The advent of social networks poses severe threats on user privacy as adversaries can de-anonymize users' identities by mapping them to correlated cross-domain networks. Without ground-truth mapping, prior literature proposes various cost functions in hope of measuring the quality of mappings. However, there is generally a lacking of rationale behind the cost functions, whose minimizer also remains algorithmically unknown. We jointly tackle above concerns under a more practical social network model parameterized by overlapping communities, which, neglected by prior art, can serve as side information for de-anonymization. Regarding the unavailability of ground-truth mapping to adversaries, by virtue of the Minimum Mean Square Error (MMSE), our first contribution is a well-justified cost function minimizing the expected number of mismatched users over all possible true mappings. While proving the NP-hardness of minimizing MMSE, we validly transform it into the weighted-edge matching problem (WEMP), which, as disclosed theoretically, resolves the tension between optimality and complexity: (i) WEMP asymptotically returns a negligible mapping error in large network size under mild conditions facilitated by higher overlapping strength; (ii) WEMP can be algorithmically characterized via the convex-concave based de-anonymization algorithm (CBDA), perfectly finding the optimum of WEMP. Extensive experiments further confirm the effectiveness of CBDA under overlapping communities, in terms of averagely 90 re-identified users in the rare true cross-domain co-author networks when communities overlap densely, and roughly 70 enhanced re-identification ratio compared to non-overlapping cases.
Network alignment refers to the problem of matching the vertex sets of two unlabeled graphs, which can be viewed as a generalization of the classic graph isomorphism problem. Network alignment has applications in several fields, including social network analysis, privacy, pattern recognition, computer vision, and computational biology. A number of heuristic algorithms have been proposed in these fields. Recent progress in the analysis of network alignment over stochastic models sheds light on the interplay between network parameters and matchability. In this paper, we consider the alignment problem when the two networks overlap only partially, i.e., there exist vertices in one network that have no counterpart in the other. We define a random bigraph model that generates two correlated graphs G1,2; it is parameterized by the expected node overlap t2 and by the expected edge overlap s2. We define a cost function for structural mismatch under a particular alignment, and we identify a threshold for perfect matchability: if the average node degrees of G1,2 grow as ω((s−2t−1 log(n)), then minimization of the proposed cost function results in an alignment which (i) is over exactly the set of shared nodes between G1 and G2, and (ii) agrees with the true matching between these shared nodes. Our result shows that network alignment is fundamentally robust to partial edge and node overlaps. In many graph--mining problems, two networks from different domains have to be matched. In the absence of reliable node attributes, graph matching has to rely on only the link structures of the two networks, which amounts to a generalization of the classic graph isomorphism problem. Graph matching has applications in social--network reconciliation and de-anonymization, protein--network alignment in biology, and computer vision. The most scalable graph--matching approaches use ideas from percolation theory, where a matched node pair "infects" neighbouring pairs as additional potential matches. This class of matching algorithm requires an initial seed set of known matches to start the percolation. The size and correctness of the matching is very sensitive to the size of the seed set. In this paper, we give a new graph--matching algorithm that can operate with a much smaller seed set than previous approaches, with only a small increase in matching errors. We characterize a phase transition in matching performance as a function of the seed set size, using a random bigraph model and ideas from bootstrap percolation theory. We also show the excellent performance in matching several real large-scale social networks, using only a handful of seeds. We consider the problem of perfectly recovering the vertex correspondence between two correlated Erdos-Renyi (ER) graphs. For a pair of correlated graphs on the same vertex set, the correspondence between the vertices can be obscured by randomly permuting the vertex labels of one of the graphs. In some cases, the structural information in the graphs allow this correspondence to be recovered. We investigate the information-theoretic threshold for exact recovery, i.e. the conditions under which the entire vertex correspondence can be correctly recovered given unbounded computational resources. Pedarsani and Grossglauser provided an achievability result of this type. Their result establishes the scaling dependence of the threshold on the number of vertices. We improve on their achievability bound. We also provide a converse bound, establishing conditions under which exact recovery is impossible. Together, these establish the scaling dependence of the threshold on the level of correlation between the two graphs. The converse and achievability bounds differ by a factor of two for sparse, significantly correlated graphs. Recently, graph matching algorithms have been successfully applied to the problem of network de-anonymization, in which nodes (users) participating in more than one social network are identified only by means of the structure of their links to other members. This procedure exploits an initial set of seed nodes large enough to trigger a percolation process which correctly matches almost all other nodes across the different social networks. Our main contribution is to show the crucial role played by clustering, which is a ubiquitous feature of realistic social network graphs (and many other systems). Clustering has both the effect of making matching algorithms more vulnerable to errors, and the potential to dramatically reduce the number of seeds needed to trigger percolation, thanks to a wave-like propagation effect. We demonstrate these facts by considering a fairly general class of random geometric graphs with variable clustering level, and showing how clever algorithms can achieve surprisingly good performance while containing matching errors.   