16671606
Individual learning of coordination knowledge
Abstract. Social agents, both human and computational, inhabiting a world containing multiple active agents, need to coordinate their activities. This is because agents share resources, and without proper coordination or ‘rules of the road’, everybody will be interfering with the plans of others. As such, we need coordination schemes that allow agents to effectively achieve local goals without adversely affecting the problem-solving capabilities of other agents. Researchers in the field of Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI) have developed a variety of coordination schemes under different assumptions about agent capabilities and relationships. Whereas some of these researchers have been motivated by human cognitive biases, others have approached it as an engineering problem of designing the most effective coordination architecture or protocol. We evaluate individual and concurrent learning by multiple, autonomous agents as a means for acquiring coordination knowledge. We show that a uniform reinforc...
1062630
The Role of Commitment in Cooperative Negotiation
Cooperative information agents need mechanisms that enable them to work together effectively while solving common problems. We investigate the use of commitment by agents to proposed actions as a mechanism that allow agents to work concurrently on interdependent problems. Judicious use of commitment can not only increase the throughput of cooperative information systems, but also allow them to deal flexibly with dynamically changing environments. We use the domain of distributed scheduling to demonstrate that static commitment strategies are ineffective. Results from simulated experiments are used to identify the environmental features on which an adaptive commitment strategy should be predicated.
12119095
Correlating Internal Parameters and External Performance: Learning Soccer Agents
We have developed a Soccer simulator in Java, which allows us to evaluate agent behavioral strategies for effectively collaborating with other team members while countering threats posed by the opposing team. Whereas action selection mechanisms to decide when to shoot, pass, dribble, guard opponent, tackle, etc. are important from a player's viewpoint, learning the capabilities of individual opponents from repeated encounters can provide critical information for the success of a team. Each agent is described by a set of skill levels for different soccer skills. A soccer agent uses its incomplete perceptions, model of the changing environment, knowledge of the skill levels of its own team players, and estimated skill levels of the opponent team players to select the most prudent action. In this paper, we identify learning opportunities for soccer agents, and investigate some of these possibilities in detail. Initial experimental results demonstrate the advantage of learning agents.
15974834
Learning Pareto-optimal Solutions in 2x2 Conflict Games
Multiagent learning literature has investigated iterated two-player games to develop mechanisms that allow agents to learn to converge on Nash Equilibrium strategy profiles. Such equilibrium configurations imply that no player has the motivation to unilaterally change its strategy. Often, in general sum games, a higher payoff can be obtained by both players if one chooses not to respond myopically to the other player. By developing mutual trust, agents can avoid immediate best responses that will lead to a Nash Equilibrium with lesser payoff. In this paper we experiment with agents who select actions based on expected utility calculations that incorporate the observed frequencies of the actions of the opponent(s). We augment these stochastically greedy agents with an interesting action revelation strategy that involves strategic declaration of one's commitment to an action to avoid worst-case, pessimistic moves. We argue that in certain situations, such apparently risky action revelation can indeed produce better payoffs than a non-revealing approach. In particular, it is possible to obtain Pareto-optimal Nash Equilibrium outcomes. We improve on the outcome efficiency of a previous algorithm and present results over the set of structurally distinct two-person two-action conflict games where the players' preferences form a total order over the possible outcomes. We also present results on a large number of randomly generated payoff matrices of varying sizes and compare the payoffs of strategically revealing learners to payoffs at Nash equilibrium.
3526092
Selecting partners
1. I N T R O D U C T I O N In an open environment the goal of a self-interested agent would be to interact with or enter into partnership with those agents that will produce maximal local utility for this agent [5]. We assume that an agent can get one of several payoffs (utilities) for joining a particular coalition which is determined by a static probability distribution over the payoffs for each coalition. We consider choosing a single coalition to interact with repeatedly when the total number of interactions is known ahead of time.
43158386
Evolution and learning in multiagent systems
5317468
Strongly Typed Genetic Programming in Evolving Cooperation Strategies
A key concern in genetic programming GP is the size of the state space which must be searched for large and complex problem do mains One method to reduce the state space size is by using Strongly Typed Genetic Programming STGP We applied both GP and STGP to construct cooperation strate gies to be used by multiple predator agents to pursue and capture a prey agent on a grid world This domain has been extensively studied in Distributed Arti cial Intelligence DAI as an easy to describe but di cult to solve cooperation problem The evolved programs from our systems are competitive with manually derived greedy algorithms In particular the STGP paradigm evolved strategies in which the predators were able to achieve their goal without explicitly sens ing the location of other predators or com municating with other predators This is an improvement over previous research in this area The results of our experiments indicate that STGP is able to evolve programs that perform signi cantly better than GP evolved programs In addition the programs gener ated by STGP were easier to understand
6882401
A Simple Optimal Randomized Algorithm for Sorting on the PDM
The Parallel Disks Model (PDM) has been proposed to alleviate the I/O bottleneck that arises in the processing of massive data sets. Sorting has been extensively studied on the PDM model due to the fundamental nature of the problem. Several randomized algorithms are known for sorting. Most of the prior algorithms suffer from undue complications in memory layouts, implementation, or lack of tight analysis. In this paper we present a simple randomized algorithm that sorts in optimal time with high probablity and has all the desirable features for practical implementation.
35225520
Some Observations on Skip-Lists
The Skip-list data-structure was proposed by Pugh as an alternate to balanced binary search trees. This remarkably simple data-structure uses randomization and Pugh proved that the expected performance is comparable to the balanced trees. In this note we prove that the performance can be further guaranteed in the following sense: the probability of the search time or space complexity exceeding their expected values, approaches 0 rapidly as the number of keys increases.
13878075
Optimal sequencing of individually rational contracts
Multiagent researchers have worked on the problem of determining optimal contracts between self-interested agents. In particular, Sandholm et al. [1,8] have both theoretically and experimentally studied the necessity and usefulness of different contract types under the assumption of individually myopically rational contracting. We study a variant of sequential contracting where the goal is to maximize social welfare through a fixed-length sequence of individually rational contracts. The space of possible contract sequences is exponential. We compare a greedy deterministic heuristic with a stochastic genetic algorithm based approach for this optimal sequential contract selection problem. We focus on sub-additive domains where individually rational contracts are feasible with side payments. We show that the GA-based approach consistently outperforms the deterministic heuristic by generating larger social welfare.
16234197
Development of a wireless integrated toxic and explosive MEMS based gas sensor
Demand of strict environmental safety norms in mines, industries leads to the development of smart sensor systems for monitoring the explosive and toxic gases like methane (CH/sub 4/) and carbon monoxide (CO). In the present work a wireless integrated CH/sub 4/ and CO gas sensor with a unique transmission scheme has been proposed. It detects CH/sub 4/ & CO gas and generates frequency modulated (FM) signal in two distinct frequency bands in the range of 2.5823 GHz to 2.5542 GHz for CH/sub 4/ concentration from 1% to 2.5% in air and 2.4854 GHz to 2.404 GHz for CO concentration from 50ppm to 300ppm. Also it transmits the generated FM signal through antenna. The receiver section demodulates the signal and displays the gas concentration.