Reasons for a warrant's intrinsic value and price not adding up?
While on the surface it may seem that the warrant you described is trading below intrinsic value, there are many reasons why that might not be the case. It's more likely that you are lacking information, than having identified a derivative instrument that the market has failed to reasonably price. For instance, might there be a conversion ratio on the warrants other than the 1:1 ratio that you seem to be assuming? Sometimes, warrant terms are such that multiple warrants are required to buy one share of stock. Consider: The conversion ratio is the number of warrants needed in order to buy   (or sell) one investment unit. Therefore, if the conversion ratio to   buy stock XYZ is 3:1, this means that the holder needs three warrants   in order to purchase one share. Usually, if the conversion ratio is   high, the price of the share will be low, and vice versa. (source) Conversion ratios are sometimes used so that warrants can be issued on a 1:1 basis to existing stockholders, but where the potential number of new shares to be issued is much less. Conversion ratio is just one such example that could lead to perceived mispricing, and there may be other restrictions on exercise. Warrants are not issued by an options exchange using standardized option contract terms, and so warrant terms vary considerably from issuer to issuer. Even series of warrants from the same issuer may have differing terms. Always look beyond any warrant quote to find a definitive source of the warrant's precise terms — and read those terms carefully before taking any position.
"And now it is at about $3. Many times ""skeletons"" are bought and inflated for various reasons. Some are legitimate (for example a private business merging into a defunct but public corporation to avoid wasting resources on going public), some are not (mainly pump-and-dump scams that are using ""skeletons""). I don't know what was the case here (probably speculation based on the new marijuana laws in the US), but clearly the inflated price was completely unjustified since it went crashing down." "An important thing that many people fail to realize is that the number of shares outstanding in a stock, times the current market price of those shares, does not represent anything related to the total value of those shares.  If a company has one million shares outstanding and its total value is $10 million, then the real worth of each share is $10.  If few people feels like buying or selling, but a few people think the company is worth $50 million and offer $50/share, that could raise the market price to $50/share, but it wouldn't mean that the company became worth five times as much; it would merely mean the stock was overpriced. If, after the price went to $50/share, all the owners of the stock put in stop-loss orders at $45.  Note that the real $10/share ""real value"" of their stock would never have changed.  If the people who thought the stock was worth $50 decided to get out of the market, and nobody else was willing to offer more than $10, that would instantly drop the price to $10.  The fact that a million shares of stock have stop-loss orders at $45 wouldn't magically generate buyers for those stocks at that price.  Indeed, unchecked stop-loss orders would have the reverse effect, since many people who would have been willing if not eager to buy the stock if it had been available for less than $10/share would instead be trying to sell it below that price. It's too bad people think that the number of shares outstanding times the current market price represents some kind of ""meaningful quantity"".  If the present cash value of all future payouts associated with a share of stock is $10, then someone who buys a share of stock for less than that makes money off the seller; someone who pays more loses money to the seller.  Many people think they can lose money to the seller and still come out okay if the price goes higher, but what that really means is that they're hoping to find a bigger sucker--a game where it's guaranteed that some people will have losses they don't recoup." Since I'm missing the shortest and simplest answer, I'll add it: A car also doesn't offer dividends, yet it's still worth money. A $100 bill doesn't offer dividends, yet people are willing to offer services, or goods, or other currencies, to own that $100 bill. It's the same with a stock. If other people are willing to buy it off you for a price X, it's worth at least close to price X to you. In theory the price X depends on the value of the assets of the company, including unknown values like expected future profits or losses. Speaking from experience as a trader, in practice it's very often really just price X because others pay price X. "(See also the question How many stocks I can exercise per stock warrant? and my comments there). Clearly, at the prices you quote, it does not seem sensible to exercise your warrants at the moment, since you can still by ""units"" (1 stock + 1/3 warrant) and bare stock at below the $11.50 it would cost you to exercise your warrant.  So when would exercising a warrant become ""a sensible thing to do""? Obviously, if the price of the bare stock (which you say is currently $10.12) were to sufficiently exceed $11.50, then it would clearly be worth exercising a warrant and immediately selling the stock you receive (""sufficiently exceed"" to account for any dealing costs in selling the newly-acquired stock). However, looking more closely, $11.50 isn't the correct ""cut-off"" price. Consider three of the units you bought at $10.26 each. For $30.78 you received three shares of stock and one warrant. For an additional $11.50 ($42.28 in total) you can have a total of four shares of stock (at the equivalent of $10.57 each). So, if the price of the bare stock rises above $10.57, then it could become sensible to exercise one warrant and sell four shares of stock (again allowing a margin for the cost of selling the stock). The trading price of the original unit (1 stock + 1/3 warrant) shouldn't (I believe) directly affect your decision to exercise warrants, although it would be a factor in deciding whether to resell the units you've already got. As you say, if they are now trading at $10.72, then having bought them at $10.26 you would make a profit if sold. Curiously, unless I'm missing something, or the figures you quote are incorrect, the current price of the ""unit"" (1 stock + 1/3 warrant; $10.72) seems overpriced compared to the price of the bare stock ($10.12). Reversing the above calculation, if bare stock is trading at $10.12, then four shares would cost $40.48. Deducting the $11.50 cost-of-exercising, this would value three ""combined units"" at $28.98, or $9.66 each, which is considerably below the market price you quote. One reason the ""unit"" (1 stock + 1/3 warrant) is trading at $10.72 instead of $9.66 could be that the market believes the price of the bare share (currently $10.12) will eventually move towards or above $11.50. If that happens, the option of exercising warrants at $11.50 becomes more and more attractive. The premium presumably reflects this potential future benefit. Finally, ""Surely I am misunderstand the stock IPO's intent."": presumably, the main intent of Social Capital was to raise as much money as possible through this IPO to fund their future activities. The ""positive view"" is that they expect this future activity to be profitable, and therefore the price of ordinary stock to go up (at least as far as, ideally way beyond) the $11.50 exercise price, and the offering of warrants will be seen as a ""thank you"" to those investors who took the risk of taking part in the IPO. A completely cynical view would be that they don't really care what happens to the stock price, but that ""offering free stuff"" (or what looks like ""free stuff"") will simply attract more ""punters"" to the IPO. In reality, the truth is probably somewhere between those two extremes." "What could the tax issues with the IRS be? I thought (but not totally certain) that the tax treatment of an ISO option was based on difference between exercise price and FMV at the time of the sale.  