Why Are U.S. Allies Killing Each Other In Syria?

Turkey's military offensive in northwest Syria, dubbed "Operation Olive Branch," has alarmed several countries and led to an emergency session of the United Nations Security Council. It pits U.S. ally and NATO member Turkey against a Kurdish fighting force armed and trained by the United States as part of the fight to defeat ISIS in Syria.

The fighting has thrown a spotlight on the confusing and at times conflicting alliances and goals in the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition.

It could be a bloody battle. On Tuesday, Turkey said it has killed at least 260 Syrian Kurdish fighters in four days in the Afrin region. The United Nations says the risk to the area's 324,000 civilians is high.

Here's a guide to help sort out who's on what side:

Who are the Syrian Kurdish forces, and why is Turkey trying to kill them?

The People's Protection Units, better known by the initials YPG. They make up the military arm of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party, or PYD. Multiple Kurdish groups have for years effectively controlled pockets of territory in northern Syria, with the tacit acceptance of the regime in Damascus.

The why is a little more complicated.

There are minority populations of ethnic Kurds in Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran. Many dream of living in an independent Kurdistan some day — a prospect that displeases the governments of all four states. A smaller number of militant Kurds, such as the Kurdistan Workers Party, the PKK, which operates out of southeast Turkey and northern Iraq, has taken up arms to achieve its goals.

Turkey, the U.S. and the European Union have all designated the PKK as a terrorist group. Turkey also brands the Kurdish fighters in neighboring Syria as terrorists, citing their links to Kurdish militants on Turkey's side of the border. Both Kurdish groups hail the same leader, the jailed PKK chief Abdullah Ocalan, and PKK flags have been photographed at Kurdish political rallies in Syria.

The U.S. and EU do not, however, label the Syrian Kurdish fighters as terrorists.

Ankara argues the U.S. has no business arming and training a group that its ally Turkey considers a terror organization and an enemy. Turkey warns that U.S. weapons given to the YPG could be transferred across Syria's border to the PKK and end up being used against Turkish security forces. Thus far Ankara has not produced any evidence of this.

Why does America support the YPG over Turkey's objections?

At one level, it boils down to necessity. The U.S. military sees the YPG as seasoned fighters, well able to take territory from ISIS and hold it. The U.S. considers other Syrian rebel fighting units less reliable.

Washington is sensitive to Turkey's concerns about the YPG but doesn't believe it can carry out the anti-ISIS fight nearly as well without the Syrian Kurdish fighters.

What does Turkey hope to accomplish with this operation?

Turkish officials say they're aiming to create a 19-mile-deep "safety zone" inside Syria, with no Kurdish fighters in that area stretching from the Turkish border. Beyond that, Ankara says it's seeking to prevent Syria's Kurds from joining up their pockets of control into a single, contiguous area of Kurdish authority.

Ultimately, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan says, Turkey aims to stabilize northern Syria to the extent that millions of Syrian refugees who have lived for years in Turkey can go home.

How is the world responding?

A number of countries in Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere have called for a swift end to the Turkish incursion, worrying about its potential for further destabilizing an already volatile situation in Syria. The White House urged Turkey to "exercise restraint" in the operation.

Russia, however, is choosing to blame the U.S. for what it calls "unilateral actions" in Syria that infuriated Turkey. Moscow is Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's most powerful ally. A number of analysts say Russia has been engaged for some time in trying to draw Turkey out of the U.S. orbit of influence.

Officially, Washington says its alliance with Ankara remains strong and necessary, and it's working with Turkey to address legitimate security concerns and return the focus to defeating ISIS. In some conservative U.S. circles, however, questions are growing about Turkey's commitment to NATO and the West.

The U.S. relies on Turkey in a number of areas. One of the most prominent is the use of Turkish air bases for launching U.S. and coalition airstrikes against ISIS. The EU also depends on Turkey to stem the flow of refugees and migrants attempting to reach Europe.

But with the battle against ISIS apparently winding down in Syria, the YPG finds itself with waning political capital in Washington and facing a Turkish government that's determined to keep Kurdish influence in northern Syria fragmented and nonthreatening.</s>Daesh terrorists released from Raqqa by the terrorist PKK-linked People's Protection Forces (YPG) were reserved to fight against Turkey, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said Wednesday.

"It is alleged that the YPG terrorist group has released Daesh members to fight against us. What difference does that make? They are all the same. They are terror groups that have assumed different roles in the same scenario," Erdoğan said.

The president added that Daesh terrorists who were besieged and could have been easily destroyed in Raqqa were taken out and spread to other regions across Syria, with some of them kept in reserve for possible action against Turkey.

Erdoğan stressed that Operation Olive Branch in northern Syria's Afrin also aims to eradicate some of this Daesh reserve.

According to Erdoğan, some 268 terrorists have been killed over the past four days in Operation Olive Branch, while the Turkish army and FSA had seven to eight martyrs.

"Turkey will first exterminate the terrorists in Afrin and then make the region livable again, all for the 3.5 million Syrians we are currently hosting," he said, adding that the region was getting under control step-by-step.

Erdoğan also criticized former U.S. president Barack Obama for violating trust, saying Turkey had a planned operation named "Olive Grove" to clear Manbij area of terrorists.

Obama, however, prevented it from starting, promising to drive the YPG terrorists east of Euphrates since 95 percent of Manbij inhabitants are Arabs, but he "did not keep his word," the president added.

Operation Olive Branch was launched Saturday, targeting the PKK terror group's Syrian affiliates the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed wing People's Protection Units (YPG) as well as the remaining Daesh elements in the Afrin region on Turkish-Syrian border.</s>Why Are U.S. Allies Killing Each Other In Syria?

Turkey's military offensive in northwest Syria, dubbed "Operation Olive Branch," has alarmed several countries and led to an emergency session of the United Nations Security Council. It pits U.S. ally and NATO member Turkey against a Kurdish fighting force armed and trained by the United States as part of the fight to defeat ISIS in Syria.

The fighting has thrown a spotlight on the confusing and at times conflicting alliances and goals in the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition.

It could be a bloody battle. On Tuesday, Turkey said it has killed at least 260 Syrian Kurdish fighters in four days in the Afrin region. The United Nations says the risk to the area's 324,000 civilians is high.

