`Prima pars dialecticae': The Influence of Agricolan Dialectic Upon English Accounts of Invention
R ENAIS SANCE scholars such as W. S. Howell, T. W. Baldwin, W. G. Crane, and Walter J. Ong have observed in general terms the influence of Rudolph Agricola's dialectic upon northern humanist thought; so far, however, no one has investigated that influence in detail.1 It is my purpose in this paper to initiate such an examination by describing how Agricola's place-theory made its way into the treatments of invention in the three major English logics of the early Renaissance, those of Thomas Wilson, John Seton, and Peter Carter. Although my account is for the most part restricted to the subject of invention (in bulk at least a lesser part of dialectic than judgment) and deals only with English logicians, the popularity of Agricola's views on dialectical invention may, I think, be taken as symptomatic of a more pervasive influence emanating from Heidelberg, an influence extending to dialectical judgment as well as invention and affecting continental as well as English scholars. In exploring the influence of Agricola's theory of invention upon English Renaissance logic, it will be useful to begin with an epitome of Agricolan place-theory.2 Then, after examining in succession Wilson's Rule of Reason, Seton's Dialectica, and Carter's Annotationes, we will be in a position to estimate with a fair degree of precision the extent of Agricola's influence upon the logical theory of English humanism.