Image copyright AFP Image caption A rare event: Patriarch Kirill (C) meets Bartholomew (R) and other Orthodox priests in Istanbul

Ukraine's President Petro Poroshenko says top clerics in the Orthodox Church are now ready to grant independence to the Kiev Church, defying Moscow.

If the Constantinople Patriarch, Bartholomew, grants Kiev autocephaly (independence) he will be recognising its split with the Moscow Patriarchate.

On Friday Russia's Patriarch Kirill met Bartholomew in Istanbul. They did not resolve the Kiev Church's status.

Russia sees Kiev as the historic cradle of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, a staunch ally of Patriarch Kirill, is bitterly opposed to President Poroshenko. There is a tense standoff in eastern Ukraine between Ukrainian government troops and Russian-backed rebels.

In a tweet on Monday Mr Poroshenko said Bartholomew's Ecumenical Patriarchate had "decided that, without taking account of Moscow's opinion, it can give all states the right to establish a local church.

"And first of all it is the right for Ukraine to set up a Local Congregation of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church."

Image copyright AFP Image caption President Poroshenko (R) is an ally of Metropolitan Filaret (C), head of the Kiev Patriarchate

On Facebook a spokesman for the Kiev Patriarchate said the move to grant independence was going ahead.

"The Ecumenical Patriarch explained to the Russian delegation that the decision had been taken and that the relevant procedures were under way," Archbishop Yevstratiy Zorya wrote.

What is the dispute all about?

Tensions within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church mounted after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Ukraine won independence, and with communism discredited there was a huge revival in Christian worship.

For centuries, before the Soviet period, the Russian Orthodox Church had been identified with the Russian state, allying its interests with those of the tsar.

The Russian nationalist revival under Boris Yeltsin, then under Vladimir Putin, boosted the Church's authority and determination to stay in charge of the Ukrainian churches.

Read more on related topics:

In the early Middle Ages Christianity spread to what is now Russia from Kievan Rus, which Moscow claims to have given the origin of the Russian state.

Today there are three Orthodox Church branches based in Kiev:

the Kiev Patriarchate, headed by Metropolitan Filaret, which does not recognise Moscow's authority

the Ukrainian Orthodox Church loyal to the Moscow Patriarchate

and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, founded in 1921 in defiance of Moscow and relaunched during World War Two, but repressed during Soviet rule.

The branch loyal to Kirill remains the biggest, but a formal schism could lead many of its followers to join the Kiev Patriarchate.

The Moscow Patriarchate's position is that the Ukrainian "schismatics" should repent and return to the Russian Orthodox fold.

Image copyright AFP Image caption In July Ukraine celebrated 1,030 years since Kievan Rus converted to Christianity

But there is also rivalry between Kirill's powerful Moscow Patriarchate - which has an estimated 150 million followers - and the Ecumenical Patriarchate under Bartholomew, who is seen as first among equals in the Eastern Orthodox Church.

The rivalry has been there for centuries, dating back to the Byzantine and Russian empires. Ukraine was part of the Russian empire, but many of its worshippers looked to Constantinople (later Istanbul), rather than Moscow for spiritual guidance.

Speaking after his talks in Istanbul, Patriarch Kirill said he and Patriarch Bartholomew had discussed "all the problems on the agenda" and it was "a dialogue between two brothers".

"There was nothing secret at the meeting, nothing that could sort of explode one's conscience," he said, without giving any specifics. Their talks lasted nearly three hours.</s>President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko urges the Verkhovna Rada to support his appeal to the Kyiv city council to rename Ivana Kudri Street in Kyiv After Senator John McCain Street.

Verkhovna Rada member Iryna Lutsenko from the Solidarity Bloc of Petro Poroshenko, who is the representative of the President at the parliament, announced this at a meeting of the parliamentary conciliatory council on Monday, Ukrainian News Agency reports.

As Ukrainian News Agency earlier reported, on August 26, 2018, President Petro Poroshenko expressed his condolences to the American people on the death of U.S. Republican Senator John McCain.</s>The Ecumenical Patriarchate has decided that it has every right to provide autocephaly without agreement from other churches.

President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko wrote this on Twitter, Ukrainian News Agency reports.

"The Ecumenical Patriarchate has endorsed a decision about the right of the Ecumenical Patriarch to provide all countries with the right to create local churches without taking into consideration the opinion of Moscow. This concerns Ukraine first of all and its right to create the local composite Ukrainian Orthodox Church," he wrote.

