u . s . patent application ser . no . 12 / 781 , 087 ( cntr . 2293 ) describes a way for a microprocessor manufacturer to limit access to model specific registers ( msr ) by requiring a user to obtain a password from the manufacturer to access the msrs . the microprocessor includes a manufacturing id that uniquely identifies the processor part . additionally , the microprocessor is manufactured with an internal secret key that is externally invisible and known only to the manufacturer . the manufacturer generates the password by encrypting the manufacturing id using the secret key . thus , the password is unique to the particular processor part . prior to executing a rdmsr / wrmsr to access the msr , a user program writes the password received from the manufacturer into a register of the microprocessor . when the processor encounters the rdmsr / wrmsr , an encryption engine within the processor decrypts the password using the secret key to generate a plaintext result . if the plaintext includes the manufacturing id , then the processor completes the rdmsr / wrmsr , i . e ., allows access to the specified msr ; otherwise , the processor aborts the rdmsr / wrmsr , i . e ., denies access to the msr . u . s . patent application ser . no . 12 / 781 , 087 ( cntr . 2293 ) also describes an even more restrictive way to limit msr access by encrypting both the unique manufacturing id and the msr number such that the password is unique not only to the particular processor part , but also to the particular msr being accessed . the microprocessor selectively allows access by the rdmsr / wrmsr based on whether the plaintext includes both the manufacturing id and the msr number . the present inventors have discovered that it would also be beneficial to provide a way for a microprocessor manufacturer to limit msr access by providing a global password that is unique to each msr . therefore , embodiments are described herein in which the manufacturer encrypts the msr number such that the password is unique to the particular msr being accessed ; however , because the unique manufacturing id is not encrypted along with the msr number , the password is not unique to the microprocessor part , thus making a password that is unique to the msr but global to all microprocessors from the manufacturer of that type . furthermore , the global msr - specific password might become public knowledge . thus , ways to revoke the global msr - specific password are provided herein . more specifically , the microprocessor includes one or more fuses that may be selectively blown during manufacturing of a microprocessor part . the manufacturer encrypts a function ( e . g ., xor ) of the value of the fuses and the msr number to generate the global msr - specific password which it supplies to the user . when the user attempts to access the msr using the password , the microprocessor reads the fuse values and encrypts the function of the read fuse value and the user - specified msr number and compares the encryption result with the user - supplied password and selectively allows access based on the comparison result . in this way , the manufacturer can blow a different value into the fuses of subsequently manufactured parts to accomplish revocation of the global msr - specific password for the subsequently manufactured parts . because strong encryption is used ( e . g ., 128 - bit aes ), an attacker cannot obtain the secret key even if he has the old password and the old fuse value , if even only a single bit of the fuse value was changed ; therefore , he cannot predict the new password . an example of a situation in which it may be valuable to have the ability to revoke the global msr - specific password is when an oem requests a version of the microprocessor for which the global msr - specific password is not publicly known , i . e ., when the oem wants to revoke the password for its own version of the microprocessor . in one embodiment , the fuse values are loaded into a feature control register when the microprocessor is reset , and the microprocessor reads the fuse value from the feature control register when it encrypts the function of the value of the fuses and the msr number . the feature control register is also writeable by software running on the microprocessor . this provides an alternate method to revoke the global msr - specific password , namely by system software , such as bios . referring now to fig1 , a block diagram illustrating a microprocessor 100 according to the present invention is shown . the microprocessor 100 is similar to the microprocessor 100 described in fig1 of u . s . patent application ser . no . 12 / 781 , 087 ( cntr . 2293 ) which is similar to the microprocessor 600 described in fig6 of u . s . pat . no . 7 , 321 , 910 ( cntr . 2224 ), which is hereby incorporated by reference herein in its entirety for all purposes . however , the microprocessor 100 of fig1 also includes a feature control register ( fcr ) 142 coupled to the execution logic 632 . the microprocessor 100 also includes fuses 144 coupled to the fcr 142 . in one embodiment , the fuses 144 are coupled to the execution logic 632 and at reset time the microprocessor 100 populates the fcr 142 with default values as modified by the fuse 144 values . in one embodiment , the default values are boolean exclusive - ored ( xor ) with the fuse 144 values . in one embodiment , microcode 604 reads the fuse 144 values and populates the fcr 142 with default values as modified by the fuse 144 values . embodiments for using the fuses 144 to populate the fcr 142 are described in u . s . pat . no . 5 , 889 , 679 ( cntr . 1328 ) and u . s . patent application ser . no . 12 / 609 , 207 ( cntr . 