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Donald Trump: America's 'African Dictatorship' Moment
8 min read.
For decades, the grandiosity and excesses of Africa's strongmen have been the subject of global ridicule and scorn. Now, under Donald Trump, Americans are finally getting a taste of what an African dictatorship looks and feels like.
Alex Roberts
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Am I the only one who felt a growing sense of ugly familiarity while watching the 4th of July proceedings in Washington DC? It took me a few days to fully comprehend the oddity of the spectacle. It was atavistically American: a questionable real estate mogul; fighter jets roaring overhead; fireworks blowing off with abandon as vague tenants of "bravery" were touted. One only needed to add in grandiose Lynard Skynyrd music, a screw-on plastic bottle of Bud Light (for safety) and the tossing of an American flag football to make it the most US-driven spectacle ever put on display.
Apart from an eye-rolling display of questionable Americana, the whole display struck a deeper and more sinister chord. Stop me if you've seen this movie before: military equipment being trucked in from all over the country to be displayed as props; invites extended mainly to party loyalists; outlandish claims of nationalistic strength in the face of unknown "threats"; and an ever-ballooning budget taken seemingly from the most needy of social programmes.
Further, the entirety of the charade was put on by a leader of questionable (at best) morals, one who openly blasts the press as anti-democratic and who is known to engage in dubious electoral practices.
Many readers within East Africa may have looked at their TV screens and thought to themselves: "It's finally America's turn to see this ridiculousness." They wouldn't be wrong. In the United States right now, the term "unprecedented" is bandied about with ferocity amongst the media, with well-established media houses with sterling reputations formed through covering the 20th century's most brutal occurrences suddenly at a loss that anything so gauche could take shape in the form of an American leader.
When it comes down to it though, doesn't it all reside at the doorstep of personality type?
From where I sit, it most certainly does. All of these strongmen (and they are all male) – whether they're in power, in post-political ennui or dead – have done the exact same thing. It is different strokes painted with the same brush. Their canvas, on this occasion, is that of spectacle, of projecting something that is better, stronger (dare I say less impotent?) than themselves. It is a public display of strength, ill-needed by those who don't secretly know that they're inwardly weak.
Many readers within East Africa may have looked at their TV screens and thought to themselves: "It's finally America's turn to see this ridiculousness." They wouldn't be wrong. In the United States right now, the term "unprecedented" is bandied about with ferocity amongst the media…
To start with, those who have systematically oppressed and plundered a country often rub it in to commemorate their "achievements". For example, there is still a nationally celebrated Moi Day annually in Kenya, despite the former president's record of extrajudicial measures, devaluing of the Kenyan shilling and rampant institutional corruption. Yoweri Museveni has been "democratically" elected five times, and makes sure to always inspect military guards dressed in full pomp at major Ugandan national days and events. Rwanda's Paul Kagame had an outright military parade during his latest inauguration in 2017. It is true, such days are often celebrated with a display of token military presence; at the inaugural "Trump Day" this past American Independence Day, an exception to the rule was not found.
A key tenet of such military-driven presidential events, at least within those run by would-be strongmen, is the heavy under-current of politicisation made more stark as the figurehead acts exceptionally stoic and well-behaved for the event. At the rally on the Fourth of July, chants of "lock her up" broke out among the crowd, and reports of minor clashes made the news. Therein, as they say, lies the key difference, the breaking point from a day of democratic celebration of national history into something more sinister. It is when the very essence of patriotism swings to identify with a single individual that the political climate can become potentially even more dangerous than it already is.
Within hours of the spectacle that put him at the centre, Trump made heavy-handed allegations of communism against his political "enemies"; within days he was saying that certain Congresswomen (all of colour) should go back to their countries of origin if they didn't "love" the US enough. The standard, it seems, is political allegiance.
Within weeks of the Fourth of July event, Donald Trump's supporters were chanting "send her back" at presidential rallies. These chants, while directed at all four Congresswomen, (Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez of New York, Ilhan Omar of Minnesota, Ayanna Pressley of Massachusetts and Rashida Tlaib of Michigan), were particularly poignant in the context of Ms. Omar, who was born in Somalia before fleeing to the Daadab refugee camp in Kenya, and finally resettling as a refugee in the US, where she eventually found a permanent home in Minneapolis, Minnesota. This, when seen through the lens of escalating nationalism, jingoistic tendencies towards refugees (including the abysmal treatment of migrants on the United States' southern border with Mexico in a series of "detention facilities"), and thrown as chum to stirring crowds at politically-driven rallies, is a dangerous recipe.
The message being espoused and defended at the present by both the Trump administration and right-wing politicians loyal to it has taken root at the very celebration of American democracy itself. It is, in fact, association by patriotism. It is becoming a deeper-seated sense of national identity and the mere act of seeing such policies associated with the nation's independence is, to put it mildly, a dangerous precedent. It is a continuation of a trend of both ramping up and normalising such attacks on what is deemed "un-American" by those currently in power. This designation, once considered "beyond the norm" within United States' politics, has rapidly shifted towards becoming the routine.
While the rally was taking place, Trump harangued the crowd with a 45-minute all-American masturbatory salute to military hardware. He read off assorted names of different combinations of letters and numbers, each signifying a different tool of top-grade, American-made weapon of death and destruction. Fighter jets, tanks, humvees, all were given their due with a salute through the rain-soaked vista of the National Mall of Washington DC. They were each named nearly laboriously, in exquisite reverence for their ability to unleash death on vague "enemies of the state" (typically seen in the guise of unspecified foreigners in Hollywood action blockbusters).
In a more current context, this is still a practice around the region. Military honour guards are inspected in ceremony by the head of state. In fairness, despite the US press's fervent response, America has an awkward relationship with the fetishisation of the military on every official and unofficial national occasion. Fighter jets zoom over the heads of Americans. Since the 9/11 terror attacks, we have seen the rampant rise of forced acts of patriotism, many of which later turned out to be directly sponsored by the Pentagon to the tune of millions of US dollars (furnished by the US taxpayer). This continued to deepen the divide among the American public along the lines of military interventionism and military prioritisation. It is an underlying sentiment of "tanks are now alongside White House officials, and who are you to disagree with their patriotism?" The association, as it were, is the issue.
It is a slippery slope when the military is viewed as an extension of the leadership, rather than one that protects the national interest. All too often within strongman-type of leadership structures, the military (and their goals) become an arm of the central governmental figure, with such events as seen on the Fourth of July being a means to "stroke the ego" of the leadership.
An adept dictator always knows where their bread is buttered: the more that one inflates the importance of the military and raises its stature, the more likely the military is going be loyal to you. In a sense, the Fourth of July parade was a natural extension of Trump's extensive rallies in support of "the troops", "the cops" and "the brave people guarding our border from the invasion from the South". Daniel arap Moi is a good example of this behaviour; in the post-1982 coup period, he closed ranks, gave the military more emphasis, and rewarded loyalty.
Within weeks of the Fourth of July event, Donald Trump's supporters were chanting "send her back" at presidential rallies. These chants…were particularly poignant in the context of Ms. Omar, who was born in Somalia before fleeing to the Daadab refugee camp in Kenya, and finally resettling as a refugee in the US…
In turn, this behaviour can drive the chosen narrative of the state – that the military is way too powerful to be challenged. The story is told, played out on screen, marched in front of the masses, splashed across newspaper front pages. It helps to reinforce an idea, one of division, that of being on an opposing side from the government if you dare disagree.
Make no mistake, however ridiculous the Fourth of July show was, it was most definitely intended to be a show of strength. How could one feasibly dare to challenge the seat of power when the very entirety of military might is on public display, with guns pointed squarely into the crowd from the very basis of the Lincoln Memorial? This is not unlike the grandiose trains of government vehicles that accompany Museveni as he zips around Kampala or Uhuru Kenyatta as he delays traffic whilst travelling out to play golf on the outskirts of Nairobi. (The number of cars isn't the point; it's that they would crush you if you were to stand in their path.) Think what you want of Kagame's policies and the issues surrounding democratic practices in Rwanda; only a fool would doubt his closeness to the top military brass. What Trump is engaging in now is the classic appearance of alliances – the same outer projection that any opposition' would be met with those same large caliber guns that faced outward to the crowd. Only the obtuse would see that positioning as merely coincidental.
It isn't a coincidence that those in the Trump administration's camp were given prime seats at the base of the Lincoln Memorial. Those "in the know" are given strength by a sort of transitive property of influence. The man on the stage is in charge of those with the guns, and he approves of you enough to let you into the inner sanctum.
It is further not a coincidence that the "vicious, mean, hateful, disgusting democrats" weren't even invited within shouting distance of the "in club". They haven't shown enough Trumpian loyalty to be positioned near the military hardware. Instead members of the Democratic Party were told to "sort themselves" and largely stayed away from the proceedings of the event at the National Mall in Washington DC that rainy evening.
The end consequences of these deepening of divisions could be seen during the event and in the immediate hours afterwards. Squabbles broke out, flag-burning protesters were angrily confronted, reports of arrests were made.
From the White House (or possibly from a late night flight down to a golf course) Trump began to launch public attacks against those who would have stood against his event, his party and his party's party. The tirade began in public, with attacks that were based on race, classism and politics. The "haters" and "losers" were blamed, and the appearance of strength steadily deepened the already existing party line divisions.
It was in the hours after that that the evidence was most apparent that Trump had used the Fourth of July "Salute to America" as a means for further political grandstanding. The traditional 4th of July political "ceasefire" was sounded with the firing off of verbal and political shots. It was in the insults that the intended circling of the wagons became further crystallised. It was classic Trump and classic strongman – to put on the best of appearances only to sink several notches lower as soon as the cameras officially turned off.
Let's finish with the gold standard of ridiculous self-congratulatory events – Idi Amin. Am I saying that the crimes of Idi Amin are equal to those of Trump? Obviously not, but am I comparing their gauche public tendencies and sub-par intellects? Absolutely. Amin was famous for his parades during times of extreme national duress. He continued on, medals ablaze with the military's full might on display. Add to this his self-congratulatory nature, his vindictive political favouritism and his toxic displays of might. (Amin, it has been noted, was jealous of the then Central African Republic president, Jean-Bedel Bakassa, who visited him adorned with medals more extravagant than his own.)
As for Trump, he is not one to shy away from self-aggrandisement and self-promotion. His very own Boeing 737 is famously decked with solid gold interiors. His ego can even be described as all-consuming; it eats whatever stands in its path. It is a self-sustaining entity, a black hole from which there can be no escape. The same could be said about Amin – power went to his head, and quickly. Once it did, enemies were dispatched and invented to be dispatched.
Trump's paranoia could be viewed as becoming extreme. There is an endless need for loyalty and deference to Trump, especially amongst his most loyal followers; the Fourth of July parade was simply the latest manifestation of it. With such parades, limits and moderation don't typically follow suit.
There will be more events, bigger showmanship and more association with himself as the idyllic vision of America. He is filling out his strongman shows nicely now, and starting to walk around in them. He now needs feats of false strength in order to back himself up.
The key difference between Trump and Amin, of course, is that the US military is a global monolith, one that can destroy the world with the push of a red button by an orange finger.
By Alex Roberts
Alex is a journalist and social media expert based in Nairobi, Kenya
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Hijacking Kenya's Health Spending: Companies Linked to Powerful MP Received Suspicious Procurement Contracts
Two obscure companies linked to Kitui South MP Rachael Kaki Nyamai were paid at least KSh24.2 million to deliver medical supplies under single-source agreements at the time the MP was chair of the National Assembly's Health Committee.
Africa Uncensored
Two obscure companies linked to Kitui South MP Rachael Kaki Nyamai were paid at least KSh24.2 million to deliver medical supplies under single-source agreements at the time the MP was chair of the National Assembly's Health Committee, an investigation by Africa Uncensored and The Elephant has uncovered.
One of the companies was also awarded a mysterious Ksh 4.3 billion agreement to supply 8 million bottles of hand sanitizer, according to the government's procurement system.
The contracts were awarded in 2015 as authorities moved to contain the threat from the Ebola outbreak that was ravaging West Africa and threatening to spread across the continent as well as from flooding related to the El-Nino weather phenomenon.
The investigation found that between 2014 and 2016, the Ministry of Health handed out hundreds of questionable non-compete tenders related to impending disasters, with a total value of KSh176 billion including three no-bid contracts to two firms, Tira Southshore Holdings Limited and Ameken Minewest Company Limited, linked to Mrs Nyamai, whose committee oversaw the ministry's funding – a clear conflict of interest.
Although authorities have since scrutinized some of the suspicious contracts and misappropriated health funds, the investigation revealed a handful of contracts that were not made public, nor questioned by the health committee.
Mrs Nyamai declined to comment for the story.
The Other Afya House Scandal
Nyamai has been accused by fellow members of parliament of thwarting an investigation of a separate alleged fraud. In 2016, a leaked internal audit report accused the Ministry of Health — colloquially referred to for its location at Afya House — of misappropriating funds in excess of nearly $60 million during the 2015/2016 financial year. Media stories described unauthorized suppliers, fraudulent transactions, and duplicate payments, citing the leaked document.
Members of the National Assembly's Health Committee threatened to investigate by bringing the suppliers in for questioning, and then accused Nyamai, the committee chairperson, of blocking their probe. Members of the committee signed a petition calling for the removal of Nyamai and her deputy, but the petition reportedly went missing. Nyamai now heads the National Assembly's Committee on Lands.
Transactions for companies owned by Mrs Nyamai's relatives were among 25,727 leaked procurement records reviewed by reporters from Africa Uncensored, Finance Uncovered, The Elephant, and OCCRP. The data includes transactions by eight government agencies between August 2014 and January 2018, and reveals both questionable contracts as well as problems that continue to plague the government's accounting tool, IFMIS.
The Integrated Financial Management Information System was adopted to improve efficiency and accountability. Instead, it has been used to fast-track corruption.
Paying for a Pandemic
Hand sanitizer was an important tool in fighting transmission of Ebola, according to a WHO health expert. In one transaction, the Ministry of Health paid Sh5.4 million for "the supply of Ebola reagents for hand sanitizer" to a company owned by a niece of the MP who chaired the parliamentary health committee. However, it's unclear what Ebola reagents, which are meant for Ebola testing, have to do with hand sanitizer. Kenya's Ministry of Health made 84 other transactions to various vendors during this period, earmarked specifically for Ebola-related spending. These included:
Public awareness campaigns and adverts paid to print, radio and tv media platforms, totalling at least KSh122 million.
Printed materials totalling at least KSh214 million for Ebola prevention and information posters, contact tracing forms, technical guideline and point-of-entry forms, brochures and decision charts, etc. Most of the payments were made to six obscure companies.
Ebola-related pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical supplies, including hand sanitizer
Ebola-related conferences, catering, and travel expenses
At least KSh15 millions paid to a single vendor for isolation beds
Hacking the System
Tira Southshore Holdings Limited and Ameken Minewest Company Limited, appear to have no history of dealing in hygiene or medical supplies. Yet they were awarded three blanket purchase agreements, which are usually reserved for trusted vendors who provide recurring supplies such as newspapers and tea, or services such as office cleaning.
"A blanket agreement is something which should be exceptional, in my view," says former Auditor-General, Edward Ouko.
But the leaked data show more than 2,000 such agreements, marked as approved by the heads of procurement in various ministries. About KSh176 billion (about $1.7 billion) was committed under such contracts over 42 months.
"Any other method of procurement, there must be competition. And in this one there is no competition," explained a procurement officer, who spoke generally about blanket purchase agreements on background. "You have avoided sourcing."
The Ministry of Health did not respond to detailed questions, while Mrs Nyamai declined to comment on the contracts in question.
BPAs Explained
Procurement experts say blanket purchase agreements are used in Kenya to short-circuit the competitive process. A ministry's head of procurement can request authority from the National Treasury to create blanket agreements for certain vendors. Those companies can then be asked by procurement employees to deliver supplies and services without competing for a tender.
Once in the system, these single-source contracts are prone to corruption, as orders and payments can simply be made without the detailed documentation required under standard procurements. With limited time and resources, government auditors say they struggle especially with reconciling purchases made under blanket agreements.
The agreements were almost always followed by standard purchase orders that indicated the same vendor and the same amount which is unusual and raises fears of duplication. Some of these transactions were generated days or weeks after the blanket agreements, many with missing or mismatched explanations. It's unclear whether any of these actually constituted duplicate payments.
