MR VISSER
Please continue.
MR BOTHA
"It was the knowledge of the members of the Security Branch that intermittently from Mozambique through and in Swaziland, an active role was fulfilled by high profile MK members in the planning and execution of violent actions in the RSA.  That weapons of war were smuggled by and through Swaziland to the RSA.  That a great deal of terrorists had left the RSA and after they had completed their military training, had returned to the RSA via Swaziland.  That there was an extensive network of safehouses and other facilities with which terrorists were supported.  That financial and logistical support was provided to such persons in Swaziland.
		Due to the geographical proximity of Natal to Swaziland, the activities of the liberation movements in Swaziland became known to Natal.  The Security Branch Eastern Transvaal was naturally also affected by this.  Due to their intelligence capacity, the Security Branch was kept up to date very well with activities and personalities and their activities in Swaziland.  
		The Security Branch was up to date regarding who the ANC operatives were and what their intentions were.  By means of well-placed informers they regularly received information regarding the terrorists and weaponry that would enter the RSA, as well as the routes along which they would travel, as well as the situation of the DLBs and safehouses.  The DLBs actually refer to weapon stockpiling location and not necessarily points of information.  They also had knowledge about safehouses, contact persons and so forth, which placed them in a capacity to act in future.
		Swaziland also played an important role in the execution of the ANC/SACP alliance's Operation Butterfly and Operation Vula.  In Swaziland certain structures had been established by the ANC/SACP alliance and had been operated as such.  There was an RPMC, a Regional Politico Military Committee under which the so-called political committee and a military committee functioned."