MARIUS OELSCHIG
Your Grace, ladies and gentleman, I would like to make it  very clear at the outset  that I am not a spokesman for the Ciskei Defence Force, nor for the South African  Defence Force.
 I was invited by Reverend Finca to come and submit my own my own impressions of this tragic day in order to assist you to arrive at the truth.  In order to do so, I have prepared voluntary a submission which I will now read to you in its entirety
 I, am Major General Marius Oelschig, presently Chief Director at Transformation Management of the South African National Defence Force.  On 22 August 1996, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission invited me to testify at this special hearing on what they have called the Bisho Massacre which occurred on 7 September.  My understanding of the events that took place has been invited in order to assist the Commission to establish the truth.  I received the invitation on Thursday 29 August upon my return following an official absence on duty.  Allow me in order to place my submission in context, to quote from the Manual of Military Law of the British War Office, dated 1894.  In the Chapter titled Observations on Duty of
Officers, paragraph 36 on page 301, the text reads as follows and I quote  
 'Complaint was made by Sir Charles Napier in his remarks on Military Law of the hardships of imposing on an officer.  The obligation of deciding whether he is or is not justified in ordering his men to act.  He contended that an officer ought not to be liable to trial by the ordinary Courts of Justice for anything he may do in executing the duty imposed on him by the civil Magistrate namely to quell the riot.  The answer is that an officer has no greater responsibility than a civilian.  At the same time the law has always made liberal allowance for the difficulties of persons, so circumstanced.  And persons whose intention is honest and upright and who act with firmness to the best of their judgment, needs seldom fear the results of inquiry into their conduct.'
 It is against this background that I welcome this opportunity to testify and beg the Commission's indulgence in listening to and considering my introductory remarks before proceeding with the presentation of my understanding of the facts pertaining to the events of 7 September 1992.  There have been suggestions in the media and elsewhere that I have not been co-operative as regards the investigations into the tragedy at the Bisho Stadium on 7 September 1992.  Nothing could be further from the truth.  
 The following is a chronological history of my involvement in inquiries and investigations into the tragedy to date.  One of my first actions following the incident on the day in question, was to instruct the Military Law Officer of the Ciskei Defence Force, Major Dave Schrobie, to obtain immediate statements from the senior military personnel involved.  The purpose was to get the immediate reactions and impressions whilst their memories were still fresh and uncluttered by media reports, rumours, tall stories and propaganda.  Within days I was summoned by Judge Pickhard, the Chief Justice of  The Ciskei and Mr Jurie Jurgens, the Attorney General of the Ciskei and asked to give a sworn statement for the purposes of the Pickhard Commission of Inquiry.   This I did promptly, and without hesitation.  
 Furthermore in accordance with normal military practice, I convened a board of inquiring into the incident on 3 October 1992.  The purpose was to determine what had led to the conduct of the troops and not to do a police type judicial inquiry, as  this I perceived to be the responsibility of the Ciskei or South African Police, or both.  Most of the senior officers of the CDF had been involved in the incident in some or other manner and were therefore excluded from serving on such a board.  I duly requested assistance from the South African Defence Force for the provision of suitable offices for conducting the inquiry.  This was acceded to and Colonel M J Buitendag and Major A J Ellis of the SADF were duly appointed as members of the board.  I myself made a sworn statement to the Board of Inquiry.  The board completed its inquiry on 30 October 1992.  A copy of the board was handed to the Minister of Defence of the Ciskei on 2 November 1992.  The Goldstone Commission was also requested by the South African Government to investigate the incident.  All parties were required to prepare documents and to make submissions to this Commission.  I again made a sworn statement on request and  without hesitation.  This I believe was used by the advocates representing the Ciskei in their presentation to the Goldstone Commission.  Upon the finding of the Commission I again made myself available to the advocates to prepare their response.  
 During early March 1995, I was contacted by advocate Wiwe Notje and another advocate in order to assist them in their possible defence of CDF soldiers who could possibly have been charged for their involvement in the Bisho incident.  I traveled to Bisho on 17 March 1995 where I spent the day in consultation with the two gentlemen.  I did so voluntarily and assisted them to the best of my ability. 
 During January 1996, I was informed that the South African Police Service in the East London region were investigating the Bisho incident and that a statement would be required of me.  A certain superintendent Walker phoned me to make an appointment which was arranged speedily and without hesitation.  Superintendent Walker and a detective colleague, visited me in my office in Pretoria on 25 January 96 where the details of their request and my subsequent response were discussed.
