text: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
  
      This Act may be cited as the ``Nuclear Weapons Complex Conversion 
  Act of 2000''.
  
  SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
  
      Congress makes the following findings:
              (1) The Russian nuclear weapons complex is still at its 
          Cold War size. Little information about this complex is shared, 
          and 10 of its most sensitive cities remain closed. These cities 
          house 750,000 people and employ approximately 150,000 people in 
          nuclear military facilities. Although the Russian Federation 
          Ministry of Atomic Energy has announced the need to 
          significantly downsize its workforce, perhaps by as much as 50 
          percent, it has been very slow in accomplishing this goal. 
          Information on the extent of any progress is very closely held. 
          The major impediments to downsizing have been economic and 
          social conditions in Russia.
              (2) The United States, on the other hand, has significantly 
          downsized its nuclear weapons complex in an open and 
          transparent manner. As a result, an enormous asymmetry now 
          exists between the United States and Russia in nuclear weapon 
          production capacities and in transparency of such capacities. 
          It is in the national security interest of the United States to 
          assist the Russian Federation in accomplishing significant 
          reductions in its nuclear military complex and in helping it to 
          protect its nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and nuclear 
          secrets during such reductions. Such assistance will accomplish 
          critical nonproliferation objectives and provide essential 
          support towards future arms reduction agreements. Without a 
          significant, transparent reduction in nuclear weapons 
          production capacity, the Russian Federation's ability to 
          quickly reconstitute its arsenal remains inconsistent with 
          current and contemplated arms control agreements.
              (3) Several current programs address portions of the 
          downsizing and nuclear security concerns. The Nuclear Cities 
          Initiative was established to assist Russia in creating job 
          opportunities for employees who are not required to support 
          realistic Russian nuclear security requirements. Its focus has 
          been on creating commercial ventures that can provide self-
          sustaining jobs in three of the closed cities. The current 
          scope and funding of the program are not commensurate with the 
          scale of the threats to the United States sought to be 
          addressed by the program.
              (4) To effectively address threats to United States 
          national security interests, progress with respect to the 
          nuclear cities must be expanded and accelerated. The Nuclear 
          Cities Initiative has laid the groundwork for an immediate 
          increase in investment and potential for immediate risk 
          reduction in the cities of Sarov, Snezhinsk, and Seversk, which 
          house four key Russian nuclear facilities. Furthermore, the 
          Nuclear Cities Initiative has made considerable progress with 
          the limited funding available. However, to gain sufficient 
          advocacy for additional support, the program must demonstrate--
                      (A) rapid progress in conversion and restructuring; 
                  and
                      (B) an ability for the United States to track 
                  progress against verifiable milestones that support a 
                  Russian nuclear complex consistent with their future 
                  national security requirements.
              (5) Reductions in the nuclear weapons-grade material stocks 
          in the United States and Russia enhance prospects for future 
          arms control agreements and reduce concerns that these 
          materials could lead to proliferation risks. Confidence in both 
          nations will be enhanced by knowledge of the extent of each 
          nation's stockpiles of weapons-grade materials. The United 
          States already makes this information public.
              (6) Many current programs contribute to the goals stated 
          herein. However, the lack of programmatic coordination within 
          and among United States Government agencies impedes the 
          capability of the United States to make rapid progress. A 
          formal single point of coordination is essential to ensure that 
          all United States programs directed at cooperative threat 
          reduction, nuclear materials reduction and protection, and the 
          downsizing, transparency, and nonproliferation of the nuclear 
          weapons complex effectively mitigate the risks inherent in the 
          Russian Federation's military complex.
              (7) Specialists in the United States and the former Soviet 
          Union trained in nonproliferation studies can significantly 
          assist in the downsizing process while minimizing the threat 
          presented by potential proliferation of weapons materials or 
          expertise.
  
  SEC. 3. EXPANSION AND ENHANCEMENT OF NUCLEAR CITIES INITIATIVE.
  
