The Contents of Consciousness: Reply to Hellie, Peacocke and Siegel
I would like to thank Benj Hellie, Chris Peacocke, and Susanna Siegel for their very interesting commentaries on The Character of Consciousness. All of them focus mainly on issues from the second half of the book, especially issues concerning the contents of consciousness. Hellie focuses especially on the role of acquaintance and perceptual attention in perception and introspection and on the ontology of consciousness. Peacocke focuses especially on my Fregean account of the content of spatial experience. Siegel focuses especially on my account of the Edenic content of perception and its relation to Fregean content. I will reply to the three commentaries in alphabetical order. Each of the commentaries raises many issues, and space precludes me from replying in detail on each issue. Instead, in each part I concentrate especially on a single central issue: acquaintance with phenomenal states for Hellie, spatial externalism for Peacocke, perceptual Frege cases for Siegel. I aim to discuss the central issue in depth and then discuss other issues more briefly. I have tried to start each section with a relatively accessible discussion of the central issue that does not presuppose much knowledge of my book or of the commentaries.1