Here's a guide to help sort out who's on what side:

Who are the Syrian Kurdish forces, and why is Turkey trying to kill them?

The People's Protection Units, better known by the initials YPG. They make up the military arm of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party, or PYD. Multiple Kurdish groups have for years effectively controlled pockets of territory in northern Syria, with the tacit acceptance of the regime in Damascus.

The why is a little more complicated.

There are minority populations of ethnic Kurds in Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran. Many dream of living in an independent Kurdistan some day — a prospect that displeases the governments of all four states. A smaller number of militant Kurds, such as the Kurdistan Workers Party, the PKK, which operates out of southeast Turkey and northern Iraq, has taken up arms to achieve its goals.

Turkey, the U.S. and the European Union have all designated the PKK as a terrorist group. Turkey also brands the Kurdish fighters in neighboring Syria as terrorists, citing their links to Kurdish militants on Turkey's side of the border. Both Kurdish groups hail the same leader, the jailed PKK chief Abdullah Ocalan, and PKK flags have been photographed at Kurdish political rallies in Syria.

The U.S. and EU do not, however, label the Syrian Kurdish fighters as terrorists.

Ankara argues the U.S. has no business arming and training a group that its ally Turkey considers a terror organization and an enemy. Turkey warns that U.S. weapons given to the YPG could be transferred across Syria's border to the PKK and end up being used against Turkish security forces. Thus far Ankara has not produced any evidence of this.

Why does America support the YPG over Turkey's objections?

At one level, it boils down to necessity. The U.S. military sees the YPG as seasoned fighters, well able to take territory from ISIS and hold it. The U.S. considers other Syrian rebel fighting units less reliable.

Washington is sensitive to Turkey's concerns about the YPG but doesn't believe it can carry out the anti-ISIS fight nearly as well without the Syrian Kurdish fighters.

What does Turkey hope to accomplish with this operation?

Turkish officials say they're aiming to create a 19-mile-deep "safety zone" inside Syria, with no Kurdish fighters in that area stretching from the Turkish border. Beyond that, Ankara says it's seeking to prevent Syria's Kurds from joining up their pockets of control into a single, contiguous area of Kurdish authority.

Ultimately, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan says, Turkey aims to stabilize northern Syria to the extent that millions of Syrian refugees who have lived for years in Turkey can go home.

How is the world responding?

A number of countries in Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere have called for a swift end to the Turkish incursion, worrying about its potential for further destabilizing an already volatile situation in Syria. The White House urged Turkey to "exercise restraint" in the operation.

Russia, however, is choosing to blame the U.S. for what it calls "unilateral actions" in Syria that infuriated Turkey. Moscow is Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's most powerful ally. A number of analysts say Russia has been engaged for some time in trying to draw Turkey out of the U.S. orbit of influence.

Officially, Washington says its alliance with Ankara remains strong and necessary, and it's working with Turkey to address legitimate security concerns and return the focus to defeating ISIS. In some conservative U.S. circles, however, questions are growing about Turkey's commitment to NATO and the West.

The U.S. relies on Turkey in a number of areas. One of the most prominent is the use of Turkish air bases for launching U.S. and coalition airstrikes against ISIS. The EU also depends on Turkey to stem the flow of refugees and migrants attempting to reach Europe.

But with the battle against ISIS apparently winding down in Syria, the YPG finds itself with waning political capital in Washington and facing a Turkish government that's determined to keep Kurdish influence in northern Syria fragmented and nonthreatening.</s>How to Stop the War Between Turkey and the Syrian Kurds

As the U.S. government shut down last weekend, two key American allies started fighting against each other: Turkey and the Kurds in Syria. Earlier this week, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson attempted an exquisite balancing act around this dilemma, nodding to “Turkey’s legitimate security concerns” but also to the “multiethnic group of fighters who are defending their home territory” inside Syria. What is the real U.S. policy here, and what should it be?

Just as the Turks have long urged, the United States now has a coherent policy in Syria. Furthermore, those goals are shared by Turkey. First, the underlying conflict between the Syrian people and the Bashar al-Assad regime should be resolved through a United Nations-led political process leading to a unitary post-Assad state. And second, Iranian influence in Syria should be diminished, and Syria’s neighbors should be kept secure from all threats emanating from Syria. The first goal satisfies Turkey’s two key objectives since 2011: getting rid of Assad, and a unified Syria, with no independent Syrian Kurdistan under the possible rule of the erstwhile allies of Turkey’s enemy, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) movement. The second goal, reducing Iran’s influence in Syria and ensuring that threats do not emanate from there, meets Turkey’s longstanding diplomatic interest (dating back to the Ottoman-Persian Empire conflicts) in containing, as President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has recently said publicly, “Persian expansionism.”

Despite Erdogan’s strident anti-Western rhetoric and domestic authoritarianism, Turkey shares a basic orientation with the United States and Europe. Like those of the Arab states and Israel, Turkey’s interests are threatened by an expansionist Iran enabled by Russia, the two traditional foes of both the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey.

But this convergence of interests does not mean that all is well between Washington and Ankara. Erdogan and most of the Turkish population have major problems with the United States supporting the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its military wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), as well as the joint Kurd-Arab military force it dominates, the Syrian Democratic Forces. Turkey has been stuck in a stalemated battle with the PKK, a listed terrorist group, and cannot afford the presence of the PYD, a PKK “offshoot,” as Erdogan’s spokesman recently termed it, all along its southern border.

The United States has had difficulties convincing Turkey that its support for the PYD and SDF was, in U.S. officials’ words, transactional and solely based on its utility against the Islamic State, in part because of the strong personal links forged between U.S. forces on the ground and the Kurdish fighters, who have been highly effective against Islamic State forces. A series of U.S. blunders at every level has made things worse, including former Vice President Joe Biden promising the Turks publicly that the PYD would retreat back across the Euphrates, President Donald Trump’s promise to Erdogan to immediately cease weapons shipments to the Kurds, and a clumsy Pentagon announcement this month that it would train SDF elements as a border force — on the Turkish border. Washington thus has a very big hole to dig itself out of.

