What is the opposite of a sunk cost? A “sunk gain”?
"It is called ""Opportunity Cost.""   Opportunity cost is the value you lose because of a decision you made.   This is the book definition from Investopedia. The difference in return between a chosen investment and one that is necessarily passed up. Say you invest in a stock and it returns a paltry 2% over the year. In placing your money in the stock, you gave up the opportunity of another investment - say, a risk-free government bond yielding 6%. In this situation, your opportunity costs are 4% (6% - 2%)." "The opposite of a cost is an investment. Buying a car is an expense, usually a sunk cost, whereas purchasing real-estate, e.g. productive farmland, is an investment. (Some investments are wasting assets, as the value decreases over time, but they are still investments with market value, not costs.) ""Sunk cost"" isn't a fallacy. It just means an expenditure that one cannot expect to recoup. The action item is, ""Don't throw good money after bad."" The opposite of a sunk cost is an investment." In the second example you are giving up future  free cash flows in exchange for a capital gain on the original investment. With that respect  the money you will not gain will be the difference of the future cash flows ( net of related costs) minus the net gain on the panel you have sold. The financial result can be considered as the opposite of a sunk cost, that is a cost you have already incurred ( and cannot be recovered)  vs net future gains you are giving up.  In more sophisticated financial terms we are talking about the  benefit-cost ratio:  ( from Investopedia) "The complete opposite of ""sunk cost"" is the term ""unrealized gain""; until you sell it, then it is a ""realized gain"". There is also a term ""paper profit"" to point out the ephemeral nature of some of these unrealized gains." "A ""sunk cost"" is a cost that you have already incurred, and won't get back. The ""sunk cost fallacy,"" as you described, is when you make a bad decision based on your sunk cost.  When you identify a sunk cost, you realize that the money has been spent, and the decision is irreversible.  Future decisions should not take this cost into account.  When you commit the ""sunk cost fallacy,"" you are keeping something that is bad simply because you spent a lot of money on it.  You are failing to identify the correct current value of something based on its high cost to you in the past. The other fallacy you describe, the opposite of the sunk cost fallacy, is when you get rid of something that is good simply because you spent little on it.  As before, you are also failing to correctly identify the correct current value of something, but in this case, you are assigning too little a value based on the low cost in the past.  You could call this a type of ""opportunity cost,"" a loss of future benefits due to a mistake made today.  It seems reasonable to describe this type of fallacy as an ""opportunity cost fallacy.""" "liquid asset A sunk cost may turn out to be a loss or it may make you a profit, but what makes it ""sunk"" is: you can't get it back.  The opposite is a cost that you can later redeem, which makes it ""liquid""."
These are not real gains. Wherever you're looking this up, the prices are not adjusted for corporate actions. In a reverse stock split the price of a single share multiplies by five, but as a shareholder you hold only one share after for every five that you did before. "There are two things going on here, neither of which favors this approach. First, as @JohnFx noted, you should be wary of the sunk-cost fallacy, or throwing good money after bad. You already lost the money you lost, and there's no point in trying to ""win it back"" as opposed to just investing the money you still have as wisely as possible, forgetting your former fortune. Furthermore, the specific strategy you suggest is not a good one. The problem is that you're assuming that, whenever the stock hits $2, it will eventually rebound to $3. While that may often happen, it's far from guaranteed. More specifically, assuming the efficient market hypothesis applies (which it almost certainly does), there are theorems that say you can't increase your expected earning with a strategy like the one you propose: the apparent stability of the steady stream of income is offset by the chance that you lose out if the stock does something you didn't anticipate." "By definition, a downturn in the business cycle will push some companies into bankruptcy. What's worse, a downturn in the business cycle will trigger ""bankruptcy fears"" for a LOT of companies, far more than will suffer this fate. So the prices of MANY candidates go down to levels that reflect this fear. This aggregate impact produces the ""overreaction"" you're talking about. It's called ""fallacy of composition""; some of these companies will go under, but not all. Then the prices of the survivors will bounce back strongly during the early stages of an upturn when it becomes clear which companies WON'T go bankrupt." "There is no opposite of a hedge, except not having a hedge at all. A ""hedge"" isn't directional. If you are short, you hedge by having something that minimizes your losses if you are wrong. If you are long, you hedge by having something that minimizes your losses if it decreases in value. If you own a house, you hedge by having insurance. There are ""hedged bets"" and ""unhedged bets""" The quant aspect '''''. This is the kind of math I was wondering if it existed, but now it sounds like it is much more  complex in reality then optimizing by evaluating different cost of capital. Thank you for sharing Ok so Arbitrage?  