  I prepared the necessary statement and answered all the questions asked of me.  Superintendent Walker made all the notes he required and left on the understanding that he would type the statement and send it to me by fax for verification and signature.  In the event I was traveling to Bisho within days and we decided to finalise the matter in Bisho.   I duly signed the statement in Bisho on 6 February 1996.  This then is the 5th time that I have been approached to assist in clarifying the facts pertaining to the tragedy and I again do so willingly without compulsion.
  On 22 May 1996 Bantu Holomisa made a statement to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in which he made certain allegations regarding myself.  On 23 May 1996, upon receipt of the transcripts of his evidence, I prepared a statement for the Chief of the South African National Defence Force, in which I made objection to the untruths which had been told and in which I insisted upon redress.  My comment on the evidence of Bantu Holomisa to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission on Wednesday 22 May 1996 is the following
  Firstly, I was not informed beforehand that I would be cited by Bantu Holomisa in his evidence to the Commission.  I was given no opportunity whatsoever to attend the hearing, to arrange for legal representation, to respond or even to prepare to respond.  I object most strenuously to the situation.  Furthermore and in response to the evidence given by Holomisa, I wish to place the following on record.  
 I understand Holomisa to have insinuated that I was withdrawn by the South African Defence Force because of the tragic events at Bisho in September 1992.  This is not correct.  I myself, requested desecondment from the Ciskei Defence Force as a result of irreconcilable differences with the Chairman of the Council of State.  I was duly transferred back to Pretoria on 1 December 1992.  Holomisa claimed that I was promoted to the rank of Major General as a so-called reward for the shooting incident at Bisho in September 1992.  My response is the following.  
 Upon my return to Pretoria I was appointed as the Director Transitional Liaison of the South African Defence Force in order to promote and to expedite communication between the military and the still to be established Transitional Executive Council, the TEC.  During this period, and commencing in March of 1993, I was actively and directly engaged in the initiation of multilateral talks between the South African Defence Force, Umkhonto we Sizwe and the other statutory and non-statutory military forces in South Africa.
  This led to my appointment as one of a team of four senior South African Defence Force officers who were responsible for the negotiated compilation of the defence chapter to the Interim Constitution.  Upon acceptance of the Interim Constitution and the subsequent establishment of the TEC, I was co-opted as a military specialist to support the sub-council on defence of the TEC in their activities.
  Once the joint military coordinating council, the JMCC had been established by the sub-council on defence, I was appointed to serve as second seconded to the chief of the South African Defence Force, who was joint chairman of the JMCC together with the chief of staff of MK.  I would like to note here that the JMCC based upon staff work and negotiation which had taken place long before the establishment of the TEC and in terms of the provision of the Interim Constitution, determined the process which lead to the successful integration of the members of all the statutory and non-statutory forces into the new South African National Defence Force.  This has been a feat without historical president.  
 Upon termination of the TEC, I was appointed Director Strategy on the staff of the chief of staff operations at defence headquarters.  In this capacity I was responsible for the establishment of a new strategic focus for the South African National Defence Force and for the formulation of new strategies in accordance with emerging defence policy.  Once it became apparent that the SANDF would have to adapt to new and emerge in policy and that it would have to do so within severely restricted resource allocations, it was decided to create a dedicated transformation management team within the National Defence Force.  
 On 1 March 1995 I was promoted to the rank of Major General and appointed as the Chief Director Transformation Management.  A promotion and appointment which was authorized by the present Minister of Defence.  I have no doubt whatsoever, that the present Government and Minister of Defence would never have contemplated or sanctioned that claimed by Holomisa.  On the contrary, his allegations must be as insulting to the Government and Minister of Defence as they are to me personally.
  I have dedicated my entire career of some 35 years as a professional soldier, to service to South Africa.  I believe I have done so with loyalty, courage, dignity and honour.  That I have discharged my duties and responsibilities with zeal and diligence and that I have set an example to all those placed under my control, as required of all commissioned officers in the S A Defence Force and the new South African National Defence Force, and inscribed upon one's deed of commission, signed by the President.
  I sincerely believe that my promotions from the rank of Lieutenant to the rank of Major General have been based purely upon merit.  To suggest otherwise is a personal insult for which redress should be given.
  In his evidence Holomisa further claimed that Charles Sebe and a person named Gusanna were murdered by Ciskei troops, and that this action was so - was masterminded by South African Defence Force seconded intelligence officers.  I am again cited by name, as being one who owes us an explanation.  In response to these allegations, I would like to point out the following.
