MR MEYER
Thank you Chairperson.  Chairperson, members of the Commission first of all I would like to say thank you very much for the opportunity that the Commission has also created for us to be able to come to East London this morning and to testify to the Commission and to give evidence regarding the views of the National Party as to what happened on the 7th of September 1992 at Bisho.
 We recognise the fact that Mr Pik Botha was before the Commission previously and no doubt he has given also certain views that related to the position of the National Party, but he has also given evidence in regard to his portfolio that he then held responsibility for, namely the then Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
 In the light of the submissions that were earlier on given to the Commission, and in the light of the fact that it appeared to us that there might have been some corrections that we would like to put to the Commission we have therefore asked the Commission, through the Chairperson and the Vice Chairperson to be given the opportunity, and we are very glad that, especially Reverend Finca, has taken care of the arrangements in this regard, and has made it possible for us to be here this morning.  So we would like to express our appreciation to the Commission for the fact that especially at our request the arrangements were made 
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like it is.
 I am here in my capacity Chairperson as Secretary General of the National Party and therefore I will start off by introducing our submission.  Premier Kriel, of course, at that particular occasion when this incident occurred, was the Minister of Law and Order and will be able to give evidence as to his experience of that particular occasion and he was assisted on that very day by Senator Ray Radue, who was the then member of Parliament for King Williamstown.   We have drafted a submission Chairperson which we have made available to the Commission and also to the Press and in the submission we have stated our position as it will be clear from the document itself.  But in order to save time and as the document itself is quite clear, will be quite clear for everybody to read we have also drafted an Executive Summary which I am now going to put for the purposes of my introductory remarks, and then of course Premier Kriel and Senator Ray Radue will also come in if they would so require and in any event would be available for questions. I am reading from the Executive Summary therefore Chairperson.
 Certain submissions have been placed before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission regarding the tragic shootings which occurred on the 7th of September 1992 at Bisho in what was then the Ciskei.  The National Party wishes to submit further information regarding that unfortunate incident.  This submission is not intended attribute guilt or liability.  That is a matter which has already conclusively been determined by the Goldstone Commission, but to assist the TRC in its endeavours to promote reconciliation by establishing the truth.
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 Circumstances leading up to the shootings indicate that rolling mass action, which when exercised responsibly within the parameters of agreed mechanisms in itself is a democratic tool to express one's opinion, but was under these circumstances deliberately organised to put pressure on a negotiating process, even whilst negotiations on the Record of Understanding which was signed on the 26th of September 1992, a mere three weeks later, was in its conclusive stage of finalisation.  It was this document that put negotiations back on track and that eventually led to the free and democratic elections of April 1994 and the peaceful reincorporation of the Ciskei.  On the other hand a dictator was determined to fiercely protect his fifedom until the last moment regardless of the consequences.  This submission alludes to the dismal failure of the so-called Leipzig Option advocated by the SACP with the ANC in tow and the grave mistakes made by the SACP leaders in under-estimating the Gqozo regime's resolve not to abdicate its power because of the mere presence of the ANC/SACP alliance and its rhetoric.
 The submission highlights the political agreement which had been reached by all parties at CODESA 1 and in its work groups.  It focuses on the multi-party agreement which was supported by the then government, the ANC/SACP alliance and the Gqozo regime had all been party to those agreements which provided for a peaceful and constitutional reincorporation of the so-called TBVC states into the New South Africa.  
 It underlines the government's continued commitment to deal with this sensitive matter on an inclusive and agreed basis replacing unilateral action with consultation with all EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
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concerned parties.  The  submission emphasises the then 
government's honouring of its commitments to all inclusive negotiations at all times.  It serves to stress the progress which had been recorded at working group 4, under the auspices of CODESA 1 and to question the ensuing occurrences against the background of unanimity between all relevant players in this strategy.
 It notes that agreement had been reached inter alia between the government, the ANC/SACP alliance and the Ciskeans on reincorporation of the independent states, the restoration of citizenship, the testing of the will of the Ciskean people in respect of reincorporation, the necessity of retaining business confidence during reincorporation and most importantly that the reincorporation process would have to be formally legislated through the relevant legislative bodies.
 The agreement reached in Working Group 4, pertaining to reincorporation were eventually all implemented in the interim constitution.  Bloodshed had not been necessary to achieve this goal.  The notion of reincorporation of the TBVC continued to be accepted by all parties, even after the collapse of Codesa II which had not been precipitated by the issues dealt with by Working Group 4.  At no time after the collapse of the negotiating process did the ANC/SACP alliance distance itself from those agreements, nor did it at any time thereafter deny or break off its recognition of the Ciskei or its rulers as important players in the negotiating process.  
