MR RHAMAPHOSA
Thank you.  There may be questions that only he can answer.  Chairperson, we wish to thank the Commission for permitting the African National Congress to make a submission on the events of the day when many people were massacred in Bisho.  In our submission we will seek to deal with, very briefly, the context in which that massacre took place, the political context.
 We will also seek to deal with the situation in the Ciskei at that time, or the so-called Ciskei.  We will also deal with attempts that were made by the leadership of the Tri-partheid Alliance and a number of other organisations, to address the problems in this area.
 We will also explain to you what happened when we held what we call a major march, the first march which was attended by 60,000 people and we will also deal with how we went about planning for, or preparing for the march for the 7th September and also deal with the events of the day themselves.   In our conclusion Chairperson, we will seek to raise a number of questions which we believe needs to be addressed.  The massacre on the 7th September 1992, Chairperson, needs to be understood within the context of the broad struggle which was being waged by millions of South Africans to bring democracy to our country and it also needs to be seen against the breakdown of the multi-party talks at CODESSA in May of that year.
 The ANC and its allies in the Tri-partheid Alliance launched a massive national campaign in June involving a whole range of actions and at that time it was popularly referred to as rolling mass action, and rolling mass action involved marches, demonstrations, sit-ins, town and city occupations or assemblies.  It also involved workers taking one action or another in their workplaces, and it also involved many other forms of peaceful protests and the specific attention was to be given to the Bantu stans, especially Bophuthatswana, the Ciskei and KwaZulu Natal homeland and the objective, the overall objective was to bring about democracy to our country but the specific one was to make sure that there is free political activity, which freedom, which fundamental human right was suppressed especially in these three areas - Bophuthatswana, the Ciskei and KwaZulu Natal.
 Whereas after 1990 Chairperson, South Africans had started experiencing a measure of some political freedom and mobility, where in a number of other towns and areas in our country we were able to hold meetings.  We were able to hold marches.  We were able to participate in a measure of free political activity.  In these three areas, these freedoms limited as they were broadly in South Africa because there wasn't democracy, we were not able to enjoy and participate in, in these three areas.
 The aim was to restore conditions that were conducive in the whole, to having the country returning back to the negotiation table and making sure that there is a levelling of playing fields.  
 For a proper understanding of the purpose of the march of the 7th September it is necessary to give a brief account of the political situation in the Ciskei and the circumstances that also led to that march.  The Ciskei was governed by one Brigadier Oupa Gqozo who was the head of the military regime and he had acceded to this position after seizing power from the administration which was headed by Lenox Sebe.  The highest chief executive structure was the Council of State over which Brigadier Gqozo presided and he tended to rule by decree.
 Oupa Gqozo's regime had no popular mandate and it is a regime that had persistently refused to allow free political activity to take place in the Ciskei.  Simply put, Chairperson, Oupa Gqozo was not seen as a person who acted in the interests of the people in this area, he was seen as a person who acted against a legitimate interest of people in this area and as a result he was abhorred and deeply hated by people in this area.
 The Ciskei security forces which prodded him up and gave him sustenance to misrule this area, were under a command of officers that were seconded by the South African Defence Force.  It was these officers who provided the Gqozo regime with the managerial capacity to carry out various actions against our people in this area and also against their organisations, primarily the ANC.  They also provided the background of intelligence reports which underpinned the strategy that was utilised by Gqozo.  In addition sir, it was De Klerk's government which provided the Gqozo regime with the necessary finance to continue operating.
 The Ciskei government had attempted but had been unable to develop a base of popular support for its policies or to retain the support of all the people who were associated with it when it first came into power.  At the time of the march over 20 cabinet ministers appointed by Oupa Gqozo since he came to power, had been dismissed by him for one reason or another or had resigned.  The Administration of the Ciskei including its security forces, was largely under the control of seconded former South African government officials.  Most of the black military officers had also been dismissed by Gqozo.  
