URIAL ABRAHAMSE
It's not only a perception, I'm going to qualify that further Mr Chair.  In the first instance in March 1985 they blew up by car bomb Mr Roger Nkadimeng, that was March 1980 and it was a complete over-kill, a complete over-kill.  I mean that was in Gaberone yes, in a block of flats.  I mean with Roger it was a complete over-kill.  When I did my military training I learned that one normally calculates the amount of explosives that you use scientifically but that say 250 grams of medium type explosive like TNT or what the Americans call C4 and things like that, medium-type explosives, you require approximately 250 grams of explosives to destroy a railway track.  In the case of Roger Nkadimeng, they blew up the car completely, the engine was lifted from the ground floor where it was parked and went through the roof of the flat which was two stories above.  It was a complete - there was nothing left of Roger, except his feet.  His feet just below the ankle which were still attached to the shoes.  That was all that was left of Roger.  That was March 1985.  Then I think it was May 1985 when the Botswana police raided the premises in Mogoditsane and found a caravan full of ANC weapons.  It was in the newspapers at the time, so it was clear that there was an escalation of South African activities against ANC people in Botswana.  It was mentioned earlier that we had been alerted.  It's true, it wasn't the first time that we had been alerted.  Yes, we had been alerted.  We, in response to the alert, because in the area where we stayed, there were Barry Guilder, Peter Richie, ourselves, Eric ...(indistinct), Judy Sideman, there were five houses which were inhabited by people who were either ANC members or supporters of the ANC and at one stage we had instituted a system where we would take turns to walk from the - at night, to walk from the one house to the next and just make sure that there's nothing untoward happening and the ANC always interpreted the question of the state of alert very seriously and it depended on the area where you were, on what type of action was undertaken.  In Angola for instance in the training camps where these facilities existed, we would move to alternative bases, when there was an alert.  In Zambia when there was an alert, the Security Department would visit each and every single ANC house and make sure that people were able to at least defend themselves.  In Tanzania where we had large concentrations of ANC people living unarmed at Morogworo, Somafko, the Tanzanian army would be alerted and they would step up their activities.  In the forward areas like in Botswana, there was essentially nothing that we could do.  I mean even the system that we had of taking turns to walk towards one another's houses, would have meant absolutely nothing, I mean, considering what Mr Olifant said yesterday about 50,60 tanks and jet fighters and helicopters and things, it's quite pathetic.  What we were able to do was nothing, so that was what follows from this issue Mr Chair.