UNKNOWN
Thank you Mr Chairman.  Mr Chairman, I only wish to draw the Committee's attention to certain aspects of the evidence, as well as certain aspects of the Act and certain general considerations when considering whether amnesty should be granted or not.
	I wish to refer to the submission made by a Mr D.J. Ackerman and Mr V.L. Smith, who represented the victims at the St James attack.  No doubt Mr Chairman you were involved in that matter and you'd alive to those considerations.  With submission I submit they are also of application here.
	The submission made is that the Committee ought to be mindful that not every act committed in a political context is an act of a political character or one associated with a political objective.  
	Secondly, nor is every politically motivated act or every act committed in a name of a political party such an act.  
	And thirdly, nor does a political slogan amount to a political objective which justifies murder.  Particularly in the light of what the APLA command had indicated, Mr Sabelo Palma, that 1994 was to be "The Year of the Ballot and the Bullet".  That certainly doesn't justify murder at any level.
	Now the Committee must also be mindful of the limitations which is placed on acts, whether they can be categorised as acts of a political character or associated with a political object.  And in the respect the well-known principles upon which our Founding Act is based, being the Norgaard principles, I think it's appropriate to say that it was clear in the Namibian context where the Norgaard principles applied, that attacks on purely civilian targets were not considered to be acts of a political nature or sufficient political nature which justified amnesty.
	It is also important to analyse whether the act of the applicants before this Committee was carried out in the furtherance or as assistance to the political objective alleged.  The general political objective stated by the applicants was to liberate AZANIA to dismantle the apartheid regime or the apartheid state and rewin the land taken by the oppressors.
	It is significant that none of the applicants were able to explain how the attack on the discotech could have advanced that objective.  In contra distinction to that I think the Committee, with respect, ought to be mindful that the process which was in place at the time and in which is common cause, that is the negotiations which led to the elections in April, were far more likelier to achieve the ends which the attack was allegedly intended to achieve were in fact successfully in operation at the very time of the attack which was only two months away.
	It is also significant that the very political party to which they belonged were party to those negotiations and were actively involved in those negotiations.  
	It would appear from the evidence that all was not well in the PAC camp.  It appears from the evidence that during the conference at Umtata there appeared to be two schools of thought, one opposing violence and the other advocating violence or the armed struggle to continue.
	That also seems to be borne out by the press clippings annexed to the bundle, which seems to indicate that the politicians were saying one thing, suspending the armed struggle, yet APLA was saying another thing.
	Another aspect is the gravity of the act in questions.  It is significant that defenceless civilians who pose not threat, and certainly on the evidence, were unconnected to any state, organisation, or body were the object of the attack.
	It is also significant that the weapons used, automatic machine rifles and hand grenades, although they weren't in fact used, the intention was to create maximum carnage.
	The applicants have said they've acted under orders and in that context they were not at liberty to defy those orders.  
	It is also significant that none of the applicants were able to advance any cogent reason what would have happened if such orders were disobeyed.  There seemed to be no sanction in place to have been an effective way to have cohersed the applicants to have acted as they did. 
	We heard from Mr Tanda that if one smoked dagga for example, one would be stripped and made to roll in the dirt or the mud and the water but certainly there was no indication that if they had failed to carry out the attack which they did, that there would have been a type of court martial where they would have been severely reprimanded or corporally punished or anything in that vein.
	It certainly seems from the evidence that those on the ground were left to their own devices.  Power, alias, sorry with the other Mzala and soforth, seemed to give a general indication of what the policy was.  Yet it appears from Mr Tanda's evidence and Mr Shiceka's evidence that the selection of the target was left up to themselves.
	My argument in this regard is, despite the evidence that it was because african people were on the pavement that desisted or caused them to desist from attacking the restaurant.  
	My submission is that on a proper analysis of that evidence it would clearly indicate that they had a discretion of whatever nature in order to effect the attacks as their mandate indicated.
	Regarding the question of proportionality, my submission is that the very nature of the means used and the nature of the target and what was to be achieved thereby, as I've addressed earlier, was disproportionate in the circumstances.
	Mr Chairman, I also highlight the remark made by the Committee which appeared to be forthcoming from the evidence of Mr Tanda, that if the target was selected purely because the people were white then, with submission, that seems to have been the motivation which was based on racial lines.  
	And if one then accepts Mr Shiceka's evidence as it is supported by Mr Tanda, that the restaurant was avoided because black people may have been injured, then the only inference that can be drawn was that white people were attacked purely because they were white people and for no other reason.