feat_summary_path: finished_summaries/sparknotes/The Prince/section_1_part_3.txt
feat_book_id: The Prince.chapter iii
feat_summary_id: chapter iii
feat_summary: {"name": "Chapter III", "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20210303115306/https://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/prince/section2/", "summary": "Mixed Principalities en must be either pampered or annihilated. Machiavelli explains why maintaining a new principality is more difficult than maintaining a hereditary state. In the first place, people will willingly trade one recently arrived ruler for another, hoping that a new ruler will be better than the present one. This expectation of improvement will induce people to take up arms against any relatively unestablished prince. Although the people may quickly realize that their revolt is ineffective, they will still create great disorder. Furthermore, when a prince takes over another prince's domain, he finds himself in a tricky situation with regard to the people who put him in power. He cannot maintain the support of these people because he cannot fulfill all of their expectations that their situation will improve. But he also cannot deal too harshly with them because he is in their debt. Immediately after taking power, the prince is in danger of losing his newly gained principality. When a prince successfully suppresses a revolt, however, the ruler can easily prevent further revolt by harshly punishing the rebels and decimating his opposition. The ruler can deal more harshly with his subjects in response to the revolt than he would be able to normally. It is much easier to maintain control over a new principality if the people share the same language and customs as the prince's own country. If this is the case, the prince has to do only two things: destroy the family of the former prince, and maintain the principality's laws and taxes. People will live quietly and peacefully so long as their old ways of life are undisturbed. New states that have different languages and customs from those of the prince are more difficult to maintain. One of the prince's most effective options is to take up residence in the new state. By living there, the prince can address problems quickly and efficiently. He can prevent the local officials from plundering his territory. The subjects will be in close contact with the prince. Therefore, those who are inclined to be good will have more reason to show their allegiance to the prince and those who are inclined to be bad will have more reason to fear him. Invaders will think twice before attempting to take over the state. Another effective method of dealing with linguistic and cultural differences is to establish colonies in the new state. It is less expensive to establish colonies than to maintain military occupation, and colonialism only harms inhabitants who pose no threat to the prince because they are scattered and poor. As a general rule, men must be either pampered or crushed. A prince should injure people only if he knows there is no threat of revenge. Setting up military bases throughout the new state will not effectively keep order. Instead, it will upset the people, and these people may turn into hostile enemies capable of causing great harm to the prince's regime. A prince who has occupied a state in a foreign country should dominate the neighboring states. He should weaken the strong ones and ensure that no other strong foreign power invades a neighboring state. Weaker powers will naturally side with the strongest power as long as they cannot grow strong themselves. The prince must remain master of the whole country to keep control of the state he has conquered. Princes should always act to solve problems before problems fully manifest themselves. Political disorders are easy to solve if the prince identifies them and acts early. If they are allowed to develop fully, it will be too late. Men naturally want to acquire more. When they succeed in acquiring more they are always praised, not condemned. But rulers who lack the ability to acquire, yet still try at the cost of their current state, should be condemned. In order to hold a state, a prince must understand statecraft and warcraft. The two are intertwined. War can be avoided by suppressing disorder. However, one can never escape a war: war can only be postponed to the enemy's advantage", "analysis": ""}
text: 
  But the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it be
  not entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which, taken
  collectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly from
  an inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities; for
  men change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and this
  hope induces them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein they
  are deceived, because they afterwards find by experience they have
  gone from bad to worse. This follows also on another natural and common
  necessity, which always causes a new prince to burden those who have
  submitted to him with his soldiery and with infinite other hardships
  which he must put upon his new acquisition.
  
  In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in
  seizing that principality, and you are not able to keep those friends
  who put you there because of your not being able to satisfy them in the
  way they expected, and you cannot take strong measures against them,
  feeling bound to them. For, although one may be very strong in armed
  forces, yet in entering a province one has always need of the goodwill
  of the natives.
  
  For these reasons Louis the Twelfth, King of France, quickly occupied
  Milan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it
  only needed Lodovico's own forces; because those who had opened the
  gates to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future
  benefit, would not endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It is
  very true that, after acquiring rebellious provinces a second time,
  they are not so lightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with
  little reluctance, takes the opportunity of the rebellion to punish the
  delinquents, to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen himself in the
  weakest places. Thus to cause France to lose Milan the first time it was
  enough for the Duke Lodovico(*) to raise insurrections on the borders;
  but to cause him to lose it a second time it was necessary to bring
  the whole world against him, and that his armies should be defeated and
  driven out of Italy; which followed from the causes above mentioned.
  
