By Simon Hradecky, created Tuesday, Apr 17th 2018 17:19Z, last updated Tuesday, Nov 20th 2018 12:06Z A Southwest Boeing 737-700, registration N772SW performing flight WN-1380 from New York La Guardia,NY to Dallas Love,TX (USA) with 143 passengers and 5 crew, was climbing through FL320 out of New York when the left hand engine (CFM56) was damaged causing inlet and parts of the cowl to separate from the airframe, debris impacted the side of the fuselage shattering a passenger window causing the loss of cabin pressure. The crew donned their oxygen masks, reported they had an engine failure and engine fire and were to initiate an emergency descent, shut the engine down and diverted to Philadelphia,PA (USA). The crew requested a 20nm final, reported part of the aircraft was missing, they needed to slow down, they did have an engine fire indication, the crew requested medical services to meet the aircraft, they had injured passengers. ATC understood a passenger might have been sucked out of the aircraft but stopped that discussion "we'll work it out" once the aircraft was on the ground. ATC cleared the flight down to 3000 feet, airspeed on pilot's discretion and instructed the crew to report as soon as they wanted to turn base. While the aircraft was on short final tower advised emergency services there was a hole in the aircraft's side. The aircraft landed safely on runway 27L, vacated the runway and stopped on the adjacent taxiway. The crew advised emergency services their left hand side was damaged, they had injuries inside the cabin. Emergency services foamed the left hand engine, the passengers disembarked via stairs onto the taxiway and were taken to the terminal. One passenger was taken to a hospital with serious injuries. The NTSB later reported one passenger has died (presumably the one taken to the hospital).



Passengers reported a woman was nearly sucked out of the aircraft and was pulled back into the cabin by fellow passengers.



Philadelphia emergency services reported one of the passengers was taken to a hospital with serious injuries in critical condition, 7 other passengers were treated at the airport for minor injuries, none of them was taken to a hospital.



The NTSB reported they have dispatched a go team on site and opened an investigation.



In a press briefing the NTSB reported one passenger has died without providing further detail. As of current the occurrence is treated as an engine failure, it might subsequently be rated an uncontained engine failure depending on investigation results.



The airline stated they are deeply saddened to confirm there is one fatality resulting from this accident, the entire Southwest Family is devastated. "This is a sad day and our hearts go out to the family and the loved ones of the deceased customer", the chairman said. This has been the first inflight fatality ever on a Southwest Airlines Aircraft.



In a second media briefing in the late evening the NTSB reported one fan blade, #13 of 24, was broken right at the hub and had separated, the preliminary examination revealed there is evidence of metal fatigue right where the blade separated. There had been no engine fire, there is no evidence of an engine fire, however, it is known there was an engine fire warning, it is possible and even likely the fire wire activated when the fan blade separated. The Captain was a female, the first officer a male, they did an excellent job. The crew elected to land with the flaps at 5 degrees over controllability concerns. A piece of the engine cowling was found on the ground about 60nm northwest of Philadelphia.



On Apr 18th 2018 the FAA reported: "aircraft experienced engine failure and made emergency descent, Philadelphia PA" stating one passenger died as result of the occurrence, the aircraft sustained substantial damage. The FAA rated the occurrence an accident.



On Apr 18th 2018 in their third media briefing the NTSB reported first data are available from the flight data recorder. The left hand engine parameters ran down to 0, the vibrations increased signficantly, the cabin altitude alert sounded shortly afterwards, the aircraft made an uncommanded rapid roll to a left bank angle of 41 degrees. The crew decided to use flaps at 5 degrees and landed at 165 KIAS about 22 minutes after the left hand engine failed. The FAA was able to see some debris falling off the aircraft on their radar screens, computed the approximate location taking winds into the account, today additional pieces of engine cowling were found as result. The cockpit voice recorder is going to be read out in the coming days. The NTSB established pieces of cowling impacted the leading edge of the wing. The fatally injured passenger was seated in row 14, the window area is being looked at to determine how the window became shattered. Interviews with flight attendants and flight crew are ongoing. This was the last on scene media briefing. The NTSB has not yet been able to determine whether the fan blades of this particular engine were subject to an Airworthiness Directive a few years ago. The crew sounded very calm and assuring, the hat is off to them. The NTSB does have the root part of the fan blade. The fan blade cracked right at the entry into the hub and also fractured about half way. The initiating event looks like to be the crack at th hub where fatigue occurred.



