Well-Being and the Extent of Its Realisation in Poor Countries
Two aspects of persons have alternatingly dominated the thinking of social philosophers over the centuries, each true in itself, but each quite incomplete without the other. One sees us capable of deliberation, having the potential capacity to do things. It details agency, choice, independence and selfdetermination, and thereby that aspect of our selves which fashions projects and pursues goals. The other views us as seats of utility or satisfaction; as loci of possible states of mind, attained by the extent to which desires are fulfilled, by the activities that are undertaken and the relationships enjoyed. If one vision sees us doing things, the other sees us residing in states of being. Where the former leads one to the language of freedom and rights, the latter directs one to a concern with welfare and happiness. These are related aspects of course, in fact so closely related that they have often been conflated into one without having caused any obvious damage. Consider for example that people often appeal to a category of socio-economic rights (that is, rights to certain scarce resources) when advocating policies which have an impact on the extent of absolute poverty in a society. Now, it is possible to use instead some notion of aggregate welfare and reach similar conclusions. We may, for instance, be considering the desirability of a nutrition-guarantee scheme. We could advocate it by invoking persons' wellbeing interests, such as certain types of positive rights. (See Section VI.) We could also commend it on grounds of aggregate utility. We could do this by noting first that nutrition intake is a determinant of individual welfare, that at low levels of intake it is a critical determinant, and that in the absence of such a scheme a sizeable fraction of the population would be vulnerable to food deprivation. We could thus argue that the level of aggregate welfare which