For example, the leaked data show two transactions for Ameken Minewest for Sh6.9 million each — a blanket purchase order for El Nino mitigation supplies and a standard order for the supply of chlorine tablets eight days later. Tira Southshore also had two transactions of Sh12 million each — a blanket purchase for the "supply of lab reagents for cholera," and six days later a standard order for the supply of chlorine powder.
Auditors say both the amounts and the timing of such payments are suspicious because blanket agreements should be paid in installments.
"It could well be a duplicate, using the same information, to get through the process. Because you make a blanket [agreement], then the intention is to do duplicates, so that it can pass through the cash payee phase several times without delivering more," said Ouko upon reviewing some of the transactions for Tira Southshore. This weakness makes the IFMIS system prone to abuse, he added.
In addition, a KSh4 billion contract for hand sanitizer between the Health Ministry's Preventive and Promotive Health Department and Tira Southshore was approved as a blanket purchase agreement in April 2015. The following month, a standard purchase order was generated for the same amount but without a description of services — this transaction is marked in the system as incomplete. A third transaction — this one for 0 shillings — was generated 10 days later by the same procurement employee, using the original order description: "please supply hand sanitizers 5oomls as per contract Moh/dpphs/dsru/008/14-15-MTC/17/14-15(min.no.6).
Reporters were unable to confirm whether KSh4 billion was paid by the ministry. The leaked data doesn't include payment disbursement details, and the MOH has not responded to requests for information.
"I can assure you there's no 4 billion, not even 1 billion. Not even 10 million that I have ever done, that has ever gone through Tira's account, through that bank account," said the co-owner of the company, Abigael Mukeli. She insisted that Tira Southshore never had a contract to deliver hand sanitizer, but declined to answer specific questions. It is unclear how a company without a contract would appear as a vendor in IFMIS, alongside contract details.
It is possible that payments could end up in bank accounts other than the ones associated with the supplier. That is because IFMIS also allowed for the creation of duplicate suppliers, according to a 2016 audit of the procurement system. That audit found almost 50 cases of duplication of the same vendor.
"Presence of active duplicate supplier master records increases the possibility of potential duplicate payments, misuse of bank account information, [and] reconciliation issues," the auditors warned.
They also found such blatant security vulnerabilities as ghost and duplicate login IDs, deactivated requirements for password resets, and remote access for some procurement employees.
Credit: Edin Pasovic/OCCRP
IFMIS was promoted as a solution for a faster procurement process and more transparent management of public funds. But the way the system was installed and used in Kenya compromised its extolled safeguards, according to auditors.
"There is a human element in the system," said Ouko. "So if the human element is also not working as expected then the system cannot be perfect."
The former head of the internal audit unit at the health ministry, Bernard Muchere, confirmed in an interview that IFMIS can be manipulated.
Masking the Setup
Ms Mukeli, the co-owner of Tira Southshore and Ameken Minewest, is the niece of Mrs Nyamai, according to local sources and social media investigation, although she denied the relationship to reporters. According to her LinkedIn profile, Ms Mukeli works at Kenya Medical Supplies Agency, a medical logistics agency under the Ministry of Health, now embroiled in a COVID procurement scandal.
Ms Mukeli's mother, who is the MP's elder sister, co-owns Icpher Consultants Company Ltd., which shares a post office box with Tira Southshore and Mematira Holdings Limited, which was opened in 2018, is co-owned by Mrs Nyamai's husband and daughter, and is currently the majority shareholder of Ameken Minewest. Documents also show that a company called Icpher Consultants was originally registered to the MP, who was listed as the beneficial owner.
Jacks of Many Trades
Co-owner of Tira Southshore Holdings Limited, Abigael Mukeli, described the company to reporters as a health consulting firm. However Tira Southshore also holds an active exploration license for the industrial mining in a 27-square-kilometer area in Kitui County, including in the restricted South Kitui National Reserve. According to government records, the application for mining limestone in Mutomo sub-county — Nyamai's hometown — was initiated in 2015 and granted in 2018.
Mukeli is also a minority owner of Ameken Minewest Company Limited, which also holds an active mining license in Mutomo sub-county of Kitui, in an area covering 135.5 square kilometers. Government records show that the application for the mining of limestone, magnesite, and manganese was initiated in 2015 and granted in 2018. Two weeks after the license was granted, Mematira Holdings Limited was incorporated, with Nyamai's husband and daughter as directors. Today, Mematira Holdings is the majority shareholder of Ameken Minewest, which is now in the process of obtaining another mining license in Kitui County.
According to public documents, Ameken also dabbles in road works and the transport of liquefied petroleum gas. And it's been named by the Directorate of Criminal Investigations in a fuel fraud scheme.
Yet another company, Wet Blue Proprietors Logistics Ltd., shares a phone number with Tira Southshore and another post office box with Icpher Consultants Company Ltd., according to a Kenya National Highway Authority list of pre-qualified vendors.
Mrs Nyamai and her husband co-own Wet Blue. The consulting company was opened in 2010, the same year that the lawmaker completed her PhD work in HIV/AIDS education in Denmark.
Wet Blue was licenced in 2014 as a dam contractor and supplier of water, sewerage, irrigation and electromechanical works. It's also listed by KENHA as a vetted consultant for HIV/AIDS mitigation services, together with Icpher Consultants.
It is unclear why these companies are qualified to deliver all these services simultaneously.
"Shell companies receiving contracts in the public sector in Kenya have enabled corruption, fraud and tax evasion in the country. They are literally special purpose vehicles to conduct 'heists' and with no track record to deliver the public goods, works or services procured," said Sheila Masinde, executive director of Transparency International-Kenya.
Both MOH and Ms Mukeli refused to confirm whether the ordered supplies were delivered.
Mrs Nyamai also co-owns Ameken Petroleum Limited together with Alfred Agoi Masadia and Allan Sila Kithome.
Mr Agoi is an ANC Party MP for Sabatia Constituency in Vihiga County, and was on the same Health Committee as Mrs Nyamai, a Jubilee Party legislator. Mr Sila is a philanthropist who is campaigning for the Kitui County senate seat in the 2022 election.
Juliet Atellah at The Elephant and Finance Uncovered in the UK contributed reporting.
We can call the kind of intrusive donor clientelism that Cheeseman is recommending Good Governance 2.0. His advocacy for strengthening patron-client relations between western donors and African governments, and his urging that donors use crises as a way of forcing regime change and policy conditionalities, is ahistorical, counterproductive and morally indefensible.
Jimi O. Adesina, Andrew M. Fischer and Nimi Hoffmann
In a piece, published on 22 December 2020, that he describes as the most important thing he wrote in 2020, Nick Cheeseman penned a strong criticism of what he calls the 'model of authoritarian development' in Africa. This phrase refers specifically to Ethiopia and Rwanda, the only two countries that fit the model, which is otherwise not generalisable to the rest of the continent. His argument, in a nutshell, is that donors have been increasingly enamoured with these two countries because they are seen as producing results. Yet the recent conflict in the Tigray region of Ethiopia shows that this argument needs to be questioned and discarded. He calls for supporting democracy in Africa, which he claims performs better in the long run than authoritarian regimes, especially in light of the conflicts and repression that inevitably emerge under authoritarianism. His argument could also be read as an implicit call for regime change, stoking donors to intensify political conditionalities on these countries before things get even worse.
Cheeseman's argument rests on a number of misleading empirical assertions which have important implications for the conclusions that he draws. In clarifying these, our point is not to defend authoritarianism. Instead, we hope to inject a measure of interpretative caution and to guard against opportunistically using crises to fan the disciplinary zeal of donors, particularly in a context of increasingly militarised aid regimes that have been associated with disastrous ventures into regime change.
We make two points. First, his story of aid dynamics in Ethiopia is not supported by the data he cites, which instead reflect the rise of economic 'reform' programmes pushed by the World Bank and IMF. The country's current economic difficulties also need to be placed in the context of the systemic financial crisis currently slamming the continent, in which both authoritarian and (nominally) democratic regimes are faring poorly.
Second, we reflect on Cheeseman's vision of aid as a lever of regime change. Within already stringent economic adjustment programmes, his call for intensifying political conditionalities amounts to a Good Governance Agenda 2.0. It ignores the legacy of the structural adjustment programmes in subverting deliberative governance on the continent during the 1980s and 1990s.
Misleading aid narratives distract from rebranded structural adjustment
On the first point, Cheeseman establishes his argument early on by stating 'that international donors have become increasingly willing to fund authoritarian regimes in Africa on the basis that they deliver on development'. In support of this assertion, he cites a table from the World Bank that shows net Official Development Assistance (ODA) received by Ethiopia surging to USD 4.93 billion in 2018, up from just over USD 4 billion in 2016 and 2017, and from a plateau oscillating around USD 3.5 billion from 2008 to 2015.
These aggregated data are misleading because ODA received by Ethiopia from western bilateral donors in fact fell in 2018 (and probably continued falling in 2019 and 2020). The World Bank data that he cites are actually from the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) statistics, which refer to all official donors (but not including countries such as China). If we restrict donor assistance to DAC countries – which is relevant given that Cheeseman only refers to the US, the UK and the EU in his piece – disbursed ODA to Ethiopia fell from USD 2.26 billion in 2017 to USD 2.06 billion in 2018 (see the red line in the figure below).
Figure: ODA to Ethiopia (millions USD), 2000-2019
Source: OECD.stat, last accessed 30 December 2020.
There was a brief moderate increase in DAC country ODA starting in 2015 and peaking in 2017. Cheeseman might have been referring to this. However, contrary to his argument, it was likely that the reason for this increase in aid was primarily humanitarian, responding to the refugee influx from South Sudan that began in 2015 and to the severe drought and famine risk in 2016-17. It was also probably related to attempts to induce incipient political reform following the major protests in Oromia in 2014, which Cheeseman would presumably condone given that conventional measures of democracy and freedom improved in 2018. Indeed, it is notable that committed ODA from DAC donor countries fell even more sharply than disbursed aid in 2018, from USD 2.49 billion in 2017 to USD 2.07 billion, reflecting the context in which these countries were negotiating hard with the Ethiopian government at the time.
Instead, the sharp increase in ODA in 2018 came entirely from the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank Group, which increased its mixture of grants and loans to the country from USD 1.1 billion in 2017 to USD 2.1 billion in 2018. This subsequently fell to USD 1.8 billion in 2019 (the dashed green line in the figure).
Such ODA has been explicitly tied to the World Bank's long-standing goal of liberalising, privatising and deregulating the Ethiopian economy, thereby 'reforming' (or disassembling) many of the attributes that have allowed the Ethiopian state to act in a developmentalist manner. These attributes include state-owned enterprises, state control over the financial sector, and relatively closed capital accounts, in strong distinction to most other countries in Africa (including Rwanda).
For instance, in October 2018 it approved USD 1.2 billion from the IDA in support of 'a range of economic reforms designed to revitalize the economy by expanding the role of the private sector… to gradually open up the economy and introduce competition to and liberalize sectors that have been dominated by key state-owned enterprises (SOEs)'. The support aimed to promote public-private partnerships in key state-owned sectors such as telecoms, power and trade logistics as key mechanisms to restructure these sectors, as well as broader deregulation and financial liberalisation. It is also notable that the World Bank prefaced this justification by emphasising the political reforms that had already been embarked upon, and the promotion of 'citizen engagement social accountability' in Ethiopia.
In other words, contra the idea that western donors have been increasing their support for an authoritarian development model, they have been gradually withdrawing aid since 2017. The World Bank pulled up the slack in 2018, and in December 2019 both the World Bank and IMF promised more funding in support of ongoing economic reforms. The economic liberalisation has in turn undermined political liberalisation and has been a key source of political destabilization.
The bargaining hand of these donors has been reinforced by the economic difficulties faced by the Ethiopian economy – in particular, a hard tightening of external foreign-exchange constraints. Balance of payments statistics reveal that the government had effectively stopped external borrowing after 2015, a policy that it was advised to adopt in its Article IV consultations with the IMF in 2016 and 2017 as its external debt distress levels were rising. As a result, the government became excessively reliant on donor grant money as a principal source of foreign financing. Yet the country continued to run deep trade deficits, in large part because its development strategies, as elsewhere in Africa, have been very import and foreign-exchange intensive (e.g. think of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, requiring more than USD 4.6 billion to build, the bulk in foreign exchange). Significant capital flight appears to have taken place as well; for example, errors and omissions reported on the balance of payments were -USD 2.14 billion in 2018. In order to keep the ship afloat, the central bank burnt through over USD 1 billion of its reserves in 2018 alone.
Contra the idea that western donors have been increasing their support for an authoritarian development model, they have been gradually withdrawing aid since 2017
This severe tightening of foreign-exchange constraints needs to be understood as a critical structural factor in causing the development strategy to stall. Along with non-economic factors, this in turn put considerable strain on the government's ability to stabilise political factions through the deployment of scarce resources, of which foreign exchange remains among the most important, especially in the current setting. Again, the point is not to apologise for authoritarianism, but rather to emphasise that the current situation is rooted deeper within a conjuncture of systemic crises that go far beyond any particular form of political administration.
Indeed, Cheeseman commits a similar oversight in ignoring the previous systemic crisis that the present is in many ways repeating. Later in his piece, he asserts: 'The vast majority of African states were authoritarian in the 1970s and 1980s, and almost all had poor economic growth.' This is an ahistorical misrepresentation of the profound global crisis that crippled Africa from the late 1970s for about two decades and which was the source of the poor growth he mentions. Then, as now, economic crisis was triggered throughout the continent by the severe tightening of external constraints, which neoliberal structural adjustment programmes exacerbated in a pro-cyclical manner despite being justified in the name of growth. The combination crippled developmentalist strategies across the continent regardless of political variations and despite the fact that many countries were performing quite well before the onset of the crisis. Such historical contextualisation is crucial for a correct assessment of the present.
Along with non-economic factors, this in turn put considerable strain on the government's ability to stabilise political factions through the deployment of scarce resources, of which foreign exchange remains among the most important, especially in the current setting.
In this respect, there is a danger of putting the cart before the horse. Most countries that descend into deep protracted crises (economic or political) generally stop being nominally democratic, and yet this result becomes attributed as a cause, as if authoritarianism results in crisis or poor performance. Cheeseman cherry-picks two papers (one a working paper) on democracy and development performance in Africa (which like all cross-country regressions, are highly sensitive to model specification and open to interpretation). However, drawing any causality from such studies is problematic given that states tended to become more authoritarian after the global economic crisis and subsequent structural adjustments of the late 1970s and 1980s, not the other way around. For instance, 16 countries were under military rule in 1972, compared with 21 countries in 1989 during the height of adjustment. Faced with crippled capacity under the weight of severe austerity and dwindling legitimacy as living standards collapsed, many states responded to mass protests against the harsh conditionalities of adjustment with increasing force. As such, economic crisis and adjustment plausibly contributed to the rise of political instability and increasingly authoritarian regimes. Other factors include the Cold War destabilisation, which western countries fuelled and profited from. In other words, the political malaise across Africa at the time was driven by as much by external as internal factors.
Aid as a lever of regime change
This leads us to our second point concerning Cheeseman's vision of aid as a lever of regime change. Cheeseman is at pains to emphasise that rigged elections and repression of opponents have contributed to the recent emergence of conflict in the Tigray region. While these are important features, Ethiopian intellectuals have also emphasised that conflicts in contemporary Ethiopia have taken place against a history of imperial state formation, slavery and debates about the 'national question', or what has sometimes been called 'internal colonialism'. These conflicts are shaped by the system of ethnic federalism, in which ethnically defined states control their own revenues, social provisioning and security forces. They have been affected by foreign agricultural land grabs, which interact with older histories of semi-feudal land dispossession. Most recently, there have been concerns that regional tensions over the Renaissance Dam and agricultural land may help draw neighbouring countries into the conflict.
In the face of this highly complex and rapidly changing context, no one person can identify the optimal response. It plausibly requires regular collective deliberation by people who are deeply embedded in the context. In particular, the brief political liberalisation of 2018 was followed by a sharp uptick of political violence on all sides, rooted in fundamental tensions between different visions of statehood. Such situations cannot be solved simply by 'adding democracy and stirring'; they require deliberative governance.
Yet, Cheeseman's piece seeks a reimposition of the very political conditionalities that were a primary factor in subverting deliberative governance on the continent during the first wave of structural adjustment and its attendant Good Governance agendas. Such conditionalities work by constraining the open contestation of ideas and the process of informed consensus-building. They undermine the sovereignty of key institutions of the polity and the economy. And by doing so they degrade the historical meaning of development as a project of reclaiming social and economic sovereignty after colonialism.
