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Events from Jun 19th 1999 to Sep 9th 2019 www.avherald.com Incidents and News in Aviation List by: Filter: Crash: LAMIA Bolivia RJ85 near Medellin on Nov 28th 2016, electrical problems, no fuel, impact with terrain

By Simon Hradecky, created Friday, Apr 27th 2018 19:15Z, last updated Tuesday, Aug 21st 2018 22:47Z Colombia's GRIAA also released their English version of the final report after Apr 27th 2018 concluding the causes of the crash were (Editorial note: we leave our summary of the Spanish report below intact for comparism):



Inappropriate planning and flight execution because the amount of fuel required to fly from the airport of destination to an alternate airport nor a quantity of reserve fuel nor the contingency fuel nor the minimum fuel of landing were taken into account, these fuel quantities are required by aeronautical regulations for carrying out this type of international flight like the one made by CP 2339 aircraft.



Sequential shutdown of the four (4) engines while the aircraft was in descent performing a holding pattern at GEMLI as a result of the exhaustion of fuel on board.



An inadequate decision-making process by the aircraft operating company management as a result of a lack of operational safety assurance.



Loss of situational awareness and mistaken decision- making process by the crew who insisted on continuing a flight with an extremely limited amount of fuel. The crew was aware of the low level of remaining fuel; however, the crew members did not take the corrective actions required to land at an aerodrome and refuel, fact that would allow them to continue the flight safely.



Contributing Factors



Premature configuretion of the aircraft for landing during descent in holding pattern at GEMLI since considering the absence of thrust, this configuretion affected the plane's glide distance to Rionegro airport runway.



Latent deficiencies in the planning and execution of non-regular transportation flights by the aircraft operator related to insufficient supply of the required amount of fuel.



Specific deficiencies in the planning of the flight involved in the accident by the aircraft operator.



Lack of oversight and operational control of the flight by the Operator, it did not supervise the planning of the flight nor its execution nor it made a follow-up of the flight that would have allowed to support the crew in making decisions.



On Apr 27th 2018 Colombia's GRIAA released their final report in Spanish concluding the probable causes of the crash were:



Inappropriate planning and execution of the flight with an amount of fuel that did not include any fuel for a diversion from destination to an alternate airport, any contingency, any reserve, the required minimum fuel after landing as would have been required by regulations for the type of international flight performed by CP-2933.



The four engines shut down in sequence while the aircraft descended towards the holding pattern at GEMLI as result of depletion of fuel.



Inadequate decision making within the operator's management resulting in lack of assurance of operational safety.



Loss of situational awareness and inadequate decision making by the crew which maintained their fixation to complete the flight with an extremely limited amount of fuel. The crew was aware of the low level of remaining fuel, however, did not take corrective actions required, e.g. to land at an aerodrome and replenish the fuel.



Contributing factors were:



Premature configuration of the aircraft for landing during the descent towards the holding pattern at GEMLI. Considering the absence of thrust this configuration affected the gliding distance to Rionegro Airport's runway.



Latent deficiencies in the planning and execution of non-regular transportation flights by the operator, in particular insufficient supply of fuel.



Specific deficiencies in the planning of the accident flight by the operator of the aircraft.



Lack of supervision and operational control of the flight by the operator who did not supervise the planning of the flight nor its execution and did not follow up on the flight to assist the crew in decision making.



Absence of timely calls requesting urgency or declaring emergency (or similiar) by the crew of the aircraft during the flight, especially when fuel depletion was already imminent during the descent, which could have alerted air traffic control to provide the support needed.



Organizational and operational deviation from fuel management procedures by the operator, who in practise did not comply with the approval by Bolivia's DGCA during certification of the company.



Delay during the approach of the aircraft to Rionegro runway due to its late priority request and late emergency call for fuel added to the traffic density in the VOR RNG holding pattern.



The GRIAA reported in 2015 an inspection revealed operational deficiencies within the operator, in particular due to inadequate fuel management. In 2016 the operator performed three flights from Rio Negro to Cobija (as declared destination of the flight), however continued to Viru Viru (which was declared alternate aerodrome but was the real destination), as such it was likely the operator did not comply with the minimum fuel requirements.



CP-2933 was originally chartered to perform two flights, one from Sao Paulo to Rio Negro and then from Rio Negro to Chapeco. Brazil's Authorities had denied authorization for the flight based on their regulations preventing flights from Brazil to a third country (Brazil as point of origin, Bolivia for the operator and Colombia as destination). Therefore another company performed the flight Sao Paulo-Santa Cruz and CP-2933 was to fly from Santa Cruz to Rio Negro with a crew different from the one that had originally been scheduled to perform the flights.



The operator managed to get the request for the flight not rejected by Colombian Aeronautical Authority who did not have an Air Safety Secretariat nor made a study of the current insurance which excluded operation of the aircraft in Colombia.



The ARO/AIS office noticed, that the flight plan presented by the operator showed an estimated enroute time (EET) similiar to the endurance of the aircraft. This observation was not considered by the operator and the flight plan was filed.



The aircraft departed Santa Cruz with a total of 9,073 kg of fuel. The minimum fuel required to perform the flight to Rio Negro in accordance with regulations was 12,052kg however, above the aircraft's fuel tank capacity. The aircraft departed Santa Cruz with a computed takeoff weight of 42,148 kh, 348kg above maximum takeoff weight. There was no evidence of a load sheet at the operator's office in Santa Cruz.



According to the CVR the crew repeatedly discussed the fuel situation and optimization of cruise and descent, including a possible diversion to Bogota for refueling.



Colombia's ATC had cleared the flight for the most direct route from point of entry into Colombian Airspace to Rio Negro. A clearance by Bogota Area Control Center to proceed direct to NIRSO, near the destination airport, motivated the crew to definitely rule out a diversion to Bogota. The CVR recording ended prematurely about 550nm from Rio Negro, 100 minutes prior to the accident. The investigation was unable to determine why the CVR stopped that early. The flight data recordings ceased about 180nm from VOR RNG. About 40 minutes prior to the last FDR recording a low fuel level warning had occurred. At that point the aircraft was 77nm from Bogota and 135nm from Cali. However, the crew did not inform ATC about the fuel situation.



In the meantime ATC dealt with an aircraft suspecting a fuel leak on approach to Rio Negro, which delayed CP-2933 (as the fuel situation was unknown to ATC) and three other aircraft. 68nm from VOR RNG ATC instructed the crew to enter the hold of RNG without providing an estimate for the anticipated time of approach. Again, the crew did not advise of the critical fuel situation.



24nm from RNG VOR the crew requested and was approved to hold at GEMLI, again without advising of the low fuel quantity remaining. The aircraft completed one round in the holding, before starting the second circuit the crew requested priority due to fuel problems. ATC advised they would be vectored onto the localizer in 7 minutes. The crew accepted again without declaring emergency.



71 seconds after CP-2933 had requested priority ATC cleared the other aircraft arriving with a suspected fuel leak for the approach to Rio Negro.



During the second circuit in the hold, 195 seconds after the crew requested priority, the crew declared Mayday, immediately veered left out of the holding pattern and left FL210. ATC cancelled the approach clearance for the other aircraft and instructed other aircraft in the hold of RNG to fly towards the west to get out of the way.



