The Critique of Pure Reason Part 23
SECTION V. Of the Impossibility of a Cosmological Proof of the
Existence of God

It was by no means a natural course of proceeding, but, on the contrary
An invention entirely due to the subtlety of the schools, to attempt
To draw from a mere idea a proof of the existence of an object
Corresponding to it. Such a course would never have been pursued
Were it not for that need of reason which requires it to suppose the
Existence of a necessary being as a basis for the empirical regress, and
That, as this necessity must be unconditioned and a priori, reason is
Bound to discover a conception which shall satisfy, if possible, this
Requirement, and enable us to attain to the a priori cognition of such
A being. This conception was thought to be found in the idea of an ens
Realissimum, and thus this idea was employed for the attainment of a
Better defined knowledge of a necessary being, of the existence of
Which we were convinced, or persuaded, on other grounds. Thus reason was
Seduced from her natural courage; and, instead of concluding with the
Conception of an ens realissimum, an attempt was made to begin with it
For the purpose of inferring from it that idea of a necessary existence
Which it was in fact called in to complete. Thus arose that unfortunate
Ontological argument, which neither satisfies the healthy common sense
Of humanity, nor sustains the scientific examination of the philosopher
The cosmological proof, which we are about to examine, retains the
Connection between absolute necessity and the highest reality; but
Instead of reasoning from this highest reality to a necessary existence
Like the preceding argument, it concludes from the given unconditioned
Necessity of some being its unlimited reality. The track it pursues
Whether rational or sophistical, is at least natural, and not only goes
Far to persuade the common understanding, but shows itself deserving of
Respect from the speculative intellect; while it contains, at the
Same time, the outlines of all the arguments employed in natural
Theology--arguments which always have been, and still will be, in
Use and authority. These, however adorned, and hid under whatever
Embellishments of rhetoric and sentiment, are at bottom identical
With the arguments we are at present to discuss. This proof, termed by
Leibnitz the argumentum a contingentia mundi, I shall now lay before the
Reader, and subject to a strict examination

It is framed in the following manner: If something exists, an
Absolutely necessary being must likewise exist. Now I, at least, exist
Consequently, there exists an absolutely necessary being. The minor
Contains an experience, the major reasons from a general experience to
The existence of a necessary being.* Thus this argument really begins at
Experience, and is not completely a priori, or ontological. The
Object of all possible experience being the world, it is called the
Cosmological proof. It contains no reference to any peculiar property
Of sensuous objects, by which this world of sense might be distinguished
From other possible worlds; and in this respect it differs from the
Physico-theological proof, which is based upon the consideration of the
Peculiar constitution of our sensuous world
The proof proceeds thus: A necessary being can be determined only in one
Way, that is, it can be determined by only one of all possible opposed
Predicates; consequently, it must be completely determined in and by its
Conception. But there is only a single conception of a thing possible
Which completely determines the thing a priori: that is, the conception
Of the ens realissimum. It follows that the conception of the ens
Realissimum is the only conception by and in which we can cogitate a
Necessary being. Consequently, a Supreme Being necessarily exists

In this cosmological argument are assembled so many sophistical
Propositions that speculative reason seems to have exerted in it all
Her dialectical skill to produce a transcendental illusion of the most
Extreme character. We shall postpone an investigation of this argument
For the present, and confine ourselves to exposing the stratagem by
Which it imposes upon us an old argument in a new dress, and appeals
To the agreement of two witnesses, the one with the credentials of pure
Reason, and the other with those of empiricism; while, in fact, it is
Only the former who has changed his dress and voice, for the purpose
Of passing himself off for an additional witness. That it may possess
A secure foundation, it bases its conclusions upon experience, and thus
Appears to be completely distinct from the ontological argument, which
Places its confidence entirely in pure a priori conceptions. But this
Experience merely aids reason in making one step--to the existence of a
Necessary being. What the properties of this being are cannot be learned
From experience; and therefore reason abandons it altogether, and
Pursues its inquiries in the sphere of pure conception, for the purpose
Of discovering what the properties of an absolutely necessary being
Ought to be, that is, what among all possible things contain the
Conditions (requisita) of absolute necessity. Reason believes that
It has discovered these requisites in the conception of an ens
Realissimum--and in it alone, and hence concludes: The ens realissimum
Is an absolutely necessary being. But it is evident that reason has
Here presupposed that the conception of an ens realissimum is perfectly
Adequate to the conception of a being of absolute necessity, that is
That we may infer the existence of the latter from that of the former--a
Proposition which formed the basis of the ontological argument, and
Which is now employed in the support of the cosmological argument
Contrary to the wish and professions of its inventors. For the existence
Of an absolutely necessary being is given in conceptions alone. But if
I say: "The conception of the ens realissimum is a conception of this
Kind, and in fact the only conception which is adequate to our idea of a
Necessary being," I am obliged to admit, that the latter may be inferred
From the former. Thus it is properly the ontological argument which
Figures in the cosmological, and constitutes the whole strength of the
Latter; while the spurious basis of experience has been of no further
Use than to conduct us to the conception of absolute necessity, being
Utterly insufficient to demonstrate the presence of this attribute in
Any determinate existence or thing. For when we propose to ourselves
An aim of this character, we must abandon the sphere of experience, and
Rise to that of pure conceptions, which we examine with the purpose of
Discovering whether any one contains the conditions of the possibility
Of an absolutely necessary being. But if the possibility of such a being
Is thus demonstrated, its existence is also proved; for we may then
Assert that, of all possible beings there is one which possesses
The attribute of necessity--in other words, this being possesses an
Absolutely necessary existence
All illusions in an argument are more easily detected when they are
Presented in the formal manner employed by the schools, which we now
Proceed to do

