The pilots of the Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737 MAX plane that crashed last month initially took the emergency steps outlined by the manufacturer but still could not regain control, The Wall Street Journal reported Wednesday.

The airliner went down soon after taking off on March 10, killing 157 people in the second deadly crash of a 737 MAX aircraft in less than five months, forcing a worldwide grounding of the model.

The first -- a Lion Air crash in Indonesia that killed 189 people in October -- led to Boeing issuing a bulletin reminding operators of emergency guidelines to override a specially developed anti-stall system on MAX planes.

The pilots trying to regain control of the Ethiopian jet at first followed those procedures to switch off the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) but failed to recover control, the WSJ said, citing people briefed on the crash investigation's preliminary findings.

They then switched the system back as they tried to find other ways to control the jet before it crashed, the newspaper added.

Its sources said "the latest details are based on data downloaded from the plane's black-box recorders".

The preliminary report on the accident will likely be issued this week, the Ethiopian government has said.

The MCAS is believed to have been a key factor in both 737 MAX crashes. It is designed to automatically lower the aircraft's nose if it detects a stall or loss of airspeed.

Before it crashed, the pilots of the Lion Air 737 MAX struggled to control it as the MCAS repeatedly pushed the plane's nose down, according to its flight data recorder.

Both the Lion Air and Ethiopian planes -- MAX 8 models -- reportedly experienced erratic steep climbs and descents, as well as fluctuating airspeeds, before crashing shortly after takeoff.

Ethiopia has said there were "clear similarities" in the two crashes.

Boeing last week gathered hundreds of pilots and reporters for a presentation on proposed MCAS changes -- including the system no longer repeatedly making corrections when pilots try to regain control.

The company is anxious to win approval for a remedy that could get the planes back in the air.

But the US Federation Aviation Administration (FAA), which faced harsh questioning last week at a congressional hearing regarding its oversight of Boeing, said it expected the plane maker to submit the proposed fix "over the coming weeks" after it undertakes additional work.</s>The pilots of the Ethiopian Airlines 737 MAX that crashed last month appear to have followed the emergency procedure laid out by both Boeing and the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) — cutting off the suspect flight control system — but could not regain control and avert the fatal plunge that killed all 157 on board.

The Wall Street Journal, citing people briefed on the crash investigation’s preliminary findings, reported Tuesday night that the pilots hit the system cut-off switches as Boeing had instructed after October’s Lion Air MAX crash, but couldn’t get the plane’s nose back up. They then turned the system back on before the plane nose-dived into the ground.

A local expert, former Boeing flight control engineer Peter Lemme, recently predicted this could happen. His account of how Boeing’s emergency procedure could have failed disastrously is backed up by extracts from a 1982 Boeing 737-200 Pilot Training Manual posted to an online pilot forum a month ago by an Australian pilot.

If the preliminary investigation confirms that the Ethiopian pilots did cut off the automatic flight control system, this is a nightmarish outcome for Boeing and the FAA.

It would suggest the emergency procedure that Boeing laid out for pilots worldwide after the Lion Air crash, that the FAA alerted airlines to the next day, is wholly inadequate, missing vital extra information that was in Boeing pilot manuals nearly 40 years ago but isn’t any longer.

That old 737 pilot manual lays out a scenario where a much more elaborate pilot response is required than the one Boeing outlined last November and has reiterated ever since.

Just a week after the Oct. 29 Lion Air crash, Boeing sent out an urgent bulletin to all 737 MAX operators across the world cautioning them that a sensor failure could cause a new MAX flight control system to automatically swivel upward the horizontal tail — also called the stabilizer — so pushing the jet’s nose down.

Boeing’s bulletin laid out a seemingly simple response: Hit a pair of cut-off switches to turn off that automatic system — known as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS — and then swivel the tail down by manually turning a large stabilizer trim wheel located next to the pilot’s seat that connects mechanically to the tail via cables.

