Influence maximization has found applications in a wide range of real-world problems, for instance, viral marketing of products in an online social network, and information propagation of valuable information such as job vacancy advertisements and health-related information. While existing algorithmic techniques usually aim at maximizing the total number of people influenced, the population often comprises several socially salient groups, e.g., based on gender or race. As a result, these techniques could lead to disparity across different groups in receiving important information. Furthermore, in many of these applications, the spread of influence is time-critical, i.e., it is only beneficial to be influenced before a time deadline. As we show in this paper, the time-criticality of the information could further exacerbate the disparity of influence across groups. This disparity, introduced by algorithms aimed at maximizing total influence, could have far-reaching consequences, impacting people's prosperity and putting minority groups at a big disadvantage. In this work, we propose a notion of group fairness in time-critical influence maximization. We introduce surrogate objective functions to solve the influence maximization problem under fairness considerations. By exploiting the submodularity structure of our objectives, we provide computationally efficient algorithms with guarantees that are effective in enforcing fairness during the propagation process. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach through synthetic and real-world experiments.
We consider the problem of fairly dividing a collection of indivisible goods among a set of players. Much of the existing literature on fair division focuses on notions of individual fairness. For instance, envy-freeness requires that no player prefer the set of goods allocated to another player to her own allocation. We observe that an algorithm satisfying such individual fairness notions can still treat groups of players unfairly, with one group desiring the goods allocated to another. Our main contribution is a notion of group fairness, which implies most existing notions of individual fairness. Group fairness (like individual fairness) cannot be satisfied exactly with indivisible goods. Thus, we introduce two “up to one good” style relaxations. We show that, somewhat surprisingly, certain local optima of the Nash welfare function satisfy both relaxations and can be computed in pseudo-polynomial time by local search. Our experiments reveal faster computation and stronger fairness guarantees in practice. Users of social media sites like Facebook and Twitter rely on crowdsourced content recommendation systems (e.g., Trending Topics) to retrieve important and useful information. Contents selected for recommendation indirectly give the initial users who promoted (by liking or posting) the content an opportunity to propagate their messages to a wider audience. Hence, it is important to understand the demographics of people who make a content worthy of recommendation, and explore whether they are representative of the media site's overall population. In this work, using extensive data collected from Twitter, we make the first attempt to quantify and explore the demographic biases in the crowdsourced recommendations. Our analysis, focusing on the selection of trending topics, finds that a large fraction of trends are promoted by crowds whose demographics are significantly different from the overall Twitter population. More worryingly, we find that certain demographic groups are systematically under-represented among the promoters of the trending topics. To make the demographic biases in Twitter trends more transparent, we developed and deployed a Web-based service 'Who-Makes-Trends' at twitter-app.mpi-sws.org who-makes-trends. Abstract We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to groups of agents. Agents in the same group share the same set of goods even though they may have different preferences. Previous work has focused on unanimous fairness, in which all agents in each group must agree that their group's share is fair. Under this strict requirement, fair allocations exist only for small groups. We introduce the concept of democratic fairness, which aims to satisfy a certain fraction of the agents in each group. This concept is better suited to large groups such as cities or countries. We present protocols for democratic fair allocation among two or more arbitrarily large groups of agents with monotonic, additive, or binary valuations. For two groups with arbitrary monotonic valuations, we give an efficient protocol that guarantees envy-freeness up to one good for at least 1 2 of the agents in each group, and prove that the 1 2 fraction is optimal. We also present other protocols that make weaker fairness guarantees to more agents in each group, or to more groups. Our protocols combine techniques from different fields, including combinatorial game theory, cake cutting, and voting. Algorithms and decision making based on Big Data have become pervasive in all aspects of our daily lives lives (offline and online), as they have become essential tools in personal finance, health care, hiring, housing, education, and policies. It is therefore of societ al and ethical importance to ask whether these algorithms can be discriminative on grounds such as gender, ethnicity, or health status. It turns out that the answer is positive: for instance, recent studies in the context of online advertising show that ads for high-income jobs are presented to men much more often than to women [, 2015]; and ads for arrest records are significantly more likely to show up on searches for distinctively black names [Sweeney, 2013]. This algorithmic bias exists even when there is no discrimination intention in the developer of the algorithm. Sometimes it may be inherent to the data sources used (software making decisions based on data can reflect, or even amplify, the results of historical discrimination), but even when the sensitive attributes have been suppressed from the input, a well trained machine learning algorithm may still discriminate on the basis of such sensitive attributes because of correlations existing in the data. These considerations call for the development of data mining systems which are discrimination-conscious by-design. This is a novel and challenging research area for the data mining community. The aim of this tutorial is to survey algorithmic bias, presenting its most common variants, with an emphasis on the algorithmic techniques and key ideas developed to derive efficient solutions. The tutorial covers two main complementary approaches: algorithms for discrimination discovery and discrimination prevention by means of fairness-aware data mining. We conclude by summarizing promising paths for future research.   