As Ukrainian News Agency earlier reported, on September 1, 2018, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate denied that Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I had informed Patriarch Kirill of Moscow about the decision to provide autocephaly to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.</s>The Universal Patriarch of the Orthodox Church, Bartholemew I, has decided to grant autocephaly to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, according to a Greek church site, giving a major victory to Kyiv and inflicting an even larger geopolitical defeat on the Moscow Patriarchate and the Kremlin.

Archbishop Yevstraty Zorya, the press secretary of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate, citing the Greek outlet Orthodoxia.info, says that Bartholemew informed Moscow Patriarch Kirill about his decision during the latter’s recent visit to Constantinople (nv.ua/ukraine/events/varfolomej-proinformiroval-hlavu-rpts-o-svoem-reshenii-otnositelno-avtokefalii-est-osnovanija-dlja-sderzhannoho-optimizma-upk-kp-2491600.html).

Yevstraty added that the headline in the Greek source could be translated as “The Die is Cast! Ukraine is Receiving Autocephaly.” He said that Patriarch Kirill left his meeting with Bartholemew “in not the best spirit.” But Ukrainians are celebrating what will be a major victory for them.

A spokesman for the Universal Patriarch told Orthodoxia.info that “no one wants yet another split,” something Moscow has threatened if Constantinople proceeded. “Everyone wants unity in the Church.” But he added the Universal Patriarchate won’t be guided in its action by “threats from anyone,” a clear rebuff to Moscow.

According to the spokesman, the Universal Patriarch took the decision about offering autocephaly to the Ukrainian Church in April and is now in the process of implementing it. And in the months since, Constantinople has signaled that it intends to meet Ukraine’s request although it has not provided a specific date.

It is important to recognize what the grant of autocephaly in Ukraine will and won’t do. It will elevate the status of the Ukrainian church and underscore its separation from Moscow, but it won’t end the existence of the Moscow Patriarchate’s network of churches in Ukraine, although it will undoubtedly cause many of them to shift their subordination to Kyiv.

Most important, it will undermine the Moscow Patriarchate’s claim to speak for all Orthodox on the former Soviet space and cost the church itself a great deal of its income given that half of its existing congregations are in Ukraine rather than in Moscow. And it will call into question Moscow’s claim to be the largest Orthodox church in the world.

Obviously, Moscow both religious and secular isn’t going to accept this without a fight. But the decision of the Universal Patriarch means that Ukraine has won a major victory, one that it is likely to build on in the future and one that may serve as a model for other post-Soviet states as far as Orthodoxy is concerned.</s>(Bloomberg Opinion) -- Ukraine can't reclaim territory annexed by Russia or held by its proxies – but it's increasingly likely to deprive its larger neighbor of something arguably as valuable: Its power over Ukraine’s Orthodox Christian believers, and with it Moscow’s claim to a central role in eastern Christianity.

Gatherings of top clerics affiliated with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople aren’t usually of political interest. Patriarch Bartholomew I, the distant heir of the heads of the Byzantine church, isn’t the Eastern Orthodox equivalent of the Pope. As first among equals, he plays a symbolic rather than an organizational role.

On Monday, however, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko tweeted excitedly about a decision made at such a gathering in Istanbul. The group confirmed Patriarch Bartholomew’s power to recognize the autocephaly of local churches -– that is, the right of their top bishop to report to no higher authority except God.

The only reason the patriarch needs such a confirmation is to allow him to grant autocephaly to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. If that happens, it will be a tectonic shift.

The Moscow Patriarchate has been in charge of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church since the 17th century. When Filaret, the Mitropolitan of Kiev, lost the political struggle for the post of Moscow Patriarch in 1992, he split off part of the Ukrainian church to align with a newly independent Ukraine.

Moscow fought the schism; Filaret was maligned in the Russian media and eventually excommunicated by the Moscow Patriarchate. The Ecumenical Patriarchate initially allied itself with Moscow in not recognizing an independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the way it extends recognition, for example, to the Greek, Serbian, Bulgarian and Romanian churches.

The lack of an official status prevented many orthodox priests from joining Filaret’s splinter church. Organizationally and financially, Ukraine remains extremely important to the Moscow Patriarchate.

In 2013, the year before Russia annexed Crimea, it accounted for about a third of the Patriarchate's 33,489 churches and 30,430 priests. The biggest and most venerated monastery in Kiev, the Monastery of the Caves, belongs to the Moscow Patriarchate. Filaret’s Ukrainian Orthodox Church, with some 3,500 priests, is smaller and poorer.

