Black hole tariffs and endogenous policy theory : political economy in general equilibrium
Preface Acknowledgments list of results 1. A preview of the results 2. Endogenous policy theory: a diagrammatic approach Part I. Endogenous Policy Theory with Specific Factors: The Theory of Industry Tariffs in Partial Equilibrium: 3. The probabilistic voting model of political efficiency and powerless politicians 4. Endogenous lobbying theory and the contribution specialization theorem 5. Endogenous tariff theory 6. The power function model of endogenous industry lobbying 7. Three simple tests of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem 8. The invisible foot and the waste of nations: lawyers as negative externalities Part II. Endogenous Policy Theory in General Equilibrium: A Long-Run Theory of National Tariff Levels: 9. The 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 model of endogenous redistribution theory 10. A prisoner's dilemma theory of endogenous protection: the Leontief model 11. The compensation effect and the multiple equilibrium trap 12. increasing returns to politics and factor endowments: economic development and Brazilian vitality versus the Indian disease 13. Endogenous protection in the United States, 1900-88 14. A Cobb-Douglas model 15. Black hole tariffs 16. The endowment effect: cross-national evidence on endogenous tariffs Part II. Postscript: 17. The senile-industry argument for protection 18. Optimal obfuscation and the theory of the second worst: the politically efficient policy Mathematical appendices References Author index Subject index.