MR RICHARD
That is my submission.  I know and I concede my guilt in relation to what is said on page 18.  I also have been guilty of using very loose terminology.   In all the other Sections that I quoted earlier, there is no mention of the word "privilege".   When one considers Section 31(4), it is the first time that the notion is introduced, there is no provision in any of the other Sections creating any legal notion of privilege.  It may create situations where a person might be compelled to give incriminating evidence, protect the person, remove the protection if a person does not, and so on.  To ascertain what this Section means, my first consideration is what type of privilege is under discussion and I came to the conclusion that only two could be in point, and that is the standard common law of the privilege or now known as the right not to answer incriminating questions, and the right of privilege pertaining to communications between legal advisor and client.  On reflection, I then understood the policy reason why this subsection was enacted.   Firstly, I think it would have been an unjustifiable limitation of the rights of a client to abolish practitioner/client privilege.  The Act does that in clear unambiguous terms.  Then when one refers to the Section, the last number of words of the Section say
"... the law regarding privilege as applicable to a witness summoned to give evidence in a criminal case in a court of law, shall apply in relation to the questioning of a person in terms of (1)."
	So, subject to (1) and subject to the limitations and the right not to incriminate, provided (1) has been complied with, incriminating questions which breach the privilege against self-incrimination are permissible, provided the subsection has been complied with.  So, to speak of the information contained in Exhibit B being privileged, is within the concept of legal notions and principles, not correct in its first instance.