In the era of big data, reducing the computational complexity of servers in data centers will be an important goal. We propose Low Complexity Secure Codes (LCSCs) that are specifically designed to provide information theoretic security in cloud distributed storage systems. Unlike traditional coding schemes that are designed for error correction capabilities, these codes are only designed to provide security with low decoding complexity. These sparse codes are able to provide (asymptotic) perfect secrecy similar to Shannon cipher. The simultaneous promise of low decoding complexity and perfect secrecy make these codes very desirable for cloud storage systems with large amount of data. The design is particularly suitable for large size archival data such as movies and pictures. The complexity of these codes are compared with traditional encryption techniques.
We focus on secure data exchange among a group of wireless clients. The clients exchange data by broadcasting linear combinations of packets over a lossless channel. The data exchange is performed in the presence of an eavesdropper who has access to the channel and can obtain all transmitted data. Our goal is to develop a weakly secure coding scheme that prevents the eavesdropper from being able to decode any of the original packets held by the clients. We present a randomized algorithm based on Generalized Reed-Solomon (GRS) codes. The algorithm has two key advantages over the previous solutions: it operates over a small (polynomial-size) finite field and provides a way to verify that constructed code is feasible. In contrast, the previous approaches require exponential field size and do not provide an efficient (polynomial-time) algorithm to verify the secrecy properties of the constructed code. We formulate an algebraic-geometric conjecture that implies the correctness of our algorithm and prove its validity for special cases. Our simulation results indicate that the algorithm is efficient in practical settings. We consider the problem of secure distributed data storage under the paradigm of , in which no is leaked to the eavesdropper. More specifically, the eavesdropper cannot get any information about any individual message file or a small group of files. The key benefit of the weak security paradigm is that it incurs no loss in the storage capacity, which makes it practically appealing. In this paper, we present a coding scheme, using a coset coding based outer code and a Product-Matrix Minimum Bandwidth Regenerating code (proposed by ) as an inner code, that achieves weak security when the eavesdropper can observe any single storage node. We show that the proposed construction has good security properties and requires small finite field size.   We consider the problem of direct data exchange among a group of wireless clients in the presence of an eavesdropper. An instance of this problem includes a set of packets X and a set of clients, such that each client has an access to a subset of packets and requests the rest of the packets in X. The clients use a lossless broadcast channel to transmit packets to other clients in the group. All transmitted packets can be observed by an eavesdropper that might have prior side information about the packets exchanged by the clients. Our goal is to construct a coding scheme that prevents the eavesdropper from decoding any individual packet in X (beyond those it already knowns). In weakly secure schemes, the more packets the eavesdropper has, the harder it is to construct a scheme that prevents the eavesdropper from obtaining additional packets. Thus, it is natural to measure the degree of secrecy by the maximum number of packets that can be held by the eavesdropper. Accordingly, our goal is to construct a coding scheme that can handle an eavesdropper that has as many packets as possible. We also present randomized and deterministic solutions for this problem and analyze their performance. We also establish a tight upper bound on the maximum degree of secrecy that a weakly secure scheme can provide for each instance of the problem. In this work we consider the problem of secure data transmission on an acyclic multicast network. A new information theoretic model for security is proposed that defines the system as secure if an eavesdropper is unable to get any “meaningful” information about the source. The “wiretap” network model by Cai and Yeung in which no information of the source is made available to the eavesdropper is a special case in the new model. We consider the case when the number of independent messages available to the eavesdropper is less than the multicast capacity of the network. We show that under the new security requirements communication is possible at the multicast capacity. A linear transformation is provided for networks with a given linear code to make the system secure. The transformation needs to be done only at the source and the operations at the intermediate nodes remain unchanged. We also show that if random coding scheme is used the probability of the system being secure can be made arbitrarily close to one by coding over a large enough field.