When leaving FL210 the crew deployed the speed brakes, extended the landing gear at FL205 and at FL180 began to extend the flaps reaching 24 degrees of flaps. ATC cleared CP-2933 for the approach, provided traffic information about the other aircraft in the area and advised the runway was wet. At FL196 engine #3 shut down, at 18,876 feet engine #4 shut down, at 17,946 feet the flaps were set to full, at 17,290 feet engine #2 shut down and at 15942 feet engine #1 shut down. Seven seconds after the last engine shut down the FDR ceased recording 15.5nm before the runway 01 threshold at an CAS of 115 KIAS, 142 knots over ground and an altitude of 15,943 feet. The crew reported a total electrical failure and requested vectors repeatedly. After the last engine shut down the aircraft glided a further 5.5nm until impact. 71 people perished in the crash, 6 people survived.



The flight plan submitted in Santa Cruz (Graphics: GRIAA):



By Simon Hradecky, created Wednesday, Dec 28th 2016 11:38Z, last updated Wednesday, Dec 28th 2016 11:53Z



The GRIAA reported that the aircraft positioned from Cochabamba to Santa Cruz landing in Santa Cruz at 17:58Z. The captain (36, ATPL, 6,692 hours total, 3,417 hours on type) occupied the left hand seat, the first officer (47, ATPL, 6,923 hours total, 1,474 hours on type) occupied the right hand seat, a private pilot occupied the observer's seat. In addition there were two cabin crew, 72 passengers (including an engineer and a dispatcher from the operator) boarded in Santa Cruz.



According to witness information the aircraft departed Santa Cruz with the maximum fuel load of 9300kg possible at 22:18Z. Some of the crew thought the aircraft would refuel enroute at Cobija (Bolivia). On the day of the accident Cobija, that operates only during daylight, closed at 22:48Z however.



The GRIAA wrote: "During the cruise, the CVR recorded various crew conversations about the fuel state of the aircraft and they could be heard carrying out fuel calculations. At 00:42:18hrs one of the pilots could be heard to say that they would divert to Bogota (ICAO: SKBO) to refuel but at 00:52:24hrs a further conversation took place, shortly after the aircraft was transferred to Colombian ATC, with the crew deciding to continue to Rionegro (ICAO: SKRG). At 01:03:01hrs the crew began their brief for the approach to Jose Maria Cordoba Airport, Rionegro."



The cockpit voice recorder ceased recording at 01:15:03Z, 1:40:45 hours prior to the end of FDR recording.



At 02:30:30z the aircraft was about 75nm south of Rionegro Airport and began their descent. At 02:40Z the aircraft was handed to RioNegro Approach and was instructed to descend to FL230 and enter the hold at RNG VOR, at 02:42Z the aircraft was instructed to descend to FL210. The crew requested to hold at GEMLI RNAV waypoint, which was approved. The aircraft passed GEMLI at 02:43:39z the first time and flew two racetracks (each 24nm).



The GRIAA wrote: "At this time there were three other aircraft holding at the Rio Negro VOR, at FL190, 18,000ft and 17,000ft. There was also an aircraft diverting into Rionegro with a reported fuel leak, about to commence its final approach to Runway 01 at Rionegro (SKRG). At 02:43:52hrs the aircraft was levelled off at FL210, the flaps lowered to FLAP18 and the speed reduced to 180 kt CAS. At 02:45:03hrs the crew informed ATC that they had entered the hold at GEMLI at FL210."



At 02:49:11z the crew radioed: "Two one zero inbound request priority for the approach, a fuel problem has occurred." The controller queried the transmission, which was confirmed, then the controller radioed: "Standby, I will give you vectors to proceed to the localiser and do the approach. Estimate seven minutes for approach."



At 02:52Z the crew queried when to expect the vectors for the approach, the controller replied at 02:52:18z: "Standby I have an aircraft below you on the approach and in addition they are doing a runway check. How long can you remain on the approach?", the crew radioed: "With fuel emergency Miss that why I request final course" and at 02:52:45Z "And request immediate descent, Lima Mike India two nine three three".



The Controller now cancelled the approach clearance for LA-3020 and queried whether LMI-2933 could turn right to start the descent, there was traffic one mile ahead below. The crew replied the traffic was in sight and immediately commenced their descent. The controller insisted on the turn right, the crew replied: "Negative Miss. We’re now starting descent and we are going to the localiser."



At 02:54:19Z the crew reported with reference to the conflicting traffic: "Identified in TCAS and we have it above us and we are in final course".



The GRIAA wrote: "At 02:54:47 hrs the Number 3 and Number 4 engine low oil pressure states were recorded on the FDR together with a MASTER WARNING. At the same time, over a 12 second period, the Number 1 engine N12 reduced from 39.5% to 29.0% and recovered. At 02:55:04hrs the Number 2 engine speed no longer matched the thrust lever demand and began to run down."



At 02:55:06z the crew received approach clearance and was reminded to pass over the VOR at 10,000 feet.



The GRIAA wrote: "At 02:55:27hrs the Number 2 engine low oil pressure state and a MASTER WARNING were recorded on the FDR. At 02:55:41hrs the Number 1 engine began to run down Following the loss of all engines, at 02:55:48hrs the FDR ceased recording. At this time the FDR data showed that the aircraft was at a CAS of 115 kt, a ground speed of 142 kt and a pressure altitude of 15,934 ft msl. The aircraft was 15.5 nm to the south of the threshold of Rionegro Runway 01 and 5.4 nm south of the accident site (which was at an elevation of about 8,500 ft amsl). Radar recording report indicates Mode C lost at 02:55:52hrs at which time there was only a primary radar contact for the aircraft."



At 02:57:10z the crew radioed: "Miss, Lima Mike India 2933 is in total failure, total electrical failure and without fuel."



Of the 77 occupants of the aircraft 71 perished in the impact, 4 received serious injuries, one crew member and a passenger survived with minor injuries.



The GRIAA located the position of first impact at GPS coordinates "N05°58'43.56 W075°25'7.86" (N5.9787 W75.4189). At that point the tail unit of the aircraft including rudder, elevators was found, the tail unit had detached from the aircraft at the pressure bulkhead frame. The airbrakes remained attached to the tail unit by its wiring. Engines #1 and #4 were found at the point of first impact, too, engines #2 and #3 were found at the main wreckage site.



The GRIAA wrote: "The state of the engines examined was consistent with these engines not being under power at the time of impact."



The GRIAA located the main wreckage site at GPS coordinates "N05°58.725 W75◦25.138" (N5.9787 W75.4190) about 140m from the point of first impact.



The GRIAA wrote: "The starboard wing fuel tank had been split open during the accident sequence. With the exception of slight fuel odour in the immediate vicinity of the fuel tanks, there was no apparent evidence of fuel anywhere on the crash site." There was no evidence of fire.



The GRIAA wrote with respect to fuel planning:



The operator had submitted flight information to a commercial flight planning company at 1325 on 28 November 2016 in order to create a flight plan for the flight from Santa Cruz to Rionegro.



The route used to create the plan was the same as that used on the ATC flight plan submitted prior to departure. The plan gave a ground distance for the flight of 1,611 nm and a trip fuel requirement of 8,658 kg.



The only other fuel requirement submitted to create the plan was for a taxi fuel requirement of 200 kg. This gave a total fuel requirement for the flight of 8,858 kg, but with no allowance for diversion, holding or contingency fuel requirements.