If the proposition: "Every absolutely necessary being is likewise an ens
Realissimum," is correct (and it is this which constitutes the nervus
Probandi of the cosmological argument), it must, like all affirmative
Judgements, be capable of conversion--the conversio per accidens, at
Least. It follows, then, that some entia realissima are absolutely
Necessary beings. But no ens realissimum is in any respect different
From another, and what is valid of some is valid of all. In this present
Case, therefore, I may employ simple conversion, and say: "Every ens
Realissimum is a necessary being." But as this proposition is determined
A priori by the conceptions contained in it, the mere conception of
An ens realissimum must possess the additional attribute of absolute
Necessity. But this is exactly what was maintained in the ontological
Argument, and not recognized by the cosmological, although it formed the
Real ground of its disguised and illusory reasoning

Thus the second mode employed by speculative reason of demonstrating the
Existence of a Supreme Being, is not only, like the first, illusory
And inadequate, but possesses the additional blemish of an ignoratio
Elenchi--professing to conduct us by a new road to the desired goal, but
Bringing us back, after a short circuit, to the old path which we had
Deserted at its call

I mentioned above that this cosmological argument contains a perfect
Nest of dialectical assumptions, which transcendental criticism does not
Find it difficult to expose and to dissipate. I shall merely enumerate
These, leaving it to the reader, who must by this time be well practised
In such matters, to investigate the fallacies residing therein

The following fallacies, for example, are discoverable in this mode of
Proof: 1. The transcendental principle: "Everything that is contingent
Must have a cause"--a principle without significance, except in the
Sensuous world. For the purely intellectual conception of the contingent
Cannot produce any synthetical proposition, like that of causality
Which is itself without significance or distinguishing characteristic
Except in the phenomenal world. But in the present case it is employed
To help us beyond the limits of its sphere. 2. "From the impossibility
Of an infinite ascending series of causes in the world of sense a first
Cause is inferred"; a conclusion which the principles of the employment
Of reason do not justify even in the sphere of experience, and still
Less when an attempt is made to pass the limits of this sphere. 3
Reason allows itself to be satisfied upon insufficient grounds, with
Regard to the completion of this series. It removes all conditions
(without which, however, no conception of Necessity can take place);
And, as after this it is beyond our power to form any other conceptions
It accepts this as a completion of the conception it wishes to form of
The series. 4. The logical possibility of a conception of the total
Of reality (the criterion of this possibility being the absence of
Contradiction) is confounded with the transcendental, which requires a
Principle of the practicability of such a synthesis--a principle which
Again refers us to the world of experience. And so on

