6639322
Emergence of Norms through Social Learning
Behavioral norms are key ingredients that allow agent coordination where societal laws do not sufficiently constrain agent behaviors. Whereas social laws need to be enforced in a top-down manner, norms evolve in a bottom-up manner and are typically more self-enforcing. While effective norms can significantly enhance performance of individual agents and agent societies, there has been little work in multiagent systems on the formation of social norms. We propose a model that supports the emergence of social norms via learning from interaction experiences. In our model, individual agents repeatedly interact with other agents in the society over instances of a given scenario. Each interaction is framed as a stage game. An agent learns its policy to play the game over repeated interactions with multiple agents. We term this mode of learning social learning, which is distinct from an agent learning from repeated interactions against the same player. We are particularly interested in situations where multiple action combinations yield the same optimal payoff. The key research question is to find out if the entire population learns to converge to a consistent norm. In addition to studying such emergence of social norms among homogeneous learners via social learning, we study the effects of heterogeneous learners, population size, multiple social groups, etc.
15974834
Learning Pareto-optimal Solutions in 2x2 Conflict Games
Multiagent learning literature has investigated iterated two-player games to develop mechanisms that allow agents to learn to converge on Nash Equilibrium strategy profiles. Such equilibrium configurations imply that no player has the motivation to unilaterally change its strategy. Often, in general sum games, a higher payoff can be obtained by both players if one chooses not to respond myopically to the other player. By developing mutual trust, agents can avoid immediate best responses that will lead to a Nash Equilibrium with lesser payoff. In this paper we experiment with agents who select actions based on expected utility calculations that incorporate the observed frequencies of the actions of the opponent(s). We augment these stochastically greedy agents with an interesting action revelation strategy that involves strategic declaration of one's commitment to an action to avoid worst-case, pessimistic moves. We argue that in certain situations, such apparently risky action revelation can indeed produce better payoffs than a non-revealing approach. In particular, it is possible to obtain Pareto-optimal Nash Equilibrium outcomes. We improve on the outcome efficiency of a previous algorithm and present results over the set of structurally distinct two-person two-action conflict games where the players' preferences form a total order over the possible outcomes. We also present results on a large number of randomly generated payoff matrices of varying sizes and compare the payoffs of strategically revealing learners to payoffs at Nash equilibrium.
3526092
Selecting partners
1. I N T R O D U C T I O N In an open environment the goal of a self-interested agent would be to interact with or enter into partnership with those agents that will produce maximal local utility for this agent [5]. We assume that an agent can get one of several payoffs (utilities) for joining a particular coalition which is determined by a static probability distribution over the payoffs for each coalition. We consider choosing a single coalition to interact with repeatedly when the total number of interactions is known ahead of time.
12119095
Correlating Internal Parameters and External Performance: Learning Soccer Agents
We have developed a Soccer simulator in Java, which allows us to evaluate agent behavioral strategies for effectively collaborating with other team members while countering threats posed by the opposing team. Whereas action selection mechanisms to decide when to shoot, pass, dribble, guard opponent, tackle, etc. are important from a player's viewpoint, learning the capabilities of individual opponents from repeated encounters can provide critical information for the success of a team. Each agent is described by a set of skill levels for different soccer skills. A soccer agent uses its incomplete perceptions, model of the changing environment, knowledge of the skill levels of its own team players, and estimated skill levels of the opponent team players to select the most prudent action. In this paper, we identify learning opportunities for soccer agents, and investigate some of these possibilities in detail. Initial experimental results demonstrate the advantage of learning agents.
43158386
Evolution and learning in multiagent systems
1062630
The Role of Commitment in Cooperative Negotiation
Cooperative information agents need mechanisms that enable them to work together effectively while solving common problems. We investigate the use of commitment by agents to proposed actions as a mechanism that allow agents to work concurrently on interdependent problems. Judicious use of commitment can not only increase the throughput of cooperative information systems, but also allow them to deal flexibly with dynamically changing environments. We use the domain of distributed scheduling to demonstrate that static commitment strategies are ineffective. Results from simulated experiments are used to identify the environmental features on which an adaptive commitment strategy should be predicated.
