In this paper, we explore using deep reinforcement learning for problems with multiple agents. Most existing methods for deep multi-agent reinforcement learning consider only a small number of agents. When the number of agents increases, the dimensionality of the input and control spaces increase as well, and these methods do not scale well. To address this, we propose casting the multi-agent reinforcement learning problem as a distributed optimization problem. Our algorithm assumes that for multi-agent settings, policies of individual agents in a given population live close to each other in parameter space and can be approximated by a single policy. With this simple assumption, we show our algorithm to be extremely effective for reinforcement learning in multi-agent settings. We demonstrate its effectiveness against existing comparable approaches on co-operative and competitive tasks.
In the Markov decision process (MDP) formalization of reinforcement learning, a single adaptive agent interacts with an environment defined by a probabilistic transition function. In this solipsis-tic view, secondary agents can only be part of the environment and are therefore fixed in their behavior. The framework of Markov games allows us to widen this view to include multiple adaptive agents with interacting or competing goals. This paper considers a step in this direction in which exactly two agents with diametrically opposed goals share an environment. It describes a Q-learning-like algorithm for finding optimal policies and demonstrates its application to a simple two-player game in which the optimal policy is probabilistic. We extend Q-learning to a noncooperative multiagent context, using the framework of general-sum stochastic games. A learning agent maintains Q-functions over joint actions, and performs updates based on assuming Nash equilibrium behavior over the current Q-values. This learning protocol provably converges given certain restrictions on the stage games (defined by Q-values) that arise during learning. Experiments with a pair of two-player grid games suggest that such restrictions on the game structure are not necessarily required. Stage games encountered during learning in both grid environments violate the conditions. However, learning consistently converges in the first grid game, which has a unique equilibrium Q-function, but sometimes fails to converge in the second, which has three different equilibrium Q-functions. In a comparison of offline learning performance in both games, we find agents are more likely to reach a joint optimal path with Nash Q-learning than with a single-agent Q-learning method. When at least one agent adopts Nash Q-learning, the performance of both agents is better than using single-agent Q-learning. We have also implemented an online version of Nash Q-learning that balances exploration with exploitation, yielding improved performance. Multi-agent systems are rapidly finding applications in a variety of domains, including robotics, distributed control, telecommunications, economics. Many tasks arising in these domains require that the agents learn behaviors online. A significant part of the research on multi-agent learning concerns reinforcement learning techniques. However, due to different viewpoints on central issues, such as the formal statement of the learning goal, a large number of different methods and approaches have been introduced. In this paper we aim to present an integrated survey of the field. First, the issue of the multi-agent learning goal is discussed, after which a representative selection of algorithms is reviewed. Finally, open issues are identified and future research directions are outlined Evolution of cooperation and competition can appear when multiple adaptive agents share a biological, social, or technological niche. In the present work we study how cooperation and competition emerge between autonomous agents that learn by reinforcement while using only their raw visual input as the state representation. In particular, we extend the Deep Q-Learning framework to multiagent environments to investigate the interaction between two learning agents in the well-known video game Pong. By manipulating the classical rewarding scheme of Pong we show how competitive and collaborative behaviors emerge. We also describe the progression from competitive to collaborative behavior when the incentive to cooperate is increased. Finally we show how learning by playing against another adaptive agent, instead of against a hard-wired algorithm, results in more robust strategies. The present work shows that Deep Q-Networks can become a useful tool for studying decentralized learning of multiagent systems coping with high-dimensional environments. A satisfactory multiagent learning algorithm should, at a minimum , learn to play optimally against stationary opponents and converge to a Nash equilibrium in self-play. The algorithm that has come closest, WoLF-IGA, has been proven to have these two properties in 2-player 2-action repeated games--assuming that the opponent's (mixed) strategy is observable. In this paper we present AWESOME, the first algorithm that is guaranteed to have these two properties in all repeated (finite) games. It requires only that the other players' actual actions (not their strategies) can be observed at each step. It also learns to play optimally against opponents that eventually become stationary. The basic idea behind AWESOME ( Adapt When Everybody is Stationary, Otherwise Move to Equilibrium ) is to try to adapt to the others' strategies when they appear stationary, but otherwise to retreat to a precomputed equilibrium strategy. The techniques used to prove the properties of AWESOME are fundamentally different from those used for previous algorithms, and may help in analyzing other multiagent learning algorithms also.