Are decisions motive-perpetuating?
How should we understand the relation between decision-making and motivation? Thomas Pink has recently argued (Pink 1996) that decisions perpetuate pre-existing motives, and that whatever motivated the formation of a decision should, after that decision is taken, also motivate the action. In this article I argue that this view has certain problems, and that these problems can be solved if we assume instead that decisions are motive-generating. Pink's concern with this issue derives from his view that our ordinary conception of freedom presupposes that our will, which he understands as our capacity to make decisions, has two important features. First, that taking a particular decision to act counts as an action itself, as something which one deliberately does, and in doing which one may exercise future action control (146). Since actions in general are justified by the likelihood they would lead to a desirable end, this means he endorses the principle: ACTION Any justification at t for then deciding or intending to do A consists in the likelihood at t that so deciding or intending would further a desirable end E (145).