Ways to trade the Euro debt crisis
Short the Pound and other English financial items.  Because the English economy is tied to the EU, it will be hit as well.  You might prefer this over Euro denominated investments, since it's not exactly clear who your counterpart is if the Euro really crashes hard.  Meaning suppose you have a short position Euro's versus dollars, but the clearing house is taken down by the crash. "The way I am trading this is:  I am long the USD / EUR in cash. I also hold USD / EUR futures, which are traded on the Globex exchange. I am long US equities which have a low exposure to Europe and China (as I expect China to growth significantly slower if the European weakens).  I would not short US equities because Europe-based investors (like me) are buying comparatively ""safe"" US equities to reduce their EUR exposure."
Huh? What does a flight to safety (cheaper US borrowing rates) have to do with the crisis not spreading if something goes wrong in Italy? It won't be the same over here - it will hit the banking system and companies tied to Europe rather than the sovereign market, but if something happens in Italy we'll feel it. theoretically this concept makes sense.  However as recent numbers have shown ( I do not have the source handy but one can simply obtain this information via the ECB's website) banks have tapped this LTRO, something in the likes of 500 billion or so, and instead of buying Sovereign debt, they instead prefer to park this money with the ECB, paying something like 25 bps on deposits.  so instead of using this LTRO money to buy Sovereigns or perhaps lend to other banks, easing the strain on LIBOR, banks have just parked this money back with the ECB, as the ECB has seen its deposits once again reach record amounts (again, see the ECB website for proof).  Just this speaks volumes about the LTRO carry trade and how it is evidently not going to achieve its long term goal of bringing spreads down in Europe.  Perhaps in the short run yes, but if you look at the fundamentals (EURUSD, the EUR Basis Swap and the OIS-LIBOR Spread) they show how the situation in Europe is far from over, and the LTRO is nothing close to a long term and stable solution The idea behind this move is to avoid or mitigate long-term deflationary pressure and to boost the competitiveness of Swiss exporters. This is primarily a Swiss-based initiative that does not appear likely to have a major impact on the broader Eurozone. However, some pressure will be felt by other currencies as investors look to purchase - ie. this is not a great scenario for other countries wanting to keep their currencies weak. In terms of personal wealth - if you hold Swiss f then you are impacted. However, 1.2 is still very strong (most analysts cite 1.3 as more realistic) so there seems little need for a reaction of any kind at the personal level at this time, although diversity - as ever - is good. It should also be noted that changing the peg is a possibility, and that the 1.3 does seem to be the more realistic level. If you hold large amounts of Swiss f then this might cause you to look at your forex holdings. For the man in the street, probably not an issue. You could buy Bitcoins. They are even more deflationary than Swiss Francs.  But the exchange rate is currently high, and so is the risk in case of volatility.  So maybe buy an AltCoin instead. See altcoin market capitalization for more information. Basically, all you'd be doing is changing SwissFrancs into Bitcoin/AltCoin.  You don't need a bank to store it. You don't need to stockpile cash at home.  Stays liquid, there's no stock portfolio (albeit a coin portfolio), unlike in stocks there are no noteworthy buy and sell commissions, and the central bank can't just change the bills as in classic-cash-currency.  The only risk is volatility in the coin market, which is not necessarely a small risk.  Should coins have been going down, then for as long as you don't need that money and keep some for everyday&emergency use on a bank account, you can just wait until said coins re-climb - volatility goes both ways after all. "The risk is that greece defaults on it's debts and the rest of the eurozone chose to punish it by kicking it out of the Eurozone and cutting off it's banks from ECB funds. Since the greek government and banks are already in pretty dire straits this would leave greece with little choice but to forciblly convert deposits in those banks to a ""new drachma"". The exchange rate used for the forced conversions would almost certainly be unfavorable compared to market rates soon after the conversion. There would likely be capital controls to prevent people pulling their money out in the runup to the forced conversion. While I guess they could theoretically perform the forced conversion only on Euro deposits this seems politically unlikely to me." You forgot the biggest thing: Japan still controls its own currency and Greece does not.   If you don't control your currency, you have much more limited options when it comes to borrowing money. It is why US states can't borrow a lot of money, they all have to share the US dollar which no one state controls. So states are used to making cutbacks in hard times, but the Eurozone nations have not adopted this mindset.  