JOHANNES LODEWIKUS GRIEBENAUW
That's right.
"in circumstances which the other party wasn't bound by any rules.  Apart from this the view of the Government of the day was that the Republic was waging a war for all practical purposes and that the enemy had to be defeated at all costs.  The armed struggle was characterised by several phases.
	Initially, Umkhonto weSizwe, MK and other organisations directed their actions mainly against Government buildings and the sabotage of those buildings and other property.  The Soweto unrest during 1976, placed the Black youth in the forefront of the battle and the ANC/SACP Alliance exploited the situation and utilised the youth in it's revolutionary battle.
	With the establishment of the United Democratic Front in 1983, a new phase was entered.  Many organisations joined the UDF country-wide and although it could never be determined exactly in what respect the ANC/SACP Alliance controlled the UDF, there was close co-operation between them.   
	And under leadership of the UDF, the defiance against the Government and Government institutions escalated quite sharply and this was followed by a civil disobedience with a view to making the country ungovernable.
	During 1985, the ANC Consultative Conference in Kobwe, Zambia took place, during which it was decided that the distinction between so-called hard and soft targets no longer applied.  Violence escalated and many civilians, including defenceless women and children were cruelly killed, injured or maimed.  
	The SACP/ANC Alliance, UDF and other organisations who were all striving for the same objective, used everything in their power to make the country ungovernable and especially to alienate the Black community from the police and Government.  Intimidation was used on a large scale to force members of the Black community to work with them.
	Defiance and treason was very brutally punished and when there was the slightest suspicion that a person was actually collaborating with the police led to a person being killed by means of the necklace method and that is crueller than most of the methods used by the Nazi's.
	Members of the security forces and in particular South African police, were regarded as so-called hard targets and could be killed at random and at will and became more and more the victims of violence.  Black members in Black townships lived in fear of their lives and property day by day.
	To avert this violent onslaught, the previous Government mustered all the forces at it's disposal and joined together it's structures under the auspices of the state security council.  The National Security Management System also had a significant influence on the police culture" 
	And in this respect I'd like to refer to pages 151 and 152 of a book entitled: "The Other Side of the Story", written by Major General H D Stadler and published during February of 1997.  This has also been attached to the statement in front of you, it's the very last section.  According to this you will see that the police commanding officers right down to the lowest level, had participation in some way or another in this system, a system which had the State President and Cabinet right at the top.
	Once again it must be pointed out that there was a chain of command or a line of communication from grassroots level right to the highest levels of command, and it would therefore not have been too far fetched to assume that an instruction coming from a commanding officer sitting in a system, was actually an instruction coming from the highest level of authority.
	The objective of these different structures was - in respect of the Government, the security forces and the different State departments, to actually join them together in a cohesive unit.  The structures succeeded to a large extent to actually carry out this object.  
	The South African police and more particularly the security branch or rather from the point of view of the South African police and in particular the security branch, the interest were to ensure the effective maintenance of law and order and also to guarantee the safety of the community. And this was so closely interwoven with the activities of the police that the police in this respect and in the circumstances which obtained at the time, was necessarily seen as an ally of Government.
	In the past time, members of the then Security Council have testified before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and I would like to refer very briefly to certain quotations as it appeared in "Die Burger", namely "Die Burger, Wednesday, 15 October 1997 - I quote:
"But according to Botha, not one of use who were in the previous Government can say today that there was no suspicion from our side that members of the South African police were involved in certain irregular activities".
	The other heading: "Use of Language Leads to Illegal Conduct", in the same newspaper he, Botha said that it was unfortunate that certain sentences in State Security Council Minutes are now being taken out of the context in which they were used, for instance reference to: "eliminate".  
	In reality it is followed by explanations which amount to detention without trial and it is a fact that our country has been placed into a certain war psychosis where such words and expressions which were gained for military usage, has now become part of our vernacular and I now realise with a sense of shock that this terminology apparently gave rise to illegal conduct by policemen - that is what Mr Vlok said.
	What is of importance here is what the consequences were of this interpretation by policemen of terms used by the State Security Council and according to them, had an innocent connotation or interpretation.  If it led to the torture or even the killing of persons in respect of whom those words were used, you would then expect that the State Security Council would immediately take suitable steps to prevent a repetition.
	If correctly reported, then it's hard to understand how Mr Vlok has now with a sense of shock learnt that this terminology and use of language, has apparently led to illegal conduct to policemen.  "Die Burger, Thursday, 16th of October 1997, Wessels said that he does not believe the political defence of: "I did not know", he didn't believe that he could actually rely on this.  
	In many instances he didn't want to know - each and every person in this country knew that people were being tortured.  Perhaps that's putting it a bit too broadly, perhaps Mr Wessels meant here that each politician knew that people were being tortured.  During my term in office in Cape Town, extreme pressure was placed by the Joint Security Management System on the security branch, in particular to stem the tide of murder and violence.  
	And obviously I gave members under my command instructions to do everything in their power to apprehend people who were guilty of these things and to extract as much information as possible from the detainees so that the entire network operative in the country could be disrupted in time to prevent further loss of life.   This was the only way in which we could protect lives and properties. 
	I never gave any member an instruction to place a wet bag over anybody's head or to torture them in any other way.  I was however very much aware of the fact that members' success could be ascribed to the use of unconventional questioning or interrogation methods.  It would have been naive of me to believe that they would extract information in any other way from a well trained terrorist and to do so quite quickly.
	Anybody who in any way had responsibility in respect of a Section 29 detainee and of whom it is here alleged that he was assaulted or tortured in any other way, must have been aware or must have suspected that unconventional interrogation methods were being used.  And their silence in this regard can be interpreted as at least a condemnation of it, if not approval.
	The applications before you deal with acts or omissions committed during a period when revolution was at it's height.  The situation which existed during this heated armed battle from the ANC/SACP Alliance who have the same objectives and in which the masses involved in different ways.  On the other hand you had the security forces and more specifically the security branch as part of a National Security Management System established by a Government which was clinging to it's power and was using everything at it's disposal to fight the enemy because the enemy was actually trying to topple the Government.
	Perhaps a better word which I'd like to buy from Mr Meyer, is "eliminate" rather that to stem.  This situation, speeches and addresses by leading figures and politicians regarding the killing and destruction of property ensured that their was a total situation of war.  The South African police and more in particular the security branch, was placed in a totally untenable situation, they had to avert the onslaught in terms of the normal rules of the combating of crime 	And it was this impossible task and constant pressure exerted by the Government and obvious condemnation of abuses and even an admission or rather a commendation, an encouragement for services rendered in the act or in the battle of terrorism, this all led to the fact that the people in the so-called: "engine room", did not have direct - didn't need direct instructions to commit certain wrongful acts but they had a bona fide belief that that was virtually the only criterion.
	I have no doubt that if these members believed that they could rely on the protection of their seniors and politicians and if this was not the case, these specific acts would never have been committed.  I also have no doubt in my mind that as investigations continue, politicians must assume more and more responsibility for that which happened during their reign.  It is ultimately a fact that the police was one of the instruments used to achieve their purpose.  Thank you Chairperson.