UNKNOWN
That is the case.  If it should be claimed
2A therefore/...
151 BRIG CRONJE
therefore by anyone that the State Security Council was not awareof the actions of the security forces and the security policeor of any specific incidents this would not be true.   BrigadierSchoon, during 1986 was in command of the terrorist division atthe security head office.  He phoned me one morning and told methat the Commissioner of Police gave him instructions, then GeneralJohan Coetzee, gave him instructions that the security policeand particularly my staff had to work with special forces.  Hisinstructions to me was to cooperate with the SADS special forces. 
 I must just mention here Chair, that there had always been somedisagreement between the SADF and the South African Police thatwe had difficulty in cooperating.  The SADF special forces wasa specialised combat group which undertook covert operations. If Brigadier Schoon for instance gave me instructions to workwith Military Intelligence I would not have considered an instructionto wage war.  But the instruction to work with special serviceswas a direct instruction to become engaged in military warfare. This instruction was given to me somewhat after the instructionfrom Brigadier Victor but the two instructions were given withina couple of months from each other.  I accepted this instructionfrom Brigadier Schoon and respected it as an instruction to becomedirectly militarily engaged and to counter the onslaught activelyin a military manner.  This was no longer normal policing functionsof normal policing tasks which I was authorised to exercise. My responsibilities became far broader.  All instructions, therefore,which I gave to my subordinates or which in another manner wastransferred to my subordinates must be seen against the backgroundof these two 
2A instructions/...
152 BRIG CRONJE
instructions.  It must be seen as instructions to act in a situationand circumstances of war.  These actions must therefore be seenas military actions in a context of guerilla warfare.