On May 3rd 2018 the NTSB released an investigation update reporting that parts of the engine inlet and cowling struck the wing and the fuselage causing a "rapid depressurization of the cabin after the loss of one of the passenger windows". The NTSB wrote: "Initial examination of the airplane revealed that the majority of the inlet cowl was missing, including the entire outer barrel, the aft bulkhead, and the inner barrel forward of the containment ring. The inlet cowl containment ring was intact but exhibited numerous impact witness marks. Examination of the fan case revealed no through-hole fragment exit penetrations; however, it did exhibit a breach hole that corresponded to one of the fan blade impact marks and fan case tearing." Two pieces of fan blade #13, that had separated, were recovered in addition to the dovetail that had remained at the fan disk. Laboratory examination revealed 6 cracks had developed originating from different points at the convex side. None of the other fan blades showed any crack. All fan blades had accumulated more than 32,000 engine cycles since new, maintenace records show the blades were lubricated as required. In addition, the fan blades had been overhauled 10,712 engine cycles before the accident in November 2012. Since that overhaul the dovetails were visually inspected six times during fan blade lubrication. With respect to the passenger partially pulled out of the cracked window the NTSB wrote: "Three flight attendants were assigned to the flight, and an additional SWA employee was in a jumpseat in the cabin. During interviews, the flight attendants and the employee reported that they heard a loud sound and experienced vibration. The oxygen masks automatically deployed in the cabin. The flight attendants retrieved portable oxygen bottles and began moving through the cabin to calm passengers and assist them with their masks. As they moved toward the mid-cabin, they found the passenger in row 14 partially out of the window and attempted to pull her into the cabin. Two male passengers helped and were able to bring the passenger in." The NTSB stated: "A large gouge impact mark, consistent in shape to a recovered portion of fan cowl and latching mechanism, was adjacent to the row 14 window (see figure 4; the window was entirely missing. No window, airplane structure, or engine material was found inside the cabin." (See photo below)



On Jul 25th 2018 the NTSB revealed in a press release announcing a hearing into this and related engine failures on Nov 14th 2018: " During climb out following departure from New York’s LaGuardia Airport April 17, 2018, the engine experienced a failure of a fan blade which resulted in the loss of the inlet and cowling. Almost the entire inner and outer barrels of the inlet cowl were missing as were the forward and aft inlet bulkheads." (see photo below)



On Nov 20th 2018 the NTSB released their investigation docket including the cockpit voice recorder transcript and the factual report by the operations group providing the flight's history as:



The crew had arrived at Nashville International Airport (BNA), Nashville, Tennessee, the night before the accident (Monday), and had ended their duty day at 2017 CDT5 after completing a block time6 of 7 hours and 53 minutes, and a total duty time7 of 12 hours and 28 minutes. The following morning, (the day of the accident) they reported to BNA at 0600 CDT for their first flight to LGA. The flight to LGA was uneventful. The accident flight was the second flight of the day for the crew and was planned to go from LGA to DAL. There were 144 passengers, two flightdeck crewmembers and three cabin crewmembers aboard. The passenger count included one Southwest Airlines ramp employee who was seated on a flight attendant jumpseat. The accident flight had an on-time departure from LGA at 1030. The first officer (FO) was the pilot-flying (PF).



The crew stated nothing unusual occurred during the taxi, takeoff, and climb to their cleared cruising altitude of FL380. At 1103, and about 40.444° north latitude, 76.235° west longitude8, and shortly after passing through FL320, the crew noted a loud bang, significant aircraft vibration, and aircraft yaw and bank to the left. The CABIN ALTITUDE warning light and horn (indicating cabin altitude of more than 10,000 ft) were activated almost immediately after the onset of the vibration.