Indeed, as Thandika Mkandawire has argued, the previous wave of political conditionalities and democratisation reduced democracies to formal structures of elections and, by wedding and subordinating them to the orthodox economic policy frameworks established under structural adjustment, led to what he called 'choiceless democracies'. Such 'disempowered new democracies' are incapable of responding to the substantive macroeconomic demands of voters and thereby undermining substantive democracy, deliberative governance and policy sovereignty.
In particular, the idea of a democratic developmental state is meaningless in the absence of policy sovereignty. The institutional monocropping and monotasking of the type that Mkandawire wrote about does not merely prevent key institutions, such as central banks, from using broader policy instruments to support the developmental project. It also involves the deliberate creation of unaccountable policy vehicles, such as Monetary Policy Committees (MPCs), which operate outside of democratic oversight, but have considerable hold on the levers of economic policy. MPCs are in turn wedded to neoliberal monetarism. The message to such disempowered new democracies is that 'you can elect any leader of your choice as long as s/he does not tamper with the economic policy that we choose for you.' Or as Mkandawire wrote in 1994, 'two or three IMF experts sitting in a country's reserve bank have more to say than the national association of economists about the direction of national policy.'
As Thandika Mkandawire has argued, the previous wave of political conditionalities and democratisation reduced democracies to formal structures of elections and, by wedding and subordinating them to the orthodox economic policy frameworks established under structural adjustment, led to what he called 'choiceless democracies'
In such contexts, the prospect of a democratic developmental state is severely diminished. Ensuring significant improvements in people's wellbeing is important for the legitimacy of democracies. Yet the subversion of policy sovereignty significantly constrains the ability of new democracies to do so, setting them up for a crisis of legitimacy.
If democracy is to be meaningful it should involve the active engagement of citizens in a system of deliberative governance. Civil society organisations, in this context, are meaningful when they are autonomous institutions of social groupings that actively engage in boisterous debate and public policymaking in articulating the interest of their members. Yet, donor clientelism in Africa has wrought civil society and advocacy organisations that are manufactured and funded by, and accountable to, donors, not the citizens. This is a substantive subversion of democracy as a system of deliberative governance.
In this respect, we can call the kind of intrusive donor clientelism that Cheeseman is recommending Good Governance 2.0. His advocacy for strengthening patron-client relations between western donors and African governments, and his urging that donors use crises as a way of forcing regime change and policy conditionalities, is ahistorical, counterproductive and morally indefensible. In particular, it does not take into account the destructive, anti-democratic role of western-backed regime change and policy conditionality across the Global South during the era of flag independence. Even recently, these donor countries have disastrous human rights records when pushing for regime change in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. Their support for military dictatorships, such as in Egypt, has been a central pillar of foreign policy for decades. And several of these donor countries worked hard to uphold apartheid in South Africa. They have no moral high ground to push for regime change, and little record to ensure that they could do so without causing more harm than good.
Moreover, external actors attempting to enforce their narrow view of democratisation in contexts of deeply polarised and competing visions of statehood, and in the midst of economic instability reinforced by already burdensome economic conditionalities, austerity and reforms, could well be a recipe for disaster. As a collective of intellectuals from across the Horn has emphasised, the people of Ethiopia in particular and the Horn in general must be at the forefront of developing a lasting peace. This would likely require a developmental commitment to supporting state capacity and deliberative governance, not undermining it through external interference and conditionalities.
This article was first published in CODESRIA Bulletin Online, No. 2, January 2021 Page 1
Last year marked the 10th anniversary of the death of Mohamed Bouazizi, who on 17 December 2010 set himself alight at Sidi Bouzid in an act of self-immolation that made him the iconic martyr of the Tunisian revolution.
Habib Ayeb
Mohamed Bouazizi's name is familiar to all; less so is his background, although the facts of his story are well known and documented. This article will explore the links between the different sequences of 'protest' processes in Tunisia, from the 2008 strikes in the minefields, to the most recent (2017-20) El Kamour protests in the country's south-east. It will also consider the concept of socio-spatial class solidarity, both in turning an individual suicide into the spark for a major uprising, and in facilitating collective resistance and its role in long revolutionary processes.
Two key questions arise: what in Bouazizi's profile, life and circumstances was of such significance that his suicide sparked a huge popular uprising whose impact, direct and indirect, was felt worldwide. And what can he teach us about the origin, scale and longevity of the Tunisian revolution?
We must therefore examine the suicide of Mohamed Bouazizi within its familial and personal context, but also within the more general context of the political protests against the Ben Ali dictatorship, and especially against the processes of dispossession, impoverishment and exclusion. Sidi Bouzid was clearly a focus of the protests and resistance then spreading throughout Tunisia's marginalised regions. The prolonged mining strikes of 2008 were a key stage in the actions.
Born into poverty, Mohamed Bouazizi was raised by his mother after he lost his father at the age of three. As the eldest son he grew up with a moral 'obligation' to support his mother, to the detriment of his education, and he left school without qualifications. Some time before his dramatic act, he acquired a barrow and scales and started selling vegetables but his informal business attracted endless administrative hassles and police harassment. Finally, on 17 December 2010, the police seized his meagre equipment to put a stop to his trading. Angry, frustrated and desperate, he turned to the only act of resistance that still appeared open to him and thereby unwittingly triggered the countdown to Ben Ali's fall, scarcely one month later, on 14 January 2011.
'Individual' suicide and class solidarity
Between the prolonged mining strike of 2008 and the shows of solidarity unleashed by Bouazizi's self-immolation, many social movements were active across Tunisia. Among them were the protests made in Sidi Bouzid in June and July 2010 by peasant farmers whose demands focused on a number of issues: access to natural resources such as agricultural land, and water for drinking and irrigation purposes, state aid, and the complex problem of indebtedness.
According to several witnesses interviewed in Sidi Bouzid, as well as two family members, Mohamed Bouazizi took an active part in these demonstrations. Whether or not this is so, I would identify a clear link between the peasant 'protests' of summer 2010 and those that followed Bouazizi's desperate act – a link that explains why this particular case, in contrast to other suicides, sparked a popular uprising across the country. First to take to the streets after Bouazizi's self-immolation were other peasant farmers' children identifying with his fatal act of resistance and despair.
Here was a clear example of 'class solidarity' among local populations directly affected by the region's multiple social and economic problems. Over the next few days that same class solidarity also found expression nationwide, moving from the 'rural' zones (including 'rural towns'), to the popular quarters of larger towns, and finally to the big urban centres, including Tunis. The progress of the protests suggests the existence of a distinct class-consciousness embracing all the 'popular' classes, rural and urban.
Since the early 1980s, the governorate of Sidi Bouzid has been the site of a rapid, state-initiated intensification of farming, designed to create a modern, export-oriented agricultural hub based on exploiting deep underground water reserves and attracting private and public capital. Over the past four decades Sidi Bouzid has been transformed: from a semi-arid desert fringe with an extensive agriculture based on olives, almonds, pasture and winter cereals, it has become Tunisia's leading agricultural region, producing over a quarter of the nation's total output of fruit and vegetables.
But behind this undoubted technical success lies a real social and ecological failure. Socially Sidi Bouzid remains one of Tunisia's four poorest regions (of 26 in total), while ecologically the level of the water table is plummeting, water for irrigation is increasingly saline, and soil damage is visible, even to non-specialist eyes.
Since the early 1980s, the governorate of Sidi Bouzid has been the site of a rapid, state-initiated intensification of farming, designed to create a modern, export-oriented agricultural hub based on exploiting deep underground water reserves and attracting private and public capital
Here investors – who are mostly outsiders, often called 'settlers' by the local population – accrue capital and profits; meanwhile peasant farmers accumulate losses, tragedies and suicides. Without this huge socio-spatial fault, which divides Tunisia between a dominant centre and dependant periphery, Mohamed Bouazizi's death would scarcely have merited a mention. And that same divide also lies at the heart of several other shocks which will be discussed below.
After the Sidi Bouzid uprising ended with the fall of the Ben Ali dictatorship, several more protest movements arose, all forming part of the same resistance processes in the social and spatial periphery.
The Jemna oasis movement began in 2011 and concerned rights to land and resources, while the El Kamour movement (2017-20) also involves rights to local resources and in particular to 'development': two different struggles each of which constitutes a key moment/sequence in the same process of dissent.
At Jemna and El Kamour, as in other cases, the key to mass mobilisation lies in the processes and dynamics of socio-spatial class solidarity: 'This is where I come from, I belong to this region and this social group, I am being deprived of resources materially and/or symbolically, so I support those who dare to say "no" and resist'. In summary, this is what you can hear in Kebili-Jemna, Tataouine-El Kamour and elsewhere; what you can read in the media reports of declarations made by local populations. And underlying it all, 'driving' resistance and 'cementing' solidarity, lie profound feelings of injustice and demands for dignity.
Jemna: rights versus law; a disruptive legitimacy
Following the Sidi Bouzid episode and the fall of the dictator, in 2011 an oasis was 'discovered' that was probably new to the majority of Tunisians. Situated in the desert, midway between Kebili and Douz, the Jemna oasis owed its sudden appearance on the map to a significant new collective action, stemming directly from specific elements of colonial history that resurfaced after the wall of silence placed around them had been breached.
While most French colonists chose to settle in north or north-west Tunisia and created big cereal farms and/or stock-raising enterprises, and even vineyards and orchards, others preferred to head south and specialise in date farming – in particular the Degla variety, whose export market in France and Europe was virtually guaranteed. Among this latter group was one Maus De Rolley, who in 1937 created a new date-palm plantation around the core of the ancient Jemna oasis. The plantation today covers some 306 hectares, including 185 hectares planted with approximately 10,000 date palms.
Although local populations had held these lands as common and indivisible (tribal) property, they were dispossessed without compensation on the pretext that nomadic herding (pastoralism) was not a genuine productive activity, and that the land therefore was uncultivated. At independence, these populations – who had battled against the occupiers – held great expectations that the new authorities would return their stolen lands.
The Jemna oasis movement began in 2011 and concerned rights to land and resources, while the El Kamour movement (2017-20) also involves rights to local resources and in particular to 'development'
When the colonial lands were nationalised in 1964, however, the government decided to place them under state control, confiding their management to the body that administered the state's agricultural land, the Office des Terres Domaniales (OTD), which thereby became Tunisia's biggest agricultural landowner. Bolstering this strategy was the collectivisation policy of the 1960s, which aimed to reorganise agricultural land and create state 'socialist' cooperatives.
Yet the real argument against the redistribution of the nationalised lands lay elsewhere: small peasant farmers were judged too ignorant and archaic, too lacking in the necessary financial and technical means, to develop a modern intensive agricultural sector – a stigmatisation that still recurs today whenever discussion returns to this subject and/or to questions of agricultural models and political choices related to farming and food.
Over the following decades, the heirs made some efforts to reclaim these lands, but it was not until early 2011 that the first organised occupations of OTD lands were launched by local populations describing themselves as the legitimate successors. Among them was Jemna's local population, who occupied the former De Rolley plantation, claiming rights of property and of exploitation. The authorities demanded an end to the occupation, and the resulting impasse lasted for several years. The government argued that the occupation was illegal, while the occupiers countered that they held a legitimate right to resources and especially to community assets, including the indivisible and inalienable commons.
After a long period of tension a compromise was reached. By mutual agreement, the state ceded full management of the palm plantation to the local population while retaining ownership of the land. Might the latter have believed this negotiated settlement to be the only viable compromise?
Underlying the government position was the fear that any solution implying the grant of freehold to the legitimate heirs might create a legal precedent and set an example that would unleash a torrent of other land claims, all drawing on the same colonial and post-colonial past. But the occupation alone had set that example already, inciting other local populations to reclaim – with some attempts at occupation – the lands snatched from their grandparents during colonisation. Furthermore, I would argue that the Jemna case also served to fuel claims of a legitimate right to other local 'natural' resources such as water, minerals (for example, phosphates) and oil that mobilised populations in the Tatouine region.
El Kamour: the 'will of the people'
Resistance entered another phase, not without success, at El Kamour – a locality situated in the barren steppes of south-eastern Tunisia, south of the town of Tatouine, on the tarmac road leading to the oil-fields in the extreme south of the country. The 'dispossession pipeline' carrying crude oil to the port of Skhira, 50 kilometres north of Gabes, runs through here, and this geographical position close to the pipeline is the immediate reason for El Kamour's sudden appearance on political maps of Tunisia, as well as in the media.
Behind El Kamour, however, lies the governorate and town of Tataouine (Tataouine is the capital of the governorate of the same name), with over 180,000 inhabitants. Arid and barren, this region contains most of Tunisia's oil reserves, producing 40 per cent of its petrol and 20 per cent of its gas. Yet Tataouine also records some of the nation's highest levels of poverty: in 2017, for example, 28.7 per cent of its active population were unemployed (compared with a national average of 15.3 per cent), while for graduates the rate rose as high as 58 per cent.
Events in El-Kamour, 2017-2020: a brief chronology
The El Kamour movement began on 25 March 2017, with protests in various localities in the governorate, all converging on the town centre of Tataouine. The protesters were demanding a share of local resources, particularly oil, as well as greater employment opportunities and infrastructure development. Met by silence from the government, on 23 April they organised a sit-in at El Kamour. Tensions mounted on both sides, and an escalation became inevitable after the prime minister visited Tataouine and met the protesters. His plans to calm the situation with a few token promises came to naught and the discussions ended in deadlock. On 20 May the pumping station was occupied for two days before being cleared by the army, and tensions remained high.
Eventually, on 16 June 2017, an agreement was signed with the government through the mediation of the Union générale tunisienne du travail (UGTT), which acted to guarantee its implementation. The terms of the agreement promised the creation of 3,000 new jobs in the environmental sector by 2019, and 1,500 jobs in the oil industry by the end of 2017. A budget of 80 million dinars was also earmarked for regional development. But, to the frustration of the local population, the agreement was never implemented. The government simply bided its time, gambling that the militants would tire and the movement run out of steam.
'This is where I come from, I belong to this region and this social group, I am being deprived of resources materially and/or symbolically, so I support those who dare to say "no" and resist'. In summary, this is what you can hear in Kebili-Jemna, Tataouine-El Kamour and elsewhere.
On 20 May 2020, however, the El Kamour activists resumed their protests and sit-ins in several places, piling on the pressure and blockading several routes to bar them to oil-industry vehicles. On 3 July they organised a new general strike throughout the public services and the oilfields, and on 16 July they closed the pumping station, blocking the pipelines carrying petroleum products north. But the El Kamour militants had to wait until 7 November 2020 before they could reach an agreement with the government's representatives, in return for which petrol producers and other oil-sector enterprises were to resume operations immediately.
Signed by the head of government on 8 November 2020, the agreement contains a number of key points, including several that had previously featured in the 2017 accord but had not been implemented. These included, dedicated 80-million-dinar development and investment fund for the governorate of Tataouine; credit finance for 1,000 projects before the end of 2020; 215 jobs created in the oil industry in 2020, plus a further 70 in 2021; 2.6 million dinars for local municipalities and 1.2 million dinars for the Union Sportive de Tataouine.
The big social movements discussed above all have several points in common. Firstly, they are very largely located in southern, central, western and north-western Tunisia, the same marginalised and impoverished regions that between 17 December 2010 and early January 2011 saw huge protests in support of Bouazizi and against current social and economic policies. Secondly, while differing in detail, the principal demands of these movements all relate essentially to the right to resources, services and a decent income. None, or virtually none, are linked to 'political' demands (political rights, individual freedom). Thirdly, in their choice of language, and of several 'spectacular' actions, these social movements display a radicalism that marks a clear break with the political games played in and around the centres of power. Finally, almost all these movements are denounced and accused of regionalism and tribalism, sometimes even of separatism and treachery. Protesters are suspected of being manipulated, of being puppets in the hands of a political party or foreign power.
Yet these movements have enjoyed some, albeit relative, success – a success impossible without the class solidarity shown in the three examples discussed above, and the ties of domination and dependency that for decades have characterised the relationship between Tunisia's centre of power (the east coast) and its deprived and impoverished periphery. Finay, these same examples, and other more recent cases, demonstrate that the 'revolutionary' processes launched in early 2008 are still active in Tunisia and will probably remain so for many years to come.
This article was first published in The Review of Africa Political Economy journal


