text: The experience always impresses two things on Canada’s former ambassador to Iran. 
   
   NEW YORK—It hasn’t been unusual over the last 20 years, when Ken Taylor returns to his home in New York from abroad, for a U.S. customs inspector to look at his passport, glance up, back at the photo and name, and say, “Hey, I studied you in high school!” 
   
   That’s why Taylor is, understandably, a little touchy about the new Ben Affleck movie Argo to be released this week, in which Canada’s role all but vanishes while the CIA and one of its agents, played by Affleck, become stars of the show. 
   
   It’s a place well earned by Taylor and his colleagues at the Canadian Embassy in Tehran — who put their lives on the line to harbour the half-dozen diplomats who slipped away from the U.S. Embassy as it was besieged by Iranian militants who took more than 60 Americans hostage and held most under harsh conditions for more than a year. 
   
   One, even for celebrated international heroes, time passes. And two, that for his role in rescuing six U.S. diplomats in 1980 after the tumultuous days of Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic revolution, he has a place in history. 
   
   “You cannot go around New York without seeing this. It’s on buses. It’s on a three-storey building in Soho. They’re spending a lot of money. They’re banking on an Academy Award.” 
   
   And the movie, he said, is a big deal. 
   
   For them, he said, the movie will probably “be the story.” 
   
   But, as he told the Star at his Upper East Side apartment building in Manhattan, he also knows that for those under age 45 or so, the hostage-takings of 1979, and Canada’s courageous support for its neighbour, “is a part of history that they may only vaguely remember.” 
   
   Taylor, still fit, fashionable and unflappable at 77, understands full well that Argo is Hollywood, not history. 
   
   “The movie’s fun, it’s thrilling, it’s pertinent, it’s timely,” he said. “But look, Canada was not merely standing around watching events take place. The CIA was a junior partner.” 
   
   That’s why Taylor is happy — and he’s still sufficiently famous to be getting media calls from all over the world — to politely “offer some interpretation of what went on in reality, rather than in Hollywood play time.” 
   
   Not only was that analysis demonstrably true, the period was hardly one of glory for U.S. intelligence and military operations. The CIA was blind to rising threats to the Shah’s regime in Iran. And the so-called “Eagle Claw” rescue operation aimed at freeing the remaining hostages in April 1980 ended in flaming fiasco in the Iranian desert with the death of eight American commandos. 
   
   In buffing up America’s “tarnished” image from the time, Argo tries to do what the CIA agent, Antonio Mendez, accused Iranian extremists of in his book on which the movie is based. 
   
   “Much like actors in a Hollywood movie,” he wrote, “the militants saw themselves as the heroes and expected the whole world to see them as such.” 
   
   On Nov. 4, 1979, outraged that the despised Shah had been admitted to the United States for medical care after fleeing the country, thousands of Iranians stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. 
   
   Sixty hostages were seized in the embassy. Three were confined at the Foreign Ministry. (Thirteen women and black hostages were later released on the grounds they represented the oppressed of America.) 
   
   But a handful had slipped away, out of the U.S. consular office into the rainy streets of Tehran. Most were quickly captured by the Revolutionary Guard. Six weren’t. 
   
   Of these, five were taken in a few days later as soon as they called Canadian consular official John Sheardown for help. A sixth, who hid out for weeks with a Swedish diplomat, joined his countrymen a few weeks later. 
   
   The Canadian response was as unhesitating as it was high-risk. 
   
   For three months, it was Taylor and his colleagues who housed the six Americans, who moved them around Tehran when the need arose, who tried to boost spirits, who visited and smuggled the odd banned libation to the three Americans confined to the Foreign Ministry, who fought for the release of all the hostages, and — in Taylor’s case — collected intelligence for Washington on possible rescue operations. 
   
   Canadians shared the emotional ups and downs of the Americans, their boredom, their anxiety, the constant simmering fear of a leak through the Iranian staff at their houses or discovery if someone was spotted through a window. 
   
