A J G ERWEE
I made no notes at the time of the incident.  These notes I made after I learnt from Brig Ivor Human that he was investigating a case of possible perjury or obstructing the course of justice against me.  I then sat down and made notes as to what had moved me at that stage, to deal with this case docket in a watered-down fashion.
	Chairperson, if I may continue.  At that stage the political opponents were already waging a serious violent struggle against the constitutional dispensation of the time.  With mass mobilisation, establishment of underground structures, alternative structures, et cetera, there was a level of equilibrium which reigned between the constitutional dispensation of the day and the violent political opponents thereof. This manifested itself in intimidation, murders of members of the South African Police, their informers, helpers and agents, and it became extremely difficult for us to maintain an information network or in any way to develop it.  Obviously the intelligence network was the most important structure to provide information to the system in order to make strategic decisions, to undermine the political opponents and murders on SAP members, agents and informers, it would not have been in the interest of the State at that time, in respect of the causal events, to have made this known in any detail.  Leakages could have occurred with the typing of statements.  The administrative process within the Police also exposed it.  The administrative process within the Department of Justice, a formal trial would involve the broader public and this would be supported by the media. It would not be in the interests of the State - it would not have been in the interests of maintaining the status quo to reveal these techniques and methods and a further risk would have been incurred.  
	Firstly, members in the provinces with these international borders, their modus operandi, one of low-border intelligence networks would have been revealed.  This would have had the result that existing networks could have collapsed, and that networks could not be further developed.  Members and their families could possibly become victims of violence and members ran the risk of being arrested in these states or countries and charges of espionage could also become a reality.  
	Even existing agents and informers could possibly be affected by a fierce psychosis, because they were operating very close to a shallow border.  There was a risk of their lives involved and they ran the risk of criminal prosecutions, if they helped South Africa, and more specifically, the security branch with information regarding espionage.
	Thirdly, my decision must also be seen in the broader national context. The modus operandi of cross border or shallow border operations, it is a customary practice to develop and maintain intelligence networks.  So there was much more at stake than just the northern province.  For me it was in the interests of the total national intelligence network.
	As already mentioned, the information network is probably the most important component to shore up the dispensation of the day, vis-a-vis its political opponents.  And I believed, therefore, that I was acting lawfully in the interests of the State and that I was acting within the course and scope of my capacities and competence. In fact, I received no criticism from my seniors or from the Department of Justice saying that I had not handled the inquest properly. 
	The media reports which were released and which indicated that a seventh member had escaped, had stimulated me in my decision to deal with the inquest in the way that I did. 
	For that reason I appointed Swarts to deal with the inquest. He knew the facts exactly and he also would know how to handle the inquest docket, in such a way so that the total causal chain of events would not be revealed and which would thereby to some extent Matthews Sehlwana's cover.