Dynamic searchable symmetric encryption (DSSE) is a useful cryptographic tool in encrypted cloud storage. However, it has been reported that DSSE usually suffers from file-injection attacks and content leak of deleted documents. To mitigate these attacks, forward privacy and backward privacy have been proposed. Nevertheless, the existing forward backward-private DSSE schemes can only support single keyword queries. To address this problem, in this paper, we propose two DSSE schemes supporting range queries. One is forward-private and supports a large number of documents. The other can achieve backward privacy, while it can only support a limited number of documents. Finally, we also give the security proofs of the proposed DSSE schemes in the random oracle model.
The single-writer multi-reader searchable encryption (SMSE) allows an arbitrary authorized user to submit a valid search token and get the corresponding encrypted identifiers. In order to achieve fine-grained access control, the identifiers are encrypted by the attribute-based encryption. In this case, the user can decrypt a ciphertext only when the access policy in it matches the user’s attribute set. However, the server unable to determine whether the user can decrypt a certain ciphertext without the knowledge of the user’s attribute set. As a result, all the ciphertexts based on a search token have to be returned to the user, which causes unnecessary communication and decryption costs. In this paper, we propose a new SMSE scheme, in which the server just needs to return the ones which can be decrypted by the user rather than the whole search results. In order to achieve this goal, we present a server-side match technique with which the server can test whether the user can decrypt a ciphertext without knowing the user’s attribute set. Furthermore, the decryption computation is very efficient, irrespective of the structure of access policy. Therefore, both the communication and decryption overheads are dramatically reduced in our scheme. It is desirable to store data on data storage servers such as mail servers and file servers in encrypted form to reduce security and privacy risks. But this usually implies that one has to sacrifice functionality for security. For example, if a client wishes to retrieve only documents containing certain words, it was not previously known how to let the data storage server perform the search and answer the query, without loss of data confidentiality. We describe our cryptographic schemes for the problem of searching on encrypted data and provide proofs of security for the resulting crypto systems. Our techniques have a number of crucial advantages. They are provably secure: they provide provable secrecy for encryption, in the sense that the untrusted server cannot learn anything about the plaintext when only given the ciphertext; they provide query isolation for searches, meaning that the untrusted server cannot learn anything more about the plaintext than the search result; they provide controlled searching, so that the untrusted server cannot search for an arbitrary word without the user's authorization; they also support hidden queries, so that the user may ask the untrusted server to search for a secret word without revealing the word to the server. The algorithms presented are simple, fast (for a document of length n, the encryption and search algorithms only need O(n) stream cipher and block cipher operations), and introduce almost no space and communication overhead, and hence are practical to use today.  We propose a multi-user Symmetric Searchable Encryption (SSE) scheme based on the single-user Oblivious Cross Tags (OXT) protocol (, CRYPTO 2013). The scheme allows any user to perform a search query by interacting with the server and any ( -1 ) ‘helping’ users, and preserves the privacy of database content against the server even assuming leakage of up to ( -1 ) users’ keys to the server (for a threshold parameter ( )), while hiding the query from the ( -1 ) ‘helping users’. To achieve the latter query privacy property, we design a new distributed key-homomorphic pseudorandom function (PRF) that hides the PRF input (search keyword) from the ‘helping’ key share holders. By distributing the utilized keys among the users, the need of constant online presence of the data owner to provide services to the users is eliminated, while providing resilience against user key exposure. We design and implement dynamic symmetric searchable encryption schemes that efficiently and privately search server-held encrypted databases with tens of billions of record-keyword pairs. Our basic theoretical construction supports single-keyword searches and offers asymptotically optimal server index size, fully parallel searching, and minimal leakage. Our implementation effort brought to the fore several factors ignored by earlier coarse-grained theoretical performance analyses, including lowlevel space utilization, I O parallelism and goodput. We accordingly introduce several optimizations to our theoretically optimal construction that model the prototype’s characteristics designed to overcome these factors. All of our schemes and optimizations are proven secure and the information leaked to the untrusted server is precisely quantified. We evaluate the performance of our prototype using two very large datasets: a synthesized census database with 100 million records and hundreds of keywords per record and a multi-million webpage collection that includes Wikipedia as a subset. Moreover, we report on an implementation that uses the dynamic SSE schemes developed here as the basis for supporting recent SSE advances, including complex search queries (e.g., Boolean queries) and richer operational settings (e.g., query delegation), in the above terabyte-scale databases. Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) allows a party to outsource the storage of its data to another party (a server) in a private manner, while maintaining the ability to selectively search over it. This problem has been the focus of active research in recent years. In this paper we show two solutions to SSE that simultaneously enjoy the following properties: Both solutions are more efficient than all previous constant-round schemes. In particular, the work performed by the server per returned document is constant as opposed to linear in the size of the data. Both solutions enjoy stronger security guarantees than previous constant-round schemes. In fact, we point out subtle but serious problems with previous notions of security for SSE, and show how to design constructions which avoid these pitfalls. Further, our second solution also achieves what we call adaptive SSE security, where queries to the server can be chosen adaptively (by the adversary) during the execution of the search; this notion is both important in practice and has not been previously considered. Surprisingly, despite being more secure and more efficient, our SSE schemes are remarkably simple. We consider the simplicity of both solutions as an important step towards the deployment of SSE technologies.As an additional contribution, we also consider multi-user SSE. All prior work on SSE studied the setting where only the owner of the data is capable of submitting search queries. We consider the natural extension where an arbitrary group of parties other than the owner can submit search queries. We formally define SSE in the multi-user setting, and present an efficient construction that achieves better performance than simply using access control mechanisms. A Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) scheme allows a server to search a user's data without having to decrypt the data. This provides the user with a high degree of privacy and is particularly useful when data is stored on Cloud. Numerous SSE schemes have already been proposed and while most have excellent security properties, few meet high performance requirements and most only support searching for a single keyword at a time. The SSE scheme of (CRYPTO 2013) is notable for its high efficiency on restricted forms of Boolean queries, but has low efficiency for, or does not support, other common forms of boolean queries. In this paper, we propose a generalization and optimization of the SSE scheme, which extends to support a much larger class of boolean queries, and performs no worse, and often with much higher efficiency than the scheme for the remaining queries. Searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) allows a client to encrypt its data in such a way that this data can still be searched. The most immediate application of SSE is to cloud storage, where it enables a client to securely outsource its data to an untrusted cloud provider without sacrificing the ability to search over it. SSE has been the focus of active research and a multitude of schemes that achieve various levels of security and efficiency have been proposed. Any practical SSE scheme, however, should (at a minimum) satisfy the following properties: sublinear search time, security against adaptive chosen-keyword attacks, compact indexes and the ability to add and delete files efficiently. Unfortunately, none of the previously-known SSE constructions achieve all these properties at the same time. This severely limits the practical value of SSE and decreases its chance of deployment in real-world cloud storage systems. To address this, we propose the first SSE scheme to satisfy all the properties outlined above. Our construction extends the inverted index approach (, CCS 2006) in several non-trivial ways and introduces new techniques for the design of SSE. In addition, we implement our scheme and conduct a performance evaluation, showing that our approach is highly efficient and ready for deployment. This work presents the design and analysis of the first searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) protocol that supports conjunctive search and general Boolean queries on outsourced symmetrically- encrypted data and that scales to very large databases and arbitrarily-structured data including free text search. To date, work in this area has focused mainly on single-keyword search. For the case of conjunctive search, prior SSE constructions required work linear in the total number of documents in the database and provided good privacy only for structured attribute-value data, rendering these solutions too slow and inflexible for large practical databases. We extend the searchable symmetric encryption (SSE) protocol of [, Crypto’13] adding support for range, substring, wildcard, and phrase queries, in addition to the Boolean queries supported in the original protocol. Our techniques apply to the basic single-client scenario underlying the common SSE setting as well as to the more complex Multi-Client and Outsourced Symmetric PIR extensions of [, CCS’13]. We provide performance information based on our prototype implementation, showing the practicality and scalability of our techniques to very large databases, thus extending the performance results of [, NDSS’14] to these rich and comprehensive query types.