Peer-to-Peer networks are designed to rely on resources of their own users. Therefore, resource management plays an important role in P2P protocols. Therefore, resource management plays an important role in P2P protocols. Early P2P networks did not use proper mechanisms to manage fairness. However, after seeing difficulties and rise of freeloaders in networks like Gnutella, the importance of providing fairness for users have become apparent. In this paper, we propose an incentive based security model which leads to a network infrastructure that lightens the work of Seeders and makes Leechers to contribute more. This method is able to prevent betrayals in Leecher-to-Leecher transactions and more importantly, helps Seeders to be treated more fairly. This is what other incentive methods such as Bittorrent are incapable of doing. Additionally, by getting help from cryptography and combining it with our method, it is also possible to achieve secure channels, immune to spying, next to a fair network. The simulation results clearly show that how our proposed approach can overcome free-riding issue. In addition, our findings revealed that our approach is able to provide an appropriate level of fairness for the users and can decrease the download time.
The Peer-to-Peer (P2P) architecture has been successfully used to reduce costs and increase the scalability of Internet live streaming systems. However, the effectiveness of these applications depends largely on user (peer) cooperation. In this article we use data collected from SopCast, a popular P2P live application, to show that there is high correlation between peer centrality--out-degree, out-closeness, and betweenness--in the P2P overlay graph and peer cooperation. We use this finding to propose a new regression-based model to predict peer cooperation from its past centrality. Our model takes only peer out-degrees as input, as out-degree has the strongest correlation with peer cooperation. Our evaluation shows that our model has good accuracy and does not need to be trained too often (e.g., once each 16 min). We also use our model to sketch a mechanism to detect malicious peers that report artificially inflated cooperation aiming at, for example, receiving better quality of service.