It has started doing so by announcing that it has no ties to another PYD force in the isolated enclave of Afrin, in northwestern Syria along the Turkish border. Turkish forces have now attacked that enclave, and the United States has urged restraint but has not stopped them. Tillerson was also at pains to praise Turkey’s role in Syria, commit to cooperation with Ankara, and implicitly criticize the SDF and thus the PYD for not allowing enough local self-rule and democracy and for “threatening” neighboring states (i.e., Turkey).

The larger question is, how will long-term American interests in Turkey fit with Washington’s highly successful three-year battlefield partnership with the PYD against the Islamic State? The United States will have to triangulate its vital alliance with Ankara and its new public promise to maintain the PYD partnership (including around 2,000 U.S. military advisors) for at least the coming two years. There is a way forward, tricky but essential, to reconcile American interests with both their Turkish and Syrian Kurdish allies.

The first step is to encourage the PYD to further distance itself from the PKK, while reminding Turkey privately that the PYD has largely kept its 2012 commitment not to provide material support to the PKK inside Turkey. It is useful to recall that as recently as 2015, Turkey and the PYD worked well together in facilitating the successful military operations against the Islamic State in Kobane, right on the Turkish border, and then-PYD leader Salih Muslim was an honored official guest of the Turkish government. This fragile entente fell victim to the collapse of the PKK-Turkish ceasefire and peace talks later that year — which made U.S. military support for the PYD a constant irritant in ties with Turkey.

The second step should be to set up direct channels for resumed discussions between the PYD and Turkey, and between the PYD and what remains of the mainstream, moderate Syrian Arab opposition that Turkey still supports. Through our unofficial, quiet contacts over the past several months with all sides, it appears that they may all be grudgingly open to this option. After Tillerson’s remarks, the PYD’s former European spokesman, Nawaf Khalil, went to so far as to publicly welcome this statement of a “balanced” U.S. commitment to all its allies in and around Syria. All these parties share a strong interest in opposing Assad and Iran, avoiding major armed conflict with each other, and maintaining their bilateral security and diplomatic ties with Washington.

The third step is tougher, yet urgently necessary. That is to reassure Turkey, even more explicitly than Tillerson just did, that the United States will actively oppose any Kurdish secessionism or territorial expansion in Syria, and any future attempts by the PYD to collaborate with the PKK inside Turkey. In return, the United States must credibly reassure its Syrian Kurdish friends that Washington will work with Turkey to forestall Turkish incursions or other military operations into the existing PYD-controlled enclaves in eastern Syria. The continued small U.S. military presence in those enclaves will make that commitment more credible. In the longer term, it may even be possible to forge a positive, informal coalition among these currently hostile regional parties, one that would consolidate pro-American and anti-Iranian, anti-Assad influence beyond Syria’s northeast corner. Without such cooperation, including the PYD’s, the U.S. presence in northeastern Syria and thus Washington’s entire Syria policy will be difficult to sustain. That would not be in Turkey’s interest, especially as it would result in either Turkey occupying all of northeast Syria in the face of fierce resistance, or allowing that region (and the pro-Kurdish military forces there) to fall under the sway of the Assad regime and Iran.

This may seem utopian right now, but it is worth recalling that Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds were enemies less than a decade ago — and today they are friends, with oil from Iraqi Kurdistan flowing daily through Turkey.

The “ancient ethnic conflict” between Turks and Kurds is not an insurmountable barrier to common strategic and economic interests — especially in the face of common enemies. The key is for the Kurds to renounce pan-Kurdish dreams the lure of the PKK and its leader, Abdullah Ocalan. And the Turks must accept some degree of local Kurdish autonomy in neighboring states in exchange for the larger prize of containing Iran, Assad, and Russia — all of which pose a greater threat to Turkey than the PYD. Such a compromise would serve Turkish, Kurdish, and American interests.</s>Presidents Donald Trump and Reccep Tayyip Erdogan faced off by phone Wednesday as the American warned Turkey not to risk a clash with US forces and the Turk demanded Washington stop backing a Kurdish militia.

On the fifth day of a Turkish assault against a Kurdish enclave in northern Syria, and with rockets fired into Turkey claiming civilian casualties, the leaders of the two NATO allies finally got in touch.

Trump’s warning was stark. He asked Erdogan to “de-escalate” the attack on the Afrin canton, which is defended by the US-backed YPG militia, and warned him to “avoid any actions that might risk conflict between Turkish and American forces.”

But he also sought to reassure the tough-talking Turkish leader. A White House statement about the call did not mention the YPG by name, and Trump expressed hope that the capitals could work to “address Turkey’s legitimate security concerns.”

Turkey’s official account of the call noted that Erdogan had urged Trump to cut off all US support for the Kurdish YPG and insisted that “Operation Olive Branch” — the assault on Afrin — was an entirely legal defense of Turkey’s national security.

As the two leaders spoke, violence continued, in both Afrin — formerly a relatively stable pocket amid the chaos of Syria’s ongoing civil war — and in a neighboring region of Turkey, where rockets fired from Syria killed two people and wounded 11 more.

The rockets, one of which hit and damaged a mosque, were fired in the early evening in the border province of Kilis, an AFP correspondent at the scene said. The second fell on a house 100 meters (300 feet) away, Kilis Governor Mehmet Tekinarslan said.

One Syrian and one Turk was killed, the governor’s office said, in attacks it blamed on the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units or YPG, a militia that Turkey sees as a Syrian offshoot of the banned PKK, which has waged a three-decade insurgency inside Turkey.

Turkish artillery fire could be heard from the center of Kilis.

Hours before the rockets, Erdogan said Syrian opposition fighters and Turkish forces were “step by step taking control of Afrin” and that: “Until the last terrorist is neutralized, this operation will continue.”

The United States supports Turkey’s fight against Kurdistan Works Party (PKK), a group which it too blacklists as an international terror organization.

Indeed, in his call on Wednesday, Trump pledged that Washington and Ankara could improve their “strategic partnership” to better fight the Islamic States, Al-Qaeda and the PKK together.

But inside Syria, US troops have formed a close partnership with the YPG to fight the Islamic State and — in parallel and to Turkey’s disgust — the Syrian Kurds have created autonomous governments in border cantons like Afrin.

Turkey’s NATO allies are now concerned that Ankara’s cross-border incursions will impede the fight against the IS group and harm efforts to bring peace to Syria after a nearly seven-year civil war.

