as an introduction to the following description , it is first pointed at a general aspect of the invention , directed to a computer - implemented method for secure personal identification number ( pin ) management of a user trusted device . instead of using the card &# 39 ; s pin , an external pin is entered by the user at an external terminal ( e . g . a personal computer ( pc )), to be used in place of the actual card &# 39 ; s pin . during an initialization phase , the device uses the external pin and the card &# 39 ; s pin to generate a key , which shall later allows for retrieving the card &# 39 ; s pin and unlock the card , during a phase of use . a subsequent trustworthy connection to a server can for instance be initiated , based on e . g . user credentials as stored on the card . more in details , fig1 - 3 depict flowcharts illustrating a given embodiment of a method of secure pin management of a trusted device . fig1 points at both fig2 and fig3 , which relate to an initialization phase and a phase of use , respectively . in the following , embodiments are described in reference to fig1 - 3 altogether . first , it is assumed that the secure device has computing means ( e . g . a processing unit ), coupled to both persistent and non - persistent memories , as known per se . it further at step s 101 possesses suitable interfaces for coupling to a memory card , e . g . a smart card , and a terminal . additional interface allows for interacting with a user . second , once coupled to a memory card , the device may either be set in an initialization mode , step s 200 or a use mode , step s 300 . typically , the device identifies the card . then , if no key is found to be stored for that card yet ( decision s 102 : no ), an initialization mode is set , else ( decision s 102 : yes ) it directly set in use mode . thus , if no external pin has been registered yet , the task flow continues on fig2 ( initialization time ). here , the user enters two pins , steps s 201 , s 203 : one of them is the card &# 39 ; s pin ( or card_pin ), i . e . capable of unlocking the card ; the other is the external pin , preferably entered at the external terminal ( denoted by ext_pin in the drawings ). preferably , the card pin is entered by the user directly at the device , for safety . the external pin can be entered at the device too , although it could be entered from the pc , in a variant . yet , the less inputted from the pc , the better the safety . furthermore , the card pin and external pin are preferably retained in the non - persistent memory only , after reception at the device . in this case , the pins shall be retained the time of generating the key and deleted after , ensuring a short exposure time . in a variant , the external pin is stored on the persistent memory , for a later use . most generally , the two pins may be entered in any order . preferably yet , the user is first prompted to enter the card pin ( step s 201 ), after insertion of the card . then , if the entry is successful ( the device unlocks the card ), the user is then invited to enter the external pin . the invitation is for instance made at the device or at the pc . third , the pins received allows for generating , step s 204 , a key k via the computing means . the key is subsequently stored on the persistent memory of the device . it is furthermore generated such that the card pin can later be computed via a function ƒ , as stored on the persistent memory , namely : wherein ƒ takes the external pin and the key as argument . thus , the card &# 39 ; s pin can be regarded as an encrypted version of the pc &# 39 ; s pin . the function ƒ can be as simple as an exclusive or ( xor ) encryption of the key and the ext_pin , where the xor is the exclusive or operator that returns e . g . 1 when the value of either the first bit or the second bit is a 1 . as a result , if x xor y = z , then z xor x equals y . thus , it is impossible to reverse the operation without knowing the initial value of one of the two arguments , such that presuming that the function is xor doesn &# 39 ; t help . if , however , one knows either x or y , then it is reversible . for example , if x xor 1 returns 1 , then x = 0 , and if it returns 0 , then x = 1 . similarly , the key k can first be generated from ext_pin and card_pin . next , if one has the encrypted string and the key , it is possible to decrypt correctly , such that card_pin can later be retrieved , starting from k and ext_pin . without k , it is impossible to decrypt without making random keys and attempting each of them . the longer the encryption key , the more difficult it is to break it . for completeness , xor encryption of a pin can be obtained by repeatedly applying the key to successive segments ( e . g . numbers ) of the pin and storing the output . in a variant , the key and external pin could else be combined to create another key that is for example used to encrypt the card_pin . once generated , the key can then be stored on the persistent memory , for later use . the card pin previously retained in the non - persistent memory can now be deleted , step s 205 . the card &# 39 ; s pin thus resides during a short time only in the memory . the external pin can be deleted too ( possibly after it has been stored on the persistent memory , according to the variant evoked earlier ). at present , the device is pin - personalized with respect to the card to which it was coupled to . a flag value can for instance be stored which indicates that an external pin is now registered at the device , in relation to that card . later , if it is detected that an external pin has already been registered for the card ( e . g . based on the flag value stored ), then the device may skip the initialization step . rather , it enters a mode of use , as to be discussed later in reference to fig3 . similarly , if the device is later coupled to another card ( again , pin - protected ), the new card &# 39 ; s pin and an external pin are again used to generate a new key . thus , the new card pin can later be computed using the same function ƒ , taking the new key and the external pin as argument . the user may for instance want to use always the same external pin : ( s ) he would then have to enter it each time a key needs be generated . thus , the external pin doesn &# 39 ; t need to be stored on the non - persistent memory . yet , in a variant evoked earlier , a reference external pin can