  I have established that the deaths of Sebe and Gusanna occurred towards the end of January 1991.  I had been stationed in France from 1987 to 1990.  From 6 February 1991 until May 1991, I was a student on the joint staff course at the Defence College in Pretoria.  I have no personal knowledge whatsoever of the circumstances surrounding the deaths of Sebe and Gusanna.  In the circumstances I can only refer the Commission to the findings of the inquest into the deaths of Sebe and Gusanna.
  A cursory consideration of the facts would have prevented Holomisa from making the statements he has.  I believe his failure to do so to be prejudicial to my good name, my reputation and my further military career.  In this instance also, I must insist on redress.  I believe that I have acted professionally and correctly at all times.
 At no stage have I acted  in any manner than that prescribed by my service conditions and within the constraints placed upon me as a serving professional officer of the S A National Defence Force.  I have responded expeditiously to every request to assist in all investigations and inquiries into the Bisho tragedy.
  At no time have I evaded or avoided any investigators, Commissioners, members of inquiries or legal teams.  I have co-operated fully, have provided all the information and documentation at my disposal and have told the truth at all times.  To suggest otherwise, is and would be false, grossly unfair and absolutely unwarranted.
 Your Grace, ladies and gentleman, I would now like to proceed with my understanding of the tragic events which occurred at the Bisho Stadium on 7 September 1992.   From May 1991 until December 1992 I was chief of the Ciskei Defence Force with the rank of Brigadier. I was on secondment from the then South African Defence Force.  I had not requested the appointment and was withdrawn from the joint staff course of the South African Defence Force which I had been attending as a student since the beginning of the year for the purpose.  Before my attendance of the joint staff course, I had been posted to Paris, France  on military service for a period of some four years.  
 I would like to make some general comments on conditions in the Ciskei prior to the march of 7 September 1992.  Upon my arrival in the Ciskei I was informed inter alia that all members of the CDF had been trained in urban encounter insurgency or coin operations which included training in crowd control.  The use of minimum force was stressed at all times.  The green card concept which had been introduced in 1987 was updated and approved by me in July 1992. The green card written in Xhosa contained conditions of when to open fire and had to be carried in the pocket of each soldier for easy reference.  All the troops in the CDF had been trained in urban coin and were retrained in June, July and August 1992, prior to this March.   
 I had been informed that Doctor Geldenhuys of the National Peace Secretariat was present in the Ciskei during the week preceding the March.  I cannot comment on his activities.  What is clear, however, is that he failed in his efforts to peacefully resolve matters or even to come up with some reasonable alternative for the march to or occupation of Bisho.  His inability is in no way ascribed to his lack of trying which I am sure he did in a  most determined and vigorous fashion.  It does, however, underline a point I wish  to make namely that I believe that the ANC wanted, in fact engineered the whole incident.  
 This is further supported by the massive presence of the local and  international press.  They would not have been there in such numbers if there was not a strong possibility of violence.  There can be no doubt that the South African Government was seriously concerned about the situation.  This was evident by the presence of two Deputy  Ministers, the Commissioner of Police, Generals Swart, De La Rosa and Calitz of the South African Police.  A very large South African Police contingent further supported by troops of the South African Defence Force under the personal command of the Officer Commanding Eastern Province Command.  
 Summoned to  the South African Embassy on Sunday afternoon 6 September 1992, I had a private conversations with both Deputy Ministers Breytenbach of Defence and Myburg of Police.  They had already been briefed by their own senior security force representatives, who had made it quite clear that the decision to allow the march to take place was the worst possible option to be considered.  At their request I also gave my opinion that the South African Government should do everything in its power to prevent the march from taking place.  The Minister's position was that everything depended on the outcome of the application by the Commissioner of Police to the Ciskei Supreme Court for an interdict to prevent the  march.  This position was subsequently modified and became dependent upon the outcome of an application to hold the march which was originally submitted to the magistrate for Zwelitsha, by the SACP, ANC, Cosatu alliance.  The effects of the run up to the march, especially on the general population, should not be underestimated.  The ANC alliance had embarked upon a massive mobilisation and propaganda campaign, not only in and around the major centers in Ciskei but also in the entire border and Eastern Province regions. Their posters, speeches and press releases were all extremely provocative, aggressive and militant.  
