An adversarial machine learning approach is introduced to launch jamming attacks on wireless communications and a defense strategy is presented. A cognitive transmitter uses a pre-trained classifier to predict the current channel status based on recent sensing results and decides whether to transmit or not, whereas a jammer collects channel status and ACKs to build a deep learning classifier that reliably predicts the next successful transmissions and effectively jams them. This jamming approach is shown to reduce the transmitter’s performance much more severely compared with random or sensing-based jamming. The deep learning classification scores are used by the jammer for power control subject to an average power constraint. Next, a generative adversarial network is developed for the jammer to reduce the time to collect the training dataset by augmenting it with synthetic samples. As a defense scheme, the transmitter deliberately takes a small number of wrong actions in spectrum access (in form of a causative attack against the jammer) and therefore prevents the jammer from building a reliable classifier. The transmitter systematically selects when to take wrong actions and adapts the level of defense to mislead the jammer into making prediction errors and consequently increase its throughput.
Various spectrum management schemes have been proposed in recent years to improve the spectrum utilization in cognitive radio networks. However, few of them have considered the existence of cognitive attackers who can adapt their attacking strategy to the time-varying spectrum environment and the secondary users' strategy. In this paper, we investigate the security mechanism when secondary users are facing the jamming attack, and propose a stochastic game framework for anti-jamming defense. At each stage of the game, secondary users observe the spectrum availability, the channel quality, and the attackers' strategy from the status of jammed channels. According to this observation, they will decide how many channels they should reserve for transmitting control and data messages and how to switch between the different channels. Using the minimax-Q learning, secondary users can gradually learn the optimal policy, which maximizes the expected sum of discounted payoffs defined as the spectrum-efficient throughput. The proposed stationary policy in the anti-jamming game is shown to achieve much better performance than the policy obtained from myopic learning, which only maximizes each stage's payoff, and a random defense strategy, since it successfully accommodates the environment dynamics and the strategic behavior of the cognitive attackers.  The objective of jamming attack in a network is to deny service to the communicating nodes, thus reducing network throughput and availability. In this paper, we propose a game theoretic framework for detecting jamming attacks in wireless ad hoc networks. We formulate jamming as a two- player, non cooperative game to analyze the interaction between attacker and monitoring nodes in the network. We propose hybrid detection strategies at the monitor node using cross-layer features for attack detection. We solve the game by computing the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and derive optimal attack and detection strategies. Numerical results show that game theoretic analysis can be used to determine optimal steady state monitoring strategies to provide higher detection accuracy, while balancing the monitoring energy costs.