I was looking specifically at the people who took this deal to the extreme taking the $5k and using the $10 giftcards to buy prepaid credit cards.  Would the better term would be positive-feedback loop, since the only constraint would be time and energy to the people exploit this deal.  Is there a financial term that fits this better? You are confusing manufacturing cost and listed price. They are being sold for less than listed price. There is no way they are being sold for 1/3rd of manufacturing cost. They could be sold for less than manufacturing cost but future support will be factored into that sale so they would still be a loss leader. The satisfaction from gains packs less of an emotional impact than the fear of loss. It's very difficult for many people to overcome this fear, so when prices begin to fall, many investors sell to minimize their potential loss. This causes a further drop, which can lead to more selling as other investors reach their emotional threshold for loss. This emotion-based selling keeps the market inefficient in the short term. If there aren't enough value investors waiting to scoop up the stock at the new discount, it can stay undervalued for a long time. Companies do both quite often.  They have opposite effects on the share price, but not on the total value to the shareholders.  Doing both causes value to shareholders to rise (ie, any un-bought back shares now own a larger percentage of the company and are worth more) and drops the per-share price (so it is easier to buy a share of the stock).  To some that's irrelevant, but some might want a share of an otherwise-expensive stock without paying $700 for it. As a specific example of this, Apple (APPL) split its stock in 2014 and also continued a significant buyback program: Apple announces $17B repurchase program, Oct 2014 Apple stock splits 7-to-1 in June 2014. This led to their stock in total being worth more, but costing substantially less per share. "The fundamental flaw here is conflating net worth with utility, at least failing to recognize that there's a nonlinear relationship between the two.  In the extreme example imagine taking a bet that will either make you twice as rich or completely broke. Your expected return is zero, but it would be pretty dumb to take it since being flat broke could ruin your life while being twice as rich may only improve it marginally. In more realistic cases most of your income is tied up in fixed costs, which magnifies relatively small perturbations to your net worth. Losing something essential (like your house or car), even if it's only 20% of your net worth, renders you effectively broke until you scrape together enough cash to get another one. That situation robs you of much more utility than you'd gain from a 20% increase in net worth. In either case, avoiding the risk is completely rational as long as you believe in nonlinear utility as a function of net worth, it's not just an issue of humans being ""risk averse""." I'm trying to think it out, but I feel like it would be hard to justify using potential profit sources as material for dividends. Especially your example of wine. Wouldn't it be counterintuitive to take a hit to sales, while still having the cost of production? I'll give the credit to @Quid in the comments section of the question.  You put out $10k, you got back $20k, that's a cash gain of $10k, how the asset was valued between your purchase and sale isn't relevant. From an accounting perspective, the company is the only party that is realizing the loss (as they have sold the asset for 40K less than par). You the buyer, only get to see the initial buy and sale of such capital asset.  Example: A company purchases a car for $20,000 and after depreciation it is worth (book valued at) $2,000. It is then sold to a customer for $3,000.  Does the customer realize a loss of $1,000? No.  Does the company realize a gain of $1,000? Yes.  Your bank analogy is flawed in two ways: If you make money in currency speculation (as in your example), that is a capital gain. A more complicated example is if you were to buy and then sell stocks on the mexican stock exchange.  Your capital gain (or loss) would be the difference in value in US dollars of your stocks accounting for varying exchange rates.  It's possible for the stocks to go down and for you to still have a capital gain, and vice versa. Start ups are a con if you're the employee that does all the work and finds that the company has no ground to stand on.  In that case, you're closer to an idiot for taking the job in the first place than anything else.  This isn't a stab at start ups being a horrible investment:  This is a stab at the people that take up a job that ends up making them the backbone of all of it and they just keep on trucking to make it happen without consideration to their value. ACH as offered in US is a very broad and versatile network used for a range of business case. There is no other network as versatile. In Europe UK has BACS as equivalent about 50-70% of what US-ACH offers. Most European countries also have ACH [Collectively Called ACH, have 90% of the layouts that are identical, called by different names domestically, different business capabilities and rules]. Most countries in Asia also have similar networks. For example in India there is ECS now replaced by NACH. In Singapore/Indonesia/Thailand/Malaysia they have Giro's. China has CNAPS and BEPS. So essentially every country has addressed the business need differently and bis.org has a decent over-view country wise on the clearing systems available.