NORMAN ARENDSE
Mr Chairman, the analysis done by Mr Prior on APLA's strategies and objectives and so on, would carry a lot of weight in a normal situation but the fact of the matter is - and we don't need evidence to be placed before this Committee, is that we were - before May 1994, in a grossly abnormal situation.  It is not appropriate to subject the strategies and the political objectives of any organisation for that matter, to the kind laboratory analysis which my learned friend attempted to do.
	This Committee has - the Act recognises this and the Committee has recognised it by granting amnesty to - for example 
Coetzee and Mitchell, by simply looking at the chain preceding the commission of the offence - the chain of command, did that person get an order or didn't he get an order.  
	The Committee hasn't gone beyond that and it hasn't done so for good reason, it hasn't done so because then the Committee will become embroiled in political debates, it will start making value judgements.  In other words, this Committee with respect, cannot objectively look at whether or not a political objective or a political aim was objectively sound and valid etc.
	The Committee has to rely - in the nature of it's work, it has to rely on the belief of the perpetrators of an act or of an offence.  For as long as that belief is not so outrageous or so unreasonable or so insupportable, the Committee has set a precedent by accepting that: "If that is what you believe, then - and it can be supported and it's not impossible, then we will accept what you say".  And that was done in the case of Coetzee, it was done in the case of Mitchell and it should be done in the case of these youngsters.
	These youngsters were sitting in the Transkei, you have a command who is sitting in Dar es Salaam or wherever - in the situation which prevailed at the time, it is impossible for them to have had communicated to them what exactly this strategy would be, how this strategy would be carried out.  
	There was a lot of misinformation, miscommunication yes, and that often led to misinterpretation of instructions and orders and it may well be that the Heidelberg and the St James may be such examples.  But the fact of the matter is that these applicants did not commit the Heidelberg Tavern massacres on their own account or for their own benefit, clearly they did not do so - the evidence cannot be attacked.
	In fact, one of the regional PAC members applied for amnesty and was granted amnesty by this Committee - Mr Siyolo, for harbouring - I think, APLA members, so there was a support structure.   They believed that they were given a genuine order and they carried out that order and that is how far it should be taken otherwise you get into a situation whereby you now have to call PW Botha and FW de Klerk to come here and say to you exactly what they meant when they told people to carry out certain instructions.
	In fact, it is of interest to note that they have publicly said - maybe not before this Committee, that: "We never told Dirk Coetzee and other people to do all these terrible things that they did" and the Generals have also said so.  Notwithstanding that, this Committee has accepted in amnesty applications, that people during the course and scope of their duties, they believed they were conducting a war against the ANC, against the UDF, against APLA, against the liberation movements - they had a genuine belief that they did that.
	If we go too far, then I think the Committee runs the risk that it then begins to make political choices and passes value judgements and that - with respect, should be avoided.
	Just another aspect, it is also common knowledge and a fact that is sufficiently notorious for this Committee to accept and that is that the PAC had not as at December 1993, renounced the armed struggle - that is a fact of the matter and we also know as a fact that APLA was the armed wing.