A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Walrasian Social Choice
Abstract The purpose of this paper is: (i) to amend a result of Gevers [Walrasian social choice: Some simple axiomatic approaches, in "Social Choice and Public Decision Making: Essays in Honor of K. J. Arrow" (Heller et al., Eds.), Vol. 1, Cambridge Univ. Press, London/New York, 1986] on Walrasian social choice, and (ii) to characterize Walrasian allocations in terms of social choice axioms when the number of agents grows infinitely large in Debreu–Scarf′s fashion. Based on Debreu–Scarf′s core convergence theorem, we prove the Walras rule is the only rule satisfying the Core property, Non-discrimination, Generalized Monotonicity, and Local Decisiveness. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, D50, D71.