MR COETZEE
Mr Chair, as far as the second applicant is concerned, it is common cause apparently that he at all times found himself in the vehicle.  What exactly happened on the premises, he had no influence on that and it is clear that he had reconciled himself with the action there, that he had a common objective.
	It is also indeed so that the applicants in their application, do not state that the premises would be first reconnoitred.  A fact on which Mr Prinsloo placed a lot of emphasis.  I would submit that the probabilities support Mr Van Zyl and Mr Holder's version.
	The idea that a white policeman would be shot and killed for the sake of a single pistol, was a  thought that clearly was not acceptable to them.
	The fact that shortly after the incident, they had sworn off, that they had given up their right-wing connections, is a very strong indication of the disappointment that they had felt - that is Messrs Van Zyl and Holder, regarding this particular incident.
	I would also respectfully submit and point out that it is clear that Messrs Van Zyl and Holder regarded Mr Van Schalkwyk as their Commanding Officer, Mr De Meillon was held up to them as a dependable person, he knew what he was doing, who had already observed targets and the impression was created that they could openly without any reservation, go along with him, and that an excessive operation would not be planned and executed.
	To lay it before their door that in the two hour trip from Secunda to Pretoria, they at that stage did not start asking who would play what role and when, I would also submit that it is not justified to do so.
	At that stage, they didn't even know exactly what their target was. One would have expected them, when they arrived at the target, perhaps to just first drive passed, make an observation.  Perhaps then walk passed and do another observation, and then perhaps to come to a final planning and execution of the plan.
	To expect of them that they would have to take this specialist De Meillon and to question him, would given the fact that they were mere members of the AWB who had been sent as assistants, would just be asking too much.  Their impressions were clearly that Commandant De Meillon when it suited him, would pass onto them the information which they might require in order to carry out the operation.
	When indeed he disclosed to them the Pretoria target and found themselves in a position to make an evaluation of the risk involved, they immediately indicated that it was not part of the planning.  The fact of the matter is that because they had not attacked those guards, it is clear that the second and third applicants did not have any expectation whatsoever, that this was the type of thing that would have happened.  It had been in Mr De Meillon's mind that automatic weapons would be taken from guards, is clear, but the fact that it didn't happen, is clear proof that it didn't fit in with Mr Holder and Mr Van Zyl's agenda.
	I would therefore like to state that the problem should further be looked at from a different perspective and that is they drove back from Pretoria, De Meillon is the respected and appreciated Commander of the BRL, he had been instructed to find weapons, and now he is on his way to Secunda from Pretoria, with empty hands.
	If on a Saturday night, before the elections, when everybody believes there is a civil war confronting them, and he would turn up with empty hands at his command structure, what a fool he wouldn't be made of under those circumstances?
	So Mr De Meillon looks at alternative planning and on route back to Secunda, he thought of Devon.  He discloses it to his co-applicants, that Devon is an area well known to him.  There were also automatic weapons.  The applicants at all times believed that there wouldn't just be a blind attack that would follow.  It is a place that had to be reconnoitred properly.