Image copyright Various Image caption Twenty-two people were killed in the blast on 22 May

Firefighters who heard the Manchester Arena bomb go off were sent away from the scene despite a paramedic arriving within 11 minutes, a report says.

"Out of the loop" crews took two hours to attend the scene of the deadly blast, which killed 22 people last May.

A report by Lord Kerslake found poor communication meant chief fire officers were "risk-averse" and kept emergency trained responders away.

The fire service's chief apologised "unreservedly" for the failures.

Suicide bomber Salman Abedi detonated a home-made device at 22:31 BST as 14,000 people streamed out of an Ariana Grande concert on 22 May, leaving more than 700 injured.

According to the report, the first North West Ambulance Service (NWAS) paramedic arrived at 22:42 and was told the incident was a "suicide bomber" by police.

A police duty inspector declared Operation Plato, a plan for dealing with a suspected marauding armed terrorist, and wrongly assumed others were aware.

Despite protocol allowing emergency workers to continue treating the injured, a senior fire officer "stuck to rules" and kept emergency responders 500m (1,600ft) away from any zone of danger.

Media playback is unsupported on your device Media caption Survivor Martin Hibbert says he is "sure" firefighters "would have been a great help" in the immediate aftermath of the blast

It was "fortuitous" the ambulance service was not informed, otherwise it might have pulled out paramedics who instead stayed and saved lives, the 224-page report said.

The report also said the fire officer was unable to get through to the force duty inspector.

As a result, Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS) was "brought to the point of paralysis", to the "immense frustration on the firefighters' faces".

The fire service and the control room "felt they had let down the people of Greater Manchester" on the night of the blast, Lord Kerslake's report said.

His report also found:

An early decision was taken to base crews at Philips Park Fire Station - about two miles away from the arena - rather than with police at the city's cathedral car park

This hampered communication and awareness of what was happening at the scene

The fire service was "effectively outside the loop [and had] little awareness of what was happening at the arena"

There were "strategic oversights" by police commanders that led to confusion over whether an "active shooter" was on the loose

"Poor communications" meant fire crews only arrived two hours and six minutes after the bombing. The average response time is under six minutes.

The report made more than 50 recommendations but states its panel of experts was not there to answer the question of: "Would the earlier arrival of GMFRS at the scene have made any difference to the medical outcomes of the injured?"

"This is a question that only the coronial inquests can decide," the report said.

Image copyright Shutterstock Image caption The report found "strategic oversights" by police commanders led to confusion over whether an "active shooter" was on the scene

Speaking after the report's publication, Lord Kerslake said the "unspeakable attack" had been a "brutal and real-world test" of the emergency services' response.

He said "not one single reason or one individual" was to blame for the errors, but a "most unfortunate combination" of "poor communications and poor procedures".

Lord Kerslake said that "deep down" the errors were prompted by failings in "operational culture".

But he conceded that it was "quite extraordinary that [the fire service] did not pick up what was happening."

"They should have gone forward not back," he said.

"The firefighters wanted to go forward but they were not able to. The discipline of the fire service meant that they could not self-deploy."

Media playback is unsupported on your device Media caption Manchester attack: 'There weren't enough staff'

Phone line failure 'catastrophic'

Lord Kerslake also singled out Vodafone for criticism, following the "catastrophic failure" of an 0800 phone line designed to help concerned people get information on the night of the attack.

The subsequent delays caused "significant stress and upset" to families.

Lord Kerslake said: "A number were reduced to a frantic search around the hospitals of Greater Manchester to find out more."

Vodafone has apologised for the distress caused and said it had undertaken a major upgrade of the system.

However, Lord Kerslake said the company "should also apologise directly to the families" for whom the failure of this "vital" system "made the experience of this truly terrible evening even worse."

'Reputation damaged'

Greater Manchester Mayor Andy Burnham also praised the emergency services but said the fire service "fell well short" of the standards it sets for itself.

The report was not designed to criticise firefighters themselves, he said, but to "ensure they are supported" by the "best possible leadership and culture".

Mr Burnham said he would now ask for a further detailed review into how the service works with other agencies.

He said he would also ask the prime minister and Home Office to "consider national guidance" over how to respond to further attacks.