We study fairness in classification, where individuals are classified, e.g., admitted to a university, and the goal is to prevent discrimination against individuals based on their membership in some group, while maintaining utility for the classifier (the university). The main conceptual contribution of this paper is a framework for fair classification comprising (1) a (hypothetical) task-specific metric for determining the degree to which individuals are similar with respect to the classification task at hand; (2) an algorithm for maximizing utility subject to the fairness constraint, that similar individuals are treated similarly. We also present an adaptation of our approach to achieve the complementary goal of "fair affirmative action," which guarantees statistical parity (i.e., the demographics of the set of individuals receiving any classification are the same as the demographics of the underlying population), while treating similar individuals as similarly as possible. Finally, we discuss the relationship of fairness to privacy: when fairness implies privacy, and how tools developed in the context of differential privacy may be applied to fairness. What does it mean for an algorithm to be biased? In U.S. law, unintentional bias is encoded via disparate impact, which occurs when a selection process has widely different outcomes for different groups, even as it appears to be neutral. This legal determination hinges on a definition of a protected class (ethnicity, gender) and an explicit description of the process. When computers are involved, determining disparate impact (and hence bias) is harder. It might not be possible to disclose the process. In addition, even if the process is open, it might be hard to elucidate in a legal setting how the algorithm makes its decisions. Instead of requiring access to the process, we propose making inferences based on the data it uses. We present four contributions. First, we link disparate impact to a measure of classification accuracy that while known, has received relatively little attention. Second, we propose a test for disparate impact based on how well the protected class can be predicted from the other attributes. Third, we describe methods by which data might be made unbiased. Finally, we present empirical evidence supporting the effectiveness of our test for disparate impact and our approach for both masking bias and preserving relevant information in the data. Interestingly, our approach resembles some actual selection practices that have recently received legal scrutiny. Abstract We investigate the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among interested agents using the concept of maximin share. Procaccia and Wang showed that while an allocation that gives every agent at least her maximin share does not necessarily exist, one that gives every agent at least 2 ∕ 3 of her share always does. In this paper, we consider the more general setting where we allocate the goods to groups of agents. The agents in each group share the same set of goods even though they may have conflicting preferences. For two groups, we characterize the cardinality of the groups for which a positive approximation of the maximin share is possible regardless of the number of goods. We also show settings where an approximation is possible or impossible when there are several groups. To help their users to discover important items at a particular time, major websites like Twitter, Yelp, TripAdvisor or NYTimes provide Top-K recommendations (e.g., 10 Trending Topics, Top 5 Hotels in Paris or 10 Most Viewed News Stories), which rely on crowdsourced popularity signals to select the items. However, different sections of a crowd may have different preferences, and there is a large silent majority who do not explicitly express their opinion. Also, the crowd often consists of actors like bots, spammers, or people running orchestrated campaigns. Recommendation algorithms today largely do not consider such nuances, hence are vulnerable to strategic manipulation by small but hyper-active user groups. To fairly aggregate the preferences of all users while recommending top-K items, we borrow ideas from prior research on social choice theory, and identify a voting mechanism called Single Transferable Vote (STV) as having many of the fairness properties we desire in top-K item (s)elections. We develop an innovative mechanism to attribute preferences of silent majority which also make STV completely operational. We show the generalizability of our approach by implementing it on two different real-world datasets. Through extensive experimentation and comparison with state-of-the-art techniques, we show that our proposed approach provides maximum user satisfaction, and cuts down drastically on items disliked by most but hyper-actively promoted by a few users. Discrimination via algorithmic decision making has received considerable attention. Prior work largely focuses on defining conditions for fairness, but does not define satisfactory measures of algorithmic unfairness. In this paper, we focus on the following question: Given two unfair algorithms, how should we determine which of the two is more unfair? Our core idea is to use existing inequality indices from economics to measure how unequally the outcomes of an algorithm benefit different individuals or groups in a population. Our work offers a justified and general framework to compare and contrast the (un)fairness of algorithmic predictors. This unifying approach enables us to quantify unfairness both at the individual and the group level. Further, our work reveals overlooked tradeoffs between different fairness notions: using our proposed measures, the overall individual-level unfairness of an algorithm can be decomposed into a between-group and a within-group component. Earlier methods are typically designed to tackle only between-group un- fairness, which may be justified for legal or other reasons. However, we demonstrate that minimizing exclusively the between-group component may, in fact, increase the within-group, and hence the overall unfairness. We characterize and illustrate the tradeoffs between our measures of (un)fairness and the prediction accuracy.