The crew donned their oxygen masks. The PF rolled the airplane back to wings-level and began an emergency descent. About one minute later, the aircraft was descending through FL307. At 1104, the air traffic controller in communication with the flight (unaware of the situation) issued a clearance direct to VINSE waypoint. The controller reported hearing a response that contained only static. He also stated he heard an alarm in the background. In the crew interviews, (Attachment 1) they reported some initial confusion about the position of one of the switches which allowed the crew to communicate through a microphone in the oxygen masks. By 1105, the communication issue had been resolved, and the crew reported an engine fire to the controller, and that they were descending.9 They asked for vectors to the nearest airport. The controller responded with Harrisburg International Airport (MDT), Middletown, Pennsylvania, and issued a heading of 250 degrees to that airport. The crew then requested a destination of PHL. At 1106, after coordination with another controller, the controller in contact with the flight cleared the flight to fly direct to PHL.



Shortly after the descent was begun, the captain, per Southwest Airlines requirement, took the airplane’s controls to become the PF, and the FO assumed the duties of pilot monitoring (PM.)10 He then began executing the Engine Fire or Engine Severe Damage or Separation checklist from the Southwest Airlines B737NG Quick Reference Handbook (QRH.)



The crew reported they accomplished the non-normal Engine Fire or Engine Severe Damage or Separation checklist. The pilots stated during their respective interviews they were very busy controlling the plane and assessing the damage and they did not execute two other appropriate non-normal checklist, Cabin Altitude Warning or Rapid Depressurization (indicated by the CABIN ALTITUDE warning light and horn), or Emergency Descent (required by step 5 of the Cabin Altitude Warning or Rapid Depressurization checklist.) The other checklist they stated they accomplished was the Before Landing checklist. The three non-normal checklists mentioned above are shown and discussed in section 7.2.



According to the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript, about 11 minutes after the engine failure, the FO attempted to call the cabin to speak to the flight attendants. The FO stated in his interview there was no reply to his call. In separate interviews11, a flight attendant stated she heard the interphone chime, but when she answered it, she could not hear anything. She stated it was too loud in the cabin. A few seconds later, another flight attendant was successful in reaching the flightdeck on the interphone. The CVR transcript confirms that shortly after the FO reported no reply to his first call, a chime was heard on the flightdeck, and the FO began speaking with one of the flight attendants. This was the first communication between the flightdeck and the cabin and was when the flightdeck crew first learned of the situation in the cabin, including an injured passenger.



According to information from the Flight Data Recorder, from the time of the event until reaching about 17,000 feet msl, the airplane maintained an airspeed between 280 and 300 knots. As the descent continued, the airplane gradually slowed, reaching an airspeed of about 185 knots two minutes before landing. The airplane maintained this speed through the approach until touchdown. The flight conducted a visual approach to runway 27L at PHL and landed without further incident 17 minutes after the engine failure.



The captain stated in the interview that she initially flew slower than the recommended speed for emergency descent to reduce the severity of the airframe vibration. The captain also stated she flew the final segment of the approach at a higher-than-normal airspeed of 180 knots because she was concerned about controllability problems and did not want to get too slow. The recommended landing flap configuration from the Aircraft Operating Manual for a single engine landing was flaps 15. The captain said she chose to land with flaps 5 to avoid getting too slow and because of the airplane’s sluggish handling. The aircraft operating manual does not list recommended reference speeds for landing with flaps 5, so the captain decided to use the speed for flaps 15 and add 20 knots. She obtained the speed for flaps 15 landing from the referring to the approach reference page on the Flight Management Computer, then added 20 knots (to account for the flap 5 vs flaps 15 setting.) She stated this came to 180 knots.



The captain (56, ATPL, 11,715 hours total, 10,513 hours on type) was initially pilot monitoring, following the engine failure assumed the role as pilot flying. The first officer (44, CPL, 9,508 hours total, 6,927 hours on type) was initially pilot flying and assumed the role as pilot monitoring following the engine failure.



