17017836
Limiting deception in groups of social agents
In open environments there is no central control over agent behaviors. On the contrary, agents in such systems can be assumed to be primarily driven by self-interests. Under the assumption that agents remain in the system for significant time periods, or that the agent composition changes only slowly, a prescriptive strategy has been previously presented for promoting and sustaining cooperation in the group. This strategy was shown to improve both individual and group performance in the long run. The prescribed strategy has been an adaptive, probabilistic, reciprocity-based policy for deciding which other individual to cooperate with. In this paper two mechanisms are investigated to limit exploitation of the reciprocative strategy by deceptive agents: 1) a penalty factor for declining requests for help, and 2) a cutoff limit on outstanding balance of help. The relative effectiveness of these mechanisms is evaluated for augmenting robustness of agent behaviors, without adversely affecting performance of homogeneous groups of reciprocative agents.
15974834
Learning Pareto-optimal Solutions in 2x2 Conflict Games
Multiagent learning literature has investigated iterated two-player games to develop mechanisms that allow agents to learn to converge on Nash Equilibrium strategy profiles. Such equilibrium configurations imply that no player has the motivation to unilaterally change its strategy. Often, in general sum games, a higher payoff can be obtained by both players if one chooses not to respond myopically to the other player. By developing mutual trust, agents can avoid immediate best responses that will lead to a Nash Equilibrium with lesser payoff. In this paper we experiment with agents who select actions based on expected utility calculations that incorporate the observed frequencies of the actions of the opponent(s). We augment these stochastically greedy agents with an interesting action revelation strategy that involves strategic declaration of one's commitment to an action to avoid worst-case, pessimistic moves. We argue that in certain situations, such apparently risky action revelation can indeed produce better payoffs than a non-revealing approach. In particular, it is possible to obtain Pareto-optimal Nash Equilibrium outcomes. We improve on the outcome efficiency of a previous algorithm and present results over the set of structurally distinct two-person two-action conflict games where the players' preferences form a total order over the possible outcomes. We also present results on a large number of randomly generated payoff matrices of varying sizes and compare the payoffs of strategically revealing learners to payoffs at Nash equilibrium.
12119095
Correlating Internal Parameters and External Performance: Learning Soccer Agents
We have developed a Soccer simulator in Java, which allows us to evaluate agent behavioral strategies for effectively collaborating with other team members while countering threats posed by the opposing team. Whereas action selection mechanisms to decide when to shoot, pass, dribble, guard opponent, tackle, etc. are important from a player's viewpoint, learning the capabilities of individual opponents from repeated encounters can provide critical information for the success of a team. Each agent is described by a set of skill levels for different soccer skills. A soccer agent uses its incomplete perceptions, model of the changing environment, knowledge of the skill levels of its own team players, and estimated skill levels of the opponent team players to select the most prudent action. In this paper, we identify learning opportunities for soccer agents, and investigate some of these possibilities in detail. Initial experimental results demonstrate the advantage of learning agents.
3526092
Selecting partners
1. I N T R O D U C T I O N In an open environment the goal of a self-interested agent would be to interact with or enter into partnership with those agents that will produce maximal local utility for this agent [5]. We assume that an agent can get one of several payoffs (utilities) for joining a particular coalition which is determined by a static probability distribution over the payoffs for each coalition. We consider choosing a single coalition to interact with repeatedly when the total number of interactions is known ahead of time.
43158386
Evolution and learning in multiagent systems
1062630
The Role of Commitment in Cooperative Negotiation
Cooperative information agents need mechanisms that enable them to work together effectively while solving common problems. We investigate the use of commitment by agents to proposed actions as a mechanism that allow agents to work concurrently on interdependent problems. Judicious use of commitment can not only increase the throughput of cooperative information systems, but also allow them to deal flexibly with dynamically changing environments. We use the domain of distributed scheduling to demonstrate that static commitment strategies are ineffective. Results from simulated experiments are used to identify the environmental features on which an adaptive commitment strategy should be predicated.
