text: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
  
      This Act may be cited as the ``Enhancing America's Security through 
  Strategic Redeployment from Iraq Act''.
  
  SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS.
  
      (a) First Principal Finding.--Ending the war in Iraq is necessary, 
  however, how the war is ended is of even greater importance for United 
  States national security, the safety of members of the United States 
  Armed Forces currently serving in Iraq, and stability in both Iraq and 
  the Middle East.
      (b) Second Principal Finding.--
              (1) Open-ended commitment is unsustainable.--An open-ended 
          United States involvement in Iraq is not in the interest of 
          United States national security, and United States military 
          forces must be redeployed or risk becoming severely over-
          strained.
              (2) Supporting facts.--
                      (A) Currently, 40 percent of all United States Army 
                  equipment is in Iraq.
                      (B) There is no Army unit currently in the United 
                  States in a state of readiness that would permit the 
                  unit to deploy anywhere another contingency might occur 
                  in the world.
      (c) Third Principal Finding.--
              (1) Lengthy redeployment process.--Redeployment from Iraq 
          will be a lengthy process.
              (2) Supporting facts.--
                      (A) Redeploying approximately 160,000 troops and 
                  50,000 civilian contractors from Iraq and closing bases 
                  are logistically challenging, especially during 
                  conflict.
                      (B) The critical consideration is the closure or 
                  turnover of the sixty-five Forward Operating Bases held 
                  by the United States Armed Forces in Iraq.
                      (C) It takes on average 100 days to close just one 
                  Forward Operating Base, and any decision regarding the 
                  number of Forward Operating Bases to close at one time 
                  depends on surrounding strife and the fact that 
                  receiving facilities in Kuwait to prepare military 
                  vehicles for shipment to the United States or elsewhere 
                  can handle only 2 to 2\1/2\ brigade combat teams at a 
                  time and there are currently 40 brigade combat teams or 
                  their equivalent in Iraq.
                      (D) Redeployment is the most vulnerable of military 
                  operations, particularly in this case because 
                  redeployment will rely on a single road, leading from 
                  Iraq to Kuwait.
                      (E) For comparison purposes, the removal of 6,300 
                  members of the Armed Forces from Somalia in 1993 took 
                  six months and actually required the deployment of 
                  another 19,000 troops to protect their withdrawal.
                      (F) In view of the logistical challenges, it will 
                  take at least a year, more likely 15 to 20 months to 
                  complete redeployment of United States forces from 
                  Iraq.
  
  SEC. 3. DECLARATIONS OF POLICY.
  
      (a) First Declaration of Policy.--
              (1) Need for comprehensive regional security plan.--
          Congress declares that it is critical that a comprehensive 
          security plan is developed for Iraq and the region that accepts 
          the necessity for a deliberate redeployment of United States 
          forces from Iraq.
              (2) Supporting details.--
                      (A) A comprehensive security plan is necessary for 
                  both the safety of United States forces in Iraq and the 
                  overall national security of the United States.
                      (B) Redeployment would allow large numbers of 
                  members of the United States Armed Forces to return to 
                  the United States, while some forces could be deployed 
                  to areas, such as Afghanistan, where terrorists pose a 
                  threat to the national security of the United States or 
                  could remain at existing bases in Kuwait, Bahrain, the 
                  United Arab Emirates, or Qatar and on aircraft carrier 
                  and amphibious groups, to protect United States 
                  interests in the region.
      (b) Second Declaration of Policy.--
              (1) Iraqi assumption of responsibility.--Congress declares 
          that a planned end to United States involvement in Iraq will 
          serve to force Iraqi leaders to assume responsibility for the 
          security and governance of their country while providing Iran 
          and Syria the incentive to prevent violence otherwise caused by 
          the redeployment of United States forces.
              (2) Supporting details.--
                      (A) The United States intelligence community has 
                  found that Iran and Syria, currently involved 
                  destructively in the fighting in Iraq want stability in 
                  Iraq following redeployment, and can play a 
                  constructive role in improving security and stability 
                  in Iraq.
                      (B) Because the redeployment of United States may 
                  take up to 20 months, there is an opportunity for a 
                  strategic approach to work diplomatically for political 
                  accommodation in Iraq with Iran and Syria (as well as 
                  Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region) during 
                  that timeframe.
      (c) Third Declaration of Policy.--Congress declares that while a 
  ``date certain'' deadline for the redeployment of United States forces 
  could force Iraqi leaders to assume responsibility and provide Iran and 
  Syria the incentive to prevent violence that could result from the 
  redeployment, a ``goal'' for the redeployment's end instead of a ``date 
  certain'' is a necessary compromise in order to ensure a strategic 
  approach for United States security and create a greater level of Iraqi 
  stability in the aftermath of the redeployment.
  
  SEC. 4. REDEPLOYMENT REQUIREMENTS.
  