       (*) Duke Lodovico was Lodovico Moro, a son of Francesco
       Sforza, who married Beatrice d'Este. He ruled over Milan
       from 1494 to 1500, and died in 1510.
  
  Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the second
  time. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it remains
  to name those for the second, and to see what resources he had, and what
  any one in his situation would have had for maintaining himself more
  securely in his acquisition than did the King of France.
  
  Now I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an
  ancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same country
  and language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold them,
  especially when they have not been accustomed to self-government; and
  to hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed the family of the
  prince who was ruling them; because the two peoples, preserving in other
  things the old conditions, and not being unlike in customs, will live
  quietly together, as one has seen in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, and
  Normandy, which have been bound to France for so long a time: and,
  although there may be some difference in language, nevertheless the
  customs are alike, and the people will easily be able to get on amongst
  themselves. He who has annexed them, if he wishes to hold them, has only
  to bear in mind two considerations: the one, that the family of their
  former lord is extinguished; the other, that neither their laws nor
  their taxes are altered, so that in a very short time they will become
  entirely one body with the old principality.
  
  But when states are acquired in a country differing in language,
  customs, or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great
  energy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real
  helps would be that he who has acquired them should go and reside there.
  This would make his position more secure and durable, as it has made
  that of the Turk in Greece, who, notwithstanding all the other measures
  taken by him for holding that state, if he had not settled there, would
  not have been able to keep it. Because, if one is on the spot, disorders
  are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly remedy them; but if one
  is not at hand, they are heard of only when they are great, and then one
  can no longer remedy them. Besides this, the country is not pillaged
  by your officials; the subjects are satisfied by prompt recourse to the
  prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have more cause to love him, and
  wishing to be otherwise, to fear him. He who would attack that state
  from the outside must have the utmost caution; as long as the prince
  resides there it can only be wrested from him with the greatest
  difficulty.
  
  The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places,
  which may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to do
  this or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A
  prince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense he
  can send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority only of
  the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them to the new
  inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and scattered,
  are never able to injure him; whilst the rest being uninjured are easily
  kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious not to err for fear it
  should happen to them as it has to those who have been despoiled. In
  conclusion, I say that these colonies are not costly, they are more
  faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as has been said, being
  poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one has to remark that men
  ought either to be well treated or crushed, because they can avenge
  themselves of lighter injuries, of more serious ones they cannot;
  therefore the injury that is to be done to a man ought to be of such a
  kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge.
  
  But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends much
  more, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the
  state, so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are
  exasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the shifting
  of the garrison up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and
  all become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their
  own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such
  guards are as useless as a colony is useful.
  
  Again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects
  ought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful
  neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care
  that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get
  a footing there; for it will always happen that such a one will be
  introduced by those who are discontented, either through excess of
  ambition or through fear, as one has seen already. The Romans were
  brought into Greece by the Aetolians; and in every other country where
  they obtained a footing they were brought in by the inhabitants. And the
  usual course of affairs is that, as soon as a powerful foreigner enters
  a country, all the subject states are drawn to him, moved by the hatred
  which they feel against the ruling power. So that in respect to those
  subject states he has not to take any trouble to gain them over to
  himself, for the whole of them quickly rally to the state which he has
  acquired there. He has only to take care that they do not get hold of
  too much power and too much authority, and then with his own forces, and
  with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more powerful of them,
  so as to remain entirely master in the country. And he who does not
  properly manage this business will soon lose what he has acquired, and
  whilst he does hold it he will have endless difficulties and troubles.
  