A similiar occurrence had happened in 2016, see Accident: Southwest B737 near Pensacola on Aug 27th 2016, uncontained engine failure.



EASA had released Airworthiness Directive 2018-0071 dated Mar 26th 2018 and effective Apr 2nd 2018 reasoning: "An occurrence was reported of fan blade failure on a CFM56-7B engine. The released fan blade was initially contained by the engine case, but there was subsequent uncontained forward release of debris and separation of the inlet cowl. Preliminary investigation determined that the fracture in the blade initiated from the fan blade dovetail. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could lead to fan blade failure, possibly resulting in uncontained forward release of debris, with consequent damage to the engine and the aeroplane." The AD requires an ultrasonic inspection of each affected fan blade within 9 months of the AD becoming effective.



The FAA had released an AD 2010-12-03 for CFM56-3 and CFM56-3B engines not applicable to this aircraft which features CFM56-7B engines. The FAA AD and EAD register shows no other airworthiness directives concerning fan blades of CFM56 engines.



Late Apr 20th 2018 the FAA released an Emergency Airwortihiness Directive (EAD) 2018-09-51 to address the fan blade issue, see News: FAA issues Emergency AD on CFM56-7B engines.



https://flightaware.com/live/flight/SWA1380/history/20180417/1430Z/KLGA/KDAL



Walk around including various views of the engine (Updated Video: NTSB):

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3TA8VWF2O8k



Second Media Briefing with first FDR results (Video: NTSB):

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EL5eMVGz5gk



Media Briefing (Video: NTSB):

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JxNS8H63oAc



Photo/Graphics of engine released in press release (Photo: NTSB):





Fan cowl part and impact marks at missing window row 14 (Photo: NTSB):





Pieces of engine cowl found near Philadelphia (Photo: NTSB):





The fan of the left hand engine, one fan blade missing (Photo: NTSB):





The shattered passenger window (Photo: Matt Tranchin):





The damaged engine (Photo: Matt Tranchin):





The aircraft seen from the ground, the winglet obscures the shattered window:





The aircraft seen from the ground:









</s>The National Transportation Safety Board will likely take more than a year to determine what caused the catastrophic failure of an engine on Southwest Flight 1380, rupturing the cabin and killing a passenger. No surprise, then, that nobody’s waiting for the final verdict to try to stop it from happening again.

The NTSB says the engine failed after one of the blades that make up the fan at the front of the CMF56-7B engine sheared off, at 32,500 feet. Investigators found signs of metal fatigue in the blade’s stumpy remains. Here, “fatigue” essentially means weakening—a possible result of subjecting metal alloys to the extreme temperatures and heavy loads that come with every flight. The regular expansion and contraction of the metal can exaggerate the smallest defects, like micro fractures, to the point where they become dangerous.

So the CMF56-7B, made by CFM International (a joint venture between Safran and General Electric) and bolted to 6,700 planes around the world, is getting a lot of extra attention. Southwest crews will spend the next 30 days inspecting hundreds of its CFM engines, according to Reuters. And the Federal Aviation Administration says it will issue an airworthiness directive within the next two weeks, requiring all airlines run an ultrasonic inspection of all 24 fan blades on every CFM56-7B they use, after it has been through a certain number of takeoff and landing cycles.

The ultrasonic bit is important, since the fatigue on the blown engine was on the interior of the snapped blade, according to the NTSB, where it would have been hard to spot in a visual inspection.

Much like a doctor inspecting an expectant mother, technicians go back and forth over each blade with a hand-held sensor, pulsing ultrasonic waves through the metal, looking for defects. The results don’t came back as an image, but more like an EKG graph, says Antonios Kontsos, an expert in structural fatigue and failure detection at Drexel University in Philadelphia. Cracks in the metal show up as an abnormal signal. It’s laborious, time-consuming, and the best way to see inside these all-important metals.

The FAA and NTSB are already investigating another Southwest flight, in August 2016, where this type of engine failed in midair. The plane made an emergency landing in Pensacola, Florida, without injuries. Afterward, the FAA proposed voluntary airworthiness inspections for the CMF56-7B. This time around, it’s making them mandatory.