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Frequently Asked Questions About Mental Health and Disability Services
Funding for services and supports is determined through the enrollment process including a standardized assessment. Southeast Iowa Link (SEIL) shall be the funder of last resort and regional funds shall not replace other funding that is available.
Step 1: Complete the Eligibility Screener
Step 2: If you qualify for services, contact your local access office
What is Southeast Iowa Link?
Southeast Iowa Link (SEIL) is a Mental Health & Disability Services (MHDS) Region comprised of Eight counties. Each county has a local access office where people may apply for service funding, receive referrals and get questions answered. The local Coordinator of Disability Services (CDS) or other staff is available to assist applicants.
Access Office Locations
Eligibility Screener
Which medical mental illness diagnoses do I need to have?
Adult Diagnostic Categories age 18 and over
Mentally Illness (MI)
Intellectually Disabled (ID)
Developmentally Disabled (DD)
Children's Diagnostic Categories up to age 18
Children's Behavioral Health (CBH)
Serious Emotional Disturbance (SED)
Who's Eligible?
Eligibility Criteria Includes:
At least 18 years of age
Lawful resident of Iowa
Meets income guidelines of 150% Federal Poverty for most services
Meets resource guidelines of $2,000 per individual / $3,000 per household
Has a diagnosis of Mental Illness, Intellectual Disability or Developmental Disability (may have other co/occurring diagnoses)
Completes a Mental Health & Disability Services MHDS Application with a local access staff and participates in a functional assessment, as coordinated by an Integrated Health Homes (IHH) or case management, supporting the need for services.
Fill out the Eligibility Screener
What are the Federal Poverty Guidelines?
Poverty Guidelines for 2022
Monthly Income Monthly Income Monthly Income Monthly Income Monthly Income
Client Participation Expanded Region
PSH Medicaid MHDS
HH Size Annual 25% 100% 133% 150% 200%
1 $13,590 $283 $1,133 $1,506 $1,699 $2,265
4 $27,750 $5478 $2,313 $3,076 $3,469 $4,625
8 $46,630 $971 $3,886 $5,168 $55,829 $7,772
Additional Person
$4,720 $98 $393 $523 $590 $787
https://aspe.hhs.gov/peverty-guidelines
What does it mean to have a mental illness?
Mental illness, also called mental health disorders, refers to a wide range of mental health conditions — disorders that affect your mood, thinking and behavior. Examples of mental illness include depression, anxiety disorders, schizophrenia, eating disorders and addictive behaviors.
Who is effected by mental illness
According to Johns Hopkins, an estimated 26% of Americans ages 18 and older — about 1 in 4 adults — suffers from a diagnose mental disorder in a given year.
Many people suffer from more than one mental disorder at a given time. In particular, depressive illnesses tend to co-occur with substance abuse and anxiety disorders.
Approximately 9.5% of American adults ages 18 and over, will suffer from a depressive illness (major depression, bipolar disorder, or dysthymia) each year.
Mental Health & Disability Services
Southeast Iowa Link (SEIL) offers 24-hour access crisis services, urgent care, and long-term support services
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redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