Image copyright Getty Images Image caption St Ann's Square in Manchester became the focus of tributes after the attack

Baroness Beverley Hughes, Mr Burnham's deputy, said the findings would "undoubtedly damage the reputation" of the fire service as an organisation.

"However, it should not tarnish the reputation of firefighters on the front line," she added.

Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service's interim chief fire officer Dawn Docx apologised "unreservedly" for her service's failures.

She said: "Firefighters were desperate on the night to help and they were let down by some of their senior colleagues."

Asked if any disciplinary action had been taken, she said: "We are very much a learning organisation.

"We are not seeking to go down the disciplining route. We are working to make sure this never happens again."

When asked whether former fire chief Peter O'Reilly - who announced his retirement last year - would have faced disciplinary action, Mr Burnham said it was not about scapegoating individuals.

Families 'hounded'

Media playback is unsupported on your device Media caption Figen Murray, whose son Martyn Hett was killed in the blast, said her daughter was told of his death by a journalist

The panel, chaired by former head of the civil service Lord Kerslake, also found:

Many key emergency personnel "exercised sound judgement"

The force duty officer from Greater Manchester Police is praised for "dynamic decision making" in allowing responders to remain in the foyer to carry out first aid

Four British Transport Police officers who had been on duty at Victoria station - which is connected to the arena - arrived at the scene within 30 seconds of the blast

However, agencies failed to share information effectively following the declaration of the incident as a terror attack

Some bereaved families felt it took too long for them to be told of their loved ones' deaths

Families felt "hounded" by the media, with reports of a "scrum" of journalists outside hospitals

Children from two families - who lost a mother and brother, respectively - were offered condolences by reporters at their homes before the deaths had been officially confirmed

Hospital staff were offered £2,000 to speak to the press by way of a note hidden in a tin of biscuits

Lord Kerslake said there was "a lot to be proud of" in the response to the attack.

"But it's also vital to learn the lessons around things that did not go so well," he added.

"It matters not just for the people of Greater Manchester and beyond who were caught up in the terrible events of that night, but also for places that might be caught up in such an attack in the future."

Andy Dark, the assistant general secretary of the Fire Brigade's Union, said the report contained "important lessons for the fire service and for all emergency services".

"A major cause of the problems encountered was the absence of any information being received by the fire service from the police," he said.

"The wider issue, of course, is that government requires only small teams of firefighters to be trained and equipped for such incidents. There is currently a dialogue with the Home Office on the issue of funding for these arrangements."</s>March 27 (UPI) -- Although paramedics arrived within 11 minutes of a bombing after an Ariana Grande concert in Manchester, Great Britain, last year, firefighters were held back for nearly two hours, according to a new report.

An independent report found that the Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service did not arrive at the scene and played "no meaningful role in the response" to the suicide bomber attack that killed 22 people in May of last year.

According to the report, the lack of fire crews at the scene meant that a "valuable resource" was not available to help victims after the attack.

The 226-page report said that a senior fire rescue officer "stuck to rules", keeping emergency responders 1,600 feet away from any suspected zone of danger. That decision made the fire service and control center feel that they "had let down the people of Greater Manchester" on the night of the blast, the report said.

"The fire service was effectively outside the loop and had little awareness of what was happening at the arena," the report found, adding that "strategic oversights" by police commanders led to confusion over whether an "active shooter" was on the loose the night of the suicide bombing.

"There is a lot to be proud of in the response to the attack, both for the city region of Greater Manchester, and for the emergency services," Lord Bob Kerslake, the former Head of the Civil Service, said. "The benefits of collaborative working and planning for emergencies were demonstrated to the full. And there were hundreds, if not thousands, of individual acts of bravery and selflessness."

"But it's also vital to learn the lessons around things that did not go so well. It matters not just for the people of Greater Manchester and beyond who were caught up in the terrible events of that night, but also for places that might be caught up in such an attack in the future."

The report additionally found that families had poor experiences with reporters following the attack, including descriptions of being "hounded" and reporting a "lack of respect" from the press.

Despite more than 50 recommendations to better emergency response in the event of future attacks, the report wasn't able to determine if an earlier arrival by the fire services would have made a difference in the medical outcome of those injured.

"This is a question that only the coronial inquests can decide," the report said.</s>Firefighters were not allowed to go to the scene of the deadly Manchester Arena bombing for more than two hours amid confusion over whether the attacker was on the loose, a scathing report found.