With Turkey pressing the operation for a fifth day, an AFP correspondent saw more tanks lined up on the Turkish side of the border, as soldiers milled around, ready to head into Syria.

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said Turkish jets struck border areas in northeast and northwest of Afrin aiming to force the YPG to move back and open the way for a ground advance.

The Observatory said there was “fierce resistance” on the ground from the Kurdish fighters.

Three Turkish soldiers have been killed since the fighting began while the Observatory has said 48 Ankara-backed Syrian rebels and 42 US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces and YPG fighters had been killed.

The SDF is an umbrella grouping composed mainly of YPG.

The Observatory has said at least 30 civilians have been killed but this is vehemently rejected by Turkey, which says it is doing everything to avoid civilian casualties.

Two of the civilians were killed by SDF fire inside Syria, the Observatory said.

This is Turkey’s second major military action in Syria after it launched the first between August 2016 and March 2017, targeting the YPG and IS on its border.

While Turkey is so far focused on the YPG-held enclave of Afrin, it has not ruled out further expanding the operation.

The YPG also holds the key town of Manbij east of Afrin and a long strip of territory in northern Syria east of the Euphrates heading right up to the Iraqi border.

Erdogan has also raised the prospect of an operation on Manbij, which could be much more tricky as there is a US military presence in the area.</s>BEIRUT (AP) — The Latest on the Syrian conflict (all times local):

A Turkish official says two rockets fired from Syria hit a mosque and a home in a Turkish border town. At least 13 people were hurt.

Gov. Mehmet Tekinarslan says the rockets struck the border town of Kilis on Wednesday during evening prayers. Media reports said they were fired from the Syrian Kurdish enclave of Afrin.

Tekinarslan says eight were wounded inside the mosque, two of them seriously. The second rocket hit a nearby home, where five were hurt.

Turkish TV images showed the rocket that struck the mosque had pierced through its dome. The private NTV station showed people inside the mosque frantically trying to clear the rubble.

It was the latest in a series of rocket attacks against the Turkish border since Ankara launched a military offensive into Afrin to clear it of Syrian Kurdish militiamen whom it considers to be linked with Turkey's own Kurdish insurgents.

Turkey's state-run agency says 11 people have been arrested over allegedly engaging in "terror propaganda" through social media postings about Turkey's military offensive into a Syrian Kurdish enclave.

Anadolu Agency says the group is among some 150 people detained in police operations across Turkey and accused of supporting a U.S.-allied Syrian Kurdish militia that Turkey considers to be a terrorist group.

The report says other detainees, suspected of social media posts allegedly supporting the Syrian Kurdish fighters, were still being questioned. The Paris-based media watchdog Reporters Without Borders criticized the detentions as a "witch hunt against critics."

Turkey considers the Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units, or YPG, an extension of the Kurdish insurgency within its own borders. Ankara last week launched a military operation codenamed Olive Branch to clear YPG fighters from the enclave of Afrin in northern Syria.

A senior U.S. official says Washington is concerned that Turkey's military offensive in the Syrian-Kurdish enclave could distract from the fight against the Islamic State group in Syria and could be exploited by extremists to re-supply or create safe havens.

The official told a group of reporters on Wednesday that Syrian Kurdish fighters in the enclave of Afrin are not part of the U.S.-supported or trained Syrian Kurdish force that is allied with the United States in the fight against IS.

Commenting on Turkish threats to expand the offensive into the Syrian Kurdish town of Manbij, the official says Washington's "number one concern is the safety and security troops in the vicinity."

Addressing Turkish complaints that the United States has not kept to its promises to take back weapons supplied to the Syrian Kurdish fighters, the official said Washington intended to "fulfil the commitment" but would not provide a time frame.

The official says the U.S. continues to be supportive of Turkey's "legitimate security concerns" and recognize their concern for security along its border.

A second U.S. official denied Turkish government claims the U.S. had delivered thousands of trucks of weapons to the Syrian Kurdish forces, saying the bulk of the supplies went to U.S. forces and also included ammunition, food and humanitarian supplies.

Both officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to talk to the media.

Some 350 Kurds burned images of the presidents of Turkey and Russia as they marched on the U.S. and Russian embassies in the Cypriot capital Nicosia to protest Turkey's "invasion" of a Kurdish enclave in northern Syria.

Waving Kurdish flags and those of the Syrian Kurdish militant group YPG, protesters chanted slogans calling Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan a "fascist" and "terrorist," and called on Turkey to "get out of Kurdistan."

They also denouncing what they said was Russia's "betrayal" for allowing the military offensive to happen.

Protester Azad Baker told The Associated Press that Wednesday's march was aimed at urging European nations to use their influence in order to stop the killing of civilians in the Kurdish enclave.

He said Kurds are fighting alone without U.S. help.

Turkey's president says its incursion into a Kurdish-held enclave in Syria is progressing "successfully" and will continue until the last "terrorist" is eliminated.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan on Wednesday renewed a threat to extend the offensive east to the city of Manbij, which is under the control of U.S.-backed Syrian Kurdish fighters. He said he plans to "foil games along our borders starting from Manbij," adding that "we will clean our region from this trouble completely."

Erdogan said that Turkish troops and allied Syrian fighters have killed at least 268 Syrian Kurdish fighters since the operation against the Afrin enclave was launched on Jan. 20. He said Turkish troops have suffered seven or eight losses.

Ankara views the main Syrian Kurdish militia in northern Syria as a threat because of its links to Kurdish insurgents fighting in southeastern Turkey. The Syrian Kurds are the main U.S. ally against the Islamic State group in Syria, and played a key role in driving the extremists from much of the country's northeast. The U.S. has urged Turkey, a NATO ally, to exercise restraint.

Syria has dismissed recent reports of chemical attacks in the war-torn country as "lies."

The United States and 28 other countries are launching a new initiative to better identify and punish anyone who uses chemical weapons, amid new reports of a suspected chemical attack on the rebel-held suburbs of Damascus.

The U.S. says Russia, a key ally of the government, shares blame for the use of chemical weapons in Syria because it vetoed the renewal of an expert body that determined responsibility for such attacks.

The Syrian Foreign Ministry said Wednesday that French and U.S. allegations of new chemical attacks were part of the "systematic targeting of Syria." It blamed Western countries for blocking probes and pressuring investigators after previous chemical attacks.