The numbers matter politically and ideologically. The Moscow and Constantinople Patriarchies both have imperial heritage, and Moscow would like to be considered leader of the Orthodox world. That ambition is one of the cornerstones of the neo-imperialist ideology promulgated by President Vladimir Putin, himself an ardent Orthodox believer.

Under Putin, the church has drawn closer to the state than at any time since the Revolution of 1917. No wonder the same hacker group accused in the U.S. of hacking the Democratic National Committee has recently shown much interest in Patriarch Bartholomew and his court: Ukrainian autocephaly would deal a powerful blow to Russia’s claim to spiritual leadership among eastern Christians.

Autocephaly is likely to drive many, if not most, Moscow Patriarchate priests to defect. Once the Ukrainian church gets ecclesiastical recognition, there will be no reason for the priests to remain part of an organization the government there considers as Russia's fifth column.

As for the faithful themselves, the two-thirds of Ukrainians who consider themselves Orthodox Christians have deserted the Moscow-led church in droves. Poroshenko, an active church-goer himself, has switched. One reason for that is that the Kiev church actively backed the 2014 Revolution of Dignity, and its priests were seen in the streets helping the protesters; the Moscow church has been more cautious.

Moscow Patriarch Kirill went to Istanbul late last month to meet with Bartholomew. A bishop who was present said that while no final decision was made on Ukrainian autocephaly, the process has now gone too far to reverse it. Russian clerics have warned that granting independence to the Ukrainian church could cause a global schism, but Patriarch Bartholomew recently rejected that rhetoric. “We neither threaten anyone, nor are we threatened by anyone,” he said. “We only fear God.”

A weakened Moscow Patriarchate would only strengthen Bartholomew’s position and his ability to speak on behalf of the Orthodox world. The conservative Russian church has dragged down his efforts to build bridges with the Catholic Church and personally with Pope Francis.

Church affairs shouldn’t be as politicized as the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is making them. On the other hand, Putin’s depredations in Ukraine have clearly undermined the church to which he belongs and which he has sought to strengthen both in Russia and globally. He cannot send tanks to repair this damage.

Meanwhile, the path Ukraine ends up taking depends less on territorial gains and losses than on which ideas win out in Ukrainians’ minds. And that makes the diplomatic battle for autocephaly a critical one for Poroshenko.

To contact the author of this story: Leonid Bershidsky at lbershidsky@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story: Edward Evans at eevans3@bloomberg.net

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

Leonid Bershidsky is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering European politics and business. He was the founding editor of the Russian business daily Vedomosti and founded the opinion website Slon.ru.</s>Ukraine's push for clerical independence from Russia is reaching its final stage. On August 31, Russian Patriarch Kirill personally traveled to Istanbul to visit the Patriarch of Constantinople Bartholomew, presumably to urge Bartholomew not to grant Kyiv's request.

Kirill claims authority over Orthodox believers in Ukraine. However, Orthodox Christians in that country are currently divided between a semi-autonomous branch loyal to Moscow and Kirill, and the one lead by the unrecognized Ukrainian Patriarch Filaret. The fighting in east Ukraine aggravated the dispute and prompted Kyiv lawmakers to enter the fray. Both the lawmakers and the President Petro Poroshenko have recently urged Patriarch Bartholomew of Constantinople to recognize the Kyiv branch.

To make things more complicated, Ukraine also has a third Orthodox Church, which cropped up in 1920s as a response to Soviet repression.

Who is in charge of believers in Ukraine?

Ukrainian officials hope that the patriarch of Constantinople would issue a "tomos of Autocephaly," granting the Kyiv-led church full clerical independence.

The patriarch of Constantinople is considered "first among equals" and wields traditional authority among his counterparts in other nations. He also bears the title of the "ecumenical" patriarch - meaning he represents a number of Christian churches.

Moreover, the Constantinople patriarchate boasts historical ties with Kyiv, according to German expert Johannes Oeldemann, the head of Ecumenical Institute Johann-Adam-Möhler in Paderborn.

Centuries ago, the Kyiv church was under authority of Constantinople, he told DW.

"The current dispute is about whether the church in Ukraine was definitely passed to Moscow's jurisdiction in the 17th century, or whether Constantinople is still in charge of Ukraine," Oeldemann said.