The fire crews “stuck to the rules” for a possible active terrorist – while paramedics were not kept away during the May 22 attack by Salman Abedi at an Ariana Grande concert, according to the Kerslake Report.

Commissioned by Andy Burnham, mayor of Greater Manchester, the inquiry assessed the preparedness and emergency response to the attack.

It deemed that the fire service was effectively “outside of the loop” of police and ambulance emergency responders, the Evening Standard reported.

The 226-page report by Lord Bob Kerslake said “strategic oversights” by police brass led to confusion over whether an “active shooter” was on the loose.

And poor communications between police and the Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service meant nearby firefighters only arrived two hours and six minutes after the bombing.

The report, released Tuesday, makes 50 recommendations but said its panel of experts was not to answer the question: “Would the earlier arrival of GMFRS at the scene have made any difference to the medical outcomes of the injured?”

“This is a question that only the coronial inquests can decide,” it added.

But the report did conclude that firefighters “would have been much better placed to support and, potentially, to accelerate the evacuation of casualties from the foyer,” if they had been at the scene.

The police commander on duty during the attack declared “Operation Plato,” a prearranged plan when officials suspect that an armed terrorist has not been captured.

The official was praised for the vital “life or death” decision to override the rules by allowing medical personnel and police to continue treating the injured.

But a senior fire officer stuck to the rule — which called for emergency responders to stay 500 meters away from a potential armed terrorist – even when “Operation Plato” was placed on standby, the report said.

It also was “fortuitous” the North West Ambulance Service was informed 90 minutes late, the report said, otherwise it may have pulled out its paramedics, whose presence meant “lives were saved.”

The phone company Vodafone – which operates an emergency system that should kick in after a terror attack — also was criticized in the report.

The National Mutual Aid Telephony system operated by Vodafone suffered a “catastrophic failure” – causing anguish to the families who were “reduced to a frantic search around the hospitals of Greater Manchester to find out more,” The Guardian reported.</s>The fire service was “outside of the loop” of the police and ambulance emergency response to the Manchester Arena attack leading to a two-hour delay, a major report said today.

Firefighters, some who heard the bomb go off, and trained in first-aid and terror scenarios with specialist equipment, did not get permission to go to the scene until hours after the suicide bombing, despite the nearest station being half a mile away.

“Strategic oversights” by police commanders led to confusion with other 999 services over whether an “active shooter” was on the loose and poor communications between Greater Manchester Police (GMP) and Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS) meant the “valuable” assistance of fire crews was delayed by two hours and six minutes after the bombing, which left 22 dead and scores injured.

The 226-page report by Lord Bob Kerslake, was commissioned by Andy Burnham , the Mayor of Greater Manchester, to assess the preparedness and emergency response to the attack on last year.

No individuals are named but the report, released on Tuesday, makes 50 recommendations.

The panel of experts state they are not able to say whether earlier arrival of the fire service would have “affected any casualty’s survivability”.

“This is a question that only the coronial inquests can decide,” the report said.

But it says firefighters “would have been much better placed to support and, potentially, to accelerate the evacuation of casualties from the foyer,” if they had gone to the scene.

Suicide bomber Salman Abedi detonated his home-made device at 10.31pm on May 22, last year, in the foyer of Manchester Arena as 14,000 people streamed out at the end of an Ariana Grande concert .

Officers from British Transport Police were on scene one minute later and declared a major incident by 10.39pm.

The police duty inspector in the Greater Manchester Police control room declared Operation Plato, a pre-arranged plan when it is suspected a marauding armed terrorist may be on the loose - and assumed, wrongly, other agencies were aware.

But he was praised for taking one of the most crucial “life or death” decisions of the night, a “key use of discretion” to over-ride the rules and allow paramedics and police already on scene to continue treating the injured even though they may be in danger of further attacks.

GMFRS and the North West Ambulance Service (NWAS) were only informed an hour and a half later, and by then Operation Plato was effectively put on “stand by” as it emerged the attack was from a single suicide bomber and not the prelude to further armed attacks.

Armed police and twelve ambulances were on the scene within 20 minutes but there was a shortage of stretchers to ferry the injured from the foyer to a casualty area on the concourse of Manchester Victoria Station, under the arena.

