Bargaining networks model the behavior of a set of players that need to reach pairwise agreements for making profits. Nash bargaining solutions are special outcomes of such games that are both stable and balanced. Kleinberg and Tardos proved a sharp algorithmic characterization of such outcomes, but left open the problem of how the actual bargaining process converges to them. A partial answer was provided by who proposed a distributed algorithm for constructing Nash bargaining solutions, but without polynomial bounds on its convergence rate. In this paper, we introduce a simple and natural model for this process, and study its convergence rate to Nash bargaining solutions. At each time step, each player proposes a deal to each of her neighbors. The proposal consists of a share of the potential profit in case of agreement. The share is chosen to be balanced in Nash's sense as far as this is feasible (with respect to the current best alternatives for both players). We prove that, whenever the Nash bargaining solution is unique (and satisfies a positive gap condition) this dynamics converges to it in polynomial time. Our analysis is based on an approximate decoupling phenomenon between the dynamics on different substructures of the network. This approach may be of general interest for the analysis of local algorithms on networks.
Max-product "belief propagation" (BP) is an iterative, message-passing algorithm for finding the maximum a posteriori (MAP) assignment of a discrete probability distribution specified by a graphical model. Despite the spectacular success of the algorithm in many application areas such as iterative decoding and combinatorial optimization, which involve graphs with many cycles, theoretical results about both the correctness and convergence of the algorithm are known in only a few cases (see section I for references). In this paper, we prove the correctness and convergence of max-product for finding the maximum weight matching (MWM) in bipartite graphs. Even though the underlying graph of the MWM problem has many cycles, somewhat surprisingly we show that the max-product algorithm converges to the correct MWM as long as the MWM is unique. We provide a bound on the number of iterations required and show that for a graph of size n, the computational cost of the algorithm scales as O(n3), which is the same as the computational cost of the best known algorithms for finding the MWM. We also provide an interesting relation between the dynamics of the max-product algorithm and the auction algorithm, which is a well-known distributed algorithm for solving the MWM problem. Bargaining games on exchange networks have been studied by both economists and sociologists. A Balanced Outcome for such a game is an equilibrium concept that combines notions of stability and fairness. In a recent paper, Kleinberg and Tardos introduced balanced outcomes to the computer science community and provided a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the set of such outcomes. Their work left open a pertinent question: are there natural, local dynamics that converge quickly to a balanced outcome? In this paper, we provide a partial answer to this question by showing that simple edge-balancing dynamics converge to a balanced outcome whenever one exists.