BUSHY PETROS VANTYU
Thank you Advocate.  First of all I would like to apologise to the floor because I will speak English to read my statement.  I felt it is necessary to make some introduction, to give light into the situation that existed in the Ciskei prior to the march as I was employed in the ANC office at that time.
EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
3 B P VANTYU
 My name is Petros Vantyu and I reside at 11 Kudu Avenue, Theresa Park, Pretoria.  I am currently employed by the National Intelligence Agency.  Before the formation of the new agency I was a member of the Department of Intelligence and Security, that is DIS of the African National Congress, and was based on the Border Regional Office of the ANC.  My responsibilities included, amongst others, office security, security of national leadership when visiting the region and information gathering.  I lived in Mdantsane which fell under the former Ciskei. The information gathering duties led me to work mostly in the areas of Ciskei where there was a lot of repression.   Repression in the Ciskei.  Early in 1991 I learned from reliable sources in Bisho that Brigadier Oupa Gqozo had a unit called International Researchers, Ciskei Intelligence Service, headed by Anton Niewoudt.  I believe maybe a lot of people know Niewoudt's background.  He was one of the people who was responsible for the training of the Caprivi trainees. Brigadier Gqozo was reported to be really scared of Anton Niewoudt and was hero-worshipping him.  That was according to the sources.
 The unit had been formed around August 1990.  Other members of the IRCIS that I can still remember were Clive Brink and there was a mistake here, instead of van der Bank, it should be Ted Brussels, Chris Wana and Colonel Gula.  This unit was responsible for sewing a lot of disinformation in the Ciskei.  I don't know whether Brigadier Gqozo was party to the disinformation or not.
 The IRCIS once spread lies about Chris Hani and Bantu Holomisa planning to attack the Ciskei.  The people in this region will remember that coming in the Press.  The IRCIS 
EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
4 B P VANTYU
was committed in creating acts of destabilisation in the Ciskei. They once staged a bogus raid in Metfort in Ndabatemba area.  The took policemen from Zwelitsha and Widdlesea and told them that they were going to raid Mr N Mabusela and Mr M M Mjumbuntqla.   This information I got directly from some of the police that were involved in that particular raid.  In that operation Clive Brink shot from inside Mr Jombuntqla's house and he claimed, that is the IR, claimed that it was an MK terrorist who did the shooting.  In the shooting that followed one policeman was injured on the thigh.  I went to interview the old man Mr Mjumbuntqla and saw the bullet holes on the wall and ceiling.  He told me that he and his wife were pointed with firearms and he was questioned about terrorists.  
 On February 9 1991 I got information that a number of senior Ciskei Defence Force officers had discovered a huge quantity of arms in a house used by the IR.  The house is situated within the ministerial complex in Bisho.  The weapons which were of Eastern Bloc origin included AK47 rifles, RPG9's and SAM 7's.  SAM 7's are surface to air missiles.  And the Commission will note that some of the weapons mentioned here are similar to the consignment that was sent to KwaZulu Natal by de Kock.  
 The beans were spilled to the other officers by Sergeant Major Vuyumelane who is now deceased, who had been recruited into the unit.  He also revealed a list of people who were going to be killed by the unit.  The list, according to the officers, including MK members, ANC leaders and people within the Ciskei administration that were regarded as stumbling blocks. 
 When the officers moved the arms from the house and 
EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
5 B P VANTYU
took them to Battalion 1 base in Bisho they were shot at by a group of soldiers at the base.  Brigadier Gqozo claimed that they were staging a coup and arrested them.  In that incident Lieutenant Tqumata was killed.  According to the officers the only thing that Niewoudt was concerned with when he arrived at the base was his weapons which he took away.  Nobody knows up to now where Niewoudt took those arms.  The arrested officers appeared in court on two or three occasions and the charges were dropped and Brigadier Gqozo fired them from the CDF. 
 One aspect that I've omitted in my written submission is that the said officers here had compiled a demand to Brigadier Gqozo that he should resign because they felt he doesn't represent their needs anymore.  The only people who had not signed that particular memorandum were only Brigadier Jemangele and Mr Makuzana, I can't remember his rank.  The charges were dropped because, according to my analysis, court proceedings would have revealed the conspiracy to murder people and derail the negotiation process in Codesa.   It would also reveal the fact that some of the Ciskean officers were not happy with Brigadier Gqozo's authority.
 The IRCIS was reported to have closed down at the end of August 1991 after Mr Breytenbach, the then deputy minister of Defence had visited the Ciskei.  In reality they did not.  Some people like Clive Brink left, but others moved quarters to house no.2 in Ballas Estate.  
 Other incidents of repression in the Ciskei.  During the course of my duties in the region I used to visit community members with Peace Monitors of the ANC.  In August 1992 I visited the Dwashu and Olifant families whose members EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
6 B P VANTYU
were killed by unknown people using a BMW on 26 August 1992.  When I enquired about the BMW I learned that it belonged to the Department of Foreign Affairs of Ciskei. At that stage I used to have the particulars of that BMW, the registration number and the colour, but I can't remember them now.  And I also know the person who was responsible for the vehicle but I couldn't mention him here, because I didn't inform him that I was going to cite his name. 
