GEN VAN DER MERWE
I am a retired member of the SouthAfrican Police who previously served as Commissioner of Policefor the period 1 January 1990 to the 31st of March 1995.  I alsoserved as Commanding Officer of Security Branch of the South AfricanPolice for the period 1 January 1986 to the 30th of September1988.  And as Deputy Commissioner of the South African Policefor the period 1 October 1988 to 31 December 1989.
 On the 3rd of September 1996 I, together with three other formerCommissioners of the South African Police, namely Generals MikeGeldenhuys, Johan Coetzee and Hennie de Wit submitted a memorandumto the Commission.  The role of the South African Police in theconflict of the past was briefly set out in the said memorandumwhich is attached as an annexure to this statement.  I am notgoing to deal with this memorandum Mr Chairman.
 I have had the opportunity of perusing the contents of the applicationsfor amnesty to the Commission by the following former membersof the South African police, Brigadier Jack Cronje, Colonel RoelfVenter, Captain Jacque Hechter, Captain Wouter Mentz, WarrantOfficer Paul van 
3A Vuuren/...
58 GNL VAN DER MERWE
Vuuren.  I have now been subpoenaed to appear before this Committeein order to give evidence pertaining to these applications andI hereby declare myself willing to do so.
 With regard to the contents of paragraph 20 - 33 of the saidmemorandum I would firstly like to deal with some of the factorsand circumstances which existed during the conflict which mayhave had a fundamental influence on both the thinking and conductof members who were initially involved in the violence which raged. I am well aware of the numerous views and interpretations whichthis Committee has to take account of and I will therefore endeavourto deal with these matters as comprehensively as possible.
 The conflict and violence of the past took on various forms andcovered wide-ranging scenarios which included combatting rolewas in both Namibia and Zimbabwe as well as acts of terror, sabotage,killings and acts of mass mobilisation and mob violence withinthe borders of the Republic.  Members of the South African Policewere employed and utilised with regard to all these terrains andaccordingly over a period of time the training and operationaldeployment of the South African Police had, of necessity, to beadapted accordingly.  This ultimately was to lead to the naturalconsequence of the bringing about of drastic changes in the outlook,approach and training of that which previously had formed thefoundation of an acceptable policing culture in a normal society.
 Amongst other things the principles of minimum violence and thebringing of perpetrators before criminal courts was to be seriouslyaffected and even eroded.  This state of affairs appertained especiallyto the utilisation of counter-insurgency tactics in a guerillawar which in 
3A many/...
59 GNL VAN DER MERWE
many an instance revolved around that which normally applied ina conventional war.  In the Republic the violent struggle wasprimarily waged between the security forces and elements of Umkhontou'Sizwe, better known as MK.
 Although MK, from a truly military perspective disposed of onlya limited capability it must be stated that it undoubtedly enjoyedthe support of the majority of the Black population in South Africa. After the founding of the  United Democratic Front in 1983 transpiredthat the levels of resistance and violence directed at the Governmentand its institutions would rise dramatically thus forcing theGovernment to implement drastic security measures such as emergencyregulations and preventative detentions in order to try and quellthe rising unrest and violence.  The South African Police wassubjected to enormous pressure to try and stabilise the situationby, amongst other things, arresting and detaining activists whoplayed a significant role in the unrest or charging them and bringingthem before court.  Members of the South African Police, and especiallythose attached to the security branch were required to work nightand day for long periods of time in order to carry out their duties. The greater portion of the Black population were ill-disposedtowards the South African Police.  
 Many members were to lose their lives as a direct result of thepolicies which were formulated at an important ANC national consultativeconference held in Kabwe, Zambia, during June 1985.  This conferencewhich took place at the same time as the 30th anniversary of thecreation of the Freedom Charter was being celebrated was to passcertain resolutions which was to have an undeniable impact onthat which was to occur later in South Africa.  
3A Under/...
60 GNL VAN DER MERWE
 Under the editorial I quote: 
  "We are revolutionaries, internationalists and Africans. 
