MR KNOETZE
That is true Mr Chairman.  I would have obviously moved to that point, subsequently.  But in my submission the most clear indication of the fact that he did what he did because he had to, is his directive in terms of which he was performing his duties and that appears in Exhibit C page 880, paragraph 4, which says
"The safety of the Eastern Province Command, the territory and the people resident there must be secured against the conventional landward onslaught from outside the RSA as well as military insurgents' activities from inside or outside the constitution territory of the RSA".
and that is precisely what he was doing.
	I also wish to refer you, Mr Chairman, to the directive which has been marked Exhibit D, which in paragraph 3 read with paragraph 8 says the following.
"By virtue of the fact that you are the Chairman you are given the authority to carry out all the functions listed below and to do so within the JMC context".
	Then paragraph 6 reads as follows:
"The JMC must have a plan of action in terms of which timeous and integrated inter-departmental action can be instituted whether on a proactive or reactive basis and the planning must provide for the co-ordinating of well-considered long-term planning which has as its aim the ensuring of the welfare and security of the populous and to develop it optimally, as well as a plan, a contingency plan to ensure that short-term welfare plans regarding certain problem areas exploited by the enemy can be carried out".
and then continues to set out how that should be done.
	My submission is, Mr Chairman, that what General van der Westhuizen did in respect of Katzen, the writing of the plan and the subsequent execution thereof, falls squarely within those clear instructions which he had.  	But then as far as his directive is concerned, which appears on page 880 one can also refer to paragraphs 13 and 14 which refers to the JMC and says:
"I hold you responsible for the effective functioning of the JMC..."
and so forth.
	And then as far as the "JMB" is concerned -
"I hold you personally responsible for the effective functioning and management of the JMB".
and you've been told, Mr Chairman, what the purpose of those two systems were.
	Then Mr Chairman on a broader scale I can refer you to numerous portions of what appears in Exhibit C, to indicate that on a broader scale this was also what he was expected to do.  I can start off by referring you to Malan, on page 693, and that which he did, I submit, falls squarely within the broad indications given by General Malan.  If I may take you, for instance, to page 707, paragraph 6.2.  It reads:
"The South African Defence Force as an organisation had a decentralised command structure.  This meant that the authority and responsibility in the execution and functioning of the South African Defence Force was delegated.  This is a universal accepted philosophy of management and applied world-wide by military forces".
Now that is what the position in which General van der Westhuizen found himself.  He was a commander of the Eastern Province Command and had to do, in terms of his broad instructions, that which was necessary in that area and Katzen is what he thought was necessary.
	And then page 709, paragraph 6, the last portion which reads:
"Therefore in 1985 the government was forced to internally employ the South African Defence Force in service in addition to the South African Police".
In other words the territory of the Republic of South Africa was declared an operational area for the South African Defence Force.  Merely to indicate once again to you, Mr Chairman, that it was a legitimate fight and war against the terrorist organisations.
	Then paragraph 7.3 and 7.4 on page 710, especially paragraph 7.4 where General Malan stated that -
"This essential direction of the South African Defence Force was not in all cases limited to only its own terrain.  The South African Defence Force applied it wherever it could act independently".
Here reference can be made to hundreds of community projects over the length and breadth of Southern Africa which is also what the General did, Mr Chairman.
	Then page 722, paragraph 10.4 where in the second portion it is stated that -
"During this time...."
which is the same timeframe during which Katzen was written and executed Mr Chairman -
"...the government's policy was clear- stop the perpetrator of violence at all costs, the carrier of the car-bomb, landmine, limpet mine, from the neighbouring states had to be destroyed, outside our borders or inside the country before he could commit his atrocity.  The destruction of the terrorist, his base and his capability was the mission of every soldier in the South African Defence Force and was also the policy of the government of the day.  In this way the killings of innocent civilians could be prevented".
Which is a much stronger policy than that which General van der Westhuizen tried to execute when he did Katzen, Mr Chairman.  He wasn't going to the extremes that would, even if he had, been within terms of the government's policy at that stage.
	I can also refer you, Mr Chairman, to the submission made by the SANDF which is the first part of Exhibit C where on page 135 and 136 paragraph 55.  There appears a quotation from what was broadcast by Radio Freedom which clearly indicates the manner in which the forces which General van der Westhuizen was opposing saw the situation at the time.  It says:-
"Ambushes must be prepared for policemen and soldiers with the aim of capturing weapons from them.  Our people must also manufacture home-made bombs and petrol bombs.  In addition our people must also buy weapons where possible.  After arming themselves in this manner our people must begin to identify collaborators and enemy agents and deal with them.  The collaborators, who are serving in the community councils, must be dealt with.  Informers, policemen, special branch police and army personnel living and working among our people must be eliminated.  Every homestead, every village, every township must be turned into a revolutionary base of the people.  Make the country ungovernable.  The whole of South Africa must be changed into a battlefield.  The time has come for whites to be regular visitors to graveyards".
	Now clearly Mr Chairman, the government of the day, as well as General van der Westhuizen in his position, was entitled to fight the war in the manner in which it did against the people who made such declarations.
	Then I can also refer you, Mr Chairman, to what is termed as Book 1, page 761, more particularly at page 762.  You will recall that this is an annexure to the submission which the SANDF made to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.  On page 762, paragraph 1.1, Mr Chairman, it is indicated that already on the 4th of March 1980, when this document was written it was stated that:
"Southern Africa is currently finding itself in total conflict situation and if a solution isn't found quite soon for the problems and issues in this area can be totally destroyed".
	Then page 764, paragraph 1.13.4 where in the second portion of that paragraph it is stated that -
"In order preventing the black states developing into areas which could constitute a great threat for the security of the RSA, it is essential that these areas must be taken up from a national security point of view as an integral part of the southern Africa strategy and utilised as allies against the communists".
which I submit, Mr Chairman, falls squarely within the purposes for which General van der Westhuizen wrote and executed Katzen.
	The same goes for the second portion of paragraph 1.14.1 of that page which reads:
"Meaningful consolidation of the black states and areas and the incorporation into a South African league of nations respectively as full members or associate members as well as a successful installation of an own constitutional direction under the black members of the RSA will lead to a greater goodwill, trust and confidence and decrease in the internal threat".
Once again, Mr Chairman, a clear purpose of plan Katzen.
	The same can also be found on page 768, Mr Chairman, paragraph 3.5.1.3 where as part of the political policy it is stated that - it can be summarised to include -
"The establishment of constitutional structures providing for the full independence of the black peoples in South Africa; meaningful consolidation of the black states and areas, and the acceptance and implementation of a socio-economic programme aimed at the development of these black states and areas".
Once again you will recall ...(indistinct) of that which he envisaged Mr Chairman.  And there are others Mr Chairman.  I won't keep you longer on ...(intervention)