Among the many approaches for reasoning about degrees of belief in the presence of noisy sensing and acting, the logical account proposed by Bacchus, Halpern, and Levesque is perhaps the most expressive. While their formalism is quite general, it is restricted to fluents whose values are drawn from discrete finite domains, as opposed to the continuous domains seen in many robotic applications. In this work, we show how this limitation in that approach can be lifted. By dealing seamlessly with both discrete distributions and continuous densities within a rich theory of action, we provide a very general logical specification of how belief should change after acting and sensing in complex noisy domains.
Relational Markov models (RMMs) are a generalization of Markov models where states can be of different types, with each type described by a different set of variables. The domain of each variable can be hierarchically structured, and shrinkage is carried out over the cross product of these hierarchies. RMMs make effective learning possible in domains with very large and heterogeneous state spaces, given only sparse data. We apply them to modeling the behavior of web site users, improving prediction in our P ROTEUS architecture for personalizing web sites. We present experiments on an e-commerce and an academic web site showing that RMMs are substantially more accurate than alternative methods, and make good predictions even when applied to previously-unvisited parts of the site.    This paper introduces and illustrates BLOG, a formal language for defining probability models over worlds with unknown objects and identity uncertainty. BLOG unifies and extends several existing approaches. Subject to certain acyclicity constraints, every BLOG model specifies a unique probability distribution over first-order model structures that can contain varying and unbounded numbers of objects. Furthermore, complete inference algorithms exist for a large fragment of the language. We also introduce a probabilistic form of Skolemization for handling evidence.  We provide a model for reasoning about knowledge and probability together. We allow explicit mention of probabilities in formulas, so that our language has formulas that essentially say «according to agent i, formula φ holds with probability at least b.» The language is powerful enough to allow reasoning about higher-order probabilities, as well as allowing explicit comparisons of the probabilities an agent places on distinct events. We present a general framework for interpreting such formulas, and consider various properties that might hold of the interrelationship between agents' probability assignments at different states. We provide a complete axiomatization for reasoning about knowledge and probability, prove a small model property, and obtain decision procedures Two of the most important threads of work in knowledge representation today are frame-based representation systems (FRS's) and Bayesian networks (BNs). FRS's provide an excellent representation for the organizational structure of large complex domains, but their applicability is limited because of their inability to deal with uncertainty and noise. BNs provide an intuitive and coherent probabilistic representation of our uncertainty, but are very limited in their ability to handle complex structured domains. In this paper, we provide a language that cleanly integrates these approaches, preserving the advantages of both. Our approach allows us to provide natural and compact definitions of probability models for a class, in a way that is local to the class frame. These models can be instantiated for any set of interconnected instances, resulting in a coherent probability distribution over the instance properties. Our language also allows us to represent important types of uncertainty that cannot be accomodated within the framework of traditional BNs: uncertainty over the set of entities present in our model, and uncertainty about the relationships between these entities. We provide an inference algorithm for our language via a reduction to inference in standard Bayesian networks. We describe an implemented system that allows most of the main frame systems in existence today to annotate their knowledge bases with probabilistic information, and to use that information in answering probabilistic queries.  We introduce ProbLog, a probabilistic extension of Prolog. A ProbLog program defines a distribution over logic programs by specifying for each clause the probability that it belongs to a randomly sampled program, and these probabilities are mutually independent. The semantics of ProbLog is then defined by the success probability of a query, which corresponds to the probability that the query succeeds in a randomly sampled program. The key contribution of this paper is the introduction of an effective solver for computing success probabilities. It essentially combines SLD-resolution with methods for computing the probability of Boolean formulae. Our implementation further employs an approximation algorithm that combines iterative deepening with binary decision diagrams. We report on experiments in the context of discovering links in real biological networks, a demonstration of the practical usefulness of the approach. This thesis presents a logical formalism for representing and reasoning with probabilistic knowledge. The formalism differs from previous efforts in this area in a number of ways. Most previous work has investigated ways of assigning probabilities to the sentences of a logical language. Such an assignment fails to capture an important class of probabilistic assertions, empirical generalizations. Such generalizations are particularly important for AI, since they can be accumulated through experience with the world. Thus, they offer the possibility of reasoning in very general domains, domains where no experts are available to gather subjective probabilities from. A logic is developed which can represent these empirical generalizations. Reasoning can be performed through a proof theory which is shown to be sound and complete. Furthermore, the logic can represent and reason with a very general set of assertions, including many non-numeric assertions. This also is important for AI as numbers are usually not available. The logic makes it clear that there is an essential difference between empirical, or statistical, probabilities and probabilities assigned to sentences, e.g., subjective probabilities. The second part of the formalism is an inductive mechanism for assigning degrees of belief to sentences based on the empirical generalizations expressed in the logic. these degrees of belief have a strong advantage over subjective probabilities: they are founded on objective statistical knowledge about the world. Furthermore, the mechanism of assigning degrees of belief gives a natural answer to the question "Where do the probabilities come from:" they come from our experience with the world. The two parts of the formalism offer combined, interacting, but still clearly separated, plausible inductive inference and sound deductive inference.    