 We have names of a number of the security officers who were seconded and those will be outlined in the document that the Commission has been already given.  Although the Ciskei regime when it came into offices, enacted what it called a Bill of Rights, it had not permitted free political activity within the Ciskei and had consistency used the provisions of the Ciskei National Security Act to curtail political activity and this it did, notwithstanding a ruling by the Ciskei Supreme Court that the provisions of their own laws were against or in conflict with the Bill of Rights that they had incorporated into their own legal system.
 The Tri-partheid Alliance as led by the African National Congress, on the contrary, had widespread support within the borders of the Ciskei.  They were not permitted by the Ciskei regime to organise freely in the Ciskei or to voice their opposition through normal democratic channels to the policies of the Ciskei.  This had been an ongoing source of grievance among the supporters of the Tri-partheid alliance which has been exacerbated by the attitude that was taken by the government of Oupa Gqozo, even at the CODESSA negotiations, and at these negotiations the regime, the Gqozo regime had purported to represent the people of the Ciskei and had adopted positions which were obstructive of the democratic process and contrary to the wishes of the people of the Ciskei.
 Even at CODESSA level we kept on raising, Chairperson, with Oupa Gqozo, Mickey Web and all those who worked with them, how they could sit at the negotiations table.  But at the same time act brutally against the people of the Ciskei and even prohibit them to express themselves freely through the democratic process and to this, they had no coherent reply and continued to insist that they represented the wishes of the people in this area, arguing that the ANC did not represent the wishes of people in this area, and if it did, it did so through coercive means.
 Attempts by the alliance to hold marches, to organise meetings in the Ciskei in order to voice opposition to Oupa Gqozo's government and the policies that he was pursuing had systematically been frustrated through the use of the Ciskei National Security Act and may I add also through the use of the Ciskei Defence Force.
 Permission to hold marches and meetings were consistently refused and peaceful demonstrations that were held without permission were brutally broken down or broken up by the Ciskei Security Forces.  Sir, numerous attempts had been made to resolve this impasse through negotiations, through discussions, through sending intermediaries and so son, and some of the attempts that were made I just want to highlight.
 As early as August 1991 the leadership in this area, the Tri-partheid alliance leadership was instrumental in convening the border peace conference in August 1991 and this border conference as it was being planned, the leadership had sought to invite a number of interested parties, including the Ciskei regime itself.  
 They had also invited the South African government, the then South African government, the National Party, churches, business formations, various civic organisations, trade unions and this was done to address the deteriorating situation in the Ciskei border region.
 The Gqozo regime did not attend.  The majority of delegates identified the policies of the Ciskei regime as an obstacle to peace and stability in the region and a number of proposals were made.  One of them was for the formation of an interim administration pending re-incorporation.
 You will recall sir, that at that time, urban negotiations, we were also dealing with the whole question of how the so-called independent states could be re-incorporated back into South Africa.  Negotiations were also held with the Ciskei regime, direct negotiations, the leadership of the African National Congress including, including its president, Nelson Mandela, had been involved in one or other form of discussion and negotiation with Oupa Gqozo and his other officials.  The leadership of the ANC in this area had held several meetings with Oupa Gqozo on the issue of repressive government through the headman system, the lack of free political activity and also specifically the use of Section 43 of the National Security Act.  
 But all these efforts and attempts were to no avail and during the course of all this, Gqozo kept on making promises, promises also to President Nelson Mandela about correcting a whole number of anomalies but all these were never met.  Tri-lateral negotiations between the South African government, the Ciskei and the ANC were also held and it was at one of these sessions when Oupa Gqozo specifically said that he will repeal Section 43 of the National Security Act but once again, Chairperson, this was not done.
 Legal and Constitutional attempts were also made to address the problem.  We approached the Court to see how best this could be resolved, once again to no avail.  There were local and regional dispute resolution attempts that were made through committees that were set up, to no avail.
 During July and August of 1992, peaceful public protests were held in the region, culminating in an attempt by the Tri-partheid alliance to hold a mass demonstration in Bisho, to voice opposition to the policies of the Ciskei government and its suppression of free political activity.  Approximately 60,000 people participated in the march.  They were prevented by the Ciskei Security Forces from entering Bisho.  Their attempt, the intention was that the protest should take place in Bisho itself.