Still, modern jet engines are a paragon of reliability. Failures—ie, In-flight Engine Shutdowns—cause less than 3 percent of flight diversions. That’s largely because airlines have robust inspection and maintenance programs. As engines cost up to $30 million and are the main thing keeping air between the plane and the ground, they’re worth looking after. KLM, for example, says the CF6-80E, which powers its Airbus A330s, needs major maintenance about every 7,300 takeoff and landing cycles, and minor maintenance every 200 to 400 cycles.

At Delta’s Atlanta maintenance facility—which is the size of 47 football fields—techs dismantle entire engines. They clean and inspect every part, from the albatross-like fan blades to the tiny component inside the fuel injector. It takes them 50 to 80 days to do that, replacing the worn out bits and putting everything back together. They then haul the refreshed engine into a bunker-like concrete cell, where they run it at speed to verify it is indeed good as new. Only then do they bolt the thing back onto a jet wing and let it return to work.

Long before they get to fly, new engine types go through a bruising array of tests—ingesting water, ice, sand from all over the world, and dead chickens. And when they are in service, airlines collect reams of data on vibration, temperature, and speed, hoping to spot problems before they become catastrophic.

In the future, a new generation of ultrasound and infrared sensors, built into the engines, could detect structural defects before they present any danger at all. “It would be a paradigm shift, integrating diagnostics and prognostics,” says Kontsos, who is working with military and commercial operators to develop such systems. “You could infer the engine health as you fly or operate the device.”

As with all such aviation advances, it will be years, at a minimum, before such sensors can make their way onto real, people-packed airplanes. Until then, we’ll have to rely on the men and women building—and rebuilding—those engines to keep us in the air.
• The exhilarating art of landing planes in crazy crosswinds
• NASA's new X-plane could revive supersonic flight for the masses
• A day with the zombies who help airports practice plane crashes</s>By Simon Hradecky, created Saturday, Apr 21st 2018 04:46Z, last updated Friday, May 4th 2018 13:25Z The FAA have released Emergency Airworthiness Directive (EAD) 2018-09-51 concerning all CFM56-7B engines with 30,000 or more flight cycles (estimated 352 engines within the USA and 681 engines globally). The FAA reasons:



This emergency AD was prompted by a recent event in which a Boeing Model 737-700 airplane powered by CFM56-7B model engines experienced an engine failure due to a fractured fan blade, resulting in the engine inlet cowl disintegrating. Debris penetrated the fuselage causing a loss of pressurization and prompting an emergency descent. Although the airplane landed safely, there was one passenger fatality. Fan blade failure due to cracking, if not addressed, could result in an engine in-flight shutdown (IFSD), uncontained release of debris, damage to the engine, damage to the airplane, and possible airplane decompression.



See Accident: Southwest B737 near Philadelphia on Apr 17th 2018, uncontained engine failure takes out passenger window for details of the accident referenced by the EAD.



The FAA reports that CFM Service Bulletin CFM56-7B S/B 72-1033 dated April 20 (SB) 2018 provides action for engines with fewer than 30,000 flight cycles, however, the EAD affects engines with 30,000 or more flight cycles only. In addition the SB requires reporting of the inspection results, the EAD does not require reporting. Otherwise there is no difference between the SB and the EAD.



The EAD requires all 24 fan blade dovetail concave and convex sides of CFM56-7B engines to undergo ultrasonic inspection to detect cracking within 20 days. If any unservicable fan blades are being found, they are to be removed from service before further flight.



On May 2nd 2018 the FAA released another Airworthiness Directive 2018-09-10 that based on the same reasoning as the previously released EAD introduces a more generic inspection scheme requiring inspections of fan blades as follows:



(1) Perform an ultrasonic inspection (USI) or eddy current inspection (ECI) of the concave and convex sides of the fan blade dovetail as follows:



(i) Perform an initial inspection on each fan blade before the fan blade accumulates 20,000 cycles since new, or within 113 days from the effective date of this AD, whichever occurs later.