Greece isn't in trouble because it borrowed too much, it's in trouble because it borrowed so much *and has to share the Euro*. Greece can't inflate its currency, so if they can't make a payment they default, no one wants to lend to a place that might default. If Greece had its own currency still there would be no currency crisis in Europe, just some inflation. **Economic and Monetary Union of the European Union: Monetary policy inflexibility**  Since membership of the eurozone establishes a single monetary policy for the respective states, they can no longer use an isolated monetary policy, e. g. to increase their competitiveness at the cost of other eurozone members by printing money and devalue, or to print money to finance excessive government deficits or pay interest on unsustainable high government debt levels. As a consequence, if member states do not manage their economy in a way that they can show a fiscal discipline (as they were obliged by the Maastricht treaty), they will sooner or later risk a sovereign debt crisis in their country without the possibility to print money as an easy way out.  ***  ^[ [^PM](https://www.reddit.com/message/compose?to=kittens_from_space) ^| [^Exclude ^me](https://reddit.com/message/compose?to=WikiTextBot&amp;message=Excludeme&amp;subject=Excludeme) ^| [^Exclude ^from ^subreddit](https://np.reddit.com/r/economy/about/banned) ^| [^FAQ ^/ ^Information](https://np.reddit.com/r/WikiTextBot/wiki/index)   ^] ^Downvote ^to ^remove ^| ^v0.23 the problem now is A LOT of people dont have confidence in the euro, and they are taking their money out of it , and confidence is the only thing that backs the euro, or any fiat money. It's gonna get worst before it gets better unfortunately... Russia current account.  https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/current-account  US current account  https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/current-account  Russia balance of trade  https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/balance-of-trade  US balance of trade  https://tradingeconomics.com/united-states/balance-of-trade  Forex reserve by country  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_foreign-exchange_reserves  List of country by oil import size.  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_oil_imports  .  If I have to make a wild guess, country with huge deficit everything and no saving usually sinks faster in time of crisis. "Yes, I'm a big picture guy.  Like when the central banks opened unlimited short term lines recently the first thing I thought was ""now hedge funds can short the euro with impunity!""  So, short bets on the euro became a no brainer even as the market was perversely celebrating the announcement with a euro rally.  Almost as if they have no idea how the bigger picture works.  As if all liquidity is created equally.  All it meant to me was that European banks would not have to call in the lines of credit they extend to hedge funds for THREE YEARS.  That is enough time to crash the euro, hold a funeral and dance on the grave.  It is just musical chairs over there.  All the banks know the EU is coming for them an they all want to be in the right capital position to survive the banhammer.  They'll sell out the euro to get there.  I think I'm a bit too jaded for Graham style fundamental analysis.  Then again I do use strong companies as my preferred trading vehicles.  So, maybe I do a hybrid." I vehemently disagree with this. Greek crisis is completely different form Spanish, Irish or Portuguese crisis. Greece has a balance of payments + fiscal crisis, due to a government which has not been balancing its budgets for decades (ever?). Greece cannot spend its way out of this crisis because this isn't a demand led crisis. "The biggest risk you have when a country defaults on its currency is a major devaluation of the currency. Since the EURO is a fiat currency, like almost all developed nations, its ""promise"" comes from the expectation that its union and system will endure. The EURO is a basket of countries and as such could probably handle bailing out countries or possibly letting some default on their sovereign debt without killing the EURO itself. A similar reality happens in the United States with some level of regularity with state and municipal debt being considered riskier than Federal debt (it isn't uncommon for cities to default). The biggest reason the EURO will probably lose a LOT of value initially is if any nation defaults there isn't a track record as to how the EU member body will respond. Will some countries attempt to break out of the EU? If the member countries fracture then the EURO collapses rendering any and all EURO notes useless. It is that political stability that underlies the value of the EURO. If you are seriously concerned about the risk of a falling EURO and its long term stability then you'd do best buying a hedge currency or devising a basket of hedge currencies to diversify risk. Many will recommend you buy Gold or other precious metals, but I think the idea is silly at best. It is not only hard to buy precious metals at a ""fair"" value it is even harder to sell them at a fair value. Whatever currency you hold needs to be able to be used in transactions with ease. Doesn't do you any good having $20K in gold coins and no one willing to buy them (as the seller at the store will usually want currency and not gold coins). If you want to go the easy route you can follow the same line of reasoning Central Banks do. Buy USD and hold it. It is probably the world's safest currency to hold over a long period of time. Current US policy is inflationary so that won't help you gain value, but that depends on how the EU responds to a sovereign debt crisis; if one matures." That's interesting. So Spain could be back in crisis mode if a crisis were to occur in Latam?  