The aim of the cosmological argument is to avoid the necessity
Of proving the existence of a necessary being priori from mere
Conceptions--a proof which must be ontological, and of which we feel
Ourselves quite incapable. With this purpose, we reason from an
Actual existence--an experience in general, to an absolutely necessary
Condition of that existence. It is in this case unnecessary to
Demonstrate its possibility. For after having proved that it exists, the
Question regarding its possibility is superfluous. Now, when we wish to
Define more strictly the nature of this necessary being, we do not look
Out for some being the conception of which would enable us to comprehend
The necessity of its being--for if we could do this, an empirical
Presupposition would be unnecessary; no, we try to discover merely the
Negative condition (conditio sine qua non), without which a being would
Not be absolutely necessary. Now this would be perfectly admissible in
Every sort of reasoning, from a consequence to its principle; but in
The present case it unfortunately happens that the condition of absolute
Necessity can be discovered in but a single being, the conception of
Which must consequently contain all that is requisite for demonstrating
The presence of absolute necessity, and thus entitle me to infer this
Absolute necessity a priori. That is, it must be possible to reason
Conversely, and say: The thing, to which the conception of the highest
Reality belongs, is absolutely necessary. But if I cannot reason
Thus--and I cannot, unless I believe in the sufficiency of the
Ontological argument--I find insurmountable obstacles in my new path
And am really no farther than the point from which I set out. The
Conception of a Supreme Being satisfies all questions a priori regarding
The internal determinations of a thing, and is for this reason an ideal
Without equal or parallel, the general conception of it indicating it
As at the same time an ens individuum among all possible things. But the
Conception does not satisfy the question regarding its existence--which
Was the purpose of all our inquiries; and, although the existence of a
Necessary being were admitted, we should find it impossible to answer
The question: What of all things in the world must be regarded as such?

It is certainly allowable to admit the existence of an all-sufficient
Being--a cause of all possible effects--for the purpose of enabling
Reason to introduce unity into its mode and grounds of explanation with
Regard to phenomena. But to assert that such a being necessarily exists
Is no longer the modest enunciation of an admissible hypothesis, but
The boldest declaration of an apodeictic certainty; for the cognition of
That which is absolutely necessary must itself possess that character

The aim of the transcendental ideal formed by the mind is either to
Discover a conception which shall harmonize with the idea of absolute
Necessity, or a conception which shall contain that idea. If the one
Is possible, so is the other; for reason recognizes that alone as
Absolutely necessary which is necessary from its conception. But both
Attempts are equally beyond our power--we find it impossible to satisfy
The understanding upon this point, and as impossible to induce it to
Remain at rest in relation to this incapacity

Unconditioned necessity, which, as the ultimate support and stay of
All existing things, is an indispensable requirement of the mind, is an
Abyss on the verge of which human reason trembles in dismay. Even the
Idea of eternity, terrible and sublime as it is, as depicted by Haller
Does not produce upon the mental vision such a feeling of awe and
Terror; for, although it measures the duration of things, it does not
Support them. We cannot bear, nor can we rid ourselves of the
Thought that a being, which we regard as the greatest of all possible
Existences, should say to himself: I am from eternity to eternity;
Beside me there is nothing, except that which exists by my will; whence
Then am I? Here all sinks away from under us; and the greatest, as the
Smallest, perfection, hovers without stay or footing in presence of the
Speculative reason, which finds it as easy to part with the one as with
The other

Many physical powers, which evidence their existence by their effects
Are perfectly inscrutable in their nature; they elude all our powers
Of observation. The transcendental object which forms the basis of
Phenomena, and, in connection with it, the reason why our sensibility
Possesses this rather than that particular kind of conditions, are and
Must ever remain hidden from our mental vision; the fact is there, the
Reason of the fact we cannot see. But an ideal of pure reason cannot
Be termed mysterious or inscrutable, because the only credential of
Its reality is the need of it felt by reason, for the purpose of giving
Completeness to the world of synthetical unity. An ideal is not even
Given as a cogitable object, and therefore cannot be inscrutable; on
The contrary, it must, as a mere idea, be based on the constitution of
Reason itself, and on this account must be capable of explanation and
Solution. For the very essence of reason consists in its ability to
Give an account, of all our conceptions, opinions, and assertions--upon
Objective, or, when they happen to be illusory and fallacious, upon
Subjective grounds

Detection and Explanation of the Dialectical Illusion in all
Transcendental Arguments for the Existence of a Necessary Being

Both of the above arguments are transcendental; in other words, they do
Not proceed upon empirical principles. For, although the cosmological
Argument professed to lay a basis of experience for its edifice
Of reasoning, it did not ground its procedure upon the peculiar
Constitution of experience, but upon pure principles of reason--in
Relation to an existence given by empirical consciousness; utterly
Abandoning its guidance, however, for the purpose of supporting its
Assertions entirely upon pure conceptions. Now what is the cause
In these transcendental arguments, of the dialectical, but natural
Illusion, which connects the conceptions of necessity and supreme
Reality, and hypostatizes that which cannot be anything but an idea?
What is the cause of this unavoidable step on the part of reason, of
Admitting that some one among all existing things must be necessary
While it falls back from the assertion of the existence of such a being
As from an abyss? And how does reason proceed to explain this anomaly
To itself, and from the wavering condition of a timid and reluctant
Approbation--always again withdrawn--arrive at a calm and settled
Insight into its cause?

