Possible pro-rated division of asset strategies without a prenup?
"Absent a pre-nup, it's a case of ""lawyer vs lawyer,"" you can't count on protecting what you came into the marriage with. In theory, what you propose sounds fair, but the reality of divorce is that everything is fair game. much depends on each spouse's earnings and impact of child-raising. For example, a woman who gives up time in a career may go after more than half, as she may be X years behind in her career path due to the choices made to stay home with the kids. I think each divorce is unique, not cookie cutter."
Wow! First, congratulations! You are both making great money. You should be able to reach your goals.  Are we on the right track ? Are we doing any mistakes which we could have avoided ? Please advice if there is something that we should focus more into ! I would prioritize as follows: Get on the same page. My first red flag is that you are listing your assets separately. You and your wife own property together and are raising your daughter together. The first thing is to both be on the same page with your combined income and assets. This is critical. Set specific goals for the future. Dreaming and big-picture life planning will be the foundation for building a detailed plan for reaching your goals. You will see more progress with more sacrifice. If you both are not equally excited about the goals, you will not both be equally willing to sacrifice lifestyle now. You have the income now to be able to set yourselves up to do whatever you want in 10 years, if you can agree on what you want. Hire a financial planner you trust. Interview people, ask someone who is where you want to be in 10 years. You need someone with experience that can guide you through these questions and understands how to manage your income stream. Start saving for retirement in tax-advantaged accounts. This should be as much as 10%-15% of your income combined, so $30k-$45k per year. You need to start diversifying your investments. Real estate is great, but I would never recommend it as this large a percentage of net worth. Start saving for your child's education. Hard to say what you need here, since I don't know your goals. A financial planner should assist you with this. Get rid of your debt. Out of your $2.1M of rental real estate and land, you have $1.4M of debt. It will be difficult to start a business with that much additional debt. It will also put stress on your retirement that you don't need. You are taking on lots of risk here. I would sell all but maybe one of the properties and let it cash flow. This will free up cash to start investing for retirement or future business too. Buy more rental in the future with cash only. You have plenty of income to do it this way, and you will be setting yourself up for a great future. At this point you can continue to pile funds into any/all your investments, with the goal of using the funds to start a business or to live on. If all your investments are tied up in real estate, you wont have anything to draw on if needed for a business opportunity. You need to weigh this out in your goal and planning. What should we do to prepare for a comfortable retirement and safety You cannot plan for or see all scenarios. However, good planning will give you more options and more choices. Investing driven by fear will set you up for failure.  Spend less than you make. Be patient. Be generous. Cheers! I think your getting at the fact that 50% of marriages end in divorce, but I don't think that means it's 50/50 for every relationship. I haven't seen the numbers but I'd bet there's trends related to wealth, prior home life, etc. "Give me your money. I will invest it as I see fit. A year later I will return the capital to you, plus half of any profits or losses. This means that if your capital under my management ends up turning a profit, I will keep half of those profits, but if I lose you money, I will cover half those losses. Think about incentives. If you wanted an investment where your losses were only half as bad, but your gains were only half as good, then you could just invest half your assets in a risk-free investment. So if you want this hypothetical instrument because you want a different risk profile, you don't actually need anything new to get it. And what does the fund manager get out of this arrangement? She doesn't get anything you don't: she just gets half your gains, most of which she needs to set aside to be able to pay half your losses. The discrepancy between the gains and losses she gets to keep, which is exactly equal to your gain or loss. She could just invest her own money to get the same thing. But wait -- the fund manager didn't need to provide any capital. She got to play with your money (for free!) and keep half the profits. Not a bad deal, for her, perhaps... Here's the problem: No one cares about your thousands of dollars. The costs of dealing with you: accounting for your share, talking to you on the phone, legal expenses when you get angry, the paperwork when you need to make a withdrawal for some dental work, mailing statements and so on will exceed the returns that could be earned with your thousands of dollars. And then the SEC would probably get involved with all kinds of regulations so you, with your humble means and limited experience, isn't constantly getting screwed over by the big fund. Complying with the SEC is going to cost the fund manager something. The fund manager would have to charge a small ""administrative fee"" to make it worthwhile.  