Peer review, evaluation, and selection is a fundamental aspect of modern science. Funding bodies the world over employ experts to review and select the best proposals of those submitted for funding. The problem of peer selection, however, is much more general: a professional society may want to give a subset of its members awards based on the opinions of all members; an instructor for a MOOC or online course may want to crowdsource grading; or a marketing company may select ideas from group brainstorming sessions based on peer evaluation. We make three fundamental contributions to the study of procedures or mechanisms for peer selection, a specific type of group decision-making problem, studied in computer science, economics, and political science. First, we propose a novel mechanism that is strategyproof, i.e., agents cannot benefit by reporting insincere valuations. Second, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our mechanism by a comprehensive simulation-based comparison with a suite of mechanisms found in the literature. Finally, our mechanism employs a randomized rounding technique that is of independent interest, as it solves the apportionment problem that arises in various settings where discrete resources such as parliamentary representation slots need to be divided proportionally.
A random assignment is ordinally efficient if it is not stochastically dominated with respect to individual preferences over sure objects. Ordinal efficiency implies (is implied by) ex post (ex ante) efficiency. A simple algorithm characterizes ordinally efficient assignments: our solution, probabilistic serial (PS), is a central element within their set. Random priority (RP) orders agents from the uniform distribution, then lets them choose successively their best remaining object. RP is ex post, but not always ordinally, efficient. PS is envy-free, RP is not; RP is strategy-proof, PS is not. Ordinal efficiency, Strategyproofness, and equal treatment of equals are incompatible. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C78, D61, D63. An experiment in which 150 proposals submitted to the National Science Foundation were evaluated independently by a new set of reviewers indicates that getting a research grant depends to a significant extent on chance. The degree of disagreement within the population of eligible reviewers is such that whether or not a proposal is funded depends in a large proportion of cases upon which reviewers happen to be selected for it. No evidence of systematic bias in the selection of NSF reviewers was found.  Peer assessment is the most common approach to evaluating scientific work, and it is also gaining popularity for scaling evaluation of student work in large and distributed classes. The key idea is that each peer reviewer or grader rates a relatively small subset of the items, and that some method of manual, semi-automatic, or fully-automatic aggregation of all assessments defines the eventual rating of all items – the grade in peer grading, or whether to accept or reject a scientific manuscript. In this paper, we explore in how far a Bayesian Ordinal Peer Assessment (BOPA) method can provide additional decision support when making acceptance rejection decisions for a scientific conference. Using data from the 2015 ACM Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (KDD), where this system was deployed, we discuss the potential merit of the BOPA approach compared to conventional decision support offered by the Microsoft Conference Management System (CMT).