 The rationale for this, Chairperson, was just as people were protesting in Cape Town, in the heart of Cape Town, in Pretoria, in Johannesburg, people in this area saw no reason why they should not carry out their peaceful protest at the seat of the regime or near their offices.
 They were prevented by the Ciskei Security Forces from entering Bisho but after negotiations that were conducted through the intervention of the National Peace Secretariat, an assembly was held at the Bisho stadium and speeches were made protesting their activities and policies of the Ciskei regime.
 This manifestation did not result in any significant change in the attitude of the Ciskei regime.  On the contrary it became, if anything, more repressive.  It seemed like even Oupa Gqozo had lost his head.  Even as some of us spoke to him on the telephone he was completely beside himself.
 Attempts to hold meetings or marches at various places in the Ciskei were broken up by the Security Forces.  Supporters of the alliance were harassed and subjected to a wave of repression and this, sir, did not only take place in the big towns in this area but also in the villages where quite elderly people were prevented even from holding meetings to discuss even local problems.
 The alliance decided that in the circumstances a major protest with a national focus should be organised in the Ciskei to draw national and international attention to the demand for the creation of a climate for free political activity and the end to violence in the Ciskei.  
 This was to be a march into Bisho and the holding of a people's assembly in the town, and may I say sir, similar manifestations were taking place in our country in other towns at more or less the same time and people in this area felt and believed that just as they were South Africans and other South Africans were participating in similar manifestations elsewhere, they should not be barred, they should not be prevented from participating in such manifestations which were in the main, peaceful and under the tight leadership of the organisations that were leading them.
 The principal demand of the alliance which was to be highlighted by the march was for free political activity and an end to violence.  Political repression and violence in the Ciskei were associated with the Gqozo regime and so the call for free political activity and an end to violence was linked to a demand for Oupa Gqozo's removal by the South African government.  For he personally was seen as an obstacle to free political activity and to peace in this area.
 The march was to be peaceful and conducted as far as possible in accordance with guidelines that were set out in the Peace Accord.  Its goal was not insurrection, it was to send a clear message that repression of free political activity in the Ciskei should not be tolerated.  
 The message would be directed not only at Oupa Gqozo but also to the South African government which was propping up the Gqozo regime, which, at the time was also refusing to listen to good reason at the negotiations when we kept raising the position or the problem of the Ciskei.
 A demand would be made for Oupa Gqozo to resign and for an interim administration acceptable to all representative bodies in the Ciskei to be installed, which would permit free political activity to take place and create a climate in which this would be possible.  A demand would be made to the South African government to support these measures and to use its day factor control of the Ciskei to help achieve them.  The intention sir, was to march to an open space on the southern side of the central business district in Bisho and to hold an assembly for a minimum of 24 hours.
 The assembly would demonstrate the strength of feelings of the people participating in the march and the substantial support which they had.  The extent of consultation at all levels of the ANC and the alliance structures, including endorsement of the plan by the National Executive Committee of the ANC, is demonstrated by a chronology of events, meetings and incidents that took place and it is far too long for me to even repeat it.
 In short, resulting from painstaking decisions at the border regional level, following the march of the 6th August, the recommendation for the action of the 7th September was endorsed by the national leadership of the Tri-partheid Alliance as well as the National Executive Committee of the ANC.
 At the meeting of the ANC National Executive it was decided to immediately send a number of national leaders to the border region to assist with the preparations.  It was stressed that thorough organising and planning must take place to ensure success for this march.  As a result, leading members of the National Executive such as Steve Tshwete, Ronnie Kasrils, Raymond Suttner and our beloved departed Chris Hani, were despatched to this area where they began to work with the steering committee or the strategising committee.
 Other members in the region included people like our then Chairperson of the province, Selumkosop Cooper, Andrew Hendriks, Lucille Meyer, Donnay Kunie, Crispian Olwer and our departed comrade Kenjane.  ANC further submits, sir, that it did not see itself as the only organisation which could resolve the situation in this province or in this area.  It was supported by a popular front which included Nafcork, the churches, the border council of churches and other regional organisations.
