Directors as guardians of the public interest: lessons from the Irish banking crisis
ABSTRACT This article examines the role played by the 'public interest directors' appointed to the Irish credit institutions in the wake of the Irish Government's blanket deposit guarantee in 2008. Based on private interviews, it explores their experiences in interpreting the term 'public interest' and fulfilling their perceived responsibilities. Their experiences are also examined through the prism of the public interest scholarship in order to confirm or debunk existing hypotheses as to their likely reception and effectiveness. The article also analyses the nature of the duty imposed on all directors pursuant to section 48 of the Credit Institutions (Stabilisation) Act 2010 to have regard to a wide range of public interest factors in the performance of their functions. A unique feature of this duty and by contrast to section 172 of the UK Companies Act 2006, it is expressly stated to take priority over any other duty of the directors to the extent of any inconsistency. As the Irish experience demonstrates, even this rather extreme measure is not a guarantee of clarity of focus and easy decision making.