Freedom as a Fact
Institutions of private law are often justified on the grounds that they allow the widest possible scope for individual freedom. Similarly, constitutional principles organising and restricting the power of the state are thought to protect freedom of individuals from state coercion. These are only two examples of the many ways in which the protection of freedom provides a justification for institutional arrangements of political power and social interaction. The distinction between private rights and public powers, which runs through the structures of the liberal state, is itself based on the imperative to preserve freedom for individuals. It is often suggested by critics, however, that this justification of liberal institutions is not as convincing as its common use suggests. This is because the liberal account of freedom presupposes a controversial, or at least contestable, account of the constitution of the self and its relation to social structures. These criticisms suggest that any theory of freedom will have to be grounded on a more fundamental set of assumptions about the exercise of free will, the nature of individual identity and the importance of social contexts.1 Within the framework of this debate, liberals and critics agree that an undertaking of other fundamental philosophical tasks is closely related to the discussion of any political theory advocating the protection of freedom.