An Institutionalist Framework for a Consistent Financial Regulation
Abstract: In the light of recurrent systemic crises that financialized market economies have been experiencing since the 1980s, this article seeks to determine the conditions required for a regulatory framework apt to ensure financial stability. Drawing upon an Institutionalist Minskyian endogenous financial instability approach, the article studies the fragilities of liberalized finance and points to some policy alternatives able to lead to an alternative financial regulatory model that is consistent with macroeconomic stability. It argues that in a weak regulatory environment financial markets naturally generate instabilities that could turn into systemic crises. The analysis maintains that in order to deal with such crises, a tight supervision should be framed under the aegis of public authorities and suggests some rules to develop a relevant regulatory system through an open and democratic decision process. Two points then deserve particular attention: a macro-prudential approach that regards instability as a systemic (non-individual) issue, and a preventive approach that aims at preventing systemic-risk generating activities from taking control over the markets.