This paper addresses the problem of constructing secure exact-repair regenerating codes at the MSR point for all feasible values of the parameters. The setting involves a passive eavesdropper who is allowed to observe the stored contents of, and the downloads into, an @math -subset of the @math nodes of a distributed storage system (DSS). The objective is to achieve perfect secrecy between the eavesdropped symbols and the file stored on the DSS. Previous secure code constructions (most notably that by ) tackle the problem only for the restricted case wherein the number, @math , of helper nodes aiding in the recovery of a failed node is equal to @math . This paper builds on Rawat's work, by combining Gabidulin pre-coding and an MSR construction by Ye and Barg to prove the achievability of secrecy capacity at the MSR point for all allowed values of @math .
Maximum distance separable (MDS) codes are optimal error-correcting codes in the sense that they provide the maximum failure tolerance for a given number of parity nodes. Suppose that an MDS code with @math information nodes and @math parity nodes is used to encode data in a distributed storage system. It is known that if @math out of the @math nodes are inaccessible and @math surviving (helper) nodes are used to recover the lost data, then we need to download at least @math fraction of the data stored in each of the helper nodes ( , 2010 and , 2013). If this lower bound is achieved for the repair of any @math erased nodes from any @math helper nodes, we say that the MDS code has the @math -optimal repair property. We study high-rate MDS array codes with the optimal repair property (also known as minimum storage regenerating codes, or MSR codes). Explicit constructions of such codes in the literature are only available for the cases where there are at most three parity nodes, and these existing constructions can only optimally repair a single node failure by accessing all the surviving nodes. In this paper, given any @math and @math , we present two explicit constructions of MDS array codes with the @math -optimal repair property for all @math and @math simultaneously. Codes in the first family can be constructed over any base field @math as long as @math , where @math . The encoding, decoding, repair of failed nodes, and update procedures of these codes all have low complexity. Codes in the second family have the optimal access property and can be constructed over any base field @math as long as @math . Moreover, both code families have the optimal error resilience capability when repairing failed nodes. We also construct several other related families of MDS codes with the optimal repair property. Regenerating codes are a class of codes for distributed storage networks that provide reliability and availability of data, and also perform efficient node repair. Another important aspect of a distributed storage network is its security. In this paper, we consider a threat model where an eavesdropper may gain access to the data stored in a subset of the storage nodes, and possibly also, to the data downloaded during repair of some nodes. We provide explicit constructions of regenerating codes that achieve information-theoretic secrecy capacity in this setting. In this paper, we revisit the problem of characterizing the secrecy capacity of minimum storage regenerating (MSR) codes under the passive @math -eavesdropper model, where the eavesdropper has access to data stored on @math nodes and the repair data for an additional @math nodes. We study it from the information-theoretic perspective. First, some general properties of MSR codes as well as a simple and generally applicable upper bound on secrecy capacity are given. Second, a new concept of stable MSR codes is introduced, where the stable property is shown to be closely linked with secrecy capacity. Finally, a comprehensive and explicit result on secrecy capacity in the linear MSR scenario is present, which generalizes all related works in the literature and also predicts certain results for some unexplored linear MSR codes. We address the problem of securing distributed storage systems against passive eavesdroppers that can observe a limited number of storage nodes. An important aspect of these systems is node failures over time, which demand a repair mechanism aimed at maintaining a targeted high level of system reliability. If an eavesdropper observes a node that is added to the system to replace a failed node, it will have access to all the data downloaded during repair, which can potentially compromise the entire information in the system.We are interested in determining the secrecy capacity of distributed storage systems under repair dynamics, i.e., the maximum amount of data that can be securely stored and made available to a legitimate user without revealing any information to any eavesdropper. We derive a general upper bound on the secrecy capacity and show that this bound is tight for the bandwidth-limited regime which is of importance in scenarios such as peer-to-peer distributed storage systems. We also provide a simple explicit code construction that achieves the capacity for this regime. This paper aims to go beyond resilience into the study of security and local-repairability for distributed storage systems (DSSs). Security and local-repairability are both important as features of an efficient storage system, and this paper aims to understand the trade-offs between resilience, security, and local-repairability in these systems. In particular, this paper first investigates security in the presence of colluding eavesdroppers, where eavesdroppers are assumed to work together in decoding the stored information. Second, this paper focuses on coding schemes that enable optimal local repairs. It further brings these two concepts together to develop locally repairable coding schemes for DSS that are secure against eavesdroppers. The main results of this paper include: 1) an improved bound on the secrecy capacity for minimum storage regenerating codes; 2) secure coding schemes that achieve the bound for some special cases; 3) a new bound on minimum distance for locally repairable codes; 4) code construction for locally repairable codes that attain the minimum distance bound; and 5) repair-bandwidth-efficient locally repairable codes with and without security constraints. The problem of securing data against eavesdropping in distributed storage systems is studied. The focus is on systems that use linear codes and implement exact repair to recover from node failures. The maximum file size that can be stored securely is determined for systems in which all the available nodes help in repair (i.e., repair degree d = n -1, where n is the total number of nodes) and for any number of compromised nodes. Similar results in the literature are restricted to the case of at most two compromised nodes. Moreover, new explicit upper bounds are given on the maximum secure file size for systems with d <; n - 1. The key ingredients for the contribution of this paper are new results on subspace intersection for the data downloaded during repair. The new bounds imply the interesting fact that the maximum amount of data that can be stored securely decreases exponentially with the number of compromised nodes. Whether this exponential decrease is fundamental or is a consequence of the exactness and linearity constraints remains an open question.