In this paper, we investigate the joint optimal sensing and distributed Medium Access Control (MAC) protocol design problem for cognitive radio (CR) networks. We consider both scenarios with single and multiple channels. For each scenario, we design a synchronized MAC protocol for dynamic spectrum sharing among multiple secondary users (SUs), which incorporates spectrum sensing for protecting active primary users (PUs). We perform saturation throughput analysis for the corresponding proposed MAC protocols that explicitly capture the spectrum-sensing performance. Then, we find their optimal configuration by formulating throughput maximization problems subject to detection probability constraints for PUs. In particular, the optimal solution of the optimization problem returns the required sensing time for PUs' protection and optimal contention window to maximize the total throughput of the secondary network. Finally, numerical results are presented to illustrate developed theoretical findings in this paper and significant performance gains of the optimal sensing and protocol configuration.
Cognitive radios (CRs) have a great potential to improve spectrum utilization by enabling users to access the spectrum dynamically without disturbing licensed primary radios (PRs). A key challenge in operating these radios as a network is how to implement an efficient medium access control (MAC) mechanism that can adaptively and efficiently allocate transmission powers and spectrum among CRs according to the surrounding environment. Most existing works address this issue via suboptimal heuristic approaches or centralized solutions. In this paper, we propose a novel joint power channel allocation scheme that improves the performance through a distributed pricing approach. In this scheme, the spectrum allocation problem is modeled as a noncooperative game, with each CR pair acting as a player. A price-based iterative water-filling (PIWF) algorithm is proposed, which enables CR users to reach a good Nash equilibrium (NE). This PIWF algorithm can be implemented distributively with CRs repeatedly negotiating their best transmission powers and spectrum. Simulation results show that the social optimality of the NE solution is dramatically improved through pricing. Depending on the different orders according to which CRs take actions, we study sequential and parallel versions of the PIWF algorithm. We show that the parallel version converges faster than the sequential version. We then propose a corresponding MAC protocol to implement our resource management schemes. The proposed MAC allows multiple CR pairs to be first involved in an admission phase, then iteratively negotiate their transmission powers and spectrum via control-packet exchanges. Following the negotiation phase, CRs proceed concurrently with their data transmissions. Simulations are used to study the performance of our protocol and demonstrate its effectiveness in terms of improving the overall network throughput and reducing the average power consumption. A resource allocation framework is presented for spectrum underlay in cognitive wireless networks. We consider both interference constraints for primary users and quality of service (QoS) constraints for secondary users. Specifically, interference from secondary users to primary users is constrained to be below a tolerable limit. Also, signal to interference plus noise ratio (SINR) of each secondary user is maintained higher than a desired level for QoS insurance. We propose admission control algorithms to be used during high network load conditions which are performed jointly with power control so that QoS requirements of all admitted secondary users are satisfied while keeping the interference to primary users below the tolerable limit. If all secondary users can be supported at minimum rates, we allow them to increase their transmission rates and share the spectrum in a fair manner. We formulate the joint power rate allocation with proportional and max-min fairness criteria as optimization problems. We show how to transform these optimization problems into a convex form so that their globally optimal solutions can be obtained. Numerical results show that the proposed admission control algorithms achieve performance very close to that of the optimal solution. Also, impacts of different system and QoS parameters on the network performance are investigated for the admission control, and rate power allocation algorithms under different fairness criteria. Cognitive radio promises a low-cost, highly flexible alternative to the classic single-frequency band, single-protocol wireless device. By sensing and adapting to its environment, such a device is able to fill voids in the wireless spectrum and can dramatically increase spectral efficiency. In this paper, the cognitive radio channel is defined as a two-sender, two-receiver interference channel in which sender 2 obtains the encoded message sender 1 plans to transmit. We consider two cases: in the genie-aided cognitive radio channel, sender 2 is noncausally presented the data to be transmitted by sender 1 while in the causal cognitive radio channel, the data is obtained causally. The cognitive radio at sender 2 may then choose to transmit simultaneously over the same channel, as opposed to waiting for an idle channel as is traditional for a cognitive radio. Our main result is the development of an achievable region which combines Gel'fand-Pinkser coding with an achievable region construction for the interference channel. In the additive Gaussian noise case, this resembles dirty-paper coding, a technique used in the computation of the capacity of the Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) broadcast channel. Numerical evaluation of the region in the Gaussian noise case is performed, and compared to an inner bound, the interference channel, and an outer bound, a modified Gaussian MIMO broadcast channel. Results are also extended to the case in which the message is causally obtained. We investigate the dynamic spectrum sharing problem among primary and secondary users in a cognitive radio network. We consider the scenario where primary users exhibit on-off behavior and secondary users are able to dynamically measure estimate sum interference from primary users at their receiving ends. For such a scenario, we solve the problem of fair spectrum sharing among secondary users subject to their QoS constraints (in terms of minimum SINR and transmission rate) and interference constraints for primary users. Since tracking channel gains instantaneously for dynamic spectrum allocation may be very difficult in practice, we consider the case where only mean channel gains averaged over short-term fading are available. Under such scenarios, we derive outage probabilities for secondary users and interference constraint violation probabilities for primary users. Based on the analysis, we develop a complete framework to perform joint admission control and rate power allocation for secondary users such that both QoS and interference constraints are only violated within desired limits. Throughput performance of primary and secondary networks is investigated via extensive numerical analysis considering different levels of implementation complexity due to channel estimation. We address the problem of spectrum pricing in a cognitive radio network where multiple primary service providers compete with each other to offer spectrum access opportunities to the secondary users. By using an equilibrium pricing scheme, each of the primary service providers aims to maximize its profit under quality of service (QoS) constraint for primary users. We formulate this situation as an oligopoly market consisting of a few firms and a consumer. The QoS degradation of the primary services is considered as the cost in offering spectrum access to the secondary users. For the secondary users, we adopt a utility function to obtain the demand function. With a Bertrand game model, we analyze the impacts of several system parameters such as spectrum substitutability and channel quality on the Nash equilibrium (i.e., equilibrium pricing adopted by the primary services). We present distributed algorithms to obtain the solution for this dynamic game. The stability of the proposed dynamic game algorithms in terms of convergence to the Nash equilibrium is studied. However, the Nash equilibrium is not efficient in the sense that the total profit of the primary service providers is not maximized. An optimal solution to gain the highest total profit can be obtained. A collusion can be established among the primary services so that they gain higher profit than that for the Nash equilibrium. However, since one or more of the primary service providers may deviate from the optimal solution, a punishment mechanism may be applied to the deviating primary service provider. A repeated game among primary service providers is formulated to show that the collusion can be maintained if all of the primary service providers are aware of this punishment mechanism, and therefore, properly weight their profits to be obtained in the future.