 The presence of senior members of the National Executive Committee of the ANC in the area for several days before the march and the militant nature of their messages to people in the towns and villages of Ciskei gave a clear indication of what was to come.  There was no way that confrontation would be avoided by the SACP, ANC.  In fact, that is exactly what they appeared to want and were actively working for.  I would urge the Commission to consider the pronouncements of the Pickhard Commission in this regard.  
 The effects on the Ciskei troops should also be considered.  They had been subjected to every devious tactic by the alliance aimed at undermining their loyalty and their determination to do their duty.   They had been exhorted to defy their leaders, to turn against the Government and to disobey commands.  Pamphlets and posters to this effect were widely distributed and/or prominently displayed.  They had been harassed, insulted, intimidated and ill treated.  Many security force members were refused entry to public facilities such as hospitals and were thrown off taxis.  Their children were insulted and ostracised at school.  Several CDF members of all ranks, had suffered arson, hand grenade and other attacks on their homes and property.  These, and the attacks on police stations and the murder of policeman were pointed out as examples of what could be expected if they did not listen to the so-called voice of the people.  Again I would urge the Commission to consult the report of the Pickhard Commission in order to establish the nature of the pressure placed upon individual CDF members and their families prior to the march of 7 September.
 The Ciskei Government reacted to such preparations by the alliance by adopting an even more stubborn and intransigent position.  The government publicly declared that the march would not be allowed to go ahead and that if it did, every means would be used to stop it from proceeding on Ciskei territory.  On Sunday 6 September 1992, a scheduled church parade was held at One Ciskei Battalion.  The Minister of Defence was present by invitation.  All the troops who  were to be deployed the following day in support of the Ciskei police, attended that church parade.  On completion of the service the congregation was addressed by the Minister.  He spoke in Xhosa for some 25 minutes.
 I came to understand that the principle theme of his address was the forthcoming march the following day and the ongoing campaign of mass action being directed against the government and people of the Ciskei.  I cannot however comment in detail on the contents of the address as I do not understand Xhosa.  The Minister did however use many English words and some English expressions and it was clear to me at one stage that he was comparing the planned march on Bisho to an invasion of the Ciskei by the ANC.  In the face of such pressure it is difficult to imagine a rational, balanced and clear understanding of the situation by relatively unsophisticated and inexperienced troops.
 Their subsequent exposure to what, in their minds, must have been a hostile mob intent on invading their country, could only have aggravated the situation.  In the event of the predicted confrontation taking place, their inevitable response would be affected by all the aforegoing factors.  It goes without saying that they would have felt threatened by the impending event and also have been extremely tense.
 During the period Wednesday 20 August to Saturday 5 September I was absent from the Ciskei as I had to undergo my annual medical check-up at the Institute of Aviation Medicine which is mandatory for senior officers in the SADF in Pretoria.  I also attended a Medical Services Medal Parade where my daughter received her first medal and I attended the funeral of a close friend in Parys on Friday 4 September.
 I felt that my absence was further justified by the fact that all remaining preparations for the march were more political, police and judicial than military in nature.  In any event the military preparations were left in the competent hands of the Deputy Commander, Colonel D A van der Bank and the Chief of Staff Operations, Colonel Horst Schobesberger.
 On my return I was briefed by both colonels in the operations room on Sunday 6 September.  They had, during my absence, been involved in a tactical appreciation and the preparation of orders to commanders of CDF personnel who were to be deployed in support of the Ciskei Police Force elements during the march planned for 7 September.  
 I was also appraised of the efforts which had been made by inter alia Colonel van der Bank to ensure that the potential conflict situation would be dealt with by the political leaders so that the Security Forces would not become embroiled in the conflict.  I gave my approval to the planning in question and in accordance with military practice, authorized the rehearsal of deployments on Sunday 6 September.
 On the same day I also finalised the command and communications systems which would be required for the operation in question.  
 Command and control arrangements I will deal with shortly.  There were four separate radio nets the purpose of which will be dealt with shortly.  I had access to and monitored all four radio nets from my position in the anti-room to the Minister's office which shall become apparent shortly.  After the march conducted by the alliance on Bisho on 4 August 1992 during which CDF personnel were placed under extreme pressure.
 I drafted a report in which I set out my extreme displeasure at the situation with which the CDF had been confronted.  A lack of forward planning and negotiations by politicians involved had left the CDF personnel uncertain until the last moment as to what the role was that they were required to perform which was an untenable situation particularly in the light of the fact for obvious reasons personnel deployed were under arms.  I have here a copy of that report which I shall attach to my presentation.  ... end of Tape 4, side A ... on page 3.