   Though long gone from the Canadian foreign service, Taylor retains the delightfully droll understatement of the diplomat. 
   
   “What would have happened if one way or another it would have gone awry? . . . I may have had to stay around awhile” in Iran. 
   
   Had his intelligence-gathering for Washington been discovered, “that would have been a difficult consequence, I think.” 
   
   It’s not for nothing the movie is set mostly in Washington and Hollywood and only fleetingly in Tehran, Taylor notes. Neither Mendez nor any other Americans under the tormented administration of President Jimmy Carter had much of a clue what was going on in Iran. 
   
   When Taylor heard a few years ago that Mendez had sold movie rights to his book (which, to be fair, is much more generous than the movie about Canada’s role), “I said, ‘Well, that’s going to be interesting.’ 
   
   “But how do they know what’s going on, because Tony Mendez was only there for a day and a half? The six diplomats were in (Canadian safekeeping) for three months, and they had no idea what was going on outside.” 
   
   Some of Taylor’s friends tried to convey to the film-maker that there was “another side to this other than Tony Mendez’s book, since he was in Washington and Hollywood, he had no idea what was going on in Tehran.” 
   
   Eventually, Taylor’s wife, Pat, did receive a call from Page Leong, the actress who plays her. 
   
   “She had a long talk with Pat and Pat went over what happened,” Taylor laughs. “And then Page says, ‘Well, you know this is a thriller?’ What you’re saying isn’t necessarily going to be in the movie.” 
   
   How right she was. 
   
   When the movie was screened at the Toronto International Film Festival, the former ambassador wasn’t invited, even though he was in Toronto at the time. 
   
   Friends who saw the opening were outraged on Taylor’s behalf, however, at how much history had been sacrificed to thrill. And after the Star’s Martin Knelman reported on this, Taylor was deluged with international attention. 
   
   Soon, Affleck phoned, Taylor recounts, and said, “ ‘You’ve got issues?’ And I said, ‘Yeah, I’ve got issues.’ ” 
   
   So Affleck invited Taylor and his wife to Los Angeles, screened the movie, and offered — “although it’s going to cost money” — to cut the postscript and let Taylor “write what you want.” 
   
   The new postscript says: “The involvement of the CIA complemented efforts of the Canadian Embassy to free the six held in Tehran. To this day the story stands as an enduring model of international co-operation between governments.” 
   
   Even that hardly does Canada justice. 
   
   Although the short-lived federal government of Joe Clark was fully supportive and deeply involved, in Argo’s version Canada was not much more a factor than Iceland. 
   
   Another Canadian hero who gets short shrift is John Sheardown, the first Canadian official the Americans approached for shelter. 
   
   “Why didn’t you call me before?” he said. “What took you so long?” 
   
   Sheardown, now in his late 80s and suffering from Alzheimer’s disease, and his wife, Zena, took in four of the Americans — at considerable risk to Zena who wasn’t a Canadian citizen and had no diplomatic immunity. 
   
   “To make the movie work, I guess, they assumed that everybody was with Pat and me,” Taylor said. “And John and Zena did yeoman work.” 
   
   For Mendez’s part, he didn’t even learn of the six hostages until weeks after their escape. The CIA agent had his idea for the Hollywood angle in January. Then he arranged a back story to portray them as Canadian film-makers, created some disguises and documents. 
   
   “But for every moment in Washington,” Taylor recalls, “there was an equal moment in Ottawa. 
   
   “All the documentation to authenticate the diplomats as Canadians, the business cards, credit cards, the passports, the academic credentials, everything came out of Canada.” 
   
   Not only that, Canada had already devised “exit strategies” — which didn’t use a Hollywood angle Mendez had dreamed up — that Taylor believes “we could have pulled off.” 
   
   “We thought the (Mendez) plan was OK,” he said. “But we didn’t think we really needed something that intricate.” 
   
