text: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
  
      This Act may be cited as the ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act 
  of 1993''.
  
  SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
  
      The Congress makes the following findings:
              (1) The United States has been a leader in seeking to 
          contain the spread of nuclear weapons technology and materials.
              (2) With the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the 
          Soviet Union, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, especially 
          to countries in unstable regions, is now the leading military 
          threat to the national security of the United States and its 
          allies.
              (3) The United Nations Security Council declared on January 
          31, 1992, that ``proliferation of all weapons of mass 
          destruction constitutes a threat to international peace and 
          security'' and committed to taking appropriate action to 
          prevent proliferation from occurring. The establishment of the 
          United Nations Special Commission on Iraq was an important 
          precedent to that end.
              (4) Aside from the 5 declared nuclear weapon states, a 
          number of other nations have or are pursuing nuclear weapons 
          capabilities.
              (5) Regional nuclear arms races pose perhaps the most 
          likely prospect for the future use of nuclear weapons.
              (6) The break-up of the Soviet Union has increased the 
          threat of nuclear proliferation.
              (7) In May 1992, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan signed 
          the protocols to START I and committed to acceding to the 
          Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states 
          ``in the shortest possible time''.
              (8) Iraq had a substantial, clandestine nuclear weapons 
          program which went undetected by the International Atomic 
          Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection process and was greatly 
          assisted by dual-use exports from western countries, including 
          the United States.
              (9) North Korea's statement of intent to withdraw from the 
          Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and its refusal to allow IAEA 
          inspections of all of its known and suspected nuclear 
          facilities, are unprecedented actions which could greatly 
          undermine efforts to stop nuclear proliferation.
              (10) Brazil and Argentina had substantial programs to build 
          nuclear weapons and South Africa has admitted developing and 
          building 6 nuclear weapons, but in response to reduced regional 
          tensions and other factors, all 3 countries have renounced 
          nuclear weapons and accepted IAEA safeguards for all of their 
          nuclear facilities, and South Africa has acceded to the Non-
          Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state.
              (11) United States security interests and current policy 
          and practices are consistent with the terms of the South 
          Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty which, like nuclear weapons 
          free zones in Latin America, South Asia, and the Middle East 
          that the United States supports, can contribute to efforts to 
          avoid regional conflicts and prevent arms races.
              (12) The IAEA is a valuable tool to counter proliferation, 
          but the effectiveness of its system to safeguard nuclear 
          materials may be adversely affected by institutional and 
          financial constraints.
              (13) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which codifies 
          world consensus against further nuclear proliferation and is 
          scheduled for review and extension in 1995, should be expanded 
          in membership and extended indefinitely, and additional steps 
          should be taken to strengthen the international nuclear 
          nonproliferation regime.
              (14) The Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 declared that 
          the United States is committed to continued strong support for 
          the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to a strengthened and 
          more effective IAEA, and established that it is United States 
          policy to establish more effective controls over the transfer 
          of nuclear equipment, materials, and technology.
              (15) The goal of the United States is to end the further 
          spread of nuclear weapons capability, roll back nuclear 
          proliferation where it has occurred, and prevent the use of 
          nuclear weapons anywhere in the world. To that end the United 
          States should adopt a comprehensive nuclear nonproliferation 
          policy.
  
  SEC. 3. COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION POLICY.
  
      In order to end nuclear proliferation and reduce current nuclear 
  arsenals and supplies of weapons-usable nuclear materials, it shall be 
  the policy of the United States to pursue the following objectives:
              (1) Encourage Ukraine to join Kazakhstan and Belarus in 
          ratifying the START I treaty and encourage Ukraine and 
          Kazakhstan to join Belarus in voting to accede to the Nuclear 
          Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states in the 
          shortest possible time.
              (2) Encourage Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to remove 
          all nuclear weapons from their territory, accept IAEA 
          safeguards over all of their nuclear facilities, and implement 
          effective controls on nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use 
          exports.
              (3) Reach an agreement with the Russian Federation--
                      (A) to deactivate and retire from field deployment 
                  on an accelerated schedule all weapons to be withdrawn 
                  under the START I treaty and the START II treaty;
                      (B) on data exchanges and inspection arrangements 
                  to verify the elimination of all nuclear weapons 
                  scheduled to be withdrawn under the START I treaty and 
                  the START II treaty; and
                      (C) to place all fissile material from such weapons 
                  under bilateral or international controls, or both.
              (4) Prepare for the ratification of the START II treaty by 
          seeking the exchange of information between the United States 
          and the Russian Federation on nuclear weapons stockpiles and 
          fissile material facilities and inventories as required by the 
          United States Senate as a condition to its approval of the 
          START I Treaty.
              (5) Conclude a multilateral comprehensive nuclear test ban 
          treaty by early 1995, before the conference to renew and extend 
          the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is held.
              (6) Ratify the START II treaty in the United States and 
          encourage ratification of that treaty by the Russian 
          Federation, and reach agreement with the Russian Federation to 
          end the production of new types of nuclear warheads.
              (7) Conclude a multilateral agreement to reduce the 
          strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Russian 
          Federation to within a range of 1,000 to 2,000 each, with lower 
          levels for the United Kingdom, France, and the People's 
          Republic of China.
              (8) Conclude additional multilateral agreements to 
          significantly and continuously reduce the nuclear arsenals of 
          all countries through a stage-by-stage process.
              (9) Reach immediate agreement with the Russian Federation 
          to halt permanently the production of fissile material for 
          weapons purposes, and achieve worldwide agreements to--
                      (A) end by 1995 the production of fissile material 
                  for any purpose;
                      (B) place existing stockpiles of such materials 
                  under bilateral or international controls; and
                      (C) require all countries to place all of their 
                  nuclear facilities dedicated to peaceful purposes under 
                  IAEA safeguards.
              (10) Strengthen IAEA safeguards to more effectively verify 
          that countries are complying with their nonproliferation 
          commitments and provide the IAEA with the political, technical, 
          and financial support necessary to implement the necessary 
          safeguard reforms.
              (11) Strengthen nuclear export controls in the United 
          States and other nuclear supplier nations, impose sanctions on 
          individuals, companies, and countries which contribute to 
          nuclear proliferation, and provide increased public information 
          on nuclear export licenses approved in the United States.
              (12) Reduce incentives for countries to pursue the 
          acquisition of nuclear weapons by seeking to reduce regional 
          tensions and to strengthen regional security agreements, and 
          encourage the United Nations Security Council to increase its 
          role in enforcing international nuclear nonproliferation 
          agreements.
              (13) Support the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-
          Proliferation Treaty at the 1995 conference to review and 
          extend that treaty and seek to ensure that all countries sign 
          the treaty or participate in a comparable international regime 
          for monitoring and safeguarding nuclear facilities and 
          materials.
              (14) Adopt a United States policy of ``no first use'' of 
          nuclear weapons, reach agreement with the other nuclear weapon 
          states to adopt such a policy and to assist immediately any 
          country which is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
          Treaty should the use of nuclear weapons be initiated against 
          such country.
              (15) Conclude a verifiable bilateral agreement with the 
          Russian Federation under which both countries withdraw from 
          their arsenals and dismantle all tactical nuclear weapons, and 
          seek to extend to all nuclear weapon states this zero option 
          for tactical nuclear weapons.
              (16) Sign the appropriate protocols to the South Pacific 
          Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.
  
