Two Grades of Non consequentialism
In this paper, I explore how to accommodate non consequentialist constraints with a broadly value based conception of reasons for action. It turns out that there are two grades of non consequentialist constraints. The first grade involves attaching ethical importance to such distinctions as the doing/allowing distinction, and the distinction between intended and unintended consequences that is central to the Doctrine of Double Effect. However, at least within the value based framework, this first grade is insufficient to explain rights, which ground weighty reasons against infringing those rights that need not be outweighed even when infringing those rights is necessary for preventing a larger number of people from having their rights infringed in the same way. Such rights form a second grade of non consequentialist constraints: within the value based framework, this second grade is best explained in terms of the intrinsically relational values and disvalues of interpersonal interactions and relationships.