It is something very remarkable that, on the supposition that something
Exists, I cannot avoid the inference that something exists necessarily
Upon this perfectly natural--but not on that account reliable--inference
Does the cosmological argument rest. But, let me form any conception
Whatever of a thing, I find that I cannot cogitate the existence of
The thing as absolutely necessary, and that nothing prevents me--be the
Thing or being what it may--from cogitating its non-existence. I may
Thus be obliged to admit that all existing things have a necessary
Basis, while I cannot cogitate any single or individual thing as
Necessary. In other words, I can never complete the regress through the
Conditions of existence, without admitting the existence of a necessary
Being; but, on the other hand, I cannot make a commencement from this
Being

If I must cogitate something as existing necessarily as the basis of
Existing things, and yet am not permitted to cogitate any individual
Thing as in itself necessary, the inevitable inference is that necessity
And contingency are not properties of things themselves--otherwise an
Internal contradiction would result; that consequently neither of
These principles are objective, but merely subjective principles
Of reason--the one requiring us to seek for a necessary ground
For everything that exists, that is, to be satisfied with no other
Explanation than that which is complete a priori, the other forbidding
Us ever to hope for the attainment of this completeness, that is, to
Regard no member of the empirical world as unconditioned. In this
Mode of viewing them, both principles, in their purely heuristic and
Regulative character, and as concerning merely the formal interest of
Reason, are quite consistent with each other. The one says: "You must
Philosophize upon nature," as if there existed a necessary primal basis
Of all existing things, solely for the purpose of introducing systematic
Unity into your knowledge, by pursuing an idea of this character--a
Foundation which is arbitrarily admitted to be ultimate; while the
Other warns you to consider no individual determination, concerning
The existence of things, as such an ultimate foundation, that is
As absolutely necessary, but to keep the way always open for further
Progress in the deduction, and to treat every determination as
Determined by some other. But if all that we perceive must be regarded
As conditionally necessary, it is impossible that anything which is
Empirically given should be absolutely necessary

It follows from this that you must accept the absolutely necessary
As out of and beyond the world, inasmuch as it is useful only as a
Principle of the highest possible unity in experience, and you cannot
Discover any such necessary existence in the would, the second rule
Requiring you to regard all empirical causes of unity as themselves
Deduced

The philosophers of antiquity regarded all the forms of nature as
Contingent; while matter was considered by them, in accordance with the
Judgement of the common reason of mankind, as primal and necessary
But if they had regarded matter, not relatively--as the substratum of
Phenomena, but absolutely and in itself--as an independent existence
This idea of absolute necessity would have immediately disappeared. For
There is nothing absolutely connecting reason with such an existence;
On the contrary, it can annihilate it in thought, always and without
Self-contradiction. But in thought alone lay the idea of absolute
Necessity. A regulative principle must, therefore, have been at
The foundation of this opinion. In fact, extension and
Impenetrability--which together constitute our conception of
Matter--form the supreme empirical principle of the unity of phenomena
And this principle, in so far as it is empirically unconditioned
Possesses the property of a regulative principle. But, as every
Determination of matter which constitutes what is real in it--and
Consequently impenetrability--is an effect, which must have a cause, and
Is for this reason always derived, the notion of matter cannot harmonize
With the idea of a necessary being, in its character of the principle of
All derived unity. For every one of its real properties, being derived
Must be only conditionally necessary, and can therefore be annihilated
In thought; and thus the whole existence of matter can be so annihilated
Or suppressed. If this were not the case, we should have found in the
World of phenomena the highest ground or condition of unity--which is
Impossible, according to the second regulative principle. It follows
That matter, and, in general, all that forms part of the world of sense
Cannot be a necessary primal being, nor even a principle of empirical
Unity, but that this being or principle must have its place assigned
Without the world. And, in this way, we can proceed in perfect
Confidence to deduce the phenomena of the world and their existence from
Other phenomena, just as if there existed no necessary being; and we
Can at the same time, strive without ceasing towards the attainment of
Completeness for our deduction, just as if such a being--the supreme
Condition of all existences--were presupposed by the mind

