A J G ERWEE
Mr Chairperson, on the 9th of July of that year, in the early morning, Brig Coetsee called me to his office.  He informed me that some of his staff members had extracted information to the effect that six ANC MK insurgents were to infiltrate the RSA on the next day, the 10th of July from Botswana and that I would l take command of the security force members that Capt Mike Bourne from 5 Reconnaissance Command would support us wherever we needed it, and this was a reference to vehicles, radio contact, and any other form of assistance that we might need.
	Col Willem van der Merwe, Brig Coetsee, myself and Capt Mike Bourne did some planning in broad terms.  Brig Coetsee told me that Sgt Sehlwana would be provided with a mini-bus and that that was the property of the security branch, to transport these six people.  Sehlwana would pretend to be a taxi driver and that he would be willing to transport these people.  We realised during the planning phase that there was a major risk in transporting these six people in this manner, namely by Sehlwana, because his life would be in great danger, should the insurgents later on find out that he was actually a member of the security forces.
	For this reason we decided to remove the right rear window of the mini-bus, and a member of 5 Reconnaissance would then hurl a gas-grenade. In order to cause confusion in the bus and to reduce the risk inherent for Matthews, as well as to cause panic and disarray in the bus.  This would of course facilitate our objective, namely arresting these people.
	I was also told that observation points had already been created, and that these posts would be responsible for monitoring these people from the moment that they entered the Republic, or the moment they crossed the border and that was across the Limpopo River.
	I was also told that there was also to be a Defence Force fixed-wing plane which would also assist us in communicating with each other and possibly also assist us with the orientation aspect.