The plan was created using a cruising flight level of FL300 and an aircraft takeoff weight of 32,991 kg. The plan recorded an increased trip fuel requirement of 64 kg for every additional 1,000 kg above this weight.



Other flight plans were found in the aircraft after the accident covering different routes.



These included a series of three plans created on 26 November 2016 covering separate flights from São Paulo to Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz to Cobija and Cobija to Rionegro. The Cobija to Rionegro plan had used Bogota as a diversion and included a diversion fuel requirement of 837 kg and a 30minute holding fuel requirement of 800 kg.



The GRIAA reported that no loadsheet was recovered from the wreckage nor was any copy obtainable through other sources. Estimating the checked baggage at 488kg (as measured after recovery from the wreckage site) the GRIAA estimated the minimum takeoff weight at 41,610kg. Measurements of the baggage during the flight from Sao Paulo to Santa Cruz showed the baggage at 1026kg, which increased the minimum takeoff weight to 42,148kg (MTOW 41,800kg according to AOM).



With respect to the filed flight plan the GRIAA wrote:



The dispatcher accompanying the flight submitted a flight plan on 28 November 2016 at about 20:10hrs at the flight plan office at Santa Cruz Airport. The submitted flight plan gave a departure time of 22:00hrs and a cruising flight level of FL280. The flight time and endurance were both recorded on the plan as 4 hrs 22 minutes.



The flight plan office requested that the flight plan was changed and re-submitted due to the following issues with the plan:



- The route did not include a standard instrument departure (SID) from Santa Cruz



- There was no second alternate airport included in the plan



- The estimated enroute time (EET) was the same as the endurance



- The dispatcher had only signed the plan but had not printed his name



The dispatcher apparently had refused to change any of the details and explained that, regarding the EET and endurance being the same, the actual flight time would be less than that on the plan. The flight plan office filed the flight plan at about 20:30hrs but sent a report to the DGAC regional office giving details of the incident, stating that under the regulations the office was not empowered to reject the submission.



The GRIAA annotated:



A team of investigators carried out a visit to the DGAC facilities in Bolivia in order to gathering information about the Operator and Regulations. The DGAC of Bolivia and the Prosecutors in La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz contributed and provided all the support to verify the Operators documents; however, the AASANA institution, did not provide any information, related to the air navigation services and interviews.



...



The evidence available to the investigation at the time of issue of this preliminary report has not identified a technical failure that may have caused or contributed to the accident. The available evidence is however consistent with the aircraft having suffered fuel exhaustion.



Point of first impact (Photo: GRIAA):





Main wreckage site (Photo: GRIAA):





Trajectory of last minutes based on FDR (Graphics: GRIAA):







On Dec 28th 2016 Colombia's GRIAA released their preliminary report The GRIAA reported that the aircraft positioned from Cochabamba to Santa Cruz landing in Santa Cruz at 17:58Z. The captain (36, ATPL, 6,692 hours total, 3,417 hours on type) occupied the left hand seat, the first officer (47, ATPL, 6,923 hours total, 1,474 hours on type) occupied the right hand seat, a private pilot occupied the observer's seat. In addition there were two cabin crew, 72 passengers (including an engineer and a dispatcher from the operator) boarded in Santa Cruz.According to witness information the aircraft departed Santa Cruz with the maximum fuel load of 9300kg possible at 22:18Z. Some of the crew thought the aircraft would refuel enroute at Cobija (Bolivia). On the day of the accident Cobija, that operates only during daylight, closed at 22:48Z however.The GRIAA wrote: "During the cruise, the CVR recorded various crew conversations about the fuel state of the aircraft and they could be heard carrying out fuel calculations. At 00:42:18hrs one of the pilots could be heard to say that they would divert to Bogota (ICAO: SKBO) to refuel but at 00:52:24hrs a further conversation took place, shortly after the aircraft was transferred to Colombian ATC, with the crew deciding to continue to Rionegro (ICAO: SKRG). At 01:03:01hrs the crew began their brief for the approach to Jose Maria Cordoba Airport, Rionegro."The cockpit voice recorder ceased recording at 01:15:03Z, 1:40:45 hours prior to the end of FDR recording.At 02:30:30z the aircraft was about 75nm south of Rionegro Airport and began their descent. At 02:40Z the aircraft was handed to RioNegro Approach and was instructed to descend to FL230 and enter the hold at RNG VOR, at 02:42Z the aircraft was instructed to descend to FL210. The crew requested to hold at GEMLI RNAV waypoint, which was approved. The aircraft passed GEMLI at 02:43:39z the first time and flew two racetracks (each 24nm).The GRIAA wrote: "At this time there were three other aircraft holding at the Rio Negro VOR, at FL190, 18,000ft and 17,000ft. There was also an aircraft diverting into Rionegro with a reported fuel leak, about to commence its final approach to Runway 01 at Rionegro (SKRG). At 02:43:52hrs the aircraft was levelled off at FL210, the flaps lowered to FLAP18 and the speed reduced to 180 kt CAS. At 02:45:03hrs the crew informed ATC that they had entered the hold at GEMLI at FL210."At 02:49:11z the crew radioed: "Two one zero inbound request priority for the approach, a fuel problem has occurred." The controller queried the transmission, which was confirmed, then the controller radioed: "Standby, I will give you vectors to proceed to the localiser and do the approach. Estimate seven minutes for approach."At 02:52Z the crew queried when to expect the vectors for the approach, the controller replied at 02:52:18z: "Standby I have an aircraft below you on the approach and in addition they are doing a runway check. How long can you remain on the approach?", the crew radioed: "With fuel emergency Miss that why I request final course" and at 02:52:45Z "And request immediate descent, Lima Mike India two nine three three".The Controller now cancelled the approach clearance for LA-3020 and queried whether LMI-2933 could turn right to start the descent, there was traffic one mile ahead below. The crew replied the traffic was in sight and immediately commenced their descent. The controller insisted on the turn right, the crew replied: "Negative Miss. We’re now starting descent and we are going to the localiser."At 02:54:19Z the crew reported with reference to the conflicting traffic: "Identified in TCAS and we have it above us and we are in final course".The GRIAA wrote: "At 02:54:47 hrs the Number 3 and Number 4 engine low oil pressure states were recorded on the FDR together with a MASTER WARNING. At the same time, over a 12 second period, the Number 1 engine N12 reduced from 39.5% to 29.0% and recovered. At 02:55:04hrs the Number 2 engine speed no longer matched the thrust lever demand and began to run down."At 02:55:06z the crew received approach clearance and was reminded to pass over the VOR at 10,000 feet.The GRIAA wrote: "At 02:55:27hrs the Number 2 engine low oil pressure state and a MASTER WARNING were recorded on the FDR. At 02:55:41hrs the Number 1 engine began to run down Following the loss of all engines, at 02:55:48hrs the FDR ceased recording. At this time the FDR data showed that the aircraft was at a CAS of 115 kt, a ground speed of 142 kt and a pressure altitude of 15,934 ft msl. The aircraft was 15.5 nm to the south of the threshold of Rionegro Runway 01 and 5.4 nm south of the accident site (which was at an elevation of about 8,500 ft amsl). Radar recording report indicates Mode C lost at 02:55:52hrs at which time there was only a primary radar contact for the aircraft."At 02:57:10z the crew radioed: "Miss, Lima Mike India 2933 is in total failure, total electrical failure and without fuel."Of the 77 occupants of the aircraft 71 perished in the impact, 4 received serious injuries, one crew member and a passenger survived with minor injuries.The GRIAA located the position of first impact at GPS coordinates "N05°58'43.56 W075°25'7.86" (N5.9787 W75.4189). At that point the tail unit of the aircraft including rudder, elevators was found, the tail unit had detached from the aircraft at the pressure bulkhead frame. The airbrakes remained attached to the tail unit by its wiring. Engines #1 and #4 were found at the point of first impact, too, engines #2 and #3 were found at the main wreckage site.The GRIAA wrote: "The state of the engines examined was consistent with these engines not being under power at the time of impact."The GRIAA located the main wreckage site at GPS coordinates "N05°58.725 W75◦25.138" (N5.9787 W75.4190) about 140m from the point of first impact.The GRIAA wrote: "The starboard wing fuel tank had been split open during the accident sequence. With the exception of slight fuel odour in the immediate vicinity of the fuel tanks, there was no apparent evidence of fuel anywhere on the crash site." There was no evidence of fire.The GRIAA wrote with respect to fuel planning:The GRIAA reported that no loadsheet was recovered from the wreckage nor was any copy obtainable through other sources. Estimating the checked baggage at 488kg (as measured after recovery from the wreckage site) the GRIAA estimated the minimum takeoff weight at 41,610kg. Measurements of the baggage during the flight from Sao Paulo to Santa Cruz showed the baggage at 1026kg, which increased the minimum takeoff weight to 42,148kg (MTOW 41,800kg according to AOM).With respect to the filed flight plan the GRIAA wrote:The GRIAA annotated:Point of first impact (Photo: GRIAA):Main wreckage site (Photo: GRIAA):Trajectory of last minutes based on FDR (Graphics: GRIAA): By Simon Hradecky, created Tuesday, Nov 29th 2016 06:15Z, last updated Wednesday, Dec 28th 2016 11:48Z



