aspects of the invention provides the advantages of enabling end - to - end security on application level , even to a device with very limited processing and memory capacity and / or which does not , or may not be able to comprise a hardware accelerator . a system in which the present invention is implemented will now be described in relation to fig1 . the system comprises a wide area network , wan , or backbone network , such as e . g . the internet . a public land mobile network , plmn , may be adapted and configured to communicate with and via the wan . in the system , a local network , ln , may be connected to the wan . the local network may be a wireless local network , and may be connected to the wan via access points aps , and the system may comprise a first access point ap and a first local network ln . the local network ln may be an ieee 802 . 11 network , an ieee 802 . 15 . 4 or zigbee network , a near field communication , nfc , network , or any other type of local , short - range , network that may provide a bridge to the wan or internet . the system further comprises a user device ud . exemplary embodiments of the system comprise a user device ud that may be connectable to the wide area network wan directly , via a global radio access network comprised in public land mobile network or via a local network ln , or may be connectable via any combination of applicable wan access methods . according to exemplary embodiments the user device ud is a so called smart mobile telephone or “ smart phone ”. an exemplary embodiment of a user device ud will be described in relation to fig2 . the exemplary user device ud comprises a processor , a memory , a radio transceiver , trx , a network interface and a user interface . the network interface provides connectivity to the public land mobile network , plmn , which may be e . g . a gsm or wcdma network or a network according to any other mobile telephony standard as specified by e . g . 3gpp or any other standardisation body . the network interface may also provide connectivity to any other network necessary to implement aspects of the present invention , such as connectivity to the local network e . g . by way of the processor and the memory , application enabling functions may be implemented as a function unit comprised in the user device ud . in fig2 this is schematically illustrated through the dashed - line box overlaid onto the processor and memory . in certain embodiments , the user device ud may itself constitute an access point to a local network . the system further comprises a network server , for the purpose of this patent application also interchangeably referred to as cloud server , cs . the network server provides a multitude of application enabling functionalities to the system , including enabling communication between the user device ud and an embedded device , ed , further described below . an exemplary embodiment of the cloud server , cs , is described in relation to fig3 . the exemplary cloud server cs comprises a processor , a memory and a network interface , and further all components necessary to perform aspects of the present invention . the network interface may also provide connectivity to any other network necessary to implement aspects of the present invention , such as connectivity to e . g . the internet . by way of the processor and the memory , any application enabling function may be implemented as a function unit comprised in the cloud server . in fig3 this is schematically illustrated through the dashed - line box overlaid onto the processor and memory . though only one such function unit is displayed in each of the schematic overviews of fig2 , 3 and 4 , embodiments of each aspect of the invention may comprise multiple such application enabling function units . the cloud server cs may be adapted and configured to implement e . g . application enabling database functions , and storage for content that a user may wish to send to or from an embedded device ed or a user device ud comprised in the system . the system further comprises an embedded device , ed , embeddable in an appliance . for the purpose of this patent application the device embeddable in an appliance is interchangeably referred to as an embedded device ed or a box . an exemplary embodiment of an embedded device , ed , will be described in relation to fig4 . the exemplary embedded device ed comprises a processor with limited capacity in comparison with a processor comprised in a user device to which the embedded device is connectable via a local network ln , a memory with limited capacity in comparison with a memory comprised in the user device to which the embedded device is connectable , a radio transceiver and a limited user interface , which comprises at least a speaker , and a microphone . the embedded device ed may further comprise or be connectable to a tactile input device such as e . g ., a button . the embedded device ed may further comprise or be connectable to a light signal output device , such as e . g . a light diode . the embedded device ed is connectable to the local network , and , via the local network further connectable to the wan , this by virtue of methods according to aspects of the present invention . in order to reduce e . g . heat generation , the embedded device ed is subject to restraints in terms of power consumption , physical space , processing capacity and memory capacity . these restraints make it e . g . difficult to implement a full secure sockets layer , ssl , stack in the embedded device ed . the mobile device ud comprises a full secure sockets layer , ssl , stack and therefore supports de - facto standards for secure communication over the internet . the embedded device ed has limited memory and therefore needs