The market economy deals with many interacting agents such as buyers and sellers who are autonomous intelligent agents pursuing their own interests. One such multi-agent system (MAS) that plays an important role in auctions is the combinatorial auctioning system (CAS). We use this framework to define our concept of fairness in terms of what we call as "basic fairness" and "extended fairness". The assumptions of quasilinear preferences and dominant strategies are taken into consideration while explaining fairness. We give an algorithm to ensure fairness in a CAS using a Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA). We use an algorithm of Sandholm to achieve optimality. Basic and extended fairness are then analyzed according to the dominant strategy solution concept.
Describes a novel Internet auction model achieving verifiable fairness, a requirement aimed at enhancing the trust of bidders in auctioneers. Distrust in remote auctioneers prevents bidders from participating in Internet auctioning. According to proposed survey reports, this study presents four characteristics that render the Internet untrustworthy for bidders. These intrinsic properties suggest that auction sites not only follow auction policies, but provide customers with evidence validating that the policies are applied fairly. Evidence of verifiable fairness provides bidders with a basis for confidence in Internet auctions. Cryptographic techniques are also applied herein to establish a novel auction model with evidence to manifest and verify every step of the auctioneer. Analysis results demonstrate that the proposed model satisfies various requirements regarding fairness and privacy. Moreover, in the proposed model, the losing bids remain sealed.