8938271
Kernel-Based Reinforcement Learning
We present a kernel-based approach to reinforcement learning that overcomes the stability problems of temporal-difference learning in continuous state-spaces. First, our algorithm converges to a unique solution of an approximate Bellman's equation regardless of its initialization values. Second, the method is consistent in the sense that the resulting policy converges asymptotically to the optimal policy. Parametric value function estimates such as neural networks do not possess this property. Our kernel-based approach also allows us to show that the limiting distribution of the value function estimate is a Gaussian process. This information is useful in studying the bias-variance tradeoff in reinforcement learning. We find that all reinforcement learning approaches to estimating the value function, parametric or non-parametric, are subject to a bias. This bias is typically larger in reinforcement learning than in a comparable regression problem.
33712953
Fractional Cascading Simplified
We give an alternate implementation of the fractional cascading data-structure of Chazelle and Guibas to do iterative search for a key in multiple ordered lists. The construction of our data-structure uses randomization and simplifies the algorithm of Chazelle and Guibas vastly making it practical to implement. Although our bounds are asymptotically similar to the earlier ones, there are improvements in the constant factors. Our analysis is novel and captures some of the inherent difficulties associated with the fractional casading data structure. In particular, we use tools from branching process theory and derive some useful asymptotic bounds. The probability of deviation from the expected performance bounds decreases rapidly with number of keys.
14273924
The Success and Failure of Tag-Mediated Evolution of Cooperation
Use of tags to limit partner selection for playing has been shown to produce stable cooperation in agent populations playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game. There is, however, a lack of understanding of how and why tags facilitate such cooperation. We start with an empirical investigation that identifies the key dynamics that result in sustainable cooperation in PD. Sufficiently long tags are needed to achieve this effect. A theoretical analysis shows that multiple simulation parameters including tag length, mutation rate and population size will have significant effect on sustaining cooperation. Experiments partially validate these observations. Additionally, we claim that tags only promote mimicking and not coordinated behavior in general, i.e., tags can promote cooperation only if cooperation requires identical actions from all group members. We illustrate the failure of the tag model to sustain cooperation by experimenting with domains where agents need to take complementary actions to maximize payoff.
1922221
Improved Algorithms for Uniform Partitions of Points

AbstractWe consider the following one- and two-dimensional bucketing problems: Given a set S of n points in \reals1 or \reals2 and a positive integer b , distribute the points of S into b equal-size buckets so that the maximum number of points in a bucket is minimized. Suppose at most (n/b) + Δ points lie in each bucket in an optimal solution. We present algorithms whose time complexities depend on b and Δ . No prior knowledge of Δ is necessary for our algorithms.For the one-dimensional problem, we give a deterministic algorithm that achieves a running time of O(b4 (Δ2+log n) + n) . For the two-dimensional problem, we present a Monte Carlo algorithm that runs in subquadratic time for small values of b and Δ . The previous algorithms, by Asano and Tokuyama [1], searched the entire parameterized space and required Ω ( n2 ) time in the worst case even for constant values of b and Δ . We also present a subquadratic algorithm for the special case of the two-dimensional problem when b=2 .

47152006
Optimal proxy cache allocation for efficient streaming media distribution
We address the problem of efficiently streaming a set of heterogeneous videos from a remote server through a proxy to multiple asynchronous clients so that they can experience playback with low startup delays. We determine the optimal proxy prefix cache allocation to the videos that minimizes the aggregate network bandwidth cost. We integrate proxy caching with traditional server-based reactive transmission schemes such as hatching, patching and stream merging to develop a set of proxy-assisted delivery schemes. We quantitatively explore the impact of the choice of transmission scheme, cache allocation policy, proxy cache size, and availability of unicast versus multicast capability, on the resulting transmission cost. Our evaluations show that even a relatively small prefix cache (10%-20% of the video repository) is sufficient to realize substantial savings in transmission cost. We find that carefully designed proxy-assisted reactive transmission schemes can produce significant cost savings even in a predominantly unicast environment such as the Internet.