In 2013, the U.S. and Russia reached an agreement to remove all chemical weapons from Syria. There have been several reported chemical attacks since then.

A top Russian diplomat has accused the United States of promoting unverified reports about chemical weapons attacks in Syria in order to cloud Russia's peace initiatives.

Russia is hosting Syria peace talks in the Black Sea resort of Sochi next week that some Syrian opposition figures said will run counter to U.N. peace initiatives.

Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said in an interview with the Interfax news agency on Wednesday that the U.S. is promoting "rigged, unverified reports" of the alleged use of chemical weapons in Syria to hamper Russia's peace efforts.

Ryabkov's remarks came a day after U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said Moscow "ultimately bears responsibility for the victims" of a new suspected chemical attack outside the Syrian capital Damascus.

Copyright 2017 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.</s>Turkey Wants to Crush U.S. Allies in Syria. That Shouldn’t Surprise Anybody.

Long-simmering tensions between Turkey and Kurdish fighters in Syria came to a head over the weekend.

On Jan. 20, Turkey launched what it calls Operation Olive Branch, a military campaign against the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Afrin, in northwestern Syria. The operation is part of Ankara’s long-standing effort to prevent the YPG, which has benefited from American backing in its fight against the Islamic State since the fall of 2014, from developing an autonomous region in Syria along the entirety of the countries’ shared border. Turkish objections stem from the YPG’s links to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is designated a terrorist organization by the United States and European Union and has waged an ongoing battle against Turkey that has resulted in tens of thousands of people dead.

According to Turkey’s Office of Public Diplomacy, the objectives of the intervention include ensuring Turkey’s border security, countering U.S. support for a terrorist organization, blocking the YPG from reaching the eastern Mediterranean and cutting off Turkey’s geographical contact with the Arab world, and ensuring that the Turkish-supported Syrian opposition controls a 3,861-square-mile area.

Bungled messaging by the Trump administration prompted Turkey’s recent move, although it is also the result of broader questions that have emerged throughout the conflict. Since the beginning of the uprising, the U.S. government has struggled to develop a coherent Syria policy. The Barack Obama administration, which wanted to prevent American entanglement in another Middle Eastern war, focused its military efforts on countering the Islamic State, given the threat it posed to the homeland and regional allies. When U.S. special forces sought ground forces with whom to partner, they found YPG fighters to be effective. More importantly, they were willing to fight the Islamic State, whereas other opposition groups prioritized the defeat of the Assad regime. Negotiations with Turkey about joint action against the Islamic State were largely unsuccessful. The previous administration papered over the geopolitical implications of its YPG partnership in pursuit of its counterterrorism objective. The Trump administration has largely adopted this same approach. Although State Department officials claim the U.S. relationship with the YPG is “temporary, transactional, and tactical,” it has never been clear if the Defense Department shares this view. The Pentagon has played an outsized role in managing counter-Islamic State policy, particularly in the current administration with a leadership dominated by generals.

Lack of message, discipline, and policy coordination within the Trump administration has complicated this already delicate matter. When President Donald Trump took office, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan hoped that the United States would reverse its support for the YPG. Trump not only maintained the policy but also implemented an Obama-era plan to arm the YPG for the assault on the Islamic State in Raqqa, about which the United State informed Erdogan days before his visit to Washington in May 2017. With that battle over, Trump told his counterpart in a November 2017 phone call that the United States would stop supplying weapons to the YPG. This move caught the Defense Department off guard, which quickly clarified it was “reviewing pending adjustments.” This month, the Pentagon surprised the White House when the allied military headquarters leading the campaign against the Islamic State announced plans for a 30,000-strong border security force with a significant YPG component that would be deployed along the Turkish border. When the Turks reacted with predictable anger, the State Department scrambled to control the damage. As Secretary of State Rex Tillerson explained: “That entire situation has been misportrayed, misdescribed. Some people misspoke. We are not creating a border security force at all.”

Within this context, Turkey’s military actions should not have surprised anyone. Despite his fiery rhetoric, Erdogan has largely gritted his teeth as American-backed YPG forces cleared the Islamic State from significant swaths of Syria. However, he has consistently proved his readiness to take military action in defense of a clear red line: any moves by the YPG to connect three cantons in northern Syria along the Turkish border into a unified Kurdish region. There is concern such territory could be used as a staging ground for attacks on southern Turkey, as well as encourage similar moves toward autonomy by Turkey’s Kurdish population. In August 2016, Turkey launched Operation Euphrates Shield, a seven-month mission to clear the remaining Islamic State forces from its border and block movement by the YPG. Last October, Erdogan sent forces into Syria as part of a joint mission with Russia and Iran, ostensibly aimed at the Islamic State but with implications for the YPG. At that time, Erdogan warned against Kurdish aggression toward Turkish troops: “We have no tolerance for the smallest wrong in Afrin.”

In addition to security concerns, Erdogan’s actions should be seen in the context of Turkish domestic politics. The misstep by the Trump administration compelled Erdogan to address a perceived threat by presenting himself as a strong leader capable of defending Turkish security. With parliamentary and presidential elections that will determine his political future on the horizon, many of his foreign-policy considerations are driven by the need to bolster his nationalist base. Moreover, maintaining rhetorical and political pressure on the Syrian Kurds serves to delegitimize the voice of Turkish Kurds. Erdogan initiated a peace process with the PKK that achieved some success, although a two-and-a-half-year cease-fire broke down in July 2015. This coincided with electoral politics, as the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) denied the ruling party a majority in June 2015 elections and surpassed for the first time the 10 percent threshold required to enter parliament. The government dragged its feet on coalition formation and reran elections that fall. Since November 2016, the party’s co-leaders and 10 HDP members of parliament have been jailed on spurious terrorism charges. Resolution of the YPG problem requires resolution of the PKK problem.

