High availability is no longer just a business continuity concern. Users are increasingly dependant on devices that consume and produce data in ever increasing volumes. A popular solution is to have a central repository which each device accesses after centrally managed authentication. This model of use is facilitated by cloud based file synchronisation services such as Dropbox, OneDrive, Google Drive and Apple iCloud. Cloud architecture allows the provisioning of storage space with "always-on" access. Recent concerns over unauthorised access to third party systems and large scale exposure of private data have made an alternative solution desirable. These events have caused users to assess their own security practices and the level of trust placed in third party storage services. One option is BitTorrent Sync, a cloudless synchronisation utility provides data availability and redundancy. This utility replicates files stored in shares to remote peers with access controlled by keys and permissions. While lacking the economies brought about by scale, complete control over data access has made this a popular solution. The ability to replicate data without oversight introduces risk of abuse by users as well as difficulties for forensic investigators. This paper suggests a methodology for investigation and analysis of the protocol to assist in the control of data flow across security perimeters.
The objective of this paper is to introduce a model to guide the analysis of the impact of churn in P2P networks. Using this model, a variety of node membership scenarios is created. These scenarios are used to capture and analyze the performance trends of chord, a distributed hash table (DHT) based resource lookup protocol for peer-to-peer overlay networks. The performance study focuses both on the performance of routing and content retrieval. This study also identifies the limitations of various churn-alleviating mechanisms, frequently proposed in the literature. The study highlights the importance of the content nature and access pattern on the performance of P2P, DHT-based overlay networks. The results show that the type of content being accessed and the way the content is accessed has a significant impact on the performance of P2P networks The 5th Annual Symposium on Information Assurance (ASIA '10): Academic Track of 13th Annual NYS Cyber Security Conference, Albany, New York, USA, 16 - 17 June 2010 This paper presents a set of exploits an adversary can use to continuously spy on most BitTorrent users of the Internet from a single machine and for a long period of time. Using these exploits for a period of 103 days, we collected 148 million IPs downloading 2 billion copies of contents. We identify the IP address of the content providers for 70 of the BitTorrent contents we spied on. We show that a few content providers inject most contents into BitTorrent and that those content providers are located in foreign data centers. We also show that an adversary can compromise the privacy of any peer in BitTorrent and identify the big downloaders that we define as the peers who subscribe to a large number of contents. This infringement on users' privacy poses a significant impediment to the legal adoption of BitTorrent.