Games with continuous strategy sets arise in several machine learning problems (e.g. adversarial learning). For such games, simple no-regret learning algorithms exist in several cases and ensure convergence to coarse correlated equilibria (CCE). The efficiency of such equilibria with respect to a social function, however, is not well understood. In this paper, we define the class of valid utility games with continuous strategies and provide efficiency bounds for their CCEs. Our bounds rely on the social function being a monotone DR-submodular function. We further refine our bounds based on the curvature of the social function. Furthermore, we extend our efficiency bounds to a class of non-submodular functions that satisfy approximate submodularity properties. Finally, we show that valid utility games with continuous strategies can be designed to maximize monotone DR-submodular functions subject to disjoint constraints with approximation guarantees. The approximation guarantees we derive are based on the efficiency of the equilibria of such games and can improve the existing ones in the literature. We illustrate and validate our results on a budget allocation game and a sensor coverage problem.
In this paper, we study the problem of maximizing continuous submodular functions that naturally arise in many learning applications such as those involving utility functions in active learning and sensing, matrix approximations and network inference. Despite the apparent lack of convexity in such functions, we prove that stochastic projected gradient methods can provide strong approximation guarantees for maximizing continuous submodular functions with convex constraints. More specifically, we prove that for monotone continuous DR-submodular functions, all fixed points of projected gradient ascent provide a factor @math approximation to the global maxima. We also study stochastic gradient methods and show that after @math iterations these methods reach solutions which achieve in expectation objective values exceeding @math . An immediate application of our results is to maximize submodular functions that are defined stochastically, i.e. the submodular function is defined as an expectation over a family of submodular functions with an unknown distribution. We will show how stochastic gradient methods are naturally well-suited for this setting, leading to a factor @math approximation when the function is monotone. In particular, it allows us to approximately maximize discrete, monotone submodular optimization problems via projected gradient ascent on a continuous relaxation, directly connecting the discrete and continuous domains. Finally, experiments on real data demonstrate that our projected gradient methods consistently achieve the best utility compared to other continuous baselines while remaining competitive in terms of computational effort. Submodular set-functions have many applications in combinatorial optimization, as they can be minimized and approximately maximized in polynomial time. A key element in many of the algorithms and analyses is the possibility of extending the submodular set-function to a convex function, which opens up tools from convex optimization. Submodularity goes beyond set-functions and has naturally been considered for problems with multiple labels or for functions defined on continuous domains, where it corresponds essentially to cross second-derivatives being nonpositive. In this paper, we show that most results relating submodularity and convexity for set-functions can be extended to all submodular functions. In particular, (a) we naturally define a continuous extension in a set of probability measures, (b) show that the extension is convex if and only if the original function is submodular, (c) prove that the problem of minimizing a submodular function is equivalent to a typically non-smooth convex optimization problem, and (d) propose another convex optimization problem with better computational properties (e.g., a smooth dual problem). Most of these extensions from the set-function situation are obtained by drawing links with the theory of multi-marginal optimal transport, which provides also a new interpretation of existing results for set-functions. We then provide practical algorithms to minimize generic submodular functions on discrete domains, with associated convergence rates. We consider the following class of problems. The value of an outcome to a society is measured via a submodular utility function (submodularity has a natural economic interpretation: decreasing marginal utility). Decisions, however, are controlled by non-cooperative agents who seek to maximise their own private utility. We present, under basic assumptions, guarantees on the social performance of Nash equilibria. For submodular utility functions, any Nash equilibrium gives an expected social utility within a factor 2 of optimal, subject to a function-dependent additive term. For non-decreasing, submodular utility functions, any Nash equilibrium gives an expected social utility within a factor 1+ spl delta of optimal, where 0 spl les spl delta spl les 1 is a number based upon discrete curvature of the function. A condition under which all sets of social and private utility functions induce pure strategy Nash equilibria is presented. The case in which agents themselves make use of approximation algorithms in decision making is discussed and performance guarantees given. Finally we present specific problems that fall into our framework. These include competitive versions of the facility location problem and k-median problem, a maximisation version of the traffic routing problem studied by Roughgarden and Tardos (2000), and multiple-item auctions.  The price of anarchy, defined as the ratio of the worst-case objective function value of a Nash equilibrium of a game and that of an optimal outcome, quantifies the inefficiency of selfish behavior. Remarkably good bounds on this measure are known for a wide range of application domains. However, such bounds are meaningful only if a game's participants successfully reach a Nash equilibrium. This drawback motivates inefficiency bounds that apply more generally to weaker notions of equilibria, such as mixed Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria, and to sequences of outcomes generated by natural experimentation strategies, such as successive best responses and simultaneous regret-minimization. We establish a general and fundamental connection between the price of anarchy and its seemingly more general relatives. First, we identify a “canonical sufficient condition” for an upper bound on the price of anarchy of pure Nash equilibria, which we call a smoothness argument. Second, we prove an “extension theorem”: every bound on the price of anarchy that is derived via a smoothness argument extends automatically, with no quantitative degradation in the bound, to mixed Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and the average objective function value of every outcome sequence generated by no-regret learners. Smoothness arguments also have automatic implications for the inefficiency of approximate equilibria, for bicriteria bounds, and, under additional assumptions, for polynomial-length best-response sequences. Third, we prove that in congestion games, smoothness arguments are “complete” in a proof-theoretic sense: despite their automatic generality, they are guaranteed to produce optimal worst-case upper bounds on the price of anarchy. Game-theoretic tools are becoming a popular design choice for distributed resource allocation algorithms. A central component of this design choice is the assignment of utility functions to the individual agents. The goal is to assign each agent an admissible utility function such that the resulting game possesses a host of desirable properties, including scalability, tractability, and existence and efficiency of pure Nash equilibria. In this paper we formally study this question of utility design on a class of games termed distributed welfare games. We identify several utility design methodologies that guarantee desirable game properties irrespective of the specific application domain. Lastly, we illustrate the results in this paper on two commonly studied classes of resource allocation problems: “coverage” problems and “coloring” problems. In marketing planning, advertisers seek to maximize the number of customers by allocating given budgets to each media channel effectively. The budget allocation problem with a bipartite influence model captures this scenario; however, the model is problematic because it assumes there is only one advertiser in the market. In reality, there are many advertisers which are in conflict of advertisement; thus we must extend the model for such a case. By extending the budget allocation problem with a bipartite influence model, we propose a gametheoretic model problem that considers many advertisers. By simulating our model, we can analyze the behavior of a media channel market, e.g., we can estimate which media channels are allocated by an advertiser, and which customers are influenced by an advertiser. Our model has many attractive features. First, our model is a potential game; therefore, it has a pure Nash equilibrium. Second, any Nash equilibrium of our game has 2-optimal social utility, i.e., the price of anarchy is 2. Finally, the proposed model can be simulated very efficiently; thus it can be used to analyze large markets.