      (a) In General.--The Secretary of Energy shall, in accordance with 
  the provisions of this section, take appropriate actions to expand and 
  enhance the activities under the Nuclear Cities Initiative in order 
  to--
              (1) assist the Russian Federation in the downsizing of the 
          Russian Nuclear Complex; and
              (2) coordinate the downsizing of the Russian Nuclear 
          Complex under the Initiative with other United States 
          nonproliferation programs.
      (b) Enhanced Use of MINATOM Technology and Research and Development 
  Services.--In carrying out actions under this section, the Secretary 
  shall facilitate the enhanced use of the technology, and the research 
  and development services, of the Russia Ministry of Atomic Energy 
  (MINATOM) by--
              (1) fostering the commercialization of peaceful, non-
          threatening advanced technologies of the Ministry through the 
          development of projects to commercialize research and 
          development services for industry and industrial entities; and
              (2) authorizing the Department of Energy, and encouraging 
          other departments and agencies of the United States Government, 
          to utilize such research and development services for 
          activities appropriate to the mission of the Department, and 
          such departments and agencies, including activities relating 
          to--
                      (A) remediation of the environmental consequences 
                  of United States nuclear weapons activities and Russian 
                  nuclear weapons activities;
                      (B) nonproliferation (including the detection and 
                  identification of weapons of mass destruction and 
                  verification of treaty compliance);
                      (C) global energy and environmental matters; and
                      (D) basic scientific research.
      (c) Acceleration of Nuclear Cities Initiative.--(1) In carrying out 
  actions under this section, the Secretary shall accelerate the Nuclear 
  Cities Initiative by implementing, as soon as practicable after the 
  date of the enactment of this Act, programs at the nuclear cities 
  referred to in paragraph (2) in order to convert significant portions 
  of the activities carried out at such nuclear cities from military 
  activities to civilian activities.
      (2) The nuclear cities referred to in this paragraph are the 
  following:
              (A) Zarechnyy (Penza-19).
              (B) Sarov (Arzamas-16 and Avangard).
              (C) Snezhinsk (Chelyabinsk-70).
              (D) Seversk (Tomsk-7).
      (3) Before implementing a program under paragraph (1), the 
  Secretary shall establish appropriate, measurable milestones for the 
  first year of the program.
      (d) Plan for Restructuring the Russian Nuclear Complex.--(1) The 
  President, acting through the Secretary of Energy, is urged to enter 
  into negotiations with the Russian Federation for purposes of the 
  development by the Russian Federation of a plan to restructure the 
  Russian Nuclear Complex in order to meet changes in the national 
  security requirements of Russia by 2010.
      (2) The plan under paragraph (1) should include the following:
              (A) Mechanisms to achieve a nuclear weapons production 
          capacity in Russia that is consistent with the obligations of 
          Russia under current and future arms control agreements.
              (B) Mechanisms to increase transparency regarding nuclear 
          weapons production processes and nuclear materials inventories 
          in Russia to the levels of transparency for such matters in the 
          United States, including the participation of Department of 
          Energy officials with expertise in transparency of such 
          matters.
              (C) Measurable milestones that will permit the United 
          States and the Russian Federation to monitor progress under the 
          plan.
      (e) Encouragement of Careers in Nonproliferation.--(1) In carrying 
  out actions under this section, the Secretary shall carry out a program 
  to encourage students in the United States and in the Russian 
  Federation to pursue a career in an area relating to nonproliferation.
      (2) Of the amounts available under subsection (f), $2,000,000 shall 
  be available for purposes of the program required under paragraph (1).
      (f) Funding for Fiscal Year 2001.--There is hereby authorized to be 
  appropriated for the Department of Energy for fiscal year 2001, 
  $50,000,000 for purposes of the Nuclear Cities Initiative, including 
  activities under this section.
      (g) Sense of Congress Regarding Funding for Fiscal Years After 
  Fiscal Year 2001.--It is the sense of Congress that the availability of 
  funds for the Nuclear Cities Initiative in fiscal years after fiscal 
  year 2001 should be contingent upon--
              (1) demonstrable progress in the programs carried out under 
          subsection (c), as determined utilizing the milestones required 
          under paragraph (3) of that subsection; and
              (2) the development and implementation of the plan required 
          by subsection (d).
  
  SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL 
                COORDINATOR FOR NONPROLIFERATION MATTERS.
  
      It is the sense of Congress that--
              (1) there should be a National Coordinator for 
          Nonproliferation Matters to coordinate--
                      (A) the Nuclear Cities Initiative;
                      (B) the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention 
                  program;
                      (C) the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs;
                      (D) the materials protection, control, and 
                  accounting programs; and
                      (E) the International Science and Technology 
                  Center; and
              (2) the position of National Coordinator for 
          Nonproliferation Matters should be similar, regarding 
          nonproliferation matters, to the position filled by designation 
          of the President under section 1441(a) of the Defense Against 
          Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (title XIV of Public 
          Law 104-201; 110 Stat. 2727; 50 U.S.C. 2351(a)).
  
  SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.
  
      In this Act:
              (1) Nuclear city.--The term ``nuclear city'' means any of 
          the closed nuclear cities within the complex of the Russia 
          Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) as follows:
                      (A) Sarov (Arzamas-16 and Avangard).
                      (B) Zarechnyy (Penza-19).
                      (C) Novoural'sk (Sverdlovsk-44).
                      (D) Lesnoy (Sverdlovsk-45).
                      (E) Ozersk (Chelyabinsk-65).
                      (F) Snezhinsk (Chelyabinsk-70).
                      (G) Trechgornyy (Zlatoust-36).
                      (H) Seversk (Tomsk-7).
                      (I) Zhelenznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-26).
                      (I) Zelenogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-45).
              (2) Russian nuclear complex.--The term ``Russian Nuclear 
          Complex'' refers to all of the nuclear cities.
target: Urges the President to enter into negotiations with the Russian Federation for the Federation's development of a plan to restructure its nuclear complex in order to meet changes in Russian nuclear security requirements by 2010. Directs the Secretary to carry out a program to encourage students in the United States and the Russian Federation to pursue careers in nonproliferation.
  Authorizes appropriations. Expresses the sense of Congress that availability of Initiative funds after FY 2001 should be contingent upon: (1) demonstrable progress in enhancing and accelerating Initiative activities; and (2) the development and implementation of Russia's nuclear restructuring plan.
  Expresses the sense of Congress that: (1) there should be a National Coordinator for Nonproliferation Matters to coordinate various Federal nonproliferation programs, including the Initiative; and (2) such Coordinator position should be similar to the Coordinator position filled by the President under the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996.
feat_title: Nuclear Weapons Complex Conversion Act of 2000