MR PRIOR
Thank you Mr Chairman, Mr Chairman, I intend to be as brief as I can.  I have not prepared written heads but I would ask the Committee's indulgence while I simply highlight certain of the areas.  The bulk of the evidence is before the Committee and the Committee will no doubt have to consider all the statements and all the evidence that has been led so far.
	Mr Chairman, I submit that this matter - this amnesty application, must be seen against the light of the political situation as of the 30th of December 1993.  I think it is singularly important to have regard to the fact that the controlling - the political arm, the PAC were party to those negotiations and it was made very clear during the submissions of the security forces - particularly that of the APLA, that the controlling organ within the organisation was the political structure.  
	At page 183 of the first bundle - that is of the bundle of documents, Brigadier Fitla on behalf of APLA said the following - the last four lines:
"But the command structure was such that the commander at the end of the day, has got to be politically accountable and he had to be politically accountable through consultation with the political Commissar"
And on page 184, he went on to say:
"So whatever we did had to enjoy the blessing of the Commissariat because at the end of the day, all our actions had to be politically justified"
I also refer the Committee to page 197 of the same submission or the bundle where Mr Makwinazi on behalf of the PAC stated at the bottom of the page, the last three lines:
"APLA is an organisation with the principles and the rules and regulations.  We perfected and developed it as an organisation that is subordinate to the Pan Africanist Congress.  It has the power"
And I go on to page 198:
"authority, the command to execute the armed struggle as it perceived it correct"
Now, Mr Chairman, it would see from the other submissions made during that presentation, that at some stage there was a breakdown in the desired line of communication where the political organ of the PAC in ...[indistinct] were unable to pass on the decisions that would have a military impact and it was then said that as a result of the breakdown of that communication, local commanders - and particularly in a large amount of the cases people without sufficient or adequate political education, were called upon to make decisions regarding targets to be attacked.