 It was on the basis of this broad support that the ANC as leading the Tri-partheid Alliance proceeded to plan for the march, and as it planned for this march sir, it took careful care, made a point that it informed and notified the relevant authorities of its intention to lead this march and to gather people at Victoria grounds in King William's Town and to march from there to Bisho where a gathering would be held on the southern side of the central business district.  
 The authorities were notified, those that were notified were the King William's Town town municipality ... end of Tape 2, side A ... holding meetings with Brigadier van der Merwe of the SAP.  Representatives of the alliance also indicated their willingness to co-operate fully with Brigadier van der Merwe to ensure that events would be peaceful but they also made it clear, they made it clear sir, that the alliance was firmly committed to proceeding with the march and that that march would take place.
 Representatives of the alliance also held meetings with the National Peace Secretariat but in addition, the alliance also took active steps to prepare carefully for this march by making sure that there would be an effective and efficient marshalling system and it proceeded to train marshals and to make sure that guidelines were clearly laid out, which guidelines the marshals would follow.
 It was made clear to all persons participating in the march that it would have to be peaceful and that under no circumstances would people participating in the march be allowed to carry any weapons to participate in any acts of violence.  There was effective communication with the crowd and we made sure that we had all instruments that are necessary, sound systems to communicate with the crowd.  Arrangements sir, were also made with the King William's Town municipality for water trucks to be made available to provide water to the marchers right up to the borders of so-called Ciskei.  A committee of the alliance was elected to ensure overall control.
 On 31st August details of the proposed march were communicated to the Council of State by means of a letter.  The letter contained assurances that the demonstration would be peaceful and that there would be full control and proper marshalling.  On the 6th September an application was brought by the Commissioner of the Ciskei police who was making an attempt to frustrate or stop the march.  He sought to interdict the holding of the march and a whole series of events ensued around this, culminating in the Supreme Court directing the magistrate to consider an application for the holding of the march and in the event, only in the early hours of the morning of the 7th September, the magistrate gave an order, an order which stipulated the type or the nature of the permission that he was giving.
 By that time sir, the Tri-partheid Alliance, leadership, membership and people broadly in this area were already committed, totally committed to proceeding with this march.  Contacts were made also with the National Peace Secretariat and other bodies.  By the time the magistrate's decision was received, there was already a fully blown mobilisation in this area and people were not as we assessed it, going to be in a mood to countenance any retreat.  They wanted to march into Bisho and to re-assert their right to free political activity as it was being celebrated and demonstrated throughout the country, suave in KwaZulu Natal, Bophuthatswana and in the Ciskei.
 Preparation for the march started early in the morning of the 7th September 1992 at the Victoria grounds.  A strategising committee had been appointed consisting of two members from each of the components of the alliance and representatives from the National Leadership.  It was there decided that the march would proceed along the main Bisho - King William's Town road, up to its intersection with Jongilanga Avenue and from there proceed to an open space south of the Ciskei People's Development Bank at which an assembly would be held right in Bisho.
 The Chairperson of the ANC in the border region led the march together with other members of the Border Regional Committee, members of the National Leadership and various other leaders in the Tri-partheid Alliance.  It had been made clear by the leadership that there should be no violence and that the demonstration should at all times remain peaceful.  They proceeded to Bisho, determined to achieve their objective of holding an assembly in the town where they would declare their other demands.  Although it was appreciated that the Ciskei Security Forces might attempt to prevent the assembly from taking place, it was never contemplated, it was never contemplated sir, that they would use lethal force to prevent this march. 
 In fact the Ciskei Defence Force's own standing instructions provided that  
[1) Minimum force is to be used when the Ciskei Defence Force was engaged in police duties.
[2[ The test as to whatever any action taken satisfy the principal of minimum force is stated therein as would a reasonable person have used the same degree of force or have considered it essential to have taken the same actions.
[3] Any situation that arises should be initially handled by means other than opening fire.  If fire has to be used, only aimed shots are to be fired at individuals who pose a threat.  
