text: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
  
      This Act may be cited as the ``Nuclear and Terrorism Threat 
  Reduction Act of 2002''.
  
  SEC. 2. ENHANCING THREAT REDUCTION.
  
      (a) Statement of Policy.--
              (1) It is the policy of the United States to work 
          cooperatively with the Russian Federation in order to prevent 
          the diversion of weapons of mass destruction and materials 
          relating thereto, including nuclear, biological, and chemical 
          weapons, as well as the scientific and technical expertise 
          necessary to design and build weapons of mass destruction.
              (2) With respect to enhancing threat reduction, there 
          should be three primary objectives, as stated in the 
          President's review of 30 different United States-Russia 
          cooperative programs, as follows:
                      (A) To ensure that existing United States 
                  cooperative non-proliferation programs with the Russian 
                  Federation are focused on priority threat reduction and 
                  non-proliferation goals, and are conducted as 
                  efficiently and effectively as possible.
                      (B) To examine what new initiatives might be 
                  undertaken to further United States threat reduction 
                  and non-proliferation goals.
                      (C) To consider organizational and procedural 
                  changes designed to ensure a consistent and coordinated 
                  United States Government approach to cooperative 
                  programs with the Russian Federation on the reduction 
                  of weapons of mass destruction and prevention of their 
                  proliferation.
              (3) The goal of United States programs to assist the 
          Russian Federation should be to have them work well, be focused 
          on priority tasks, and be well managed.
              (4) In order to further cooperative efforts, the following 
          key programs should be expanded:
                      (A) The Department of Energy Material Protection, 
                  Control and Accounting (MPC&A) program to assist the 
                  Russian Federation secure and consolidate weapons-grade 
                  nuclear material.
                      (B) The Department of Energy Warhead and Fissile 
                  Material Transparency Program.
                      (C) The International Science and Technology Center 
                  (ISTC).
                      (D) The Redirection of Biotechnical Scientists 
                  program.
                      (E) The Department of Defense Cooperative Threat 
                  Reduction project to construct a chemical weapons 
                  destruction facility at Shchuch'ye, Russia, to enable 
                  its earliest completion at no increased expense.
              (5) Other programs should be adjusted, refocused, or 
          reexamined, including--
                      (A) approaches to the current plutonium disposition 
                  program in the Russian Federation, in order to make the 
                  program less costly and more effective;
                      (B) the project to end production by the Russian 
                  Federation of weapons-grade plutonium, in order to 
                  transfer the project from the Department of Defense to 
                  the Department of Energy;
                      (C) consolidation of the Department of Energy's 
                  Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) with the Initiative for 
                  Proliferation Prevention (IPP), with a focus on 
                  projects to assist the Russian Federation in reduction 
                  of its nuclear warheads complex; and
                      (D) acceleration of the Department of Energy's 
                  Second Line of Defense program to assist the Russian 
                  Federation install nuclear detection equipment at 
                  border posts.
      (b) Increased Funding of Certain Key Programs.--In order to 
  guarantee that the United States-Russia non-proliferation and threat 
  reduction efforts operate as efficiently as possible, certain key 
  programs should receive additional funding above current levels, 
  including--
              (1) the United States-Russia Highly Enriched Uranium 
          Purchase Agreement;
              (2) the Second Line of Defense program;
              (3) the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention;
              (4) the Fissile Materials Disposition program;
              (5) the Redirection of Biotechnical Scientists program;
              (6) the Department of Energy Material Protection, Control, 
          and Accounting (MPC&A) program;
              (7) the International Science and Technology Center; and
              (8) the Warhead and Fissile Material Transparency program.
      (c) Report.--Not later than six months after the date of enactment 
  of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report containing 
  recommendations on how to enhance the implementation of United States-
  Russia non-proliferation and threat reduction programs, which shall 
  include--
              (1) recommendations on how to improve and streamline the 
          contracting and procurement practices of those programs; and
              (2) a listing of impediments to the efficient and effective 
          implementation of those programs.
  
  SEC. 3. COMPREHENSIVE INVENTORIES AND DATA EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE UNITED 
                STATES AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION ON WEAPONS-GRADE 
                MATERIAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
  
      (a) Findings.--Congress finds that inventories of weapons-grade 
  material and warheads should be tracked in order, among other things--
              (1) to make it more likely that the Russian Federation can 
          fully account for its entire inventory of weapons-grade 
          material and assembled weapons; and
              (2) to make it more likely that the sources of any material 
          or weapons possessed or used by any foreign state or terrorist 
          organization can be identified.
      (b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to 
  establish jointly with the Russian Federation comprehensive inventories 
  and data exchanges of Russian and United States weapons-grade material 
  and assembled warheads, with particular attention to tactical, or 
  ``nonstrategic'' warheads, one of the most likely weapons a terrorist 
  organization or terrorist state would attempt to acquire, and with 
  particular attention focused on weapons that have been removed from 
  deployment.
      (c) Assistance in Developing Comprehensive Inventories.--
  Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the United States 
  Government shall work with the Russian Federation to develop 
  comprehensive inventories of Russian weapons-grade plutonium and highly 
  enriched uranium programs and assembled warheads, with special 
  attention to be focused on tactical warheads and warheads that have 
  been removed from deployment.
      (d) Data Exchanges.--As part of this process, to the maximum extent 
  practicable, without jeopardizing United States national security 
  interests, the United States is authorized to enter into ongoing data 
  exchanges with the Russian Federation on categories of material and 
  weapons described in subsection (c).
      (e) Report.--Not later than six months after the date of enactment 
  of this Act, and annually thereafter until a comprehensive inventory is 
  created and the information collected from the inventory exchanged 
  between the governments of the United States and the Russian 
  Federation, the President shall submit to Congress a report, in both an 
  unclassified and classified form as necessary, describing the progress 
  that has been made toward that objective.
  
