As the largest e-commerce platform, Taobao helps advertisers reach billions of search requests each day with its sponsored search service, which has also contributed considerable revenue to the platform. How to design a suit of marketing optimization tool to cater various advertiser demands while balancing platform revenue and consumer experience is significant to a healthy and sustainable marketing ecosystem, among which bidding strategy plays a critical role. Traditional keyword-level bidding optimization only provides a coarse-grained match between advertisement and impression. Meanwhile impression-level expected value bidder is not applicable to various demand optimization of massive advertisers, not to mention its lack of mechanism to balance benefits of three parties. In this paper we propose , a bidding optimization framework which designs an impression-level bidding strategy to reflect advertiser's conversion willingness and budget control. In this way, with a simplified control ability for advertisers, CIA is capable of fulfilling various e-commerce advertiser demands in different levels, such as GMV optimization, style comparison etc. Additionally, a replay based simulation system is designed to predict the performance of different take-rate. CIA unifies the benefits of three parties in the marketing ecosystem without changing the classic expected Cost Per Mille mechanism. Our extensive offline simulations and large-scale online experiments on platform verify the high effectiveness of the CIA framework. Moreover, CIA has been deployed online as a major bidding tool for advertisers in TSA.
Sponsored search has been proven to be a successful business model, and sponsored search auctions have become a hot research direction. There have been many exciting advances in this field, especially in recent years, while at the same time, there are also many open problems waiting for us to resolve. In this article, we provide a comprehensive review of sponsored search auctions in hopes of helping both industry practitioners and academic researchers to become familiar with this field, to know the state of the art, and to identify future research topics. Specifically, we organize the article into two parts. In the first part, we review research works on sponsored search auctions with basic settings, where fully rational advertisers without budget constraints, preknown click-through rates (CTRs) without interdependence, and exact match between queries and keywords are assumed. Under these assumptions, we first introduce the generalized second price (GSP) auction, which is the most popularly used auction mechanism in the industry. Then we give the definitions of several well-studied equilibria and review the latest results on GSP’s efficiency and revenue in these equilibria. In the second part, we introduce some advanced topics on sponsored search auctions. In these advanced topics, one or more assumptions made in the basic settings are relaxed. For example, the CTR of an ad could be unknown and dependent on other ads; keywords could be broadly matched to queries before auctions are executed; and advertisers are not necessarily fully rational, could have budget constraints, and may prefer rich bidding languages. Given that the research on these advanced topics is still immature, in each section of the second part, we provide our opinions on how to make further advances, in addition to describing what has been done by researchers in the corresponding direction. This paper is concerned with the joint allocation of bid price and campaign budget in sponsored search. In this application, an advertiser can create a number of campaigns and set a budget for each of them. In a campaign, he she can further create several ad groups with bid keywords and bid prices. Data analysis shows that many advertisers are dealing with a very large number of campaigns, bid keywords, and bid prices at the same time, which poses a great challenge to the optimality of their campaign management. As a result, the budgets of some campaigns might be too low to achieve the desired performance goals while those of some other campaigns might be wasted; the bid prices for some keywords may be too low to win competitive auctions while those of some other keywords may be unnecessarily high. In this paper, we propose a novel algorithm to automatically address this issue. In particular, we model the problem as a constrained optimization problem, which maximizes the expected advertiser revenue subject to the constraints of the total budget of the advertiser and the ranges of bid price change. By solving this optimization problem, we can obtain an optimal budget allocation plan as well as an optimal bid price setting. Our simulation results based on the sponsored search log of a commercial search engine have shown that by employing the proposed method, we can effectively improve the performances of the advertisers while at the same time we also see an increase in the revenue of the search engine. In addition, the results indicate that this method is robust to the second-order effects caused by the bid fluctuations from other advertisers.