When are my actions due to me
There are cases in which we feel that a person has performed an action without having taken an active part in it. We feel this, for instance, about those whom Harry Frankfurt describes as 'wanton' on the grounds that they do not care about their wills ([1], p. 11). Such people, we feel, are not 'in' their behaviour. And we feel the same about people who, though not wanton, are nevertheless incapable of acting on the desire which they want to be their will. Thus we feel that those in the extreme stages of addiction, who are compelled to act on a desire which they repudiate, do not contribute to their drug-taking behaviour. The challenge posed by these examples is to describe, if not the circumstances in which agents play a causal role in the production of their behaviour, at least the circumstances in which we consider them to play such a role. J. David Velleman, in his article 'What Happens When Someone Acts?' [3], argues that the agent's role is the interventionist one of determining which of the potential determinants of one's behaviour are actually to govern it. He argues that we qualify as agents to the extent that we reflect on the potential determinants of our behaviour, calculate which of them provides the stronger reason for acting, and make sure that the stronger reason prevails. He goes on to say that there is a particular desire which drives these activities, and therefore performs the functions which are definitive of agency. This desire is the desire to act in accordance with reasons. Thus I have contributed to the production of my behaviour when the desire to act in accordance with reasons has intervened between my motives and behaviour, adding its motivational force to a motive which appears to provide the strongest reason for acting ([3], pp. 476-80).