2490 ). the fuses 144 may be selectively blown by the microprocessor 100 manufacturer at manufacturing time . some of the msrs 132 are password - protected and some are not . in one embodiment , the microcode rom 604 stores a list of password - protected msrs 132 that the microcode consults when it implements a rdmsr / wrmsr in order to determine whether to limit access , i . e ., to require the valid password . in one embodiment , each msr 132 has one of several different password - protection types . described herein is a type in which an msr 132 is protected according to a global msr - specific password generated using the msr 132 number and fuse 144 value associated with the particular version of the microprocessor 100 part . that is , the type is msr - specific , but it is not part - specific , or at least is not part - specific within a set of parts manufactured with the same fuse value ; however , as described herein , the msr - specific password for a first set , or version , of parts blown with a first set of fuse 144 values will be different from the msr - specific password for a second set , or version , of parts blown with a second set of fuse 144 values . this type is in addition to the types described in u . s . patent application ser . no . 12 / 781 , 087 ( cntr . 2293 ) in which an msr 132 is protected according to a part - specific password generated using either the manufacturing id of the microprocessor 100 part or both the manufacturing id and the msr 132 number . furthermore , each msr 132 may be further classified within the above types based on whether it is protected for read ( for example , the msr that is used to read out the microcode of the microprocessor 100 ), protected for write ( for example , internal control registers that control the bus timing or protocol , or that control various performance or power saving features of the microprocessor 100 ), or protected for both read and write . the manufacturing id 134 is a serial number manufactured into the microprocessor 100 hardware that is unique to each microprocessor 100 part . because the manufacturing id 134 is a serial number , it is a relatively predictable number . in one embodiment , the manufacturing id 134 is a 50 - bit number blown into fuses of the microprocessor 100 . the manufacturing id 134 is visible to users . in one embodiment , a user may read the manufacturing id 134 via a rdmsr instruction . the secret key 136 is a secret value manufactured into the hardware of the microprocessor 100 that is not externally visible . the secret key 136 is known only by a small number of authorized personnel of the manufacturer . the secret key 136 can be read internally by microcode of the microprocessor 100 , but may not be read externally to the microprocessor 100 . thus , the secret key 136 cannot be obtained by any external program executing on the microprocessor 100 ; rather , the secret key 136 may only be obtained if one of the persons who know the secret key 136 reveals it or if someone examines the physical silicon and / or metal layers of the microprocessor 100 and discovers the location and arrangement of the secret key 136 manufactured into the hardware of the microprocessor 100 . in one embodiment , the secret key 136 is the same for all instances of the microprocessor of the same manufacturer . in one embodiment , the secret encryption key 136 is 128 bits . referring now to fig4 , a flowchart illustrating operation according to one embodiment of the present invention is shown . fig4 is broken into two drawing sheets denoted fig4 a and fig4 b . fig4 a includes blocks 401 through 406 and block 492 ; fig4 b includes block 408 through 432 . the steps described in blocks 402 through 406 of fig4 a are also described pictorially in the block diagram of fig2 , and many of the steps described in blocks 408 through 432 of fig4 b are also described pictorially in the block diagram of fig3 . thus , fig2 and 3 will also be described along with the description of fig4 . flow begins at block 401 . at block 401 , the microprocessor 100 manufacturer manufactures a first version set of microprocessor 100 parts . the first version includes a first fuse value 204 ( of fig2 ) selectively blown into the fuses 144 of fig1 . flow proceeds to block 402 . at block 402 , the user desires to read / write an msr 132 of his microprocessor 100 , so he provides the microprocessor 100 manufacturer the number , or address , of the msr 132 and requests an msr password 138 . the user also provides the microprocessor 100 version to the manufacturer , which enables the manufacturer to ascertain the fuse value 204 that was blown into the user &# 39 ; s microprocessor 100 version . flow proceeds to block 404 . at block 404 , the manufacturer encrypts , using the secret key 136 , a function 208 of the msr 132 number received at block 402 and the first fuse value 204 associated with the first version , i . e ., the user &# 39 ; s version , to generate a first msr password 138 using an encryption function 202 , as shown in fig2 . in one embodiment , the function 208 is a boolean exclusive - or ( xor ) function , although other functions are contemplated . for example , in another embodiment , concatenation is employed . in one embodiment , the encryption function 202 used by the manufacturer is aes encryption , although other embodiments are contemplated , such as des . it is noted that the plain text input and the cipher text output of aes encryption have the same number of bits . thus , in embodiments in which the function 208 of the msr 132 number and first fuse value 204 contains fewer bits than the msr password 138 , the manufacturer pads the function 208 of the msr 132 number and first fuse value 204 to the same number of bits as the msr password 138 before aes encrypting the function 208 of the msr 132 number and first fuse value 204 to generate the msr password 138 . encrypting the msr 132 number and first fuse value 204 using the secret key 136 using a strong encryption algorithm , such as aes , provides extremely high security for the password - protected msrs 