Unsurprisingly, the Moscow patriarchate believes its authority over Christians in Ukraine has been clearly established. Some of its religious figures have warned that a "tomos" from Constantinople might cause a split within the Orthodox world. However, the Moscow church leadership did not announce an official position on the issue.

The decision over Ukraine would influence long-running tensions between the two seats of religious power, Moscow and the present day Istanbul. While the Russian patriarch has less traditional authority than his colleague in Istanbul, he is also directly in charge of 150 million believers, or around one half of all Orthodox Christians in the world.

History offers an explanation for this rivalry, says Johannes Oeldemann.

"In the course of history, both of the patriarchates turned into somewhat imperialistic structures, depending either on the Russian or the Byzantine Empire, making them in charge not only of Greeks or Russians, but also other Orthodox believers living in their canonical area.

Read more: Is the Russian Orthodox Church serving God or Putin?

"This leads to tensions to this day, even as those two empires don't exist in the same form anymore," he told DW. "The churches still have ambitions to influence their territories, and there are some areas where they overlap, Ukraine being the biggest one of them."

The Constantinople patriarchate has already bumped heads with Moscow over Orthodox believers in other ex-Soviet countries like Estonia. Eventually, the two patriarchates settled on creating two parallel Orthodox hierarchies in the state.

Bartholomew wants to bridge the gap

Patriarch Bartholomew has so far proven to be very interested in church unity, according to Oeldemann, and made friendly gestures towards the Russian church. The Constantinople patriarch is also committed to building bridges with Christians outside of the Orthodox community.

"Specifically when it comes to the Roman Catholic Church, he has a close relationship with Pope Francis," says the German expert.

Read more: Pope joins Orthodox patriarch in historic prayer for unity

Still, Oeldemann says it would be tricky to negotiate an Estonian-like compromise in Ukraine, where three separate churches are vying for power.

"The question will be that – if you declare autocephaly on one church – which church will that be?" he told DW. "I don't believe any of them is a really worthy solution."

"Moscow will massively oppose making the Kyiv patriarchate autocephalous, because it is led by Patriarch Filaret, and he has been excommunicated by the Moscow Patriarchate."

On the other hand, setting up a new Ukrainian church and giving it authority would most likely just lead to new divisions, he said.

The decision on Ukrainian independence could come as early as September 2018, according to officials in Kyiv.</s>CONSTANTINOPLE (AP) — A senior official in the Orthodox Church says “there’s no going back” in granting Ukrainian clerics full ecclesiastic independence from the Russian Orthodox Church.

However, Metropolitan Emmanuel of France, who is part of a committee dealing with the Ukrainian question, told The Associated Press that the final step of the procedure has yet to be reached.

His comments came as Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I welcomed Patriarch Kirill of Moscow in Istanbul on Friday.

Ukraine’s president has launched a campaign to persuade Bartholomew, seen by many as the first among equals of Orthodox leaders, to accept Ukraine’s request.

Ukrainian politicians see a declaration, known as a “Tomos of Autocephaly,” as a key step in consolidating their country’s national identity.

Russian religious leaders see it as an attack on Orthodox unity.</s>Moscow and Kiev are locked in a religious dispute with political overtones.

On Monday, Aug. 27, the Associated Press broke the news. The Russian hacking collective Fancy Bear, known for stealing emails from the U.S. Democratic National Committee in 2016, had also been spying on the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople (also known as the Phanar) and other religious institutions, including Muslim, Jewish, and Christian targets in both Ukraine and the United States.

 These revelations, which should be assessed in the context of the active role played by the Russian Orthodox Church in pursuing the Kremlin’s agenda abroad, came less than a week ahead of Friday’s meeting between Patriarch Bartholomew I of Constantinople and Patriarch Kirill I of Moscow and all Rus’. The question of whether Constantinople would move to recognize an autocephalous, or independent, Ukrainian Orthodox Church was hanging heavily in the air. The ROC is, of course, staunchly opposed to the possible loss of its authority over Ukrainian Orthodox Christians. By Orthodox standards, Constantinople is far more “liberal” than the ROC, for example, in its promotion of sustainability and environmental responsibility. Unfortunately, many Westerners know little to nothing about the Phanar. The much larger ROC enjoys far greater visibility, and its apparent effectiveness in the pursuit of a socially conservative, “traditional values” agenda makes it an object of envy and admiration to some illiberally minded Westerners. President and CEO of the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association Franklin Graham famously met with Russian President Vladimir Putin and with Patriarch Kirill in 2015, after which the Russian patriarch declared Western Christians opposed to LGBTQ rights to be “confessors of the faith.”

