Recent Work on Normativity
Although only a recently introduced term of art, philosophical enquiry under the rubric of “normativity” has quickly become a major industry. A date-range search of the Philosopher’s Index for titles with the word returns zero results before 1980,1 three results for the „80s, 76 results for the „90s, and (to date) 218 results for the 2000s.2 Philosophical appeals to normativity are also exceptionally widespread. In addition to the subjects traditionally considered „normative‟—ethics, practical reason, political and legal philosophy, and epistemology—it is increasingly common for philosophers to maintain that normativity is essential in the analysis of subjects as diverse as truth, meaning, probability, and psychological attitudes like belief. This article is therefore unavoidably selective and idiosyncratic in the issues and literature it addresses, focusing on some recent developments in metaethics on the nature of normativity.