We study a security game over a network played between a @math and @math @math . Every attacker chooses, probabilistically, a node of the network to damage. The defender chooses, probabilistically as well, a connected induced subgraph of the network of @math nodes to scan and clean.Each attacker wishes to maximize the probability of escaping her cleaning by the defender. On the other hand, the goal of the defender is to maximize the expected number of attackers that she catches. This game is a generalization of the model from the seminal paper of "The price of defense" (MFCS'06). We are interested in Nash equilibria (NE) of this game, as well as in characterizing @math - @math networks which allow for the best @math @math @math , termed Price of Defense; this is the ratio of @math over the expected number of attackers that the defender catches in a NE. We provide characterizations of the NEs of this game and defense-optimal networks. This allows us to show that the NEs of the game coincide independently from the coordination or not of the attackers. In addition, we give an algorithm for computing NEs. Our algorithm requires exponential time in the worst case, but it is polynomial-time for @math constantly close to 1 or @math . For the special case of tree-networks, we refine our characterization which allows us to derive a polynomial-time algorithm for deciding whether a tree is defense-optimal and if this is the case it computes a defense-optimal NE. On the other hand, we prove that it is NP-hard to find a best-defense strategy if the tree is not defense-optimal. We complement this negative result with a polynomial-time constant-approximation algorithm that computes solutions that are close to optimal ones for general graphs. Finally, we provide asymptotically (almost) tight bounds for the Price of Defense for any @math .
1. Introduction.PART I: FUNDAMENTALS.2. Basic Algorithms in Message-Passing Systems.3. Leader Election in Rings.4. Mutual Exclusion in Shared Memory.5. Fault-Tolerant Consensus.6. Causality and Time.PART II: SIMULATIONS.7. A Formal Model for Simulations.8. Broadcast and Multicast.9. Distributed Shared Memory.10. Fault-Tolerant Simulations of Read Write Objects.11. Simulating Synchrony.12. Improving the Fault Tolerance of Algorithms.13. Fault-Tolerant Clock Synchronization.PART III: ADVANCED TOPICS.14. Randomization.15. Wait-Free Simulations of Arbitrary Objects.16. Problems Solvable in Asynchronous Systems.17. Solving Consensus in Eventually Stable Systems.References.Index. Consider a network vulnerable to security attacks and equipped with defense mechanisms. How much is the loss in the provided security guarantees due to the selfish nature of attacks and defenses? The Price of Defense was recently introduced in [7] as a worst-case measure, over all associated Nash equilibria, of this loss. In the particular strategic game considered in [7], there are two classes of confronting randomized players on a graph G(V,E): v attackers, each choosing vertices and wishing to minimize the probability of being caught, and a single defender, who chooses edges and gains the expected number of attackers it catches. In this work, we continue the study of the Price of Defense. We obtain the following results: - The Price of Defense is at least |V| 2; this implies that the Perfect Matching Nash equilibria considered in [7] are optimal with respect to the Price of Defense, so that the lower bound is tight. - We define Defense-Optimal graphs as those admitting a Nash equilibrium that attains the (tight) lower bound of |V| 2. We obtain: ○ A graph is Defense-Optimal if and only if it has a Fractional Perfect Matching. Since graphs with a Fractional Perfect Matching are recognizable in polynomial time, the same holds for Defense-Optimal graphs. ○ We identify a very simple graph that is Defense-Optimal but has no Perfect Matching Nash equilibrium. - Inspired by the established connection between Nash equilibria and Fractional Perfect Matchings, we transfer a known bivaluedness result about Fractional Matchings to a certain class of Nash equilibria. So, the connection to Fractional Graph Theory may be the key to revealing the combinatorial structure of Nash equilibria for our network security game.  Consider an information network with threats called attackers; each attacker uses a probability distribution to choose a node of the network to damage. Opponent to the attackers is a protector entity called defender; the defender scans and cleans from attacks some part of the network (in particular, a link), which it chooses independently using its own probability distribution. Each attacker wishes to maximize the probability of escaping its cleaning by the defender; towards a conflicting objective, the defender aims at maximizing the expected number of attackers it catches. We model this network security scenario as a non-cooperative strategic game on graphs. We are interested in its associated Nash equilibria, where no network entity can unilaterally increase its local objective. We obtain the following results: We obtain an algebraic characterization of (mixed) Nash equilibria. No (non-trivial) instance of the graph-theoretic game has a pure Nash equilibrium. This is an immediate consequence of some covering properties we prove for the supports of the players in all (mixed) Nash equilibria. We coin a natural subclass of mixed Nash equilibria, which we call Matching Nash equilibria, for this graph-theoretic game. Matching Nash equilibria are defined by enriching the necessary covering properties we proved with some additional conditions involving other structural parameters of graphs, such as Independent Sets. We derive a characterization of graphs admitting Matching Nash equilibria. All such graphs have an Expanding Independent Set. The characterization enables a non-deterministic, polynomial time algorithm to compute a Matching Nash equilibrium for any such graph. Bipartite graphs are shown to satisfy the characterization. So, using a polynomial time algorithm to compute a Maximum Matching for a bipartite graph, we obtain, as our main result, a deterministic, polynomial time algorithm to compute a Matching Nash equilibrium for any instance of the game with a bipartite graph.