 I remind your Grace that this report has to do with the march of the 4th August, one month prior to the 7th September.
General reflections on the course of events.
Let there be no question regarding the flexibility of the Ciskei government and the determination of the Ministers to avoid violence and bloodshed.  The same cannot be said for the march organisers who, to the very last minute, and despite considerable concessions made by the Ciskei authorities and security forces, insisted that they would go ahead with their intention to march on Bisho.
Negotiation.
The negotiations which took place on the RSA/Ciskei border should have been conducted in the King Williams Town stadium and I stress before the march was allowed to commence.  It was pure chance that the Amatola Sun Hotel was within two kilometers of the border and the Council of State within five minutes' drive by car.  If a similar situation had arisen for example in the Mdantsane area, some 25 minutes' drive from Bisho, there would undoubtedly have been bloodshed.
Commitment to agreements made.
The United Nations monitor Mr Campino will be in a position to confirm the commitment made by the ANC leaders prior to the march.  It is clear that the ANC reneged on their agreements on a number of occasions thereby precipitating the crisis.  If the agreement had been properly dealt with at an earlier stage, for example formalised in writing, there would now be documentary proof of the fact that the ANC Alliance had not honoured their commitment.  Fortunately as it now stands, Mr Campino is the impartial observer in a position to confirm or deny these perceptions or allegations.
Crowd Control.
The march organisers had control of the crowd in the Victoria grounds.  There was a public address system and the crowd could have been informed of all arrangements in the stadium.  Mr Hani apparently told Doctor Geldenhuys that he was not in a position to stop the march which was obviously a strategy to proceed to the border before any agreement was finalised.  During the march, when approached by Doctor Geldenhuys to stop and sit down at the border as previously agreed, Hani again claimed not to have the power to stop the marchers.  This was again an obvious strategy aimed at getting his way and avoiding commitments.  When told of the decision to allow the crowd to enter the Bisho stadium and requested to use the closest entrance at the rear of the marchers, the organisers again claimed that they had no control over the crowd and would only be able to enter the stadium by advancing further into the Ciskei in order to use entrances ahead of the marchers.  Again a ruse to advance further onto Ciskei territory.  The ANC pride themselves on their ability to control crowds, when it suits them.  
Commitment to peaceful process.
The presence of a significant number of armed MK members in the crowd has been confirmed.  The nature of the propaganda disseminated before the march which included assurances that the crowd would be protected from security action by the MK and the confirmed presence of armed elements suggest that the claimed commitment to peaceful protest was as empty as the commitment not to enter Ciskei forcefully but to stop and sit down at the border.
Gravity of the situation.
Despite the best attempts of the Security Forces to impress upon the members of the Peace Secretariat and through them, upon the leaders of the march the extreme gravity of the situation, this did not appear to succeed.  Throughout the day the impression was created that political face saving was of prime importance and that public safety was of lesser significance.
 It should be recorded that Security Forces on the ground were within 30 seconds of taking action on three distinct occasions, namely, as the marchers approached the police positions after Doctor Geldenhuys had informed Security Forces of Hani's intention to proceed across the border.  Secondly, the marchers stopped at the border to receive Doctor Geldenhuys' request for Hani to contact Minister Botha by telephone.  Had Hani not acceded, police action would have followed.  Following the protracted telephonic negotiations which included a conversation between Colonel Pieter and Mr Rhamaphosa, Hani returned to the head of the march.
 Having been informed of the situation on the ground, Mr Rhamaphosa accepted that there would be no further advance into the Ciskei.  When this was conveyed by radio to Doctor Geldenhuys and he in turn informed the ANC, a renewed request was made by the ANC to make telephonic conversation with Mr Rhamaphosa.  The request was turned down and the Security Forces received instructions to take action.
 Before this could be executed, Brigadier Gqozo intervened and having favorably considered a request from Minister Botha to allow the crowd to enter Bisho stadium before dispersing, instructed Security Forces to allow the crowd to enter Bisho stadium unhindered.  Very few people are aware of the true circumstances which existed on the ground and it is serious cause for concern that such situations be allowed to develop with very little consideration given for the task of Security Forces involved.
 As was clearly stated to the UN observer and the National Peace Secretariat team during their initial visit to the Council of State, it appeared as if the ANC SACP Cosato Alliance was determined to create an incident, possibly a tragedy similar in scope to the Boipatong massacre in the presence of the UN monitor and the international media.  
My recommendations to be submitted for consideration by the Goldstone Commission.
