In the Russian cards problem, Alice, Bob and Cath draw @math , @math and @math cards, respectively, from a publicly known deck. Alice and Bob must then communicate their cards to each other without Cath learning who holds a single card. Solutions in the literature provide weak security, where Cath does not know with certainty who holds each card that is not hers, or perfect security, where Cath learns no probabilistic information about who holds any given card from Alice and Bob's exchange. We propose an intermediate notion, which we call @math -strong security, where the probabilities perceived by Cath may only change by a factor of @math . We then show that a mild variant of the so-called geometric strategy gives @math -strong safety for arbitrarily small @math and appropriately chosen values of @math .
Consider three players Alice, Bob and Cath who hold a, b and c cards, respectively, from a deck of d = a+b+c cards. The cards are all different and players only know their own cards. Suppose Alice and Bob wish to communicate their cards to each other without Cath learning whether Alice or Bob holds a specific card. Considering the cards as consecutive natural numbers 0, 1, . . . , we investigate general conditions for when Alice or Bob can safely announce the sum of the cards they hold modulo an appropriately chosen integer. We demonstrate that this holds whenever a, b > 2 and c = 1. Because Cath holds a single card, this also implies that Alice and Bob will learn the card deal from the other player’s announcement. Two parties A and B select a cards and b cards from a known deck and a third party C receives the remaining c cards. We consider methods whereby A can, in a single message, publicly inform B of her hand without C learning any card held by A or by B. Conditions on a, b, c are given for the existence of an appropriate message. In the generalized Russian cards problem, the three players Alice, Bob and Cath draw @math a , b and @math c cards, respectively, from a deck of @math a + b + c cards. Players only know their own cards and what the deck of cards is. Alice and Bob are then required to communicate their hand of cards to each other by way of public messages. For a natural number @math k , the communication is said to be @math k -safe if Cath does not learn whether or not Alice holds any given set of at most @math k cards that are not Cath's, a notion originally introduced as weak @math k -security by Swanson and Stinson. An elegant solution by Atkinson views the cards as points in a finite projective plane. We propose a general solution in the spirit of Atkinson's, although based on finite vector spaces rather than projective planes, and call it the geometric protocol'. Given arbitrary @math c , k > 0 , this protocol gives an informative and @math k -safe solution to the generalized Russian cards problem for infinitely many values of @math ( a , b , c ) with @math b = O ( a c ) . This improves on the collection of parameters for which solutions are known. In particular, it is the first solution which guarantees @math k -safety when Cath has more than one card. We consider the generic problem of Secure Aggregation of Distributed Information (SADI), where several agents acting as a team have information distributed amongst them, modelled by means of a publicly known deck of cards distributed amongst the agents, so that each of them knows only her cards. The agents have to exchange and aggregate the information about how the cards are distributed amongst them by means of public announcements over insecure communication channels, intercepted by an adversary "eavesdropper", in such a way that the adversary does not learn who holds any of the cards. We present a combinatorial construction of protocols that provides a direct solution of a class of SADI problems and develop a technique of iterated reduction of SADI problems to smaller ones which are eventually solvable directly. We show that our methods provide a solution to a large class of SADI problems, including all SADI problems with sufficiently large size and sufficiently balanced card distributions.  In the generalized Russian cards problem, Alice, Bob and Cath draw a, b and c cards, respectively, from a deck of size a+b+c. Alice and Bob must then communicate their entire hand to each other, without Cath learning the owner of a single card she does not hold. Unlike many traditional problems in cryptography, however, they are not allowed to encode or hide the messages they exchange from Cath. The problem is then to find methods through which they can achieve this. We propose a general four-step solution based on finite vector spaces, and call it the ''colouring protocol'', as it involves colourings of lines. Our main results show that the colouring protocol may be used to solve the generalized Russian cards problem in cases where a is a power of a prime, c=O(a^2) and b=O(c^2). This improves substantially on the set of parameters for which solutions are known to exist; in particular, it had not been shown previously that the problem could be solved in cases where the eavesdropper has more cards than one of the communicating players.   This paper investigates Russian Cards problem for the purpose of unconditional secure communication. First, a picking rule and deleting rule as well as safe communication condition are given to deal with the problem with 3 players and 7 cards. Further, the problem is generalized to tackle n players and n(n−1)+1 cards. A new picking rule for constructing the announcement is presented, and a new deleting rule for players to determine each other’s cards is formalized. Moreover, the safe communication condition is proved. In addition, to illustrate the approach, an example for 5 players and 21 cards is presented in detail.