 That sir, was their code.  After the march had commenced, some members of the strategising committee proceeded ahead of the march to the Ciskei border to reconnoitre the situation there.  This advance group consisted of Ronnie Kasrils, Andrew Hendriks, Smuts Ngonyama, Crispian Olwer, Lucille Meyer, Donnay Kunie and our departed comrade, Kenjane.  On their arrival at the border approximately 15 to 10 minutes ahead of the main body of the march, they found that the road had been blocked by rolls of razor wire which had been erected in a way which would prevent people marching, from proceeding along the Bisho road.
 There were discussions between these people and representatives of the National Peace Secretariat at the point where the razor wire had been erected.  Assurances were given that the march was peaceful and that no soldiers need have any fear and the march was already proceeding and these people were giving assurances about a situation which they themselves had witnessed.
 An earnest plea was made that the Secretariat should ensure that the Security Forces would not shoot.  The members of the committee then went to inspect the stadium.  The razor wire had been installed in a way which left open a route into the stadium which was alongside the main road.
 Ciskei soldiers were deployed at the Fort Hare campus and along the ridge, and the Ciskei police behind the Peace Secretariat.  The advance group noted this and also noted conditions in the stadium.  They observed that a section of the stadium fence on the northern side, approximately ten metres long, had previously been flattened and provided the only unobstructed route out of the stadium.  Ciskei Defence Force members were visible approximately 250 metres away to the right of the flattened fence but to the left of the opening there appeared to be an unobstructed path through which marches could proceed if they chose to do so.
 A subsequent study, Chairperson, of the deployment maps and the inspections in loco showed that some soldiers must have been hiding behind shrubs intertwined with freshly cut branches and a mound of earth behind which there was a trench, and they were therefore not visible to the left of the advance group.
 The advance group itself having noted the gap in the fence and the possibility that it offered of moving out of the stadium, returned to the main body of the march.  They reported on what they had seen and discussions which they had had with representatives of the Peace Secretariat, it was decided that some of the leaders, some of the leaders and the Chairperson of the region here and a number of others would attempt to meet representatives of the National Peace Secretariat and ask them to use their influence with the Ciskei Security Forces to permit the march to proceed into Bisho.  Other leaders, including Chris Hani and Ronnie Kasrils, would then lead the marchers into the stadium.  Some of them would then go through the gap and attempt to reach our goal which was the central business district and there they would await the outcome of negotiations between the leadership and the National Peace Secretariat.
 It was hoped that the presence of a large number of people at the CBD would enable an agreement to be reached allowing the leaders to proceed also with those that they were leading to the CBD.  The march arrived at the razor wire barricade and the leadership headed by Cyril Rhamaphosa and others, deployed itself as per agreement and arrangement.
 A line of marshals was formed right in front of the razor wire directing marchers into the stadium.  Other marchers led by Chris Hani and Ronnie Kasrils, moved at a fast pace into the stadium.  They paused briefly in the stadium to rally a large group behind them prior to moving through the gap in the fence.  Most of the marchers were then still on the South African side of the border and the march itself extended back from the wire for a distance of approximately one kilometre.
 The shooting itself  When the front of the group had proceeded through the gap in the fence, was approximately 60 meters beyond the gap, the shooting started without any warning whatsoever.  At this time there was a large crowd in the stadium and an even larger crowd still on the main road on the South African side of the razor wire barrier.
 The shooting was widespread and was directed at the people who had moved out of the stadium.  Some still coming in, people still seated on the grandstand and people also alongside the main road, including leaders of the alliance and members of the National Peace Secretariat who were about to conduct negotiations across the razor wire.
 The shooting consisted of two sessions of automatic rifle fire.  The first volley lasted for between one or two minutes and having been there myself sir, I thought it lasted forever, and was followed by a second volley shortly afterwards which, it has been estimated, lasted for about a minute.
 There was terror and panic all around as we all heard the sound of gunfire.  During the rifle fire, whistling sounds followed by explosions were heard near the stadium and the main road close to the razor wire.  These explosions were caused by rifle grenades launched at the crowd.  Some of us thought that these were bombs that were being thrown at us.  As is clearly indicated in the South African Police video supplied to the Commission which we will hand over, four mini craters were found where unarmed marchers were present and not anywhere near the Ciskei Security Forces.