The senior fire officer on duty, a national inter-agency liaison officer, came to believe an “active shooter” scenario was still in play and stuck to rules which dictate keeping emergency responders 500m away from any suspected “hot” zone of danger from a potential armed terrorist.

It was “fortuitous” the NWAS were not informed - otherwise they may have pulled out their paramedics and instead they stayed and “lives were saved” the report said.

As the fire officer could not get through on the phone to the police force duty officer the response of the fire service was, “brought to the point of paralysis” to the “immense frustration on the firefighters’ faces”.

Instead of rushing to the scene to help, fire crews and a special response team, trained to deal with terrorist incidents, rendezvoused at a fire station outside the city centre.

And while a joint strategic co-ordinating group of emergency response services and others gathered at GMP HQ in east Manchester, GMFRS chief fire officer Peter O’Reilly, who has now retired, focused his senior officers at their own HQ in Salford, which played a “key role” in delaying the response further.

The report says it hopes a scenario of different services control rooms not being able to properly pass critical information between them, “will never happen again”.

Lord Kerslake, the panel, police, fire and other authority bosses will shortly hold a press conference about the report’s findings.</s>An independent report into the emergency response to last year’s Manchester Arena bombing highlights major failings, including the fire service’s absence from the scene for the first two hours after the explosion.

The review chaired by Lord Bob Kerslake, the former head of the civil service, stated that the Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS) “played no meaningful role in the response for two hours.” This failure to arrive on the scene meant emergency services were down a valuable resource, according to the review.

The fire service was effectively “outside the loop,” the report said, blaming a combination of poor communication and poor procedures. The Kerslake Report noted that the average response time for the service was less than six minutes.

READ MORE: One year since Westminster attack, top cop admits Britain had become ‘less hostile’ to terrorists

The review also branded the actions of some members of the media as “completely and utterly unacceptable.” The panel said it was shocked and dismayed by accounts from families of being ‘hounded’ and shown a ‘lack of respect.’

Vodafone was criticised for "the complete failure" of its telephone system which seriously hampered an effective emergency response line for families, causing considerable distress to those looking for information on their loved ones. A number of people were reduced to a frantic search around the hospitals of Greater Manchester to find out more, the report outlined.

While the actions of the Greater Manchester police were commended for the most part, the report noted communication issues between the police and other agencies.

Speaking at the launch of the review, Kerslake acknowledged “there is a lot to be proud of in the response to the attack” but added it’s “vital to learn the lessons around things that did not go so well.”

Specifically the report praised the civic response and the support provided by family liaison officers and bereavement nurses. It also commended the care and sensitivity demonstrated in the removal of the deceased from the arena.

The May 22 suicide attack killed 22 people and injured hundreds, many of them children.

If you like this story, share it with a friend!</s>Firefighters who were kept 'outside the loop' during the Manchester terror attack were not allowed near the scene until two hours after the fatal bombing at an Ariana Grande concert.

While paramedics and armed police were on the scene of last May’s attack within ten minutes, the fire service was in ‘paralysis’, according to Lord Bob Kerslake’s report into the atrocity, published today.

Frustrated crews - many of whom had heard the blast from their city centre post - were instead sent away to a station in Beswick, three miles away, only to later be sent back into town again amid confusion.

However a major report into the attack at the Manchester Arena does not say if the delay caused more people to lose their life.

The report says that the fire service was effectively "outside of the loop" of police and ambulance emergency responders.

This meant firefighters, some who heard the bomb go off, and trained in first-aid and terror scenarios with specialist equipment, did not get permission to go to the scene until hours after the suicide bombing, despite being stationed half a mile away.

"Strategic oversights" by police commanders led to confusion over whether an "active shooter" was on the loose.

Poor communications between Greater Manchester Police (GMP) and Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS) meant fire crews only arrived two hours and six minutes after the bombing, which left 22 dead and scores injured.

The 226-page report by Lord Bob Kerslake was commissioned by Andy Burnham, the mayor of Greater Manchester, to assess the preparedness and emergency response to the attack last year.

The review also finds that Vodafone, which holds the national Home Office contract for emergency post-disaster hotlines, experienced a ‘catastrophic’ technical failure on the night that meant no fully-functioning phone number could be set up for desperate people in search of information.

Some relatives were forced to drive around hospitals in search of loved ones instead.