Thus far, the international community has been measured in its response to Turkish actions. On Sunday, the State Department expressed support for the “legitimate security concerns of Turkey as a NATO Ally and critical partner in the effort to defeat ISIS.” It called on Turkey to “exercise restraint and ensure that its military operations remain limited in scope and duration and scrupulous to avoid civilian casualties.” Defense Secretary James Mattis, who acknowledged that Ankara had provided advance notice of its operation, said, “It’s easy to understand why Turkey has concerns about the chaos.” British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson tweeted, “Turkey is right to want to keep its borders secure.” Similarly, a NATO spokesman said Turkey has the right to self-defense but urged action in a “proportionate and measured way.” The French were stronger in their calls for restraint and requested U.N. Security Council discussions, which were held in a closed-door session on Monday. Trump and Erdogan will reportedly speak on Wednesday. The Russian reaction has been telling. Given its control of airspace around Afrin, Russia clearly acquiesced to the Turkish operation. (Erdogan dispatched his military and intelligence chiefs to Moscow last week to discuss plans.) Russia also removed troops from harm’s way, including military advisors working with YPG forces there. Erdogan has been notably silent about Russia’s partnership with the YPG given Turkey’s lack of leverage and vulnerability to Russia’s Kurdish policy. Moscow is seeking political capital from recent events, which it described as the result of “provocative U.S. steps aimed at the separation of regions with predominantly Kurdish populations.” On Monday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov criticized American cooperation with the YPG as either a “misunderstanding of the whole situation or a deliberate provocation.”

In the near term, another fix will be found: most likely some accommodation of Turkey’s desire to create a face-saving, Kurd-free buffer zone along its border. The international community has signaled its acceptance of limited Turkish military action, emphasizing restraint and avoidance of civilian casualties. Yet as the operation continued into its fourth day, Mattis expressed concern that it could distract from efforts to conclude the international fight against the Islamic State. More broadly, dealing with these combustible issues cannot be put off indefinitely. In addition to questions about the extent of Turkey’s military action, the Kurdish issue will continue festering in peace talks amid disagreements over YPG participation, as well as governance and security arrangements for a post-Islamic State Syria. Lavrov announced Monday that Russia had invited Kurdish representatives (seemingly over long-standing Turkish objections and notwithstanding ongoing military operations) to join the next round of peace talks in Sochi, Russia, later this month, stating they should play a role in the “future political process.” Some Syrian Kurds have decried these talks as meaningless after “Russian collusion” with Turkey in Afrin.

Syria poses a wicked policy conundrum, complicated by numerous external actors who have competing interests and webs of relationships. To date, the U.S. approach has been militarily driven and narrowly focused on the Islamic State. It needs to become much more holistic with a broader awareness of regional dynamics. Last week, Tillerson outlined a reasonable way forward that called for a continued U.S. presence in Syria to prevent a resurgence of terrorist violence, ensure a change of regime leadership, and help reconstruct liberated areas so refugees can return home. The challenge, as he acknowledged, will be managing the agendas of external actors with their own stakes in Syria’s future. Among the many obstacles to implementing this policy is Turkish opposition to what Ankara interprets as American security guarantees for a YPG-controlled region. The United States does not appear to have fully grappled with the complexity of this issue, as evidenced by disparate messaging from across the government. The lack of active U.S. involvement in the peace process — which is managed by Russia, Turkey, and Iran — further limits its room for maneuver.

The United States chose to support the YPG in the fight against the Islamic State, partly driven by a desire to avoid becoming enmeshed in the conflict. Yet this decision may ironically dictate greater American involvement on the ground to prevent a new war among its proxies. Wishing away Turkish concerns is not a strategy. The conflict between Turkey and the Kurds is a key part of the larger Syrian puzzle.</s>How to Stop the War Between Turkey and the Syrian Kurds

As the U.S. government shut down last weekend, two key American allies started fighting against each other: Turkey and the Kurds in Syria. Earlier this week, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson attempted an exquisite balancing act around this dilemma, nodding to “Turkey’s legitimate security concerns” but also to the “multiethnic group of fighters who are defending their home territory” inside Syria. What is the real U.S. policy here, and what should it be?

Just as the Turks have long urged, the United States now has a coherent policy in Syria. Furthermore, those goals are shared by Turkey. First, the underlying conflict between the Syrian people and the Bashar al-Assad regime should be resolved through a United Nations-led political process leading to a unitary post-Assad state. And second, Iranian influence in Syria should be diminished, and Syria’s neighbors should be kept secure from all threats emanating from Syria. The first goal satisfies Turkey’s two key objectives since 2011: getting rid of Assad, and a unified Syria, with no independent Syrian Kurdistan under the possible rule of the erstwhile allies of Turkey’s enemy, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) movement. The second goal, reducing Iran’s influence in Syria and ensuring that threats do not emanate from there, meets Turkey’s longstanding diplomatic interest (dating back to the Ottoman-Persian Empire conflicts) in containing, as President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has recently said publicly, “Persian expansionism.”

Despite Erdogan’s strident anti-Western rhetoric and domestic authoritarianism, Turkey shares a basic orientation with the United States and Europe. Like those of the Arab states and Israel, Turkey’s interests are threatened by an expansionist Iran enabled by Russia, the two traditional foes of both the Ottoman Empire and modern Turkey.

But this convergence of interests does not mean that all is well between Washington and Ankara. Erdogan and most of the Turkish population have major problems with the United States supporting the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its military wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), as well as the joint Kurd-Arab military force it dominates, the Syrian Democratic Forces. Turkey has been stuck in a stalemated battle with the PKK, a listed terrorist group, and cannot afford the presence of the PYD, a PKK “offshoot,” as Erdogan’s spokesman recently termed it, all along its southern border.

The United States has had difficulties convincing Turkey that its support for the PYD and SDF was, in U.S. officials’ words, transactional and solely based on its utility against the Islamic State, in part because of the strong personal links forged between U.S. forces on the ground and the Kurdish fighters, who have been highly effective against Islamic State forces. A series of U.S. blunders at every level has made things worse, including former Vice President Joe Biden promising the Turks publicly that the PYD would retreat back across the Euphrates, President Donald Trump’s promise to Erdogan to immediately cease weapons shipments to the Kurds, and a clumsy Pentagon announcement this month that it would train SDF elements as a border force — on the Turkish border. Washington thus has a very big hole to dig itself out of.

It has started doing so by announcing that it has no ties to another PYD force in the isolated enclave of Afrin, in northwestern Syria along the Turkish border. Turkish forces have now attacked that enclave, and the United States has urged restraint but has not stopped them. Tillerson was also at pains to praise Turkey’s role in Syria, commit to cooperation with Ankara, and implicitly criticize the SDF and thus the PYD for not allowing enough local self-rule and democracy and for “threatening” neighboring states (i.e., Turkey).