 Sir, there was no warning of any nature prior to the shooting.  The unarmed crowd posed no threat to life or property and there was no excuse for the prolonged violent and murderous attack by the Ciskei Defence Force.  It resulted in the deaths of 28 marchers and injuries to about 250 people.
 The indiscriminate nature of the shooting is demonstrated by the fact that a member of the Ciskei Defence Force was shot in the back of the head clearly by people on his own side.  There was no explanation for the failure to repair the flattened portion of the stadium fence or to place razor wire across it on the day of the march or to deploy soldiers there.  
 This and the concentration of soldiers who were covering the gap from a position in front of Jongilanga Avenue suggests that, it suggests sir, that there was a trap set for people, there was an ambush set for people who might choose to move out of the stadium.  There is no other explanation that we are able to give for the existence of that gap.  Had they sought to prevent people completely from going into Bisho, that gap would have been closed and soldiers would not have hidden themselves behind shrubs, they would not have hidden behind an earth mound, they would not have been in a trench.
 Immediately after the volley stopped there was confusion amongst the marchers.  Pandemonium broke out and all attempts were made to try and attend to the injured and there was blood flowing everywhere.  The saddest part, the saddest part sir, was to see women, fairly elderly women, middle aged women, dropping to the floor and crawling and being terrified.  It was to see terror written on the faces of young people.  It was a terrible and a sad day.
 In conclusion, the ANC and the Tri-partheid Alliance regrets the loss of life that took place on that day but our submission is that the responsibility for the Bisho massacre rests squarely with the Ciskei regime and with the government of F W de Klerk where the real power, the real power behind Oupa Gqozo resided.  Oupa Gqozo would never have had the courage, would never have had the nerve to do what he did if he did not know that there was a real power behind him and F W de Klerk's government was the real power behind him.  Subsequent investigation showed most of the dead and injured were running away from the unbridled attack on them, rather than endangering the life or property of anyone in the Ciskei.  
 We would submit, Chairperson that the evidence shows that there was a plan to trap those whom they knew would want to emerge from a gap in the fencing.  The circumstances under which lethal force could be used on a crowd of demonstrators, had previously been enunciated in a number of Commissions.
 The conduct of the Ciskei Defence Force on the day of the massacre was criminal and failed to measure up to three standards or their own standing orders on the use of force.  To compound matters, Gqozo showed no remorse, no remorse whatsoever, for his criminal actions by threatening a repeat of the action if similar action were to arise.
 There are a number of questions which need to be clarified and possibly clarified through and by this Commission.  Why was the gap left in the fence, is a question that many of us still ask.  Were the Ciskei Defence Force soldiers concealed in order to ambush anyone venturing through that opening?  Why were no warnings given?  Having lived in this country through the years of repression, we became accustomed to the fact that much as the brutal South African machine was quite vicious, it was also given to some civility.  
 It was given to also warning people if they were in a situation which they felt they needed to take action on.  They would either use loud hailers, they would either shoot in the air, they would use all manner of things before opening fire.  This was not done and the question we ask is why was there no warning?
 We would like to know as some of the witnesses have already said, who gave the order to open fire?  Many South Africans would like to know, was it Oupa Gqozo or was it someone else elsewhere?  Fifthly sir, we would like to know why live ammunition was used instead of non-lethal methods to control the crowd.  Why were rubber bullets not used?  Why was teargas not used?  Why was even water, purple rain, or whatever other means, why were these not used?
 There are questions which the Truth and Reconciliation Commission can hopefully find answers to, so that the whole truth about this deplorable massacre can emerge.  We remember those who fell at Bisho, they are our martyrs, they did not die in vain, and as you, Chairperson of the Commission said as you opened, we paid a price to achieve this freedom but sir, it's possible that this is one of those prices we did not have to pay.
 We extend our condolences to the families of those who died and to extend our sympathies as the African National Congress, to those who were injured.  We urge those who were responsible for the crime to come forward to this Commission to tell the truth, for it is the truth that is going to heal our land.  It is through the truth that we will be able to have full reconciliation.  Thank you Chairperson.