MR VISSER
Which you didn't?
		MR WASSERMAN:  I left it in Col Taylor's vehicle."
And he says that is the reason why he stated, that as far as he was concerned, there was no intention to get involved in a skirmish with them.  That was never Wasserman's intention.  So that's just an additional probability, we say, Mr Chairman, that should be taken into account.
	My learned friend, Mr Webster, then also suggested that it can't be correct, or it is hardly true that it was a Task Force operation because if it had been, why then did Botha and/or Steyn and/or Wasserman not first obtain the permission from Breytenbach before they acted at all?  Now, first of all we wish to submit, Mr Chairman, that this proposition does not take account of realities, the realities on the evidence as you have heard it.  Secondly, you have heard that there were different radios with different wavebands and Botha at least told you that there was, as far as he can remember, no communication with the Task Force.  In any event, it would hardly be necessary for a policeman, under the circumstances where he wants to stop a car, to first permission from the Task Force Commander whether he may stop the car, in circumstances where the whole purpose was to stop the car and to arrest the occupants.  We say, Chairperson, that the applicants were thrown into a position due to circumstances where they first observed this car for no other reason than fortuitously, clearly, and where they had to act and had to act rapidly and quickly and we say it's unreasonable to suggest that in those circumstances they could do nothing without orders from Breytenbach.  
	Now, Chairperson, Mr Webster put to Botha that in 1986, September or October of 1986, the level of violence in the country had subsided considerably.  That's at the record page 507 line 5 to 508 line 21.  Well, Chairperson, we submit that that is altogether an incorrect statement of what we know the situation was.  In the Cronje Decision at page 3 line 8, the original Amnesty Committee made reference to the war by referring first of all to the 1970's and then by saying by 1980 a full-scale revolutionary war had broken out.  We also know, Chairperson, that the Kabwe Conference of the ANC was held at Gorongoza in June 1985 and it's old news, Chairperson, that at that Conference the important decision that was taken was to intensify the war and you will recall that the ANC came under heavy criticism because so much was the feeling of intensifying the war, that there were pronouncements made that innocent bystanders who were injured or killed, had to be accepted as part of the war.  We say, Chairperson, that all that, together with the statistics which we know of, the ones given by van der Merwe in the Khotso House matter and the ANC, the ANC statement of August 1996, from page 52 to 53, gives you the stats for 1986 and 1987.  And Chairperson, for each of those two years, there were around 70 serious incidents of violence.