In this paper we propose a novel easily reproducible technique to attack the best public Face ID system ArcFace in different shooting conditions. To create an attack, we print the rectangular paper sticker on a common color printer and put it on the hat. The adversarial sticker is prepared with a novel algorithm for off-plane transformations of the image which imitates sticker location on the hat. Such an approach confuses the state-of-the-art public Face ID model LResNet100E-IR, ArcFace@ms1m-refine-v2 and is transferable to other Face ID models.
State-of-the-art object detection networks depend on region proposal algorithms to hypothesize object locations. Advances like SPPnet and Fast R-CNN have reduced the running time of these detection networks, exposing region proposal computation as a bottleneck. In this work, we introduce a Region Proposal Network (RPN) that shares full-image convolutional features with the detection network, thus enabling nearly cost-free region proposals. An RPN is a fully convolutional network that simultaneously predicts object bounds and objectness scores at each position. The RPN is trained end-to-end to generate high-quality region proposals, which are used by Fast R-CNN for detection. We further merge RPN and Fast R-CNN into a single network by sharing their convolutional features---using the recently popular terminology of neural networks with 'attention' mechanisms, the RPN component tells the unified network where to look. For the very deep VGG-16 model, our detection system has a frame rate of 5fps (including all steps) on a GPU, while achieving state-of-the-art object detection accuracy on PASCAL VOC 2007, 2012, and MS COCO datasets with only 300 proposals per image. In ILSVRC and COCO 2015 competitions, Faster R-CNN and RPN are the foundations of the 1st-place winning entries in several tracks. Code has been made publicly available. An adversarial example is an example that has been adjusted to produce a wrong label when presented to a system at test time. To date, adversarial example constructions have been demonstrated for classifiers, but not for detectors. If adversarial examples that could fool a detector exist, they could be used to (for example) maliciously create security hazards on roads populated with smart vehicles. In this paper, we demonstrate a construction that successfully fools two standard detectors, Faster RCNN and YOLO. The existence of such examples is surprising, as attacking a classifier is very different from attacking a detector, and that the structure of detectors - which must search for their own bounding box, and which cannot estimate that box very accurately - makes it quite likely that adversarial patterns are strongly disrupted. We show that our construction produces adversarial examples that generalize well across sequences digitally, even though large perturbations are needed. We also show that our construction yields physical objects that are adversarial.  We introduce YOLO9000, a state-of-the-art, real-time object detection system that can detect over 9000 object categories. First we propose various improvements to the YOLO detection method, both novel and drawn from prior work. The improved model, YOLOv2, is state-of-the-art on standard detection tasks like PASCAL VOC and COCO. At 67 FPS, YOLOv2 gets 76.8 mAP on VOC 2007. At 40 FPS, YOLOv2 gets 78.6 mAP, outperforming state-of-the-art methods like Faster RCNN with ResNet and SSD while still running significantly faster. Finally we propose a method to jointly train on object detection and classification. Using this method we train YOLO9000 simultaneously on the COCO detection dataset and the ImageNet classification dataset. Our joint training allows YOLO9000 to predict detections for object classes that don't have labelled detection data. We validate our approach on the ImageNet detection task. YOLO9000 gets 19.7 mAP on the ImageNet detection validation set despite only having detection data for 44 of the 200 classes. On the 156 classes not in COCO, YOLO9000 gets 16.0 mAP. But YOLO can detect more than just 200 classes; it predicts detections for more than 9000 different object categories. And it still runs in real-time. Given the ability to directly manipulate image pixels in the digital input space, an adversary can easily generate imperceptible perturbations to fool a Deep Neural Network (DNN) image classifier, as demonstrated in prior work. In this work, we propose ShapeShifter, an attack that tackles the more challenging problem of crafting physical adversarial perturbations to fool image-based object detectors like Faster R-CNN. Attacking an object detector is more difficult than attacking an image classifier, as it needs to mislead the classification results in multiple bounding boxes with different scales. Extending the digital attack to the physical world adds another layer of difficulty, because it requires the perturbation to be robust enough to survive real-world distortions due to different viewing distances and angles, lighting conditions, and camera limitations. We show that the Expectation over Transformation technique, which was originally proposed to enhance the robustness of adversarial perturbations in image classification, can be successfully adapted to the object detection setting. ShapeShifter can generate adversarially perturbed stop signs that are consistently mis-detected by Faster R-CNN as other objects, posing a potential threat to autonomous vehicles and other safety-critical computer vision systems. Code related to this paper is available at: https: github.com shangtse robust-physical-attack. Deep learning has proven to be a powerful tool for computer vision and has seen widespread adoption for numerous tasks. However, deep learning algorithms are known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples. These adversarial inputs are created such that, when provided to a deep learning algorithm, they are very likely to be mislabeled. This can be problematic when deep learning is used to assist in safety critical decisions. Recent research has shown that classifiers can be attacked by physical adversarial examples under various physical conditions. Given the fact that state-of-the-art objection detection algorithms are harder to be fooled by the same set of adversarial examples, here we show that these detectors can also be attacked by physical adversarial examples. In this note, we briefly show both static and dynamic test results. We design an algorithm that produces physical adversarial inputs, which can fool the YOLO object detector and can also attack Faster-RCNN with relatively high success rate based on transferability. Furthermore, our algorithm can compress the size of the adversarial inputs to stickers that, when attached to the targeted object, result in the detector either mislabeling or not detecting the object a high percentage of the time. This note provides a small set of results. Our upcoming paper will contain a thorough evaluation on other object detectors, and will present the algorithm.