We study the fair division of a continuous resource, such as a land-estate or a time-interval, among pre-specified groups of agents, such as families. Each family is given a piece of the resource and this piece is used simultaneously by all family members, while different members may have different value functions. Three ways to assess the fairness of such a division are examined. (a) *Average fairness* means that each family's share is fair according to the "family value function", defined as the arithmetic mean of the value functions of the family members. (b) *Unanimous fairness* means that all members in all families feel that their family received a fair share according to their personal value function. (c) *Democratic fairness* means that in each family, at least half the members feel that their family's share is fair. We compare these criteria based on the number of connected components in the resulting division, and based on their compatibility with Pareto-efficiency.
Couples looking for jobs in the same labor market may cause instabilities. We deter- mine a natural preference domain, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, that guarantees stability. Under a restricted unemployment aversion condition we show that this domain is maximal for the existence of stable matchings. We illustrate how small deviations from (weak) responsiveness, that model the wish of couples to be closer together, cause instability, even when we use a weaker stability notion that excludes myopic blocking. Our remaining results deal with various properties of the set of stable matchings for "responsive couples markets," viz., optimal- ity, filled positions, and manipulation. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78; J41.  The allocation of resources within a system of autonomous agents, that not only havepreferences over alternative allocations of resources but also actively participate in com-puting an allocation, is an exciting area of research at the interface of Computer Scienceand Economics. This paper is a survey of some of the most salient issues in MultiagentResource Allocation. In particular, we review various languages to represent the pref-erences of agents over alternative allocations of resources as well as different measuresof social welfare to assess the overall quality of an allocation. We also discuss pertinentissues regarding allocation procedures and present important complexity results. Ourpresentation of theoretical issues is complemented by a discussion of software packagesfor the simulation of agent-based market places. We also introduce four major applica-tion areas for Multiagent Resource Allocation, namely industrial procurement, sharingof satellite resources, manufacturing control, and grid computing Abstract We introduce an extension of Kaneko′s ratio equilibrium to the case of economies with many public and private goods. Specifically, we employ a general production model where public goods may be inputs in the production of public goods. Using the accounting concept of transfer prices, we propose a definition of ratio equilibrium that generalizes Kaneko′s. We prove that, under standard assumptions, ratio equilibria exist and are free-access core allocations and therefore Pareto efficient. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D50, H41, D62.