Postmodernism and Institutionalism: Toward a Resolution of the Debate on Relativism
Probably the major event in the philosophy of science over the last several decades has been the death of foundationalism. It was Kuhn's revolutionary 1962 book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, that first announced this death to the world. But Kuhn was not alone; other philosophers too-Michael Polanyi, H. G. Gadamer, Richard Rorty, Paul Feyerabend, Charles Taylor, and Jurgen Habermas-have all pronounced foundationalism dead and have sought to move beyond it. Briefly stated, foundationalism is the notion that we can come to a true understanding of the world if our theories are logically based on some indubitable foundation, the fabled Archimedean fixed point from which we can leverage the rest of the world. But no such foundation apparently exists. Philosopher Richard Bernstein points out that since Descartes, there have been numerous attempts to establish such a foundation, but no sooner is a foundation posited than the process of critical undercutting begins, and after a while we come to see that the foundation is not so sound as originally thought. It is now widely accepted that there exists no grand or meta-narrative that explains the world from some objective, disinterested standpoint. There are only narratives based on particular perspectives and viewpoints. But though philosophers have generally agreed to jettison foundationalism, many of the sciences have not been so quick to throw it overboard, for they have long histories of allegiance to