a custom method for authentication , integrity and encryption . through aspects of the present invention , the embedded device ed does not need a hardware accelerator . hence , embedded devices according to certain embodiments of the present invention do not comprise a hardware accelerator . the mobile device ud uses ssl when communicating with the cloud server cs . the user of the mobile device ud may select a publically available identity provider , such as a social media services provider or a search engine services provider to authenticate to the cloud server . the mobile device ud will register the user , the mobile device ud and the embedded device ed with the cloud server . the box ed and the cloud server cs have a shared secret , a first key , key . this secret key , key , is distributed by the mobile phone ud . the security features used by the box ed to authenticate to the cloud server cs is described further below . distribution of a shared secret key , key , will now be illustrated in relation to fig5 , and further with reference to method steps as illustrated by fig8 . upon configuration of the box ed , the mobile device ud will generate 1010 a first secret key , key , that the box ed may use in order to communicate with the cloud server . the arrow 1 illustrates how the first key key is transmitted 1020 from the mobile device ud to the box . the first key key is sent over the local network ln connection , illustrated by a fine - dashed line . the first secret key key is stored in a local parameter database comprised in the box . as illustrated by the arrow 2 , the first key key is then also transferred 1030 from the mobile device ud to the cloud server cs using the secure ssl connection . the first key key will be stored in a database comprised in the cloud server cs and will be used for the authentication , message digest and payload encryption of messages transferred during the box ed to cloud server cs communication . however , the first key key is used only indirectly to derive digest and encryption . this is further described below . for the purpose of clarification , within the system , a message can be sent e . g . from the user device ud , or from another device that is not the cloud server . for the purpose of this patent application , such a message is referred to as a global message : and comprises a header hdr and payload text . the payload text may be anything that a user of the system wishes to send to the box , such as a voice message or a piece of music , or some other content . in relation to fig5 and 6 below , the references hdr and text refers to header and payload of such global messages while the messages as indicated by arrows in fig5 and 6 are application enabling local messages according to an application - specific protocol enabled through aspects of the present invention . an authentication sequence 2020 , 3020 , will be described in relation to fig5 , and comprises the following steps , the numbering corresponding to respective arrows in the sequence diagram . 3 . the cloud server cs sends an authentication request message to the box . a first challenge , c 1 , is comprised with the authentication request message . the box ed saves the received first challenge , c 1 , in its local memory . in the box , a digest h 1 box is calculated using the hmac function with the shared secret key key and a concatenation of the first challenge c 1 and the box &# 39 ; s hardware identification , id as parameters , according to the following : h 1 box = hmac ( key , c 1 : id ). 4 . the box ed sends an authentication reply message to the cloud server . a set of parameters is comprised in the authentication reply message . the set of parameters comprises a second challenge c 2 , the digest h 1 box , and the box &# 39 ; s hardware identification id . the cloud server cs saves the second challenge c 2 in a local memory and computes a digest h 1 cloud server according to h 1 cloud server = hmac ( key , c 1 : id ) the cloud server cs then compares h 1 box and h 1 cloud server . if the digests differ then the box ed has failed to authenticate itself to the cloud server , and the cloud server cs will therefore disconnect the box . if the digests match , however , the cloud server cs will calculate another digest h 2 cloud server according to h 2 cloud server = hmac ( key , c 2 : 1 d ). 5 . an authentication request message is sent from the cloud server cs to the box . the sent message comprises the parameter h 2 cloud server . the box ed computes h 2 box and compares h 2 box and h 2 cloud server . if they differ then the cloud server cs has failed to authenticate itself to the box , and the box ed will disconnect . the cloud server cs on the internet is easy to identify , locate and address with satisfactory security . the embedded device ed , however , may be a nomadic device , and may have the need to connect from different locations . hence , for methods according to certain embodiments of the present invention , the box ed uses its hardware identity , id , as identification . if any step fails during the authentication a disconnection will be performed by the node that discovered the error , e . g . non - matching digest , and the authentication has to start over next time the box ed connects to the cloud server . c 1 and c 2 should be randomly selected . they should further be different for each session . in a messaging session initiation step 2030 , 3030 , a second key , a session key skey is used to compute the digest for the message headers . a keyed - hash message authentication code , hmac , may be used to calculate a message authentication code , mac , involving a cryptographic hash function in combination with the shared secret key key . the first and second challenges