The report, released on Tuesday, makes 50 recommendations but states its panel of experts was not to answer the question of, "would the earlier arrival of GMFRS at the scene have made any difference to the medical outcomes of the injured?"

"This is a question that only the coronial inquests can decide," the report said.

But it says firefighters "would have been much better placed to support and, potentially, to accelerate the evacuation of casualties from the foyer," if they had gone to the scene.

Suicide bomber Salman Abedi detonated his home-made device at 10.31pm on May 22 last year, as 14,000 people streamed out of Manchester Arena at the end of an Ariana Grande concert.

Officers from British Transport Police were on scene one minute later and declared a major incident by 10.39pm.

The police duty inspector in the GMP force control room declared Operation Plato, a pre-arranged plan when it is suspected a marauding armed terrorist may be on the loose - and assumed, wrongly, other agencies were aware.

But he was praised for taking one of the most crucial "life or death" decisions of the night, a "key use of discretion" to override the rules and allow paramedics and police to continue treating the injured even though they may be in danger of further attacks.

But GMFRS and the North West Ambulance Service (NWAS) were only informed an hour and a half later and by then Operation Plato was effectively put on "stand by" as it emerged the attack was from a single suicide bomber and not the prelude to further armed attacks.

Armed police and 12 ambulances were on the scene within 20 minutes but a shortage of stretchers hampered ferrying the injured from the foyer to a casualty area on the station concourse.

The senior fire officer on duty, a National Inter-Agency Liaison Officer, stuck to rules which dictate keeping emergency responders 500 metres away from any suspected "hot" zone of danger from a potential armed terrorist.

It was "fortuitous" the NWAS were not informed - otherwise they may have pulled out their paramedics, the report stated and instead they stayed and "lives were saved".

As the fire officer could not get through on the phone to the police force duty officer, the response of the fire service was "brought to the point of paralysis" to the "immense frustration on the firefighters faces".

Instead of rushing to the scene to help, fire crews and a Special Response Team, trained to deal with terrorist incidents, rendezvoused at fire station outside the city centre.

And while a joint strategic co-ordinating group of emergency response services and others gathered at GMP HQ in east Manchester, GMFRS chief fire officer Peter O'Reilly, who has now retired, focused his senior officers at their own HQ in Salford, which played a "key role" in delaying the response further.

The report says it hopes, in future, different services control rooms not being able to properly pass critical information between them "will never happen again."

Lord Kerslake, the panel, police, fire and other authority bosses will shortly hold a press conference about the report's findings.</s>Suicide bomber Salman Abedi killed 22 people last year on May 22 in the foyer of an arena, as thousands of people streamed out after attending an Ariana Grande concert.

An independent review, chaired by former Head of the Civil Service Lord Kerslake, illustrated how poor communications between the emergency agencies gave the Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS) conflicting information. The service began the wrong type of response and later set up at an incorrect "rendezvous" point several miles away from the scene as a result.

Two fire teams were in earshot of the explosion yet did not immediately respond at or nearer to the scene, having been told it was too dangerous to do so.

"The Fire Service was effectively 'outside the loop,' having no presence at the rendezvous point established by the Police, little awareness of what was happening at the Arena and only a very limited and belated presence," the report found.

The fire service was heavily reliant on the police and ambulance services for information and an inter-agency officer to coordinate the different services. The fire service said in a statement Tuesday that there were clear failures in the leadership and decision-making in the response, and that the firefighters had been let down by their superiors. "The 22nd May 2017 was Greater Manchester's darkest hour and it is clear that our response fell far short of that which the people of Greater Manchester have a right to expect. I apologize unreservedly for that," said Dawn Docx, the service's interim chief fire officer. "The fundamental mistake made by the fire service that night was failing to communicate with our partner agencies and that is something at the forefront of our plans to change fundamentally the fire service and its culture." The report said there was no single reason or person behind the failure: "Rather, it was a combination of poor communication and poor procedures." The report also pointed to failure by telecommunications company Vodafone, saying that a casualty bureau it had set up "was seriously hampered by the complete failure" of a telephone-based communications system provided by Vodafone. "As a consequence, communication with the families caught up in the attack was badly affected," the report found. It said that a dedicated telephone contact service was not set up more than four hours after the attack. "This failure was a cause of significant stress and upset on the night to the families involved, who were seeking to find out more about the situation of their loved ones. A number were reduced to a frantic search around the hospitals of Greater Manchester to find out more." Tributes for the victims of the Manchester bombing at Albert Square on May 24, 2017. Vodafone, which has a contract with the government to provide dedicated phone services in emergencies, has also apologized. In a statement to CNN it admitted that a failure in one of its systems meant the Greater Manchester Police were not able to issue the dedicated number immediately after the attack. "This was clearly unacceptable and we sincerely apologize for the distress caused to those affected by this terrible attack," Vodafone said in a statement sent to CNN. The report did, however, commend emergency responders, saying there was "a lot to be proud of." Police and ambulance services arrived at the scene rapidly, and armed officers quickly secured the area.</s>The Kerslake Report, which looked into the response following the Manchester Arena attack on May 22, was published today.

