the following discussion is directed to various embodiments of the invention . although one or more of these embodiments may be preferred , the embodiments disclosed should not be interpreted , or otherwise used , as limiting the scope of the disclosure , including the claims , unless otherwise specified . in addition , one skilled in the art will understand that the following description has broad application , and the discussion of any embodiment is meant only to be exemplary of that embodiment , and not intended to intimate that the scope of the disclosure , including the claims , is limited to that embodiment . fig1 shows a computing system 100 constructed in accordance with at least some embodiments of the invention . the computing system 100 preferably comprises the arm ® trustzone ® architecture , but the scope of disclosure is not limited to any specific architecture . the computing system 100 may comprise a multiprocessing unit ( mpu ) 10 coupled to various other system components by way of a bus 11 . the mpu 10 may comprise a processor core 12 that executes applications , possibly by having a plurality of processing pipelines . the mpu 10 may further comprise a security state machine ( ssm ) 56 which , as will be more fully discussed below , aids in allowing the computer system 100 to enter a secure mode for execution of secure software , such as m - commerce and e - commerce software . the computing system 100 may further comprise a digital signal processor ( dsp ) 16 that aids the mpu 10 by performing task - specific computations , such as graphics manipulation and speech processing . a graphics accelerator 18 may couple both to the mpu 10 and dsp 16 by way of the bus 11 . the graphics accelerator 18 may perform necessary computations and translations of information to allow display of information , such as on display device 20 . the computing system 100 may further comprise a memory management unit ( mmu ) 22 coupled to random access memory ( ram ) 24 by way of the bus 11 . the mmu 22 may control access to and from the ram 24 by any of the other system components such as the mpu 10 , the dsp 16 and the graphics accelerator 18 . the ram 24 may be any suitable random access memory , such as synchronous ram ( sram ) or rambus ™- type ram . the computing system 100 may further comprise a usb interface 26 coupled to the various system components by way of the bus 11 . the usb interface 26 may allow the computing system 100 to couple to and communicate with external devices . the ssm 56 , preferably a hardware - based state machine , monitors system parameters and allows the secure mode of operation to initiate such that secure programs may execute from and access a portion of the ram 24 . having this secure mode is valuable for any type of computer system , such as a laptop computer , a desktop computer , or a server in a bank of servers . however , in accordance with at least some embodiments of the invention , the computing system 100 may be a mobile ( e . g ., wireless ) computing system such as a cellular telephone , personal digital assistant ( pda ), text messaging system , and / or a computing device that combines the functionality of a messaging system , personal digital assistant and a cellular telephone . thus , some embodiments may comprise a modem chipset 28 coupled to an external antenna 30 and / or a global positioning system ( gps ) circuit 32 likewise coupled to an external antenna 34 . because the computing system 100 in accordance with at least some embodiments is a mobile communication device , computing system 100 may also comprise a battery 36 which provides power to the various processing elements . the battery 36 may be under the control of a power management unit 38 . a user may input data and / or messages into the computing system 100 by way of the keypad 40 . because many cellular telephones also comprise the capability of taking digital still and video pictures , in some embodiments the computing system 100 may comprise a camera interface 42 which may enable camera functionality , possibly by coupling the computing system 100 to a charge couple device ( ccd ) array ( not shown ) for capturing digital images . inasmuch as the systems and methods described herein were developed in the context of a mobile computing system 100 , the remaining discussion is based on a mobile computing environment . however , the discussion of the various systems and methods in relation to a mobile computing environment should not be construed as a limitation as to the applicability of the systems and methods described herein to just mobile computing environments . in accordance with at least some embodiments of the invention , many of the components illustrated in fig1 , while possibly available as individual integrated circuits , are preferably integrated or constructed onto a single