H J P BOTHA
That is correct, Chairperson.  This Communication and Logistic Network was not only used by Ndaba but also other informers who operated across the borders of the countries.  If Ndaba would convey the information which he had to the ANC SACP Alliance, it would undoubtedly endanger this whole intelligence network of the Security Branch in Durban and the disclosure of his knowledge, of the informants and collaborators who were involved with the Communication and Logistic network, their lives would also be endangered.  There was a great possibility that Ndaba had realised that there were other informers of the SAP in Operation Vula which was indeed the position.  He would have suspected from his tasks, this from his tasks and questions.  If he had conveyed these suspicions to the ANC, the ANC would start with a witch hunt and the informer's life would mean nothing. Because it became clear to me that a great problem stared us in the face if Ndaba had to be released to go to the ANC SACP Alliance, I considered other alternatives.  Detention of Ndaba in terms of the Security Legislation was senseless and could be severely counter productive if Ndaba had made a Section 29 statement and disclosed his involvement as an informer and other informers, the detention of Ndaba was therefore not a viable option.  With regard to Shabalala the situation was not less complicated.  Initially he could not be released before there was time to monitor the situation with regard to Ndaba's position.  Because of his outspoken belief that Ndaba was a police informant, he could not be released and the paradox of the situation was that Shabalala's fate had been decided in order to protect Ndaba and last names at the end would go and make a disclosure to the ANC which sealed his fate.  When I decided to eliminate Ndaba, the considerations with regard to Shabalala changed.  I considered whether he could not be released because he could no longer compromise Ndaba's position but I decided against it.  The problem with Shabalala was then that he had been detained for quite some time.  It would be an embarrassment if he had been released and he would inform the ANC about his unlawful abduction and detention, therefore if we should eliminate Ndaba and release Shabalala he would certainly tell the ANC that he had been detained with Ndaba and also deduce that Ndaba had been eliminated.  The  mere fact of such an allegation would, during the time of the negotiations, create an embarrassment for the National Party.  These options were discussed by myself and General Steyn on the morning of the 14th of June 1990.  Consequently I came to the conclusion that the only solution was that Ndaba and Shabalala had to be eliminated.  I contacted Gen Steyn the afternoon of the 14th of July 1990 to inform him but he was not available and I thought that he might have departed for Pretoria for further information and planning.  I then discussed the problem with Lt du Preez.  We discussed our possible options and came to the conclusion that the only safe and permanent solution to the problem was the elimination of the two persons.  I then requested du Preez to be of assistance.  I called van der Westhuizen and Wasserman to the safe-house and after informing them I gave instruction to them to be of assistance.
	I truly believed that in order to protect the South African Police, the Security Branch and the National Party, which was the Government, and to voice the instructions which I had received from the S A Police command structure to fight against the ANC SACP Alliance and because of conditioning through courses, seminars, conferences and speeches by politicians, that the ANC could never take over the RSA, that my action to eliminate Ndaba and Shabalala, this was expected of me as a member of the Security Branch and fell within my express or implied authorisation.
	After discussion with regard to the elimination method was decided that the two would be shot dead the same evening and that their bodies be thrown into the river.  van der Westhuizen was a fisherman and knew the rivers well and he went on a reconnaissance tour of the Tugela.  van der Westhuizen departed at approximately 15h30 and returned at approximately 19h00 with the report that he had found a suitable place next to the Tugela where the water was deep, flowed deep and strong, next to the northern embankment.
	While van der Westhuizen was absent, du Preez, Wasserman and I took two concrete poles, in which prefab walls fit in, a roll of hessian, wire or twine, a black bag and two silenced weapons, Scorpion pistols, into the vehicle.
	I spoke to Ndaba and Shabalala and told them that I would transfer them to another safe-house in Norther Natal.  I wanted to prevent them getting any ideas that something was about to happen to them.  At approximately 11 that evening, all of us departed to the Tugela River in a single vehicle, a Volkswagen kombi and because van der Westhuizen had done the reconnaissance earlier that afternoon, he was the driver of that vehicle. 
	On the other side of the Tugela bridge we turned off left on a road which led to the Tugela River.  When we turned off van der Westhuizen said that he had a need and we had to turn into the bushes.