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'Forgive me, I didn't know any better' - why Nottingham Forest ace Joe Lolley wanted Derby County to succeed
The Reds' Player of the Season has jokingly asked for fans' forgiveness
Sarah Clapson
Joe Lolley celebrates scoring for Nottingham Forest (Image: PA)
Nottingham Forest ace Joe Lolley may now be a true Red, but there was a time when he wanted Derby County to succeed – albeit not in the way you might expect.
A self-confessed "football nerd", the winger is a big fan of the computer game Football Manager.
And back in his youth, when he "didn't know any better", Lolley used to play the simulation as Forest's arch-rivals.
Now proudly wearing the Garibaldi, he has jokingly asked for Reds fans' forgiveness.
Asked who had been his best signing while playing the game, Lolley said: "There were three players I had when I managed Derby (forgive me, I was a young university student and didn't know any better).
Panagiotis Tachtsidis left opponents 'in awe' - will Nottingham Forest regret not giving him a chance?
"One, Giamarchi, was my record goal scorer with about 700 goals.
"I signed him when he was just 16 and he retired when he was about 36. Legend.
"Then there was a 6'4" winger called Kevin Smith with a bullet throw. He was a genius on the pitch and like (Rory) Delap with a ball in his hand… a lethal combination.
"Last of all, we had a right-back called Gonzalo. He had (a score of) 20 for dribbling and just used to go on mazy runs from all areas of the pitch and score and assist consistently."
Nottingham Forest's Joe Lolley (Image: Joseph Raynor/ Nottingham Post)
Forest's Player of the Season is so good at the game, he managed to get Shrewsbury Town into Europe, all while playing in the Joe Lolley Stadium.
"I had a save with Shrewsbury and by about 2035 I had a squad where 50 percent of the players had come through the academy," he said, when asked about his greatest managerial achievement.
"We played a 2-7-1 formation and won every trophy going.
"I can remember beating Atlanta away 13-0 in the group stages in Europe and having 50-odd shots. Total domination."
He added: "We won the domestic league and were the best team in Europe every year for about eight to 10 years.
Forgotten man Apostolos Vellios' message as he prepares for Nottingham Forest return
"I finished around 2040 playing a ridiculous formation (which I've never ever been able to replicate with any success) and winning roughly every game in the Joe Lolley Stadium. Good times.
"My current save with Oxford City is up to 2037 and I've gone from Conference South to five top-flight titles and three European trophies, so that's right up there."
Lolley says he doesn't like to sign former teammates for any of the clubs he manages and tries "to play good football".
Asked why he loves Football Manager, he told the game's official website: "Who knows, it's been part of my life on and off since 03/04.
"Once I'm into a game, it's impossible to get me off it.
"Just creating things tactically and seeing things you want to happen actually happen is amazing, especially now with the likes of defenders splitting from goal-kicks and playing out from the back and seeing players take up positions you want them to.
"It's just a wonderful game for a football nerd like me."
Sadness after Nottinghamshire pub landlord says farewell after 50 years in trade
Pubs and bars in Nottingham'Put me behind the bar and that's been my stage'
Nottingham City CouncilVictoria Embankment Memorial Gardens secures £1.7m for restoration projectA new visitor centre will be built
Watch the moment police storm home of suspected Nottingham drug dealer
Call for safety measures following three-car crash which killed father and young son in Mansfield
Chewbacca costume, Lego village and a groom - oddest things found at Travelodges
Nottingham City CentreRoald Dahl books and a marriage certificate were also left behind
Teen arrested after stolen car driven across two counties
MansfieldPolice stopped the car in the Warsop area


