MR VISSER
Mr Chairman, I speak under correction, I think Steyn was at that stage a Colonel, he might have been a Brigadier.  It was Major Taylor and it was Captain Botha at the time.
	An elaborate scheme was then devised which was put into operation to abduct Zandile Ndwandwe from Swaziland which involved two informers have made contact with her.  We don't know what their pretence was, why they wanted to meet her, but in terms of a note which we received, which is an Exhibit before you, one M.K. Jones suggested that it had something to do with the obtaining of firearms and or explosives.
	However that may be, the members and the informers went to Swaziland where Ndwandwe got into a bakkie with the two informers, they were intercepted on the way, on the road to the Big Bend and she was transferred into a Toyota bus.
	Botha immediately started to talk to her.  I neglected to say Mr Chairman that although a decision was initially already taken that she would probably have to be eliminated, to neutralise her and her influence in the violence in Natal, it was always important to attempt first to obtain the services of such a person because the information would have been more valuable than simply eliminating her.
	For that purpose, she had to be abducted from Swaziland.  On the way to the border post, already Botha started talking to her, finding out, probing and trying to find out whether it would be possible to canvass her, to elicit her services as an informer of the Security Branch.
	They eventually all got together, apart from Mr Wasserman who I think, was a Sergeant at the time, and Du Preez was a Lieutenant.  Lieutenant Du Preez and Wasserman who stayed over in Manzini on that first day of the abduction and Botha and Ndwandwe exited Swaziland through the fence, not through the border post and they all got together, apart from the two gentlemen which I have mentioned, at a house, a police house at the border post at Onverwacht where the interrogation and attempts to obtain the services of Ndwandwe was proceeded with until about half past twelve that evening.
	The next day when Wasserman and Du Preez had joined the group at the Onverwacht border post, it was clear that she was not yet willing or had not given signs that she was willing to act as an informer for the Security Branch, and they then proceeded to Pietermaritzburg.
	Also on the way to Pietermaritzburg, Botha was talking to Ndwandwe and they eventually reached a farm in the district of Maritzburg, where Botha continued talking to her and eventually realised that she was unwilling to cooperate with the Security Branch of the South African Police.
	When that happened, he handed her over to the other members of the Security Branch, who were present there and he left with the two informers for Durban.
	What is important was that in the process of the interrogation, Botha learnt from Ndwandwe certain information which was new to the Security Branch, and other information which was confirmed by her, which was already within the knowledge of the Security Branch.
	We refer to page 6 of volume 2 of the papers where the incidents were dealt with and we cross-referenced those incidents to Exhibit A and what it boils down to is that it was learnt as I understand the evidence of Mr Botha, that the incidents which are mentioned here and of which the Security Branch was obviously aware at the time, it was confirmed or for the first time, told to the Security Branch, were carried out by units under the control or a unit under the control and directions of Pumeso Nxiweni.
	Mr Chairman, while I am at that point, I neglected to make a reference, a cross-reference to Exhibit A.