These remarks will have made it evident to the reader that the ideal of
The Supreme Being, far from being an enouncement of the existence of a
Being in itself necessary, is nothing more than a regulative principle
Of reason, requiring us to regard all connection existing between
Phenomena as if it had its origin from an all-sufficient necessary
Cause, and basing upon this the rule of a systematic and necessary unity
In the explanation of phenomena. We cannot, at the same time, avoid
Regarding, by a transcendental subreptio, this formal principle as
Constitutive, and hypostatizing this unity. Precisely similar is the
Case with our notion of space. Space is the primal condition of all
Forms, which are properly just so many different limitations of it; and
Thus, although it is merely a principle of sensibility, we cannot help
Regarding it as an absolutely necessary and self-subsistent thing--as
An object given a priori in itself. In the same way, it is quite natural
That, as the systematic unity of nature cannot be established as a
Principle for the empirical employment of reason, unless it is based
Upon the idea of an ens realissimum, as the supreme cause, we should
Regard this idea as a real object, and this object, in its character
Of supreme condition, as absolutely necessary, and that in this way a
Regulative should be transformed into a constitutive principle. This
Interchange becomes evident when I regard this supreme being, which
Relatively to the world, was absolutely (unconditionally) necessary
As a thing per se. In this case, I find it impossible to represent this
Necessity in or by any conception, and it exists merely in my own mind
As the formal condition of thought, but not as a material and hypostatic
Condition of existence

SECTION VI. Of the Impossibility of a Physico-Theological Proof

If, then, neither a pure conception nor the general experience of an
Existing being can provide a sufficient basis for the proof of the
Existence of the Deity, we can make the attempt by the only other
Mode--that of grounding our argument upon a determinate experience of
The phenomena of the present world, their constitution and disposition
And discover whether we can thus attain to a sound conviction of
The existence of a Supreme Being. This argument we shall term the
Physico-theological argument. If it is shown to be insufficient
Speculative reason cannot present us with any satisfactory proof of the
Existence of a being corresponding to our transcendental idea

It is evident from the remarks that have been made in the preceding
Sections, that an answer to this question will be far from being
Difficult or unconvincing. For how can any experience be adequate
With an idea? The very essence of an idea consists in the fact that no
Experience can ever be discovered congruent or adequate with it. The
Transcendental idea of a necessary and all-sufficient being is so
Immeasurably great, so high above all that is empirical, which is always
Conditioned, that we hope in vain to find materials in the sphere of
Experience sufficiently ample for our conception, and in vain seek the
Unconditioned among things that are conditioned, while examples, nay
Even guidance is denied us by the laws of empirical synthesis

If the Supreme Being forms a link in the chain of empirical conditions
It must be a member of the empirical series, and, like the lower members
Which it precedes, have its origin in some higher member of the series
If, on the other hand, we disengage it from the chain, and cogitate it
As an intelligible being, apart from the series of natural causes--how
Shall reason bridge the abyss that separates the latter from the former?
All laws respecting the regress from effects to causes, all synthetical
Additions to our knowledge relate solely to possible experience and
The objects of the sensuous world, and, apart from them, are without
Significance

The world around us opens before our view so magnificent a spectacle of
Order, variety, beauty, and conformity to ends, that whether we pursue
Our observations into the infinity of space in the one direction, or
Into its illimitable divisions in the other, whether we regard the world
In its greatest or its least manifestations--even after we have attained
To the highest summit of knowledge which our weak minds can reach, we
Find that language in the presence of wonders so inconceivable has lost
Its force, and number its power to reckon, nay, even thought fails to
Conceive adequately, and our conception of the whole dissolves into an
Astonishment without power of expression--all the more eloquent that it
Is dumb. Everywhere around us we observe a chain of causes and effects
Of means and ends, of death and birth; and, as nothing has entered
Of itself into the condition in which we find it, we are constantly
Referred to some other thing, which itself suggests the same inquiry
Regarding its cause, and thus the universe must sink into the abyss
Of nothingness, unless we admit that, besides this infinite chain
Of contingencies, there exists something that is primal and
Self-subsistent--something which, as the cause of this phenomenal world
Secures its continuance and preservation