  SEC. 4. REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF POLICY.
  
      (a) Report to Congress.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
  the enactment of this Act, and not later than February 1 of each year 
  thereafter, the President shall submit to the Congress a report on--
              (1) the actions the United States has taken and the actions 
          the United States plans to take during the succeeding 12-month 
          period to implement each of the policy objectives set forth in 
          this Act;
              (2) actions which have been taken by the Russian 
          Federation, by the other former Soviet republics, and by other 
          countries and institutions to achieve those policy objectives; 
          and
              (3) obstacles that have been encountered in seeking to 
          implement those policy objectives.
  Each such report shall be submitted in unclassified form, with a 
  classified appendix if necessary.
      (b) Report on Nuclear Stockpile Information.--The President shall 
  submit a report to the Congress on the specific actions that have been 
  taken and those that are planned to comply with Condition 8 concerning 
  the ``Nuclear Stockpile Weapons Arrangement'' of the Senate resolution 
  of ratification of the START I treaty (Treaty Doc. 102-20 and 102-32).
  
  SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.
  
      As used in this Act--
              (1) the term ``fissile materials'' means highly enriched 
          uranium and plutonium;
              (2) the term ``highly enriched uranium'' means uranium 
          enriched to 20 percent or more in the isotope U-235;
              (3) the term ``IAEA'' means the International Atomic Energy 
          Agency;
              (4) the term ``IAEA safeguards'' means the safeguards set 
          forth in an agreement between a country and the IAEA, as 
          authorized by Article III(A)(5) of the Statute of the 
          International Atomic Energy Agency;
              (5) a policy of ``no first use'' of nuclear weapons means a 
          commitment not to initiate the use of nuclear weapons;
              (6) the term ``non-nuclear weapon state'' means any country 
          that is not a nuclear weapon state;
              (7) the term ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'' means the 
          Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at 
          Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968;
              (8) the term ``nuclear weapon state'' means any country 
          that is a nuclear-weapon state, as defined by Article IX(3) of 
          the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed 
          at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968;
              (9) the term ``START I treaty'' means the Treaty on the 
          Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed by the United 
          States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on July 31, 
          1991; and
              (10) the term ``START II treaty'' means the Treaty on 
          Further Reductions and Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms, 
          signed by the United States and the Russian Federation on 
          January 3, 1993.
target: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1993 - Declares that, in order to end nuclear proliferation and reduce current nuclear arsenals and supplies of weapons-usable nuclear materials, it shall be U.S. policy to pursue the following objectives:  (1) encourage the Ukraine to ratify the START I treaty and Ukraine and Kazakhstan to vote to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states; (2) encourage Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to remove all nuclear weapons from their territory, accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards over nuclear facilities, and implement effective controls on nuclear exports; (3) reach an agreement with the Russian Federation to deactivate weapons to be withdrawn under START I and II, place all fissile material from weapons under bilateral or international controls, and arrange for inspections and data exchanges; (4) prepare for the ratification of START II by seeking the exchange of information; (5) conclude a multilateral comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty by early 1995; (6) ratify START II in the United States and encourage the Russian Federation to do the same; (7) conclude multilateral agreements to reduce nuclear arsenals; (8) reach agreement with the Russian Federation to halt the production of fissile material for weapons purposes and other worldwide agreements respecting such materials and the placement of all nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards; (9) strengthen IAEA safeguards and nuclear export controls; (10) reduce incentives for countries to pursue the acquisition of nuclear weapons by seeking to reduce regional tensions; (11) support the extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at the 1995 conference; (12) adopt a U.S. policy of "no first use" of nuclear weapons, reach agreement with other nuclear weapon states to adopt such a policy, and assist any country which is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty should weapons be initiated against such country; (13) conclude an agreement with the Russian Federation to dismantle all tactical nuclear weapons; and (14) sign the appropriate protocols to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty.
feat_title: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1993