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The Classiest First Lady In History Has The Best Reply To The Classless Samantha Bee
Frank Lea
The most classy First Lady you could find in the White House has finally responded to the boarish foul-mouth jokes by Samantha Bee who went after Ivanka Trump for no reason. Perhaps Bee went after the Trump daughter because she's super successful and beautiful, but no one's really sure what provoked the attack when Bee called her a "feckless c-nt." Nevertheless, Bee persisted to go on with the attack that was unwarranted and unprovoked, sparking a national outrage of people blasting her network for the nasty double standard she's trying to embrace as she hasn't been fire yet. She's lost a few advertisers, but that's about it.
It was with such grace that the office of Melania Trump finally responded to questions about the blabbering Bee and their reply helps prove why Melania is one of the most class First Lady's you'll ever see parade around the White House. Their response took the higher road and reminded people of how to act when someone goes after your family with some lewd words and lack of humor. Had Samantha Bee said something that was actually funny, then people would take it as a joke, laugh, and move on. Except, there's just one problem. Samantha Bee isn't funy. She's like the blonde Kathy Griffin – they're just not good at comedy. It's a subjective topic, but many would agree that the two can't seem to muster up enough jokes to make people get a good laugh. The pair is more like a tag team of torture. Throw a little bit of Michelle Wolf in the mix and you have the three worst.
With all further ado, it was Daily Caller who broke the exclusive story about Melania's office and their response to the blithering Bee:
"First lady Melania Trump's office responded to TBS comedian Samantha Bee's profane tirade against presidential adviser Ivanka Trump by saying it was an example of an "astounding" double standard.
The official spokeswoman for the first lady, Stephanie Grisham, gave The Daily Caller an exclusive statement on the issue on behalf of Trump.
"The double standard is truly astounding," Grisham told TheDC. "Time and again the Trump family and members of this Administration are subjected to false reporting, hateful rhetoric and outrageous lies all in the name of freedom of speech or comedy, yet the mainstream media stays silent."
Bee called Ivanka Trump a "feckless c**t" in a segment targeting her for posting a photo with her daughter over the weekend. Ivanka posted this photo with her youngest child to draw the ire of the late night host:
Press secretary Sarah Sanders also commented, saying, "The language used by Samantha Bee last night is vile and vicious. The collective silence by the left and its media allies is appalling."
Ivanka's brother, Don Jr., also called out the double standard, asking if a host would get away with calling Obama's wife or daughters the vulgar slur."
Big Don came through with the most logical statement one can say about the obvious double standard. If anyone said this about Michelle Obama, then they would be labeled as hateful, racist, etc. When Samantha Bee says something horrible, it's just bad comedy. When Roseanne Barr said something horrible, she was fired.
Don Trump Jr posted this on Twitter:
He raises a great point. The double standard in America is getting old, tired, and should be put to rest. The younger generation has found themselves to be offended by everything and they lack the toughness, grit, and strong personality to push through their day with resilience.
Think about it. Back in the day if someone said something mean about you, then you said something mean to them or you punched them in the face. Nowadays people run away from conflict and they cry, whine, and beg for boycotts or for people to be fired. People who whine about things being offensive or call for boycotts are the bigger problem.
We were probably better off when people were a lot tougher and weren't crying outrage on social media every time someone says something mean.
I'd rather see Ivanka Trump take down Samantha Bee with a few witty comments of her own or a quick right hook when she catches her on the street. Enough with the complaining and boycotts.
Melania Trump can't go around punching people in the face, so she will handle her problems with grace. She's the First Lady, so she gets a pass. However, for the rest of us – It's time to make America tough again.
No more complaining, no more boycotting, no more asking for people to get fired. If you don't like what someone said, then say something to them about it. Have a conversation and see how it goes.
The fake outrage on social media is a huge downfall for all of us. At least Melania Trump and her staff act with the type of class we'd expect from the wife of the President of the United States.
She doesn't have time for some washed up comedian or her failed jokes.
Share if you think we need to be tougher and stop with the boycotting nonsense.
Share if Melania Trump is one of the best First Lady's we ever had!
Write your answers below!
YUGE WIN! Supreme Court Just Made Final Ruling – Liberals Are PISSED!
Bill Clinton Says #HeToo, Claims He Was Victim Of The White House After What Happened To Him


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Гран-прі Японії 2017 (офіційно 2017 Formula 1 Japanese Grand Prix) — автоперегони чемпіонату світу Формули-1, які пройшли 8 жовтня  на трасі Судзука в Судзуці, Префектура Міє, Японія. Це шістнадцятий етап чемпіонату світу, сорок третє Гран-прі Японії і тридцять третє в межах Чемпіонату Світу з Формули-1.

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 – Вальттері Боттас і Кімі Ряйкконен отримали штраф по п'ять позицій за заміну коробки передач.
 – Фернандо Алонсо отримав штраф в 35 позицій за заміну елементів двигуна, а Джоліон Палмер і Карлос Сайнс (молодший) — по 20 позицій.

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Положення в чемпіонаті після Гран-прі

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Кубок конструкторів

 Примітка: Тільки 5 позицій включені в обидві таблиці.

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Офіційний вебсайт
 Гонка на офіційному сайті Формули 1

Гран-прі Японії
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Жовтень 2017
2017 у японському спорті

