to query given a target guarantee threshold likelihood of choosing high-performance processors in the face of such "noisy" reputation mechanisms. We evaluate the robustness of this reputation-based trusting mechanism over varying environmental parameters like percentage of liars, performance difference and variances for high and low-performing agents, learning rates, etc.