Lurking is a complex user-behavioral phenomenon that occurs in all large-scale online communities and social networks. It generally refers to the behavior characterizing users that benefit from the information produced by others in the community without actively contributing back to the production of social content. The amount and evolution of lurkers may strongly affect an online social environment, therefore understanding the lurking dynamics and identifying strategies to curb this trend are relevant problems. In this regard, we introduce the Lurker Game, i.e., a model for analyzing the transitions from a lurking to a non-lurking (i.e., active) user role, and vice versa, in terms of evolutionary game theory. We evaluate the proposed Lurker Game by arranging agents on complex networks and analyzing the system evolution, seeking relations between the network topology and the final equilibrium of the game. Results suggest that the Lurker Game is suitable to model the lurking dynamics, showing how the adoption of rewarding mechanisms combined with the modeling of hypothetical heterogeneity of users' interests may lead users in an online community towards a cooperative behavior.
Lurkers are silent members of a social network (SN) who gain benefit from others' information without significantly giving back to the community. The study of lurking behaviors in SNs is nonetheless important, since these users acquire knowledge from the community, and as such they are social capital holders. Within this view, a major goal is to delurk such users, i.e., to encourage them to more actively be involved in the SN. Despite delurking strategies have been conceptualized in social science and human-computer interaction research, no computational approach has been so far defined to turn lurkers into active participants in the SN. In this work we fill this gap by presenting a delurking-oriented targeted influence maximization problem under the linear threshold (LT) model. We define a novel objective function, in terms of the lurking scores associated with the nodes in the final active set, and we show it is monotone and submodular. We provide an approximate solution by developing a greedy algorithm, named DEvOTION, which computes a k- node set that maximizes the value of the delurking-capital-based objective function, for a given minimum lurking score threshold. Results on SN datasets of different sizes have demonstrated the significance of our delurking approach via LT-based targeted influence maximization.