Reparation and Retribution: Are They Reconcilable?
The recent history of criminal justice contains an apparent anomaly: the simultaneous renaissance of retributive and reparative models of justice. This article will explore the genesis and competing claims of these two models, how it is that their fortunes have coincided, and with what consequences. Many writing in this field have felt driven to champion the claims of one or the other.’ Some of these writings read like missionary tracts whose proselytising purposes tend to obstruct measured analysis. Yet the greatest possibilities for illuminative debate have arisen where rival champions have entered into battle with one another to expose the inadequacies or undesirability of the other’s model.* The consequence, however, is that positions have become polarised. Retributive and reparative justice are posed as antinomies whose claims rival one another and whose goals must be in conflict. The most radical writers propose a major paradigm shift in which reparation would take priority over punishment as the goal of the criminal justice ~ y s t e m . ~ From the opposing camp, adherents of retributivism generally argue that reparation is merely incidental to the main purpose of punishment. According to this latter view, the place of reparation within the criminal justice system serves pragmatic purposes but is conceptually anomalous. More recently, welcome attempts to bridge the gap traditionally posed between reparation and retributivism have been mooted by those who question the usefulness of this dichotomised approach to penal theory .4