Search, Rescue and Recovery



Colombia's Air Force have deployed search and rescue forces, the crash site located between La Ceja and Medellin was only accessible by land, helicopters can not operate due to low visibility due to fog.



National Police reported 6 survivors.



Emergency services reported the aircraft did not catch fire increasing the chances of survivors. There may be up to 10 survivors.



Two players were already in hospital care in La Ceja.



Colombian Authorities reported the search and rescue was suspended over night, 5 survivors and 25 fatalities have been recovered so far. One of the initial 6 survivors died in hospital. No further survivors have been located, 76 occupants lost their lives in the crash.



Late Nov 29th 2016 Colombian Authorities, the government of Antioquia, corrected the passenger manifest reporting, that only 77 people were on board, not 81 as initially indicated. According to the boarding list 4 people listed on the passenger manifest did not travel. Six people survived, 71 people died in the crash, a seventh survivor later succumbed to his injuries. All 71 bodies have been recovered, the bodies are now being identified, it is estimated that the identification carried out by 12 teams is completed by Friday. Preparations have begun in consultation with Brazilian officials to return the victims home to Brazil.



Investigation



Colombia's Civil Aviation Authority (CCAA) confirmed flight LMI-2933 arriving from Bolivia crashed in the municipality of El Ceja. CAA staff including the director of the CAA have been dispatched to Medellin's Rio Negro Airport and have established a command post to address the situation. The aircraft had requested a priority landing, subsequently contact with the aircraft was lost.



In the early morning hours of Nov 29th 2016 the CCAA reported, that an investigation has been opened into the crash, data and information are being collected. The head of investigation stated: "No existe evidencia de combustible en la aeronave" (there is no evidence of fuel in the aircraft).



On Nov 29th 2016 the British AAIB reported that CCAA requested the assistance by the AAIB and BAe for the investigation into the crash, that occurred about 13nm south of Medellin Airport. The AAIB is dispatching three investigators specialised in operations, engineering and flight data recorders to Colombia, the investigators will be assisted by representatives from the UK manufacturer. The team is estimated to reach Colombia on Nov 30th.



In the afternoon of Nov 29th 2016 the CCAA reported that both cockpit voice and flight data recorder have been recovered describing both boxes in "perfect condition".



On Dec 1st 2016 Bolivia's Directorate General de Aeronautica Civil (DGCA) announced, that the Air Operator's Certificate (AOC) of LAMIA Bolivia has been suspended with immediate effect.



Late Dec 1st 2016 Bolivia's Ministry of Public Services expressed their condolences to the families of those affected and announced, that:



1) the AOC of Lamia was suspended

2) an investigation has been opened into the circumstances of how LAMIA received their AOC

3) a specific investigation has been opened into the capital of the airline

4) The executive staff of DGAC (Bolivia's Civil Aviation Authority) and AASANA ( Administración de Aeropuertos y Servicios Auxliares a la Navegación Aérea, Administration of Airports and Air Navigation Services) have been changed during the investigation

5) Conduct an internal investigation into AASANA related to all events concerning administrative and operational permits

6) Coordinate with the Transparency Unit of the Ministry, the senate and the house regarding the accident



In addition the Ministry of Public Services is conducting an investigation into the details of the events that occurred, the government will take all appropriate actions once the investigation determined responsibilities with the operational and technical area.



On Dec 26th 2016 Colombia's Aerocivil introduced their preliminary report in a press conference (the preliminary report itself was not released) stating, that the aircraft did not show any technical fault, there was no sabotage or suicide attempt. The evidence revealed the aircraft suffered fuel exhaustion. The crew was aware of their fuel status and considered fuel stops in Leticia (Colombia) and Bogota (Colombia), however did not decide to perform such stops. The aircraft was operated at a takeoff weight of 42,148 kg, maximum takeoff weight permitted 41,800 kg, this takeoff weight was not a factor into the accident however. According to cockpit voice recordings the first officer and observer repeatedly calculated the fuel and considered a fuel stop in Leticia but did not follow up as they did not know whether the airport was open. The aircraft features a system that activates an alarm if the fuel remaining was no longer sufficient for more than 20 minutes of flight, however, this system did not activate. 10 minutes prior to impact the crew requested priority for landing and selected the first stage of flaps. The aircraft began to turn and descend without ATC clearance causing separation problems with the other aircraft in the hold. 6 minutes prior to impact engine #3 is the first to flame out, 5 minutes prior to impact the crew selected the next stage of flaps and selected the landing gear down, the crew advised ATC ground services were not needed. Engine #2 fails. 3:45 minutes prior to impact all engines had flamed out, the aircraft was without power, the APU also failed due to lack of fuel. 2 minutes prior to impact the crew declared emergency reporting total power failure. The aircraft impacted Cerro Gordo at a speed of 230km/h (124 knots) below 9000 feet when they needed to be above 10,000 feet to safely cross the mountain.



Statements and Data



In a press release the Airport of Medellin reported further, that the aircraft had declared emergency with Medellin's Control Tower at 22:00L reporting electrical problems.



The last transponder data were received from the aircraft at 02:56Z as the aircraft descended through FL155 about 11nm southsoutheast of Medellin's Rio Negro Airport.



According to ATC recordings the crew reported about their predicament: "Señorita Lamia 933 está en falla total, falla eléctrica total, sin combustible", translated, "Ma'am, Lamia 933, total failure, total electrical failure, no fuel".