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


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Blogs > RUFADAA > An Ultimate Guide to Understanding RUFADAA
The information age has radically altered many facets of our life during the last several decades. As a result of these developments, there have been heated discussions over individual privacy and how civil and criminal laws should be applied.
In a world where information critical to modern society is generated, distributed, and kept on the Internet, it is unavoidable that the traditional approach to estate planning must alter and adapt. This sociocultural progress is exemplified by RUFADAA.
In this post, you will learn:
The Importance of RUFADAA
The Purpose behind RUFADAA
The Legislative History of RUFADAA
The Scope and Extent of RUFADAA as a law
Don't put your trust solely in the law
Brief Overview of the Operative RUFADAA Sections
RUFADAA Applicability by State
RUFADAA is a statute granting access to an individual's internet accounts to the Executor of an Estate or an attorney after death or incapacitation.
RUFADAA, which was created by the Uniform Law Commission (U.L.C.), expands the authority customarily granted to an Executor or trustee of an Estate when managing a person's tangible assets to encompass their Digital Assets as well.
We have decoded RUFADAA and what it means for digital asset management at Clocr. We have also got you set to learn how to make your own digital Estate Plan.
RUFADAA is a redesigned version of UFADAA, which aimed to provide Estate Executors and Trustees with the same online account access as the owner in the case of their death or incapacitation.
Critics of the law argued that it went too far and that there were insufficient safeguards in place, and they were successful, resulting in the passage of RUFADAA. Only if the decedent explicitly agrees does the Revised Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act grant an Executor of Trustee access to the content of electronic communications, such as emails, chats, and D.M.s.
RUFADAA defines Custodians as companies that create, store, or provide Digital Assets, such as Google and Facebook.
Custodians may seek court orders before passing over access to an account to limit their role in the estate's settlement. They may also only provide you access to "reasonably essential" information for settling an estate. Custodians cannot access deleted assets and joint accounts.
RUFADAA establishes a foundation for how the State and an Executor, Fiduciary, or Attorney should handle a person's Digital Assets after incapacitation or death. A hierarchy of procedures gives clear guidance on how to manage or close someone's online account.
Users can choose what should happen to their accounts after death or long periods of inactivity using online tools like Google's Inactive Account Manager and Facebook's Legacy Contact. RUFADAA states that when such tools are provided, they take precedence over all other instructions, including a website's Terms of Service.
Google's Inactive Account Manager allows users to nominate a Trusted Contact who will obtain access to their account when a set amount of time has passed. A user might also opt to have their data permanently removed. Last sign-ins, recent activity, Gmail usage on the web or in the app, and Android check-ins are all used by Google to detect inactivity.
The Legacy Contact feature on Facebook allows users to appoint someone they trust to handle their account after they pass away. A Legacy Contact can publish a pinned post for someone's profile and edit their profile and cover photographs despite not having full access to the account. They can also ask for a user's account to be deleted. A Legacy Contact has no access to a user's private communications or the ability to delete old posts or friends.
If a Custodian does not provide an online tool, the next step, according to RUFADAA, is to consult the legal documents. A Will, a Trust, or a Power of Attorney are all examples of this. An Executor or Fiduciary can be granted access to one or more specified accounts through a person's digital Estate Plan.
The Terms of Service of a Custodian will define a Fiduciary's access to a user's digital asset if no information about accessing their Online Accounts has been left, whether through an online tool or a Digital Estate Plan.
If you can recall the last time you read a website's Terms of Service, you can see how this could cause problems. Exactly. For example, Verizon and all of its subsidiaries, including Yahoo!, require that all accounts be non-transferable and expire upon the user's death. If the Terms of the Service agreement is ignored, your family and loved ones may lose access to critical information needed to settle your estate.
RUFADAA was enacted in most jurisdictions to dictate how to manage someone's Digital Assets after they died. The Executor or Trustee of a Decedent's Estate can access and manage the estate's Digital Assets and electronic communications under RUFADAA. Your State's definition of what counts as a digital asset or electronic communication is different.
Most people nowadays utilize Digital Assets without even realizing it — to communicate, pay payments, manage subscriptions, save images, and so on.
There were few laws in place before recently that helped decide who may access these data and accounts if the person became incompetent or died. It was difficult to determine who would have legal access to a deceased or incompetent person's Digital Assets if they wanted them destroyed, amended, or distributed to loved ones.
The fiduciary would be unable to access the accounts unless the person provided usernames and passwords. As a result, Digital Assets are frequently erased by the firm that owns them, or they remain unreachable by family and friends on the Internet or on devices long after the person's death.
This loophole in the law created anguish for families trying to recover precious artifacts from their loved one's online legacy, as well as issues for the Executor of the estate. Delays, frustrations, and the loss of important things or information were all too common. The Uniform Law Commission began looking for a solution to this challenge in 2012.
UFADAA – The First Attempt
In 2014, the first Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Access Act (UFADAA) was passed. The authors of the UFADAA believed that the best method to give executors and agents access to a principal's or decedent's Digital Assets was to provide them with access to the traditional property.
In other words, they intended to treat Digital Assets the same way they treated traditional assets: the owners should be able to decide what should happen to them, and fiduciaries should be able to control them if the owner died or became incapable.
After being appointed Executor (called a personal representative in several jurisdictions), a person has the same right to access the deceased person's accounts that the deceased person had during his or her lifetime under the UFADAA. If the Executor lacks the necessary login or password information, he or she may request access from the corporation, which would be obliged to comply.
Ideally, this technique would have provided executors with the necessary access to close the estate, including the ability to pass on images, archive communications, delete or edit social media accounts, pay last debts via bill pay, and cancel subscriptions.
Technology corporations, as well as privacy advocacy groups like the ACLU, were vocal in their opposition to this version of the law. They suggested that giving executors access to all of a deceased person's digital possessions would do the following:
intrude on the deceased's privacy in ways they could not have envisioned or desired
increase the risk of accountability for the companies that committed to keeping the accounts safe
trespass on the privacy of third parties whose messages or information may come into contact with the Executor
misclassify digital property, which differs significantly from traditional assets held by an executor, and
cause inconsistencies with privacy protections.
The technology businesses claimed that parts of the UFADAA violated federal privacy laws as well as state and federal computer fraud statutes, compelling them to break one law while following another.
They also contended that UFADAA should not be allowed to override the terms of service agreements (TOSAs) that their clients sign when they register new digital asset accounts. The majority of TOSAs make Digital Assets non-transferable and place severe limits on who can access accounts. The UFADAA would have granted fiduciaries broad access to the records of the decedent or principal, even if they contradicted the TOSA.
Furthermore, the UFADAA's treatment of Digital Assets as traditional assets prompted privacy concerns. People's privacy expectations for Digital Assets aren't the same as they are for traditional assets, according to privacy advocacy groups.
For example, you may be aware that your Executor will have access to all of your desk drawers' photos and letters. Do you anticipate (or want) your Executor to have access to every email you've ever sent or every photo you've ever stored online?
In 2015, state legislators introduced UFADAA in more than half of the United States, but only one State approved a version of the law due to opposing pressure and concerns (Delaware). The U.L.C. went back to the planning board to come up with a new plan.
Revised UFADAA (RUFADAA)
The updated regulation significantly limits an executor's ability to access Digital Assets. Here are a few of the key highlighted changes:
Unless the deceased individual is explicitly authorized to disclosure, an executor no longer has jurisdiction over the content of electronic communications (tweets, private emails, and chats).
An executor can access other sorts of Digital Assets, but they must now petition the court and explain why the asset is required to close the estate.
If a fiduciary does not have explicit authorization to access a deceased person's account through a Will, Trust, or Power of Attorney, custodians might look to the terms of service agreements to see if they should cooperate with requests for access.
Custodians can: seek court orders; limit their compliance by only granting access to assets that are "reasonably necessary" for the estate's completion; charge costs to comply with access requests, and refuse requests that are unreasonably demanding.
Deleted assets and joint accounts may not be accessible by custodians.
RUFADAA appears to be on the verge of becoming law in the majority of states. On the National Conference of State Legislatures' website, you can follow RUFADAA's progress.
Although most lawyers, tech businesses, and average individuals with Digital Assets will welcome some clarity on a fiduciary's access to Digital Assets upon death or incapacity, the legislation is still young, and issues appear likely in reality.
Don't Put Your Trust Solely in the Law
Even if your State has enacted RUFADAA, you need to establish a plan for your Digital Assets. If you wish your Executor or agent to have access to your estate, follow these steps:
You should include in your Will or Power of Attorney whether you want your Executor or attorney-in-fact to have legitimate access to your Digital Assets.
Even if you provide this authorization, going through the legal process of invoking RUFADAA to gain access to your Digital Assets would be a task and a problem for your fiduciary. Your fiduciary will have to send a deluge of documentation to each company (perhaps even court orders), and the fiduciary will likely only have the most limited access—it may be just enough to close the estate.
Go beyond giving authorization in your Will or Power of Attorney if you want your Executor to have ultimate access to your Digital Assets (which not everyone does).
Also, provide information and instructions on how to access your accounts and files to your Executor or agent. Your Executor will be able to quickly access your accounts in the same way that you do.
This is by all measures the simplest and most reliable approach to ensure that your Executor is able to close down your Digital Estate. Here's how to do it:
Make a letter or a note to the person you're writing to. There's no need for anything spectacular. Simply write a letter, either by hand or on a computer. This information should not be included in your Will, which will be made public.
Include instructions and information about how to get there. Leave detailed information on how to gain access to your accounts. Include any required websites or devices, along with usernames and passwords.
Also, instruct your Executor on how to handle each account. Do you want your images to be shared with relatives, your Twitter account to be erased, and your blog archived and saved? Make sure you're being as clear and thorough as possible.
Place your mail in a secure location. Keep your letter safe with other critical documents such as your Will, health care directive, and insurance information. Because your Executor may require this information immediately after your death, make sure it's easily available and that you tell them where to find it.
Keep your letter current. Update your letter as account information changes so that your Executor gets the most up-to-date information when the time comes.
If you don't want anyone to have complete access to your Digital Assets if you die or become incapacitated, talk to a lawyer about privacy options.
An attorney may be able to include a clause in your Will that expressly forbids your personal representative from accessing specific assets. Alternatively, the attorney could assist you in establishing a Trust that selects a trusted individual to protect your assets on your behalf.
The following is a section-by-section description of RUFADAA's provisions, based on the uniform act's section numbers.
RUFADAA's Section 2 has a list of definitions that are utilized throughout the legislation. While it is beyond the scope of this article to go over each definition in detail, we will go over a few of the more important ones below.
The Uniform Probate Code is the source of several of RUFADAA's definitions. "A person who carries, maintains, processes, receives, or stores a user's digital asset" is characterized as a "custodian." As a result, most online email and social media service providers will be considered custodians.
The phrase "content of an electronic communication" is borrowed from the S.C.A., which states that content "includes any information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of any wire, oral, or electronic communication when used with respect to any wire, oral, or electronic communication."
The term is intended to apply exclusively to content that is covered by the ECPA (including the S.C.A.). As a result, throughout the Revised UFADAA, the term "content of an electronic communication" applies solely to material in the body of an electronic message that is not easily available to the public.
The information would not be subject to the federal law's privacy safeguards under ECPA if it was easily available to the public. A "tweet" by a Twitter user that is visible to the general public, for example, would not be included in this definition.
A "catalog of electronic communications," on the other hand, is defined as information that identifies each individual with whom a user has had electronic communications, as well as the time and date of that communication and the person's electronic address.
A catalog linked to an email, for example, might include the sender and recipient's email addresses, as well as the time and date the communication was sent. In most cases, a fiduciary will have access to a catalog of the user's communications but not to the content unless the user has authorized the publication of the material (as explained below).
RUFADAA defines an "online tool" as "an electronic service provided by a custodian that allows the user to provide directions for or nondisclosure of Digital Assets to a third person in an agreement separate from the custodian's terms of service agreement."
