The internet has enabled collaborations at a scale never before possible, but the best practices for organizing such large collaborations are still not clear. Wikipedia is a visible and successful example of such a collaboration which might offer insight into what makes large-scale, decentralized collaborations successful. We analyze the relationship between the structural properties of WikiProject coeditor networks and the performance and efficiency of those projects. We confirm the existence of an overall performance-efficiency trade-off, while observing that some projects are higher than others in both performance and efficiency, suggesting the existence factors correlating positively with both. Namely, we find an association between low-degree coeditor networks and both high performance and high efficiency. We also confirm results seen in previous numerical and small-scale lab studies: higher performance with less skewed node distributions, and higher performance with shorter path lengths. We use agent-based models to explore possible mechanisms for degree-dependent performance and efficiency. We present a novel local-majority learning strategy designed to satisfy properties of real-world collaborations. The local-majority strategy as well as a localized conformity-based strategy both show degree-dependent performance and efficiency, but in opposite directions, suggesting that these factors depend on both network structure and learning strategy. Our results suggest possible benefits to decentralized collaborations made of smaller, more tightly-knit teams, and that these benefits may be modulated by the particular learning strategies in use.
A longstanding idea in the literature on human cooperation is that cooperation should be reinforced when conditional cooperators are more likely to interact. In the context of social networks, this idea implies that cooperation should fare better in highly clustered networks such as cliques than in networks with low clustering such as random networks. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a series of experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk, in which 24 individuals played a local public goods game arranged on one of five network topologies that varied between disconnected cliques and a random regular graph. In contrast with previous work, we found that network topology had no significant effect on average contributions. This result implies either that individuals are not conditional cooperators, or else that cooperation does not benefit from positive reinforcement between connected neighbors. We then tested both of these possibilities in two subsequent series of experiments in which artificial "seed" players were introduced, making either full or zero contributions. First, we found that although players did generally behave like conditional cooperators, they were as likely to decrease their contributions in response to low contributing neighbors as they were to increase their contributions in response to high contributing neighbors. Second, we found that positive effects of cooperation did not spread beyond direct neighbors in the network. In total we report on 113 human subjects experiments, highlighting the speed, flexibility, and cost-effectiveness of web-based experiments over those conducted in physical labs. Human subjects perform a computationally wide range of tasks from only local, networked interactions. Theoretical work suggests that structural properties of naturally occurring networks are important in shaping behavior and dynamics. However, the relationships between structure and behavior are difficult to establish through empirical studies, because the networks in such studies are typically fixed. We studied networks of human subjects attempting to solve the graph or network coloring problem, which models settings in which it is desirable to distinguish one9s behavior from that of one9s network neighbors. Networks generated by preferential attachment made solving the coloring problem more difficult than did networks based on cyclical structures, and “small worlds” networks were easier still. We also showed that providing more information can have opposite effects on performance, depending on network structure. Theoretical models suggest that social networks influence the evolution of cooperation, but to date there have been few experimental studies. Observational data suggest that a wide variety of behaviors may spread in human social networks, but subjects in such studies can choose to befriend people with similar behaviors, posing difficulty for causal inference. Here, we exploit a seminal set of laboratory experiments that originally showed that voluntary costly punishment can help sustain cooperation. In these experiments, subjects were randomly assigned to a sequence of different groups to play a series of single-shot public goods games with strangers; this feature allowed us to draw networks of interactions to explore how cooperative and uncooperative behaviors spread from person to person to person. We show that, in both an ordinary public goods game and in a public goods game with punishment, focal individuals are influenced by fellow group members’ contribution behavior in future interactions with other individuals who were not a party to the initial interaction. Furthermore, this influence persists for multiple periods and spreads up to three degrees of separation (from person to person to person to person). The results suggest that each additional contribution a subject makes to the public good in the first period is tripled over the course of the experiment by other subjects who are directly or indirectly influenced to contribute more as a consequence. These results show experimentally that cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks.