How does conversion of Secured Convertible Notes work?
Let's assume that the bonds have a par value of $1,000.  If conversion happens, then one bond would be converted into 500 shares.  The price in the market is unimportant.  Regardless of the share price in the market, the income per share would be increased by the absence of $70 in interest expense.  It would be decreased by the lost tax deduction.  It would be further diluted by the increase in 500 shares.  Likewise, the debt would be extinguished and the equity section increased.  Whether it increased or decreased on a per share basis would depend upon the average amount paid in per share in the currently existing structure, adjusted for changes in retained earnings since the initial offering and for any treasury shares. There would be a loss in value, generally, if it is trading far from $2.00 because it would be valued based on the market price.  Had the bond not converted, it would trade in the market as a pure bond if the stock price is far below the strike price and as an ordinary pure bond plus a premium if near enough to the strike price in a manner that depends upon the time remaining under the conversion privilege.   I cannot think of a general case where someone would want to convert below strike and indeed, barring a very strange tax, inheritance or legal situation (such as a weird divorce), I cannot think of a case where it would make sense.  It often does not make sense to convert far from maturity either as the option premium only vanishes well above $2.  The primary case for conversion would be where the after-tax dividend is greater than the after-tax interest payment.
If it had immediate purchase power of $525, can I use that to buy more $500 bonds over and over again?  Your idea is flawed. You can't just make money out of thin air, unless you are running a Ponzi scheme. Your biggest concern will be what happens during the transition period. In the past when my employer made a switch there has been a lockout period where you couldn't move money between funds. Then over a weekend the money moved from investment company A to investment Company B. All the moves were mapped so that you knew which funds your money would be invested in, then staring Monday morning you could switch them if you didn't like the mapping. No money is lost because the transfer is actually done in $'s. Imagine both investment companies had the same S&P 500 fund, and that the transfer takes a week. If when the first accounts are closed the S&P500 fund has a share value of $100 your 10 hares account has a value of $1000. If the dividend/capital gains are distributed during that week; the price per share when the money arrives in the second investment company will now be $99. So that instead of 10 shares @ $100 you now will buy 10.101 shares @ $99. No money was lost. You want that lookout period to be small, and you want the number of days you are not invested in the market to be zero. The lockout limits your ability to make investment changes, if for instance the central bank raises rates. The number of days out of the market is important if during that period of time there is a big price increase, you wouldn't want to miss it. Of course the market could also go lower during that time. You're talking about floating rate loans. It's so that the bond is marked back to market every 90 days. Any more often would be a hassle to deal with for everyone involved, any less often and they would be significant variance from LIBOR vs. the loan's specific rate. it sounds like you don't have experience in this, and neither does your *investor*; which is a recipe for disaster (pun intended).  Your first order of business is to check whether your investor is an *Accredited Investor* (google to see what it means), if s/he's not, **walk away**.  If s/he's an accredited investor, find a lawyer who can help you navigate this process, however these are the issues:  * lawyers are expensive, and lawyers who have experience in these type of transactions are even more expensive * you actually need 2 lawyers, one for you and one for the investor * if neither of you have experience, there will be a lot more billable hours from the lawyers.....  In principle this can go 3 ways:  1. The investors give you a loan, you pay them interests on a periodic basis, and then also principal.  Items to be negotiated: interest rates, repayment schedule, collateral, personal guarantees. Highly unlikely this is what the investors wants.  2. The Investors get equity. items to be negotiated: your compensation, % of ownership, how profits are divided, how profits are paid; who gets to decide what.  3. A combination of 1 and 2 above, a *Convertible Note*.  There's a lot more, too much for a Reddit post.  There's not an easy ELI5. A security is a class of financial instrument you can trade on the market.  A share of stock is a kind of security, for example, as is a bond. In the case of your mortgage, what happens: You take out a loan for $180k.  The loan has two components. a.  The payment stream (meaning the principal and the interest) from the loan b.  The servicing of the loan, meaning the company who is responsible for accepting payments, giving the resulting income to whomever owns it. Many originating banks, such as my initial lender, do neither of these things - they sell the payment stream to a large bank or consortium (often Fannie Mae) and they also sell the servicing of the loan to another company. The payment stream is the primary value here (the servicing is worth essentially a tip off the top).  