An online tool can assign a "designated recipient" to manage the user's Digital Assets. An online tool replaces directions in the user's estate planning paperwork, as detailed below, even if such directions are in conflict with the user's preferences as indicated in an online tool.
The act applies to:
(1) fiduciary acting under a Will or power of attorney signed before or after the act's effective date;
(2) a personal representative of a decedent who died before or after the act's effective date (including a decedent who died intestate);
(3) a conservatorship commenced before or after the act's effective date; and
(4) a trustee of a Trust created before or after the act's effective date.
RUFADAA creates a "three-tier priority system" for establishing a user's purpose in relation to any digital asset in Section 4.
First, the user can instruct the custodian whether or not to divulge the content of the digital asset using an online tool. Any such directive "overrides a contrary direction by the user in a Will, Trust, power of attorney, or other records" provided the online tool permits the user to change or delete the direction at any time.
Second, if an online tool is not used, the user's instructions in a Will, Trust, Power of Attorney, or "other record" will determine whether a digital asset's content can be given to a fiduciary.
Finally, if the user does not offer instruction through an online tool or related documentation, the fiduciary's rights will be governed by the TOSA regulating the digital asset. If the TOSA is silent on a user's fiduciary's rights, as it usually is, RUFADAA's default regulations (described below) will be the fiduciary's only remaining choice.
According to Section 5 of RUFADAA, if a fiduciary gains access to a digital asset, the TOSA continues to apply to the fiduciary in the same way as it did to the original user. If the custodian can comply with section 6.69, the custodian is not obligated to allow a fiduciary to assume the rights under the TOSA.
Section 6 lays forth the steps a custodian must take to comply with RUFADAA's disclosure requirements. When disclosing a digital asset, the custodian may grant the fiduciary or designated recipient
(1) "full access to the user's account,"
(2) "partial access to the user's account sufficient to perform the tasks with which the fiduciary or designated recipient is charged," or
(3) an electronic or paper copy of the digital asset, at its "sole discretion."
If the custodian believes a request from a fiduciary will place an "undue burden" on the custodian, this clause authorizes the custodian to seek direction from the court.
The first of RUFADAA's provisions, Section 7, lays out the methods by which fiduciaries can get information about a deceased or incapacitated user's Digital Assets from internet providers.
This section allows a personal representative of a decedent's estate to obtain such access if the personal representative submits to the custodian
(1) a written request for disclosure in written or electronic form;
(2) a certified copy of the user's death certificate;
(3) a certified document evidencing the personal representative's authority (such as a court-issued letter of appointment or letters testamentary); and
(4) unless the user used an online service.
Section 7 also states that the personal representative may be required to provide additional information to the custodian if the custodian requests it, such as evidence that the user had an account with the custodian, such as the account number, username, address, or other uniquely identifying information.
Furthermore, the custodian can request that the fiduciary obtain a court order finding that
(1) the user had an account with the custodian;
(2) disclosure of the content of the electronic communications does not violate the S.C.A.;
(3) the user consented to the disclosure unless the user used an online tool; or
(4) disclosure of the information is "reasonably necessary for estate administration."
The personal representative faces substantial obstacles as a result of the judicial proceedings anticipated under section 7. The first sentence of section 7 permits the content of a digital asset to be disclosed if a "court directs."
Prior to making such a disclosure, the custodian may ask the court to rule that the revelation would not violate the S.C.A. or federal privacy laws (47 U.S.C. section 222); or that the "user consented to the disclosure." This clause explicitly addresses the question of whether a fiduciary designated under state law has the user's "lawful consent" to receive the content of electronic communication under federal law.
Courts appear hesitant to assume permission only by the fact that the personal representative is acting in a fiduciary position, as evidenced in the In re Facebook, Inc. case noted above. A user's unequivocal consent for disclosure of Digital Assets under the user's Will, Trust, or Power of Attorney is critical in this case.
Section 8 of RUFADAA allows the personal representative to request that the custodian disclose a "catalog of electronic communications sent or received by the user, other than the content of electronic communications sent or received by the user," unless the decedent's Will expressly states otherwise.
The method described in section 8 is similar to that stated in section 7, except that no copy of the decedent's Will is necessary, and a court finding need not mention conformity with the S.C.A. because such non-content disclosures are not forbidden by the S.C.A.
As a result, even if there is no basis for "lawful consent" under the S.C.A., the fiduciary may still be entitled to acquire non-content information from the custodian. A power of attorney agent may seek disclosure of the content of a digital asset if a power of attorney "expressly grants" permission to the agent of such Digital Assets, according to section 9 of RUFADAA.
The agent's request to the custodian must include the following:
(1) a written request for disclosure in paper or electronic form;
(2) an "original or copy of a power of attorney expressly granting the agent authority over the content of the principal's electronic communications"; and
(3) a certification by the agent that a power of attorney is in effect, signed under penalty of perjury.
The custodian may, as in section 7, ask the agent to produce identifying information or other proof that the user has an account with the custodian.
Section 10 permits a power of attorney agent to request a list of electronic communications. The agent must submit the request to the custodian along with a copy of the power of attorney and a sworn statement that a power of attorney is still valid.
As with section 9, the custodian may ask for identification information or other proof to validate the existence of an account.
According to Section 11 of RUFADAA, if a trustee is the "original user" of an account, the trustee has access to all Digital Assets held in Trust as well as a catalog of all electronic interactions.
If the trustee of a Trust is not the original user of an account and the account is moved into the Trust by the settlor, or in another way, section 12 of RUFADAA establishes a procedure for the trustee to request disclosure of Digital Assets from the custodian.
Unless the trustee gives the custodian
(2) a certified copy of the Trust instrument or certification of Trust that includes consent to the disclosure of the content of the digital asset to the trustee; and
(3) certification by the trustee, under penalty of perjury, a custodian shall disclose the digital asset information to the trustee unless ordered by the court, directed by the original user, or provided in the Trust.
The trustee may also be asked to give identifying information or "evidence linking the account to the Trust" by the custodian.
Section 13 of the RUFADAA deals with the disclosure of non-content information (that is, the catalog of electronic communications).
The trustee may make a request to the custodian under this section by submitting a request that is similar to the one described in section 12 above, except that the copy of the Trust instrument or certification of Trust does not have to include a reference to consent to the disclosure of the digital asset's content.
The mechanism through which a conservator may get limited information about the protected person's Digital Assets is outlined in Section 14 of RUFADAA. The protected person preserves private rights in his or her personal correspondence, according to this provision.
As a result, Digital Assets can only be accessed with a court order, not just because the conservator has broad jurisdiction to handle the protected person's assets. The conservator may only obtain the inventory of the user's Digital Assets, not the content-based information, unless the court orders otherwise.
The conservator has the legal right to access this information by submitting a request for such information to the custodian in either paper or electronic format, together with a certified copy of the court's order.
A conservator with broad jurisdiction over the protected person's Digital Assets may also ask the custodian to suspend or terminate the protected person's account for a good reason.
Section 15 of the RUFADAA is a crucial section that defines the nature and scope of a fiduciary's responsibilities as they pertain to Digital Assets. This section begins by reiterating that a fiduciary's legal obligations to "manage tangible property" also extend to the administration of Digital Assets.
These responsibilities include those of care, loyalty, secrecy, and may include some more. In addition, section 15 states that the fiduciary's authority over a digital asset is subject to any applicable TOSA unless it is supplanted by the user's direction in an online tool or applicable documents expressing lawful consent (which is section 4 of RUFADAA); (2) is subject to applicable law, including copyright law; (3) is limited by the scope of the fiduciary's duties; and (4) is not to be used to "impersonate the user."
Section 15 affirms that the fiduciary has unfettered access to Digital Assets that are not held by a custodian or subject to a TOSA (for example, digital data saved on a decedent's own computer).
A fiduciary working within the limits of the fiduciary's obligations is an authorized user of the property of a deceased, protected person, principal, or settlor for the purposes of state laws pertaining to computer fraud or unauthorized computer access.
A fiduciary having power over a decedent's protected person's, principal's, or settlor's tangible personal property has the right to access that property and any Digital Assets held on it. Section 15 of the Act states that:
(1) a custodian may disclose to fiduciary information in an account that is required in order to close such an account; and
(2) a fiduciary may terminate the user's account by submitting a written request to the custodian, along with enumerated documentation to verify the fiduciary's authority and a death certificate, if the user is deceased.
Section 16 of RUFADAA states that a custodian must comply with a fiduciary's request for disclosure within 60 days of receiving it, together with all other information needed by RUFADAA.
If the custodian refuses to comply, the fiduciary may seek a court order requiring compliance, but any such order must also state that "compliance is not in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 2702." Section 16 empowers the custodian to notify the original user of a fiduciary's disclosure request.
Section 16 further states that the custodian may decline a fiduciary's disclosure request if "the custodian is aware of any lawful access to the account following the receipt of the fiduciary's request" under RUFADAA.
Furthermore, section 16 does not limit or require a fiduciary to obtain a court order that specifies that
(1) the account belongs to a protected person or principal under a power of attorney;
(2) "specifies that there is sufficient consent from the [protected person] or [principal] to support the requested disclosure"; and
(3) "contains a finding required by law other than [RUFADAA]."
Finally, a custodian (together with its officers, employees, and agents) is "immune from liability for an act or omission done in good faith in compliance" with RUFADAA, according to section 16.
The comments to RUFADAA go on to describe the "immunity" granted by this clause, stating that it protects custodians from "indirect" responsibility (for example, if a custodian grants access under the act).
This exemption, however, would not apply to "direct" culpability, such as a custodian's failure to comply with a court order under RUFADAA. RUFADAA has various administrative measures, including a uniformity clause, in sections 17 through 21.
To learn about the applicability by State, you can visit our State-specific blogs.
The act, on the other hand, is a poor answer to many of the problems that estate planners encounter. Attorneys and other professional advisers will have to struggle with how federal legislation, such as the SCA, affect both the interpretation of state statutes, such as RUFADAA, and the management of Digital Assets by fiduciaries in the future years. Courts, future state legislatures, and, eventually, Congress will all play a part in the growth of digital asset law.
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Capetonians wasted no time in capturing the Table Mountain in all its beauty when a double rainbow shone above the city.
Social media lit up after a double rainbow was noticeably arching over Cape Town. Viewers delightedly took pictures and videos of the meteorological phenomenon whose explanation is as colourful as its display.
Sir Isaac Newton discovered that sunlight falling upon a prism split into various component colours, now known as dispersion. He classified these components as red, orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo and violet.
Combined, the colours appear as white to the eye. After the rain, millions of tiny water droplets remain in the air. The rain droplets serve as a type of light reflector.
When light passes through a transparent material, such as air, into another, such as water, bending occurs. The bending of light is known as refraction.
Blue and violet have shorter wavelengths so they bend the most whereas red and orange have longer wavelengths and are bent the least.
White light enters the droplet at a specific angle, the drop separates the white light into different colours. What colour is refracted is dependant on the angle the sunlight strikes the back of the rain droplet.
Red light exits the droplet at a 42° angle, whereas violet light exits at a 40° angle. The other colours in the spectrum exit the rain droplets at angles between 40° and 42°. This allows for the colourful display of ROYGBIV (red, orange, yellow, green, blue, indigo, violet).
Although only one colour hits the eye (requiring millions of droplets to create a rainbow), at any given point, each raindrop reflects all colours.
While only half is visible due to the horizon, rainbows actually form a circle.
In some instances, as was the case in Cape Town, we can observe a secondary rainbow, dimmer and higher than the primary rainbow.
This phenomenon is due to light being reflected twice, instead of just once. As the secondary rainbow is formed by one more reflection than the primary rainbow, it is much fainter and rarer to see.
The colours in the secondary rainbow are in reverse order of the primary rainbow.
Rainbows can form wherever conditions are favourable: over the ocean and waterfalls as well as sprinklers and in mist from a garden hose.
If the rainbow is caused by sunlight, it will always appear in the section of sky directly opposite the sun so make sure you have your back towards the sun when wanting to spot a rainbow after the rain.
According to legend, Newton included indigo because he felt that there should be seven rather than six colours in a rainbow due to his strong religious beliefs.