   The key was that the Americans were travelling as Canadians. Whether they were purported to be petroleum engineers, nutritionists, agronomists — instead of film-makers — probably didn’t much matter, he said. 
   
   In Tehran, moreover, Mendez “was totally in our hands,” Taylor said. His involvement over his weekend in Tehran was “not much . . . just some visa stamps. Ottawa had provided everything else.” 
   
   In fact, the CIA almost scuppered the plan by making passport notations that used the wrong Iranian calendar and would have essentially had the Americans leaving the country before they arrived. 
   
   Canadian official Roger Lucy, who spoke Farsi, spotted the error. Otherwise, Taylor said, “that would have been game over.” 
   
   On the departure date, Taylor arranged embassy cars to pick everyone up — Mendez from his hotel, the diplomats from the Canadian residences — in pre-dawn Tehran. 
   
   He ensured the flight got off before leaving Iran himself forever with the last of the Canadian embassy staff. 
   
   As for Argo’s car chase and Mendez/Affleck’s various on-screen heroics, “it makes a great movie,” said Taylor, who was played in an earlier movie on the Khomeini revolution by Gordon Pinsent and is this time portrayed by Victor Garber. 
   
   If Argo has a useful message, he said, it is on the importance and need for diplomacy and the fact that “what happened 32 years ago could happen tomorrow.” 
   
   For Taylor, his life changed utterly after his exploits in Tehran. He left the foreign service, spent four years as Canada’s consul-general in New York, and has since enjoyed a successful career in the private sector. 
   
   “It became a different life entirely,” he said. But not so much that the past isn’t these days ringing his phone off the hook. 
   
   Recently, he was called by the BBC World Service for Tehran to comment on the closure of the Canadian embassy in Iran and on Argo. 
   
   They told him “they still remember you in Iran,” he said. 
   
   And they wanted to know whether Canada had closed its embassy in Tehran to “coincide with the showing of the movie in Toronto. 
   
   “I said, ‘Well, I doubt it.’ ” 
   
   Whatever goes on in Hollywood, life goes on, and rather sweetly, for Ken Taylor, who will travel to Washington this week for a screening of Argo at the Canadian Embassy. 
   
   The other morning, the phone rang once more in his 26th-floor apartment overlooking the East River. 
   
   It was the BBC World Service calling back to inform him they owed him £40 for the interview. 
   
   He told them it was very thoughtful, but not to bother. ||||| Please consider disabling it for our site, or supporting our work in one of these ways 
   
   Ken Taylor, the Canadian diplomat who sheltered six Americans in Tehran during the Iranian hostage crisis and clandestinely aided their flight from the country, died Thursday in New York City. He was 81. “As Canada’s ambassador to Iran during the Iranian Revolution, Taylor valiantly risked his own life by shielding a group of American diplomats from capture,” Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper said in a statement. “Ken Taylor represented the very best that Canada’s foreign service has to offer.” Except for those three months in winter of 1979, Taylor’s public career evinced little of the drama that would characterize one of the most famous moments in Canadian diplomatic history. He worked in Canada’s industry ministry and specialized in foreign trade commissions before Pierre Trudeau elevated him to the diplomatic corps. An initial New York Times description of Taylor after the escape from Iran perfunctorily described him as a diplomat “whose career has been spent primarily in furthering his country’s commercial interests.” 
   
