We propose PiNcH, a methodology to detect the presence of a drone and its current status leveraging just the communication traffic exchanged between the drone and its Remote Controller (RC). PiNcH is built applying standard classification algorithms to the eavesdropped traffic, analyzing features such as packets inter-arrival time and size. PiNcH does not require either any special hardware or to transmit any signal. Indeed, it is fully passive and it resorts to cheap and general purpose hardware. To evaluate the effectiveness of our solution, we collected real communication measurements from the 3DR SOLO drone, being the most popular open-source hardware, running the widespread ArduCopter open-source firmware, mounted on-board on a wide range of commercial amateur drones. Then, we test our solution against different publicly available wireless traces. The results prove that PiNcH can efficiently and effectively: (i) identify the presence of the drone in several heterogeneous scenarios; (ii) identify the current state of a powered-on drone, i.e., flying or lying on the ground; (iii) discriminate the movement of the drone; and, finally, (iv) estimate a lower bound on the time required to identify a drone with the requested level of assurance. The quality and viability of our solution do prove that network traffic analysis can be successfully adopted for drone identification and pave the way for future research in the area.
Drones have created a new threat to people's privacy. We are now in an era in which anyone with a drone equipped with a video camera can use it to invade a subject's privacy by streaming the subject in his her private space over an encrypted first person view (FPV) channel. Although many methods have been suggested to detect nearby drones, they all suffer from the same shortcoming: they cannot identify exactly what is being captured, and therefore they fail to distinguish between the legitimate use of a drone (for example, to use a drone to film a selfie from the air) and illegitimate use that invades someone's privacy (when the same operator uses the drone to stream the view into the window of his neighbor's apartment), a distinction that in some cases depends on the orientation of the drone's video camera rather than on the drone's location. In this paper we shatter the commonly held belief that the use of encryption to secure an FPV channel prevents an interceptor from extracting the POI that is being streamed. We show methods that leverage physical stimuli to detect whether the drone's camera is directed towards a target in real time. We investigate the influence of changing pixels on the FPV channel (in a lab setup). Based on our observations we demonstrate how an interceptor can perform a side-channel attack to detect whether a target is being streamed by analyzing the encrypted FPV channel that is transmitted from a real drone (DJI Mavic) in two use cases: when the target is a private house and when the target is a subject.