semiconductor die . thus , the mpu 10 , digital signal processor 16 , memory controller 22 and ram 24 , along with some or all of the remaining components , are preferably integrated onto a single die , and thus may be integrated into a computing device 100 as a single packaged component . having multiple devices integrated onto a single die , especially devices comprising a multiprocessor unit 10 and ram 24 , may be referred to as a system - on - a - chip ( soc ) or a megacell 44 . while using a system - on - a - chip may be preferred , obtaining the benefits of the systems and methods as described herein does not require the use of a system - on - a - chip . fig2 shows a portion of the megacell 44 in greater detail . the processor 46 comprises a core 12 , a memory management unit ( mmu ) 22 and a register bank 80 including a current program status register ( cpsr ) 82 and a secure configuration register ( scr ) 84 , described further below . the processor 46 couples to a security state machine ( ssm ) 56 by way of a security monitoring ( secmon ) bus 73 , also described below . the processor 46 couples to the ram 24 and rom 48 by way of an instruction bus 50 , a data read bus 52 and a data write bus 54 . the instruction bus 50 may be used by the processor 46 to fetch instructions for execution from one or both of the ram 24 and rom 48 . data read bus 52 may be the bus across which data reads from ram 24 propagate . likewise , data writes from the processor 46 may propagate along data write bus 54 to the ram 24 . the rom 48 and the ram 24 are partitioned into public and secure domains . specifically , the rom 48 comprises a public rom 68 , accessible in non - secure mode , and a secure rom 62 , accessible in secure mode . likewise , the ram 24 comprises a public ram 64 , accessible in non - secure mode , and a secure ram 60 , accessible in secure mode . in at least some embodiments , the public and secure domain partitions in the rom 48 and the ram 24 are virtual ( i . e ., non - physical ) partitions generated and enforced by the mmu 22 . the ssm 56 monitors the mmu 22 for security purposes via bus 25 , as described further below . secure rom 62 and secure ram 60 preferably are accessible only in secure mode . in accordance with embodiments of the invention , the ssm 56 monitors the entry into , execution during and exiting from the secure mode . the ssm 56 preferably is a hardware - based state machine that monitors various signals within the computing system 100 ( e . g ., instructions on the instruction bus 50 , data writes on the data write bus 52 and data reads on the data read bus 54 ) and activity in the processor core 12 through secmon bus 73 . each of the secure and non - secure modes may be partitioned into “ user ” and “ privileged ” modes . programs that interact directly with an end - user , such as a web browser , are executed in the user mode . programs that do not interact directly with an end - user , such as the operating system ( os ), are executed in the privileged mode . by partitioning the secure and non - secure modes in this fashion , a total of four modes are made available . as shown in fig3 , in order of ascending security level , these four modes include the non - secure user mode 300 , the non - secure privileged mode 302 , the secure user mode 306 , and the secure privileged mode 304 . there is an intermediate monitor mode 308 , described further below , between the modes 302 and 304 . the computer system 100 may operate in any one of these five modes at a time . the computer system 100 may switch from one mode to another . fig3 illustrates a preferred mode - switching sequence 298 . the sequence 298 is preferred because it is more secure than other possible switching sequences . for example , to switch from the non - secure user mode 300 to the secure privileged mode 304 , the system 100 should first pass through non - secure privileged mode 302 and the monitor mode 308 . likewise , to pass from the secure user mode 306 to the non - secure user mode 300 , the system 100 should switch from the secure user mode 306 to the secure privileged mode 304 , from the secure privileged mode 304 to the monitor mode 308 , from the monitor mode 308 to the non - secure privileged mode 302 , and from the non - secure privileged mode 302 to the non - secure user mode 300 . each mode switch is enacted by the adjustment of bits in the cpsr 82 and the scr 84 . the cpsr 82 comprises a plurality of mode bits . the status of the mode bits determines which mode the computer system 100 is in . each mode corresponds to a particular combination of mode bits . the mode bits may be manipulated to switch modes . for example , the bits may be manipulated to switch from mode 300 to mode 302 . the scr 84 comprises a non - secure ( ns ) bit . the status of the ns bit determines whether the computer