This highest cause--what magnitude shall we attribute to it? Of the
Content of the world we are ignorant; still less can we estimate its
Magnitude by comparison with the sphere of the possible. But this
Supreme cause being a necessity of the human mind, what is there to
Prevent us from attributing to it such a degree of perfection as to
Place it above the sphere of all that is possible? This we can easily
Do, although only by the aid of the faint outline of an abstract
Conception, by representing this being to ourselves as containing
In itself, as an individual substance, all possible perfection--a
Conception which satisfies that requirement of reason which demands
Parsimony in principles, which is free from self-contradiction, which
Even contributes to the extension of the employment of reason in
Experience, by means of the guidance afforded by this idea to order and
System, and which in no respect conflicts with any law of experience

This argument always deserves to be mentioned with respect. It is the
Oldest, the clearest, and that most in conformity with the common reason
Of humanity. It animates the study of nature, as it itself derives its
Existence and draws ever new strength from that source. It introduces
Aims and ends into a sphere in which our observation could not of itself
Have discovered them, and extends our knowledge of nature, by directing
Our attention to a unity, the principle of which lies beyond nature
This knowledge of nature again reacts upon this idea--its cause; and
Thus our belief in a divine author of the universe rises to the power of
An irresistible conviction

For these reasons it would be utterly hopeless to attempt to rob this
Argument of the authority it has always enjoyed. The mind, unceasingly
Elevated by these considerations, which, although empirical, are so
Remarkably powerful, and continually adding to their force, will
Not suffer itself to be depressed by the doubts suggested by subtle
Speculation; it tears itself out of this state of uncertainty, the
Moment it casts a look upon the wondrous forms of nature and the majesty
Of the universe, and rises from height to height, from condition to
Condition, till it has elevated itself to the supreme and unconditioned
Author of all

But although we have nothing to object to the reasonableness and utility
Of this procedure, but have rather to commend and encourage it
We cannot approve of the claims which this argument advances to
Demonstrative certainty and to a reception upon its own merits, apart
From favour or support by other arguments. Nor can it injure the cause
Of morality to endeavour to lower the tone of the arrogant sophist, and
To teach him that modesty and moderation which are the properties of a
Belief that brings calm and content into the mind, without
Prescribing to it an unworthy subjection. I maintain, then, that the
Physico-theological argument is insufficient of itself to prove
The existence of a Supreme Being, that it must entrust this to the
Ontological argument--to which it serves merely as an introduction, and
That, consequently, this argument contains the only possible ground of
Proof (possessed by speculative reason) for the existence of this being

The chief momenta in the physico-theological argument are as follow:
1. We observe in the world manifest signs of an arrangement full of
Purpose, executed with great wisdom, and argument in whole of a
Content indescribably various, and of an extent without limits. 2. This
Arrangement of means and ends is entirely foreign to the things existing
In the world--it belongs to them merely as a contingent attribute;
In other words, the nature of different things could not of itself
Whatever means were employed, harmoniously tend towards certain
Purposes, were they not chosen and directed for these purposes by a
Rational and disposing principle, in accordance with certain fundamental
Ideas. 3. There exists, therefore, a sublime and wise cause (or
Several), which is not merely a blind, all-powerful nature, producing
The beings and events which fill the world in unconscious fecundity, but
A free and intelligent cause of the world. 4. The unity of this cause
May be inferred from the unity of the reciprocal relation existing
Between the parts of the world, as portions of an artistic edifice--an
Inference which all our observation favours, and all principles of
Analogy support

In the above argument, it is inferred from the analogy of certain
Products of nature with those of human art, when it compels Nature to
Bend herself to its purposes, as in the case of a house, a ship, or
A watch, that the same kind of causality--namely, understanding
And will--resides in nature. It is also declared that the internal
Possibility of this freely-acting nature (which is the source of all
Art, and perhaps also of human reason) is derivable from another and
Superhuman art--a conclusion which would perhaps be found incapable of
Standing the test of subtle transcendental criticism. But to neither of
These opinions shall we at present object. We shall only remark that
It must be confessed that, if we are to discuss the subject of cause
At all, we cannot proceed more securely than with the guidance of the
Analogy subsisting between nature and such products of design--these
Being the only products whose causes and modes of organization are
Completely known to us. Reason would be unable to satisfy her own
Requirements, if she passed from a causality which she does know, to
Obscure and indemonstrable principles of explanation which she does not
Know