And that's called a mutual fund. But if you have millions of free capital willing to give out, people take notice. Is there an instrument where a bunch of people give a manager capital for free, and then the investors and the manager share in the gains and losses? Yes, hedge funds! And this is why only the rich and powerful can participate in them: only they have enough capital to make this arrangement beneficial for the fund manager." Asset protection is broad subject. In your examples it is certainly possible to have accounts that exist undisclosed from a spouse and legally inaccessible by said spouse. In the US, balances in 401k retirement accounts are exempt from forfeitures in bankruptcy. The only trick to secret stashes is that it involves you having any wealth in the first place, that you don't need to access. It is more worth it, for most people, to use all of their access to wealth to get out of debt, earn claims to property, and save for retirement. This takes up all of their earnings, making hidden wealth of any significant portion to be an impractical pipe dream. But with trust laws, corporate laws, and marriage property laws being different in practically every jurisdiction, there is plenty of flexibility to construct the form of your secret wealth.  Cryptocurrency makes it much easier, at the expense of net asset value volatility. Fidelity recently had an article on their website about deferred annuities (variable and fixed) that don't have the contribution limitations of an IRA, are a tax-deferred investment, and can be turned into a future income stream. I just started investigating this for myself. DISCLAIMER: I'm not a financial professional, and would suggest that you consult with a fee-only planner and tax advisor before making any decision. I'm not going to speculate on the nature of your relationship with your wife, but the fact that you are worried about what would happen in the event of a divorce is a bit concerning.  Presumably you married her with the intent of staying together forever, so what's the big deal if you spend 50k upgrading the house you live in, assuming you won't get divorced? Now, if you really are worried about something happening in the future, you might want to seek legal advice about the content of the prenup.  I am guessing if the 400k were your assets before marriage, you have full claim to that amount in the event of a divorce*.  If you document the loan, or make some agreement, I would think you would have claim to at least some of the house's appreciation due to the renovations if they were made with your money*. *obligatgory IANAL "You are not allowed to take a retirement account and move it into the beneficiary's name, an inherited IRA is titled as ""Deceased Name for the benefit of Beneficiary name"". Breaking the correct titling makes the entire account non-retirement and tax is due on the funds that were not yet taxed. If I am mistaken and titling remained correct, RMDs are not avoidable, they are taken based on your Wife's life expectancy from a table in Pub 590, and the divisor is reduced by one each year.  Page 86 is ""table 1"" and provides the divisor to use. For example, at age 50, your wife's divisor is 34.2 (or 2.924%). Each year it decrements by 1, you do not go back to the table each year. It sounds like the seller's recommendation bordered on misconduct, and the firm behind him can be made to release you from this and refund the likely high fees he took from you. Without more details, it's tough to say. I wish you well. The only beneficiary that just takes possession into his/her own account is the surviving spouse. Others have to do what I first described." In the US, illegal. Giving free investment advice (opinions) is really hard to get arrested for. Might lose you a friend, but nothing that would get cross-wise with the Securities and Exchange Commission. That said, I would never put those opinions in writing. "For one thing fund managers, even fund management companies, own less money than their clients put together. On the whole they simply cannot underwrite 50% of the potential losses of the funds they manage, and an offer to do so would be completely unsecured. Warren Buffet owns about 1/3 of Berkshire Hathaway, so I suppose maybe he could do it if he wanted to, and I won't guess why he prefers his own business model (investing in the fund he manages, or used to manage) over the one you propose for him (keeping his money in something so secure he could use it to cover arbitrary losses on B-H). Buffett and his investors have always felt that he has sufficient incentive to see B-H do well, and it's not clear that your scheme would provide him any useful further incentive. You say that the details are immaterial. Supposing instead of 50% it was 0.0001%, one part in a million. Then it would be completely plausible for a fund manager to offer this: ""invest 50 million, lose it all, and I'll buy dinner to apologise"". But would you be as attracted to it as you would be to 50%? Then the details are material. Actually a fund manager could do it by taking your money, putting 50% into the fund and 50% into a cash account. If you make money on the fund, you only make half as much as if you'd been fully invested, so half your profit has been ""taken"" when you get back the fund value + cash. If you lose money on the fund, pay you back 50% of your losses using the cash. Worst case scenario[*], the fund is completely wiped out but you still get back 50% of your initial investment. The combined fund+cash investment vehicle has covered exactly half your losses and it subtracts exactly half your profit. The manager has offered the terms you asked for (-50% leverage) but still doesn't have skin the game. Your proposed terms do not provide the incentive you expect. Why don't fund managers offer this? Because with a few exceptions 50% is an absurd amount for an investment fund to keep in cash, and nobody would buy it. If you want to use cash for that level of inverse leverage you call the bank, open an account, and keep the interest for yourself. You don't expect your managed fund to do it. Furthermore, supposing the manager did invest 100% of your subscription in the