Research about the Mass Media and Disaster: Never (Well Hardly Ever) the Twain shall Meet
A review of two areas of scholarship into the role of the mass media in crisis and/or disaster reveals a dichotomy. There is substantial research by scholars in a number of disciplines and by scholars in Journalism and Mass Communications. The two appear unaware of what each other is doing. Cross referencing is rare. The scholarship shows that the media can play a critical role before, during and after such incidents. The media are essential, for example, for warnings to be effective and may be the single most important source of public information in the wake of a disaster. The scholarship also shows that media reports that distort what happens in a disaster and lead to misunderstandings. Failure by officials to issue a warning, for example, may be a result of the myth that people panic, a myth perpetuated by the media. Media scholarship also shows however that in one area where the media are often criticized they are not guilty as charged: the limited research available suggests many victims and relatives of victims welcome the presence of the media and do not see journalists as intruders. Oh, East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet. Rudyard Kipling, "Ballad of East and West" Research about the role of Journalism in disaster has been done by disaster scholars from a number of areas of social science and by Mass Communications or Journalism scholars. The result is a dichotomy. The general social science literature on media and disaster rarely focuses on issues such as ethical concerns that dominate the Mass Communications and Journalism literature. The Journalism/ Mass Com literature includes information that supports the findings from social science research but the authors do not make that connection. There is, in short, a great deal of information about the role the mass media play in crisis and disaster but it is found in two compartments. When Tom Drabek reviewed the literature in the disaster field, he discovered a number of publications about mass media and disaster, but he also discovered that only a handful were published in Mass Communication or Journalism scholarly journals (Anderson, 1969; Drabek, 1986; Kueneman and Wright, 1975; Scanlon, Luukko and Morton, 1978; Waxman, 1973) or in monograph or book form (Singer and Green, 1972; Scanlon, 1976; Scanlon, Dixon and McClellan, 1982; Okabe, 1979) Similarly, when the author reviewed the main scholarly journals in the Mass Com/ Journalism field Journalism and Mass Communications Quarterly, Journalism and Mass Communications Educator, Journalism Studies, Newspaper Research Journal, Quill, Mass Communications and Society, Public Relations Quarterly and Canadian Journal of Communication he discovered there were few articles about crises or disasters. When an article did appear even if it overlapped the disaster literature, the authors did not indicate that. Until September 11, 2001, that would have been the end of the story. However, since 9/11 the media have been giving massive attention to terrorism and to ethical issues related to terrorism and the Mass Communications and Journalism literature has echoed that shift. But, once again, this new scholarship has not acknowledged the existing and relevant research. This chapter reviews what is known about the media and crisis and/or disaster, whether this comes from the general social science literature or the Mass Communications and Journalism literature. It does not show as the quote from Kipling implies that the twain never meet. It does suggest a dichotomy. This is an important finding for, as E. L. Quarantelli has pointed out, practically everyone is willing to express views or opinions about what will happen in disasters yet the great majority of people in Western society have only limited experience with disasters. So where do people get their images of disastrous phenomena if they do not base them on personal experiences? Some of the pictures they have undoubtedly come from deeply rooted cultural beliefs. But we think a strong case can be made that what average citizens and officials expect about disasters, what they come to know on ongoing disasters, and what they learned from disasters that have occurred, are primarily it not exclusively learned from mass media accounts (Quarantelli, 1991, p. 2) The social science literature has established that the media play a key role in many aspects of crisis and disasters. Mass media participation is critical, for example, for effective warning and the mass media may be the glue that binds societies in certain occasions. Yet the media are also responsible for many of the misconceptions that exist about disaster, misconceptions that may lead to errors of judgment when disaster strikes. A review of texts suggests Journalism scholars are unaware of this. Strangely, the one area where media scholars have shown the most concern the way journalists deal with survivors and relatives of victims is the area where the limited available research suggests the media are not as guilty as painted. Media Response to Disasters It is now fairly well established what media do when disaster strikes. The media hear of the event, try to obtain more information, use their own files to add background to their stories, dispatch reporters and report anything they are told. Often they devote all their air time or much of the space available to that single story (Scanlon and Alldred, 1982) To gather material to fill this expanded news hole, the media draft anyone available. When two teenagers killed 15 students including themselves and wounded 13 others at Columbine High School in Colorado, KCNC TV in Denver used every staff member available for its 13 hours of non stop coverage: Well over 150 newsroom regulars and extras pitched in to make the extensive coverage possible. Off duty employees came into the station without being summoned and took up posts. Newsroom hierarchies were discarded. Everyone, intern and news director alike, answered phones and responded when a need arose (Dean, 1999, p. 24) On such occasions, the media will also use its technical resources and ingenuity to gather information. For example, when Mount St. Helen's erupted, NBC took a helicopter into the crater and persuaded a geologist to view and comment on the resulting tape. At Three Mile Island, staff from the Philadelphia Inquirer copied the license plates of all vehicles in the parking lot, traced the owners and started phoning them. Many were belligerent but 50 agreed to interviews (Sandman and Paden, 1979, p. 48) All media monitor what their competitors are reporting and copy it if they think it is newsworthy. There are also many interconnections among the media. For example, almost all Canadian newspapers belong to the Canadian Press (CP) news agency. Everything is shared with CP which means any story produced by one paper is made available to every other paper. The electronic media have similar agreements. That's why visuals shot by one media outlet soon appear on stations around the world. These interconnections also mean that a false report can generate headlines around the world. That, in fact, is exactly what happened in November, 1973, when Swedish radio broadcast a program about the nuclear power station at Barseback. The power station was still under construction but the program included dramatic fiction set nine years in the future about a radioactive release. That night and the next day all major Swedish media reported that the program led to widespread panic and that story was carried around the world by Reuters news agency. All those reports were based on an unsubstantiated report filed by one regional correspondent in Malmo: Panic was the main theme of his [report] panic in a whole country, perhaps two. [Malmo is just a short ferry ride from Denmark] The telephone exchanges of the police stations, fire stations and mass media in two countries were reported to be jammed. People queuing before the civil shelters. Large crowds in the communities around Barseback taking to the roads. People in Malmo collecting their valuables and heading southward in their cars (Rosengren, Arvidson and Struesson, 1974, p. 12) The story led to widespread comment and editorials, even questions in Parliament about how future similar panics could be avoided. The report in short was accepted as true because of the widespread belief among journalists that people do panic in crisis situations. But the researchers who interviewed 1,089 respondents found that while persons had reacted to the broadcast, there was not a single incident of flight or panic. The "behavioural" reactions to the programme as a rule consisted in contacting family members, relatives or neighbours, over the telephone or face to face. Other reactions were to close the windows, think over what to bring along in case of a possible evacuation, etc. No case of telephoning to the mass media, to the police or other authorities were found. Nor did we find anyone having fled in panic (Rosengren, Arvidson and Struesson, 1974, p. 6) The Barseback "panic" was a media invention that spread 'round the world. One reason why such a distorted account can be so readily accepted is that when a major stories break, there is also widespread cooperation among reporters. That was true at Three Mile Island: From the moment the Harrisburg press corps heard about the accident [at Three Mile Island].we all shared information. We got drawings and pierced together events. We went out and got books on nuclear energy and compared them and discussed how a reactor works (Sandman and Paden, 1979, p. 16) It was the same in Dallas, the day President Kennedy was assassinated. Throughout the day, every reporter on the scene seemed to do his best to help everyone else. Information came only in bits and pieces. Every one who picked up a bit or piece passed it on. I know no one who held anything out. Nobody thought about an excl