      (a) Redeployment Required.--
              (1) Requirement.--Redeployment of United States Armed 
          Forces serving in Iraq as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom shall 
          begin within three months after the date of the enactment of 
          this Act. Within six months after the date of the enactment of 
          this Act, troop levels shall be at least 15,000 below the pre-
          surge level of 130,000 troops.
              (2) Goal.--Except as provided in subsection (b), not later 
          than twenty months after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
          the goal is that all United States Armed Forces serving in Iraq 
          as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom shall be deployed outside of 
          Iraq, to locations within the Middle East or Southwest Asia 
          regions or to other regions or nations, or returned to the 
          United States.
              (3) Purpose and pace of redeployment.--The redeployment 
          required by this subsection shall be carried out for the 
          purposes of both enhancing global security interests of the 
          United States and improving the military readiness of the 
          United States. The Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the 
          redeployment is carried out at a deliberate, orderly pace that 
          allows for the full security of members of the Armed Services.
      (b) Exceptions to Redeployment Requirement.--The redeployment 
  required by subsection (a) shall not apply to the following:
              (1) Special operations forces and counter-terrorism 
          operations.--Special operations forces assigned outside of Iraq 
          that conduct either targeted counter-terrorism operations or 
          periodic support operations of the Iraqi security forces in 
          Iraq.
              (2) Military liaison teams.--Military or civilian personnel 
          on military liaison teams involved in military-to-military 
          contacts and comparable activities between the United States 
          and Iraq, as authorized under section 168 of title 10, United 
          States Code.
              (3) Air support.--Members of the Air Force, Navy, and 
          Marine Corps assigned to locations outside Iraq for purposes of 
          conducting air operations in Iraq (including air operations in 
          support of combat operations) to support the Iraqi security 
          forces.
              (4) Security for united states diplomatic missions in 
          iraq.--Members of the Armed Forces providing security for the 
          United States Embassy and other United States diplomatic 
          missions in Iraq.
              (5) Defense attache.--Personnel conducting routine 
          functions of the Office of Defense Attache.
  
  SEC. 5. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.
  
      Effective six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
  funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department of 
  Defense under any provision of law for Operation Iraqi Freedom may not 
  be obligated or expended to support more than 115,000 members of the 
  United States Armed Forces within Iraq, with a goal of no funding for 
  troops in Iraq within twenty months after the date of the enactment of 
  this Act.
  
  SEC. 6. DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES.
  
      (a) United States Leadership.--The United States should take a 
  leadership role in diplomatic efforts and negotiations necessary for 
  countries in the region, including Iran and Syria, to work together to 
  ensure the long-term stability of Iraq, which is in the best interests 
  of such countries and the United States.
      (b) International Conference.--The United States should convene an 
  international conference to bring together countries throughout the 
  world to provide economic aid for rebuilding the infrastructure of Iraq 
  and other reconstruction efforts in Iraq that are essential to ensure 
  the long-term stability of Iraq and America's national security.
target: Enhancing America's Security through Strategic Redeployment from Iraq Act - Sets forth the following findings: (1) ending the war in Iraq is necessary, however, how the war is ended is of even greater importance for U.S. national security, the safety U.S. Armed Forces members serving in Iraq, and stability in both Iraq and the Middle East; (2) an open-ended U.S. involvement in Iraq is not in the interest of U.S. national security and U.S. military forces must be redeployed or risk becoming severely overstrained; and (3) redeployment from Iraq will be a lengthy process.
  
  Declares that: (1) it is critical that a comprehensive security plan is developed for Iraq and the region that accepts the necessity for a deliberate U.S. redeployment of forces from Iraq; (2) a planned end to U.S. involvement in Iraq will serve to force Iraqi leaders to assume responsibility for security and governance while providing Iran and Syria the incentive to prevent violence otherwise caused by the U.S. redeployment; and (3) a "goal" for the redeployment's end rather than a "date certain" end is a necessary compromise to ensure a strategic approach for U.S. security and to create to a greater level of post-redeployment Iraqi stability.
  
  States that: (1) with specified exceptions, redeployment of U.S. Armed Forces in Iraq shall begin within three months, and that within six months troop levels shall be at least 15,000 below the pre-surge level of 130,000 troops; and (2) the goal is that all U.S. Armed Forces in Iraq shall be deployed outside of Iraq within 20 months.
  
  States that funds for the Department of Defense (DOD) for Operation Iraqi Freedom may not be obligated or expended to support more than 115,000 U.S. Armed Forces members within Iraq, with a goal of no funding for troops in Iraq within 20 months.
  
  States that the United States should take a leadership role in diplomatic efforts necessary for countries in the region, including Iran and Syria, to work together to ensure Iraq's long-term stability of Iraq.
feat_title: To provide a strategic approach to the war in Iraq to enhance the national security interests of the United States both at home and abroad, while ensuring the safety of the United States Armed Forces and ensuring stability in Iraq and the Middle East.