Moore's paradox and Evans's principle: a reply to Williams
us call one such person Gill Bates. Since Gill Bates has done all that is humanly possible to accumulate wealth (she is a multimillionaire many times over) yet is far poorer than Bill Gates merely as a result of brute luck beyond the control of her choice, she too must be helped up. The resources for topping up Buffett, Gill Bates, and the NEs to Bill Gates's level would then come from taxing everyone, including ordinary hardworking people. To conclude. I had argued that, according to choice-egalitarianism, since Non-Effectives lack the pertinent choices, they cannot receive less than the wealthiest person, Bill Gates. Tal Manor's response argues that almost all of us cannot receive less than Bill Gates. I claim to have shown here that his response is not convincing, even today, and that his attempted refutation would be even less applicable in an ideal CE society. To some extent, we can apply the CE rule of 'Index to Bill Gates' beyond persons who are NEs, but the targets for such equalization would largely lie among the atypical cases Warren Buffett and the Gill Bates's of this world not the common man or woman. And that, surely, does not make choiceegalitarianism morally (or, indeed, pragmatically) more appealing.3