MR RICHARD
Yes Chair, there are factual situations which one can hypothesise and theorise, public interest, State security and very special exceptions, but in relation to this particular incident which arose 13 years ago, there is no factual basis for any such submission.   Then parallel to that we have the debate relating to full disclosure.  Again to go through it quickly and I don't intend labouring the point, I believe our learned Deputy President of the Constitutional Court set it out far better than I will ever do it, in the case of Azanian People's Organisation Azapo & Others v The President of South African & Others, I have referred to the case at page 12, paragraph 3.2.2.4 and I have set out the quotes therein, particularly the second quote lower down on the page and continuing on to page 13.  There the learned Judge emphasised the utmost importance and quintessential essence of an amnesty application, that the victims are entitled to ascertain the truth and to know the truth and the applicant is under a duty to disclose the truth and make full disclosure.  I then allude to the object of the Commission at paragraph 3.2.2.1, I refer to paragraph 1(a)
"... by establishing as complete a picture as possible of the cause, nature and extent of gross violation of human rights."
	And then paragraph (b) more importantly -
"... the object of the Commission shall be to promote national unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts and divisions of the past by facilitating the granting of amnesty to persons who make full disclosure of all the relevant facts relating to acts associated ..."
	Now, if one relates that back to the discretion I have outlined in terms of Section 29(5), again, there is only one defensible and justifiable decision that could be made as to what to do with a document and the information emanating from it, like Exhibit C, and my submission is that there certainly could have been no irregularity or mis-application of mind in making a decision not to do anything to declare it a document which shall not be made public.   
	Now, then we revert to some more what I call semantic arguments and there I refer to paragraph 3.4.2 of my Heads at page 17.  Section 31(3) of the Act, that is the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, contains a section which is interesting from a point of view from interpretation.  In that subsection there is a phrase which I have emphasised by highlighting it - "shall not be admissible as evidence against the person concerned."  Now, the word concerned creates a semantic convolution which can only be resolved by returning to (1) of Section 31, where the Section compels any person who is questioned by the Commission in the exercise of its powers in terms of this Act, or who has been subpoenaed to give evidence, to procure, etc.  
	Now, we then turn back to (3) and there before the tortuous phrase, derived from a questioning in terms of (1), my submission in that regard is that the only proper meaning that might be given to the phrase "against the person concerned" is that that person is the person who in terms of (1), was compelled to produce or to answer questions or to provide information.   The next question is what does the Section relate to?  Any incriminating answer or information obtained or incriminating evidence directly or indirectly derived - now that evidence shall not be admissible in criminal proceedings in a court of law, or before any body or institution established by or under any law.   
	Now, in the nature of things, any applicant before this Amnesty Committee is required to give particulars of an act or omission which constitutes a crime or a delict within the rest of the requirements.  Now, the mere making of an application for amnesty is an incriminating act.  That fact in my submission means that an Amnesty Committee is not what was intended when ...(intervention)