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text:
Q: Using theme options in header.php Im presently working on a theme where I would like to user to be able to change the logo image.
Im using the NHP Theme framework.
But for some reason
<?php
echo $options['logo'];
?>

does nothing in the header.php. It works in index.php but not header.php...
How can I make it echo in the header as well?

A: It's pure guess. But in lot of frameworks the close tag ?> can cause a problem. Try just
<?php
echo $options['logo'];

without the close tag, if you have pure php file.

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text:
Flower Ornament Depository 華嚴藏
Revisiting Ancient Buddhist India
Long ago there was a Korean monk named Hyecho 慧超 (704–787) who in the 8th century traveled from China to India and back. This was a time long before the comforts and security of modern travel, where much of the journey was done on foot, which took considerable time and energy. Like his predecessors Faxian (338-c423), Xuanzang (602–664) and Yijing (635–713), he also kept a travelogue detailing his journey, entitled Memoir of a Pilgrimage to the Five Indian Kingdoms (Krn. Wang Ocheonchukguk Jeon 徃五天竺國傳). While born in Silla, at a young age he seems to have departed his home to study Buddhism in China. At some point he had the inclination to travel abroad and like a number of other monks during the Tang Dynasty he set out for India.
In 723 he departed China from Guangzhou by ship and arrived in eastern India some time later, thereupon visiting various places such as Kushinagar, Kapilavastu and Varanasi before leaving India west via Karasahr. His journey took him north and west through modern day Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran before arriving back in China in 729.
Having personally visited several of the sites he himself went to some thirteen or fourteen centuries before I did, it is interesting for me to envision how he saw things from how I did. Furthermore, we also have the travelogues of other pilgrims from East Asia which we might consult and compare. This enabled me while travelling in India and Nepal to appreciate the historical richness of several ancient sites while also personally in a sense reliving the trip as some pilgrims many centuries had done before me.
Hyecho arrived in India by sea and then slowly made his way to Kushinagar, the site where the Buddha passed away. He describes it as follows.
《遊方記抄》卷1:「一月至拘尸那國。佛入涅槃處。其城荒廢。無人住也。佛入涅槃處置塔。有禪師在彼掃灑。」(CBETA, T51, no. 2089, p. 975, a27-29)
"After a month I arrived at Kushinagar, the site where the Buddha entered parinirvāṇa. The city is desolate and nobody lives there. There is a stūpa built where the Buddha entered parinirvāṇa. There is a master there who mops it."
Now, curiously, he refers only to what is presumably Parinirvāṇa Stūpa (pictured to the right), the site where the Buddha passed away, but not Makutabandhana, otherwise called Ramabhar Stūpa, which is where the Buddha's body was cremated. It makes one wonder why he did not mention the other notable stūpa as they are in short walking distance of each other. This might be due to the fact there were at the time many other stūpas which Xuanzang in the previous century provided detailed descriptions for.
Xuanzang also makes mention of the site which is now called Parinirvāṇa Stūpa as follows.
《大 唐西域記》卷6:「城西北三四里,渡阿恃多伐底河。西岸不遠,至娑羅林。其樹類槲,而皮青白,葉甚光潤。四樹特高,如來寂滅之所也。其大甎精舍中作如來涅 槃之像,北首而臥。傍有窣堵波,無憂王所建,基雖傾陷,尚高二百餘尺。前建石柱,以記如來寂滅之事,雖有文記,不書日月。」(CBETA, T51, no. 2087, p. 903, b14-21)
"Northwest of the city three or four li one crosses the Ajitavatī River. The west bank is not far and one arrives at the śāla trees. The tree is a type of oak (hu 槲) and the bark is greenish-white with the leafs quite glossy and smooth. The four trees are especially tall. It is where the Tathāgata passed away. Inside the great brick temple there is a statue of the Tathāgata's parinirvāṇa. The head is to the north and it is lying down. To the side there is a stūpa built by King Aśoka. Even though it has collapsed it is still more than two-hundred chi tall. In the front there is raised a stone pillar recording the event of the Tathāgata's passing away. Although there is a written record, there is not written the day or month."
Remarkably, even today you can see this statue that he describes. As one might see in the photograph, the statue is laying down with the head facing north. It was excavated in the 19th century by archaeologists and given its age it is in quite good condition. There is also indeed something remarkable about reading Xuanzang's account from the 7th century and seeing in the 21st century the same statue he laid eyes upon.
It is notable here that the stūpa had collapsed with no mention of it being repaired. This may indicate the decline of Buddhism in India at the time. Interestingly, at the same time Nālandā University was operating and perhaps even flourishing with erudite figures like Candrakīrti on the faculty. Nevertheless, according to Xuanzang sites like Kushinagar and Lumbini were being poorly maintained. This suggests that while Buddhism was thriving amongst intelligentsia, it had lost much of the popular support it once held with the common people who would otherwise tend to such holy sites. One contributing factor that is cited in Buddhism's decline in India is that over time it gradually ceased being relevant to the common people and thus came to live on only amongst intellectuals.
Xuanzang also describes what appears to be Ramabhar Stūpa, a short distance from the aforementioned statue.
《大唐西域記》卷6:「城北渡河三百餘步,有窣堵波,是如來焚身之處。地今黃黑,土雜灰炭,至誠求請,或得舍利。」(CBETA, T51, no. 2087, p. 904, b11-13)
"Crossing the river north of the city and walking about three-hundred steps there is a stūpa, which is place where the Tathāgata's body was burned. The earth is now yellowish-black with the soil a mix of ash and charcoal. With utmost sincere requests some go to obtain relics (śarīra)."
A few centuries earlier in the early 5th century Faxian seems to have come from the opposite direction.
《高僧法顯傳》卷1:「從此東行四由延到炭塔。亦有僧伽藍。復東行十二由延到拘夷那竭城。城北雙樹間希連禪河邊。世尊於此北首而般泥洹。」(CBETA, T51, no. 2085, p. 861, c1-4)
"From here going east four yojanas one arrives at the cremation stūpa. There is also a monastery. Going further east twelve yojanas one arrives at the city of Kuśinagara. North of the city there among the twinned trees on the banks of the Nairañjanā River the World Honored One laid his head to the north and [passed into] pariṇirvāṇa."
In the present day there is no river alongside this purported site where the Buddha passed away. That river is somewhat to the south. In all likelihood the course of the river has changed over the many centuries since Faxian visited said location. The present location of the river relative to the stūpa can be seen in the lower left corner of the following image.
Faxian also remarks that the city when he visited it was sparsely populated and largely deserted besides the monks and some families. Judging from the aforementioned records we can assume that Kushinagar was not a major center of learning or practice for Buddhists. In the 8th century when Hyecho visited it seemed all but one lonely master was left to do the mopping. This also perhaps indicates the slow decline of Buddhism on the subcontinent. Either for lack of resources or apathy the Buddhists at the time did not invest much resources in such a holy site.
This seems to have also been the case with Lumbini and Kapilavastu (now close to the Indian border in Nepal), where the Buddha was born and raised.
Hyecho makes the following brief comments on the state of Kapilavastu:
《遊方記抄》卷1:「迦毘耶羅國。即佛本生城。無憂樹見在。彼城已廢。有塔無僧。亦無百姓。... 林木荒多。道路足賊。往彼禮拜者。甚難方迷。」(CBETA, T51, no. 2089, p. 976, a2-5)
"The country of Kapilavastu. It is where the Buddha was originally born and the city [where he was raised]. The aśoka tree [under which the Buddha was born] is still extant. The city has been abandoned. There are stūpas, but no monks. There is also no populace. The forests are much neglected. The roads are full of bandits. Those going there to pay respects have much difficulty and become lost."
Xuanzang in the previous century recorded his observations in more details as follows.
《大 唐西域記》卷6:「劫比羅伐窣堵國,周四千餘里。空城十數,荒蕪已甚。王城頹圮,周量不詳。其內宮城周十四五里,壘甎而成,基跡峻固。空荒久遠,人里稀 曠。無大君長,城各立主。土地良沃,稼穡時播。氣序無愆,風俗和暢。伽藍故基千有餘所,而宮城之側有一伽藍,僧徒三千餘人,習學小乘正量部教。天祠兩所, 異道雜居。」(CBETA, T51, no. 2087, p. 900, c22-29)
"The country of Kapilavastu is more than four-thousand li in circumference. There are tens of empty cities, truly abandoned and overgrown with weeds. The king's city is decrepit. The measurements for the circumference are unclear. Within there is the palace, fourteen or fifteen li in circumference built of layered bricks, the remains of the foundation tall and solid. They have long been emptied and abandoned. The villages of the people are rare and scarce. There are great lords or chiefs and the cities individually elect their headmen. The land is fertile. Sowing or harvesting they are often seeding. The order of the seasons is without lapse. Their culture is gentle and kind. There are more than a thousand old foundations for temples, though on the side of the palace there is one temple with over three thousand monks who study the Hīnayāna Saṃmitīya-nikāya teachings. There are two Hindu sites and the different paths reside together."
Clearly the local society had once undergone catastrophe, but at this point it seems to have recovered. The people are seen to be secure in their agriculture and friendly in their dispositions. However, said realm was once a major Buddhist culture, but in Xuanzang's time it was largely all but ruins that remained of its former glory. This was not unlike what Xuanzang encountered in his journey through what is now Afghanistan and Pakistan - old monasteries, once thriving and active, all but abandoned and desolate.
Faxian also visited the location in the 5th century and noted the desolation.
《高僧法顯傳》卷1:「從此東行減一由延到迦維羅衛城。城中都無王民甚丘荒。止有眾僧民戶數十家而已。」(CBETA, T51, no. 2085, p. 861, a22-24)
"From here going east less than a yojana away one arrives at the city of Kapilavastu. Inside the city there is neither king nor citizens and it is quite desolate. There are only the monks and some tens of households."
Fortunately for Faxian he was able to find Lumbini, the site of the Buddha's birth.
《高僧法顯傳》卷1:「城東五十里有王園。園名論民。夫人入池洗浴出池。北岸二十步舉手攀樹枝東向生太子。太子墮地行七步。二龍王浴太子。身浴處遂作井。及上洗浴池。今眾僧常取飲之。」(CBETA, T51, no. 2085, p. 861, b6-10)