fund and cover the risk with their own capital, that means the only place they actually make any profit is the return on a risk that they take with their capital on the fund's wins/losses. You've given them no incentive to invest your money as well as their own: they might as well just put their capital in the fund and let you keep your money. They're better off without you since there's less paperwork, and they can invest whatever they like instead of carefully matching whatever money you send them. If you think they can make better picks than you, and you want them to do so on your behalf, then you need to pay them for the privilege. Riding their coattails for free is not a service they have any reason to offer you. It turns out that you cannot force someone to expose themselves to a particular risk other than by agreeing that they will expose themselves to that risk and then closely monitoring their investment portfolio. Otherwise they can find ways to insure/hedge the risk they're required to take on. If it's on their books but cancelled by something else then they aren't really exposed. So to provide incentive what we normally want is what Buffett does, which is for the fund manager to be invested in the fund to keep them keen, and to draw a salary in return for letting you in[**]. Their investment cannot precisely match yours because the fund manager's capital doesn't precisely match your capital. It doesn't cover your losses because it's in the same fund, so if your money vanishes the fund manager loses too and has nothing to cover you with. But it does provide the incentive. [*] All right, I admit it, worst case scenario there's a total banking collapse, end of civilization as we know it, and the cash account defaults. But then even in your proposed scheme it's possible that whatever assets the fund manager was using as security could fail to materialise. [**] So why, you might ask, do individual fund managers get bonuses in return for meeting fixed targets instead of only being part-paid in shares in their own fund whose value they can then maximise? I honestly don't know, but I suspect ""lots of reasons"". Probably the psychology of rewarding them for performance in a way that compares with other executive posts or professions they might take up instead of fund management. Probably the benefit to the fund itself, which wants to attract more clients, of beating certain benchmarks. Probably other things including, frankly, human error in setting their compensation packages." Yes. It's called executive hedging, and it's a lot more common than most people know. As long as it's properly disclosed and the decision is based on publicly available information, there's technically nothing wrong with it.  Krispy Kreme, Enron, MCI, and ImClone are the most notable companies that had executives do it on a large scale, but almost every company has or had executives execute a complex form of hedging known as a prepaid variable forward (PVF). In a PVF, the executive gives his shares to an investment bank in exchange for a percentage of cash up front. The bank then uses the executive shares to hedge in both directions for them. This provides a proxy that technically isn't the executive that needs to disclose.  There's talk about it needing to be more public at the SEC right now. http://www.sec.gov/news/statement/020915-ps-claa.html This is not what you normally get told, including by partners who were there at the time.  What IPO were you referring to? Andersen Consulting / Accenture's IPO was some time after the split.  Edit: spun off? It wasn't what you'd call a friendly split That is not an effective strategy for hiding assets. If you own any stake in those corporations, the attorney can target that ownership interest. If you don't have any ownership interest in those companies, then you're just like any other American dealing with other companies - no one expects to get a judgment against their adversary's apartment complex. * Absolutely agree with /u/IsAnAlpaca  * You /must/ not agree to this without seeing his balance sheet. * That means assets and liabilities, but also ask for the last 12 months' cash flow * Inability or unwillingness to provide any of those things is a HUGE no-go red flag. Many partnership agreements include a shotgun clause: one person sets a price, the other can either buy at that price or sell at it. It's rather brutal. You can make offers that you know are less than the company is worth if you're sure the other person will have to take that money from you, say if you know they can't run the company without you.  He has asked for $X to be bought out, and failing that he would like to keep owning his half and send his wife (who may very well be competent, but who among other things has a very ill husband to deal with) to take his place. If he can occasionally contribute to the overall vision, and she can do the day to day, then keeping things as they are may be the smart move. But if that's not possible, it doesn't mean you have to buy him out for twice what you think it's worth.  In the absence of a partnership agreement, it's going to be hard to know what to do. But one approach might be to pretend there is a shotgun clause. Ask him, if he thinks half the company is worth $X, if he's willing to buy you out for that price and have his wife run it without you. He is likely to blurt out that it isn't worth that and she can't do that.  And at that point, you'll actually be negotiating. The methodology for divisor changes is based on splits and composition changes. Dividends are ignored by the index. Side note - this is why, in my opinion, that any discussion of the Dow's change over a long term becomes meaningless. Ignoring even a 2% per year dividend has a significant impact over many decades.  The divisor can be found at http://wsj.com/mdc/public/page/2_3022-djiahourly.html