The originating bank lends $180k of their own money.  Then they have something that is worth some amount - say $450k total value, $15k per year for 30 years - and they sell it for however much they can get for it.  The actual value of $15k/year for 30 years is somewhere in between - less than $450k more than $180k - since there is risk involved, and the present value is far less.  The originating bank has the benefit of selling that they can then originate more mortgages (and make money off the fees) plus they can reduce their risk exposure. Then a security is created by the bigger bank, where they take a bunch of mortgages of different risk levels and group them together to make something with a very predictable risk quotient.  Very similar to insurance, really, except the other way around.  One mortage will either default or not at some % chance, but it's a one off thing - any good statistician will tell you that you don't do statistics on n=1.  One hundred mortgages, each with some risk level, will very consistently return a particular amount, within a certain error, and thus you have something that people are willing to pay money on the market for. The general idea is that if the statement wasn't true there would be an arbitrage opportunity.  You'll probably want to do the math yourself to believe me.  But theoretically you could borrow money in country A at their real interest rate, exchange it, then invest the money in the other country at Country B's interest rate.  Generating a profit without any risk.  There are a lot of assumptions that go along with the statement (like borrowing and lending have the same costs, but I'm sure that is assumed wherever you read that statement.) No. Bonds don't work like that.  When you buy a bond, you buy pieces of notional at a price. 1K denotes the amount you would get back at maturity (+ coupons), So the smallest piece size would be 1k.  I've even seen 50K plus but thats for more illiquid products.... For the US government, they've just credited Person B with a Million USD and haven't gained anything (afterall, those digits are intangible and don't really have a value, IMO). Two flaws in this reasoning: The US government didn't do anything. The receiving bank credited the recipient. If the digits are intangible, such that they haven't gained anything, they haven't lost anything either. In practice, the role of governments in the transfer is purely supervisory. The sending bank debits the sender's account and the receiving bank credits the recipient's account. Every intermediary makes some money on this transaction because the cost to the sender exceeds the credit to the recipient. The sending bank typically receives a credit to their account at a correspondent bank. The receiving bank typically receives a debit from their account at a correspondent bank. If a bank sends lots of money, eventually its account at its correspondent will run dry. If a bank receives lots of money, eventually its account at its correspondent will have too much money. This is resolved with domestic payments, sometimes handled by governmental or quasi-governmental agencies. In the US, banks have an account with the federal reserve and adjust balances there. The international component is handled by the correspondent bank(s). They also internally will credit and debit. If they get an imbalance between two currencies they can't easily correct, they will have to sell one currency to buy the other. Fortunately, worldwide currency exchange is extremely efficient. e.g. a European company has to pay 1 million USD exactly one year from now While that is theoretically possible, that is not a very common case. Mostly likely if they had to make a 1 million USD payment a year from now and they had the cash on hand they would be able to just make the payment today.  A more common scenario for currency forwards is for investment hedging.  Say that European company wants to buy into a mutual fund of some sort, say FUSEX. That is a USD based mutual fund. You can't buy into it directly with Euros. So if the company wants to buy into the fund they would need to convert their Euros to to USD. But now they have an extra risk parameter. They are not just exposed to the fluctuations of the fund, they are also exposed to the fluctuations of the currency market. Perhaps that fund will make a killing, but the exchange rate will tank and they will lose all their gains. By creating a forward to hedge their currency exposure risk they do not face this risk (flip side: if the exchange rate rises in a favorable rate they also don't get that benefit, unless they use an FX Option, but that is generally more expensive and complicated). The reason it's not automatic is that Questrade doesn't want to force you to convert in margin accounts at the time of buying the stock. What if you bought a US stock today and the exchange rate happened to be very unfavorable (due to whatever), wouldn't you rather wait a few days to exchange the funds rather than lose on conversion right away? In my opinion, Questrade is doing you a favor by letting you convert at your own convenience. This is all answered in the prospectus. The money not yet invested (available/committed to a note but not yet funded) is held in pooled trust account insured by FDIC. Money funded is delivered to the borrower. Lending Club service their notes themselves. Read also my reviews on Lending Club. The money is transferred through an electronic funds transfer, which is an umbrella term that encompasses wire transfers, direct debits, etc. The application form for Key Trade Bank (the only place I can find that uses that exact phrasing) lists a SWIFT number. This usually indicates that the transfer of funds is done through an international wire transfer.  