Response to Todd Bindig's “Confusion about Speciesism and Moral Status”
Todd Bindig takes a provocative position in his essay "Confusion about Speciesism and Moral Status". He proposes that we, as Catholic believers, can find some common ground with the position taken by Peter Singer against "speciesism". Bindig offers some tweaking to the meaning of the term "species" to create grounds for agreement. He argues that Singer is correct; species is morally irrelevant if it is founded merely on one's reproductive community and historical origin. Bindig offers some very imaginative scenarios for recategorizing human beings in a plurality of species possibilities, i.e. the existence of another planet where beings exactly like human beings exist, but from diverse origins and within a separate reproductive community. Unfortunately, the supposed confusion over the acceptable definition of the term "species" is irrelevant to Singer's arguments. Singer is not confused about his understanding of speciesism. Speciesism is a "morally indefensible preference for members of our own species" (53), that is, human beings over non-human animals. He proposes that the moral status of "persons" cannot be limited to human beings alone, but must include non-human animals as well, if we are not to be accused of the sin of "speciesism". According to Singer, ethical decision making must be based on equal consideration of interests. These interests cannot be limited to such irrelevant criteria as intelligence or rationality, as these would be "as arbitrary as skin color". He maintains that, instead, we base ethical decisions on sentience, that is, a balance of pain vs. pleasure: classical utilitarianism, he claims. Hence, since pigs, horses, and chickens are as likely to experience pain as adult humans there can be no moral justification for not weighing their interests equally. Personhood achieves meaning based on a being's capacity to feel pain. Hence, according to Singer, most of us are regularly