system 100 is in secure mode or non - secure mode . in at least some embodiments , an asserted ns bit indicates that the system 100 is in non - secure mode . in other embodiments , an asserted ns bit indicates that the system 100 is in secure mode . adjusting the ns bit switches the system 100 between secure and non - secure modes . because the status of the ns bit is relevant to the security of the system 100 , the ns bit preferably is adjusted only in the monitor mode 308 , since the monitor mode 308 is , in at least some embodiments , the most secure mode . more specifically , when the system 100 is in the monitor mode 308 , the processor 46 executes monitor mode software ( not specifically shown ) on the secure rom 62 , which provides a secure transition from the non - secure mode to the secure - mode , and from the secure mode to the non - secure mode . in particular , the monitor mode software performs various security tasks to prepare the system 100 for a switch between the secure and non - secure modes . the monitor mode software may be programmed to perform security tasks as desired . if the processor 46 determines that these security tasks have been properly performed , the monitor mode software adjusts the ns bit in the scr register 84 , thereby switching the system 100 from non - secure mode to secure mode , or from secure mode to non - secure mode . the ns bit and the cpsr bits are provided by the processor 46 to the ssm 56 via the secmon bus 73 . the ssm 56 uses the secmon bus 73 to monitor any mode switches enacted by the processor 46 . for example , if the system 100 switches from the non - secure user mode 300 to the non - secure privileged mode 302 , the cpsr mode bits on the secmon bus 73 reflect the mode switch . the ssm 56 receives the updated cpsr mode bits and determines that the system 100 has switched from the non - secure user mode 300 to the non - secure privileged mode 302 . likewise , if the system 100 switches from the non - secure privileged mode 302 to the secure privileged mode 304 , the processor 46 updates the cpsr mode bits to reflect the mode switch , and further unasserts the ns bit in the scr 84 to reflect the switch from the non - secure mode to the secure mode . upon receiving the updated cpsr mode bits and the ns bit , the ssm 56 determines that the system 100 has switched from the non - secure mode to the secure mode and , more specifically , from the non - secure privileged mode 302 to the secure privileged mode 304 . the ssm 56 uses the secmon bus 73 in this way to ensure that the processor 46 does not take any action that may pose a security risk . for example , for security reasons , the processor 46 preferably adjusts the ns bit in the scr 84 only when the system 100 is in the monitor mode 308 . the ssm 56 uses the secmon bus 73 to ensure that the processor 46 does not adjust the ns bit when the system 100 is not in monitor mode 308 . thus , if the ssm 56 detects that the ns bit is being adjusted by the processor 46 and the cpsr 82 mode bits indicate that the system 100 is in the monitor mode 308 , the ssm 56 takes no action . however , if the ssm 56 detects that the ns bit is being adjusted and the cpsr mode bits indicate that the system 100 is not in monitor mode 308 ( e . g ., the system 100 is in one of the modes 300 , 302 , 304 or 306 ), the ssm 56 may report a security violation to the power reset control manager 66 via the security violation bus 64 . the power reset control manager 66 then may reset the system 100 . the ssm 56 also may take any of a variety of alternative actions to protect the computer system 100 . examples of such protective actions are provided in the commonly owned patent application entitled , “ system and method of identifying and preventing security violations within a computing system ,” u . s . patent application ser . no . 10 / 961 , 748 , incorporated herein by reference . in addition to monitoring the ns bit and / or cpsr bits , the ssm 56 also may use the secmon bus 73 to ensure that when switching modes , the processor 46 does not deviate from the preferred mode switching path shown in fig3 . in particular , the ssm 56 monitors the cpsr bits provided on the secmon bus 73 . each mode ( e . g ., mode 300 , 302 , 304 , 306 , and 308 ) corresponds to a particular combination of cpsr bits . by decoding the cpsr bits provided on the secmon bus 73 , the ssm 56 determines the mode in which the computer system 100 is operating . if , in decoding the cpsr bits , the ssm 56 determines that the processor 46 has performed an illegal mode switch ( e . g ., from mode 300 to mode 304 without first passing through modes 302 and 308 ), the ssm 56 reports a security violation to the power reset control manager 66 via the security violation bus 64 . the ssm 56 alternatively may take any other suitable action ( s ) to protect the computer system 100 , such as those disclosed in the u . s . patent application ser . no . 