In the most basic sense, the process works like this: Key Trade Bank uses the SWIFT number to notify your current bank of the transfer.  Your bank instructs the settlement bank, e.g. the central bank of your country, where your bank is located, to transfer funds to Key Trade.  If Key Trade is in another country from your current country, your central bank will send money to the central bank where Key Trade is located, which will in turn send the money to Key Trade. Otherwise, your central bank deposits the money into the account that Key Trade also has with them, and the transfer is complete. They all basically mean the same thing - a type of debt than can be exchanged for (converted into) equity at some point. It's only the mechanics that can be different. A convertible bond is structured just like a regular bond - it (usually) pays periodic interest and has a face value that's due at maturity. The difference is that the bond holder has the option to exchange the debt for equity at some point during the life of the bond.  There can be restrictions on when that conversion is possible, and they typically define a quantity of equity (number of shares) that the bond can be converted into.  If the market price of the shares goes above a price that would make the shares more valuable than the bond, it's in the best interest of the bond holder to convert. A convertible note is typically used to describe a kind of startup financing that does not pay interest or have a face value that's redeemed, but instead is redeemed for equity as part of a later financing round.  Rather than specifying a specific number of shares, the bond holder receives equity at a certain discount to the rest of the market. So they both are debt instruments that can turn into equity investments, just through different mechanisms. A debenture is a fancy word for unsecured debt, and convertible debt could be used to described either structure above, so those terms could mean either type of structure. True blue preferred shares are considered loose hybrids of credit and equity.  They are more senior than common equity in bankruptcy liquidation but pay out a dividend which is not mandatory. Financial institutions issue the bulk of genuine preferred shares because of their need for more flexibility than a bond but not so much that they can afford the cost to shareholders by diluting common equity. Since it is a credit-like security that receives none of the income from operations but merely pays out a potentially unpredictable yet fixed amount of income, it will perform much more like a bond, rising when interest rates fall and vice versa, and since interest rates do not move to the extent of common equity valuations, preferreds' price variances will correspond much more to bonds than common equities.  If the company stops paying the preferred dividend or looks to become in financial trouble, the price of the preferred share should be expected to fall. There are more modern preferred however.  It has now become popular to fund intermediate startups with convertible preferred shares.  Because these are derivatives based upon the common equity, they can be expected to be much more variant. "Someone has to hand out cash to the seller. Even if no physical money changes hands (and I've bought a house; I can tell you a LOT of money changes hands at closing in at least the form of a personal check), and regardless of exactly how the bank accounts for the actual disbursement of the loan, the net result is that the buyer has cash that they give the seller, and are now in debt to the bank for least that amount (but, they now have a house). Now, the bank probably didn't have that money just sitting in its vault. Money sitting in a vault is money that is not making more money for the bank; therefore most banks keep only fractionally more than the percentage of deposit balances that they are required to keep by the Feds. There are also restrictions on what depositors' money can be spent on, and loans are not one of them; the model of taking in money in savings accounts and then loaning it out is what caused the savings and loan collapse in the 80s. So, to get the money, it turns to investors; the bank sells bonds, putting itself in debt to bond holders, then takes that money and loans it out at a higher rate, covering the interest on the bond and making itself a tidy profit for its own shareholders. Banks lose money on defaults in two ways. First, they lose all future interest payments that would have been made on the loan. Technically, this isn't ""revenue"" until the interest is calculated for each month and ""accrues"" on the loan; therefore, it doesn't show on the balance sheet one way or the other. However, the holders of those bonds will expect a return, and the banks no longer have the mortgage payment to cover the coupon payments that they themselves have to pay bondholders, creating cash flow problems. The second, and far more real and damaging, way that banks lose money on a foreclosure is the loss of collateral value. A bank virtually never offers an unsecured ""signature loan"" for a house (certainly not at the advertised 3-4% interest rates). They want something