MR RICHARD
I will hand in the documents.   Then if we proceed further, there Mr Maharaj made this comment in answer to a question by Mr Lax and I will read the question and the answer
"... If I could just follow that up, I hear you.  I hear the difficulties of operational command, we heard that from APLA themselves and we heard it now, how difficult that became as the struggle intensified as more and more people were recruited, training became less intensive and more difficult as the struggle intensified.  But what we are trying to gain and understand of in essence is for example, the so-called notorious MAGOOS bomb where the vast majority of victims were civilian in that particular case, we have heard that it was a last minute decision to change the nature of the target, the specified place.  Cadres on the ground made that sort of decision, what sort of censure in the light of what subsequently happened came from the high command when it became apparent that this was a big mistake in a sense, what steps were taken?"
	Mr Maharaj answered -
"... then I think that the MAGOOS bar has again been dealt with extensively by us and what we showed was that in the ordinary operational situation we were living in, in an environment where the overwhelming majority of our actions were correct, well targeted, achieved what they set out to achieve.  Then we come to a number of operations that begin to move in the grey, faulty, Intelligence, false flagging, enemy Force penetrating and misleading our forces on the ground, directing them towards a target not in keeping with our policy.  It is in that situation that as command, we have to take correct actions."
	Now again, you were present at these hearings, why was MAGOOS bar put in that grey or faulty Intelligence category?