  Following paragraphs in Tshichaba, the official publicationof the ANC adequately described the entire direction and moodof the conference.  Deficiencies and shortcomings in this regardwere also pointed out.  The recurring theme of the conferencewas to intensify the armed struggle.  Some people favoured theterm "armed seizure of power" rather than "seizureof power".  It was this realisation which led to the decisionthat we must attack not only inanimate objects but also enemypersonnel.  
  This ANC conference which took the form of a Council of Wardecided that the distinction between hard and soft targets shoulddisappear.  This was not a new idea.  It had been discussed, likeall other issues in the numerous continual regional pre-conferencediscussions which involved everybody including all those who werenot elected as delegates to the conference.  In other words theANC membership as a whole was involved for the last nine monthsor so in discussions which took place at the conference.  Theattack on South African refugees in Botswana, by the racist forcesjust before the conference emphasised the need for our movementto bleed the enemy.  The question of intensifying armed struggleposes new challenges and responsibilities on the ANC and on theinternational community which by the look of 
3A things/...
61 GNL VAN DER MERWE
  things and the nature of the violence of the enemy is goingto be more involved in that struggle for our liberation".
That is the editorial of the Tsichaba of August 1985.
 The decision that in future there was to be no distinction betweenhard and soft targets was to have very important ramificationsand consequences for South Africa as a whole, more especiallyfor the general public at large.  It immediately became obviousthat among other things this declaration was to be a flagrantviolation of that very undertaking which the ANC ostensibly heldso dear, namely the signing at the end of 1980 of Protocol 1 of1977 of the Geneva Convention of 1949 when it was declared thatit's future actions, inter alia only be directed at militarytargets.  Articles 1(52) and (57) being especially relevant.
 It had already become apparent during 1983 that the ANC, as previouslyindicated, had already reconciled themselves to the fact thatinnocent civilians could be killed or injured in future MK attacks. According to an article in the Tsichaba of January 1983 it wasstated that, I quote,
  "Also reported have been 15 instances of bombs in citycentres, shopping areas, public buildings and places of entertainment".
After another consequence which arose from both the Kabwe Conferenceand an earlier visit by a high-powered ANC delegation to Vietnamduring 1978 under the leadership of the late Mr Oliver Tambo wasthe gradual implementation of the so-called "People's WarStrategy".  
 The delegation, which also included Mr Joe Modise and the lateMr Chris Hani, came to the conclusion that armed 
3A actions/...
62 GNL VAN DER MERWE
actions had to be supported by political actions which includedthe mobilisation, organisation and politicising of the massesaround certain grievances.  This was regarded as a prerequisiteto create a revolutionary climate and to initiate a people's war. Thereafter the National Executive Committee of the ANC decidedon a three year plan aimed at mobilising and politicising theBlack population.  
 The underground structures of the ANC would be used for thispurpose.  Other channels which were to be used included sympatheticorganisations, distribution of pamphlets and the establishmentof revolutionary themes for the ensuing years.  Themes included1979 the Year of the Spear; 1985 the Year of the Cadre; 1986 theYear of Umkhonto u'Sizwe, the People's Army; 1987 the Year ofAdvance to People's Power; 1988 the Year of United Action forPeople's Power; 1989 the Year of Mass Action for People's Power.
 To add to this idea in 1980 the Central Committee of the SouthAfrican Communist party issued a statement entitled "Forwardto People's Power - The Challenge Ahead".  It stated thata strategy of armed struggle can only be effective and take shapeif it is rooted in the broadest possible mobilisation of the organisationsof the people and in mass legal and semi-legal battles.  The build-uptowards the winning of people's power called for an even greateremphasis in the strengthening of mass movements at national, regionaland local level.
 A further requirement according to the ANC for the successfulimplementation of a people's war was the creation of alternativestructures responsible for mobilising and organising the masses. It must be borne in mind that the theme selected by the ANC foreach year were a useful 
3A propaganda/...
