UNKNOWN
I served under the area commissioner in East London.  Currently during 1992 I was a major in the South African Police and I was seconded to the then Ciskei Police Force.  I was appointed as the commanding officer of the
EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
6 R P SIMMS
Ciskei Riot Unit.  
 During August 1992 information was received that a march would be held by the ANC/SACP alliance to protest against the regime of Brigadier Gqozo, the chairperson of the Military Council in the Ciskei.   This march would allegedly move from King Williamstown to the Ciskean Parliamentary buildings.  The march would take place during September 1992 after a failed march led by the ANC/SACP alliance on the 4th of August 1992.  I might just qualify why we say a failed march during August, the 4th of August, information which we received then was that they also wanted to march through the Parliamentary buildings but couldn't reach them.  Joint planning sessions were held by the Ciskei police force, Ciskei defence force and Ciskei Traffic Police.  These meetings were held on several dates in 1992, in September.  The meetings were attended or initiated by the Defence force of the Ciskei and Brigadier van der Bank of the defence force was the chairperson during these meetings.   During the meetings the conduct of the group of people on the 4th of August 1992 was discussed, inter alia the position of the person in command of the police on the ground was discussed.  During the march on the 4th of August 1992 problems were experienced by myself who was then in charge of the police on the ground, in relation to the fact that the leaders of the march ignored myself completely during the negotiations and relaying of messages to headquarters.  Because, this is just conjecture, possibly because I was a White person or because they knew I was a seconded member or simply just too low in status and rank.  Whatever the reason I was ignored.  
 A further problem which was experienced by myself was 
EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
7 R P SIMMS
that the Ciskei police did not have any razor wire at its disposal and that led to marchers intermingling with the police whilst negotiations were continuing between Brigadier Gqozo and their leaders.  Razor wire was then ordered from Pretoria and then two container units of razor wire were received.  
 During some of these meetings, especially at the one during which we considered who would be the commanding officer on the day was Brigadier Ngcobo and Brigadier Sam of the Ciskei Police headquarters.  They were present.  At the meeting it was decided that Brigadier Ngcobo would be the commanding officer of the members during the march and he accepted it as such.  Brigadier Ngcobo was also, by virtue of his appointment at head office overall in charge of the riot unit.  I therefore fell directly under his command.
 Chairperson may I just add something here to perhaps cut short a long story.  As a seconded member it was my task to give information and also to give leadership and training and guidance on all these issues, so even if I had been in command myself I would have acted in exactly the same way.  I just wanted to make that clear.
 Further decisions taken at these meetings as a result of information received were inter alia the march had been prohibited by the military dictator, Brigadier Gqozo and had to be stopped at the RSC/Ciskei border.  That was an express instruction which was decided at these meetings.  It could not go further than the Ciskei border.  According to the Chairperson express instructions were received from Gqozo that the marchers would not be allowed under any circumstances to enter Ciskei territory.  
 Commandant Nkosana from the Ciskei defence force would EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
8 R P SIMMS
be in charge of the defence force members deployed on the ground.  Brigadier Ngcobo from the Ciskei police would be in charge of the police on the ground.  In other words the riot unit was the first line of defence.  And also because of the reasons mentioned in paragraph 4 obtained.
 The Ciskei defence force would only act in support of the Ciskei police.  When the Ciskei police could not handle the situation anymore Brigadier Ngcobo would then orally, by means of Brigadier Nkosana request them to take over.  The police would then withdraw.
 The following information, which was also submitted to the meeting, and it was considered, namely that the organisers of the march would approach Bisho from various directions and try and spread the manpower of the police and defence force; that there was an open piece of land between the Ciskei People's Bank and the Supreme Court that this would be occupied for 24 hours by the marchers;  that Brigadier Gqozo would on that day, 7 September, would be removed as head of state on that day. 
 On the 2nd of September various people visited the area, myself included and a copy of my diary is attached for that particular day.  I see it's not been attached but that means it's probably still in the docket.  The main road between Bisho and King Williamstown was checked and we decided on the various spots where the police and defence force would be deployed.  The fence was inspected since this fence could be used by us as a blockade by putting the razor wire across the road right up to the fence.  The Bisho stadium itself was not inspected since during the planning it was decided that a company of defence force members, now I don't know Chairperson a company of defence force members
EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
9 R P SIMMS
would be about 120 members approximately, it was decided during planning that a company of defence force members would be deployed within the stadium.  The stadium was therefore, at no stage in the planning, made accessible to the marchers.  It was therefore not necessary to check the stadium as well as all the fences around the stadium.  The Ciskei defence force members would also be deployed at Fort Hare University grounds as well as the dirt road in the area.  The dirt road in the Jongalanga Road, and it's the road which leads to the Post Office.
 The defence force would be deployed about 100 metres from the border and seen in the light of this planning the Ciskei defence force could not act before the police actually withdrew.  That will become clear later from the statement or perhaps from my answers to questions later on.
 The Ciskei defence force was present in a supporting role since the police did not have enough manpower to actually deal with the march.  The Ciskei police force's strength at that stage was about a 1800 members and that included men, women, members on leave, on sick leave etc, that included the whole lot and they were about 1800.  
 As a result of events on the 4th of August 1992, events preceding that day, namely, the fact that businesses had been burnt down, there had been stonings of cars, people had been killed in Ndantsane and various other areas in Ciskei it was decided that sufficient members had to be deployed in all the bigger centres to prevent a repetition of this.  And this further tied up the police manpower.
