Development of quality assured software-intensive systems, such as automotive embedded systems, is an increasing challenge as the complexity of these systems significantly increases. EAST-ADL is an architecture description language developed to specify automotive embedded system architectures at multiple abstraction levels in the development of safety-critical automotive products. In this paper, we propose an architecture-based verification technique which enhances the model-based development process supported by EAST-ADL by adapting model-checking to EAST-ADL specifications. We employ UPPAAL as a verification tool to ensure that predicted function behaviors of the models in EAST-ADL satisfy functional and real-time requirements. The criteria for this architecture-based verification is presented and the transformation rules which comply with this criteria are derived. This enables us to extract the relevant information from EAST-ADL specifications and to generate analyzable UPPAAL models. The formal semantics of EAST-ADL is defined which is essential to automate the verification of EAST-ADL specifications. Our approach is demonstrated by verifying the safety of the steering truck system units.
For systems where functions are distributed but share support for computation, communication, environment sensing and actuation, it is essential to understand how such functions can affect each other. Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) is the task through which safety requirements are established. This is usually a document-based process where each system function is analyzed alone, making it difficult to reason about the commonalities of related functional concepts and the distribution of safety mechanisms across a systemof-systems. This paper presents a model-based approach to PHA with the EAST-ADL2 language and in accordance with the ISO DIS 26262 standard. The language explicitly supports the definition and handling of requirements, functions and technical solutions, and their various relations and constraints as a coherent whole with multiple views. We show in particular the engineering needs for a systematic approach to PHA and the related language features for precise modeling of requirements, user functionalities, system operation contexts, and the derived safety mechanisms.