The ANC and its allies are using the guidelines of the Goldstone Commission as the basis for their organisation of and participation in mass and other protest action.  They believe that mere notification of intention to march, picket, protest or generally disrupt normal community life, is sufficient compliance with the requirements for public safety and the orderly conduct of their planned actions.  This is clearly not so as suitably demonstrated by the reported events in King William's Town and Bisho.  It needs to be noted, the note I made, that the Ciskei government was not a party to the interim agreement on the conduct of public demonstrations.  The law in Ciskei requires that all such demonstrations and meetings are to be authorized by a magistrate on application by the organisers.  
The following are felt to be the minimum requirements before any protest or similar actions are embarked upon.  
 A formal recognition by all parties of the exact routes or  locations to be used.  
 Acceptance of reasonable time limits on the envisaged action. 
 Formal negotiation and acceptance of conditions pertaining to the     action before commencement and a formal commitment by all parties     to abide by commitments and agreements.  
 Disputes are to be referred to the Peace Accord structures for arbitration.  Failure to comply with accepted conditions must lead to punitive sanctions.  For example withdrawal of the right to further protest in the same area or region in future.
 The Goldstone Commission has given guidelines for procedures to be followed by all parties involved in protest action.  It is felt that the roles and functions of law enforcement agencies and other security forces have not been sufficiently considered.  The guidelines are being abused by parties for political advantage at the expense of law and order and public safety.  When marches, demonstrations and other protest actions go beyond the agreed conditions and uncontrolled or uncontrollable crowds start rampaging, looting and destroying public and private property, the Security Forces are expected to perform adequately.  This is an almost impossible task with most of the initiative having already been lost.  
 The Goldstone Commission should be urged to give far more attention to these and related matters.  If the Security Forces are not supported in their efforts to protect the general public and to maintain law and order in the face of political mass action, the situation will inevitably degenerate into anarchy.  We stand at the brink of exactly that happening in the very near future.
 I stress, your Grace, that this report was submitted by myself and that it was sent to the Chairman of the Council of State, the Minister of Defence of the Ciskei, the Chairman of the National Peace Secretariat, Mr Justice Goldstone, the Ambassador of the RSA to the Ciskei and the Commissioner of the Ciskei Police.  A copy was given to the military attache at the South African Embassy in King William's Town for onward transmission to the South African Defence Force.
 Preliminary discussions between myself and the Commissioner of Police of the Ciskei had indicated that incidents of unrest could be anticipated in the outlying areas and that it would accordingly not be possible to draw significant numbers of Ciskei Police personnel from these areas to Bisho on Monday 7 September.  It was regarded as critical that the CDF personnel be available to act in a supportive role and to assist the Ciskei police should a situation develop which the Ciskei could not deal with on their own.  The deployment of the CDF troops was accordingly arranged to be well to the rear of the Ciskei police positions which were in turn in the immediate vicinity of the RSA/Ciskei border.
 I was aware that the Commissioner of Police brought an application on Saturday night 6 September to restrain the alliance from conducting the march without the permission of the magistrate of Zwelitsha.  By Monday morning 7 September, I was also aware that the magistrate in question had granted the requisite permission subject to the conditions that the march proceed to the Bisho stadium, that the gathering there take place between the hours of 1200 noon and 1630 and that no dangerous weapons be carried by members of the procession.   Notwithstanding this permission, the instructions which the Security Forces had received from the government to the effect that the march should not be allowed to enter Ciskei, were not varied in any way at that stage.  Broadly speaking, the CDF were deployed as follows.  
 Behind and far to the rear of the Ciskei police on the national road at the  intersection to Bisho and Amatola View.
 On the inside and top of embankment of the southern open  stands of the stadium to prevent marchers breaking to their left.
On the south side of the Bisho/Zwelitsha road and inside the main
government buildings to prevent marchers breaking to their right and to safeguard 
government  buildings and the ministerial complex.
 In an open veld to the north-west of Fort Hare Bisho campus, to prevent 
marchers from reaching Bisho should they break through the police lines at the 
roadblock.
 Despite the magistrate's ruling, my instructions were still to stop marchers from entering Bisho at all costs as that would be disastrous.
 On Monday 7 September 1992 I was in the anti-room of the office of the Minister of Defence in the National Assembly Building.  With the role of keeping the Minister and the Council of State informed as to developments during the day, to advise on such developments, to play what role I could in respect of facilitation of negotiations, and to receive and immediately transmit such instructions as were emanating from the government.  The Deputy Commander, Colonel van der Bank who was in overall command of the CDF operation was stationed on the roof of the National Assembly Building.