A VivaColombia Airbus A320-200 registration HK-5051 performing flight FC-8170 from Bogota to San Andres Island (Colombia) was enroute at FL360 about 150nm northwest of Medellin at 02:11Z when the crew initiated a diversion to Medellin, turned around and descended to FL160 on the way to Medellin. The aircraft reached the Final Approach Fix for the approach to runway 01 at 02:45Z and touched down safely at 02:51Z.



CP-2933 was enroute at FL300 and started the descent towards Medellin about 80nm south of Medellin at 02:34Z. The aircraft descended to FL210 and entered a holding pattern south of La Ceja at 02:48Z, joined the approach at 02:54Z descending through FL190 and disappeared from radar at 02:56Z descending through FL155.



On Nov 30th 2016 the crew of Avianca Airbus A320-200 registration N411AV performing flight AV-9771 from Cartagena (Colombia) to Medellin reported they were arriving at Medellin at about the same time the VivaColombia Airbus A320 diverted to Medellin with priority due to a suspected fuel leak and the LAMIA aircraft arrived at Medellin. They (Avianca) and the LAMIA were sent into holds while the VivaColombia received priority to land in Medellin. The LAMIA crew, told to be number 3 for the approach, queried about the estimated delay, then transmitted they were commencing the approach due to problems with the fuel, then declared Mayday due to electrical failure and contact was lost.



Fuel Computations



A dispatcher at a large airline together with input from The Aviation Herald computed various flight plan possibilities with respect to distances and fuel needed according to Bolivia's law. During the accident flight the enroute winds averaged at a headwind component of 4 knots.



In summary it can be said, that flights from Santa Cruz (VVI) to Medellin (MDE) or Bogota (BOG) could not have been planned legally, even if the aircraft was equipped with pannier tanks. Even in optimistic computations the computed trip fuel alone, without any taxi, contingency, diversion or reserve fuel, would have exceeded the standard fuel tank capacity (9362kg).



The dispatcher computed three different flight plans, see in detail at the



Santa Cruz-Medellin Alternate Bogota with no payload: Trip Fuel 8,660kg, Release Fuel 11,838kg

Santa Cruz-Medellin Alternate Bogota optimistic weights: Trip Fuel 9,380kg, Release Fuel 12,461kg

Santa Cruz-Bogota Alternate Medellin optimistic weights: Trip Fuel 9,260kg, Release Fuel 12,578kg



Fuel Stop Possibilities



Along the route following possibilities were checked with respect of a possible fuel stop (rounded Great Circle distances used for first leg to fuel stop and second leg to Medellin):



- Cobija (Bolivia, SLCO, 500nm+1100nm): operating from sunrise to sunset only, not open anymore at estimated time of arrival

- Tabatinga (Brazil, SBTT, 900nm+700nm): Brazil did not permit flights from Brazil to Colombia for the Bolivia registered operator, in addition the aerodrome and fuel facilities would have been closed after 23:00Z

- Leticia (Colombia, SKLT, 900nm+700nm): The airport would be open 24/7, fuel services however officially only available until 00:30Z, too tight for estimated arrival

- Bogota (Colombia, SKBO, 1500nm+100nm): as seen above not legally possible



Summary: provided an arrangement with the fuel services in Leticia could have been reached, so that refuelling would have been possible after usual service hours, Leticia would have been an ideal fuel stop.



General



The aircraft was carrying the Brazilian soccer team of Chapecoense to play the finals of Copa Sudamericana 2016 in Medellin. The finals were cancelled as result of the crash. The opponent's team Atletico Nacional Medellin suggested the title should be awarded to Chapecoense.



On Dec 6th 2016 (European Time) South America's Soccer Association Conmebol announced, that Chapecoense have been pronounced winner of the Copa Sudamericana 2016 following the request by Atletico Nacional Medellin. In addition Atletico National Medellin have been awarded for this their extraordinary fair play.



Rionegro Airport is at an elevation of 2141 meters/7025 feet. The VOR Rio Negro RNG is located on top of Cerro Gordo at an elevation of 2642 meters/8669 feet.



Metars Rio Negro Airport:

SKRG 290600Z 02003KT 9999 BKN015 BKN080 15/15 A3022 REDZ

SKRG 290500Z 04003KT 8000 -DZ BKN015 BKN080 16/15 A3024

SKRG 290400Z 00000KT 8000 DZ BKN015TCU SCT080 16/15 A3024 RMK RERA

SKRG 290300Z VRB02KT 9999 -DZ BKN015 SCT080 17/16 A3025

SKRG 290200Z 00000KT 9999 BKN015 SCT200 17/16 A3023

SKRG 290100Z 01003KT 9999 SCT017 SCT200 17/16 A3020

SKRG 290000Z 06003KT 9999 SCT017 SCT200 17/16 A3019

SKRG 282300Z 08005KT 9999 VCSH SCT017TCU SCT200 18/16 A3017 RMK TCU VCSH/SW/W



Aerial Video circling the crash site (Video: Jose Luis Osorio Ortega):

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sJSF6Z3h5Ow



Aerial Images of crash site, right image point of first impact, two left images main wreckage (Photos: Jose Luis Osorio Ortega):





One of the engines (Photo: CCAA):





Main wreckage (Photo: AP/Luis Benavides):





First daylight impressions from the crash site (Photos: Telemedellin):













First impressions at the crash site:





Detail Map (Graphics: AVH/Google Earth):





Map (Graphics: AVH/Google Earth):





ILS runway 01 Approach Chart (Graphics: AIP Colombia):