Boeing has publicly contended for five months that this simple procedure was all that was needed to save the airplane if MCAS was inadvertently activated.

In a November television interview on the Fox Business Network, Boeing Chief Executive Dennis Muilenburg, when asked about whether information had been withheld from pilots, cited the procedure as “part of the training manual” and said Boeing’s bulletin to airlines “pointed to that existing flight procedure.”

But Lemme said the Ethiopian pilots most likely were unable to carry out that last instruction in the Boeing emergency procedure — because they simply couldn’t physically move that wheel against the heavy forces acting on the tail.

“The forces on the tail could have been too great,” said Lemme. “They couldn’t turn the manual trim wheel.”

The stabilizer in the Ethiopian jet could have been in an extreme position with two separate forces acting on it.
• MCAS had swiveled the stabilizer upward by turning a large mechanical screw inside the tail called the jackscrew. This is pushing the jet’s nose down.
• But the pilot had pulled his control column far back in an attempt to counter, which would flip up a separate movable surface called the elevator on the trailing edge of the tail.

The elevator and stabilizer normally work together to minimize the loads on the jackscrew. But in certain conditions, the elevator and stabilizer loads combine to present high forces on the jackscrew and make turning it manually very difficult.

In this scenario, the air flow pushing downward against the elevator would have created an equal and opposite load on the jackscrew, a force tending to hold the stabilizer in its upward displacement. This heavy force would resist the pilot’s manual effort to swivel the stabilizer back down.

This analysis suggests the stabilizer trim wheel at the Ethiopian captain’s right hand could have been difficult to budge. As a result, the pilots would have struggled to get the nose up and the plane to climb.

If after much physical exertion failed, the pilots gave up their manual strategy and switched the electric trim system back on, MCAS would have begun pushing the nose down again.

More detailed instructions that conceivably could have saved the plane in this situation are provided in the 1982 pilot manual for the old 737. As described in the extract posted by the Australian pilot, they require the pilot to do something counterintuitive: to let go of the control column for a brief moment.

As Lemme explains, this “will make the nose drop a bit,” but it will relax the force on the elevator and on the jackscrew, allowing the pilot to crank the stabilizer trim wheel. The instructions in the old manual say that the pilot should repeatedly do this. Release the control column and crank the stabilizer wheel, release and crank, release and crank, until the stabilizer is swiveled back to where it should be.

The 1982 manual refers to this as “the ‘roller coaster’ technique” to trim the airplane, which means to get it back on the required flight path with no force pushing it away from that path.

“If nose-up trim is required, raise the nose well above the horizon with elevator control. Then slowly relax the control column pressure and manually trim nose-up. Allow the nose to drop below the horizon while trimming (manually). Repeat this sequence until the airplane is trim,” the manual states.

The Australian pilot also posted an extract from Boeing’s “Airliner” magazine published in May 1961, describing the a similar technique as applied to Boeing’s first jet, the 707.

Clearly this unusual circumstance of having to move the stabilizer manually while maintaining a high stick force on the control column demands significant piloting skill.

“We learned all about these maneuvers in the 1950-60s,” the pilot wrote on the online forum. “Yet, for some inexplicable reason, Boeing manuals have since deleted what was then — and still is — vital handling information for flight crews.”

The preliminary investigation report into the Ethiopian crash is expected soon and will offer more detail on exactly what happened in the cockpit.</s>The doomed Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737 Max that crashed and killed 157 people last month reportedly had its angle-of-attack sensor damaged on takeoff from a foreign object or bird.

The damaged sensor went on to trigger inaccurate data and resulted in the pilots turning the anti-stall software - known as MCAS - off, but it re-engaged and pushed the jet downwards, sources told ABC News.

The pilots are said to have tried to manually bring the nose of the plane back up before restoring power but they were unable to regain control - ultimately resulting in the plane crashing to the ground.

