UNKNOWN
I was referring to the two extracts of Mtombo newspapers dated the 3rd of 1992, no.3 of 1992.  I am convinced that Ciskei was targeted as it was because it was probably regarded as the weakest of the Homelands that were not sympathetic to the ANC and hence where such a campaign was likely to succeed.  There seemed no doubt that the ANC alliance hoped that by targeting Ciskei a domino effect would result causing the other Homelands, who were not sympathetic to them to fall and ultimately the then South African Government without further negotiation.
 Background to the 7 September 1992 Bisho Massacre.  On the 4th of August the alliance held a march from the Victoria grounds in King Williamstown towards Bisho, Ciskei.  At the time I was at Mpekweni.  The aim was to occupy Bisho and to force me to stand down.  The ANC alliance was refused access to Bisho and were stopped at the border between South Africa and Ciskei.  Negotiations took place between the Ciskeian authorities and the leaders of the march at the initiation of the National Peacekeeping Secretariat.  I was contacted at Mpekwene and informed of the tense situation which I comment lasted many hours.  Finally an agreement was reached between all concerned out of fear of a possible violent confrontation that the marchers could hold a meeting at the Bisho stadium.  This took place and various speakers addressed the masses.
 I was informed that the security forces felt incredibly threatened by the large group of marchers who became restless and in fact even forced the security forces to retreat some distance to accommodate them.
 Pursuant to this march on the 4th of August 1992 violence increased dramatically in the Ciskei.  The soldiers in particular were targeted and intimidated.  The situation was so bad that soldiers and their families lived in fear and many took up residence in tents at the military bases and even at my farm, Blacklands, for security reasons.  There was a calculated attempt to demoralise and intimidate the soldiers in particular. 
 I became increasingly concerned about the violence in Ciskei and accordingly approached the Goldstone Commission to investigate the same.  This request was met with a response that the Goldstone Commission had no jurisdiction to investigation incidents which occurred in the Ciskei.  I then approached the National Peace Secretariat and it was suggested that I establish a commission akin to the Goldstone Commission in the Ciskei.  This I did in the form of a commission headed by the Chief Justice of Ciskei, Mr Justice Pickard, the mandate of which was, for all intents and purposes, the same as that of the Goldstone Commission.
 The message that was spread throughout Ciskei was that the 4th of August 1992 march was nothing and that the march originally scheduled for the 9th of September would be the march.  I was to be ousted and the military of Ciskei were constantly undermined, it being said that Umkhonto weSizwe would show Gqozo boys how real soldiers would take me on.  Anybody known or suspected to be supporters of my government, including civil servants were harassed and terrorised and many fell victim to criminal elements.
 I mention at this stage that I was also given this information by the former head of Ciskei Military Intelligence Colonel Chris Nel.  I distinctly remember him telling me about pamphlets and ANC alliance propaganda, and telling me that this was being freely distributed among the people of Ciskei.  The gist of the propaganda was that the ANC alliance was giving people a last chance, especially the soldiers to be saved if they joined in the march against me, failing which they would be rejected and even killed.  I am not in a position to provide this Commission with such documentation, but maybe Colonel Nel is.
 However, to my dismay I have subsequently learnt in an article in the Weekly Mail and Guardian of June 1994 that Colonel Nel, in whose information I trusted, seems to have been playing cat and mouse with me.  Clearly, therefore, the possibility exists that myself and my security forces who relied rather heavily on the information of the Ciskei Intelligence Service might have been misled by Colonel Nel.  He, however, might be in a better position to elaborate.
 Nonetheless the confidence of the soldiers was severely dented by this propaganda, and it became apparent that the ANC alliance was attempting to neutralise the Ciskeian Defence Force.
 What I also regard as significant are the comments of Major General Bantu Holomisa, the then military leader of Transkei. He expressed the view that I was not being given honest advice and was probably also referring to Colonel Nel.  I annex in this regard a press report on the 8th 
September 1992, marked as Annexure D. 
 Mr Chairman I could just mention a few lines here where he says, I read,
"The Ciskeians should insist that mercenaries and seconded personnel be kicked out".
And then he says,
"Oupa Gqozo could not expect honest advice especially in this climate of transition. He suggested that some of these people, independent Homelands send these people back to their host countries for re-training.  I speak from experience, this is why Transkei decided the South African defence force personnel should cease commanding Transkeian forces in 1978 and why mercenaries were done away with in 1981".
Mr Chairman I am carrying on now.
 On the 23rd August 1992 at the National Alliance Summit, the ANC alliance brought forward the march to the 7 September 1992 clearly to coincide with the then State President de Klerk's conference of regionalism.  It was decided by the ANC alliance that the national leadership should go to the areas near Ciskei to mobilise the people for the march.  There was no doubt in my mind that the ANC alliance from the outset had much more than a march in mind.
 The media and gatherings were used and abused to whip up the emotions of people.  The remarks made by the leaders were largely inflammatory and in fact contrary to the spirit of the National Peace Accord.  It appeared as if the ANC alliance would not even hesitate to use violence.  I firmly believed that the ANC alliance intended to invade Ciskei at all costs and oust me and were not interested in negotiations.
 On the 3rd of September 1992 they sent a letter to the then President de Klerk demanding my removal and threatening to occupy Bisho for days if needs be.  De Klerk warned them against such action and informed them that they should seek proper permission from Ciskei as it was an independent state.  De Klerk warned Dr Mandela that the proposed march might lead to a serious showdown and that the demands were unrealistic in any event and formed part of matters still subject to negotiation.  Mandela assured De Klerk of the ANC's full cooperation to ensure peaceful mass action.