 I was linked to Colonel van der Bank on a radio network on which I could communicate with him and further monitor his communications with the Field Commander.
 Colonel van der Bank in turn was linked by radio to the Field Commander who at that stage was positioned at the intersection of Jongilanga Crescent, Yellowwoods Road, and the Main Road in close proximity to the troops who had been deployed.  The Field Commander in turn was linked by radio to the Company Commanders who were in direct control of the troops who had been deployed.
 In an attempt to avoid the undesirable situation referred to in my report where the National Peace Secretariat had on 4 August been without effective means of communication and liaison, a senior liaison officer of the Ciskei Defence Force was positioned at the Ciskei Police position along the main road behind the razor wire fence and linked by radio to my position to ensure that an effective means of communication would be established between the marchers, negotiators and the government.  All of the aforesaid radio links are apparent from the radio network diagram, a copy of which has been handed in to be attached to my statement to the Military Board of Inquiry.
 The decision by the magistrate to permit the march subject to conditions was the subject of debate by members of the Council of State on Monday morning 7 September.  Shortly before 11h00 I was informed by the Minister of Defence that the Council of State had agreed to accept the magistrate's decision and that the marchers would be allowed to enter the Bisho stadium and remain there until 16h30.  I immediately conveyed this information to the Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff Operations and instructed them to effect a redeployment of the troops in accordance with this development.  
 Broadly stated, the troops in the stadium were withdrawn and redeployed inside the perimeter security fence at Fort Hare to bolster troops deployed there.  At about 11h45 Colonel Schobesberger reported all troops in position.  There was general relief at the decision to allow the rally to proceed in the stadium.  The ANC had stuck to a similar negotiated agreement during the march of 4 August and there was no reason to believe that they would not do so again.  From approximately 13h00 onwards the front end of the march reached the RSA/Ciskei border and I was able to monitor radio communications indicating that talks were being conducted with the leadership and that marchers had swung away from the razor wire which had been erected across the main road and had begun to move into the stadium.  
 Shortly after the above report, the Field Commander reported to Colonel van der Bank that there was movement on his front and on his right flank.  In other words on the northern side of the stadium.  I monitored these transmissions.  At this stage I was approached by the Minister of Finance, Admiral Bekker who entered my office and drew me by the arm into an adjoining conference room from which there was a view over the stadium.  The Minister pointed out to me that a part of the crowd which had moved into the stadium precincts had not moved onto the covered grandstands but towards the northeastern embankments around the stadium.  He expressed concern that these persons could surge out of the stadium towards the central business district of Bisho.  I was, under these circumstances, absent from my office for a period of 90 seconds to two minutes.  
 Upon my return to my office I heard the Field Commander reporting to Colonel van der Bank with great concern that his position was under attack or under fire, I cannot recall his exact words.  He further reported that his position was being approached at speed.  He sought advice from Colonel van der Bank and asked whether he should open fire.  Colonel van der Bank instructed him to hold fire and inquired from me whether I had monitored this transmission which I confirmed.  Colonel van der Bank then inquired whether the Field Commander could open fire.  I instructed him to confirm that the Field Commander was being fired upon.  
 Upon confirmation by Colonel van der Bank that the crowd was firing at the Field Commander's troops and was storming their position, I confirmed that the troops were authorized to fire, meaning those troops who were in immediate danger.  This was conveyed to the Field Commander by Colonel van der Bank.  It was subsequently reported to me that the charge on the position of the troops had taken place through a gap in the perimeter fencing of the stadium.  This gap had been created during the march of 4 August when the marchers themselves had destroyed a section of the fencing in order to gain access to the stadium.
 Up to this stage I had not actually heard any shots being fired although there was a helicopter flying overhead, the radios were going and there was a lot of activity in the office.  After a brief delay, I heard sporadic shots being fired which subsequently intensified and continued.  When I heard shooting in the vicinity of the palace or rather the administrative buildings surrounding the National Assembly, I realised that it was not only the troops in the Jongilanga Crescent that were fired, I also realised that this type of fire was not of a defensive nature, i.e. aimed at neutralising the immediate threat.