"Fifty li east of the city there is a regal park. The park is called Lumbinī. The lady [i.e., the Buddha's mother] entered the pond to wash and then came out. Walking twenty steps from the north bank she raised her hands, holding onto the branch of a tree and facing east the prince was born. The prince fell to the earth and walked seven steps. Two nāga kings washed the prince. The place where his body was washed there then was created a well [from which], along with the above pond [which the lady] bathed in, the monks now often take [water from] and drink."
As to the reason why Kapilavastu ended up in such desolation it probably begun with the assault by Virūḍhaka, king of Kośala, who laid waste to the realm and slaughtered five hundred members of the Śākyas. This was during the Buddha's lifetime. However, it is unlikely this was the sole reason for the eventual abandonment of tens of cities.
It has been a joy for me to be able to revisit ancient Indian sites that correspond to the details in travelogues written by travellers centuries ago. It is a kind of applied scholarship that I imagine archaeologists can appreciate. To read these accounts and consider how things have changed and what things have stayed the same is also an exercise in analyzing history itself.
One last thing to consider is that these travelogues are often the only witness accounts we have for many of the regions they visited throughout those centuries. If it was not for these accounts our understanding might otherwise be strictly limited to scarce references and archaeological reports. As eyewitness historical documents they are extremely valuable. This makes reliving them as a modern pilgrim all the more interesting.
on Thursday, March 29, 2012 No comments :
Labels: faxian , hyecho , india , kushinagar , lumbini , pilgrimage , travel , xuanzang
Why did the Buddha prohibit alcohol?
I have often found that although most Buddhists are aware that the Buddha laid down a rule against alcohol consumption, they are often unaware of precisely why. There are plenty of treatises and writings that describe the benefits of abstaining from alcohol consumption while informing the reader about the faults of the substance. These resources generally inform Buddhists about the ethical issues surrounding alcohol consumption. However, the original reason for the Buddha prohibiting his disciples from consuming alcohol was much more practical. It should be firstly noted that prior to the prohibition the disciples were free to receive offerings of alcohol and consume them. There was no prohibition from the start against drinking alcohol. The individual rules in the Vinaya were originally formulated according to circumstances as they arose. When situations arose that required regulations to be implemented the Buddha would lay down a rule suitable to the circumstances. At the beginning, however, there were no rules at all. The disciplinary code only came to exist due to dangerous activities of certain disciples.
One other thing to note is that the original Vinaya regulations were neither precepts nor vows, but rules. They might be considered kind of house rules specifically aimed at a male community younger in age.
With these facts in mind we can then examine the original reason for the alcohol prohibition. For this purpose we can examine the various Vinaya texts that exist in translation in the Chinese canon. These were all translated in the 5th century. Preference in this context might be given to the Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya as it is probably the earliest and most reliable version. Incidentally, the issue of expanding the Vinaya was an issue that contributed to the first schism in the early sangha. See the following.
"The Mahāsāṃghikas were involved in the first division of the Buddhist community in the second century after the demise of the Buddha, that is, the schism between the Mahāsāṃghikas and the Sthaviravādins. This schism was most likely invoked by the expansion of the root Vinaya text by the future Sthaviravādins, an expansion that was not accepted by the later Mahāsāṃghikas."1
We can thus assume that the Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya 摩訶僧祇律 is the earlier version and likely better reflects the original narrative concerning the incident which led to the Buddha prohibiting alcohol consumption. We might consider the Mahāsāṃghika account in its entirety as follows.
《摩訶僧祇律》卷20:「佛住拘睒彌國。廣說如上。爾時拘睒彌界有惡龍。名菴婆羅。能使亢旱不雨苗稼不收。人民飢饉。如是種種災患。時尊者善來比丘往降惡龍。如善來比丘經中廣說降伏惡龍已。乃至國土豐樂人民感德。知恩報恩。有五百大家為善來故。各立常施幢幡施設床座。請僧供養。別請善來比丘。其所造家。則設種種美食。時有一家施食之後。因渴施酒色味似水得而飲之。還向精舍。爾時世尊大會說法。酒勢發盛。昏悶躃地。當世尊前舒脚而臥。佛知而故言。是何比丘在如來前舒脚而臥。比丘答言。善來比丘飲酒過多是故醉臥。佛問諸比丘。此善來比丘先曾晝寢不。不也世尊。復問比丘善來。未醉之時頗曾佛前舒脚臥不。不也世尊。復問比丘多飲酒已。欲使不醉可得爾不。不也世尊。復問諸比丘。設使善來比丘不飲酒時聞說微妙不死之法。當欲失是善利。不聽受不。不也世尊。佛語諸比丘。是善來比丘本能降伏惡龍。今者能降蝦蟆不。答言。不能。佛言。設使菴婆羅龍聞者生其不樂。從今日後不聽飲酒。」(CBETA, T22, no. 1425, p. 386, c13-p. 387, a4)
The Buddha was residing in the country of Kauśāmbī teaching as was mentioned above. At that time in the realm of Kauśāmbī there was an evil nāga named Āmra who had caused a drought where the rain did not fall and the crops were not harvested. The people were starving and there were various calamities like this. It was then that the bhikṣu Venerable Svāgata went to placate the evil nāga. As it is explained in the *Svāgata Bhikṣu Sūtra, after placating the evil nāga the country celebrated and the people felt gratitude, aware of the kindness bestowed upon them and wanting to repay it. It was on Svāgata's behalf that five hundred great families each offered up hanging banners and setup seats, inviting the monks for offerings. They made a special invitation to Bhikṣu Svāgata. The households which made [the offerings] provided various kinds of delicious foods. It was then that after one household had offered food that due to his thirst they offered alcohol which appeared as water whereupon he drank it. He returned to the monastery where the World Honored One [the Buddha] was teaching the Dharma in a great assembly at the time. The influence of the alcohol was all too much as he became unwell and fell onto the ground. It was in front of the World Honored One that he stretched out his legs and passed out.
The Buddha was aware of this and thus said, "Which bhikṣu is it here that has stretched out his legs and passed out in front of the Tathāgata?"
The bhikṣus replied, "Bhikṣu Svāgata drank much alcohol and thus has become inebriated and passed out."
The Buddha asked the bhikṣus, "Has Bhikṣu Svāgata here ever slept during the day?"
"No, World Honored One."
He again asked, "Has Bhikṣu Svāgata prior to being inebriated ever stretched out his legs and passed out in front of the Buddha before?"
He again asked, "The bhikṣu having drank too much alcohol, if he wanted to make himself un-inebriated, would it be possible to do this?"
He again asked the bhikṣus, "Suppose Bhikṣu Svāgata at a time when he had not drank alcohol heard an exposition on the excellent and immortal Dharma – would he want to lose this benefit and not listen to it?"
The Buddha said to the bhikṣus, "This Bhikṣu Svāgata was originally able to placate an evil nāga. Now, could he placate a toad?"
They replied, "He could not."
The Buddha said, "Suppose Āmra the nāga heard this – it would provoke his displeasure. From today onward it is not permitted to drink alcohol."
Curiously, the accounts of this incident in other Vinaya texts differ in the details of what transpired.
The Dharmagupta Vinaya 四分律 is a much longer account of the event and the substance consumed is a "black liquor" which the monks were aware was alcohol. It also states Svāgata not only fell over at the road side, but vomited which caused the birds to be disturbed. The Buddha then tells Ānanda the ten faults of consuming alcohol.
The Mahīśāsaka Vinaya 五分律 reports the nāga was causing torrential rains and hail which destroyed the fields, in contrast to the account in the Mahāsāṃghika Vinaya which states it was a drought. Svāgata is also seen in a non-violent battle of magical powers with the nāga where the latter loses and is scooped up into the former's bowl and taken to the Buddha who gives him permission to release it. The grateful laity come to the assembly of monks and ask Svāgata if he needs anything. He replies that when he was layperson he enjoyed meat and alcohol. The laity then provided him with both meat and alcohol which resulted in him becoming drunk, vomiting all over robe and bowl, and passing out. The Buddha saw this with his clairvoyant eye from afar and went with Ānanda to tend to Svāgata and clean him up with water from the well. They placed him on a rope-bed and in a drunken haze Svāgata kicked the Buddha. It was then that the Buddha summoned the assembly of monks and spoke to them of the faults of alcohol. He then prohibited the consumption of it.
In consideration of all these differing details of the incident we can understand two things.
Firstly, all the accounts agree that Svāgata became intoxicated due to having consumed too much alcohol following festivities celebrating his placation of an evil nāga that was terrorizing the people of Kauśāmbī, which we can assume more or less reflects the actual event that took place, or at least the general hearsay concerning it, albeit with differing accounts of the details.
Secondly, the differences we find in the various Vinaya collections tell us that when it comes to knowing precisely what was said and done when the Buddha lived we are actually at a loss to safely conclude anything as matter of fact. There is a general tendency in modern Buddhist scholarship to chiefly favor the Theravāda Pāli canon as representing what the "historical Buddha" actually taught and the events of his life. However, this is problematic for the simple fact that the canons from other early Buddhist schools such as that of the Mahāsāṃghikas, who incidentally are noted as having disagreed to the expansion of the Vinaya unlike the Sthaviravāda (Theravāda) school, have differing accounts of the Buddha's teachings and the events which occurred in the early community. As noted above, in the case of the alcohol prohibition there is indeed agreement on the general outline of the incident, but the details differ. This is likewise to be expected when it comes to teachings as recorded in the various differing editions of sūtras that we have, many of which are preserved in Classical Chinese which exasperates the problem.
