In this paper, we present a multi-user resource allocation framework using fragmented-spectrum synchronous OFDM-CDMA modulation over a frequency-selective fading channel. In particular, given pre-existing communications in the spectrum where the system is operating, a channel sensing and estimation method is used to obtain information of subcarrier availability. Given this information, some real-valued multi-level orthogonal codes, which are orthogonal codes with values of @math , are provided for emerging new users, i.e., cognitive radio users. Additionally, we have obtained a closed form expression for bit error rate of cognitive radio receivers in terms of detection probability of primary users, CR users' sensing time and CR users' signal to noise ratio. Moreover, simulation results obtained in this paper indicate the precision with which the analytical results have been obtained in modeling the aforementioned system.
 In this paper, the problem of joint multichannel cooperative sensing and resource allocation is investigated. A cognitive radio network with multiple potential channels and multiple secondary users is considered. Each secondary user carries out wideband spectrum sensing to get a test statistic for each channel and transmits the test statistic to a coordinator. After collecting all the test statistics from secondary users, the coordinator makes the estimation as to whether primary users are idle or not in the channels. When a channel is estimated to be free, secondary users can get access to the channel with assigned bandwidth and power. An optimization problem is formulated, which maximizes the weighted sum of secondary users' throughputs while guaranteeing a certain level of protection for the activities of primary users. Although the problem is nonconvex, it is shown that the problem can be solved by bilevel optimization and monotonic programming. This paper is also extended to cases with consideration of proportional and max-min fairness. We study a spectrum sharing problem in an unlicensed band where multiple systems coexist and interfere with each other. Due to asymmetries and selfish system behavior, unfair and inefficient situations may arise. We investigate whether efficiency and fairness can be obtained with self-enforcing spectrum sharing rules. These rules have the advantage of not requiring a central authority that verifies compliance to the protocol. Any self-enforcing protocol must correspond to an equilibrium of a game. We first analyze the possible outcomes of a one shot game, and observe that in many cases an inefficient solution results. However, systems often coexist for long periods and a repeated game is more appropriate to model their interaction. In this repeated game the possibility of building reputations and applying punishments allows for a larger set of self-enforcing outcomes. When this set includes the optimal operating point, efficient, fair, and incentive compatible spectrum sharing becomes possible. We present examples that illustrate that in many cases the performance loss due to selfish behavior is small. We also prove that our results are tight and quantify the best achievable performance in a non-cooperative scenario