63 GNL VAN DER MERWE
propaganda tool in this mobilisation process. People's War statutewas described as, I quote,
  "A war in which the entire nation is engaged. Umkhontou'Sizwe, the People's Army, workers, the rural masses, women,intellectuals, the religious community selectively in groups oras organised individuals who use all forms of provisional warfare,armed or non-combat, legal and illegal means to attack and destroyall symbols and structures and organs of apartheid power includingall those who manned them".
  The long term and fundamental objective of the ANC/SACP alliancewas the total destruction of the South African state.  After analysingthe situation in the Republic during 1983 and again in 1985 theANC came to the conclusion that masses entered a new era in theirstruggle.  It foresaw political demonstrations followed by semi-armedactions by the masses using rudimentary weapons at first, suchas sticks, stones and pangas.  During 1983 the political militarycouncil of the ANC issued a document planning for a People's War. According to this document the ANC directed it's attention towardsa protracted guerilla war, mass uprising, arming the masses andpreparing them for a People's War for the establishment of alternativestructures and the revolutionary basis.  
 In this document the ANC visualised accelerating the activationof the masses in proceeding from peaceful non-violent politicaldemonstrations to demonstrations with emphasis on violence andinsurrection.  Stone was ultimately to be replaced by petrol bomb,acid bomb and hand grenade while firearms such as the AK 47 assaultrifle became a 
3A substitute/...
64 GNL VAN DER MERWE
substitute for the stick and panga.
 During 1984 and virtually each year thereafter the ANC announcedthat in future the revolutionary war would rest on four pillars,namely, 
 (a) the armed struggle led by Umkhonto u'Sizwe,
 (b) mass mobilisation of the masses,
 (c) the underground structures of the ANC,
 (d) the international offensive to isolate the Republic of SouthAfrica.
 At the same time a call was issued by the late Mr Oliver Tamboto make South Africa ungovernable.  The destruction of local authoritieswas seen to be part of this process.  This was followed by thebrutal murders of a number of community councillors, administrativepersonnel, police officials and other persons who in any way assistedthe State.  These murders and killings often occurred by meansof the dreaded necklace method.
 By June 1985 it was reported that only five of the 38 Black governmentstructures had survived and 396 innocent people had already beenmurdered.  In destroying these structures the ANC was createdthe necessary prerequisites for liberated zones.  The ANC andits front organisations embarked on campaigns of murder intimidationwhich left a vacuum in the townships.  In this manner the ANC/SACPalliance hoped to create no-go areas and total ungovernability.
 The vacuum created was aimed at having a dual effect.  Informationfrom the townships would not reach the security forces.  In thecourse of no security force presence unrest would continue andsteps would be taken to create revolutionary bases.  Once a revolutionarybase had been 
3A created/...
65 GNL VAN DER MERWE
created for a people's war it could develop and grow and providea safe haven for trained MK cadres returned to the country ina clandestine fashion.
 MK was regarded as the core of the people's army which consistedof three components.  One is the advanced detachments of MK intothe politicised masses and previous sympathetic or recruited membersof the security forces which included the South African DefenceForce and the South African Police.
 The ANC instructions to MK were that they should operate in organisedunits with the following objectives. Deployed units in the ruralareas were instructed to mobilise the local inhabitants.  Undergroundunits in the urban complexes and factories and in Black residentialareas were to form combat, sabotage and elimination groups.  Thesecadres would react normally during the day and operate at night. The establishment of self-defence units whose primary purposewas to protect the organisation against State activity.  MK memberswere instructed to give the necessary guidance to these units. 
 Politicised masses which formed the second component of the revolutionaryarmy would be recruited, trained and supplied with arms by theadvanced detachments of MK members.  Thereafter they were to beorganised into disciplined combat units.  Training was to takeplace internally.  This would circumvent the problem of only personsbeing recruited were prepared to leave the RSA for training. Dissident national servicemen, Black soldiers, officers and therank and the file were regarded by the ANC as potential recruitsto form the third component of the people's army.  It was statedthat Whites should not be 
3A encouraged/...