  The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely these
  measures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations with(*)
  the minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept down the
  greater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain authority.
  Greece appears to me sufficient for an example. The Achaeans and
  Aetolians were kept friendly by them, the kingdom of Macedonia was
  humbled, Antiochus was driven out; yet the merits of the Achaeans and
  Aetolians never secured for them permission to increase their power, nor
  did the persuasions of Philip ever induce the Romans to be his friends
  without first humbling him, nor did the influence of Antiochus make them
  agree that he should retain any lordship over the country. Because the
  Romans did in these instances what all prudent princes ought to do,
  who have to regard not only present troubles, but also future ones, for
  which they must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, it is
  easy to remedy them; but if you wait until they approach, the medicine
  is no longer in time because the malady has become incurable; for it
  happens in this, as the physicians say it happens in hectic fever,
  that in the beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but difficult to
  detect, but in the course of time, not having been either detected or
  treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect but difficult to
  cure. Thus it happens in affairs of state, for when the evils that arise
  have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise man to see), they
  can be quickly redressed, but when, through not having been foreseen,
  they have been permitted to grow in a way that every one can see them,
  there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, the Romans, foreseeing troubles,
  dealt with them at once, and, even to avoid a war, would not let them
  come to a head, for they knew that war is not to be avoided, but is only
  to be put off to the advantage of others; moreover they wished to fight
  with Philip and Antiochus in Greece so as not to have to do it in Italy;
  they could have avoided both, but this they did not wish; nor did that
  ever please them which is forever in the mouths of the wise ones of our
  time:--Let us enjoy the benefits of the time--but rather the benefits of
  their own valour and prudence, for time drives everything before it, and
  is able to bring with it good as well as evil, and evil as well as good.
  
       (*) See remark in the introduction on the word
       "intrattenere."
  
  But let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of the
  things mentioned. I will speak of Louis(*) (and not of Charles)(+) as
  the one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having held
  possession of Italy for the longest period; and you will see that he
  has done the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain a
  state composed of divers elements.
  
       (*) Louis XII, King of France, "The Father of the People,"
       born 1462, died 1515.
  
       (+) Charles VIII, King of France, born 1470, died 1498.
  
  King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, who
  desired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his intervention. I
  will not blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get a
  foothold in Italy, and having no friends there--seeing rather that every
  door was shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles--he was forced to
  accept those friendships which he could get, and he would have succeeded
  very quickly in his design if in other matters he had not made some
  mistakes. The king, however, having acquired Lombardy, regained at once
  the authority which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded; the Florentines
  became his friends; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, the
  Bentivogli, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of Pesaro, of
  Rimini, of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchese, the Pisans, the
  Sienese--everybody made advances to him to become his friend. Then could
  the Venetians realize the rashness of the course taken by them, which,
  in order that they might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made the king
  master of two-thirds of Italy.
  
  Let any one now consider with what little difficulty the king could have
  maintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules above laid
  down, and kept all his friends secure and protected; for although they
  were numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the Church,
  some of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been forced to
  stand in with him, and by their means he could easily have made himself
  secure against those who remained powerful. But he was no sooner in
  Milan than he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander to occupy the
  Romagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he was weakening
  himself, depriving himself of friends and of those who had thrown
  themselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church by adding much
  temporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it greater authority. And
  having committed this prime error, he was obliged to follow it up, so
  much so that, to put an end to the ambition of Alexander, and to prevent
  his becoming the master of Tuscany, he was himself forced to come into
  Italy.
  
  And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and
  deprived himself of friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of Naples,
  divided it with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime arbiter in
  Italy he takes an associate, so that the ambitious of that country and
  the malcontents of his own should have somewhere to shelter; and whereas
  he could have left in the kingdom his own pensioner as king, he drove
  him out, to put one there who was able to drive him, Louis, out in turn.
  
  The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always
  do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not blamed; but
  when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, then there is
  folly and blame. Therefore, if France could have attacked Naples with
  her own forces she ought to have done so; if she could not, then she
  ought not to have divided it. And if the partition which she made with
  the Venetians in Lombardy was justified by the excuse that by it she got
  a foothold in Italy, this other partition merited blame, for it had not
  the excuse of that necessity.
  
  Therefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers,
  he increased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, he
  brought in a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he did not
  send colonies. Which errors, had he lived, were not enough to injure
  him had he not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from the
  Venetians; because, had he not aggrandized the Church, nor brought Spain
  into Italy, it would have been very reasonable and necessary to humble
  them; but having first taken these steps, he ought never to have
  consented to their ruin, for they, being powerful, would always have
  kept off others from designs on Lombardy, to which the Venetians would
  never have consented except to become masters themselves there; also
  because the others would not wish to take Lombardy from France in order
  to give it to the Venetians, and to run counter to both they would not
  have had the courage.
  