The larger question is, how will long-term American interests in Turkey fit with Washington’s highly successful three-year battlefield partnership with the PYD against the Islamic State? The United States will have to triangulate its vital alliance with Ankara and its new public promise to maintain the PYD partnership (including around 2,000 U.S. military advisors) for at least the coming two years. There is a way forward, tricky but essential, to reconcile American interests with both their Turkish and Syrian Kurdish allies.

The first step is to encourage the PYD to further distance itself from the PKK, while reminding Turkey privately that the PYD has largely kept its 2012 commitment not to provide material support to the PKK inside Turkey. It is useful to recall that as recently as 2015, Turkey and the PYD worked well together in facilitating the successful military operations against the Islamic State in Kobane, right on the Turkish border, and then-PYD leader Salih Muslim was an honored official guest of the Turkish government. This fragile entente fell victim to the collapse of the PKK-Turkish ceasefire and peace talks later that year — which made U.S. military support for the PYD a constant irritant in ties with Turkey.

The second step should be to set up direct channels for resumed discussions between the PYD and Turkey, and between the PYD and what remains of the mainstream, moderate Syrian Arab opposition that Turkey still supports. Through our unofficial, quiet contacts over the past several months with all sides, it appears that they may all be grudgingly open to this option. After Tillerson’s remarks, the PYD’s former European spokesman, Nawaf Khalil, went to so far as to publicly welcome this statement of a “balanced” U.S. commitment to all its allies in and around Syria. All these parties share a strong interest in opposing Assad and Iran, avoiding major armed conflict with each other, and maintaining their bilateral security and diplomatic ties with Washington.

The third step is tougher, yet urgently necessary. That is to reassure Turkey, even more explicitly than Tillerson just did, that the United States will actively oppose any Kurdish secessionism or territorial expansion in Syria, and any future attempts by the PYD to collaborate with the PKK inside Turkey. In return, the United States must credibly reassure its Syrian Kurdish friends that Washington will work with Turkey to forestall Turkish incursions or other military operations into the existing PYD-controlled enclaves in eastern Syria. The continued small U.S. military presence in those enclaves will make that commitment more credible. In the longer term, it may even be possible to forge a positive, informal coalition among these currently hostile regional parties, one that would consolidate pro-American and anti-Iranian, anti-Assad influence beyond Syria’s northeast corner. Without such cooperation, including the PYD’s, the U.S. presence in northeastern Syria and thus Washington’s entire Syria policy will be difficult to sustain. That would not be in Turkey’s interest, especially as it would result in either Turkey occupying all of northeast Syria in the face of fierce resistance, or allowing that region (and the pro-Kurdish military forces there) to fall under the sway of the Assad regime and Iran.

This may seem utopian right now, but it is worth recalling that Turkey and the Iraqi Kurds were enemies less than a decade ago — and today they are friends, with oil from Iraqi Kurdistan flowing daily through Turkey.

The “ancient ethnic conflict” between Turks and Kurds is not an insurmountable barrier to common strategic and economic interests — especially in the face of common enemies. The key is for the Kurds to renounce pan-Kurdish dreams the lure of the PKK and its leader, Abdullah Ocalan. And the Turks must accept some degree of local Kurdish autonomy in neighboring states in exchange for the larger prize of containing Iran, Assad, and Russia — all of which pose a greater threat to Turkey than the PYD. Such a compromise would serve Turkish, Kurdish, and American interests.</s>Turkey steps up assault on Kurdish militia in Syria

Turkey on Monday intensified its offensive against Kurdish militia targets in Syria as President Recep Tayyip Erdogan vowed there would be no stepping back in a campaign that has stoked concern among Ankara’s allies and neighbours.

The Turkish military on Saturday launched operation “Olive Branch”, its second major intervention in Syria’s devastating seven-year civil war.

The operation, with Turkish war planes and artillery backing a major ground incursion involving Ankara-backed Syrian rebels and Turkish tanks, aims to oust the People’s Protection Units (YPG) militia from its Afrin enclave.

Civilians in the town of Afrin, 18 kilometres (11 miles) from the front line, stocked up on food and medicine as they readied for a potential onslaught. Shelters were prepared and the internet was only functioning sporadically.

Turkey sees the YPG as a terror group and the Syrian offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) which has waged a bloody three-decade insurgency against the Turkish state.

“We are determined. Afrin will be sorted out. We will take no step back,” Erdogan said in a televised speech in Ankara.

But the operation is hugely sensitive as Washington relied on the YPG to oust Islamic State (IS) jihadists from their Syrian strongholds and the Kurdish militia now holds much of Syria’s north.

France has called for additional talks at a UN Security Council meeting Monday to discuss concerns over flashpoints in Syria including the Turkish offensive.

– ‘A short operation’ –

 Turkish state news agency Anadolu said ground forces had already seized 15 villages and other locations during their advance into Syria.

Meanwhile, Turkish artillery fired shells on YPG targets inside Syria and ground troops opened a new front against Afrin from Azaz, further east, state media said.

In Afrin, residents queued at bakeries and cars were on the streets as residents braced themselves for any violence.

“God willing, the war will not last long. We pray for strength and courage for the YPG,” Zuheir Hussein, 32, told AFP.

Convenience store owner Ali Sourani said his shop was running low on food and the region was “surrounded”.

“We have had our shelters prepared for 10 days to hide during the fighting,” he said.

“We have difficulties with the internet which has been down for three days. We cannot communicate with our relatives.”

The Britain-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said a total of 22 Syrian civilians had been killed by Turkish strikes and two more by Kurdish fire.

It said 54 Syrian combattants had been killed, including 19 Ankara-backed rebels, 26 Kurdish fighters and nine unidentified figures.

But Ankara has denied inflicting civilian casualties, with Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu accusing the YPG of sending out “nonsense propaganda and baseless lies”.

Observatory director Rami Abdel Rahim told AFP in Beirut that Monday’s clashes were the fiercest since the start of the offensive.

He said Kurdish forces had recaptured a key hill in the region, briefly seized by pro-Turkish Syrian rebels on Monday.

