text: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
  
      This Act may be cited as the ``Iran Nuclear Nonproliferation Act''.
  
  SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
  
      Congress finds the following:
              (1) Numerous bi-partisan commissions and study groups, 
          including the Iraq Study Group co-chaired by James A. Baker III 
          and Lee H. Hamilton, a 2004 working group established under the 
          Council on Foreign Relations and co-chaired by Robert Gates and 
          Zbigniew Brzezinski, and a 2001 Atlantic Council of the United 
          States Working Group, co-chaired by Lee H. Hamilton, James 
          Schlesinger, and Brent Scowcroft have called for various forms 
          of dialogue and engagement with Iran in order to achieve United 
          States strategic interests in the Middle East region.
              (2) Implementing effective strategies to deflect or deter 
          Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, or pursuing the 
          development of nuclear weapons capabilities, is an important 
          United States strategic interest.
              (3) Establishing a diplomatic dialogue with the Government 
          of Iran and deepening relationships with the Iranian people 
          would help foster greater understanding between the people of 
          Iran and the people of the United States and would enhance the 
          stability and security of the Persian Gulf region, including by 
          reducing the threat of the proliferation or use of nuclear 
          weapons in the region, while advancing other United States 
          foreign policy objectives in that region.
              (4) The Iraq Study Group Report states ``Iran's interests 
          would not be served by a failure of U.S. policy that led to 
          chaos and the territorial disintegration of the Iraqi state'', 
          and therefore, the Government of the United States should build 
          upon this mutual interest to develop a diplomatic dialogue with 
          the Government of Iran concerning deteriorating conditions in 
          Iraq, which can become a basis of broader future United States-
          Iranian engagement.
              (5) Given the dispersal of Iran's nuclear program at sites 
          throughout the country and their proximity to urban centers, 
          the use of military force against Iran would be extraordinarily 
          difficult and probably ineffective, the immediate consequences 
          and loss of life would be drastic, and the long-term 
          instability generated would be against long-term United States 
          interests in the region.
              (6) Any military action designed to eliminate Iran's 
          capacity to produce nuclear weapons would run the significant 
          risk of reinforcing and accelerating the desire of the 
          Government of Iran to acquire a nuclear deterrent and 
          compounding nationalist passions in defense of that very 
          course, and would most likely also generate hostile Iranian 
          initiatives in Iraq and Afghanistan.
              (7) Together, the ongoing efforts of the International 
          Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) along with corresponding 
          multilateral sanctions recently adopted by the United Nations 
          Security Council offer a viable path for steering Iran's 
          nuclear efforts along peaceful lines, provided that there is 
          close multilateral coordination and steadfastness in the 
          adherence to the sanctions and firm United States leadership in 
          support of the multilateral effort.
              (8) According to the most definitive United States 
          intelligence reports, Iran is likely a decade away from 
          acquiring the know-how and material to have an option to build 
          a nuclear weapon, and even the most pessimistic analysis by 
          outside experts puts the timeline at least three years away, 
          assuming Iran suffers no setbacks during development, which 
          would be unprecedented.
  
  SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
  
      It is the sense of Congress that--
              (1) full diplomatic, political, and economic relations 
          between the United States and Iran cannot be normalized unless 
          and until enforceable safeguards are put in place to prevent 
          weaponization of Iran's nuclear program and the Government of 
          Iran ends its support for international terrorist groups, but 
          the attainment of these policy objectives should not constitute 
          preconditions for any diplomatic dialogue; and
              (2) no congressional authorization for the use of military 
          force in any Act of Congress enacted before the date of the 
          enactment of this Act constitutes, either implicitly or 
          explicitly, an authorization for the use of military force 
          against Iran or its nuclear program.
  
  SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
  
      It is the policy of the United States not to enter into a 
  preemptive war against Iran in the absence of an imminent threat, and 
  then only in accordance with international law and constitutional and 
  statutory requirements for congressional authorization.
  
  SEC. 5. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.
  
      No funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department 
  of Defense or any other department or agency of the Government of the 
  United States may be used to carry out any covert action for the 
  purpose of causing regime change in Iran or to carry out any military 
  action against Iran in the absence of an imminent threat, in accordance 
  with international law and constitutional and statutory requirements 
  for congressional authorization.
target: Iran Nuclear Nonproliferation Act - Expresses the sense of Congress that: (1) full diplomatic, political, and economic relations between the United States and Iran cannot be normalized unless enforceable safeguards are put in place to prevent weaponization of Iran's nuclear program and the government of Iran ends its support for international terrorist groups, but the attainment of these objectives should not constitute preconditions for any diplomatic dialogue; and (2) no congressional authorization for the use of military force in any Act enacted before the date of enactment of this Act constitutes an authorization for the use of military force against Iran or its nuclear program.
  
  States as the policy of the United States not to enter into a preemptive war against Iran in the absence of an immediate threat, and then only in accordance with international law and constitutional and statutory requirements for congressional authorization.
  
  Prohibits funds available to the Department of Defense (DOD) or any other federal department or agency from being used to carry out any covert action for the purpose of causing regime change in Iran or to carry out any military action against Iran in the absence of an imminent threat.
feat_title: To prohibit the use of funds to carry out any covert action for the purpose of causing regime change in Iran or to carry out any military action against Iran in the absence of an imminent threat, in accordance with international law and constitutional and statutory requirements for congressional authorization.