A crucial privacy-driven issue nowadays is re-identifying anonymized social networks by mapping them to correlated cross-domain auxiliary networks. Prior works are typically based on modeling social networks as random graphs representing users and their relations, and subsequently quantify the quality of mappings through cost functions that are proposed without sufficient rationale. Also, it remains unknown how to algorithmically meet the demand of such quantifications, i.e., to find the minimizer of the cost functions. We address those concerns in a more realistic social network modeling parameterized by community structures that can be leveraged as side information for de-anonymization. By Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) estimation, our first contribution is new and well justified cost functions, which, when minimized, enjoy superiority to previous ones in finding the correct mapping with the highest probability. The feasibility of the cost functions is then for the first time algorithmically characterized. While proving the general multiplicative inapproximability, we are able to propose two algorithms, which, respectively, enjoy an -additive approximation and a conditional optimality in carrying out successful user re-identification. Our theoretical findings are empirically validated, with a notable dataset extracted from rare true cross-domain networks that reproduce genuine social network de-anonymization. Both theoretical and empirical observations also manifest the importance of community information in enhancing privacy inferencing.  The proliferation of online social networks, and the concomitant accumulation of user data, give rise to hotly debated issues of privacy, security, and control. One specific challenge is the sharing or public release of anonymized data without accidentally leaking personally identifiable information (PII). Unfortunately, it is often difficult to ascertain that sophisticated statistical techniques, potentially employing additional external data sources, are unable to break anonymity. In this paper, we consider an instance of this problem, where the object of interest is the structure of a social network, i.e., a graph describing users and their links. Recent work demonstrates that anonymizing node identities may not be sufficient to keep the network private: the availability of node and link data from another domain, which is correlated with the anonymized network, has been used to re-identify the anonymized nodes. This paper is about conditions under which such a de-anonymization process is possible. We attempt to shed light on the following question: can we assume that a sufficiently sparse network is inherently anonymous, in the sense that even with unlimited computational power, de-anonymization is impossible? Our approach is to introduce a random graph model for a version of the de-anonymization problem, which is parameterized by the expected node degree and a similarity parameter that controls the correlation between two graphs over the same vertex set. We find simple conditions on these parameters delineating the boundary of privacy, and show that the mean node degree need only grow slightly faster than log n with network size n for nodes to be identifiable. Our results have policy implications for sharing of anonymized network information. Anonymized social network graphs published for academic or advertisement purposes are subject to de-anonymization attacks by leveraging side information in the form of a second, public social network graph correlated with the anonymized graph. This is because the two are from the same underlying graph of true social relationships. In this paper, we (i) characterize the maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimates of user identities for the anonymized graph and (ii) provide sufficient conditions for successful de-anonymization for underlying graphs with community structure. Our results generalize prior work that assumed underlying graphs of Erd o s-R 'enyi type, in addition to proving the optimality of the attack strategy adopted in the prior work.  Graph matching is a generalization of the classic graph isomorphism problem. By using only their structures a graph-matching algorithm finds a map between the vertex sets of two similar graphs. This has applications in the de-anonymization of social and information networks and, more generally, in the merging of structural data from different domains. One class of graph-matching algorithms starts with a known seed set of matched node pairs. Despite the success of these algorithms in practical applications, their performance has been observed to be very sensitive to the size of the seed set. The lack of a rigorous understanding of parameters and performance makes it difficult to design systems and predict their behavior. In this paper, we propose and analyze a very simple percolation - based graph matching algorithm that incrementally maps every pair of nodes (i,j) with at least r neighboring mapped pairs. The simplicity of this algorithm makes possible a rigorous analysis that relies on recent advances in bootstrap percolation theory for the G(n,p) random graph. We prove conditions on the model parameters in which percolation graph matching succeeds, and we establish a phase transition in the size of the seed set. We also confirm through experiments that the performance of percolation graph matching is surprisingly good, both for synthetic graphs and real social-network data.