be stored on the device ( e . g . obfuscated ), such that the user needs not be prompted to enter a new external pin . entering the new card &# 39 ; s pin would suffice in that case . this variant is however not preferred , since then there remains a possibility that the external pin and the key be both read out of the device memory and , assuming the attacker knows the function , used to generate the card &# 39 ; s pin . next , during the phase of use , the user is first prompted to enter the external pin , upon coupling the device to the card , step s 301 . the external pin is preferably entered at the terminal , which usually is more practical , owing to the likely more suited human interfaces . then , the external pin can be communicated to the device , where it is preferably retained in the non - persistent memory only . second , computing means at the device are instructed to compute ( s 302 ) the card pin , using the function ƒ and the key as stored in relation to the card , in the persistent memory . again , the card pin is preferably retained in the non - persistent memory only , step s 303 . finally , the ( re -) computed card pin can be used to unlock the card , step s 304 . now , in a variant , if the user forgets his / her external pin , the card &# 39 ; s pin can yet be entered directly on the device , even if the device is in a pin - personalized state . entering the card &# 39 ; s pin at the device instead of the external pin overrides the card &# 39 ; s pin re - computation and can results in unlocking the card . preferably , after entering the card &# 39 ; s pin at the device , the user is prompted to enter a new external pin , such that a new key can be generated . note that a number of variants as described above can be advantageously combined . for instance , in a particularly advantageous embodiment , the following takes place . initially the device has no information regarding the card &# 39 ; s pin ; it is non pin - personalized yet . then , when the user inserts a smart card into the device &# 39 ; s reader , ( s ) he is prompted to enter the card &# 39 ; s pin on the device . if the latter entry is successful , the user is then prompted to enter a new pin . i . e . the external pin . the latter is entered on the pc or the device . the device then performs a number of checks with respect to the external pin ( e . g . it checks that it is not the same as the card &# 39 ; s pin ). furthermore the device generates a key such that , given the external pin and key , the card &# 39 ; s pin can be computed using the function ƒ . the key is then stored on the device and the device is now said to be in a pin - personalized state . no pin is stored permanently on the device . next , when the user inserts the smart card into the device ( now pin - personalized ), ( s ) he is prompted to enter the external pin on the pc . the external pin is passed to the device which can then compute the card &# 39 ; s pin , using the external pin and key , lithe external pin was entered correctly , the device computes the correct card &# 39 ; s pin and thus unlocks the user &# 39 ; s card as desired . now , if the user forgets his / her external pin , the card &# 39 ; s pin can yet be entered directly on the device , even if the device is in a pin - personalized state , and then a new external pin can be set . the same procedure can be used to change the external pin at any time . if the user has multiple smart cards that can be used with a single device , the device can determine which card is inserted and will thus know which key to use so that the correct card &# 39 ; s pin is computed . yet , a single external pin can be used as opposed to having one external pin per card , as discussed earlier . note that entering an external pin on the pc is more convenient for the user than entering the card &# 39 ; s pin on the secure device . yet , this does not compromise the security of the system since the user &# 39 ; s card &# 39 ; s pin is not exposed and cannot be computed by an attacker ( the attacker does at least not know the key used to compute the card &# 39 ; s pin ). if an attacker manages to steal the external pin and knows the function ƒ , a brute - force attack on the key ( guessing possible keys ) will result in a large number of reasonable plain texts which an attacker would have to try one by one . this is however not a problem since smart cards only allow a very small number of retries ( e . g . 3 or 5 ) before blocking the card &# 39 ; s function . also , the function ƒ can be chosen so that it produces a viable result for any guessed key , thus making such an attack effectively impossible . at present , suitable use can safely be made out of data , e . g . user credentials as stored on the card . in particular , a trustworthy connection can be established , step s 305 , between a user ( or strictly speaking the device ) and a server , via the terminal , and using such data . more in details , the device is preferably provided with a computerized method , stored on the persistent memory , for establishing ( see s 304 ) a trustworthy connection between the device and the server . more shall be said in reference to fig4 , showing a schematic representation of a trusted device coupled to a terminal and a server . as described above , the secure device 10 , which may also be referred to as a trusted device or a user trusted device , has computing means ( processing unit ) 15 coupled to the non - persistent memory 15 ′ and the persistent memory 15 ″. it further has suitable interfaces 17 , 20 for communicating with a smart memory card 16 and a terminal 30 . further interfaces ( like control buttons 18 and display 12 ) allow for interaction with a user 1 via connection 90 . the secure device 10 is further designed for detecting whether a key is already stored for the smart memory card 16 currently coupled . if not , then it shall prompt the user 1 to enter both the external pin and the card &# 39 ; s pin via connection 90 . the latter ( especially ) is entered directly at the secure device 10 via convenient input means 18 , such as buttons / selectors . in turn , a logic circuit can instruct the computing means 15 to generate and store the key in the persistent memory 15 ″. then , during the phase of use , the secure device 10 can receive the external pin from the terminal 30 , re - compute the card &# 39 ; s pin and thereby unlock the smart memory card 16 . the secure device 10 can invoke the computerized method stored thereon to trigger a trustworthy connection to the server 40 . for instance , secure device 10 may establish a communication 91 with the server 40 over a non - secure connection 92 via the terminal 30 , upon unlocking the card . authenticating the secure device 10 to the server 40 can be done while initiating the communication 91 over the non - secure connection 92 , e . g . by initiating a secure sockets layer ( ssl )/ transport layer security ( tls ) ( ssl / tls ) authentication to the server 40 , using user credentials as stored on the smart memory card 16 . in this regards , setting the secure device 10 in communication with the server 40 may advantageously comprises starting , from the secure device 10 , a proxy client 32 residing at the terminal 30 , in order for the secure device 10 to connect to the server 40 , via the terminal 30 ( note that the proxy 32 may possibly reside on the secure device 10 too ). the proxy 32 relays bits received from the secure device 10 to the internet and vice versa . authenticating the secure device 10 to the server 40 can be achieved , e . g . bi - directionally , by initiating from the secure device 10 the ssl / tls authentication to the server 40 . thus , an ssl / tls channel is set between the server 40 and the secure device 10 . sensitive user - server communication is passed through and processed at the secure device 10 , hooked into the path to the server 40 by the proxy 32 . the secure device 10 intercepts the communication flow . the secure device 10 may for instance continuously scans exchanged data for sensitive operations . critical information can thereby be extracted for subsequent display at the secure device 10 . the user 1 can accordingly verify the displayed information . non - sensitive operations are instead allowed to be passed along the secure device 10 to go to the pc . meanwhile , sensitive personal information as stored on the smart memory card 16 ( e . g . a private key used in ssl / tls ) is hold at the secure device 10 . private data are protected from extraction and duplication in the smart memory card 16 within the secure device 10 . a trusted and tamper - resistant secure communication is thereby obtained at the secure device 10 endpoint . referring more particularly to fig4 , the secure device 10 may for instance look as a usual usb device 10 , comprising a processing unit 15 , using one or more processors , and coupled to both non - persistent 15 ′ memory and persistent 15 ″ memory . the persistent memory 15 ″ notably stores suitable code for generating and storing the key evoked earlier . the function used at re - computation of the card &# 39 ; s pin is also stored on the persistent memory 15 ″. code is further stored which allows to re - compute the card &# 39 ; s pin and unlock the smart memory card 16 . the persistent memory 15 ″ may further have stored thereon a security software stack , including cryptographic algorithms , e . g . a tls engine 14 for the ssl / tls authentication . the computerized method for establishing the trustworthy connection to server 40 is stored on the persistent memory 15 ″ too . it may further include hypertext transfer protocol ( http ) parser executable 11 ( for parsing data and thereby scan them ), a usb management software ( implementing the universal serial bus ( usb ) mass storage device ( msd ) or msd profile 20 ), and possibly a pre - loaded networking proxy 32 , as evoked above . as said too , user credentials can be stored on the memory card ( e . g . a smart memory card 16 ), such as client - server certificates ( e . g . x . 509 ) enabling tls - client authentication . the smart memory card 16 may hold sensitive personal information and have encryption means . in variants , the smart memory card 16 cannot encrypt but is used to sign sensitive operations . the secure device 10 is preferably equipped with a standard smart card reader 17 . finally , the secure device 10 has control buttons 18 ( e . g . ok , cancel , etc . selectors ) and display 12 , for displaying sensitive information . the computer program code required may be implemented in a high - level ( e . g . procedural or object - oriented ) programming language , or in assembly or machine language if desired ; and in any case , the language may be a compiled or interpreted language . suitable processors include , by way of example , both general and special purpose microprocessors . note that instruction operations that the device , the terminal or the server performs may be stored on a computer program product tangibly embodied in a machine - readable storage device for execution by a programmable processor ; and method steps of the invention may be performed by one or more programmable processors executing instructions to perform functions of the invention . in all case , the present invention encompasses not only the device but the computer system , extended with a terminal and at least one server . more generally , the above invention may be implemented in digital electronic circuitry , or in computer hardware , firmware , software , or in combinations of them . generally , a processor will receive instructions and data from a read - only memory and / or a random access memory . storage devices suitable for tangibly embodying computer program instructions and data include all forms of non - volatile memory , including by way of example semiconductor memory devices , such as eprom , eeprom , and flash memory devices ; magnetic disks such as internal hard disks and removable disks ; magneto - optical disks ; and cd - rom disks or the like . while the present invention has been described with reference to certain embodiments , it will be understood by those skilled in the art that various changes may be made and equivalents may be substituted without departing from the scope of the present invention . in addition , many modifications may be made to adapt a particular situation or material to the teachings of the present invention without departing from its scope . therefore , it is intended that the present invention not be limited to the particular embodiment disclosed , but that the present invention will include all embodiments falling within the scope of the appended claims . for example , the device may require to be not connected to the pc at the time of entering the card &# 39 ; s pin , if it is provided with a battery .