It was not immediately clear whether the crew intentionally re-deployed the MCAS system, which was designed to push the nose of the 737 MAX down to prevent a stall but which is suspected of exacerbating a different scenario linked to two recent crashes.

A person with knowledge of the aircraft said the system cannot re-activate itself unless prompted by pilots. One possibility is that the crew may have re-activated MCAS in an attempt to reduce the forces on the control column, or because they were unable to adequately trim the plane manually.

Boeing warned against speculation ahead of a preliminary report, while Ethiopian investigators could not be reached for comment.

Boeing's anti-stall software is at the center of investigations into last month's Ethiopian Airlines crash and a Lion Air accident in Indonesia in October.

Ethiopia is due to release its first report on Thursday.

No significant new technical issues have so far emerged in the Ethiopian investigation beyond those already being addressed by Boeing through updated software in the aftermath of the Lion Air crash, a person familiar with the findings said.

People close to the Ethiopian investigation have said the anti-stall software - which automatically pushes the aircraft's nose down to guard against a loss of lift - was activated by erroneous 'angle of attack' data from a single sensor.

The investigation has now turned towards how MCAS was initially disabled by pilots, in line with part of a cockpit checklist procedure, but then appeared to start working again before the jet plunged to the ground, the people said.

A directive issued after the Indonesian crash instructed pilots to use two cut-out switches to disengage the system in the event of problems and then leave them switched off.

Officials briefed on the matter said a key question is when did the pilots at the helm of the Ethiopian Airlines 737 MAX disengage the MCAS system and did they do it too late to regain control of the airplane.

Two people briefed on the matter said the system is not designed to resume operations unless the crew acts and the crew may have unintentionally re-engaged the system as it desperately tried to pull the plane out of its nose-down descent.

They cautioned the data was still being reviewed and that the findings were preliminary.

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration and National Transportation Safety Board declined to comment.

Boeing is working to submit an upgrade of the software to the U.S. regulators in a couple of weeks and adding extra training.

Investigators will also look at whether the crew carried out procedures in full, including a recommendation to steady the plane's nose using the trim system before turning software off.

The pilots maneuvered the plane back upwards at least two times before hitting the stabilizer cut-out switches to disable the system, a person familiar with the matter said.

However, initial flight data indicates the aircraft was flying nose-heavy and not in a 'neutral' attitude when pilots hit the stabilizer cutout switches to disable the MCAS system, the person added, making the situation harder to manage.

After the pilots turned off MCAS, the airplane over the next few minutes gained roughly 2,000 feet, but dived into the ground after the MCAS system re-engaged, a source told Reuters.

Safety experts stress accidents are usually caused by a combination of factors and the probe is at an early stage.</s>Pilots of the 737 Max that crashed in Ethiopia in March initially followed Boeing’s standard emergency procedures to try to get control of the plane, but ultimately failed, The Wall Street Journal reported Wednesday.

Crew members turned off the flight-control system that automatically pushed down the plane’s nose after takeoff but could not get the plane to climb, the Journal reported, citing people briefed on the investigation’s preliminary findings. The Ethiopian Airlines crew ended up turning the control system back on before the plane crashed, killing all 157 people aboard.

It’s the latest report amid mounting pressure on Boeing and the Federal Aviation Administration over their assertions that the crash may have been avoided had pilots simply followed established safety procedures. The new details of the crash are based on data from the aircraft’s "black box" recorders.

The pilots turned the electrical power back on, which re-engaged the stall-prevention feature, known as MCAS, and then used electrical switches to try to raise the nose, the Journal’s sources said.

It’s not clear why pilots on Ethiopian Flight 302 turned the automated system back on rather than continuing to follow Boeing’s standard emergency steps. Government officials and investigators said it’s likely that manual controls to raise the nose of the plane didn’t work, and pilots tried to reengage the system to combat the nose-down angle of the jet and failed, the Journal reported.

