Knowing and guessing—by examples
RADFORD chose to discuss the possibility of knowledge without belief in terms of the third of the examples which he produced in his article 'Knowledge-by examples'.' He argues (p. 5) that English speakers would say, given the conditions of the example, that Jean knew some history, and that they would say so with good reason, for Jean's answers are correct, or nearly correct, often enough to show that he must have learned, and not forgotten, some history. So Jean knows some history. But he denies that he knows any, and insists that he is only guessing the answers. Thus he does not believe what he knows. I take it that Radford does not wish to hold that Jean cannot conceivably have been guessing, and that he necessarily knows, when the circumstances are as described. Radford does not try to show that the supposition that Jean was genuinely guessing, and did not know, in the given circumstances involves a contradiction. So everything turns on what it is reasonable for an English speaker to say about Jean in the light of the circumstances put before us in the example. I wish to argue that it would not be reasonable for an English speaker to make the judgment which Radford recommends. I think we could give the 1 ANALYSIS, Vol. 27, No. 1, Oct. 1966. 19