16584682
You are what you say: privacy risks of public mentions
In today's data-rich networked world, people express many aspects of their lives online. It is common to segregate different aspects in different places: you might write opinionated rants about movies in your blog under a pseudonym while participating in a forum or web site for scholarly discussion of medical ethics under your real name. However, it may be possible to link these separate identities, because the movies, journal articles, or authors you mention are from a sparse relation space whose properties (e.g., many items related to by only a few users) allow re-identification. This re-identification violates people's intentions to separate aspects of their life and can have negative consequences; it also may allow other privacy violations, such as obtaining a stronger identifier like name and address.This paper examines this general problem in a specific setting: re-identification of users from a public web movie forum in a private movie ratings dataset. We present three major results. First, we develop algorithms that can re-identify a large proportion of public users in a sparse relation space. Second, we evaluate whether private dataset owners can protect user privacy by hiding data; we show that this requires extensive and undesirable changes to the dataset, making it impractical. Third, we evaluate two methods for users in a public forum to protect their own privacy, suppression and misdirection. Suppression doesn't work here either. However, we show that a simple misdirection strategy works well: mention a few popular items that you haven't rated.
14273924
The Success and Failure of Tag-Mediated Evolution of Cooperation
Use of tags to limit partner selection for playing has been shown to produce stable cooperation in agent populations playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game. There is, however, a lack of understanding of how and why tags facilitate such cooperation. We start with an empirical investigation that identifies the key dynamics that result in sustainable cooperation in PD. Sufficiently long tags are needed to achieve this effect. A theoretical analysis shows that multiple simulation parameters including tag length, mutation rate and population size will have significant effect on sustaining cooperation. Experiments partially validate these observations. Additionally, we claim that tags only promote mimicking and not coordinated behavior in general, i.e., tags can promote cooperation only if cooperation requires identical actions from all group members. We illustrate the failure of the tag model to sustain cooperation by experimenting with domains where agents need to take complementary actions to maximize payoff.
16079000
Searching for optimal coalition structures
Coalition formation has been a very active area of research in multiagent systems. Most of this research has concentrated on decentralized procedures that allow self-interested agents to negotiate the formation of coalitions and division of coalition payoffs. A different line of research has addressed the problem of finding the optimal division of agents into coalitions such that the sum total of the the payoffs to all the coalitions is maximized (Larson and Sandholm, 1999). This is the optimal coalition structure identification problem. Deterministic search algorithms have been proposed and evaluated under the assumption that the performance of a coalition is independent of other coalitions. We use an order-based genetic algorithm (OBGA) as a stochastic search process to identify the optimal coalition structure. We compare the performance of the OBGA with a representative deterministic algorithm presented in the literature. Though the OBGA has no performance guarantees, it is found to dominate the deterministic algorithm in a significant number of problem settings. An additional advantage of the OBGA is its scalability to larger problem sizes and to problems where performance of a coalition depends on other coalitions in the environment.
13878075
Optimal sequencing of individually rational contracts
Multiagent researchers have worked on the problem of determining optimal contracts between self-interested agents. In particular, Sandholm et al. [1,8] have both theoretically and experimentally studied the necessity and usefulness of different contract types under the assumption of individually myopically rational contracting. We study a variant of sequential contracting where the goal is to maximize social welfare through a fixed-length sequence of individually rational contracts. The space of possible contract sequences is exponential. We compare a greedy deterministic heuristic with a stochastic genetic algorithm based approach for this optimal sequential contract selection problem. We focus on sub-additive domains where individually rational contracts are feasible with side payments. We show that the GA-based approach consistently outperforms the deterministic heuristic by generating larger social welfare.
2102099
R/qtl: QTL Mapping in Experimental Crosses
SUMMARY
R/qtl is an extensible, interactive environment for mapping quantitative trait loci (QTLs) in experimental populations derived from inbred lines. It is implemented as an add-on package for the freely-available statistical software, R, and includes functions for estimating genetic maps, identifying genotyping errors, and performing single-QTL and two-dimensional, two-QTL genome scans by multiple methods, with the possible inclusion of covariates.


AVAILABILITY
The package is freely available at http://www.biostat.jhsph.edu/~kbroman/qtl.