What this means is that essentially we only have the general outline of the Buddha's teachings and the events of his life available to us, thus we must accept this limitation rather than believing any particular scriptural record to be a verbatim record. This is important in the process of exegesis where we must not place too much faith on the fine points of scriptures which record the Buddha's words as said records are in reality quite limited as records and we have really only to rely on their general meanings. In other words, we need to rely on the spirit and general outline of many teachings rather than the letter of how it is recorded as having been presented.
Returning to the issue of alcohol prohibition, it goes without saying that Buddhism developed in most cultures to generally see alcohol in a negative light, although we need to remind ourselves that in the early sangha alcohol was not prohibited and Buddhists could and evidently did consume it. There are also a lot of secondary literature such as treatises which discuss the issue in an ethical context as well as in a practical context of how it might affect one's cultivation of mindfulness. It was thus absolutely forbidden. This prohibition also came to be included among the five lay precepts, which is a characteristic set of vows that Buddhist laypeople are generally expected to undertake.
Many Mahāyāna thinkers reacted against rigid interpretations of rules and precepts arguing that if motivated by compassion or other benevolent purposes, then committing acts that would otherwise be outright violations of one's precepts would actually be meritorious. This perhaps lead to a relaxed attitude towards alcohol consumption both in China and Japan, and elsewhere. There is an expression still favored in Japanese Buddhism to this day to refer to liquor as "prajñā soup" 般若湯, which actually originates in Song Dynasty (960–1279) China. The reasoning seems to have been that by calling it something else then, in good humor, it was not alcohol and thus did not violate any precepts.
In summary, we have reviewed the original reason for the Buddha prohibiting alcohol and we can indeed see it was not due to the beverage being inherently unwholesome and evil, but the regulation was actually a practical rule established with the disciples in mind and likely with a wish that no repeat of the incident would occur. In that sense, there is nothing holy or sacred about such a rule. This is also an important thing to note: the Vinaya regulations were rules in the beginning rather than vows. The earliest disciples were also free to consume alcohol and they did. The differing accounts of these regulations also leads us to the perhaps unfavorable conclusion that we really cannot faithfully rely on any single account for the fine details of what the Buddha said and the circumstances in which he taught things due to the various records we have differing to the extent that they do. In other words, we have the general outline of his wording and the events which prompted his declarations and statements, but no verbatim text from which fine exegesis based on the letter of the teaching might be executed.
1See Bart Dessein in "The First Turning of the Wheel of the Doctrine: Sar and Maha Controversy" in Handbook of Oriental Studies The Spread of Buddhism, edited by Ann Heirman and Stephan Peter Bumbacher (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 15.
on Wednesday, March 14, 2012 3 comments :
Labels: alcohol , bodhisattvas , buddhism , mahayana , precepts , vinaya
Are nirmaṇakāyas philosophical zombies?
The nirmaṇakāya in Mahāyāna thought is essentially conceived of as a seemingly physical and tangible manifestation of an otherwise transcendental Buddha. In other words, it is a means through which that transcendental force interacts with ordinary beings in a way they can comprehend.
This might lead to the question, "Are nirmaṇakāyas philosophical zombies?" A philosophical zombie is a hypothetical entity that for all intents and purposes is identical with a living being though lacking experience, consciousness, qualia and/or sentience. This is worth considering because a Buddha fundamentally is the dharmakāya which while encompassing all beings and all reality, is not a being (sattva). The dharmakāya is the body of truth and the body of reality. It is the eternal principle of emptiness. Hence, it is free of all marks and characteristics such as physical form, consciousness or senses. It then begs the question of what a seemingly flesh and blood Śākyamuni Buddha was.
To investigate this question I think we might consider the ideas of Kumārajīva 鳩摩羅什 (344-413), the great Central Asian translator of texts in fifth-century China.
Firstly, looking briefly at Kumārajīva's ideas in his dialogue with Huiyuan 慧遠 (334-416), he explains that the dharmakāya is conventionally able to teach the sūtras with an illusory body via a relationship like the sun to sunlight. The question Huiyuan poses is why bodhisattvas are able to perceive the Buddha, which is the dharmakāya, teaching the dharma. Huiyuan's question is as follows.
《鳩摩羅什法師大義》卷1:「遠問曰。佛於法身中為菩薩說經。法身菩薩乃能見之。如此則有四大五根。若然者。與色身復何差別。而云法身耶。經云法身無去無來。無有起滅。泥洹同像。云何可見。而復講說乎。」(CBETA, T45, no. 1856, p. 122, c6-10)
"Huiyuan asks, 'The Buddha as the dharmakāya teaches sūtras to the bodhisattvas. The bodhisattvas are able to see the dharmakāya. If it is like this, then it would have the four elements and five faculties. If so, what difference is there with a form body, and why call it a dharmakāya? The sūtras state that the dharmakāya is without going and without coming. It has no arising and no cessation, always like nirvāṇa. How are they able to see it and furthermore [how is it] able to teach?'"
Kumārajīva replies to this by introducing the idea of an illusory body.
《鳩摩羅什法師大義》卷1:「什答曰。佛法身者。同於變化。化無四大五根。」(CBETA, T45, no. 1856, p. 122, c11-12)
"Kumārajīva replies, 'The Buddha's dharmakāya is the same as an illusion. It is without the four elements and five faculties.'"
The thing to note here is that the illusory bodies are described as extensions of the dharmakāya. In one sense, they are the dharmakāya, but the true dharmakāya is not actually being perceived, but just a provisional manifestation of it, just as the sunlight while born from the sun is not the sun itself. These illusory bodies, like the dharmakāya, are further described as having the quality of an image in a mirror.
《鳩摩羅什法師大義》卷1:「如鏡中像。水中月。見如有色。而無觸等。則非色也。化亦如是。法身亦然。又經言法身者。或說佛所化身。或說妙行法身。」(CBETA, T45, no. 1856, p. 122, c20-23)
"Like the image in a mirror or a moon in the water, it appears to have form, but there is no tactile [quality] to it, therefore it is not form. The illusion is also like this. The dharmakāya is also so. Again, the sūtras speak of a dharmakāya, others explain an illusionary body of the Buddha, while others explain it as a dharmakāya of excellent practices."
The relationship between the two as noted above is akin to the sun and sunlight. See the following.
《鳩摩羅什法師大義》卷1:「真法身者。猶如日現。所化之身同若日光。」(CBETA, T45, no. 1856, p. 123, a9-10)
"The true dharmakāya is like the sun manifest. The illusionary body is like the sunlight."
He also explains a difference between the "true body" of the Buddha and the innumerable illusory ones which arise from the former. The former is also beyond the three realms which ordinary beings inhabit. Again, in his words:
《鳩摩羅什法師大義》卷1:「真法身者。遍滿十方虛空法界。光明悉照無量國土。說法音聲。常周十方無數之國。具足十住菩薩之眾。乃得聞法。從是佛身方便現化。常有無量無邊化佛。遍於十方。隨眾生類若干差品。而為現形。光明色像。精麁不同。如來真身。九住菩薩尚不能見。何況惟越致及餘眾生。所以者何。佛法身者。出於三界。不依身口心行。無量無漏諸淨功德本行所成。」(CBETA, T45, no. 1856, p. 122, c29-p. 123, a8)
"The true dharmakāya pervades the empty dharma-realm of the ten direction, its light completely illuminating immeasurable lands. The sound of the dharma being taught always encompassing innumerable realms of the ten directions. The masses of bodhisattvas fully abiding on the tenth stage are able to hear [that] dharma. From the Buddha's body there provisionally (upaya) manifest illusions, there always being immeasurable and unlimited illusory buddhas pervading the ten directions, manifesting forms appropriate to the differences in dispositions of sentient beings, differing in brilliance, physical appearance, fineness and coarseness. The true body of the Tathāgata is not even capable of being seen by ninth stage bodhisattvas. How much more so those who have achieved non-retrogression (avaivartika) and other sentient beings? The reason for this is that the Buddha's dharmakāya is beyond the three realms, not relying upon karma of the body, speech or mind, having been perfected by immeasurable and untainted pure merit and past deeds."
So, as to whether these nirmaṇakāyas are philosophical zombies or not, I would say judging from Kumārajīva's ideas, that this would be the case.
A nirmaṇakāya might be better thought of as a reaction brought about from the sufferings of beings and the past aspirations of a Buddha coming into fruition. As is commonly said in Mahāyāna the Tathāgata arises where there are beings that suffer. Such a reaction is characterized as being illusory and intangible, albeit still perceived. If a nirmaṇakāya possessed ordinary consciousness and sense faculties these would presumably be a result of afflicted karma, which a Buddha is entirely free from. To say on the other hand the faculties arise due to non-afflicted karma is perhaps equally problematic because it raises the question of how that specific karma would arise when there actually is no more being to produce such action. A bodhisattva is a sentient being (sattva), and thus their non-afflicted karma and its results are reasonable because the bodhisattva is still an individuated and distinguishable being, but in the case of a Buddha which stands nowhere like infinite space, from whence would that karma arise?
From a more basic Abhidharma perspective one needs a certain set of faculties for ordinary perception and awareness. As the nirmaṇakāya is neither composed of elements or faculties, we may infer that it would not have an awareness or perception, being an illusory body of the dharmakāya. It has the quality of a moon in the water or a reflection in the mirror. Visible, but not tangible.
One might suggest the nirmaṇakāya is a non-volitional reaction (hence not karma as volitional action) spurn from the immeasurable qualities of the dharmakāya, though not relying on karma of body, speech and mind. Thus, it would qualify as being a philosophical zombie.
on Wednesday, March 07, 2012 No comments :
Labels: buddhism , dharmakāya , huiyuan , kumarajiva , nirmaṇakāya , philosophy
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text:
package com.google.gwt.inject.client.assistedinject;

