Preventive diplomacy, mediation and the responsibility to protect in Libya: a missed opportunity for Canada?
Despite Canada’s proud history of peacemaking, peacekeeping and diplomacy, Canadian voices advocating a mediated resolution to the Libya crisis were strikingly absent (Government of Canada 2011). Instead, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s application of the Canadian-initiated Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine noticeably bypassed preventive and mediation efforts throughout its seven-month military campaign. While NATO’s use of force in Libya ostensibly functioned to uphold human rights and strengthen the R2P norm, its actions have inadvertently reaffirmed the importance of mediation and preventive diplomacy in resolving future R2P crises. This article begins by determining if windows of opportunity for preventive diplomacy and mediation presented themselves during the crisis in Libya, and how such windows could have been capitalized upon by Canada and the international community. These windows reflect the conditions that must be present for mediation to take place; they do not, however, guarantee a successful outcome. The early stages of the Libyan revolution are analyzed, exposing several windows of opportunity that lent themselves to preventive and mediation efforts. As the article is counterfactually based, justification is provided on how and why preventive diplomacy and mediation could have been attempted in Libya and could be more readily used in the future. Acknowledging the position of the current Canadian Government, the article concludes that Canada could take on a more assertive preventive and mediation role. It closes by outlining key recommendations on capacity building actions the Government of Canada could undertake.