66 GNL VAN DER MERWE
encouraged to refuse to do their national service but that theyshould rather be used clandestinely within the South African DefenceForce as organisers and agitators.
 To shift the balance of forces in favour of the ANC it was decidedthat that should be launched from the revolutionary bases in theBlack townships against White areas.  These attacks would be carriedout by combat and defence units using trained cadres and directedat the security forces, both Black and White.  
 Furthermore, attacks would also be aimed at strategic and economicinstallations which were regarded as the lifeline of the Whitepopulation.  As far as the rural areas were concerned it was decidedthat farm workers and labourers must be involved in order to seizethe land.  Attacks had to be directed at farmers and their familiesin the border areas with landmines being used in many of theseattacks.  The street, alley and block committees were to be usedto bring about a revolutionary transfer of power.  People's Committeeshad to be developed into so-called organs of people's power. The purpose of creating organs of people's power was to establisha situation of field power, namely the forces of the revolutionon the one hand and the force of the State on the other. The organsof people's power were designed so that people's lives were directedin a new revolutionary way.  
 These structures had to lead the all-round offensive employingall forms of action.  Organs of people's power were to be electedby the people in the street and they were to be responsible tothe people.  Regular meetings were held so as to determine thepeople's needs and requirements.
 Another organ of people's power was the so-called 
3A People's/...
67 GNL VAN DER MERWE
People's Courts.  They were originally regarded as instrumentswhereby the so-called concept of people's power could be upheldand defended.  That task was to ensure healthy, revolutionaryand democratic inter-relations within society and to serve theinterests of the people in general.  To ensure this state of affairsthe boards were tasked with dealing with cases of anti-socialbehaviour, conflict and political crimes against the people. It was these people courts which progressively implemented a campaignof terror and intimidation in the Black townships against thepopulation who had very little or no defence or protection inthis regard. It was very often quite sufficient to be merely suspectedof being a sell-out or collaborator in order to pay the ultimateprice in the most dreadful manner.   With the notable exceptionof a few cases where a perpetrator was caught red-handed theseacts of violence and other offences committed with a politicalmotive were generally speaking to go unpunished in the propercourts of law.  This can be directly attributed to high levelsof intimidation which firstly neutralised the effectiveness ofthe intelligence network and secondly the victims of witnesseswho were totally unwilling to come forward in order to bear testimonyagainst those responsible.
 As already indicated over many years the liberation movementsregarded armed attacks on members of the security forces beingso-called legitimate hard targets as morally acceptable.  Thiswas to result in many policemen being killed or injured whilstengaged in combatting ordinary crime in performing their normalpolice functions.
 Of significance is the fact that this type of activity was toescalate even more sharply during and subsequent to 
3A 1990/...
68 GNL VAN DER MERWE
1990 when the negotiation process and that which was to bringabout the election of a new democratic government was alreadywell and truly on course.  In this regard the following statisticsare revealing.  During the years 1973 to 1979, that is six years,76 policemen were killed.  From 1980 to 1990, ten years, 270. From the 1st of January 1991 till the 31st of December 1992,that's two years, 385.  During 1992 2204 politically motivatedattacks on policemen took place killing 145 and injuring 363.Whilst during 1993 267 members were killed in 4165 acts of violence. 
 In regard to some of the other acts of violence perpetrated underthe banner of the people's war strategy the following statisticswith regard to only two categories, namely the necklace methodand death by otherwise setting alight of persons are reflectedhereto after so as to present some idea of that which the SouthAfrican Police had to cope with in this particular regard.  
 I am not going to quote all the statistics Mr Chairman.  Perhapswhat is important that during 1986 306 persons were murdered bymeans of the necklace method and during the same year 171 setalight and burnt to death.
 With your permission may I proceed with paragraph 16 Mr Chairman?