According to the physico-theological argument, the connection and
Harmony existing in the world evidence the contingency of the form
Merely, but not of the matter, that is, of the substance of the world
To establish the truth of the latter opinion, it would be necessary to
Prove that all things would be in themselves incapable of this harmony
And order, unless they were, even as regards their substance, the
Product of a supreme wisdom. But this would require very different
Grounds of proof from those presented by the analogy with human art
This proof can at most, therefore, demonstrate the existence of an
Architect of the world, whose efforts are limited by the capabilities of
The material with which he works, but not of a creator of the world, to
Whom all things are subject. Thus this argument is utterly insufficient
For the task before us--a demonstration of the existence of an
All-sufficient being. If we wish to prove the contingency of matter
We must have recourse to a transcendental argument, which the
Physico-theological was constructed expressly to avoid

We infer, from the order and design visible in the universe, as a
Disposition of a thoroughly contingent character, the existence of a
Cause proportionate thereto. The conception of this cause must contain
Certain determinate qualities, and it must therefore be regarded as the
Conception of a being which possesses all power, wisdom, and so on, in
One word, all perfection--the conception, that is, of an all-sufficient
Being. For the predicates of very great, astonishing, or immeasurable
Power and excellence, give us no determinate conception of the thing
Nor do they inform us what the thing may be in itself. They merely
Indicate the relation existing between the magnitude of the object and
The observer, who compares it with himself and with his own power of
Comprehension, and are mere expressions of praise and reverence
By which the object is either magnified, or the observing subject
Depreciated in relation to the object. Where we have to do with the
Magnitude (of the perfection) of a thing, we can discover no determinate
Conception, except that which comprehends all possible perfection or
Completeness, and it is only the total (omnitudo) of reality which is
Completely determined in and through its conception alone

Now it cannot be expected that any one will be bold enough to declare
That he has a perfect insight into the relation which the magnitude
Of the world he contemplates bears (in its extent as well as in its
Content) to omnipotence, into that of the order and design in the
World to the highest wisdom, and that of the unity of the world to
The absolute unity of a Supreme Being. Physico-theology is therefore
Incapable of presenting a determinate conception of a supreme cause of
The world, and is therefore insufficient as a principle of theology--a
Theology which is itself to be the basis of religion

The attainment of absolute totality is completely impossible on the
Path of empiricism. And yet this is the path pursued in the
Physico-theological argument. What means shall we employ to bridge the
Abyss?

After elevating ourselves to admiration of the magnitude of the power
Wisdom, and other attributes of the author of the world, and finding we
Can advance no further, we leave the argument on empirical grounds
And proceed to infer the contingency of the world from the order and
Conformity to aims that are observable in it. From this contingency we
Infer, by the help of transcendental conceptions alone, the existence of
Something absolutely necessary; and, still advancing, proceed from
The conception of the absolute necessity of the first cause to the
Completely determined or determining conception thereof--the conception
Of an all-embracing reality. Thus the physico-theological, failing
In its undertaking, recurs in its embarrassment to the cosmological
Argument; and, as this is merely the ontological argument in disguise
It executes its design solely by the aid of pure reason, although it at
First professed to have no connection with this faculty and to base its
Entire procedure upon experience alone

The physico-theologians have therefore no reason to regard with such
Contempt the transcendental mode of argument, and to look down upon
It, with the conceit of clear-sighted observers of nature, as the
Brain-cobweb of obscure speculatists. For, if they reflect upon and
Examine their own arguments, they will find that, after following for
Some time the path of nature and experience, and discovering themselves
No nearer their object, they suddenly leave this path and pass into the
Region of pure possibility, where they hope to reach upon the wings of
Ideas what had eluded all their empirical investigations. Gaining, as
They think, a firm footing after this immense leap, they extend their
Determinate conception--into the possession of which they have come
They know not how--over the whole sphere of creation, and explain their
Ideal, which is entirely a product of pure reason, by illustrations
Drawn from experience--though in a degree miserably unworthy of the
Grandeur of the object, while they refuse to acknowledge that they have
Arrived at this cognition or hypothesis by a very different road from
That of experience

Thus the physico-theological is based upon the cosmological, and this
Upon the ontological proof of the existence of a Supreme Being; and as
Besides these three there is no other path open to speculative reason
The ontological proof, on the ground of pure conceptions of reason, is
The only possible one, if any proof of a proposition so far transcending
The empirical exercise of the understanding is possible at all