132 since it is statistically essentially impossible using current computing methods for anyone who does not know the secret key 136 , even if he knows the encryption algorithm , to calculate the msr password 138 even if he knows the msr 132 number and first fuse value 204 . in one embodiment , the secret key 136 is 128 bits and the generated msr password 138 is 128 bits , although other embodiments are contemplated . furthermore , it is statistically essentially impossible using current computing methods to discover the secret key 136 even if one knows the msr 132 number and first fuse value 204 and the generated msr password 138 provided by the manufacturer . in one embodiment , the manufacturer uses a program written to encrypt the function 208 of the msr 132 number and first fuse value 204 to generate the msr password 138 . the program may run on any system that includes a processor capable of executing a program that performs the encryption algorithm used . although not required , the system may include a microprocessor 100 according to the present invention that includes the cryptography unit 617 for performing the encryption algorithm . flow proceeds to block 406 . at block 406 , the manufacturer provides to the user the msr password 138 generated at block 404 , such as via telephone , email , website , ftp , paper mail , etc . it is noted that although the msr password 138 is msr - specific , it is not part - specific . therefore , if the msr password 138 becomes public information , persons other than the user to whom the manufacturer provided the msr password 138 may also use the msr password 138 to access the msr 132 on the first version set of microprocessor 100 parts . while this may generally be desirable , as discussed above , circumstances may arise in which it is desirable to revoke access to the particular msr 132 via the msr password 138 . advantageously , incorporating the fuse 144 values makes it possible to revoke access to the particular msr 132 via the first msr password 138 on subsequent versions of the microprocessor 100 , as described herein . flow proceeds to block 408 . at block 408 , the user program loads the msr password 138 received from the manufacturer at block 406 into a register of the microprocessor 100 . in one embodiment , the register is the xmm7 register of the x86 sse programming environment . in an alternate embodiment , the user program loads the msr password 138 into system memory and loads a general purpose register of the microprocessor 100 with a pointer to the memory location storing the msr password 138 . flow proceeds to block 412 . at block 412 , the user program executes a rdmsr or wrmsr instruction that specifies a particular msr 132 to be read or written . flow proceeds to block 414 . at block 414 , the processor decodes the rdmsr or wrmsr instruction and transfers control to a microcode routine in the microcode rom 604 of fig1 . the microcode determines whether the specified msr 132 is in the list of password - protected msrs . in one embodiment , architected msrs are not included in the list of password - protected msrs . in one embodiment , the list of password - protected msrs may be changed by blowing fuses on the microprocessor , as described in u . s . patent application ser . no . 12 / 391 , 781 ( cntr . 2428 ), filed feb . 24 , 2009 . additionally , the microcode further determines the type of password protection associated with the msr 132 , namely whether the msr 132 being accessed has an msr - specific password , a part - specific password , or a password that is both msr and part - specific . flow proceeds to decision block 416 . at decision block 416 , if the msr 132 specified by the rdmsr / wrmsr instruction is not in the list of password - protected msrs , flow proceeds to block 432 ; otherwise , flow proceeds to decision block 423 . at decision block 423 , if the msr 132 requires an msr - specific password , flow proceeds to decision block 425 ; otherwise , flow proceeds to block 424 . at decision block 425 , if the msr 132 requires a part - specific password , flow proceeds to decision block 427 ; otherwise , flow proceeds to block 429 . at block 424 , the microcode 604 causes the cryptography unit 617 to encrypt the manufacturing id 134 using the secret key 136 . flow proceeds to block 431 . at block 427 , the microcode 604 causes the cryptography unit 617 to encrypt the manufacturing id 134 and msr 132 number using the secret key 136 . flow proceeds to block 431 . at block 429 , the microcode 604 causes the cryptography unit 617 to encrypt the function 208 of the msr 132 number and fuse value read from the fcr 142 using the secret key 136 , as shown in fig3 . flow proceeds to block 431 . at block 431 , the integer unit 610 compares the user - supplied msr password 138 with the encryption result generated at block 429 ( as shown in fig3 ), block 424 , or block 427 , as appropriate . as shown in fig3 , the integer unit 610 generates a valid indicator 302 that indicates whether the encrypted function 208 of the msr 132 number and fuse value read from the fcr 142 matches the msr password 138 . flow proceeds to decision block 426 . at decision block 426 , if the comparison performed at block 431 indicates a match , flow proceeds to block 432 ; otherwise , flow proceeds to block 428 . at block 428 , the microprocessor 100 aborts the rdmsr / wrmsr instruction . in one embodiment , the microprocessor 100 generates a general protection fault . flow proceeds to block 492 . at block 432 , the processor executes the rdmsr or wrmsr instruction as requested by the user program . flow proceeds to block 492 . at block 492 , the microprocessor 100 manufacturer manufactures a second version set of microprocessor 100 parts . the second version includes a second fuse value selectively blown into the fuses 144 of fig1 that is different from the first fuse value blown into