An AFP correspondent in the Turkish border village of Hassa saw more Turkish tanks heading towards Syria, enthusiastically cheered by locals.

In a sign of the risks to Turkey, rockets fired from Syria on the border town of Reyhanli on Sunday killed a Syrian refugee. One more person was killed in a similar attack Monday on the village of Kirikhan.

The Syrian Democratic Forces, an umbrella group dominated by the YPG, said in a statement that the operation amounted to “clear support” for IS.

Turkey’s previous incursion into Syria was the Euphrates Shield campaign in August 2016-March 2017, targeting both the YPG and IS in an area east of Afrin.

Erdogan has warned that those protesting against the operation will pay a “heavy price”. Turkish police detained 24 people on suspicion of disseminating “terror propaganda” on social media.

– ‘Russian backing’ –

 As well as a complex military mission, Turkey faces a sensitive diplomatic landscape as it seeks to avoid alienating allies and provoking foes.

Western capitals fear the campaign against the YPG will shift the focus from eliminating IS after a string of successes in recent months.

US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said Monday he was “concerned” about the offensive, while EU diplomatic chief Federica Mogherini said she would discuss the situation with Turkish officials.

But Erdogan expressed impatience with US demands to set a clear timetable, saying the campaign would be over “when the target is achieved”.

“How long have you been in Afghanistan? Is that over in Iraq?” he said, referring to long-running US military presence in those countries.

Erdogan has previously indicated that once control is imposed in Afrin, Turkey wants to head west to defeat the YPG in the town of Manbij.

Meanwhile Russia and Iran — who have a military presence in Syria and are working with Turkey on a peace process — have also expressed concern.

Erdogan insisted Turkey had discussed the operation in advance with Russia, and Moscow was in “agreement”.

A crucial factor will be whether the operation affects a Syrian peace conference to be held in the Russian resort of Sochi in late January.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Kurdish representatives would be invited, without specifying who, and accused the US of encouraging Syrian Kurdish separatism.

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This post was syndicated from The Guardian Nigeria Newspaper – Nigeria and World News. Click here to read the full text on the original website.</s>Turkey's military offensive in northwest Syria, dubbed "Operation Olive Branch," has alarmed several countries and led to an emergency session of the United Nations Security Council. It pits U.S. ally and NATO member Turkey against a Kurdish fighting force armed and trained by the United States as part of the fight to defeat ISIS in Syria.

The fighting has thrown a spotlight on the confusing and at times conflicting alliances and goals in the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition.

It could be a bloody battle. On Tuesday, Turkey said it has killed at least 260 Syrian Kurdish fighters in four days in the Afrin region. The United Nations says the risk to the area's 324,000 civilians is high.

Here's a guide to help sort out who's on what side:

Who are the Syrian Kurdish forces, and why is Turkey trying to kill them?

The People's Protection Units, better known by the initials YPG. They make up the military arm of the Kurdish Democratic Union Party, or PYD. Multiple Kurdish groups have for years effectively controlled pockets of territory in northern Syria, with the tacit acceptance of the regime in Damascus.

The why is a little more complicated.

There are minority populations of ethnic Kurds in Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran. Many dream of living in an independent Kurdistan some day — a prospect that displeases the governments of all four states. A smaller number of militant Kurds, such as the Kurdistan Workers Party, the PKK, which operates out of southeast Turkey and northern Iraq, has taken up arms to achieve its goals.

Turkey, the U.S. and the European Union have all designated the PKK as a terrorist group. Turkey also brands the Kurdish fighters in neighboring Syria as terrorists, citing their links to Kurdish militants on Turkey's side of the border. Both Kurdish groups hail the same leader, the jailed PKK chief Abdullah Ocalan, and PKK flags have been photographed at Kurdish political rallies in Syria.

The U.S. and EU do not, however, label the Syrian Kurdish fighters as terrorists.

Ankara argues the U.S. has no business arming and training a group that its ally Turkey considers a terror organization and an enemy. Turkey warns that U.S. weapons given to the YPG could be transferred across Syria's border to the PKK and end up being used against Turkish security forces. Thus far Ankara has not produced any evidence of this.

Why does America support the YPG over Turkey's objections?

At one level, it boils down to necessity. The U.S. military sees the YPG as seasoned fighters, well able to take territory from ISIS and hold it. The U.S. considers other Syrian rebel fighting units less reliable.

Washington is sensitive to Turkey's concerns about the YPG but doesn't believe it can carry out the anti-ISIS fight nearly as well without the Syrian Kurdish fighters.

What does Turkey hope to accomplish with this operation?

Turkish officials say they're aiming to create a 19-mile-deep "safety zone" inside Syria, with no Kurdish fighters in that area stretching from the Turkish border. Beyond that, Ankara says it's seeking to prevent Syria's Kurds from joining up their pockets of control into a single, contiguous area of Kurdish authority.

Ultimately, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan says, Turkey aims to stabilize northern Syria to the extent that millions of Syrian refugees who have lived for years in Turkey can go home.

How is the world responding?

A number of countries in Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere have called for a swift end to the Turkish incursion, worrying about its potential for further destabilizing an already volatile situation in Syria. The White House urged Turkey to "exercise restraint" in the operation.

Russia, however, is choosing to blame the U.S. for what it calls "unilateral actions" in Syria that infuriated Turkey. Moscow is Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's most powerful ally. A number of analysts say Russia has been engaged for some time in trying to draw Turkey out of the U.S. orbit of influence.

Officially, Washington says its alliance with Ankara remains strong and necessary, and it's working with Turkey to address legitimate security concerns and return the focus to defeating ISIS. In some conservative U.S. circles, however, questions are growing about Turkey's commitment to NATO and the West.

The U.S. relies on Turkey in a number of areas. One of the most prominent is the use of Turkish air bases for launching U.S. and coalition airstrikes against ISIS. The EU also depends on Turkey to stem the flow of refugees and migrants attempting to reach Europe.

But with the battle against ISIS apparently winding down in Syria, the YPG finds itself with waning political capital in Washington and facing a Turkish government that's determined to keep Kurdish influence in northern Syria fragmented and nonthreatening.
Several rockets fired from Syria strike the Turkish city of Kilis, near the Syria–Turkey border, killing at least one person and injuring 13 others. Turkey blames the YPG group.