The difference is quite large so it must mean Spain owns a heck of a lot of foreign assets producing significant returns relative to their GDP... "In essence the problem that the OP identified is not that the FX market itself has poor liquidity but that retail FX brokerage sometimes have poor counterparty risk management. The problem is the actual business model that many FX brokerages have. Most FX brokerages are themselves customers of much larger money center banks that are very well capitalized and provide ample liquidity. By liquidity I mean  the ability to put on a position of relatively decent size (long EURUSD say) at any particular time with a small price impact relative to where it is trading. For spot FX, intraday bid/ask spreads are extremely small, on the order of fractions of pips for majors (EUR/USD/GBP/JPY/CHF). Even in extremely volatile situations it rarely becomes much larger than a few pips for positions of 1 to 10 Million USD equivalent notional value in the institutional market. Given that retail traders rarely trade that large a position, the FX spot market is essentially very liquid in that respect. The problem is that there are retail brokerages whose business model is to encourage excessive trading in the hopes of capturing that spread, but not guaranteeing that it has enough capital to always meet all client obligations. What does get retail traders in trouble is that most are unaware that they are not actually trading on an exchange like with stocks. Every bid and ask they see on the screen the moment they execute a trade is done against that FX brokerage, and not some other trader in a transparent central limit order book. This has some deep implications. One is the nifty attribute that you rarely pay ""commission"" to do FX trades unlike in stock trading. Why? Because they build that cost into the quotes they give you. In sleepy markets, buyers and sellers cancel out, they just ""capture"" that spread which is the desired outcome when that business model functions well.  There are two situations where the brokerage's might lose money and capital becomes very important. In extremely volatile markets, every one of their clients may want to sell for some reason, this forces the FX brokers to accumulate a large position in the opposite side that they have to offload. They will trade in the institutional market with other brokerages to net out their positions so that they are as close to flat as possible. In the process, since bid/ask spreads in the institutional market is tighter than within their own brokerage by design, they should still make money while not taking much risk. However, if they are not fast enough, or if they do not have enough capital, the brokerage's position might move against them too quickly which may cause them lose all their capital and go belly up. The brokerage is net flat, but there are huge offsetting positions amongst its clients. In the example of the Swiss Franc revaluation in early 2015, a sudden pop of 10-20% would have effectively meant that money in client accounts that were on the wrong side of the trade could not cover those on the other side. When this happens, it is theoretically the brokerage's job to close out these positions before it wipes out the value of the client accounts, however it would have been impossible to do so since there were no prices in between the instantaneous pop in which the brokerage could have terminated their client's losing positions, and offload the risk in the institutional market. Since it's extremely hard to ask for more money than exist in the client accounts, those with strong capital positions simply ate the loss (such as Oanda), those that fared worse went belly up. The irony here is that the more leverage the brokerage gave to their clients, the less money would have been available to cover losses in such an event. Using an example to illustrate: say client A is long 1 contract at $100 and client B is short 1 contract at $100. The brokerage is thus net flat. If the brokerage had given 10:1 leverage, then there would be $10 in each client's account. Now instantaneously market moves down $10. Client A loses $10 and client B is up $10. Brokerage simply closes client A's position, gives $10 to client B. The brokerage is still long against client B however, so now it has to go into the institutional market to be short 1 contract at $90. The brokerage again is net flat, and no money actually goes in or out of the firm. Had the brokerage given 50:1 leverage however, client A only has $2 in the account. This would cause the brokerage close client A's position. The brokerage is still long against client B, but has only $2 and would have to ""eat the loss"" for $8 to honor client B's position, and if it could not do that, then it technically became insolvent since it owes more money to its clients than it has in assets. This is exactly the reason there have been regulations in the US to limit the amount of leverage FX brokerages are allowed to offer to clients, to assure the brokerage has enough capital to pay what is owed to clients." Krugman (Nobel prize in Economy) has just said: Greek euro exit, very possibly next month. Huge withdrawals from Spanish and Italian banks, as depositors try to move their money to Germany. 3a. Maybe, just possibly, de facto controls, with banks forbidden to   transfer deposits out of country and limits on cash withdrawals. 3b. Alternatively, or maybe in tandem, huge draws on ECB credit to   keep the banks from collapsing. 4a. Germany has a choice. Accept huge indirect public claims on Italy   and Spain, plus a drastic revision of strategy — basically, to give   Spain in particular any hope you need both guarantees on its debt to   hold borrowing costs down and a higher eurozone inflation target to   make relative price adjustment possible; or: 4b. End of the euro. And we’re talking about months, not years, for this to play out. http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/13/eurodammerung-2/