The same Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System was also involved in the 737 Max crash in Indonesia in October that resulted in deaths of all 189 people on board.

The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation launched an investigation on Tuesday into whistleblower complaints accusing the FAA of improperly training its safety inspectors to review the Boeing jets. The FAA may have been notified about these deficiencies as early as August, the panel said. The Justice Department has also launched a criminal probe.

Ethiopian investigators are expected to release a preliminary report about the crash in coming days. Investigators looking to the Lion Air Flight 610 crash in Indonesia think similar system malfunctions were involved, including erroneous data from a single sensor that caused the MCAS system to misfire.

Boeing is still preparing software updates for the 737 Max plane’s flight-control system. The plane maker initially planned to submit the fixes to the FAA last week but said it needs more time. The revised software will have two sensors, rather than one, and will give pilots more control over the system, according to Boeing.</s>ADDIS ABABA/SEATTLE/PARIS (Reuters) - Investigators will release a keenly awaited report on the deadly crash of an Ethiopian Airlines jet on Thursday, Ethiopia's transport ministry said, giving the first official clues to the second crash of a new Boeing 737 MAX in five months.

Some 35 nationalities were among the 157 passengers and crew who died when the nearly full plane crashed six minutes after take-off from the capital Addis Ababa in clear conditions.

The March 10 disaster prompted the worldwide grounding of Boeing's best-selling plane and scrutiny of its certification process.

"The 10:30 a.m. (0730 GMT) press conference is to present the preliminary report," Ethiopian transport ministry spokesman Musie Yehyies said.

The report may shed light on how a piece of cockpit software came back to life after pilots initially switched it off as they tried to save the doomed jet, people familiar with the matter said, placing both technology and crew in the spotlight.

The Ethiopian-led investigation has begun piecing together details of flight 302, starting with faulty sensor data on take-off from Addis Ababa, questions over the Boeing 737 MAX's high speed and a nosedive coinciding with the software re-activation.

The aircraft's high speed and initial climb suggests the engines were running at a higher than usual thrust, experts say.

The so-called MCAS anti-stall software is at the centre of accident probes in both the Ethiopian crash and October's Lion Air accident in Indonesia that have together killed 346 people.

MCAS was designed to help prevent an aerodynamic stall by issuing commands to push the plane's nose lower. However, in both cases it is suspected of firing up in response to faulty airflow data from a single sensor designed to measure the 'angle of attack,' a parameter needed to avoid stalling or losing lift.

Echoing the fate of the Lion Air jet, initial evidence suggests the Ethiopian Airlines jet experienced sensor problems shortly after take-off, causing the MCAS software to begin lowering the nose to grab air under the wings.

Unlike the Lion Air crew, who were flying at a time when pilots had been told little about the MCAS software, the Ethiopian crew used switches to turn the automatic system off but it later re-engaged, people familiar with the matter said.

Although aircraft experts say MCAS cannot turn back on by itself, the report is expected to shed light on whether and why the crew chose to restore electrical power to the system at the risk of setting off more automated nose-down movements.

Aerospace analyst Bjorn Fehrm said in a blog post for Leeham News that pilots may have deliberately re-activated the system in order to make it easier to trim or control the aircraft only to be overwhelmed by rapid counter-moves from MCAS.

Investigators will also look at whether the crew carried out all necessary procedures, including a recommendation to stabilise the plane using the trim system before turning the crucial software off.

The pilots manoeuvred the plane upwards at least two times before hitting the stabilizer cut-out switches to disable the system, one person familiar with the matter said.

However, initial flight data indicates the aircraft was flying nose-heavy and not in a "neutral" attitude when pilots hit the cut-out switches, the person added, making the situation harder to manage.

Cockpit procedures call for pilots to leave the MCAS system off for the rest of the flight once it has been disengaged.

Safety experts stress the investigation is far from complete and most aviation disasters are caused by a unique combination of human and technical factors.

