CHRISTOFFEL PIERRE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN
Yes.  In paragraph (d) I say that especially in the Ciskei, and the fact that they were not viable as a full independent country, that actually causes a problem for the RSA inasfar as its policy was concerned.  In other words, it was a visible sign that the policy hadn't worked.  In this State there was even more than latent instability, and of course that stimulated the revolution in this area.
	In paragraph (c), there I say that the Ciskei and Transkei are part of the Eastern Province and things were not very sound in the Eastern Province at that stage.  Then I say that in military terms the Eastern Cape should be seen as one theatre of war and should not be seen as three different military fronts.
	Paragraph (d), there I refer to the inability of the government and its instruments, especially at a regional level, to combat the escalating and worsening situation of unrest in the country and in the Eastern Cape.  And that let, in the Eastern Cape especially, to a growing feeling of defeatism, even amongst the whites.
	At the same time, in the mid-80's, there was an economic collapse or decline, Ford and other factories closed down in the Eastern Cape.  And as I've put it here, there as a whole aura of bankruptcy in the area, there was no feeling that there was a future, that there was something permanent here.  There was a lack of confidence, whites moved away, the property market started collapsing.  And I think the people today would be able to remember, the people who lived here at that time will actually remember how bad it was.
	In paragraph (e), what I say is that we tried to activate resistance movements as a front to counter the revolutionary forces and we tried to keep this alive, the resistance movements which we tried to foster amongst the moderate blacks, but it didn't actually work.  They were intimidated and infiltrated by the enemy.  And then, it was really a disturbing thing for us to try and fight this political war in the Eastern Cape, because we didn't have very good dynamic National Party politicians in this area to help us fight this war.  I just felt that I actually wanted to convey this to my chief.  
	So these factors in paragraph 6, well I said that they were eroding the prosperity and progress in the Eastern Cape and that like with an iceberg, it's the portion which is not visible, which is massive and the full extent of that, I don't think that was truly familiar and known to the people who had to make decisions.
	Perhaps optimistically I say the situation is serious but not entirely lost and that things look darker than they actually are.  Then I mention that aspect of the winning recipe and that we were trying to deal with the matter or the issue.