A LAMIA Bolivia Avro RJ-85, registration CP-2933 performing flight LMI-2933 from Santa Cruz (Bolivia) to Medellin (Colombia) with 68 passengers and 9 crew, was descending towards Medellin about 15-20nm southeast of Medellin in the area of La Ceja (Colombia) at 21:56L (02:56Z Nov 29th) when the aircraft disappeared from radar screens. The Airport of Medellin reported a search was initiated and the crash site has been located in the municipality of La Ceja at the slopes of Cerro Gordo (main wreckage location N5.9789 W75.4189 190m southsouthwest of the VOR RNG on the north slope of a hilltop, point of first impact at N5.9779 W75.4183 on the southern edge of the hilltop about 290m south of the VOR RNG). Authorities confirmed 6 survivors (3 players, one flight attendant, one mechanics and one journalist) and 71 fatalities.Colombia's Air Force have deployed search and rescue forces, the crash site located between La Ceja and Medellin was only accessible by land, helicopters can not operate due to low visibility due to fog.National Police reported 6 survivors.Emergency services reported the aircraft did not catch fire increasing the chances of survivors. There may be up to 10 survivors.Two players were already in hospital care in La Ceja.Colombian Authorities reported the search and rescue was suspended over night, 5 survivors and 25 fatalities have been recovered so far. One of the initial 6 survivors died in hospital. No further survivors have been located, 76 occupants lost their lives in the crash.Late Nov 29th 2016 Colombian Authorities, the government of Antioquia, corrected the passenger manifest reporting, that only 77 people were on board, not 81 as initially indicated. According to the boarding list 4 people listed on the passenger manifest did not travel. Six people survived, 71 people died in the crash, a seventh survivor later succumbed to his injuries. All 71 bodies have been recovered, the bodies are now being identified, it is estimated that the identification carried out by 12 teams is completed by Friday. Preparations have begun in consultation with Brazilian officials to return the victims home to Brazil.Colombia's Civil Aviation Authority (CCAA) confirmed flight LMI-2933 arriving from Bolivia crashed in the municipality of El Ceja. CAA staff including the director of the CAA have been dispatched to Medellin's Rio Negro Airport and have established a command post to address the situation. The aircraft had requested a priority landing, subsequently contact with the aircraft was lost.In the early morning hours of Nov 29th 2016 the CCAA reported, that an investigation has been opened into the crash, data and information are being collected. The head of investigation stated: "No existe evidencia de combustible en la aeronave" (there is no evidence of fuel in the aircraft).On Nov 29th 2016 the British AAIB reported that CCAA requested the assistance by the AAIB and BAe for the investigation into the crash, that occurred about 13nm south of Medellin Airport. The AAIB is dispatching three investigators specialised in operations, engineering and flight data recorders to Colombia, the investigators will be assisted by representatives from the UK manufacturer. The team is estimated to reach Colombia on Nov 30th.In the afternoon of Nov 29th 2016 the CCAA reported that both cockpit voice and flight data recorder have been recovered describing both boxes in "perfect condition".On Dec 1st 2016 Bolivia's Directorate General de Aeronautica Civil (DGCA) announced, that the Air Operator's Certificate (AOC) of LAMIA Bolivia has been suspended with immediate effect.Late Dec 1st 2016 Bolivia's Ministry of Public Services expressed their condolences to the families of those affected and announced, that:1) the AOC of Lamia was suspended2) an investigation has been opened into the circumstances of how LAMIA received their AOC3) a specific investigation has been opened into the capital of the airline4) The executive staff of DGAC (Bolivia's Civil Aviation Authority) and AASANA ( Administración de Aeropuertos y Servicios Auxliares a la Navegación Aérea, Administration of Airports and Air Navigation Services) have been changed during the investigation5) Conduct an internal investigation into AASANA related to all events concerning administrative and operational permits6) Coordinate with the Transparency Unit of the Ministry, the senate and the house regarding the accidentIn addition the Ministry of Public Services is conducting an investigation into the details of the events that occurred, the government will take all appropriate actions once the investigation determined responsibilities with the operational and technical area.On Dec 26th 2016 Colombia's Aerocivil introduced their preliminary report in a press conference (the preliminary report itself was not released) stating, that the aircraft did not show any technical fault, there was no sabotage or suicide attempt. The evidence revealed the aircraft suffered fuel exhaustion. The crew was aware of their fuel status and considered fuel stops in Leticia (Colombia) and Bogota (Colombia), however did not decide to perform such stops. The aircraft was operated at a takeoff weight of 42,148 kg, maximum takeoff weight permitted 41,800 kg, this takeoff weight was not a factor into the accident however. According to cockpit voice recordings the first officer and observer repeatedly calculated the fuel and considered a fuel stop in Leticia but did not follow up as they did not know whether the airport was open. The aircraft features a system that activates an alarm if the fuel remaining was no longer sufficient for more than 20 minutes of flight, however, this system did not activate. 10 minutes prior to impact the crew requested priority for landing and selected the first stage of flaps. The aircraft began to turn and descend without ATC clearance causing separation problems with the other aircraft in the hold. 6 minutes prior to impact engine #3 is the first to flame out, 5 minutes prior to impact the crew selected the next stage of flaps and selected the landing gear down, the crew advised ATC ground services were not needed. Engine #2 fails. 3:45 minutes prior to impact all engines had flamed out, the aircraft was without power, the APU also failed due to lack of fuel. 2 minutes prior to impact the crew declared emergency reporting total power failure. The aircraft impacted Cerro Gordo at a speed of 230km/h (124 knots) below 9000 feet when they needed to be above 10,000 feet to safely cross the mountain.In a press release the Airport of Medellin reported further, that the aircraft had declared emergency with Medellin's Control Tower at 22:00L reporting electrical problems.The last transponder data were received from the aircraft at 02:56Z as the aircraft descended through FL155 about 11nm southsoutheast of Medellin's Rio Negro Airport.According to ATC recordings the crew reported about their predicament: "Señorita Lamia 933 está en falla total, falla eléctrica total, sin combustible", translated, "Ma'am, Lamia 933, total failure, total electrical failure, no fuel".A VivaColombia Airbus A320-200 registration HK-5051 performing flight FC-8170 from Bogota to San Andres Island (Colombia) was enroute at FL360 about 150nm northwest of Medellin at 02:11Z when the crew initiated a diversion to Medellin, turned around and descended to FL160 on the way to Medellin. The aircraft reached the Final Approach Fix for the approach to runway 01 at 02:45Z and touched down safely at 02:51Z.CP-2933 was enroute at FL300 and started the descent towards Medellin about 80nm south of Medellin at 02:34Z. The aircraft descended to FL210 and entered a holding pattern south of La Ceja at 02:48Z, joined the approach at 02:54Z descending through FL190 and disappeared from radar at 02:56Z descending through FL155.On Nov 30th 2016 the crew of Avianca Airbus A320-200 registration N411AV performing flight AV-9771 from Cartagena (Colombia) to Medellin reported they were arriving at Medellin at about the same time the VivaColombia Airbus A320 diverted to Medellin with priority due to a suspected fuel leak and the LAMIA aircraft arrived at Medellin. They (Avianca) and the LAMIA were sent into holds while the VivaColombia received priority to land in Medellin. The LAMIA crew, told to be number 3 for the approach, queried about the estimated delay, then transmitted they were commencing the approach due to problems with the fuel, then declared Mayday due to electrical failure and contact was lost.A dispatcher at a large airline together with input from The Aviation Herald computed various flight plan possibilities with respect to distances and fuel needed according to Bolivia's law. During the accident flight the enroute winds averaged at a headwind component of 4 knots.In summary it can be said, that flights from Santa Cruz (VVI) to Medellin (MDE) or Bogota (BOG) could not have been planned legally, even if the aircraft was equipped with pannier tanks. Even in optimistic computations the computed trip fuel alone, without any taxi, contingency, diversion or reserve fuel, would have exceeded the standard fuel tank capacity (9362kg).The dispatcher computed three different flight plans, see in detail at the PDF Santa Cruz-Medellin Alternate Bogota with no payload: Trip Fuel 8,660kg, Release Fuel 11,838kgSanta Cruz-Medellin Alternate Bogota optimistic weights: Trip Fuel 9,380kg, Release Fuel 12,461kgSanta Cruz-Bogota Alternate Medellin optimistic weights: Trip Fuel 9,260kg, Release Fuel 12,578kgAlong the route following possibilities were checked with respect of a possible fuel stop (rounded Great Circle distances used for first leg to fuel stop and second leg to Medellin):- Cobija (Bolivia, SLCO, 500nm+1100nm): operating from sunrise to sunset only, not open anymore at estimated time of arrival- Tabatinga (Brazil, SBTT, 900nm+700nm): Brazil did not permit flights from Brazil to Colombia for the Bolivia registered operator, in addition the aerodrome and fuel facilities would have been closed after 23:00Z- Leticia (Colombia, SKLT, 900nm+700nm): The airport would be open 24/7, fuel services however officially only available until 00:30Z, too tight for estimated arrival- Bogota (Colombia, SKBO, 1500nm+100nm): as seen above not legally possibleSummary: provided an arrangement with the fuel services in Leticia could have been reached, so that refuelling would have been possible after usual service hours, Leticia would have been an ideal fuel stop.The aircraft was carrying the Brazilian soccer team of Chapecoense to play the finals of Copa Sudamericana 2016 in Medellin. The finals were cancelled as result of the crash. The opponent's team Atletico Nacional Medellin suggested the title should be awarded to Chapecoense.On Dec 6th 2016 (European Time) South America's Soccer Association Conmebol announced, that Chapecoense have been pronounced winner of the Copa Sudamericana 2016 following the request by Atletico Nacional Medellin. In addition Atletico National Medellin have been awarded for this their extraordinary fair play.Rionegro Airport is at an elevation of 2141 meters/7025 feet. The VOR Rio Negro RNG is located on top of Cerro Gordo at an elevation of 2642 meters/8669 feet.Metars Rio Negro Airport:SKRG 290600Z 02003KT 9999 BKN015 BKN080 15/15 A3022 REDZSKRG 290500Z 04003KT 8000 -DZ BKN015 BKN080 16/15 A3024SKRG 290400Z 00000KT 8000 DZ BKN015TCU SCT080 16/15 A3024 RMK RERASKRG 290200Z 00000KT 9999 BKN015 SCT200 17/16 A3023SKRG 290100Z 01003KT 9999 SCT017 SCT200 17/16 A3020SKRG 290000Z 06003KT 9999 SCT017 SCT200 17/16 A3019SKRG 282300Z 08005KT 9999 VCSH SCT017TCU SCT200 18/16 A3017 RMK TCU VCSH/SW/WAerial Video circling the crash site (Video: Jose Luis Osorio Ortega):Aerial Images of crash site, right image point of first impact, two left images main wreckage (Photos: Jose Luis Osorio Ortega):One of the engines (Photo: CCAA):Main wreckage (Photo: AP/Luis Benavides):First daylight impressions from the crash site (Photos: Telemedellin):First impressions at the crash site:Detail Map (Graphics: AVH/Google Earth):Map (Graphics: AVH/Google Earth):ILS runway 01 Approach Chart (Graphics: AIP Colombia):