In a statement, Boeing said: "We urge caution against speculating and drawing conclusions on the findings prior to the release of the flight data and the preliminary report."

The 737 MAX is Boeing's top-selling jet with almost 5,000 on order. Ethiopian Airlines is also in the midst of an expansion drive, while other 737 MAX customers and victims' families want answers, and potentially compensation.

Boeing shares were down 1.5 percent at 1800 GMT. They have lost more than 8.5 percent since the Ethiopian crash.

Getting the planes flying again depends partly on the role that Boeing design features are found to have played in the crash, though investigators are also paying attention to airline operations, crew actions and regulatory measures.

Boeing is upgrading the MCAS software and training while stressing that existing cockpit procedures enable safe flight. It however faces mounting lawsuits alleging poor system design.

The Wall Street Journal reported earlier that the pilots had initially followed Boeing's emergency procedures but later deviated from them as they tried to regain control of the plane.

This story has not been edited by Firstpost staff and is generated by auto-feed.

Firstpost is now on WhatsApp. For the latest analysis, commentary and news updates, sign up for our WhatsApp services. Just go to Firstpost.com/Whatsapp and hit the Subscribe button.</s>SEATTLE/PARIS/ADDIS ABABA (Reuters) - Boeing anti-stall software forced down the nose of a doomed Ethiopian jet even after pilots had turned it off, sources told Reuters on Wednesday, as investigators scrutinise the role played by technology and crew in the fatal March 10 crash.

A preliminary Ethiopian report into the disaster is due to be published within days and may include evidence the software system kicked in as many as four times before the 737 MAX dived into the ground, two people with knowledge of the matter said.

A third person familiar with the findings confirmed the software had fired up again after pilots had initially switched it off, but said there was only one significant episode in which the plane pointed itself lower in the moments before the crash.

The so-called MCAS software is at the centre of accident probes in both the crash of Ethiopian flight 302 and a Lion Air accident in Indonesia five months earlier that together killed 346 people.

It was not immediately clear whether the Ethiopian crew chose to re-deploy the system, which pushes the Boeing 737 MAX downwards to avoid stalling. But one of the sources said investigators were studying the possibility that the software started working again without human intervention.

In a statement on media reports about the investigation, Boeing said: “We urge caution against speculating and drawing conclusions on the findings prior to the release of the flight data and the preliminary report.”

Ethiopian investigators were not available for comment.

The Ethiopian crash led to a global grounding of 737 MAX jets and scrutiny of its certification process. Initial results of the accident investigation are due within days.

The stakes are high. The 737 MAX is Boeing’s top-selling jet with almost 5,000 on order. Ethiopian Airlines is also in the midst of an expansion drive, while other 737 MAX customers and victims’ families want answers, and potentially compensation.

Boeing shares were down 1.5 percent at 1450 GMT. They have lost more than 8.5 percent since the Ethiopian crash.

Getting the planes flying again depends partly on the role that Boeing design features are found to have played in the crash, though investigators are also paying attention to airline operations, crew actions and regulatory measures.

Boeing is upgrading the MCAS software and training while stressing that existing cockpit procedures enable safe flight.

People familiar with the investigation have already said the anti-stall software was activated by erroneous ‘angle of attack’ data from a key aircraft sensor.

Now, the investigation has turned towards how MCAS was initially disabled by pilots, but then appeared to resume sending automated instructions to point downwards before the jet plunged to the ground, the two sources said. Boeing issued guidelines to pilots on how to disable the anti-stall system after the Indonesian crash, reminding pilots to use cut-out switches in the console to shut off the system in the event of problems.

Cockpit procedures call for pilots to leave the MCAS system off for the rest of the flight once it has been disengaged.

The Wall Street Journal reported earlier that the pilots had initially followed Boeing’s emergency procedures but later deviated from them as they tried to regain control of the plane.

