Internet services are traditionally priced at flat rates; however, many Internet service providers (ISPs) have recently shifted towards two-part tariffs where a data cap is imposed to restrain data demand from heavy users. Although the two-part tariff could generally increase the revenue for ISPs and has been supported by the US FCC, the role of data cap and its optimal pricing structures are not well understood. In this article, we study the impact of data cap on the optimal two-part pricing schemes for congestion-prone service markets. We model users' demand and preferences over pricing and congestion alternatives and derive the market share and congestion of service providers under a market equilibrium. Based on the equilibrium model, we characterize the two-part structures of the revenue- and welfare-optimal pricing schemes. Our results reveal that 1) the data cap provides a mechanism for ISPs to transition from the flat-rate to pay-as-you-go type of schemes, 2) both the revenue and welfare objectives of the ISP will drive the optimal pricing towards usage-based schemes with diminishing data caps, and 3) the welfare-optimal tariff comprises lower fees than the revenue-optimal counterpart, suggesting that regulators might want to promote usage-based pricing but regulate the lump-sum and per-unit fees.
I. Two-part tariffs and a discriminating monopoly, 78.—II. Determination of a uniform two-part tariff, 81.—III. Applications of two-part tariffs, 88.—Appendix: Mathematical derivation of a uniform two-part tariff, 93. This paper provides explicit characteristics of those two-part tariffs which maximize profit and consumers' plus producer's surplus. The effect of consumption externalities (as in telecommunications systems) is then explored. The characterizations are in terms of elasticities of demand with respect to price, income, and the number of other customers in the system. Abstract Two part pricing by a multiproduct monopoly and a differentiated oligopoly are examined and compared. Two part pricing policies are seen to depend on whether products are complements or substitutes and on whether or not the market is segmented. A principle result is that although competition tends to lower unit prices, there is no corresponding tendency for competition to reduce entry fees. The unit pricing rule is related to the Ramsey pricing rule. Oligopoly equilibrium unit prices equal marginal cost when there is one consumer type. We explore how well the market will provide shared facilities which are subject to congestion. It is usually efficient to have multiple facilities because it is more efficient to spend resources on facilities than to endure crowding costs. We assume firms can charge a membership price and a visit price. We present a symmetric Nash equilibrium in these two prices. We show that if a number of firms is large, the membership price will be small. Thus, the membership price is a measure of market power. When entry occurs in response to positive profit (but such that entry is deterred by the prospect of negative profit in a symmetric Nash equilibrium), the endogenous number of firms is bounded below by one fewer than the efficient number. The fees paid by a client converge to an appropriately defined competitive price as the economy is replicated.