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Add your comment: (max 1024 characters) Your Name: Your Email: Subject: Your comment: The Aviation Herald Apps

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Interview: The human factor named "Simon Hradecky" and the team of man and machine Get the news right onto your desktop when they happen © 2008-2019 by The Aviation Herald, all rights reserved, reprint and republishing prohibited. We use cookies to ensure you get the best experience on our site, learn more</s>The 2016 plane crash that nearly wiped out an entire Brazilian football team was caused by a lack of fuel, Colombia’s civil aviation authority said Friday, following an extensive investigation into the disaster.

It blamed the shortage of fuel on mismanagement by LaMia Airlines, a now-defunct Bolivian charter firm that specialized in flying Latin American football clubs.

The probe was launched after the tragic crash in the Colombian mountains in November 2016, which claimed the lives of 71 people, including all but a handful of players from the Chapecoense team, from southern Brazil.

The tragedy cut short the club’s fairy tale rise from obscurity to the finals of the regional Copa Sudamericana tournament, in which they were to face Atletico Nacional of Medellin.

The accident “was caused by the plane’s empty fuel tank as a result of inappropriate risk management by LaMia,” said Miguel Camacho, who heads the authority’s accident investigation branch.

Investigators from Bolivia, Brazil and Colombia had been probing the cause of the crash, with Friday’s report confirming what had been a leading theory after a recording emerged in which the pilot radioed the control tower to report a fuel emergency.

Following a preliminary investigation a month after the crash, the Colombian aviation authority said it believed the airline had disregarded international rules on fuel reserves.

In its report Friday, the aviation authority said it had found sufficient “evidential and technical support” to corroborate that theory.

“The aircraft was carrying 9,073 kilograms of fuel, which was insufficient to fly” between Santa Cruz, Bolivia and its final destination, the international airport in Rionegro outside Medellin.

“It did not meet the minimum fuel standard for an international flight,” he said.

The probe, which also involved investigators from Brazil, Bolivia, Britain and the United States, said the airline was in “a precarious financial situation” and that it was also not the first time it had allowed planes to fly “with critically low supplies of fuel.”

It also suggested that the pilots were aware of the fuel emergency for some time before contacting air traffic controllers in Colombia, who were exonerated of any responsibility for the crash.

Forty minutes before the accident, “there was an indication in the cabin about the low fuel level and from that moment, the plane was already in an emergency,” Camacho said.

However, “the crew did not inform air traffic control about this emergency to request priority” landing, he said, without suggesting why.

As well as lacking fuel, the plane was also overweight by about 500 kilograms (1,100 pounds).

“In light of the factors which contributed to causing this tragic accident, there were latent shortcomings on the part of LaMia relating to a failure to comply with fuel policies, a lack of supervision and operational control,” the civil aviation authority said in a statement.

Shortly after the crash, Bolivia suspended LaMia’s permit to operate, effectively shutting it down.</s>The 2016 plane crash that wiped out a Brazilian football team was caused by a lack of fuel, Colombia's aviation authority said Friday following an extensive investigation into the disaster.

The probe was launched after the November 28 crash which claimed the lives of 71 people, including all but a handful of players from Brazil's Chapecoense Real football club.

The accident "was caused by the plane's empty fuel tank as a result of inappropriate risk management by LaMia (Airlines)," said Miguel Camacho, who heads the authority's accident investigation branch.

LaMia Airlines is a Bolivian-registered charter company that specializes in flying Latin American football clubs.

Investigators from Bolivia, Brazil and Colombia had been looking into what caused the crash, with Friday's report confirming what had been one of the leading theories after a recording emerged in which the pilot radioed the control tower to report a fuel emergency.

Following a preliminary investigation a month after the crash, the Colombian aviation authority said it believed the airline had disregarded international rules on fuel reserves.

In its report Friday, the aviation authority said it had found sufficient "evidential and technical support" to corroborate that theory.

Chapecoense had been enjoying a fairy tale season and were en route to the biggest match in their history, which they were tipped to win, when the plane went down, crashing into the Colombian mountains not far from the city of Medellin.

Of the 77 people onboard, only six people survived, three of them Chapecoense players.

Also killed were 20 Brazilian journalists who were traveling with the team to cover the match.</s>The 2016 plane crash that wiped out a Brazilian football team Chapecoense was caused by a lack of fuel, Colombia’s aviation authority said Friday following an extensive investigation into the disaster.

The probe was launched after the November 28 crash which claimed the lives of 71 people, including all but a handful of players from Brazil’s Chapecoense Real football club.

The accident “was caused by the plane’s empty fuel tank as a result of inappropriate risk management by LaMia (Airlines),” said Miguel Camacho, who heads the authority’s accident investigation branch.

LaMia Airlines is a Bolivian-registered charter company that specializes in flying Latin American football clubs.

Investigators from Bolivia, Brazil and Colombia had been looking into what caused the crash, with Friday’s report confirming what had been one of the leading theories after a recording emerged in which the pilot radioed the control tower to report a fuel emergency.

Following a preliminary investigation a month after the crash, the Colombian aviation authority said it believed the airline had disregarded international rules on fuel reserves.

