The following game is played on a weighted graph: Alice selects a matching @math and Bob selects a number @math . Alice's payoff is the ratio of the weight of the @math heaviest edges of @math to the maximum weight of a matching of size at most @math . If @math guarantees a payoff of at least @math then it is called @math -robust. In 2002, Hassin and Rubinstein gave an algorithm that returns a @math -robust matching, which is best possible. We show that Alice can improve her payoff to @math by playing a randomized strategy. This result extends to a very general class of independence systems that includes matroid intersection, b-matchings, and strong 2-exchange systems. It also implies an improved approximation factor for a stochastic optimization variant known as the maximum priority matching problem and translates to an asymptotic robustness guarantee for deterministic matchings, in which Bob can only select numbers larger than a given constant. Moreover, we give a new LP-based proof of Hassin and Rubinstein's bound.
 In this paper, we introduce the randomized network interdiction problem that allows the interdictor to use randomness to select arcs to be removed. We model the problem in two different ways: arc-based and path-based formulations, depending on whether flows are defined on arcs or paths, respectively. We present insights into the modeling power, complexity, and approximability of both formulations. The minmax regret problem for combinatorial optimization under uncertainty can be viewed as a zero-sum game played between an optimizing player and an adversary, where the optimizing player selects a solution and the adversary selects costs with the intention of maximizing the regret of the player. The conventional minmax regret model considers only deterministic solutions strategies, and minmax regret versions of most polynomial solvable problems are NP-hard. In this paper, we consider a randomized model where the optimizing player selects a probability distribution (corresponding to a mixed strategy) over solutions and the adversary selects costs with knowledge of the player’s distribution, but not its realization. We show that under this randomized model, the minmax regret version of any polynomial solvable combinatorial problem becomes polynomial solvable. This holds true for both interval and discrete scenario representations of uncertainty. Using the randomized model, we show new proofs of existing approximation algorithms for the deterministic model based on primal-dual approaches. We also determine integrality gaps of minmax regret formulations, giving tight bounds on the limits of performance gains from randomization. Finally, we prove that minmax regret problems are NP-hard under general convex uncertainty.