We opened up our offices to welcome the executive team from the Birmingham Chambers of Commerce, as we hosted their team day. Facilitated by our very own Principal Consultant Stuart Bailey, he led the team through a day of development and leadership skills. The day provided them with a new level of self awareness of how to work effectively together, through the use of a unique learning tool, TetraMap.
We hear from Paul Faulkner, CEO of the Birmingham Chambers of Commerce as he reflects on his biggest learn from his experience of TetraMap.
For the latest TetraMap events, visit our events page.


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Fat-free finale for loyal 'losers'
Tim Kroenert
A confession: over the past two years I've become a regular (though not religious) viewer of The Biggest Loser. This interest has been aided by virtue of living in a household where the show is often on the TV, and abetted by a Foxtel IQ box that lets us record the program and skip through tedious 'filler' to focus on the competition itself.
I've consistently sneered at reality TV, and always considered The Biggest Loser to be a particularly objectionable example. Yet in the lead-up to the season finale, due to air tonight, I've been forced to reassess a couple of my prejudices, while others remain firmly intact.
Don't get me wrong. This is trash TV. Some of its dubious features are common throughout the 'reality' genre: the formulaic structure, the emotional manipulation, the vapidity of the format, the sniping and backstabbing which is cast as 'drama'.
Others are idiosyncratic: the nauseating pap-psychology dribbled by the Aussie trainers — as if bulky biceps give them the ability to psychoanalyse their emotionally vulnerable charges — and the try-hard tough talk spouted by militaristic motivator, The Commando.
Then there's the 'temptations', where high-fat, high-calorie foods (how can you fit so much bacon and fried eggs onto one plate?) are dangled in front of contestants, with the promise of prizes such as a week's immunity from elimination if they give in and scoff up. And, of course, there's the irony of a show that purports to celebrate weight loss while keeping thousands of viewers pinned to their sofas and their television sets.
As far as losing weight goes, the 'big brother' approach seems a particularly undignified one. That is a personal judgement. I'm a self-conscious exerciser. I prefer to pound pavement under cover of night. I use the gym at times when I know it will be nearly empty. The idea of sweating it out on a treadmill or struggling through my stomach crunches in front of a camera and a television audience seems totally abhorrent.
So while my overriding emotional response to the decreasingly overweight contestants on The Biggest Loser is one of pity and vicarious shame, that has more to do with personal biases than anything else.
I've reassessed another personal prejudice. In the throes of skepticism, I usually scoff at the seemingly insincere camaraderie between contestants. After all, at the end of the day each has their individual eye on the cash prize, and to hell with camaraderie.
It was for this reason that last year, I was rooting for Chris. Cast by the show's producers as the series villain, Chris was the outsider who came into the house during the final few weeks and swiped victory out from under the 'real' contestants' noses.
Chris wasn't into playing games, except to the extent that he was there to play the game. I respected his frankness, and was pleased when his skeletal form stepped onto the scales at the finale, and he was declared to be the 'biggest loser'. There can be only one winner, so surely to be openly self-interested is the only way to play without being disingenuous.
Or so I thought. This year I've been eating my words, like one of those overstuffed plates of bacon and eggs. Two of this year's final three, who will take to the stage for tonight's final weigh-off, have gotten through simply by being too damn nice to vote out.
Only a seriously heartless mug could have eliminated baby-faced Sam, with his cheeky grin and little-brother affability, or 30-something Alison, the unofficial 'mum' to the other contestants, who gets weepy every time she talks about missing her young daughters back home.
This year's final three have put paid to the idea that 'every person for his or herself' is the only way to win. The third finalist, Kirsten, is a former Olympian with one hell of a competitive streak. She's been a contender from the get-go, but has made it to the final thanks in no small part to an alliance with Sam and Alison.
In an apparent reversal of the reality TV formula, a pact based on loyalty and friendship, not on backstabbing and strategy, has allowed this triumvirate to stand strong while the other contestants have gradually competed themselves out of the game.
It could be that 2008 goes down in history as the year The Biggest Loser redeemed itself. On the other hand, Sam, Alison and Kirsten may have simply rewritten the strategy book, so that next year's competitors exploit teamwork as a way to achieve individual success.
The Biggest Loser website
Tim Kroenert is Assistant Editor of Eureka Street. His articles have been published by The Age, Inside Film, and the Brisbane Courier Mail. He is a contributor to the inaugural edition of the journal Studies in Australian Weird Fiction. Email Tim
Recent articles by Tim Kroenert.
Meet the robots who would be human
A bad trip to the pits of human experience
Fake news about 'fascist' Queen
Faith through a different lens
Comedy and trauma in Nanette and Funny Cow
SUPPORT RESPECTFUL CONVERSATIONS IN A TIME OF DIVISION
If there's one thing that the recent election campaign and its outcome demonstrated, it's the depth of the divisions that exist in our Australian community.
Our politics is focused on point-scoring, personalities, and name-calling across party lines. The media, for the most part, don't help, driven by the 24-hour news cycle and the pursuit of advertising dollars into a frenzy of click-bait and shallow sensationalism.
What does it mean to be an Australian in times like these? What are the values that unite us?
Eureka Street offers an alternative. It's less a magazine than a wide ranging conversation about the issues that matter in our country and our world; a conversation marked by respect for the dignity of ALL human beings.
Importantly, it's a conversation that takes place in the open, unhindered by paywalls or excessive advertising. And it's through the support of people like you that it is able to do so.


