MR HATTINGH
I am doing it on my own accord, thank you.  Mr Chairman, I just want to take you quickly through the case law as far as I gather the rules applicable to an application for recusal.
	In the S v Maseko 1990 (1) SACLR (107) (A), it is stated in Afrikaans and I am quoting the principle that is applicable for this whole matter for recusal from a legal official is that the law without suspicion, must be followed.  Not only must this official present this case impartially and also with an open mind, but nothing in his actions must or can be connected that would give reason that justice is not done.
	From this decision it would seem that the test has to do with the perceptions of the reasonable person.
	Then I refer you to S v Radebe 73 (1) SA 812 (A) where Appellate Judge Roelf said with regard to applications for recusal and I quote a Court looks at the impression which would be given to other people, even if he was as impartial as could be, nevertheless if right minded persons would think that in the circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias on his part, then he should not sit and if he does sit, his decision cannot stand.
	This was confirmed, referred to and confirmed in Munnik & Others v The Council of Review & Others (C), Friedman, Howie and Conradie 1989 (4) SA 866 and I quote from the heading - the test for bias is that a Judge should recuse himself if there is reason for fear of partiality on his part.
	That test is more stringent when non-judicial tribunal performing functions indistinguishable from the judicial process, since public would expect it to behave exactly like a court of law.  And in the case of Schultz v Chairman Personnel Advice Committee of the Municipal Council of George, 1983 (4) SA 689.   This decision follows this principle but we are dealing with a kwazi judicial issue here before this forum and the issue was if the Chairman of such a Committee was the subject for a recusal and then it has bearing on the whole Committee.
	Then I would like to refer you to a decision (E) Kicky v Commissioner of Correctional Services & Another 1992 (2) SA 269, Judges Kannemeyer and Ludolf applied the test and confirmed that it is the fear of biased expressed by the applicants which is to be considered.
	Then I would like also to refer to another case reported in 1996 (9) BCLR 1221 (T).  I quote from page 1229 at (i), the law in respect of the test for bias has recently been settled in the case of BTR Industries South Africa v Metal and Allied Workers Union where Appellate Judge Hookster stated in Rex v Connie & Another, Judge President Krause made the following observations which in this country are as pertinent now as they were some 60 years ago.  It is a matter of the gravest public policy that the impartiality of the courts of justice should not be doubted or that the fairness of a trial should not be questioned, otherwise the only (indistinct) of the liberty of the subject in these times of revolutionary tendencies would be undermined.
	Then on page 1230 at (c), I quote further, the law does not seek in such a case to measure the amount of his interest.  I venture to suggest that the matter stands no differently with regard to the apprehension of bias by a lay litigant provided the suspicion of partiality is one which might reasonably be entertained by a lay litigant, a Reviewing Court cannot so I consider, be called upon to measure in a nice balance, the precise extent of the apparent risk.
	If suspicion is reasonably apprehended, then that is the end of the matter.
	Last case but one that I would like to refer to is the one of BTR Industries South Africa 1992 (3) SA 673 (A) and I quote from the heading, Appellate Division decision, the test to be adopted in a recusal application is involving the appearance of bias is whether there exists a reasonable suspicion of bias on the part of the decision maker.