 On Sunday an interdict was obtained by the ANC in the Supreme Court, Bisho, against the declaring of the meeting as illegal.  The Supreme Court gave judgement and referred 
EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
10 R P SIMMS
the application to the magistrate of Zwelitshwa for his decision on Monday.  On the 7th during placing of the police members, that is the day of the actual march, the 7th of September at 7 o'clock in the morning during placing of the police members as well as the defence force members the march was still illegal.  In other words we had received no contrary decision from the magistrate or the Supreme Court so it was still illegal.
 The planning as set out in the paragraphs in the statement were put into operation.  The Ciskei defence force members were also deployed in terms of our planning.  The Bisho stadium was occupied by them.  The Ciskei police force members were put in position about 9 o'clock about 100 metres from the RSA/Ciskei border.  
 The two containers of razor wire were taken from the southern part of the national road to the northern part of the road right opposite the Bisho stadium, that is from the Fort Hare campus right up to the Bisho stadium, the southernmost fence.  The razor wire was then attached to the fence with other types of wire and this was about 20 metres within the Ciskei.  Road blockades were erected by the Ciskei police and these were withdrawn.  
 The front line of the Ciskei police consisted of about 15 members armed with teargas and rubber bullets.  The members also had their normal 9mm side arms with them.  About 10 metres behind them there were about 20 members armed with shotguns and birdshot and rubber bullets as well as their side arms.  About 10 metres behind the second line there were 15 members with R5 rifles and behind them was a vehicle or vehicles were parked with their faces fronting east.  There were members of the riot squad in these lines 
EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
11 R P SIMMS
because they had better training in this type of conduct and situation.  At that stage they were about the only people who had training in riot control, and therefore it was thought that they would not panic so easily.
 The riot unit at this stage consisted of 70 members and that included officers.  Brigadier Ngcobo was not yet on the scene at the time.  At about 10 o'clock that morning Lieutenant-General Viktor, the Commissioner of the Ciskei police appeared on the scene and then told me that the march had been approved by the magistrate of Zwelitsha on condition that the marchers only go up to the stadium and that the marchers would only be able to enter the stadium from the west side and not from the Jongalanga Street side.  In other words the side closest to where the marchers would come from.
 Brigadier Ngcobo at this stage was with Lieutenant-General Viktor.  Lieutenant-General Viktor then told me that he had borrowed some more razor wire from the SAP and I then erected this extra razor wire to try and prevent the marchers from entering the stadium by the police station side.  The defence force members had to withdraw, had to be withdrawn by their commanding officers to be deployed elsewhere.
 I told Viktor that the gate on the western side of the stadium was not big enough to accommodate the hoards of people and that two other gates at the back of the stadium had to be opened.  These gates unfortunately were padlocked.
 The arrangements and the steps which I took I took because I saw that he was not planning to do anything. That is now - I apologise I have jumped ahead here.  I will repeat.  I told Viktor that the gate on the western side of 
EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
12 R P SIMMS
the stadium was not wide enough to accommodate the hoards of people who wanted to enter the stadium and that I would try and open two other gates at the back of the stadium for them.  These gates had been padlocked.  He, however, told me to leave the gates locked because the gate on the western side would apparently be sufficient for the people to gain access.  I then went to the razor wire behind the stadium and saw that the one gate would definitely not be sufficient and I then tried to open one of the other gates.  I couldn't open the gates and then I took steps to try and open the gates because I saw that Viktor was not intending to do anything.  
 As a result of the granting of permission by the magistrate that the marchers could use the stadium which was entirely unforeseen and under the circumstances in which the march would take place, Brigadier Gqozo's attitude towards the march and the Supreme Court's judgement on the 6th of September our planning actually became a bit confused and the new arrangements and the deployment of troops as well as the obtaining of new razor wire meant that the police finished their tasks at the Ciskei/South African border about 20 minutes before the start of the march.  We had trouble with some of these razor wire containers.  We had to use a bit of force to get them over the fence of the stadium so we wasted time there as well.
 At about 12 o'clock the march, approximately 30,000 people approached the road blockade near the border, a large group stayed near the fence and others started tampering with the fence and started pulling at it.  Some of the people in charge of the marchers, they were marshals tried to prevent these people from fiddling with the wire.  After 
EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
13 R P SIMMS
some minutes the foremost group started moving to the left.  They started running towards the left.  They sang and danced all the time and they started entering the stadium.  At this stage I thought that there would be no problems and that the organisers would adhere to the magistrate's conditions.
 Lieutenant-General Viktor was present throughout.  Some of the marchers entered the stadium and others ran in amongst, between the fence and the security police.  This group ran past the southernmost entrance of the stadium and at this stage I saw that the marchers were trying to remove the razor wire. ..(tape ends)  Viktor then instructed me to take some of my members to the back of the stadium to see where the large group of people were moving.  I then sent three members, two of them had radios, before they could report back to me I heard a shot on the eastern side, the Jongalanga Street side of the stadium and the next moment I heard automatic gunfire and the soldiers on the Fort Hare side started firing then.  Shots sounded next to me in the tarred road and I knew that there was chaos because people were shooting at random.  All the police members who were in the direct line of fire just ran for cover.
 General Viktor and myself found shelter behind a casper wheel and I heard two very loud blows, like explosions, I wasn't sure, however, where they came from.  After about three minutes the rifle fire died down and the other members I told them to actually move away from the line of fire and to withdraw. We then fell back and the group dispersed and ran off in all directions.  I don't know who fired the first shot or shots.  It is therefore clear that the situation went completely out of control and that the defence force had not yet, at that stage, when the firing started had 
EAST LONDON HEARING TRC/EASTERN CAPE
14 R P SIMMS
received an order from myself or Viktor or Brigadier Ngcobo.  At no stage did the police act or fire.  That is just a formality at the end.  That is all.