 I gave an instruction three times on the radio to cease fire, whereafter firing died down to a few sporadic shots.  There was a subsequent intensification of fire again for a brief period whereafter firing terminated.  I am unable to say who gave the orders to fire on the ground or in which terms those orders were communicated.  I immediately instructed the preparation of a casualty report and ordered ambulances to the scene.  Casualties were evacuated while I continued to monitor reports of perceived threats and sought the assistance of the South African forces in channeling the crowd back to King William's Town without further incident.  The CDF Military Law Officer, Major Skrewby was immediately dispatched to the Field Commander to take notes, obtain reports and record the names of soldiers and commanders involved in the operation.  What subsequently transpired is a matter of public record as reported by the media.  
 I would now like to make some personal observations which I wish to have recorded.  It is a sad and serious indictment of our whole South African society at the time of these events, that no one was capable of preventing the tragedy from occurring.  The negotiators, the intermediaries, the peacemakers, the political leaders, the clergy, the lawyers, the courts, the diplomats, the international observers, the media, all failed miserably in their efforts to avert the consequences of ambition, manipulation and intolerance.  Despite the efforts of weeks and days when reason should have prevailed, the outcome of the whole sorry affair was determined by irrational decisions taken in the heat of passion and excitement and under conditions of confrontation and fear.
 We, the military, especially in the light of our experience of the march of 4 August, had taken great care to remove ourselves from the likely areas of immediate contact and possible confrontation with the marchers.  I am absolutely convinced that had the charge through the stadium around the flank of the Ciskei police not occurred, not a single shot would have been fired by members of the Ciskei Defence Force.  My conviction is based upon and supported by the behaviour of the troops under conditions of extreme provocation and duress during the march of 4 August.  There have been totally misguided suggestions that the incident was somehow planned by Ciskei Security Forces, that the marchers were ambushed or intentionally lead into some trap.  I reject these allegations in the strongest possible terms.
 This Commission undoubtedly wishes to hear my response to questions which I have been asked many times in the recent past.  How do you personally feel about the tragedy?  Are you sorry that it happened?  What can we do to prevent such a terrible thing from happening to us again?  My response has always been, and I repeat it here today, I am not proud that troops under my command were involved in a calamity of this nature.  The fact that I had been in command of the force for less than 14 months at the time of the Bisho incident, that the CDF had a history of inadequate training, in discipline and poor leadership, and had just emerged from an internal crisis involving coups and attempted coups, in no way diminishes the sense of extreme professional disappointment which I experienced at the time and which I still feel today.
 I cannot adequately explain the anger and frustration of seeing how warnings and recommendations apparently being ignored or disregarded by politicians, negotiators and others who could have influenced the situation and of witnessing the realisation of our worst predictions.  Were I to have the power to rewrite history, this would certainly be a chapter of our history and of my own military career which I would expunge from the record.  I was personally deeply saddened by the tragedy, even more so when it became apparent that the son of my internal auditor and friend, Mr Mangona, had been killed in the incident.   It is only by God's grace that no more than 30 people were killed.  The circumstances were such that hundreds more could have perished.  I feel deeply and sincerely for all those who have been touched by this tragedy and as a fellow citizen deplore the circumstances which lead to the untimely and unnecessary loss of or injury to your loved ones.  As a loyal and committed South African, I deeply regret that so many people had to die, not only at Bisho, but all over our country, to prove that we as a nation were in the process of destroying ourselves.  It is to the honour of all those who died that we have finally come to our senses and have managed to stem the tide.  We now need to ensure that we do not repeat the painful mistakes of our past.  
 How to avoid a recurrence of this tragedy?  My position and that of the military generally has always been and remains so today, that soldiers should only be deployed in the most exceptional circumstances.  Soldiers are neither trained nor orientated, nor equipped for deployment against civilians.  They are trained and prepared to employ maximum force against external military aggression.  The South African Police Service must therefore be given the resources to develop the capacity to deal with public violence and internal disorder.  Employment of the military for these purposes must be avoided at all costs.
 My brother officers and I who testify today are laymen and not lawyers.  We do not have legal representation although we are presumably entitled to it.  I, and I believe the same of my brother officers, did my duty towards our country and the government of the day in all good faith.  This said, I would like the Commission to note my regret that I, and in particular my brother officers, have not been assisted by the State in the provision of legal representation.  This support has been available to members of the forces in the past.  Why the change?  Have we already been weighed somewhere outside these proceedings and found to be wanting?  What signal regarding future reconciliation could be intended?  
 It is my fervent hope that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission achieves its objectives of promoting national unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts and divisions of the past.  I trust that this submission will contribute in some way to the achievement of that objective.  Thank you for the opportunity of presenting it to you.