the first version set of microprocessor 100 parts that was manufactured at block 401 . therefore , user attempts to access the msr 132 on a second version microprocessor 100 part using the first password will fail ; thus , the first password has been essentially revoked with respect to the second version set of microprocessor 100 parts . advantageously , because the embodiments described herein employ strong encryption , such as aes encryption , it is statistically essentially impossible using current computing methods for anyone who does not know the secret key 136 , even if he knows the first msr password 138 generated at block 404 , the msr 132 number , the first fuse value , and the encryption algorithm , to calculate a second msr password 138 that is now required to access the msr 132 within a microprocessor 100 part of the second version . furthermore , it is statistically essentially impossible using current computing methods to discover the secret key 136 even if one knows the msr 132 number , first fuse value , first msr password 138 , second fuse value , and second msr password 138 . flow ends at block 492 . in an alternate embodiment , to determine the validity of the user - supplied msr password 138 , rather than encrypting the function 208 of the msr 132 number and fuse value read from the fcr 142 to generate a result to compare with the user - supplied msr password 138 , the microprocessor 100 decrypts the user - supplied msr password 138 and compares the result with the function 208 of the msr 132 number and fuse value read from the fcr 142 . this embodiment is shown pictorially in fig6 . referring now to fig5 , a flowchart illustrating operation according to an alternate embodiment of the present invention is shown . fig5 describes a second manner , in addition to the first manner described with respect to block 492 of fig4 , in which the msr - specific password may be revoked without blowing a new value into the fuses 144 of fig1 . flow begins at block 592 . at block 592 , the microprocessor 100 manufacturer provides a new bios release . the bios release includes code that runs at system boot time and writes a value to the fcr 142 of fig1 that includes second fuse values that are different than the first fuse values used at block 401 of fig4 to blow the fuses 144 of fig1 . although the fuses 144 themselves are not physically altered , because the microprocessor 100 operates according to block 429 of fig4 to encrypt the fuse value read from the fcr 142 , by writing the fcr 142 the bios effectively reconfigures the microprocessor 100 part as a second version in the sense that the user can no longer use the first msr - specific password generated at block 404 of fig4 to access the specific msr . that is , the bios has effectively revoked the first msr - specific password with respect to the microprocessor 100 in the system with the new bios release . it is noted that the fcr 142 may also be password - protected according to any of the msr password types described herein . flow ends at block 592 . although the present invention and its objects , features , and advantages have been described in detail , other embodiments are encompassed by the invention as well . for example , the fuse 144 values may also be employed with respect to the part - specific passwords associated with blocks 424 and 427 of fig4 . although the need to revoke a part - specific password is unlikely , it may simplify the design of the microprocessor 100 to do so , such as the design of the microcode . additionally , although embodiments have been described in which 128 - bit encryption keys are employed , other embodiments are contemplated in which other size encryption keys are employed ; and , although embodiments have been described in which aes encryption is employed , other embodiments are contemplated in which other encryption standards are employed . while various embodiments of the present invention have been described herein , it should be understood that they have been presented by way of example , and not limitation . it will be apparent to persons skilled in the relevant computer arts that various changes in form and detail can be made therein without departing from the scope of the invention . for example , software can enable , for example , the function , fabrication , modeling , simulation , description and / or testing of the apparatus and methods described herein . this can be accomplished through the use of general programming languages ( e . g ., c , c ++), hardware description languages ( hdl ) including verilog hdl , vhdl , and so on , or other available programs . such software can be disposed in any known computer usable medium such as magnetic tape , semiconductor , magnetic disk , or optical disc ( e . g ., cd - rom , dvd - rom , etc . ), a network , wire line , wireless or other communications medium . embodiments of the apparatus and method described herein may be included in a semiconductor intellectual property core , such as a microprocessor core ( e . g ., embodied in hdl ) and transformed to hardware in the production of integrated circuits . additionally , the apparatus and methods described herein may be embodied as a combination of hardware and software . thus , the present invention should not be limited by any of the exemplary embodiments described herein , but should be defined only in accordance with the following claims and their equivalents . specifically , the present invention may be implemented within a microprocessor device which may be used in a general purpose computer . finally , those skilled in the art should appreciate that they can readily use the disclosed conception and specific embodiments as a basis for designing or modifying other structures for carrying out the same purposes of the present invention without departing from the scope of the invention as defined by the appended claims .