MR HATTINGH
... is whether there exists a reasonable suspicion of bias on the part of the decision maker.  An apprehension of a real likelihood that the decision maker will be biased, is not a prerequisite for disqualifying bias.  The very objects which the reasonable suspicion test are calculated to achieve, would be frustrated by grafting onto it the further requirement that the probability of bias must be foreseen provided that the suspicion of partiality is one which might reasonably be entertained by a lay litigant, a Reviewing Court cannot be called upon to measure in a nice balance, the precise extent of the apparent risk.
	If suspension is reasonably apprehended, then that is an end to the matter.  The last case is the Supreme Court judgement, Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division, S v Collier 1995 (8) BCLR 975 (C) where it is stated on page 978 at (g) to (i) it was an appeal pertaining to an application for recusal, turning to the matter of the appeal, it is true that justice should not only be done, but manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.
	It is for this reason that South African courts have not hesitated to set aside proceedings where a person challenged, has so associated himself with one of the two opposing sides, that there was a real likelihood of bias or where reasonably lay people would get the impression that he would be biased.
	South African law has developed to a stage that disqualifying bias will be found to exist where the reasonably lay observer would gain the impression that there is a real likelihood that the decision maker will be biased.
	Mr Chairman, the golden threat that runs through all the judgements is that we are dealing with a subjective perception on the part of a litigant or on the part of a party, or of an interested party.