It is named after Lord Bob Kerslake - chairman of the independent review.

Lord Kerslake, whose full name is Robert Walter Kerslake, is a senior civil servant and a member of the House of Lords.

He was formerly head of the Home Civil Service, but now holds the position of permanent secretary at the Department for Communities and Local Government.

At the start of his career, Lord Kerslake worked for numerous councils in London, before becoming chief executive of the London Borough of Hounslow.

After that, he worked as chief executive of Sheffield City Council, then chief executive of the Homes and Communities Agency until he moved into central government.

Before joining the civil service Lord Kerslake received a knighthood for his services to local government.

Other honours include being made an honorary graduate at Sheffield Hallam University and the University of Warwick, and in 2015 he was elected a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences.</s>Firefighters – some who heard the bomb go off and trained in first-aid for terror scenarios – did not get permission to go to the scene until hours after the blast. This came despite the nearest station being half a mile away, a 226-page report by Lord Bob Kerslake ruled. "Strategic oversights" by police commanders led to confusion with other 999 services over whether an "active shooter" was on the loose, it was ruled. And poor communications between Greater Police (GMP) and Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS) meant the "valuable" assistance of fire crews was delayed by two hours and six minutes. Suicide bomber Salman Abedi detonated his home-made device at 10.31pm on May 22, last year, in the foyer of Arena as 14,000 people streamed out at the end of an Ariana Grande concert.

Officers from British Transport Police were on the scene one minute later and declared a major incident by 10.39pm. The police duty inspector in the Greater Manchester Police control room declared Operation Plato, a pre-arranged plan when it is suspected a marauding armed terrorist may be on the loose. But he assumed, wrongly, other agencies were aware. However, he was praised for taking one of the most crucial "life or death" decisions of the night, a "key use of discretion" to over-ride the rules and allow paramedics and police already on scene to continue treating the injured even though they may be in danger of further attacks. GMFRS and the North West Ambulance Service (NWAS) were only informed an hour and a half later.

And by then, Operation Plato was effectively put on "stand by" as it emerged the attack was from a single suicide bomber and not the prelude to further armed attacks. Armed police and twelve ambulances were on the scene within 20 minutes, but there was a shortage of stretchers to ferry the injured from the foyer to a casualty area on the concourse of Manchester Victoria Station, under the arena. The report – commissioned by Mayor of Greater Manchester Andy Burnham – set out to assess the preparedness and emergency response to the attack on last year. No individuals are named but the report makes 50 recommendations. The panel of experts state they are not able to say whether earlier arrival of the fire service would have "affected any casualty's survivability".</s>Emergency services have been criticised over the chaotic response to the Manchester Arena bombing in a report which found the fire service was not informed about the terror attack for two hours.

Poor communications between Greater Manchester Police (GMP) and Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS) meant the 'valuable' assistance of fire crews was delayed by two hours and six minutes after the bombing, which left 22 dead and more than 100 injured.

Armed police and twelve ambulances were on the scene within 20 minutes but there was a shortage of stretchers to ferry the injured from the foyer, the report found.

One person injured in the blast told the report: 'I was carried out of the Arena on an advertising board. There was a lack of first aid equipment for people to access.

'They had small first aid boxes on their belts and were not allowed to collect more from stores as the zones were closed off.'

Another added: 'Metal railings were used to carry out all the injured people from the Arena.'

The 226-page report by Lord Bob Kerslake stated: 'A common perspective was that there were too few paramedics in the foyer assisting the injured.