text:
extern char *commandname;	/* currently executing command */
extern int exitstatus;		/* exit status of last command */
extern int back_exitstatus;	/* exit status of backquoted command */
extern struct strlist *cmdenviron;  /* environment for builtin command */

struct backcmd {		/* result of evalbackcmd */
	int fd;			/* file descriptor to read from */
	char *buf;		/* buffer */
	int nleft;		/* number of chars in buffer */
	struct job *jp;		/* job structure for command */
};

int evalstring(char *, int);
union node;	/* BLETCH for ansi C */
void evaltree(union node *, int);
void evalbackcmd(union node *, struct backcmd *);

extern int evalskip;

/* reasons for skipping commands (see comment on breakcmd routine) */
#define SKIPBREAK	(1 << 0)
#define SKIPCONT	(1 << 1)
#define SKIPFUNC	(1 << 2)
#define SKIPFILE	(1 << 3)
#define SKIPEVAL	(1 << 4)

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaGithub


A bank robber was running from the law. The police were on his tail and he had nowhere to go so he went into a church.
A priest started to talk to him and just as he was asking him why he stole the money the robber heard sirens. He shot the priest and moments later then the police shot the robber.
Somehow there was a mix up; the robber went to heaven and the priest went to hell.
Luckily, they found the mistake and when they were changing places, they both met in the middle.
The priest said to him, "I cant wait until I meet the Virgin Mary!"
The robber said, "She's not a virgin anymore."


text:
Remko Bicentini (Nijmegen, 20 februari 1968) is een Nederlands-Curaçaos voormalig profvoetballer en huidig voetbaltrainer. Hij is een zoon van oud-voetballer Moises Bicentini.

Spelerscarrière
Bicentini speelde van 1986 tot 1988 in totaal 24 wedstrijden (22 competitiewedstrijden en 2 in de nacompetitie) als verdediger voor N.E.C.. Hierna ging hij voor De Treffers spelen en later kwam hij uit voor onder andere Germania, AWC en DIO '30.

Trainerscarrière
In 2008 was hij assistent-bondscoach van het Nederlands-Antilliaans voetbalelftal naast bondscoach Leen Looyen. Hij volgde Looyen ad-interim op tot de ontmanteling van het land in oktober 2010. Bicentini is initiatiefnemer en trainer van de Dutch Caribbean Stars, en oprichter van de Fundashon Bicentini. In het seizoen 2010/11 werd Bicentini als trainer van zondagamateur Beuningse Boys halverwege het seizoen ontslagen. In het seizoen 2011-2012 werd hij hoofdtrainer van SV Orion waar hij in november 2011 ontslagen werd. Vanaf de zomer van 2011 was hij assistent-bondscoach van het Curaçaos voetbalelftal. In januari 2012 werd hij aangesteld als coach van AWC. In augustus 2016 werd hij bondscoach, als opvolger van Patrick Kluivert. Met Curaçao won hij de Caribbean Cup 2017 en plaatste hij zich voor de CONCACAF Gold Cup 2017, 2019 en 2021. Tevens is Bicentini vanaf 2017 ook hoofdtrainer van Hoofdklasser SV Juliana '31 uit Malden. Eind augustus 2020 werd hij door de Curaçaose voetbalbond uit zijn functie ontheven en vervangen door Guus Hiddink.

In januari 2021 werd Bicentini toegelaten tot de UEFA-Pro opleiding van de KNVB. Hij werd hij assistent bij het Canadees voetbalelftal en kondigde aan medio 2021 te stoppen bij Juliana '31. In het seizoen 2021/22 liep hij als assistent-coach stage bij N.E.C. en behaalde in juni 2022 het diploma van de UEFA-Pro opleiding. Het Canadese team plaatste zich voor het Wereldkampioenschap voetbal 2022. In augustus 2022 keerde hij terug als bondcoach van Curaçao.

Erelijst
Als trainer

Zie ook
Lijst van spelers van N.E.C.

Externe links
Fundashon Bicentini
necarchief.nl

Nederlands-Antilliaans voetballer
Nederlands-Antilliaans voetbalcoach
Nederlands voetballer
Nederlands voetbalcoach

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


text:
Ratus, également appelé Ratus Poche, est une série de livres-jeux conçue comme méthode d'apprentissage de la lecture comprise entre CP et CM2. Elle contient des énigmes pour chaque histoire, et est éditée par les éditions Hatier.

Histoire
Le personnage de Ratus a été créé en 1985 par Jeanine et Jean Guion. Dès lors, ils conçoivent, dans le cadre d'une méthode, des « petits romans » que des enfants peuvent lire seuls. Avant la création de Ratus, les Guion écrivaient ensemble leurs premières histoires pour enfants en 1972.

La méthode Ratus en quatre niveaux (niveau 1 à 4) est composée de différents outils, dont des manuels, des cahiers de travaux ou des livres. Les histoires sont articulées autour d'un rat anthropomorphe vert dénommé Ratus. Elle est écrite par le couple Guion, et illustrée par Olivier Vogel. Pour Myriam Gau, présidente du centre francophone de Pittsburgh aux États-Unis, « la méthode Ratus et ses amis est excellente pour donner envie aux enfants d'apprendre à lire. Elle est bien faite, agréable pour les parents comme pour les enfants car ils aiment beaucoup les histoires marrantes de Ratus et de ses compagnons, et si on est motivé en tant que tuteur c'est l'occasion d'en faire un moment agréable avec eux. »

En 2015, le site web officiel ratus.com est mis à jour. En 2021, le site web est hors-ligne.

Personnages
Ratus est un rat anthropomorphe vert et personnage principal à la tenue rebelle (jeans et t-shirt bleu). Celle des histoires qui est chronologiquement la première raconte qu'il était gris à l'origine mais est devenu vert en volant et dévorant l'entièreté d'une récolte d'olives vertes appartenant à son voisin, le chat Belo.

Parmi les personnages secondaires, on compte une famille de chats : Marou (chat turquoise) et Mina (chat rose) sont frères et sœurs et vivent avec leur grand-père Belo, un chat bleu en salopette. Tous sont voisins de Ratus. Victor, un chien orange et musclé, est l'ami et voisin de Belo. On compte aussi Mamie Ratus, une rate grise en robe violette, grand-mère de Ratus. Ainsi que Jeanette, la maîtresse d'école, et Ralette, une rate blonde, personnage principal de certains livres de la collection Ratus Poche.

Parutions
 1988 : Ratus découvre les livres CE1, Livre de lecture
 1993 : Ratus et ses amis CP, Guide pédagogique
 1994 : Ratus et ses amis CP - Manuel de l'élève
 1994 : Ratus découvre les livres CE1, Cahier de lecture
 1995 : Ratus et ses amis CP, Cahier de lecture
 1997 : Ratus et ses amis CP, Cahier d'expression n° 1
 1997 : Ratus et ses amis CP, Cahier d'expression n° 2
 2003 : Le Cadeau de Mamie Ratus
 2004 : Ratus à l'hôpital
 2015 : Les Champignons de Ratus, Ratus chevalier vert, Ratus joue aux devinettes, Ratus et les puces savantes, Ratus et le monstre du lac, Ratus en ballon, Ratus court le marathon, Ratus champion de tennis, Ratus à la ferme, Ralette fait du judo, Les Mensonges de Ratus, Le Poney de Ralette, Ratus à l'école, La Cachette de Ralette, Ratus et la télévision, Le Robot de Ratus, La cabane de Ratus, Ratus, le trésor du pirate, Ratus raconte ses vacances, Ratus et le poisson fou, Un nouvel ami pour Ratus, Ratus chez le coiffeur, Ratus à l'école du cirque, Ratus et le sapin-cactus, Le Jeu vidéo de Ratus
 2016 : Ratus aux sports d'hiver, Méthode de lecture syllabique Ratus et ses amis, Ratus à la fête des amoureux, Ralette reine du carnaval, Ratus, gare au sorcier, Ratus et l'œuf magique, Ralette reine de la magie, Les amoureux de Ralette, L'Anniversaire de Ratus, Ratus chez les cow-boys, Les Belles vacances de Ratus, Ratus fait du surf, Ratus et sa classe en voyage, Ratus et l'étrange maîtresse, Ratus écrit un livre, Ratus chez les robots, Ratus père Noël, Ratus et les fantômes de sa mamie
 2017 : Ratus à Venise, Ratus se déguise, Ratus pique-nique, Drôle de Noël pour Ratus, Joyeux Noël Ralette
 2018 : La Grosse bêtise de Ratus
 2019 : Ratus sur la route des vacances

Séries disparues
 Les Histoires de toujours
 Super Mamie et la forêt interdite
 L'École de  Bégonia
 La Classe de
 Achille, le robot de l'espace
 Les Imbattables
 Baptiste et Clara
 Les Enquêtes de Mistouflette
 Francette top-secrète
 Hors séries

