To establish secure (point-to-point and or broadcast) communication channels among the nodes of a wireless sensor network is a fundamental task. To this end, a plethora of (socalled) key pre-distribution schemes have been proposed in the past. All these schemes, however, rely on shared secret(s), which are assumed to be somehow pre-loaded onto the sensor nodes. In this paper, we propose a novel method for secure initialization of sensor nodes based on a visual out-of-band channel. Using the proposed method, the administrator of a sensor network can distribute keys onto the sensor nodes, necessary to bootstrap key pre-distribution. Our secure initialization method requires only a little extra cost, is efficient and scalable with respect to the number of sensor nodes. Moreover, based on a usability study that we conducted, the method turns out to be quite user-friendly and easy to use by naive human users.
In the near future, many personal electronic devices will be able to communicate with each other over a short range wireless channel. We investigate the principal security issues for such an environment. Our discussion is based on the concrete example of a thermometer that makes its readings available to other nodes over the air. Some lessons learned from this example appear to be quite general to ad-hoc networks, and rather different from what we have come to expect in more conventional systems: denial of service, the goals of authentication, and the problems of naming all need re-examination. We present the resurrecting duckling security policy model, which describes secure transient association of a device with multiple serialised owners.