In addition, the World Congress of Families, which will hold its 12th major international meeting in Chisinau, Moldova, this September 13-16, has been primarily a Russian-American project from its inception in the 1990s. Somewhat like the better known American National Prayer Breakfast, WCF serves as a vehicle through which Russian Orthodox Christians — priests and lay believers — can attempt to cultivate relationships with foreigners, who may then become more likely to vocally support Russia’s positions in international controversies, furthering the Kremlin’s goal of weakening Western democracies. Given the news about alleged Russian spy Maria Butina’s exploitation of the National Prayer Breakfast along with the news about Fancy Bear hacking religious organizations, we can start to see how the Kremlin can use the Russian Orthodox Church’s “traditional values” agenda to attract fellow travelers, and why it would value information about foreign religious groups, whether it considers them rivals or pools of potential assets. When it comes to the Phanar, the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church have long seen a rival. While there is no Orthodox pope, the Orthodox Churches recognize the Ecumenical Patriarch as “first among equals,” a status that gives Constantinople important symbolic and moral authority. The ROC, which enjoys the support of the Russian state and can claim roughly 150 million adherents, making it by far the largest of the Orthodox Churches, resents the authority of the tiny Ecumenical Patriarchate, which is struggling to survive in a Turkish state that is not entirely well disposed to it. This resentment was on display when Moscow refused to attend the Holy and Great Pan-Orthodox Council convened on Crete in June 2016, in which Constantinople played a leading role, and it is on display now as Moscow seeks to dissuade Constantinople from recognizing an autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Should Patriarch Bartholomew do so by issuing what is called a Tomos of autocephaly, this would cause the ROC to lose property, numbers, and, crucially, direct control over Ukrainian priests, who could not be recalled to Moscow or subjected to church discipline for failing to toe Moscow’s line. (Ukraine is also home to two breakaway churches that are not recognized as canonical by any other Orthodox Church; the Phanar’s recognition of an autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church might in time lead to their unification with the canonical church.)

Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko and the Ukrainian parliament have directly lobbied the Phanar precisely for autocephaly, which would be a boon to the majority of Ukrainians who place a high value on the assertion of a national identity that is starkly distinct from that of Russia. It would also morally shore up Ukrainian sovereignty, which Moscow has undermined with its 2014 annexation of Crimea and its ongoing involvement in the military destabilization of Ukraine’s Donbas region, a conflict that has so far claimed over 10,000 lives. Patriarch Bartholomew has reportedly been quietly feeling out the other Orthodox Churches on the question of Ukrainian autocephaly, and he is now generally expected to grant it. While this news would be welcomed by more liberal, Western-looking Ukrainians, it also comes with the risk of retaliation from Moscow, perhaps by stepping up violence in the Donbas. To be prepared for whatever follows, Western governments, international institutions, analysts and researchers must take into consideration the roles of religious believers and institutions in geopolitics. Christopher Stroop holds a Ph.D. in modern Russian history and the humanities from Stanford University and is currently a senior research associate with the Postsecular Conflicts project at the University of Innsbruck. The views and opinions expressed in opinion pieces do not necessarily reflect the position of The Moscow Times.</s>President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko has submitted draft amendments to the Constitution to enshrine Ukraine's aspirations to become a member of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and to abolish the Constitution’s provision that allows a foreign country to lease a military base in Ukraine.

Verkhovna Rada member Iryna Lutsenko from the Solidarity Bloc of Petro Poroshenko, who is the representative of the President at the parliament, announced this at a meeting of the parliamentary conciliatory council on Monday, Ukrainian News Agency reports.

According to her, Poroshenko's bill suggests amendments to articles 85, 102, and 116 of the Constitution.

"In addition, there will be amendments to the preamble of the Constitution. Another important feature, which is suggested, abolishing the norm, which allows the use of military bases in the territory of Ukraine for temporary stay of foreign military formations on the terms of leasehold and under international agreements," she added.

She specified that it concerns the stay of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea.

She called on the Verkhovna Rada to support the bill.

As Ukrainian News Agency earlier reported, President Poroshenko favors abolition of the Ukrainian Constitution’s provision that allows a foreign country to lease a military base in Ukraine.</s>Between two and three million Americans identify as members of the Russian Orthodox Church. Many say it was the church’s exoticism, its “smells and the bells,” that first got them interested. But why do some people convert?