 According the source in the morning following the death of Olifant and Dwashu the BMW had been used by two young men and it had dust, the (...indistinct) and another policeman had to drop these young men who were carrying Uzzi submachine guns at the Youth Training Centre near Mount Coke.  
 Another source of violence in the Ciskei was the Peace Force.  The Peace Force was a group of youths which was recruited from the rural areas of Ciskei and were trained in Wesley and armed with G3's and pistols.  And in this regard there's a similarity between what happened in KwaZulu Natal, the arming of people with G3's and some other firearms which were put around the chiefs for their security.  I interviewed one Peace Force member who had volunteered information in Rocklands in the Ndabatemba area.  He told me that only ADM people were accepted in the Peace Force security and their duty was to protect headmen and other government property.  
 During that period Brigadier Gqozo had imposed the headman system which was rejected by the people.  The Peace Force people were involved in beating members of the community.  I interviewed a number of people that had been 
EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
7 B P VANTYU
beaten by the Peace Force.  ANC people had to seek permission from the headmen before holding meetings.  This led to confrontation between the headmen and other members of the community.  
 In November 1991 about 13 members of Umkhonto weSizwe who stayed in Mdantsane were arrested in an early morning raid by the Ciskei police.  They were only released when President Nelson Mandela.  During that period I had to be on the run because I was lucky I was not arrested.  I don't know the reason for their arrest even today.  
 I was involved in numerous interviews with people who had been assaulted by Ciskei soldiers.  One time I went to one family in Gamneyba in whose house a handgrenade had been thrown by a CDF member who used to live in that village.  A child was killed in that incident. I felt so useless when I talked to members of that family.  Here I was being a member of MK talking to people who had been terrorised and maimed and yet could do nothing except pass the information to Peace Monitors.
 I would like to expand on this point.  You could imagine how people's hopes would be raised when you go with members of the organising committee and peace monitors of the ANC and you are introduced as an MK member to a person who has been attacked with weapons and the people, the high esteem they had for MK, and you know that the policy of the ANC at that particular moment was that all armed activities were suspended, you know on your emotional being that that particular person who has been there in that situation you really feel is working on your emotions, but there is nothing you can really do.
 The first Bisho march.  Here I am subject to correction EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
8 B P VANTYU
on the date which I've written was the 6th of August 1992.  The Tripartite alliance held a march to Bisho to demand free political activity in the Ciskei.  The march was led, amongst others, by the late Comrade Chris Hani.  When we reached the border between Bisho and King Williamstown Ciskei security forces both soldiers and police refused us entry into Ciskei.  Negotiations took place between the leadership and Ciskei police who were apparently in charge of the situation.  The head of the march, that is the first column of the march was about ten metres from a group of soldiers who were in kneeling position pointing rifles at the marchers, a message came that Mr Pik Botha, then Minister of Foreign Affairs wanted to speak to Comrade Chris Hani over the telephone.  I was amongst the people who accompanied Comrade Chris to Amatola Sun for the phone call.  I could hear from Comrade Chris' conversation that they were talking about the prevailing situation, that is the march.  After the call we went back to the march and it was decided that we should go to the Bisho stadium.  
 In this regard I would like to point out what has been put in the submission this morning that the RSA government was not able to intervene in matters of the Ciskei.  As far as I could gather from Comrade Chris' conversation with Mr Pik Botha over the telephone, he was negotiating between Chris and the Ciskean administration, hence the agreement was reached that we should go into the stadium.  Here I am in my mind I am trying to say I believe the South African government was able to intervene in matters regarding the Ciskei.  I am using this as one of the examples.  
 After the march nothing changed with regard to freedom of political activity in the Ciskei.  On the same paragraph 
EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
9 B P VANTYU
I would like to refer to some testimony that was earlier given here by Major General Olschig(?) who in one paragraph refers to himself having drafted the report in which he set out his extreme displeasure at the situation with which the  CDF had been confronted during that march, that is the August march.  I would like to put on record, that is according to my experience, that is absolutely untrue.  Some of the marchers at that stage even drank from a water truck that was provided by the Ciskean police.  There was no confrontation at that stage.
 Bisho massacre.  The Bisho massacre occurred when the ANC was involved in rolling mass action all over the Republic of South Africa.  As part of that mass action it was decided that another march to Bisho should be held.  The purpose of the march was to occupy Bisho for 24 hours and hold a people's assembly there.  Previously the Tripartite Alliance had occupied East London for 24 hours, and I was involved in that occupation of East London.  I was involved in the preparations and the build-up to the march to Bisho.  At this stage I would request to the Commission that I submit some photos that I still have of the march.  Fortunately I have been keeping them as photos I have been having.  
 I would also like to put on skipper, jacket that I was wearing that particular day which will be relevant in my testimony at a later stage, if the Chairman pleases.