Notes et références

Liens externes
  (version archivée du )

Lecture dans l'éducation
Souris ou rat imaginaire


text:
The Presidential Health Summit
Deputy President David Mabuza delivers the closing remarks at the summit
Official Funeral of the late Minister Edna Molewa
President Cyril Ramaphosa delivering the eulogy at the Official Funeral of the late Minister of Environmental Affairs, Ms Edna Molewa, in Pretoria
Presidential Jobs Summit
President Cyril Ramaphosa addressing the first day of the two-day Presidential Jobs Summit held in Midrand, Johannesburg
Hand over of Title Deeds
President Cyril Ramaphosa addressing the community during the hand over of Title Deeds to beneficiaries of the Franklin Housing Project in KwaZulu-Natal
Official opening of the Kokstad Home Affairs Office
President Cyril Ramaphosa unveils the plague during the official opening of the Home Affairs Office in Kokstad, KwaZulu-Natal


46 former employees of CSX Locomotive Shop have filed suit in federal court alleging wrongful termination, insurance fraud, violations of the Family medical leave act, and exposing their medical records .
Filed Feb 15 by attorney Gregory Paul of Morgan & Paul in Pittsburgh, the plaintiffs include electricians, boilermakers, carmen, communications maintainers, engineers, firemen/oilers, machine operators, machinists, painters, sheet metal workers, utility workers and welders.
Alleging violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Section 510 of ERISA, FMLA and state violations, the brief summation states: "Termination of employment , interference with health benefits and denial of medical leave."
The employees visited one or more doctors and submitted paperwork to CSX. However, CSX ordered disciplinary hearing and submitted health information to the Railroad Retirement Board alleging that they had sought treatment for "highly suspicious" injuries and the physicians kept patients off work longer than necessary.
The case is styled Justin Adkins, et. al v. CSX Transportation, Inc. and CSX Corporation, et. al. 18-cv-00321.


Tools/Options: Gus Pech GH 48: Hydraulic Gear Pump, Updated Hydraulic Valves, cylinders and a New 18,000# Braden Main Winch Line ($21K alone) from Gus Pech. Maxi Torque Extended Range Transmission. Low Miles. Rig is Ready to Work and Tooling is Available and Negotiable. A Cylinder was Added in the Tower to Raise and Pull Out Arm to Drill Position. Helper does not need to climb mast. Various Kelly Bars and Buckets can be Sold with it, a Few Options are Available on a Bucket and Kelly Bars. Odometer Reads 14,403 Miles but was Changed Out in 2014 @ 89,777 Miles so there are approx. 110,000 Miles on Truck.


Silk and Sparkle is a design house known for its high-end-quality Indian wedding and formal outfits . The team aims to provide clients with their dream outfits to make their wedding/functions a unique and unforgettable experience.
Silk and Sparkle - Wedding & Modern Indian Clothing for Women/Men is a Satisfied Customers Program (SCP) member. Positive reviews , complaints and testimonials will be published on the business directory following review or arbitration if required. Please do not review 'Silk and Sparkle - Wedding & Modern Indian Clothing for Women/Men' if you've received , or have been offered , a reward for writing this review. Do not write a review if you are associated with the owner or employees of this business.
Australian Business Directory members who receive an unfavourable review are given the opportunity to respond to the customer who posted the review before it is published. We know that slanderous and unfounded reviews are common place on the web so we have allowed "Silk and Sparkle - Wedding & Modern Indian Clothing for Women/Men" the tools to arbitrate and contact the reviewer in order to resolve outstanding complaints or disputes. We have found that this achieves a far better outcome for both the reviewed business and their customer in the longterm. Fake reviews will be removed according to our policies and guidelines.
If you require more specific business details such as opening hours , further customer reviews , directions etc please contact Silk and Sparkle - Wedding & Modern Indian Clothing for Women/Men on their website , by phone or at their store location (if applicable). All profile related content remains the sole property of Bridal Wear Retailers business 'Silk and Sparkle - Wedding & Modern Indian Clothing for Women/Men'.


Learn more about Tecta America Southern California, Inc. (RCAC Member Contractor Rex Souders, President) at the website here.
Want to be featured in Members in Action? It couldn't be easier!
If you're a current RCAC member contractor, just email our Communications Coordinator at syoungblood@connerlyandassociates.com the following details: (1) a few pictures (2) description of the roofing system (3) contractor (4) job/project name. We'll feature your most recent project on our website, newsletter and social media!


text:
Q: Web Dynpro Action on Button There is some kind of Shopping Cart in which you have Product positions.
There is a Button in web dynpro which is supposed to copy the text from the Inputfield from one position to the others.
When I click one of the positions, and enter a text in the inputfield and click on copy to all other positions - it doesn't copy.
Only if I click the button twice it copies the position to the others. What am I doing wrong?
I'm not a web dynpro expert.

A: Could be an IE bug or some problem in the code.
You can check the onAction property of your button and also check if there's any loop in the events that could probably cause this "only for the second click" behavior.
Please share your Controller/View code so we can provide a complete answer.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


text:
Home General Movies ANTIM "THE FINAL TRUTH": MovieRulz, Telegram Movies Rockerz 480p, 720p Leaked Online
ANTIM "THE FINAL TRUTH": MovieRulz, Telegram Movies Rockerz 480p, 720p Leaked Online
ANTIM Movie Download: ANTIM-Filmymeet, Bollyflix, Telegram-movies rockerz and other torrent sites have leaked in Full HD, 720p and 480P. Here's why you shouldn't download it online.
ANTIM: The Final Truth is a 2021 Indian Hindi film. This film has been directed by Mahesh Manjrekar Ji, while it is produced by Salman Khan Films. This film is actually an action thriller film which you will definitely enjoy watching.
Distributed by Zee Studios, it is an adaptation of the Marathi film Mulshi Pattern. The film stars Salman Khan and Aayush Sharma in lead roles, starring Mahima Makwana and Pragya Jaiswal in lead roles. The story revolves around a face-off between a Sikh police officer (Khan) and a gangster (Sharma), and like the original, it explores the difficult situations faced by farmers that push some of them to crime.
The Principal photography began in November 2020 and was completed in the first week of October 2021. The official trailer of the film was launched on 25 October 2021. It is scheduled for theatrical release worldwide on 26 November 2021.
In Antim Movie Download , the cop played by Salman fights the land mafia. Rahulya is a poor village boy whose dream is to become the biggest don of Pune. His closest friend Gyan is with him in all this while his parents stay away from their violent son. Policeman Rajveer Singh sees this innocent boy rising up and becomes disheartened as Rahulya manages to use his connections to break out of police custody over and over again.
With Rajveer on the heels, Rahulya still manages to rise to the top with ease, but soon loses sight of why he ever wanted to climb the ranks.
ANTIM "THE FINAL TRUTH" Movie Trailer
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Some popular films like Maya and The Three, Haseen Dillruba, Lucifer Season 6, Aashram Chapter 2, Qismat 2, Outer Banks Season 2, Hungama 2, Toofan, Black Widow, Little Things Season 4, etc have also become victims of this.
Antim: The Final Truth has been released worldwide on November 26, 2021 at 09:00 am IST . On the other hand, if you have a subscription to Netflix , then you can watch it by streaming it online. At the same time, if you want, you can also download it in your mobile or computer.
Available On Netflix
Running Time 2:30 Hours
Released Date 26 November 2021
Subtitle English
Antim: The Final Truth is an upcoming Hindi movie which is scheduled to release on November 26, 2021. The film is directed by Mahesh Manjrekar and will feature Salman Khan, Aayush Sharma, Sayaji Shinde and Mahima Makwana in lead roles. Other popular actors who were roped in for Ultimate: The Final Truth are Sachin Khedekar, Chhaya Kadam and Jisshu Sengupta.
Let us now know what is the full cast of Antim: The Final Truth Movie .
Movie Antim: The Final Truth
Artists Salman Khan | Aayush Sharma | Mahima Makwana
Director Mahesh Manjrekar
Movie Type Action | Drama | Thriller
The real hero of the film seems to be Salman Khan. The one who was introduced as a special guest appears to be a full-fledged leading man in the trailer. Khan plays a Sikh cop to nab a lousy gangster from Pune, played by Aayush Sharma, who has clearly given his best shot at character, raucous looks, glowing eyes, crazy grin and all .
At the beginning of the trailer, the cop hero of Salman Khan says, "Jin din ye sardar ki hate. Everyone will burst." Our Sikh brothers are so impressed with his dialogue skills that he repeats the same dialogue at the end of the trailer, making it the only trailer in the history of Indian cinema where the protagonist gets the same dialogue twice.
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As the characters of Salman and Aayush come face to face, shots are fired, shirts come off and heavy dialogues are exchanged. At one point, Aayush's gangster asks Salman's cop, "Tu janta hai kya? Apun Pune ka naya bhai hai (Do you know that I am the new don of Pune)?"
Salman is seen lovingly playing on the 'bhai (brother)' tag given to him by fans as he replies, "Tu Pune ka bhai hai, main se hai Hindustan ka bhai hoon (You may be the don of Pune but I I have always been a brother of India) ).
Antim: The Final Truth marks Salman's first on-screen collaboration with his brother-in-law, Aayush, who underwent a major physical transformation for his role.
Distributor Netflix
Channel Partner Sony Max
Music Partner Zee Music
Running Time Not Available
Release Date 26 November 2021
ANTIM "THE FINAL TRUTH": MovieRulz, Telegram Movies Rockerz 480p, 720p Leaked Online https://t.co/7qmNVvSpQY via @Kordinate
— Kordinate.World (@rinovative007) November 28, 2021
Yes, if you want, we can watch ANTIM Movie sitting with our family.
Mahesh Manjrekar is the director of ANTIM Movie.
Theft of any original material is an offence punishable under the Copyright Act. We strongly oppose piracy. We neither endorse nor promote any torrent/piracy website.
Time and again we are reminding you that downloading/streaming movies from piracy websites can put you in huge trouble. We strongly advise you to stay away from piracy sites. There is always an option of legal sites like Netflix, Amazon Prime Video to watch movies.
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