Ordinary Language and Metaphysical Commitment
1. Philosophical theories that convict ordinary discourse of metaphysical error tend to be viewed with suspicion. It is true that some philosophers present their metaphysical claims as error theories theories that imply that ordinary language incorporates metaphysical mistakes. However, many who advocate what appear to be revisionary metaphysical theories prefer to present them as consistent with ordinary discourse. An extreme example of this reconciling tendency is to be found in Peter van Inwagen's recent Material Beings.' The central tenet of van Inwagen's metaphysics is that there are no tables, chairs, rocks, stars, or any other visible material objects except living organisms. Yet he maintains that this theory is consistent with what ordinary people mean when, in everyday life, they say things like 'There are two chippendale chairs in the room' or 'There are rocks that weigh over a ton'. This apparently outrageous thesis is defended by an appeal to the metaphysical neutrality of ordinary language. Van Inwagen holds that the everyday utterances are sufficiently free of metaphysical commitment to be insulated from conflict with his metaphysical denial of the existence of chairs, rocks, etc. (pp. 1-2, 98-107, 112-13, 129-31). I do not agree with van Inwagen's metaphysical theory2, but it is a separate issue whether he is right in claiming for the ordinary language statements a metaphysical neutrality that would allow them to be true even if his metaphysical theory were correct. In this paper, I shall challenge this claim. First, I shall show that van Inwagen must say that although ordinary discourse 'about' chairs, stars, rocks, etc., is not systematically mistaken, it is systematically misleading as to its ontological commitments. Secondly, I shall argue that this radical thesis is not supported by the analogies to which van Inwagen appeals in his attempt to reconcile his metaphysics with popular usage.