Disabling the system does not shut down MCAS completely but severs an electrical link between the software’s attempts to give orders to push the plane lower and the actual controls, a person familiar with the aircraft system said. Investigators are studying whether there are any conditions under which MCAS could re-activate itself automatically, without the pilots intentionally reversing the cut-out manoeuvre.

Aerospace analyst Bjorn Fehrm said in a blog post for Leeham News that pilots may have deliberately re-activated the system in order to make it easier to trim or control the aircraft only to be overwhelmed too quickly by counter-moves from MCAS.

Safety experts stress the investigation is far from complete and most aviation disasters are caused by a unique combination of human and technical factors.

None of the parties involved in the investigation was available for comment.</s>April 3 (Reuters) - Ethiopian authorities will deliver their first report on the crash of Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 on Thursday at 10:30 a.m. local time (0730 GMT), a source told Reuters.

Some 35 nationalities were among the 157 passengers and crew who died when the new Boeing 737 MAX 8 plane crashed just 6 minutes after take-off from the capital Addis Ababa in clear conditions.

The March 10 disaster was the second crash of a MAX 8 in five months and has prompted the worldwide grounding of Boeing's best-selling plane.</s>Some 35 nationalities were among the 157 passengers and crew who died when the nearly full plane crashed six minutes after take-off from Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital, in clear conditions.

The March 10 disaster prompted the worldwide grounding of Boeing's best-selling plane and scrutiny of its certification process.

"The 10:30 a.m. (0730 GMT) press conference is to present the preliminary report," Ethiopian Transport Ministry spokesman Musie Yehyies said.

The report may shed light on how a piece of cockpit software came back to life after pilots initially switched it off as they tried to save the doomed jet, people familiar with the matter said, placing both technology and crew in the spotlight.

Boeing said on Wednesday it successfully tested an update of the MCAS anti-stall software that is at the center of accident probes in both the Ethiopian crash and October's Lion Air accident in Indonesia that together killed 346 people.

Boeing said its CEO Dennis Muilenburg joined the Wednesday test flight and that the flight crew performed different scenarios to test failure conditions. "The software update worked as designed, and the pilots landed safely at Boeing Field" near Seattle, the company said in a statement.

The Ethiopian-led investigation has begun piecing together details of flight 302, starting with faulty sensor data on take-off from Addis Ababa, questions over the Boeing 737 MAX's high speed and a nosedive coinciding with the software re-activation.

The aircraft's high speed and initial climb suggests the engines were running at a higher than usual thrust, experts say.

MCAS was designed to help prevent an aerodynamic stall by issuing commands to push the plane's nose lower. However, in both cases it is suspected of firing up in response to faulty airflow data from a single sensor designed to measure the "angle of attack," a parameter needed to avoid stalling or losing lift.

Echoing the fate of the Lion Air jet, initial evidence suggests the Ethiopian Airlines jet experienced sensor problems shortly after take-off, causing the MCAS software to begin lowering the nose to grab air under the wings.

Unlike the Lion Air crew, who were flying at a time when pilots had been told little about the MCAS software, the Ethiopian crew used switches to turn the automatic system off but it later re-engaged, people familiar with the matter said.

Although aircraft experts say MCAS cannot turn back on by itself, the report is expected to shed light on whether and why the crew chose to restore electrical power to the system at the risk of setting off more automated nose-down movements.

Aerospace analyst Bjorn Fehrm said in a blog post for Leeham News that pilots may have deliberately re-activated the system in order to make it easier to trim or control the aircraft only to be overwhelmed by rapid counter-moves from MCAS.

Investigators will also look at whether the crew carried out all necessary procedures, including a recommendation to stabilize the plane using the trim system before turning the crucial software off.

The pilots maneuvered the plane upwards at least two times before hitting the stabilizer cut-out switches to disable the system, one person familiar with the matter said.

However, initial flight data indicates the aircraft was flying nose-heavy and not in a "neutral" attitude when pilots hit the cut-out switches, the person added, making the situation harder to manage.