to back up the loan, so if you disappear off the face of the earth they have a clear claim to something that can help them recover their money. Usually, that's the house itself; if you default, they get the house from you and sell it to recover their money. Now, a major cause of foreclosure is economic downturn, like the one we had in 2009 and are still recovering from. When the economy goes in the crapper, a lot of things we generally consider ""stores of value"" lose that value, because the value of the whatzit (any whatzit, really) is based on what someone else would pay to have it. When fewer people are looking to buy that whatzit, demand drops, bringing prices with it. Homes and real estate are one of the real big-ticket items subject to this loss of value; when the average Joe doesn't know whether he'll have a job tomorrow, he doesn't go house-hunting. This average Joe may even be looking to sell an extra parcel of land or an income property for cash, increasing supply, further decreasing prices. Economic downturn can often increase crime and decrease local government spending on upkeep of public lands (as well as homeowners' upkeep of their own property). By the ""broken window"" effect, this makes the neighborhood even less desirable in a vicious cycle. What made this current recession a double-whammy for mortgage lenders is that it was caused, in large part, by a housing bubble; cheap money for houses made housing prices balloon rapidly, and then when the money became more expensive (such as in sub-prime ARMs), a lot of those loans, which should never have been signed off on by either side, went belly-up. Between the loss of home value (a lot of which will likely turn out to be permanent; that's the problem with a bubble, things never recover to their peak) and the adjustment of interest rates on mortgages to terms that will actually pay off the loan, many homeowners found themselves so far underwater (and sinking fast) that the best financial move for them was to walk away from the whole thing and try again in seven years. Now the bank's in a quandary. They have this loan they'll never see repaid in cash, and they have this home that's worth maybe 75% of the mortgage's outstanding balance (if they're lucky; some homes in extremely ""distressed"" areas like Detroit are currently trading for 30-40% of what they sold for just before the bubble burst). Multiply that by, say, 100,000 distressed homes with similar declines in value, and you're talking about tens of billions of dollars in losses. On top of that, the guarantor (basically the bank's insurance company against these types of losses) is now in financial trouble themselves, because they took on so many contracts for debt that turned out to be bad (AIG, Fannie/Freddie); they may very well declare bankruptcy and leave the bank holding the bag. Even if the guarantor remains solvent (as they did thanks to generous taxpayer bailouts), the bank's swap contract with the guarantor usually requires them to sell the house, thus realizing the loss between what they paid and what they finally got back, before the guarantor will pay out. But nobody's buying houses anymore, because prices are on their way down; the only people who'd buy a house now versus a year from now (or two or three years) are the people who have no choice, and if you have no choice you're probably in a financial situation that would mean you'd never be approved for the loan anyway. In order to get rid of them, the bank has to sell them at auction for pennies on the dollar. That further increases the supply of cheap homes and further drives down prices, making even the nicer homes the bank's willing to keep on the books worth less (there's a reason these distresed homes were called ""toxic assets""; they're poisonous to the banks whether they keep or sell them). Meanwhile, all this price depression is now affecting the people who did everything right; even people who bought their homes years before the bubble even formed are watching years of equity-building go down the crapper. That's to say nothing of the people with prime credit who bought at just the wrong time, when the bubble was at its peak. Even without an adjusting ARM to contend with, these guys are still facing the fact that they paid top dollar for a house that likely will not be worth its purchase price again in their lifetime. Even with a fixed mortgage rate, they'll be underwater, effectively losing their entire payment to the bank as if it were rent, for much longer than it would take to have this entire mess completely behind them if they just walked away from the whole thing, moved back into an apartment and waited it out. So, these guys decide on a ""strategic default""; give the bank the house (which doesn't cover the outstanding balance of course) and if they sue, file bankruptcy. That really makes the banks nervous; if people who did everything right are considering the hell of foreclosure and bankruptcy to be preferable to their current state of affairs, the bank's main threat keeping people in their homes is hollow. That makes them very reluctant to sign new mortgages, because the risk of default is now much less certain. Now people who do want houses in this market can't buy them, further reducing demand, further decreasing prices... You get the idea. That's the housing collapse in a nutshell, and what banks and our free market have been working through for the past five years, with only the glimmer of a turnaround picking up home sales."