'Some felt there was a delay in treatment and transfer to hospital. Many were concerned at the need to use makeshift stretchers, insufficient first aid equipment and the lack of blankets.'

Lord Kerslake found that firefighters, some who heard the bomb go off and were trained in first-aid and terror scenarios, did not get permission to go to the scene until hours after the suicide bombing, despite the nearest station being half a mile away.

Mistakes by police commanders led to confusion with other 999 services over whether an 'active shooter' was on the loose.

A senior fire officer on duty came to believe an 'active shooter' was still around - meaning rules were in place to keep emergency responders 500 metres away from the scene.

The report found it was lucky that the ambulance service was not informed - otherwise they may have pulled out their paramedics and instead they stayed and 'lives were saved' the report said.

As the fire officer could not get through on the phone to the police force duty officer the response of the fire service was 'brought to the point of paralysis' to the 'immense frustration on the firefighters' faces', the report stated.

Instead of rushing to the scene to help, fire crews and a special response team, trained to deal with terrorist incidents, rendezvoused at a fire station outside the city centre.

And while a joint strategic co-ordinating group of emergency response services and others gathered at GMP HQ in east Manchester, GMFRS

Police were gathered at police headquarters while Chief fire officer Peter O'Reilly, who has now retired, focused his senior officers at their own HQ in Salford, which delaying the response further.

The report says it hopes a scenario of different services control rooms not being able to properly pass critical information between them, 'will never happen again'.

No individuals are named but the report, released on Tuesday, makes 50 recommendations.

The panel of experts state they are not able to say whether earlier arrival of the fire service would have 'affected any casualty's survivability'.

'This is a question that only the coronial inquests can decide,' the report said.

But it says fire fighters 'would have been much better placed to support and, potentially, to accelerate the evacuation of casualties from the foyer,' if they had gone to the scene.

Suicide bomber Salman Abedi detonated his home-made device at 10.31pm on May 22, last year, in the foyer of Manchester Arena as 14,000 people streamed out at the end of an Ariana Grande concert.

Officers from British Transport Police were on scene one minute later and declared a major incident by 10.39pm.

The police duty inspector in the Greater Manchester Police control room declared Operation Plato, a pre-arranged plan when it is suspected a marauding armed terrorist may be on the loose - and assumed, wrongly, other agencies were aware.

But he was praised for taking one of the most crucial 'life or death' decisions of the night; to over-ride the rules and allow paramedics and police already on scene to continue treating the injured even though they may be in danger of further attacks.

The fire and ambulance services were only informed an hour and a half later, and by then Operation Plato was effectively put on 'stand by' as it emerged the attack was from a single suicide bomber and not the prelude to further armed attacks.

Lord Kerslake, the panel, police, fire and other authority bosses will shortly hold a press conference about the report's findings.

Terror of injured who lay for hours waiting for help Adam Lawler, 15, was seriously injured while his friend Olivia Campbell, also 15, died Badly-hurt survivors have told of their terror and confusion as they waited in the bombed-out Manchester Arena. Schoolboy Adam Lawler, 15, was seriously injured while his friend Olivia Campbell, also 15, died. He spent a week in intensive care and had five operations to remove more than 20 pieces of shrapnel in his body, one of which left him blind in his right eye. But despite the severity of his condition, he was left on the floor for as long as two hours before being taken to hospital. Recalling the traumatic moments after the blast, Adam, from Bury, Lancashire, said: 'All I remember is a white light and very severe ringing in my ears. It felt like I was dreaming, in a very bad nightmare. It was surreal.' Victims Josie Howarth, 62, and Janet Senior were forced to improvise with a handbag strap as they waited for help. Speaking last year, Miss Howarth said: 'I took my handbag strap off and said to Janet, 'Can you help me tie a tourniquet on this leg?' And that's when I realised she was injured [too].' As they waited, Mrs Senior, 60, from Knottingly, West Yorkshire, told her sister to hold her hand 'because I thought our time had come'. They were overcome with emotion after recalling that they had to wait two hours for help – with paramedics later telling them the tourniquet had prevented Miss Howarth from bleeding to death.
A United Kingdom panel, chaired by the former head of the Home civil service, Lord Bob Kerslake, issues a report which concludes that firefighters were prevented from attending the scene of the bombing for two hours. The report makes more than 50 recommendations.