10 / 961 , 748 referenced above . in addition to monitoring the ns bit , the ssm 56 also may use the secmon bus 73 in conjunction with the mmu bus 25 to monitor the mmu 22 and to ensure that the mmu &# 39 ; s activities do not compromise the security of the computer system 100 . for example , for security reasons , it is undesirable for the mmu 22 to be disabled when switching from non - secure mode to secure - mode . accordingly , the ssm 56 checks bus 25 to ensure that the mmu 22 is enabled when the ns bit on the secmon bus 73 indicates that the system 100 is switching from the non - secure mode to the secure mode . for example , if the mmu 22 is disabled when the ns bit is unasserted , the ssm 56 reports a security violation to the power reset control manager 66 via the security violation bus 64 . alternatively , the ssm 56 may take any of the protective actions mentioned above . for security reasons , it is also undesirable to fetch instructions from public ( i . e ., unsecure ) memory when in the secure or monitor modes . for this reason , the ssm 56 may monitor both the instruction bus 50 and the secmon bus 73 to ensure that while the system 100 is in either the monitor mode or secure mode , the processor 46 does not fetch an instruction from the public rom 68 and / or the public ram 64 . if the ssm 56 detects that an instruction tagged as “ unsecure ” is fetched on the instruction bus 50 while bits on the secmon bus 73 indicate that the system 100 is in monitor or secure mode , the ssm 56 reports a security violation to the power reset control manager 66 via the security violation bus 64 . the ssm 56 also may take alternative measures to protect the computer system 100 as mentioned above . for security reasons , it is also undesirable to read data from and / or write data to public ( i . e ., unsecure ) memory when in the monitor mode . for this reason , the ssm 56 may monitor the data read bus 52 , the data write bus 54 and the secmon bus 73 to ensure that the processor 46 does not read data from and / or write data to either the public rom 68 and / or the public ram 64 while the system 100 is in the monitor mode . for example , if the ssm 56 detects that data read from the public rom 68 is being carried on the data read bus 52 while bits on the secmon bus 73 indicate that the system 100 is in the monitor mode , the ssm 56 reports a security violation to the power reset control manager 66 or takes some other suitable , protective measure . in another example , if the ssm 56 detects that data is being written to the public ram 64 via data write bus 54 and the secmon bus 73 indicates that the system 100 is in monitor mode , the ssm 56 takes a suitable , protective measure ( e . g ., reports a security violation to the power reset control manager 66 ). fig4 illustrates a flow diagram of a process 400 used to monitor the computer system 100 for at least some of the security violations mentioned above . the process 400 begins by monitoring the processor 46 using the ssm 56 ( block 402 ). the process 400 further comprises determining whether one or more of the cpsr mode bits have been altered ( block 404 ). as mentioned above , the ssm 56 determines whether one or more of the cpsr mode bits have been altered by monitoring the secmon bus 73 . if any of the cpsr mode bits have been altered , the process 400 comprises determining whether an illegal mode switch has occurred ( block 406 ). an illegal mode switch may be , for example , a deviation from the preferred mode switching pattern shown in fig3 . the pattern may be stored , for instance , on the cpu 46 or on one of the memories 24 or 48 . if an illegal mode switch has occurred , the process 400 comprises reporting a security violation and taking one or more suitable , protective measures ( block 408 ). otherwise , the process 400 then comprises using the secmon bus 73 to determine whether the ns bit is being changed ( block 410 ). if the ns bit is being changed , the process 400 comprises using the cpsr bits on the secmon bus 73 to determine whether the change is occurring ( or occurred ) with the computer system 100 in the monitor mode ( block 412 ). if the change in the ns bit is occurring ( or occurred ) with the computer system 100 in a mode other than the monitor mode , the process 400 comprises reporting a security violation and taking one or more suitable , protective measures ( block 408 ). the above discussion is meant to be illustrative of the principles and various embodiments of the present invention . numerous variations and modifications will become apparent to those skilled in the art once the above disclosure is fully appreciated . it is intended that the following claims be interpreted to embrace all such variations and modifications .