As smart grids are getting popular and being widely implemented, preserving the privacy of consumers is becoming more substantial. Power generation and pricing in smart grids depends on the continuously gathered information from the consumers. However, having access to the data relevant to the electricity consumption of each individual consumer is in conflict with its privacy. One common approach for preserving privacy is to aggregate data of different consumers and to use their smart-meters for calculating the bills. But in this approach, malicious consumers who send erroneous data to take advantage or disrupt smart grid cannot be identified. In this paper, we propose a new statistical-based scheme for data gathering and billing in which the privacy of consumers is preserved, and at the same time, if any consumer with erroneous data can be detected. Our simulation results verify these matters.
ABSTRACTSmart grid (SG) allows for two-way communication between the utility and its consumers and hence they are considered as an inevitable future of the traditional grid. Since consumers are the key component of SGs, providing security and privacy to their personal data is a critical problem. In this paper, a security protocol, namely TPS3, is based on Temporal Perturbation and Shamir’s Secret Sharing (SSS) schemes that are proposed to ensure the privacy of SG consumer’s data. Temporal perturbation is employed to provide temporal privacy, while the SSS scheme is used to ensure data confidentiality. Temporal perturbation adds random delays to the data collected by smart meters, whereas the SSS scheme fragments these data before transmitting them to the data collection server. Joint employment of both schemes makes it hard for attackers to obtain consumer data collected in the SG. The proposed protocol TPS3 is evaluated in terms of privacy, reliability, and communication cost using two different SG topol... We study a mechanism design problem of privacy- preserving data collection with privacy protection uncertainty. A data collector wants to collect enough data to perform a certain computation that benefits the individuals who contribute the data, with the possibility of individual privacy leakage. The data collector adopts a privacy-preserving mechanism by adding some random noise to the computation result, which reduces the accuracy of the computation. Individuals decide whether to contribute data based on the potential benefit and the possible privacy cost induced by the mechanism. Due to the intrinsic uncertainty involved in privacy protection, we model individuals' privacy-aware participation using the prospect theory, which more accurately models individuals' behavior under uncertainty than the traditional expected utility theory. We show that the data collector's utility maximization problem involves a polynomial of high and fractional order, which is difficult to solve analytically. We get around this issue by proposing an approximation method, which allows us to obtain a closed form unique solution of the data collector's decision problem. We numerically show that the approximation error is small when the number of individuals is large. By comparing with the results under the expected utility theory, we conclude that a data collector who considers the more realistic prospect theory modeling should adopt a stricter privacy-preserving mechanism to boost her utility. Collecting and publishing personal data may lead to the disclosure of individual privacy. In this chapter, we consider a scenario where a data collector collects data from data providers and then publish the data to a data miner. To protect data providers’ privacy, the data collector performs anonymization on the data. Anonymization usually causes a decline of data utility on which the data miner’s profit depends, meanwhile, data providers would provide more data if anonymity is strongly guaranteed. How to make a trade-off between privacy protection and data utility is an important question for data collector. We model the interactions among data providers, data collector and data miner as a game. A backward induction-based approach is proposed to find the Nash equilibria of the game. To elaborate the analysis, we also present a specific game formulation which uses k-anonymity as the privacy model. Simulation results show that the game theoretic analysis can help the data collector to achieve a better trade-off between privacy and utility. Privacy-preserving billing protocols are useful in settings where a meter measures user consumption of some service, such as smart metering of utility consumption, pay-as-you-drive insurance and electronic toll collection. In such settings, service providers apply fine-grained tariff policies that require meters to provide a detailed account of user consumption. The protocols allow the user to pay to the service provider without revealing the user’s consumption measurements. Our contribution is twofold. First, we propose a general model where a meter can output meter readings to multiple users, and where a user receives meter readings from multiple meters. Unlike previous schemes, our model accommodates a wider variety of smart metering applications. Second, we describe a protocol based on polynomial commitments that improves the efficiency of previous protocols for tariff policies that employ splines to compute the price due.