In its report Friday, the aviation authority said it had found sufficient “evidential and technical support” to corroborate that theory.

Chapecoense had been enjoying a fairy tale season and were en route to the biggest match in their history, which they were tipped to win, when the plane went down, crashing into the Colombian mountains not far from the city of Medellin.

Of the 77 people onboard, only six people survived, three of them Chapecoense players.

Also killed were 20 Brazilian journalists who were traveling with the team to cover the match.

The post Lack of fuel caused 2016 Brazil football team Chapecoense plane crash appeared first on Vanguard News.

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This post was syndicated from Vanguard News. Click here to read the full text on the original website.</s>Fuel shortages and negligence caused a plane crash that killed 71 people in 2016, including most members of Brazilian football team Chapecoense, Colombian authorities have concluded.

The plane crashed on Nov. 28, 2016, on a mountain in Colombia just a few miles from Medellin. On Friday, Colombia’s Civil Aviation Authority presented the findings of a 15-month inquiry.

Officials say crew members ignored a low-fuel warning when the plane was about 40 minutes from its intended destination.

Instead of making an emergency landing at a nearby airport, they headed on towards Medellin and the British Aerospace Avro RJ85 ran out of fuel.

The plane has alarms and lights that turn on that tell the crew to do something when fuel is low,” chief investigator Miguel Camacho told reporters on Friday.

The report said the plane – operated by charter company LaMia, departed Santa Cruz de La Sierra in Bolivia with insufficient fuel for the 2,972km journey.

“The crew insisted on carrying out their original flight plan, even when they realized they had a very limited amount of fuel,” the report said. “But there was no communication with air traffic control.”

The report followed a 15-month inquiry into the incident by the Colombian authorities, which worked in conjunction with counterparts in Bolivia and Brazil.

LaMia’s general manager Gustavo Vargas Gamboa was charged with manslaughter following the incident.

Criminal charges have also been brought against LaMia co-owner Marco Antonio Rocha, whose whereabouts are unknown.

The post Probe Reaveals Chapecoense Plane Crash Caused By Fuel Shortage appeared first on 360Nobs.com.

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This post was syndicated from 360Nobs.com. Click here to read the full text on the original website.</s>Fuel shortages and negligence caused a plane crash that killed 71 people in 2016, including most members of Brazilian football team Chapecoense, Colombian authorities have concluded.

The plane crashed on November 28 2016, on a mountain in Colombia just a few miles from Medellin.

Officials say crew members ignored a low-fuel warning when the plane was about 40 minutes from its intended destination.

Instead of making an emergency landing at a nearby airport, they headed on towards Medellin and the British Aerospace Avro RJ85 ran out of fuel.</s>A lack of fuel caused the 2016 crash of a charter flight carrying a Brazilian soccer team, the Colombian aviation agency said Friday during a press conference in Bogota.

The official report indicates the Bolivian company LaMia did not make the decision to land at another airport to refuel before it reached its destination, even though they were aware of the small amount of fuel needed to complete the flight.

Players, coaches and invited guests from Brazil’s Chapecoense soccer team were on board the charter flight on November 28, 2016 when it crashed. Seventy-one people were killed and six survived.

“We could say that the accident was caused by the depletion of the plane’s fuel as a result of inappropriate risk management by the LaMia company that, specifically for this flight, did not foresee the minimum amount of fuel necessary for an international flight,” Miguel Camacho, Colombia’s civil aeronautics chief, said in remarks at the press conference, according to Reuters. Camacho led the crash investigation.

LaMia Flight 2933 took off from Bolivia’s Viru Viru International Airport and headed to Rionegro, Colombia. It crashed into the side of a mountain in Colombia.

The team at the time, which rose through the ranks in Brazilian soccer, was set to play in the first leg of the South American Cup finals.</s>Fuel shortages and negligence caused a plane crash that killed 71 people in 2016, including most members of the Brazilian football team Chapecoense, Colombian authorities have concluded.

The team was on its way to Medellin in Colombia to play a South American cup final.

Friday's report from Colombia's Civil Aviation Authority capped a 17-month inquiry into the November 28 2016 crash on a mountain just a few miles from Medellin.

Officials said crew members ignored a low-fuel warning when the plane was about 40 minutes from its intended destination.

Instead of making an emergency landing at a nearby airport, they headed on towards Medellin and the British Aerospace Avro RJ85 ran out of fuel.

The flight that took the Brazilian football players to Medellin was operated by LaMia, a charter airline registered in Bolivia whose general manager was charged with manslaughter following the accident.

The airline's sole surviving owner, Marco Antonio Rocha, is also wanted for manslaughter, but is currently at large and has refused to return to Bolivia, claiming that he will not receive a fair trial.

Forensic experts had long said that the lack of an explosion at the crash site indicated the plane had run out of fuel.

On Friday, Colombian officials provided further details on the flight's last minutes, saying crew members failed to tell controllers that their plane was low on fuel.

"The plane has alarms and lights that turn on that tell the crew to do something when fuel is low," said Miguel Camacho, the chief investigator for Colombia's Civil Aviation Authority.

"But there was no communication with air traffic control.
• Chapecoense plane crash: Who are the six survivors?

Officials said the plane's crew could have requested an emergency landing at two airports that were located closer than Medellin's airport, but that would have forced the airline to pay landing fees and fines.

"The crew insisted on carrying out their original flight plan, even when they realised they had a very limited amount of fuel," the report said.

Officials said that the crew of the 90-seat passenger jet attempted to make a four-hour flight from Santa Cruz in Bolivia to Medellin with 9,300 kilograms of fuel.

Regulations stipulate that the plane would have needed to carry 11,600 kilograms of fuel to fly that distance.</s>Fuel shortages and negligence caused a plane crash that killed 71 people in 2016, including most members of the Brazilian football team Chapecoense, Colombian authorities have concluded.

The team was on its way to Medellin in Colombia to play a South American cup final.

Friday’s report from Colombia’s Civil Aviation Authority capped a 17-month inquiry into the November 28 2016 crash on a mountain just a few miles from Medellin.

Officials said crew members ignored a low-fuel warning when the plane was about 40 minutes from its intended destination.

Instead of making an emergency landing at a nearby airport, they headed on towards Medellin and the British Aerospace Avro RJ85 ran out of fuel.

The flight that took the Brazilian football players to Medellin was operated by LaMia, a charter airline registered in Bolivia whose general manager was charged with manslaughter following the accident.</s>An investigation into the plane crash in Colombia that killed all but six of the 77 people on board in 2016 has confirmed that a lack of fuel was responsible.

Forty minutes before the impact, the low fuel warning light came on "in the cabin (...), from then on, the aircraft was already in an emergency", the head of the Colombian investigation, Colonel Miguel Camacho, stated.

On board were the Brazilians football team Chapecoense and twenty journalists all headed for the Copa Sudamericana.

The small Brazilian club Chapecoense had defied all odds by qualifying for the final of the tournament.

The crew flying the LaMia airlines plane ignored the flight plan which included a refuelling stop in Bolivia.

It crashed into a hillside near Medellin on November 26th 2016.
Colombian investigators release their final report on the 2016 disaster, which killed 71 including most of the Associação Chapecoense de Futebol team. The report blames mismanagement leading to fuel exhaustion, noting the aircraft departed without adequate fuel.