The dining cryptographers protocol implements a multiple access channel in whichsenders and recipients are anonymous. A problem is that a malicious participant can disrupt commu-nication by deliberately creating collisions. We propose a computationally secure dining cryptogra-phers protocol with collision resolution that achieves a maximum stable throughput of 0.924 messagesper round and which allows to easily detect disruptors.
In present day communication networks, the network operator or an intruder could easily observe when, how much and with whom the users communicate (traffic analysis), even if the users employ end-to-end encryption. With the increasing use of ISDNs, this becomes a severe threat.Therefore, we summarize basic concepts to keep the recipient and sender or at least their relationship unobservable, consider some possible implementations and necessary hierarchical extensions, and propose and evaluate some suitable performance and reliability enhancements. A protocol is described which allows to send and receive messages anonymously using an arbitrary communication network, and it is proved to be unconditionally secure.