import com.google.gwt.core.client.GWT;
import com.google.gwt.inject.client.AbstractGinModule;
import com.google.gwt.inject.client.GinModules;
import com.google.gwt.inject.client.Ginjector;
import com.google.gwt.junit.client.GWTTestCase;
import com.google.inject.BindingAnnotation;
import com.google.inject.Key;

import java.lang.annotation.ElementType;
import java.lang.annotation.Retention;
import java.lang.annotation.RetentionPolicy;
import java.lang.annotation.Target;

public class AnnotatedFactoryTest extends GWTTestCase {

  public void testAnnotatedFactory() {
    AnnotatedFactoryGinjector ginjector = GWT.create(AnnotatedFactoryGinjector.class);
    assertNotNull(ginjector.getFactory());
  }

  public static class AnnotatedFactoryModule extends AbstractGinModule {
    @Override
    protected void configure() {
      install(new GinFactoryModuleBuilder().build(Key.get(MyFactory.class, MyAnno.class)));
    }
  }

  @GinModules({AnnotatedFactoryModule.class})
  public static interface AnnotatedFactoryGinjector extends Ginjector {
    @MyAnno MyFactory getFactory();
  }

  public static class FactoryProvidedType {}

  @Retention(RetentionPolicy.RUNTIME)
  @Target({ElementType.FIELD, ElementType.METHOD, ElementType.PARAMETER})
  @BindingAnnotation
  public @interface MyAnno {}

  public interface MyFactory {
    FactoryProvidedType getCycleType();
  }

  @Override
  public String getModuleName() {
    return "com.google.gwt.inject.InjectTest";
  }
}

