Generative models estimate the underlying distribution of a dataset to generate realistic samples according to that distribution. In this paper, we present the first membership inference attacks against generative models: given a data point, the adversary determines whether or not it was used to train the model. Our attacks leverage Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs), which combine a discriminative and a generative model, to detect overfitting and recognize inputs that were part of training datasets, using the discriminator's capacity to learn statistical differences in distributions. We present attacks based on both white-box and black-box access to the target model, against several state-of-the-art generative models, over datasets of complex representations of faces (LFW), objects (CIFAR-10), and medical images (Diabetic Retinopathy). We also discuss the sensitivity of the attacks to different training parameters, and their robustness against mitigation strategies, finding that defenses are either ineffective or lead to significantly worse performances of the generative models in terms of training stability and or sample quality.
We quantitatively investigate how machine learning models leak information about the individual data records on which they were trained. We focus on the basic membership inference attack: given a data record and black-box access to a model, determine if the record was in the model's training dataset. To perform membership inference against a target model, we make adversarial use of machine learning and train our own inference model to recognize differences in the target model's predictions on the inputs that it trained on versus the inputs that it did not train on. We empirically evaluate our inference techniques on classification models trained by commercial "machine learning as a service" providers such as Google and Amazon. Using realistic datasets and classification tasks, including a hospital discharge dataset whose membership is sensitive from the privacy perspective, we show that these models can be vulnerable to membership inference attacks. We then investigate the factors that influence this leakage and evaluate mitigation strategies. The past several years have seen remarkable progress in generative models which produce convincing samples of images and other modalities. A shared component of some popular models such as generative adversarial networks and generative moment matching networks, is a decoder network, a parametric deep neural net that defines a generative distribution. Unfortunately, it can be difficult to quantify the performance of these models because of the intractability of log-likelihood estimation, and inspecting samples can be misleading. We propose to use Annealed Importance Sampling for evaluating log-likelihoods for decoder-based models and validate its accuracy using bidirectional Monte Carlo. Using this technique, we analyze the performance of decoder-based models, the effectiveness of existing log-likelihood estimators, the degree of overfitting, and the degree to which these models miss important modes of the data distribution.