Cockpit procedures call for pilots to leave the MCAS system off for the rest of the flight once it has been disengaged.

Safety experts stress the investigation is far from complete and most aviation disasters are caused by a unique combination of human and technical factors.

In a statement, Boeing said: "We urge caution against speculating and drawing conclusions on the findings prior to the release of the flight data and the preliminary report."

The 737 MAX is Boeing's top-selling jet with almost 5,000 on order. Ethiopian Airlines is also in the midst of an expansion drive, while other 737 MAX customers and victims' families want answers, and potentially compensation.

Boeing shares closed down 1.5 percent. They have lost more than 8.5 percent since the Ethiopian crash.

Getting the planes flying again depends partly on the role that Boeing design features are found to have played in the crash, though investigators are also paying attention to airline operations, crew actions and regulatory measures.

The chief executive of Norwegian Air, Bjoern Kjos, who is a former fighter pilot, said on Wednesday he tested the old MCAS flight control system versus the new one in a MAX simulator "under a malfunction," and said it appears to be foolproof.

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration said it is launching a new review of the 737 MAX. It will be headed by former National Transportation Safety Board chairman Christopher Hart and include experts from the FAA, NASA and international aviation authorities.</s>The pilots on the doomed Ethiopian Airlines 737 Max plane which crashed shortly after takeoff in March followed Boeing's emergency procedures but still couldn't stop the disaster, according to a report into the preliminary findings of an investigation into the crash.

Unnamed sources familiar with the investigation told The Wall Street Journal that the pilots on the doomed flight initially responded to the plane pushing its nose down by turning off the automated anti-stall system that is widely thought to have been behind the crash. When that didn't work, the Journal reports, the pilots turned the system back on and tried other steps to control the plane.

All 157 people on board were killed when the plane crashed soon after taking off from Addis Ababa's Bole International Airport on March 10.

A potential failure of the automated system, called the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), has been the most widely discussed theory for the Ethiopian Airlines crash, and also the Lion Air Boeing 737 Max 8 crash that killed 189 people in October.

The system is designed to prevent stalls by automatically pointing the nose of the plane downward if it senses the aircraft climbing too sharply.

A passenger safety instruction card is seen at the scene of the Ethiopian Airlines Flight ET 302 plane crash in Ethiopia in March 2019. REUTERS/Tiksa Negeri/File Photo

Boeing and the FAA sent bulletins to 737 MAX operators after the Lion Air crash, reminding them of procedures to follow in case the plane's system pushed the nose down. They told pilots to disable MCAS by cutting its power.

Government and industry officials said the pilots likely turned the MCAS system back on because using manual controls to raise the nose didn't work as needed, the WSJ reported.

Read more: Investigators are close to confirming the lead theory about why the Ethiopian Airlines 737 Max crashed, report says

Pilots turned a manual wheel that controls the parts of the plane's tail that the MCAS system controls, sources told the WSJ, but they then turned electronic power back on. They then used electric switches to try and raise the plane's nose, but that also reactivated MCAS, continuing to push the plane's nose downwards.

These details are based on the black box flight recorders from the flight, the sources said.

The black box from the crashed Ethiopian Airlines 737 Max plane. Twitter/BEA

The Wall Street Journal also reported last week that the preliminary conclusion into the Ethiopian Airlines crash was that the MCAS system mistakenly activated during the fatal flight. This conclusion is subject to change.

Investigations into both crashes are ongoing.

Boeing is introducing new software for the planes, which have been grounded around the world and will not be allowed to fly until regulators approve the fixes, most of which are to the MCAS system.

The FAA announced on Monday that it expects Boeing to submit the final software fixes for the 737 Max "over the comings weeks" and that it would not approve the software until it was satisfied — a delay that means airlines could keep the planes grounded for weeks longer than expected.