c 1 , c 2 and the boxes hardware id id are concatenated into one parameter c 1 : c 2 : id . the session key is then calculated 2032 , 3032 accordingly , skey = hmac ( key , c 1 : c 2 : id ). the session key skey is derived from the parameters c 1 and c 2 , and is therefore unique for each session . further if the system comprises multiple boxes , the session key skey is unique for each box . if a brute - force attack reveals a session key skey , the first , secret , key key will not be compromised . the messaging session initiation step 2030 , 3030 further comprises a step where a third key , an encryption key xkey , is created 2034 , 3034 , calculated as xkey = hmac ( key , skey ). the encryption key xkey will be used to encrypt the payload text . the encryption key xkey is created 2034 , 2034 such that it can be used in relation to an encryption algorithm that requires comparatively less processing power than the messaging session authentication algorithm . the rc4 algorithm may be used for such encryption . the encryption key xkey is generated from the shared secret key key and the session key skey but since a keyed - hash message authentication code , hmac , function is a non - reversible function , the session key skey may not be derived from the encryption key xkey . the box ed and the cloud server cs may increment the challenges c 1 and c 2 for each message , and include them in the hmac calculation , in order to prevent replay - attacks . the second challenge c 2 may be incremented c 2 + by the cloud server cs before sending a request . c 1 may be incremented c 1 + by the box ed before sending a confirmation or an event . a messaging sequence 2040 , 3040 will now be described in relation to fig7 . a first digest , a message authentication code , mac , is computed 2042 based on the session key skey and a concatenation of a header hdr of the message , an incremented challenge c 2 + and the box ed hardware id id according to the following : any payload will be encrypted by using the encryption key xkey = hmac ( key , skey ). an encrypted payload xtext may be derived on the basis of the encryption key xkey and the unencrypted payload , text . the rc4 may be used according to the following : rc4 ( xkey , text ). a second digest , a message integrity check , mic , of the original , non - encrypted , header and payload will be created 2044 , calculated according to : 7 . the cloud server cs sends a message to the box . the sent message comprises the parameters mac cloud server , xtext and mic cloud server . 8 . the box ed receives the message . the box ed then computes 3042 a first digest , mac box , corresponding to the first digest mac cloud server . the digests mac box and mac cloud server are compared . if the two digests are not identical , then the message authentication has failed and the box ed will disconnect . if the digests match , then the box ed will decrypt the payload and compute 3044 the mic for the header and payload . mic box and mic cloud server are compared . if the mic matches , the box ed will respond and set the digest to hmac ( skey , hdr : c 1 +: id ). any payload will be encrypted ; rc4 ( xkey , text ). the mic of the original , non - encrypted , header and payload will be set ; mic = fmic ( hdr : text ). if any step fails during the messaging , a disconnection will be performed by the node that discovered the non - matching digest , and the authentication has to start over next time the box ed connects to the cloud server . the security relies on that the first key key is not compromised . according to embodiments of the invention the following may apply . the first key key may be a 256 - bit key . the first key key may be randomly generated by the mobile device ud during key distribution . this may make a brute - force attack non - feasible on the hmac . the first key key may only be used directly for the hmac during the initial authentication steps 2020 , 3020 . all other messages use a session key skey . payload encryption 2046 , 3046 uses a session key skey and a challenge , which may be incremented . the key xkey used for encryption of the payload cannot be used to compute the digest . the mobile device ud can change the secret key , key , at regular intervals without any user - intervention . the mic of message header hdr and clear - text text , e . g . non - encrypted payload ensures that the encryption key xkey is correct and that the payload really belongs to the header . otherwise a man - in - the - middle could replay a captured payload attached to another header . mutual authentication prevents non - authorised cloud servers or non - authorized boxes to impersonate authorized cloud servers css and boxes eds . to support implementation with minimal resources , any mic that include the payload text or the encrypted payload xtext may be sent after the payload , and not in the message header . this allows the processing unit comprised in the embedded device ed to compute the mic during transferring of the payload between the cloud server cs and the embedded device ed . application software enabling methods according to the present patent application may be downloadable to and installable on a mobile device ud from an internet - based digital distribution platform for application software . the application software may be provided as a functional unit of an operating system on a personal computer , smart phone , or tablet pc . the header digest algorithm may be sha - 1 . the digest may be computed according to the hmac function as defined in rfc2104 . adler32 may be used as fmic , in order to produce the the message integrity check , mic . rc4 may be used as the payload encryption algorithm . challenges c 1 , c 2 , c 1 +, c 2 +, etc , may be 128 - bit challenges .