 On the 6th of September 1992 the late Chris Hani held a final meeting with the people and declared their true intention to oust me at all costs.  I was referred to as "De Klerk's puppet" and "kitchen boy", terms which were not only inaccurate but hurtful to me.
 A conference on violence was held prior to the march of the 7th September 1992 by IDASA.  I sent representatives from both the ADM and the Ciskei government to participate.  It was reported to me that basically the intention of the meeting was to make Ciskei accept interim administration at that stage.  Ciskei was severely down-played and the meeting clearly wanted my removal for political reasons.  This meeting was presided over by Dr Alex Boraine.
 A seven member delegation including Reverend Bongani Finca were to meet with the then President de Klerk to attempt to obtain these objectives.  What was significant and hinted at a somewhat biased agenda was that not a single representative from either the ADM or the Ciskei government were part of the delegation.  In this regard I attach as annexure E.  It is a letter, Mr Chairman, which is very 
EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
O GQOZO
self-explanatory.  I will ask that you pass it on.  Thanks.
 Prior to the march of the 7th of September 1992 a delegation of church leaders headed by his Grace the Honourable Bishop Desmond Tutu came to me at Parliament in Bisho.  They were concerned about the march and possible violence and enquired why I did not simply resign as the people seemed to want and hand over to an interim administrator.  I said that I was not prepared to do so in this hostile climate as not all the persons under my control were ANC supporters.  I genuinely felt that I owed allegiance to many people who relied on me.  I showed them videos of an ANC march in Ciskei where the marchers displayed vulgar behaviour towards the Ciskei government.  They were shocked and admitted that nobody should have to endure that.
 After lengthy discussions the delegation agreed to try and dissuade the ANC alliance from adopting this attitude, and to request them to call off the march.  I waited for their report-back but this never occurred. 
 I mention further that this delegation also requested a referendum to be held in Ciskei but I declined, for the following reasons.  The Ciskeian people had no experience of voting procedures at that time.  Such referendum seemed a costly option.  I did not see the need for a referendum because I was prepared to, and was negotiating reincorporation which was imminent in any event.  There seemed to be no dispute about the need for reincorporation.
 De Klerk declared the area surrounding Bisho an unrest area and informed the ANC that security forces would be on standby to ensure that the march conformed to the National Peace Accord.
 I further felt that De Klerk should never have permitted that march from Victoria grounds in King Williamstown as it was contrary to the non-aggression pact between South Africa and Ciskei.
 Steps taken by the Ciskei government prior to the 7th of September 1992, the march.  I consistently issued warnings that the proposed mass action seen against the background of the violence, intimidation and threats in Ciskei could have devastating consequences and I refused to allow it to happen.  I believed that as head of the Ciskei, which was at that stage an autonomous government I had a duty to protect the Ciskei as I saw fit and in the interests of my people.
 On the evening of the 6th of September 1992 an urgent application was brought by the Commissioner of Police against the ANC alliance declaring the proposed march unlawful if the requisite permission had not been obtained from the magistrate and consequently interdicting the ANC from continuing with such a march.  A copy of this application is annexed hereto marked Annexure F.  It sketches, Mr Chairman, the situation as my officials and I saw it at the time.  
 The ANC brought a simultaneous application, ja here is the application, which is lengthy and I think we will leave it at that.  The ANC brought a simultaneous application compelling the magistrate to apply his mind to the application previously made by them to the magistrate seeking permission for the march.  Both applications were granted.  The magistrate accordingly heard submissions and consequently permitted the march to take place and set certain conditions to be observed by the marchers.  Despite all the aforegoing the ANC alliance had repeatedly stated that they would have their march and would not be restrained.  They did not regard themselves bound by the Ciskei courts which is peculiar considering the fact that they brought an application to the very courts that they did not recognise.
 I must concede that initially I was not prepared to allow the march either, but after the courts had made orders and  ...(tape ends)
... only issued press release, annexed hereto as Annexure G.  It's a press release Mr Chairman which is self-explanatory describing the futility of my attempts to stop the march and expressing my wish to cooperate with the courts.
 Mr Chairman facsimiles were sent by the government lawyers, Hardman Cooke requesting that the ANC comply and/or alternatively pledge compliance with the conditions set down in the magistrate's order.  These facsimiles elicited no response from the African National Congress.  I annex them hereto for your information marked Annexure H.  The ANC alliance instead expressed its intention, publicly, to bridge the conditions and march to the original site which is the centre of Bisho.  
 The Bisho Massacre.  At all material times hereto I was at the Parliamentary buildings, I was not involved in the security operations at all which was left to the various commanders of the security forces in whom I had the fullest confidence to handle this situation.  From where I was I was not watching nor could I see with any clarity what was occurring in the vicinity of the march.  The security forces were aware from the outset that they were to prevent the marchers from occupying Bisho as even after the magistrate had permitted the march the ANC alliance had made it quite clear that they did not consider themselves bound by the restrictions.  I heard the noise and chanting of the marchers.  Subsequently I heard sounds which I initially did not identify as being shooting.  The Bisho Massacre had occurred.
 I consequently learned about the shooting incident and that lives had been lost.  I was informed that this had occurred as a result of the ANC alliance having breached the conditions of the march.  I immediately released a press statement conveying our sincerest condolences to the injured and the families of the deceased.  I annex as Annexure I a copy thereof.
 With your permission I will read, because it's short.