   That changed on November 8, 1979, when John Sheardown, a Canadian consular official, telephoned Taylor and informed him that five Americans had escaped from the U.S. embassy in Tehran after it was stormed four days earlier, and that they were in hiding in Sheardown’s house. (Sheardown died in 2013.) Taylor moved two of them to his own residence, where they were joined by another American who had found temporary refuge among Swedish diplomats. In the tumult that followed the Iranian Revolution, the U.S. and Canadian governments feared what would happen if the six Americans and their Canadian protecters were discovered. Taylor and his remaining staff, in coordination with Canadian Prime Minister Joe Clark and the U.S. State Department, orchestrated the six Americans’ escape from Iran. Every possible avenue of escape posed its own risks, as Taylor explained to The New York Times in 1981. At first, Canadian officials in Teheran considered driving the four men and two women to Tabriz, in the northeast, and over the border to Turkey. But Mr. Taylor said that Tabriz was “up in arms with local revolts and once they left our residences we would lose control.” Next, a dash for a Persian Gulf port and a friendly tanker was considered. But Teheran was lawless, he said, “to say nothing of the countryside.” Moreover, this move would have meant traveling through Khuzistan, the Arab-populated province that was in turmoil and later became the focus of the war with Iraq. “We couldn't say goodbye to our house guests with any degree of confidence on that route,” Mr. Taylor said. “So we decided to confront the Iranians head on,” he added, and fly out the six Americans directly from the Teheran airport. Taylor gave Canadian passports to the Americans so they could pass through customs, while the CIA forged exit visas and sent an agent, Tony Mendez, to aid their flight. As the Americans left, Taylor also evacuated the few remaining Canadian personnel and closed the embassy on January 28. The six Americans’ safety was originally kept secret by both governments for fear of retribution toward the hostages. ||||| By the 1970s, many Iranians were fed up with the Shah’s government. In protest, they turned to the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a radical cleric whose revolutionary Islamist movement seemed to promise a break from the past and a turn toward greater autonomy for the Iranian people. In July 1979, the revolutionaries forced the Shah to disband his government and flee to Egypt. The Ayatollah installed a militant Islamist government in its place. 
   
   The United States, fearful of stirring up hostilities in the Middle East, did not come to the defense of its old ally. (For one thing, President Carter, aware of the Shah’s terrible record in that department, was reluctant to defend him.) However, in October 1979 President Carter agreed to allow the exiled leader to enter the U.S. for treatment of an advanced malignant lymphoma. His decision was humanitarian, not political; nevertheless, as one American later noted, it was like throwing “a burning branch into a bucket of kerosene.�? Anti-American sentiment in Iran exploded. 
   
   On November 4, just after the Shah arrived in New York, a group of pro-Ayatollah students smashed the gates and scaled the walls of the American embassy in Tehran. Once inside, they seized 66 hostages, mostly diplomats and embassy employees. After a short period of time, 13 of these hostages were released. (For the most part, these 13 were women, African-Americans and citizens of countries other than the U.S.–people who, Khomeini argued, were already subject to “the oppression of American society.�?) Some time later, a 14th hostage developed health problems and was likewise sent home. By midsummer 1980, 52 hostages remained in the embassy compound. 
   
   Diplomatic maneuvers had no discernible effect on the Ayatollah’s anti-American stance; neither did economic sanctions such as the seizure of Iranian assets in the United States. Meanwhile, while the hostages were never seriously injured, they were subjected to a rich variety of demeaning and terrifying treatment. They were blindfolded and paraded in front of TV cameras and jeering crowds. They were not allowed to speak or read, and they were rarely permitted to change clothes. Throughout the crisis there was a frightening uncertainty about their fate: The hostages never knew whether they were going to be tortured, murdered or set free. ||||| The Canadian plan that allowed six American diplomats to escape the takeover of the American Embassy in Teheran was produced after six weeks of coded telex messages between Teheran, Ottawa and Washington. 
   
   ''By mid-November I was convinced we were certainly going to have to look for an exit,'' said Kenneth D. Taylor, the Canadian Ambassador who gave the six sanctuary and who is now Consul General in New York. That conviction came to him 10 days afer the United States compound was seized. 
   
   ''I didn't envisage that it would take 14 months before they were all free,'' Mr. Taylor said in his office yesterday. ''But it did seem to be an endless affair.'' 
   