Daniel Elwell, acting administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, arrives to testify before a Senate Commerce subcommittee in March 2019. REUTERS/Joshua Roberts

Lawmakers are looking at the plane's approval to fly with increased scrutiny, with particular focus being put on the policy that allows Boeing to partially certify its own aircraft on behalf of the FAA. Acting FAA head Dan Elwell told a Senate committee that Boeing partly certified the MCAS software system itself.

Read more: Senate investigating whistleblowers' claims that government safety inspectors who approved Boeing's 737 Max plane lacked sufficient training

Whistleblowers also warned of possible serious safety issues in the inspection program for new aircraft, including the 737 Max. They alleged that "numerous FAA employees, including those involved in the Aircraft Evaluation Group (ARG) for the Boeing 737 MAX, had not received proper training and valid certifications," senators said on Monday.</s>Boeing and U.S. aviation regulators say the company needs more time to finish changes in a flight-control system suspected of playing a role in two deadly crashes.

The Federal Aviation Administration said Monday it anticipates Boeing's final software improvements for 737 Max airliners "in the coming weeks."

Boeing was expected to complete the work last week, but FAA spokesperson Greg Martin said the company needs more time to make sure it has identified and addressed all issues.

Chicago-based Boeing offered the same timetable as it works to convince regulators that it can fix software on the planes.

"Safety is our first priority, and we will take a thorough and methodical approach to the development and testing of the update to ensure we take the time to get it right," said Boeing spokesperson Charles Bickers.

Boeing needs approval not just from the FAA, but elsewhere, including Europe and China, where safety officials have indicated they will conduct their own reviews.

The planes have been grounded around the world since mid-March.

Awaiting preliminary report on Ethiopian crash

The news from the FAA suggests that airlines could be forced to park their Max jets longer than they expected. Airlines that own Max jets are scrambling other planes to fill some Max flights while cancelling others.

"We are aware that the resumption of service for our 737 Max aircraft may be further delayed, and our team will work with all customers impacted by any flight cancellations," said American Airlines spokesperson Ross Feinstein.

Calgary-based WestJet Airlines plans to stick with deliveries of Boeing 737 Max aircraft once regulators approve the plane for re-entry into service. Air Canada declined to say to The Canadian Press if it still has faith in the plane.

Separately, U.S. regulators and Boeing are awaiting a preliminary report from Ethiopian investigators into the March 10 crash of an Ethiopian Airlines Max 8 jet shortly after takeoff from Addis Ababa. The report will be scrutinized for information from the plane's data recorders that might suggest similarities between the doomed flight and the Oct. 29 crash of a Lion Air Max 8 into the Java Sea off Indonesia. The two crashes killed 346 people.

Family members leave flowers at the site of the Ethiopian Airlines crash, near the town of Bishoftu, southeast of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on March 13. (Baz Ratner/Reuters)

Data from the Indonesian plane indicates that pilots unsuccessfully fought the automated anti-stall system for control of the plane, which plunged into the sea shortly after takeoff. According to published reports, the same system activated on the Ethiopian Airlines flight.

Boeing is making changes in an automated system that is designed to prevent the plane's nose from rising, which can lead to a dangerous aerodynamic stall. The changes include relying on readings from more than one sensor before the anti-stall system activates and pushes the nose down, and making the system's actions less severe and easier for pilots to handle. Boeing has said it will pay to train pilots on the technology.

Two American Airlines pilots who attended a session with Boeing experts last week expressed satisfaction with the manufacturer's changes. American's chief 737 pilot, Roddy Guthrie, said Boeing added "some checks and balances in the system that will make the system much better."

The U.S. Congress, meanwhile, is looking into the relationship between Boeing and the FAA. The House transportation and infrastructure committee said Monday that it had requested records from both Boeing and the FAA related to the certification of the 737 Max.
Boeing delays the availability of the software update for its 737 Max airliners. The Federal Aviation Administration anticipates the update to be rolled out "in the coming weeks."