  SEC. 4. COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE TRANSITION FROM MUTUALLY ASSURED 
                DESTRUCTION (MAD) TO MUTUALLY ASSURED SECURITY (MAS).
  
      (a) Statement of Policy.--With the end of the Cold War more than a 
  decade ago, with the United States and the Russian Federation fighting 
  together against global terrorism, and with the Presidents of the 
  United States and the Russian Federation agreeing to establish ``a new 
  strategic framework to ensure the mutual security of the United States 
  and Russia, and the world community'', the United States and the 
  Russian Federation should increase significantly their efforts to put 
  dangerous and unnecessary elements of the Cold War to rest.
      (b) Establishment.--In order to assist with the policy expressed in 
  subsection (a), the President is authorized to conclude an agreement 
  with the Russian Federation for the establishment of a Joint United 
  States-Russia Commission to Assess the Transition from Mutual Assured 
  Destruction (MAD) to Mutual Assured Security (MAS) (in this section 
  referred to as the ``Commission'').
      (c) Composition.--The United States delegation of the Commission 
  shall consist of 13 members appointed by the President, as follows:
              (1) Three members, after consultation with the Speaker of 
          the House of Representatives.
              (2) Three members, after consultation with the Majority 
          Leader of the Senate.
              (3) Two members, after consultation with the Minority 
          Leader of the House of Representatives.
              (4) Two members, after consultation with the Minority 
          Leader of the Senate.
              (5) Two members as the President may determine.
      (d) Qualifications.--The United States members of the Commission 
  shall be appointed from among private United States citizens with 
  knowledge and expertise in United States-Russia strategic stability 
  issues.
      (e) Chair.--The chair of the Commission should be chosen by 
  consensus from among the members of the Commission.
      (f) Russian Commission.--The President should make every effort to 
  encourage the Government of the Russian Federation to appoint a Russian 
  Federation delegation of the Commission that would jointly meet and 
  discuss the issues described in subsection (g).
      (g) Duties of the Commission.--The duties of the Commission should 
  include consideration of how--
              (1) to ensure that the reduction of strategic nuclear 
          weapons announced by the United States and the Russian 
          Federation in November 2001 take effect in a rapid, safe, 
          verifiable and irreversible manner;
              (2) to preserve and enhance START I monitoring and 
          verification mechanisms;
              (3) to develop additional monitoring and verification 
          mechanisms;
              (4) to preserve the benefits of the unratified START II 
          agreement, especially those measures that affect strategic 
          stability;
              (5) to ensure the safety of warheads removed from 
          deployment;
              (6) to safely and verifiably dismantle warheads in excess 
          of the ceiling established by the President Bush at the 
          November 2001 United States-Russia summit;
              (7) to begin a new high-level dialogue to discuss United 
          States and Russian Federation proposals for a global and 
          theater level missile defense systems;
              (8) to extend presidential decision-making time as it 
          relates to nuclear weapons operations;
              (9) to improve Russian-American cooperative efforts to 
          enhance strategic early warning, including but not limited to 
          the Joint Data Exchange Center and the Russian-American 
          Observation Satellite; and
              (10) to increase cooperation between the United States and 
          the Russian Federation on the programs and activities described 
          in sections 2 and 3.
      (e) Cooperation.--In carrying out its duties, the Commission should 
  receive the full and timely cooperation of United States Government 
  officials, including providing the Commission with analyses, briefings, 
  and other information necessary for the fulfillment of its 
  responsibilities.
      (f) Report.--The Commission shall, not later than six months after 
  the date of its first meeting, submit to Congress an interim report on 
  its findings and, not later than six months after submission of the 
  interim report, submit to Congress a final report containing its 
  conclusions.
target: Nuclear and Terrorism Threat Reduction Act of 2002 - States the policy of the United States to work cooperatively with the Russian Federation in order to prevent the diversion of weapons of mass destruction and related materials, including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, as well as scientific and technical expertise necessary to design and build weapons of mass destruction.Requires the U.S. Government to work with the Russian Federation to develop comprehensive inventories of Russian weapons-grade material and warheads.Authorizes the President to conclude an agreement with the Russian Federation for the establishment of a joint United States-Russia Commission to Assess the Transition from Mutual Assured Destruction to Mutual Assured Security.
feat_title: A bill to promote enhanced non-proliferation cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation.