On the verifiability of universal empirical statements
THE claim that it is logically possible to verify universal empirical statements (UE-statements) requires no indirect demonstration. It is patently established by the fact that we do actually verify such statements-as our well-confirmed scientific laws will attest to. Any theoretical analysis that seeks to show this verifiability must therefore be regarded as an explanation of it rather than as necessary for it. The explanation would then constitute a test of the verification principle or of the manner of applying it, or perhaps even of some manner of explicating what we understand by a UE-statement. It would not constitute a test of the verifiability itself. In what follows, it is not our aim to argue for or against the verifiability of UE-statements, but rather to give some consideration to Mr. S. Malinovich's interesting account of such verifiability (ANALYSIS, June 1965) and to the independent but similar treatment of a closely related topic by Mr. F. I. Dretske ('Counting to Infinity', ANALYSIS, January 1965). Mr. Malinovich states that, '. .. for the human race to verify a universal empirical proposition involving an infinite number of instances would in fact be impossible'. He goes on, however, to urge that the logical possibility of such verification may nevertheless be maintained. Apparently, the locution, 'would in fact be impossible', means: would be factually (i.e., physically) impossible, rather than would in fact be logically impossible. The question however immediately arises as to how one would know of this physical impossibility. The suggested answer seems to be that such verification necessitates the eternal existence of the human race and that the realization of this requirement would be contrary to what we know regarding the future of humanity. But the argument goes further to indicate that it is in principle quite possible that human existence will continue without end. This latter possibility, at first deemed necessary for the logical possibility of actually realizing an infinite class of confirmations, is then readily taken as also sufficient to guarantee it. The