   Mr. Taylor began planning the best exit route on the telex to the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa. That ministry, in turn, discussed the plans with the State Department. Two Escape Routes Ruled Out 
   
   At first, Canadian officials in Teheran considered driving the four men and two women to Tabriz, in the northeast, and over the border to Turkey. But Mr. Taylor said that Tabriz was ''up in arms with local revolts and once they left our residences we would lose control.'' 
   
   Next, a dash for a Persian Gulf port and a friendly tanker was considered. But Teheran was lawless, he said, ''to say nothing of the countryside.'' Moreover, this move would have meant traveling through Khuzistan, the Arab-populated province that was in turmoil and later became the focus of the war with Iraq. ''We couldn't say goodbye to our house guests with any degree of confidence on that route,'' Mr. Taylor said. 
   
   ''So we decided to confront the Iranians head on,'' he added, and fly out the six Americans directly from the Teheran airport. By early January the Canadian Cabinet had agreed to issue the Americans with Canadian passports. Mr. Taylor will not say who did it, but entry visas were then affixed to the documents. Consternation Over Visa 
   
   When the passports arrived through the diplomatic pouch in Teheran, however, there was consternation at the embassy. One of Mr. Taylor's Persian-speaking aides, Roger Lucey, saw that the visa makers had followed the calendar used under the Shah and not the traditional Islamic calendar brought back by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The visas would have had the Americans leaving before they had arrived. 
   
   ''We might have argued it out with immigration,'' Mr. Taylor said, ''and told them, 'Don't blame us for your administrative foulup.' '' Instead, he said, ''we fixed it up,'' but he will not say how this was accomplished. By Jan. 28, with the embassy staff gradually reduced to half a dozen, the six Americans were ready to go. Mr. Taylor posted two aides at the Teheran airport to keep an eye on things and to telephone him at his residence. 
   
   He was worried. ''After three months with us,'' he said, ''the six were healthy but their degree of resiliency, their ability to respond to the unexpected was limited.'' 
   
   The Americans passed through five checkpoints without difficulty. ''There was a bad moment at the next,'' Mr. Taylor said. The official there insisted on taking the passports to a private room and reading them carefully. He found nothing, however, and the Americans boarded a Swissair flight to Zurich. 
   
   Another bad moment came when the plane was held up because of ''mechanical difficulties.'' ''We were prepared for that,'' Mr. Taylor said. All six had tickets on other planes, and a four-bedroom house had been rented in case the Americans had to return to Teheran. 
   
   Twenty minutes later, however, the ''technical difficulty'' was fixed and the plane took off for Zurich.
target: – Ken Taylor, the Canadian ambassador to Iran who helped smuggle six American hostages home from the country in 1980, died Thursday of colon cancer at the age of 81, his wife tells the AP. For three months, Taylor and his deputy, John Sheardown, hid at their Tehran homes the six US hostages who escaped from the American Embassy after it was overrun by Iranian student radicals on Nov. 4, 1979. Along with the CIA, Taylor helped arrange the hostages' escape by procuring plane tickets and fake Canadian passports. It was an incredibly risky operation that included passport foul-ups and a suspicious airport official, but the six hostages flew to safety from Tehran's airport on Jan. 28, 1980, the New York Times reported. Taylor's Iran exploits were chronicled both in the 2013 documentary Our Man in Tehran and in Ben Affleck's Oscar-winning Argo, though critics complained of the latter movie's inaccuracies, saying it minimized the Canadians' role in the rescue and gave most of the credit to the CIA. "Canada was not merely standing around watching events take place," Taylor told the Toronto Star in 2012. "The CIA was a junior partner." (Affleck later apologized and reworked the closing credits that mentioned Taylor's role, the Atlantic notes.) Meanwhile, Taylor's wife of 50 years, Pat, remembers one of her husband's most notable traits: his generous spirit. "He did all sorts of things for everyone without any expectation of something coming back," she tells the AP. "It's why that incident in Iran happened. There was no second thought about it."