During the last decade, the matroid secretary problem (MSP) became one of the most prominent classes of online selection problems. Partially linked to its numerous applications in mechanism design, substantial interest arose also in the study of nonlinear versions of MSP, with a focus on the submodular matroid secretary problem (SMSP). So far, O(1)-competitive algorithms have been obtained for SMSP over some basic matroid classes. This created some hope that, analogously to the matroid secretary conjecture, one may even obtain O(1)-competitive algorithms for SMSP over any matroid. However, up to now, most questions related to SMSP remained open, including whether SMSP may be substantially more difficult than MSP; and more generally, to what extend MSP and SMSP are related. Our goal is to address these points by presenting general black-box reductions from SMSP to MSP. In particular, we show that any O(1)-competitive algorithm for MSP, even restricted to a particular matroid class, can be transformed in a black-box way to an O(1)-competitive algorithm for SMSP over the same matroid class. This implies that the matroid secretary conjecture is equivalent to the same conjecture for SMSP. Hence, in this sense SMSP is not harder than MSP. Also, to find O(1)-competitive algorithms for SMSP over a particular matroid class, it suffices to consider MSP over the same matroid class. Using our reductions we obtain many first and improved O(1)-competitive algorithms for SMSP over various matroid classes by leveraging known algorithms for MSP. Moreover, our reductions imply an O(loglog(rank))-competitive algorithm for SMSP, thus, matching the currently best asymptotic algorithm for MSP, and substantially improving on the previously best O(log(rank))-competitive algorithm for SMSP.
 In the classical prophet inequality, a gambler observes a sequence of stochastic rewards V1, ..., Vn and must decide, for each reward Vi, whether to keep it and stop the game or to forfeit the reward forever and reveal the next value Vi. The gambler's goal is to obtain a constant fraction of the expected reward that the optimal offline algorithm would get. Recently, prophet inequalities have been generalized to settings where the gambler can choose k items, and, more generally, where he can choose any independent set in a matroid. However, all the existing algorithms require the gambler to know the distribution from which the rewards V1, ..., Vn are drawn. The assumption that the gambler knows the distribution from which V1, ..., Vn are drawn is very strong. Instead, we work with the much simpler assumption that the gambler only knows a few samples from this distribution. We construct the first single-sample prophet inequalities for many settings of interest, whose guarantees all match the best possible asymptotically, even with full knowledge of the distribution. Specifically, we provide a novel single-sample algorithm when the gambler can choose any k elements whose analysis is based on random walks with limited correlation. In addition, we provide a black-box method for converting specific types of solutions to the related secretary problem to single-sample prophet inequalities, and apply it to several existing algorithms. Finally, we provide a constant-sample prophet inequality for constant-degree bipartite matchings. In addition, we apply these results to design the first posted-price and multi-dimensional auction mechanisms with limited information in settings with asymmetric bidders. Connections between prophet inequalities and posted-price mechanisms are already known, but applying the existing framework requires knowledge of the underlying distributions, as well as the so-called "virtual values" even when the underlying prophet inequalities do not. We therefore provide an extension of this framework that bypasses virtual values altogether, allowing our mechanisms to take full advantage of the limited information required by our new prophet inequalities. In Martin Gardner's Mathematical Games column in the February 1960 issue of Scientific American, there appeared a simple problem that has come to be known today as the Secretary Problem, or the Marriage Problem. It has since been taken up and developed by many eminent probabilists and statisticians and has been extended and generalized in many different directions so that now one can say that it constitutes a "field" within mathematics-probability-optimization. The object of this article is partly historical (to give a fresh view of the origins of the problem, touching upon Cayley and Kepler), partly review of the field (listing the subfields of recent interest), partly serious (to answer the question posed in the title), and partly entertainment. The contents of this paper were first given as the Allen T. Craig lecture at the University of Iowa, 1988. The matroid secretary problem was introduced by Babaioff, Immorlica, and Kleinberg in SODA 2007 as an online problem that was both mathematically interesting and had applications to online auctions. In this column I will introduce and motivate this problem, and give a survey of some of the exciting work that has been done on it over the past 6 years. While we have a much better understanding of matroid secretary now than we did in 2007, the main conjecture is still open: does there exist an O(1)-competitive algorithm. The most well-known conjecture in the context of matroid secretary problems claims the existence of a constant-factor approximation applicable to any matroid. Whereas this conjecture remains open, modified forms of it were shown to be true, when assuming that the assignment of weights to the secretaries is not adversarial but uniformly random (Soto [SODA 2011], Oveis Gharan and Vondr 'ak [ESA 2011]). However, so far, there was no variant of the matroid secretary problem with adversarial weight assignment for which a constant-factor approximation was found. We address this point by presenting a 9-approximation for the , a model suggested shortly after the introduction of the matroid secretary problem, and for which no constant-factor approximation was known so far. The free order model is a relaxed version of the original matroid secretary problem, with the only difference that one can choose the order in which secretaries are interviewed. Furthermore, we consider the classical matroid secretary problem for the special case of laminar matroids. Only recently, a constant-factor approximation has been found for this case, using a clever but rather involved method and analysis (Im and Wang, [SODA 2011]) that leads to a 16000 3-approximation. This is arguably the most involved special case of the matroid secretary problem for which a constant-factor approximation is known. We present a considerably simpler and stronger @math -approximation, based on reducing the problem to a matroid secretary problem on a partition matroid.