 This underlines two important issues.  Firstly, that the government of the day had fully cooperated in including all TBVC states and their constitutional future in the EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
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multi-party negotiating process.  At no time and nowhere did the then government try to prevent the constitutional reincorporation of all TBVC states and at no stage did it try to preserve any of the TBVC states' independence indefinitely.
 Secondly, that the ANC/SACP alliance had accepted and actively supported the TBVC states' status right to participate in a negotiating process.  It vociferously advocated and supported the inclusion of those states in the process and actively cooperated with all of them at the negotiating table.  
 The government had adopted an even-handed and fair attitude towards all of the TBVC states.  It sought to accommodate all interest groups in the process and often mediated and facilitated talks between differing parties.  It sought to create circumstances within which the constitutional future of the TBVC states could be determined by agreement with all parties and interested groups concerned.  
 In trying to achieve this it was often caught between the devil and the deep blue sea.  The ANC/SACP effectively, but irresponsibly exploited the government's dilemma of having to fulfil its duties in respect of impartial and good governance whilst having to take part in the negotiating process at the same time.  It reflects on the ambivalence and opportunistic attitude of the ANC/SACP alliance in accepting the Ciskei's presence and participation at the negotiating table, yet trying to hold the government responsible for all the Ciskei's actions, of, at times rejecting independence of the Ciskei, yet forcefully defending the independence of its allies, the Transkei and EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
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Venda.  And by blaming the government for not unilaterally 
and extra-constitutionally removing Gqozo and revoking the Ciskei's independence whilst insisting on an all-inclusive negotiating process.
 The submission traces all the positive steps taken by the government of the day to avert bloodshed or a crisis.  It provides a reminder of the successful mediation undertaken by the government on a previous occasion when a march to Bisho had been peaceful. It indicates the number of steps taken on all fronts by the government to ensure the peaceful and free exercise of political rights in the Ciskei.  
 The submission includes, Chairperson, details of the weak and deteriorating relationship between the government and the stubborn Gqozo regime, and how the government sought to use its good offices as a positive influence on the increasing tensions developing between the Gqozo and ANC/SACP alliance.  
 The submission traces the contributory causes of the shooting starting with the attempted coup d'etat by Onwod Gozana and Charles Sebe in late 1990, resulting in a clash between Oupa Gqozo and Chris Hani, leading to the mass action and the Nehawu strike action against the Gqozo regime in March and April of 1991.  The first attempted and failed march of 25 November 1991 to Bisho.  The second campaign of mass action designed to facilitate the occupation of Bisho which was foiled when exposed by the media.  The peaceful march to Bisho on 4 August 1992 after the then government had successfully mediated between the Gqozo regime and the ANC/SACP alliance.  Finally the tragic and unnecessary violent confrontation on 7 September 1992.
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 The submission notes the Goldstone Commission's 
findings on the strategy namely, that had the Ciskei authorities acceded to the pleas of the South African Government the SAP and the NPS to allow a peaceful and negotiated mass demonstration to take place, the violence could have been averted.  That the Ciskean defence forces' failure to close the gap in the fence of the Bisho stadium amounted to gross negligence and unprofessional.  Its condemnation of violence or strong-arm tactics to physically occupy a town or public facility as the ANC had been planning to do, especially when the vast majority of South Africans believed that no effort shall be spared to move to a democratic government by peaceful means. Its finding that the threats made by some leaders of the ANC/SACP alliance to embark on mass action with the intention of intimidation and directly causing the change of existing power is against the letter and spirit of the National Peace Accord.  And its recommendation that the leadership of the alliance should publicly censure Mr Kasrils and other persons who were responsible for the decision to lead demonstrators through the gap in the fence and thereby knowingly and negligently exposing them to the danger of death and injury.Chairperson I would like to read, lastly, the concluding paragraph on page 20 of the main submission, paragraph 5 on page 20.
 The epitaph to this sad and avoidably regrettable tragedy will be written by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.The tragedy had been totally unnecessary because it had been avoidable.  All relevant parties had been involved in open negotiations on the constitutional future of South Africa and of the Ciskei.  All relevant parties had committed themselves to a peaceful resolution of conflict 
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and a peaceful transition and the government and the ANC were in the conclusive stage of preparing the Record of Understanding.  Those who were killed and injured at Bisho were at the wrong place at the wrong time being led by irresponsible and reckless leaders against the tyrant and the regime with weapons wrongfully shooting at them, and although all measures had been taken to try and safeguard a peaceful outcome to the crisis they paid the ultimate price for reasons we may still not fully comprehend.  They should not be forgotten.
 The National Party therefore requests that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in its final report on the tragic shootings at Bisho on 7 September 1992 include a list of the names of all children, women and men who died on that fateful day under the burning African sun.  Let the names and tragedy of that day remind us all, and our children, of the price they paid for us to enter into the New South Africa.
 I thank you.