  And if any one should say: "King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexander
  and the kingdom to Spain to avoid war," I answer for the reasons given
  above that a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to avoid war, because
  it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to your disadvantage. And
  if another should allege the pledge which the king had given to the
  Pope that he would assist him in the enterprise, in exchange for the
  dissolution of his marriage(*) and for the cap to Rouen,(+) to that I
  reply what I shall write later on concerning the faith of princes, and
  how it ought to be kept.
  
       (*) Louis XII divorced his wife, Jeanne, daughter of Louis
       XI, and married in 1499 Anne of Brittany, widow of Charles
       VIII, in order to retain the Duchy of Brittany for the
       crown.
  
       (+) The Archbishop of Rouen. He was Georges d'Amboise,
       created a cardinal by Alexander VI. Born 1460, died 1510.
  
  Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the
  conditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries and
  wished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much that
  is reasonable and quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at Nantes
  with Rouen, when Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope Alexander,
  was usually called, occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal Rouen
  observing to me that the Italians did not understand war, I replied
  to him that the French did not understand statecraft, meaning that
  otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach such
  greatness. And in fact it has been seen that the greatness of the Church
  and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and her ruin may be
  attributed to them. From this a general rule is drawn which never or
  rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another becoming powerful
  is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about either by
  astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by him who has been
  raised to power.
  
  
  
  
feat_summary_name: Chapter III
target: Mixed Principalities en must be either pampered or annihilated. Machiavelli explains why maintaining a new principality is more difficult than maintaining a hereditary state. In the first place, people will willingly trade one recently arrived ruler for another, hoping that a new ruler will be better than the present one. This expectation of improvement will induce people to take up arms against any relatively unestablished prince. Although the people may quickly realize that their revolt is ineffective, they will still create great disorder. Furthermore, when a prince takes over another prince's domain, he finds himself in a tricky situation with regard to the people who put him in power. He cannot maintain the support of these people because he cannot fulfill all of their expectations that their situation will improve. But he also cannot deal too harshly with them because he is in their debt. Immediately after taking power, the prince is in danger of losing his newly gained principality. When a prince successfully suppresses a revolt, however, the ruler can easily prevent further revolt by harshly punishing the rebels and decimating his opposition. The ruler can deal more harshly with his subjects in response to the revolt than he would be able to normally. It is much easier to maintain control over a new principality if the people share the same language and customs as the prince's own country. If this is the case, the prince has to do only two things: destroy the family of the former prince, and maintain the principality's laws and taxes. People will live quietly and peacefully so long as their old ways of life are undisturbed. New states that have different languages and customs from those of the prince are more difficult to maintain. One of the prince's most effective options is to take up residence in the new state. By living there, the prince can address problems quickly and efficiently. He can prevent the local officials from plundering his territory. The subjects will be in close contact with the prince. Therefore, those who are inclined to be good will have more reason to show their allegiance to the prince and those who are inclined to be bad will have more reason to fear him. Invaders will think twice before attempting to take over the state. Another effective method of dealing with linguistic and cultural differences is to establish colonies in the new state. It is less expensive to establish colonies than to maintain military occupation, and colonialism only harms inhabitants who pose no threat to the prince because they are scattered and poor. As a general rule, men must be either pampered or crushed. A prince should injure people only if he knows there is no threat of revenge. Setting up military bases throughout the new state will not effectively keep order. Instead, it will upset the people, and these people may turn into hostile enemies capable of causing great harm to the prince's regime. A prince who has occupied a state in a foreign country should dominate the neighboring states. He should weaken the strong ones and ensure that no other strong foreign power invades a neighboring state. Weaker powers will naturally side with the strongest power as long as they cannot grow strong themselves. The prince must remain master of the whole country to keep control of the state he has conquered. Princes should always act to solve problems before problems fully manifest themselves. Political disorders are easy to solve if the prince identifies them and acts early. If they are allowed to develop fully, it will be too late. Men naturally want to acquire more. When they succeed in acquiring more they are always praised, not condemned. But rulers who lack the ability to acquire, yet still try at the cost of their current state, should be condemned. In order to hold a state, a prince must understand statecraft and warcraft. The two are intertwined. War can be avoided by suppressing disorder. However, one can never escape a war: war can only be postponed to the enemy's advantage