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaGithub


text:
Italy's Migrant Crisis Intensifies with Murder Arrests, Drownings
Some 2,800 migrants have been rescued off the Italian coast this last weekend alone. Photo: Francesco Malavolta/IOM
By Stephanie Nebehay and Wladimiro Pantaleone
GENEVA/PALERMO, Italy, April 16 (Reuters) – Italian police arrested 15 African men suspected of throwing about a dozen Christians from a migrant boat in the Mediterranean on Thursday, as the crisis off southern Italy intensified.
Forty-one more deaths were reported in a separate incident.
Police in the Sicilian capital Palermo said they had arrested the men, from Ivory Coast, Mali and Senegal, after survivors reported they had thrown 12 people from Nigeria and Ghana to their deaths and threatened other Christians.
The 15 were arrested on charges of multiple homicide motivated by religious hatred.
"The motive for the resentment was traced to their faiths," police said. "Twelve people are said to have drowned in the waters of the Mediterranean, all of them Nigerian and Ghanaian."
The survivors' account underscores the rising chaos in the Mediterranean, which thousands of migrants, many fleeing war and deprivation in Africa, try to cross in rickety boats in the hope of a better life in Europe.
Around 20,000 migrants have reached the Italian coast this year, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) estimates, fewer than arrived in the first four months of last year, but the number of deaths has risen almost nine-fold.
Almost 450 people are now thought to have died this week after rescued migrants brought to the Sicilian port of Trapani on Thursday said 41 others travelling with them had drowned.
About 400 died earlier this week when passengers crowded to one side of their boat, causing it to capsize, survivors said.
Traffickers take advantage of a breakdown of order in Libya to charge some $1,000 for every migrant to whom they give a passage. Some also turn violent, threatening coast guards with machine guns to avoid having their boats confiscated.
The murder suspects were among almost 100 migrants brought to Palermo on Wednesday. The arrests were made on the basis of testimony from about 10 survivors, who said they had left Libya in a rubber boat on Tuesday, police said.
Italy phased out a dedicated maritime search and rescue operation called "Mare Nostrum" or "Our Sea" late last year, making way for a European Union border control mission.
The EU operation, called Triton, has been criticised by humanitarian groups and Italian authorities as it has a much smaller budget and a narrower remit than Mare Nostrum. (Reporting by Wladimir Pantaleone in Sicily and Stephanie Nebehay in Geneva; Additional reporting by Steve Scherer; Writing by Isla Binnie; Editing by Catherine Evans)
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text:
John Catron
John Catron (January 7, 1786 – May 30, 1865) was an American jurist who served as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States from 1837 to 1865, during the Taney Court era.
"Justice Catron" redirects here. For New Mexico Supreme Court justice Charles C. Catron, see List of Justices of the New Mexico Supreme Court.
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States
May 1, 1837[1] – May 30, 1865[1]
Nominated by
Appointed by
Seat established
Seat abolished
(1786-01-07)January 7, 1786
Pennsylvania, U.S.
Nashville, Tennessee, U.S.
Matilda Childress
Early and family life
Little is known of Catron's early life, other than that all of his grandparents emigrated from Germany to Virginia, as part of the extensive emigration of Swiss and Germans from Hesse and the Palatinate due to wars, and economic and religious insecurity in the area. His father, Peter (Catron) Kettering, had immigrated as a child with his parents from Mittelbrun in the German Palatinate and settled in Montgomery County (later Wyeth County). His mother was Maria Elizabetha Houck, whose parents had settled in Virginia after emigrating from the Palatinate by way of Pennsylvania. His only sibling, Mary, later married Thomas Swift and moved to Missouri and, ultimately, Oregon. John Catron was a second cousin to Thomas Benton Catron, who later became one of the first senators to represent the state of New Mexico. Catron's father had served in Captain William Doack's militia company from Montgomery County during the Revolutionary War.
The family relocated to Kentucky in the first years of the 19th century. Catron served in the War of 1812 under Andrew Jackson. He read law and was admitted to the Tennessee bar in 1815. He married Mathilda Childress, sister of George C Childress who was one of the political leaders of the Texas Republic and chaired the committee that drafted the Constitution of the Republic of Texas. John and Mathilda Catron had no children.
A slaveholder all his adult life, Catron had a relationship with Sally, a Tennessee slave in her 30s who had a laundry in Nashville and was held by the Thomas family. Catron fathered her third mixed-race son, whom she named James P. Thomas. In his lifetime, Catron gave Thomas 25 cents. James was born into slavery but when he was six, his mother effectively bought his freedom.[2] She was unable to gain full manumission for him then, but he gained an education and successfully built a business as a barber in Nashville. Because of his achievements, in 1851 he gained manumission as well as permission from the Tennessee legislature to stay in the state. Later he owned property in St. Louis, Missouri valued at $250,000.[3] Thomas was Catron's only known child.
Catron was in private legal practice at Sparta in the Cumberland Mountains of Tennessee from 1815 to 1818, while simultaneously serving as a prosecuting attorney of that city. He established a land law practice in Nashville in 1818, in which he continued until 1824. From 1824-1834, Catron was appointed to the Tennessee Supreme Court of Errors and Appeals, being elevated to Chief Justice of that court in 1831. In 1834, the Tennessee state legislature abolished the chief justice position, and Catron retired and returned to private practice in Nashville.[4] During the election of 1836, Catron directed Martin Van Buren's presidential campaign in Tennessee against native son Hugh Lawson White.
Supreme Court tenure
The number of seats on the Supreme Court was expanded from seven to nine in 1837, as a result of the Eighth and Ninth Circuits Act.[5] This allowed President Andrew Jackson the opportunity to appoint two new justices, which he did on March 3, 1837, his last full day in office. The newly seated Senate of the 25th Congress confirmed Catron's nomination five days later by a vote of 28-15. The nominee for the other seat, William Smith, was also confirmed, but he subsequently declined to serve.[6] Catron took the judicial oath on May 1, 1837, and served for 28 years, until his death in May 1865.[1]
Catron supported slavery and sided with the majority in the Dred Scott v. Sandford case (exchanging letters with president-elect James Buchanan in February, 1857).[7] But, he opposed secession and urged Tennessee to remain with the Union. For a brief time after Tennessee seceded from the Union but prior to Nashville being occupied by Federal troops, Catron left his residence in Nashville and temporarily lived in Louisville, Kentucky.
While he typically wrote few opinions, it is still possible to decipher his stance on certain political issues and determine his importance to the court. John Catron's political views primarily coincided with the views of his fellow Tennessean Andrew Jackson. Just as Jackson opposed the idea of the national bank, Catron also became an outspoken critic of the national bank. This view coincides with his political view on corporations. While Catron ultimately believed that corporate power could threaten the livelihoods of American citizens, his views were not always this way. During his early years on the Court, particularly, in the case of Bank of Augusta v. Earle (1839), Catron actually concurred with the majority and agreed with the idea that corporations had the ability to conduct business nationwide. The Justices ruled in Bank of Augusta that a state could exclude a foreign corporation from doing business within that state, but, that the state would have to state this exclusion directly.
Catron's overpowering anti-corporate views were more evident in Piqua Branch of the State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 57 U.S. 369 (1854). This case raised the issue of whether or not a corporate charter constituted a contract between the state and the bank and therefore could not be repealed due to the contract clause in Article 1 Section 10 of the Constitution. The Piqua Branch of the State Bank of Ohio's original charter granted an exemption from state taxation. However, a new legislature was attempting to repeal this exemption and impose a tax on the bank. The majority of the Court ruled in favor of the charter, citing the contract clause in Article 1 section 10 of the Constitution. John Catron, along with justices John Campbell and Peter Daniel, however, dissented. In his dissent, Catron argued, "The sovereign political power is not the subject of contract so as to be vested in an irrepealable charter of incorporation, and taken away from, and placed beyond the reach of, future legislatures.[8]" With this statement, Catron argued against the power of corporations and for the power of the federal government. Catron made the stance that political power was not only sovereign but that it also was not to be overruled by a contract, especially a corporate charter. Essentially Catron argued that in this case, corporate power exceeded federal power. Because John Catron was a Jacksonian, he felt the American Union should always be the most powerful entity within the United States and therefore dissented in this case which he saw as granting more power towards corporate power than the American federal power. Catron argued that because of this ruling, corporations could overrule the government as long as a contract was present. Another case that exemplified Catron's anti-corporation views was the case of Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Co. v. DeBolt, 57 U.S. 416 (1853). This case saw the issue of the power of taxation over corporations. This case essentially took on bigger picture questions such as the role of corporations in American society and whether corporations had begun to possess more power than the states had originally granted them. Catron again dissented from the majority and re-stated his Jacksonian beliefs when he voiced his concern about, "the vast amount of property, power, and exclusive benefits, prejudicial to other classes of society that are vested in and held by these numerous bodies of associated wealth,[9]" . Catron also stated, "That a different doctrine would tend to sap and eventually might destroy the state constitutions and governments,[9]" in his dissent when referring to the power charters and contracts of corporations could have over the United States government. Clearly, Catron was concerned with the vast amount of power of the corporations in the United States and the seemingly waning power of the American federal power.
Catron's opinion in the Dred Scott v. Sandford case and his stance on slavery at the time would lead to the assumption that in a time of civil war, he would support his residence state of Tennessee and its act of secession. However, Catron resented the secession of his home state of Tennessee because he felt the American Union should be preserved at all costs. Following President Abraham Lincoln's inauguration, Catron returned to perform circuit court duties in the states of Missouri, Tennessee, and Kentucky. Although Catron was an advocate for slavery and fought to protect the property rights of individuals, his Jacksonian views of the protection of the Union overpowered these sentiments. Catron felt that the preservation of the Union was of utmost importance, whatever the risk. Catron's views led his fellow Tennesseans to despise him; and when Catron attempted to return to Nashville to perform his circuit duties, he was told that his very life could be in danger due to his pro-Union stance and his stance on Tennessee's secession. Catron was forced to permanently flee the state of Tennessee and reside in Louisville, Kentucky, away from his wife and friends who sympathized with the Confederacy. Catron's stance on the southern rebels was to "punish treason and will." This belief was present in his ruling in a circuit case of United States v. Republican Banner Officers (1863). This case raised the issue of whether non-personal property could be confiscated due to the federal Confiscation Act congress passed in 1861. The Republican Banner was a newspaper that at the time, was spreading very anti-Union and pro-Confederacy propaganda throughout the South. The employees of the Banner argued that because the newspaper was not a personal property, it could not be confiscated. In this case, Catron ruled for federal confiscation, through the federal Confiscation Act of 1861 and against the pro-Confederacy newspaper. Catron argued that when, "there being then a formidable rebellion in progress, the intention of Congress in enacting this law must have been to deter persons from so using and employing their property as to aid and promote the insurrection[10]" . Even to the end of his legal and judicial career, Catron held fast to his protection of the rights of states and his stance on preserving the Federal Union whatever the cost.
John Catron was an outspoken critic of the national bank, an advocate for federal power over corporate power, and a pro-Union, pro-slavery supporter. Many of his beliefs stemmed from the beliefs of his friend and battlefield leader, Andrew Jackson. Catron fought against corporations of accumulated wealth and privilege and for the rights of citizens. He remained true to his pro-slavery stance in the most important case the Supreme Court had ever seen until that point, Dred Scott v. Sandford. Despite his pro-slavery stance, Catron was a strong advocate for the Union and remained steadfast to this view, even leaving his wife and friends to help in the preservation of the United States. Ultimately, John Catron's most important contribution to the Supreme Court of the United States was his loyalty to the Constitution and his undying support of the Federal Union, despite the political costs.
Catron died on May 30, 1865, at the age of 79.[4] He is interred at Nashville's Mount Olivet Cemetery.
After Catron's death, Congress eliminated his seat from the Court under the Judicial Circuits Act of 1866 as a way to prevent President Andrew Johnson from appointing any justices.[11]
Legacy and honors
During World War II the Liberty ship SS John Catron was built in Brunswick, Georgia, and named in his honor.[12]
"Justices 1789 to Present". supremecourt.gov. Washington, D.C.: Supreme Court of the United States. Retrieved August 26, 2018.
James B. Peterson (2012-06-17). "The Original Deadbeat Dads". Retrieved 2012-06-17.
Schweninger, Loren (1975). "A Slave Family in the Ante-Bellum South" (PDF). Journal of Negro History. 60 (1): 29–44. doi:10.2307/2716792. JSTOR 2716792.
"Timeline of the Justices: John Catron, 1837-1865". supremecourthistory.org. Washington, D.C.: Supreme Court Historical Society. Retrieved August 26, 2018.
"Landmark Legislation: Eighth and Ninth Circuits". Washington, D.C.: Federal Judicial Center. Retrieved August 26, 2018.
"Supreme Court Nominations: present-1789". Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary, United States Senate. Retrieved August 26, 2018.
Fehrenbacher, Don E. (1981). Slavery Law and Politics: The Dred Scott Case in Historical Perspective. pp. 164–168. ISBN 0-19-502883-X.
Piqua Branch of the State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 14 U.S 369, 404 (1854).
Ohio Life Insurance and Trust Co. v. DeBolt. 57 U.S. 441, (1853).
United States v. Republican Banner Officers. 27 Fed. Cases 783 (No. 16,148) (C.C.D. Tenn. 1863).
"Landmark Legislation: Reorganization of the Judicial Circuits". Washington, D.C.: Federal Judicial Center. Retrieved August 26, 2018.
Williams, Greg H. (25 July 2014). The Liberty Ships of World War II: A Record of the 2,710 Vessels and Their Builders, Operators and Namesakes, with a History of the Jeremiah O'Brien. McFarland. ISBN 978-1476617541. Retrieved 9 December 2017.
John Catron, Oyez-Supreme Court Multimedia.
John Catron at the Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, a public domain publication of the Federal Judicial Center.
Kegley, Mary B. "Militia of Montgomery County, Virginia 1777-1790," Kegley Books, (1974)
Westphall, Victor. "Thomas Benton Catron and His Era," University of Arizona Press(1973)
Huebner, Timothy S. (1999). The Southern Judicial Tradition: State Judges and Sectional Distinctiveness, 1780–1890. Athens: University of Georgia Press. ISBN 0-8203-4228-9.
Allen, Austin (2009). "Jacksonian Jurisprudence and the Obscurity of Justice John Catron". Vanderbilt Law Review. 62 (2): 491–517.
Legal offices
New seat Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States
1837–1865 Seat abolished
Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States
Chief justices
John Jay (1789–1795, cases)
John Rutledge (1795, cases)
Oliver Ellsworth (1796–1800, cases)
John Marshall (1801–1835, cases)
Roger B. Taney (1836–1864, cases)
Salmon P. Chase (1864–1873, cases)
Morrison Waite (1874–1888, cases)
Melville Fuller (1888–1910, cases)
Edward Douglass White (1910–1921, cases)
William Howard Taft (1921–1930, cases)
Charles Evans Hughes (1930–1941, cases)
Harlan F. Stone (1941–1946, cases)
Fred M. Vinson (1946–1953, cases)
Earl Warren (1953–1969, cases)
Warren E. Burger (1969–1986, cases)
William Rehnquist (1986–2005, cases)
John Roberts (2005–present, cases)
Associate justices
J. Rutledge* (1790–1791)
Cushing (1790–1810)
Wilson (1789–1798)
Blair (1790–1795)
Iredell (1790–1799)
T. Johnson (1792–1793)
Paterson (1793–1806)
S. Chase (1796–1811)
Washington (1798–1829)
Moore (1800–1804)
W. Johnson (1804–1834)
Livingston (1807–1823)
Todd (1807–1826)
Duvall (1811–1835)
Story (1812–1845)
Thompson (1823–1843)
Trimble (1826–1828)
McLean (1830–1861)
Baldwin (1830–1844)
Wayne (1835–1867)
Barbour (1836–1841)
Catron (1837–1865)
McKinley (1838–1852)
Daniel (1842–1860)
Nelson (1845–1872)
Woodbury (1845–1851)
Grier (1846–1870)
Curtis (1851–1857)
Campbell (1853–1861)
Clifford (1858–1881)
Swayne (1862–1881)
Miller (1862–1890)
Davis (1862–1877)
Field (1863–1897)
Strong (1870–1880)
Bradley (1870–1892)
Hunt (1873–1882)
J. M. Harlan (1877–1911)
Woods (1881–1887)
Matthews (1881–1889)
Gray (1882–1902)
Blatchford (1882–1893)
L. Lamar (1888–1893)
Brewer (1890–1910)
Brown (1891–1906)
Shiras (1892–1903)
H. Jackson (1893–1895)
E. White* (1894–1910)
Peckham (1896–1909)
McKenna (1898–1925)
Holmes (1902–1932)
Day (1903–1922)
Moody (1906–1910
Lurton (1910–1914)
Hughes* (1910–1916)
Van Devanter (1911–1937)
J. Lamar (1911–1916)
Pitney (1912–1922)
McReynolds (1914–1941)
Brandeis (1916–1939)
Clarke (1916–1922)
Sutherland (1922–1938)
Butler (1923–1939)
Sanford (1923–1930)
Stone* (1925–1941)
O. Roberts (1930–1945)
Cardozo (1932–1938)
Black (1937–1971)
Reed (1938–1957)
Frankfurter (1939–1962)
Douglas (1939–1975)
Murphy (1940–1949)
Byrnes (1941–1942)
R. Jackson (1941–1954)
W. Rutledge (1943–1949)
Burton (1945–1958)
Clark (1949–1967)
Minton (1949– 1956)
J. M. Harlan II (1955–1971)
Brennan (1956–1990)
Whittaker (1957–1962)
Stewart (1958–1981)
B. White (1962–1993)
Goldberg (1962–1965)
Fortas (1965–1969)
T. Marshall (1967–1991)
Blackmun (1970–1994)
Powell (1972–1987)
Rehnquist* (1972–1986)
Stevens (1975–2010)
O'Connor (1981–2006)
Scalia (1986–2016)
Kennedy (1988–2018)
Souter (1990–2009)
Thomas (1991–present)
Ginsburg (1993–present)
Breyer (1994–present)
Alito (2006–present)
Sotomayor (2009–present)
Kagan (2010–present)
Gorsuch (2017–present)
Kavanaugh (2018–present)
*Also served as Chief Justice of the United States
Taney Court (1836–1864)
Taney
Catron
Grier
Swayne
How.
Aboriginal title
Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge (1837)
United States v. The Amistad (1841)
Luther v. Borden (1849)
Cooley v. Board of Wardens (1852)
Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857)
Ableman v. Booth (1859)
Prize Cases (1863)
Seventh Circuit Act of 1807
Eighth and Ninth Circuits Act of 1837
Tenth Circuit Act of 1863
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