(ii) If cycles since new on a fan blade is unknown, perform an initial inspection within 113 days from the effective date of this AD.



(iii) Thereafter, repeat this inspection no later than 3,000 cycles since the last inspection.



(iv) Use the Accomplishment Instructions, paragraphs 3.A.(3)(a) through (i), of CFM Service Bulletin (SB) CFM56-7B S/B 72-1033, dated April 20, 2018, to perform a USI or use the instructions in subtask 72-21-01-220-091, of task 72-21-01-200-001, from CFM CFM56-7B Engine Shop Manual, Revision 57, dated January 15, 2018, to perform an ECI.



(2) If any unserviceable indication, as specified in the applicable service information in paragraph (g)(1)(iv) of this AD, is found during the inspections required by paragraph (g) of this AD, replace the fan blade before further flight with a part eligible for installation.



The FAA estimates that 3,716 engines under US registration will be affected by the AD.



</s>The notification comes from the FAA and will affect roughly 352 engines administered by U.S. operators.

Following the fatal engine failure that led to the mid-air accident of Southwest Flight 1380 earlier this week, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has demanded a massive engine inspection, CNBC reports.

The FAA has issued an Emergency Airworthiness Directive (EAD) on Friday, April 20, regarding CFM56-7B engines — the same engine type on the Boeing 737 airplane involved in the Southwest accident on Tuesday, April 17.

According to the directive, airline operators are required to perform an inspection of the CFM56-7B engine fan blades, which in the case of Flight 1380, exploded at 32,000 feet, killing one passenger and forcing the Southwest Airlines airplane to make an emergency landing in Philadelphia.

“We are issuing this [airworthiness directive] because we evaluated all the relevant information and determined the unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop in other products of the same type design,” notified the FAA.

The EAD applies to certain CFM56-7B engines, specifically those that have been used for more than 30,000 total cycles. A cycle is a unit measure for airplane use and runs from take-off to shut down after landing, CNBC notes.

Furthermore, the directive states that operators must complete this verification within 20 days.

The EAD comes after the CFM56-7B engine manufacturer, CFM International, released a service bulletin calling for more rigid testing of this type of engine, the FAA explained.

The airline regulator also mentioned that data from the investigation on Boeing 737 engine failure factored into Friday’s emergency directive.

The CFM bulletin, also issued on Friday, recommends that the CFM56-7B fan blades be examined with an ultrasonic probe — a procedure that lasts for four hours per each of the airplanes’ engines and which can be performed without removing the engines from the aircrafts’ wings.

The reason why CFM is suggesting that operators conduct the CFM56-7B engine verifications via ultrasonic probe is that the fan blades might hide tiny cracks, which would not be detected with the naked eye.

According to CFM estimates, the inspection order will affect some 352 engines in the U.S. and 681 worldwide, specified the FAA.

In addition, the engine manufacturer also recommends that operators verify the CFM56-7B engines with about 20,000 cycles as well. This will be applicable to an estimated 2,500 engines, states CFM.

The CFM56-7B engine is one of the most widely used airplane engines worldwide. Tuesday’s tragic failure of the popular engine model resulted in the first passenger fatality on a U.S. airline in the last nine years and the first accident-related passenger death ever recorded in the history of Southwest Airlines.</s>WASHINGTON, April 18 (Reuters) - The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) said on Wednesday it would order inspection of some 220 jet engines after investigators said a broken fan blade touched off the explosion on a Southwest Airlines flight, shattering a window and killing a passenger.

The so-called air-worthiness directive would require an ultrasonic inspection within the next six months of the fan blades on all CFM56-7B engines that have accrued a certain number of flights. (Reporting by David Shepardson; Writing by Dan Whitcomb; Editing by Sandra Maler)</s>WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) said on Wednesday it would order inspection of some 220 jet engines after investigators said a broken fan blade touched off the explosion on a Southwest Airlines flight, shattering a window and killing a passenger.

