We present a method to secure the complete path between a server and the local human user at a network node. This is useful for scenarios like internet banking, electronic signatures, or online voting. Protection of input authenticity and output integrity and authenticity is accomplished by a combination of traditional and novel technologies, e.g., SSL, ActiveX, and DirectX. Our approach does not require administrative privileges to deploy and is hence suitable for consumer applications. Results are based on the implementation of a proof-of-concept application for the Windows platform.
Client computers are often a weak link in a technical network infrastructure. Increasing the security of client systems and applications against malicious software attacks increases the security of the network as a whole. Our work solves integrity and authenticity of input, confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of output. We present components to integrate a trusted path into an application to directly communicate with a user at a personal computer. This allows security sensitive parts of applications to continue operating while being attacked with malicious software in an event-driven system. Our approach uses widely employed COTS software – DirectX – and can be varied in design and implementation, hence making it more difficult to defeat with generic attack tools.  Corruption or disclosure of sensitive user documents can be among the most lasting and costly effects of malicious software attacks. Many malicious programs specifically target files that are likely to contain important user data. Researchers have approached this problem by developing techniques for restricting access to resources on an application-by-application basis. These so-called "sandbox environments," though effective, are cumbersome and difficult to use. In this paper, we present a prototype Windows NT 2000 tool that addresses malicious software threats to user data by extending the existing set of file-access permissions. Management and configuration options make the tool unobtrusive and easy to use. We have conducted preliminary experiments to assess the usability of the tool and to evaluate the effects of improvements we have made. Our work has produced an intuitive data-centric method of protecting valuable documents that provides an additional layer of defense beyond existing antivirus solutions. Technology aimed at making life easier for game developers is an issue of controversy among security experts. Objections arise out of concerns of stability of a game-friendly platform. However, this kind of programming interfaces can be used to promote security as well. We use Microsoft's DirectX platform to access input and output devices directly. Thereby we enable applications to distinguish between user actions and simulated behaviour by malicious code. With modest effort for a developer we are able to ensure authenticity and integrity of mouse and keyboard input and the display's integrity. Computer security protocols usually terminate in a computer; however, the human-based services which they support usually terminate in a human. The gap between the human and the computer creates potential for security problems. We examine this gap, as it is manifested in secure Web servers. demonstrated the potential, in 1996, for malicious servers to impersonate honest servers. In this paper, we show how malicious servers can still do this---and can also forge the existence of an SSL session and the contents of the alleged server certificate. We then consider how to systematically defend against Web spoofing, by creating a trusted path from the browser to the human user. We present potential designs, propose a new one, prototype it in open-source Mozilla, and demonstrate its effectiveness via user studies. Electronic signatures are introduced by more and more countries as legally binding means for signing electronic documents with the primary hope of boosting e-commerce and e-government. Given that the underlying cryptographic methods are sufficiently strong, attacks by Trojan horse programs on electronic signatures are becoming increasingly popular. Most of the current systems either employ costly or inflexible – yet still inadequate – defence mechanisms or simply ignore the threat. A signatory has to trust the manufacturer of the software that it will work in the intended way. In the past, Trojan horse programs have shown to be of growing concern for end-user computers. Software for electronic signatures must provide protection against Trojan horses attacking the legally relevant signing process. In a survey of commercial of the shelf signature software programs we found severe vulnerabilities that can easily be exploited by an attacker. In this work we propose a secure electronic paper as a countermeasure. It is a collection of preventive and restorative methods that provides, in parallel to traditional signatures on paper, a high degree of protection of the system against untrustworthy programs. We focus our attention on Microsoft Windows NT and Windows 98, two operating systems most likely to be found on the customers' computers. The resulting system is an assembly of a small number of inexpensive building blocks that offers reliable protection against Trojan horse programs attempting to forge electronic signatures. A method for protecting the video memory on a computer system from being illicitly copied. The invention decrypts a previously encrypted image and displays it on the video screen. During the time the image is displayed, the invention protects it from being copied by other running applications. This is accomplished in multithreaded operating systems by first issuing a multithreaded locking primitive to the video memory resource, and then inserting a pending video hardware request that will take precedence over any subsequent video memory access requests. The pending request serves the purpose of destroying the contents of video memory. The pending request is passive in that it does not execute unless a malicious program has removed the video memory lock.