Until he was nine, Patrick Maiorca lived in Texas, where his father served in the United States Air Force. After he retired, the family moved to Oklahoma. At the time, there were just a couple of Orthodox churches there, given that most residents were Baptists or Protestants. "I was raised Anglican. After going to some crazy protestant school, I became agnostic," Patrick recalls.

Patrick developed an interest in the Russian Orthodox Church when began studying Russian language and history, along with Roman history. He quickly fell in love with Russian culture. "But also, as an agnostic, I felt the Orthodox Church was the only one with a leg to stand on,” he says. “The west was shaped by the fall of the Western Roman Empire."

And Patrick is not alone in this. Robert Hegwood from Mississippi thinks some American converts are looking for “something more grounded, older, time-tested and enduring.”

He was raised in a Southern Baptist home, became Methodist in his late teens, and shortly thereafter was part of the Charismatic Movement for 21 years. Robert first encountered orthodoxy in 1995, while living abroad on Saipan, a small island in the North Pacific.

"When I went home to Mississippi in 1995 on vacation, I made contact with a local Orthodox church whose priest, to my surprise, told me that his father had fought in WWІІ on the island of Saipan," Robert recalls. The priest gave him several books and magazines about the Orthodox Church, including one about the life of St. Seraphim of Sarov. "He was the sort of Christian I could only hope to be,” Robert says. “It would have to be his path or there was no path to follow."

When Robert met with the priest again and told him he wanted to convert to the Orthodox Church, the priest heard him out with a smile and then replied, "No, the time is not yet right for you."

But Robert was determined. He tried to get in touch with Eastern bishops on Saipan, but there was no one there. "Eventually I was put in touch with an English-speaking priest in Tokyo. The priest's bishop gave him a blessing to catechize me by email, the teaching lasted over a year and was harder any college course I had ever had."

Now Robert feels grateful that it took longer than he had expected. Orthodoxy turned out to be far more complex than he had expected: "There was no just walking the aisle as in the Baptist faith. One had to stick to be taken seriously."

David Pettit of Altadena, California agrees with him: "Nobody comes to the Orthodox Church because the morning spirit band has a great guitarist."

He says there is one question that almost always weeds out who will stay and who will leave: "Are you here to see if the church fits you, or are you here to fit the church?" David thinks people who are there to fit the church wind up staying for life. Everyone else finds it too regimented, structured and uncompromising. "Even when they completely agree, still they leave because it isn't fun enough," he says

joined the Orthodox Church in 2007 while serving his 10th year in prison on a 15-year sentence. Before that, David had not believed in any religion. He and his parents were atheists and Russophobes. David's grandfather had designed rocket boosters for the U.S. government. "The first three generations in my family were and are professionally and morally opposed to the inhabitants of the Kremlin on all fronts," he remembers. However, while in prison, he felt that he developed what he calls “a Russian heart.

I had found that Tchaikovsky was my favorite composer, not Beethoven. Solzhenitsyn was my favorite author, not Hemingway. Tolstoy, Dostoevsky Sholokhov were writers who spoke directly from my heart,” he says. “So, the curious fool in me asked, 'What, then, is the main church in Russia?'"

He first saw The Passion of the Christ while in prison and after became more interested in the , started to pray and says he had a vision of the Virgin Mary.

When David was released from prison, he went to an Orthodox church for the first time. He noticed that most of the Russians there were women and that almost all of them were married to American men.

"Russians and Americans get along well in our church,” he says. “We are rarely, if ever, close, but we do get along well." Most members of Robert’s parish are American converts and their children (most of whom are first-generation Orthodox). With Syrian, Lebanese, Ukrainian, Armenian, Romanians families, Orthodox parishes here are growing slowly but steadily.

"Many American converts admire [Russian president] Vladimir Putin," Robert says. "And are a little envious of the direction Russia is taking to stand up for Christian civilization and Christian virtues in the public square. Where you have processions of thousands following the Holy Cross and Icons…we have to endure yet another flamboyant, often obscene, gay-rights parade."

However, Orthodox churches are growing mainly in the conservative American South and Southwest. "In its old immigrant in the Northeast and Upper Midwest, it is in serious decline,” Robert says. “Many of the young people leave, never to return.” He thinks this is related to those regions being more liberal and less religious.

"But all I know is, despite our deficiencies, weakness and present small numbers, in the region where I live, we are growing in raw numbers. Not sure of percentages."

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President of Ukraine Petro Poroshenko states that the Orthodox Church intends to grant the Kiev Patriarchate autocephaly.