MR MEYER
Chairperson, Commissioner, as far as the first point of clarification is concerned on page 1 of the Executive Summary, in that particular sentence we are referring first of all to what is being referred to in the main document also as the so-called Leipzig Option.  I think that is terminology that comes from certain newspaper quotes that is being referred to in the main document where I think it was Mr Raymond Suttner was quoted by referring to that Option.  There are extensive quotes in the main document referring to Mr Suttner and others who have apparently been responsible to design the strategy and afterwards they were called upon to give their reactions and so forth by the media, so that is what is being referred to there.   I would say that I think the clarity will come if one reads the main document in that regard.
 The other part of that sentence indicates that maybe on the side of those that led the demonstration there was an under-estimation of what actually Gqozo had in mind, and that there was something of, if one also reads the comments afterwards, again in the main document, it appears that there was almost a challenge that was executed by those that led the demonstration to see almost how far Gqozo might go in his reaction.  And I think that is what is being indicated to in this sentence.  But that links up with the next page and your second question actually.
EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
42 R MEYER
 In that regard Chairperson I think it's important to note that, and I think one has to make the observation that although the parties, be it at Codesa or at a later stage, all agreed to the reincorporation of the TBVC states they resisted it in various ways, up to a very late stage.  I must remind Honourable Commissioners of for instance the case of Bophuthatswana they were not even after the conclusion of the interim constitution, or the negotiations on the interim constitution, they were at that stage even still not prepared to give up and to become part of the New South Africa.  I don't have to refer now, because it's not relevant as far as this meeting is concerned and I believe the Commission will separately deal with that issue, but various other decisions and actions had to follow before the actual reincorporation of Bophuthatswana could be effected, although they were also part of the original agreement in Working Group 4.  So what I am trying to prove with this point is to say the parties were all part of the original agreement in Working Group 4, but it didn't mean it's true.
 Now with hindsight one can reflect on that and say it is clear that they did not right through up to the end, or at every given moment, agree to actually work for the execution of those agreements.  And that again is reflected also, to my mind, in what happened on the 7th of September. Because in a certain way that was an indication of Gqozo's reaction against the agreement to which he was himself part of.  
 I hope I have tried to clarify that particular point that we are actually getting to in the submission, namely to say there were agreements, all parties were part of it, including the Ciskean Government, but they were not 
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43 R MEYER
necessarily executing it in the way that one should have thought they should have.
 Maybe the last question Mr Kriel would like to respond to.