The so-called air-worthiness directive would require an ultrasonic inspection within the next six months of the fan blades on all CFM56-7B engines that have accrued a certain number of flights.

 

 (Reporting by David Shepardson; Writing by Dan Whitcomb; Editing by Sandra Maler)</s>WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) said on Wednesday it would order inspection of some 220 jet engines after investigators said a broken fan blade touched off the explosion on a Southwest Airlines flight, shattering a window and killing a passenger.

The so-called air-worthiness directive would require an ultrasonic inspection within the next six months of the fan blades on all CFM56-7B engines that have accrued a certain number of flights.</s>The Federal Aviation Administration on Friday ordered airlines to inspect the fan blades of some engines of the same type that exploded on a Southwest Airlines flight earlier this week. One passenger was killed after she was partially sucked through a window that blew open in the blast when a fan blade on one of the Boeing 737's engines broke loose when the plane was above 30,000 feet.

It was the first passenger death on a U.S. airline since 2009 and the first ever passenger fatality due to an accident or incident in Southwest's history.

The Federal Aviation Administration said the "emergency" order was based on a service bulletin, also issued Friday from the engine's manufacturer, CFM International, calling for more stringent testing of the CFM56-7B engine, and an investigation into the deadly engine failure on Southwest Flight 1380, the airline regulator said.

Under the FAA's order some engines will have to be inspected within 20 days.

The engine type is one of the most commonly used around the world. Friday's order will affect some 352 engines in the U.S. and 681 worldwide.

CFM International, a joint venture of General Electric and France's Safran Aircraft Engines, said engine inspectors can examine the engine while it is still on the wing using an ultrasonic probe. Tiny cracks in the engine's fan blades may not be visible to the naked eye. That test takes about four hours per engine, CFM said.

CFM also recommended that engines with about 20,000 cycles, which it estimates applies to 2,500 engines.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued an Emergency Airworthiness Directive (EAD) that requires operators to inspect fan blades on certain CFM56-7B engines within 20 days. The directive is based on a CFM International Service Bulletin issued today and on information gathered from the investigation of Tuesday's Southwest Airlines engine failure. The inspection requirement applies to CFM56-7B engines. Specifically, engines with more than 30,000 total cycles from new must undergo inspections within 20 days. The EAD becomes effective upon publication. The engine manufacturer estimates today's corrective action affects 352 engines in the U.S. and 681 engines worldwide.

This story is developing. Please check back for updates.</s>WASHINGTON (Reuters) - U.S. and European regulators on Friday will announce they are requiring emergency inspections within the next 20 days of fan blades of nearly 700 CFM56-7B engines worldwide after the crash this week of a Southwest Airlines jet that killed one person, two sources said.

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration and European regulators will announce they are mandating the inspections that were recommended by engine maker CFM International, a partnership of France’s Safran SA and General Electric Co, in a bulletin earlier Friday. The emergency inspections apply to 681 engines worldwide, including 352 in the United States. CFM said more than 150 have already been inspected.</s>The order, called an air-worthiness directive, would require an ultrasonic inspection within the next six months of the fan blades on all CFM56-7B engines that have accrued a certain number of takeoffs. Bank executive Jennifer Riordan, 43, was killed



Signs of metal fatigue were found where the fan blade separated from the engine. Pic/AFP

The US Federal Aviation Administration said on Wednesday it would order inspection of some 220 jet engines after investigators said a broken fan blade started off an engine explosion on a Southwest Airlines flight, shattering a window and killing a passenger.

The order, called an air-worthiness directive, would require an ultrasonic inspection within the next six months of the fan blades on all CFM56-7B engines that have accrued a certain number of takeoffs. Bank executive Jennifer Riordan, 43, was killed in the engine explosion.

220

No. of jet engines that will be inspected

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The United States Federal Aviation Administration issues an emergency Airworthiness Directive for CFM56-7B jet engines. The EAD expands on previous orders requiring ultrasonic testing to search for metal fatigue in fan blades. It mandates testing on engines that have reached 30,000+ flights, believed to cover 352 US engines and 681 engines worldwide.