This is an accounting issue. There were times not so long ago that companies actually did these things on purpose, to boost the stock grant values for their employees (especially senior employees). They would give a grant but date it with an earlier date with a more favorable valuation. This is called ""backdating"", and it brought companies down and CEOs into criminal courts. In addition, only reasonable compensation is allowed as a deduction for the company, and incorrectly set strike price may be deemed unreasonable. Thus, the deduction the company would take for your compensation can be denied, leading to loss of tax benefit (this was also a weapon used by the IRS at the time against companies doing backdating). Last but not least, company that has intentions of going public cannot allow itself such a blatant disregard of the accounting rules. Even if the mistake was not made on purpose (as it sounds), it is a mistake that has to be corrected. What should I take into consideration to determine whether a 27% increase in shares is a fair exchange for an increase in 270% increase in strike price. Did you know the strike price when you signed the contract? Was it a consideration for you? For most people, the strike price is determined at the board approval, since the valuations are not public and are not disclosed before you actually join, which is already after you've agreed to the terms. So basically, you agreed to get 100 sheets of toilet paper, and instead getting 127 sheets. So you're getting 27 sheets more than you initially agreed to. Why are you complaining? In other words, options are essentially random numbers which are quite useless. By the time you get to exercise them, they'll be diluted through a bunch of additional financing rounds, and their value will be determined for real only after the IPO, or at least when your company's stocks are trading OTC with some reasonable volume. Until then - it's just a number with not much of a meaning. The FMV does matter for early exercise and 83(b) election, if that is an option, but even then - I doubt you can actually negotiate anything." I still can't understand why there is a price discrepancancy.  There isn't. It's the same stock and price differences between such major exchanges will always be minimal. I think you simply haven't paid attention to the date range. It seems Google finance only has data for FRA:BMW reaching back to 2011, so if you try to look at the development of your investment since 2009, you're not getting comparable data. Ignorance - people might not pay attention to the value, or forgot that they had them. Fees - the gain could be too small and eaten away by fees, so it's cheaper to abandon them. Knowledge - people might not understand that they miss a chance to cash in Formal errors - when the execution is incorrectly filed and fails therefore, and the time is already run out when they realize. This is a tough question SFun28.  Let's try and debug the metric. First, let's expand upon the notion share price is determined in an efficient market where prospective buyers and sellers have access to info on an enterprises' cash balance and they may weigh that into their decision making.  Therefore, a desirable/undesirable cash balance may raise or lower the share price, to what extent, we do not know.   We must ask How significant is cash/debt balance in determining the market price of a stock?   As you noted, we have limited info, which may decrease the weight of these account balances in our decision process. Using a materiality level of 5% of net income of operations, cash/debt may be immaterial or not considered by an investor. investors oftentimes interpret the same information differently (e.g. Microsoft's large cash balance may show they no longer have innovative ideas worth investing in, or they are well positioned to acquire innovative companies, or weather a contraction in the sector) My guess is a math mind would ignore the affect of account balances on the equity portion of the enterprise value calculation because it may not be a factor, or because the affect is subjective. &gt;I don't understand the logic of converting a cost of funds of 4% to a monthly % and then subtracting that number from an annual one (the 1.5%).  I know it was wrong, so how would you approach it?  &gt;Unfortunately without seeing the case I really can't help you...there was likely much you have left out from above.    All the relevant details I received for the case are here. What other info are you looking for? There are things that are clearly beyond me as well. Cash per share is $12.61 but the debt looks like $30 or so per share. I look at that, and the $22 negative book value and don't see where the shareholders are able to recoup anything. Of course, this calculation does not take into consideration the fact that once the rights are issues, the price of the shares will drop. Usually this drop corresponds to the discount. Therefore, if a rights issue is done correctly share price before issuance-discount=share price after issuance. In this result, noone's wealth changes because shareholders can then sell their stock and get back anything they had to put in. This is a bit complicated because of all the moving parts, but is a little simpler because the two warrants are now publicly traded.  The main rule appears to be that your cost should be apportioned into the bases for the pieces you received by the proportions of the prices established in the market on the first day of trading in which they trade separately (source: costbasis.com).  Since the A and B GM warrants began trading in March 2011 (at least that's what a quick search shows), use their prices and the GM price on the same day to establish the proportions.  You also must include the factor of how much of each piece you received for each of your bonds. So, for example, if the prices of GM, WSA, and WSB, were $32, $23, and $17 on the first day of trading, and you got 3 shares GM, 2 A warrants, and 1 B warrant for your bonds, their worth on first day of separate trading would be: and so the proportion of your bond cost to be allocated to your A warrants, for instance, would be 46/159 or about 28.9% using these example figures. The small dribbles of additional securities you have received already, I would include in the calculation above, and if you in the future receive any further dribbles, I would assign them a basis of $0 (as your full bond cost would have already been completely allocated). It's an SEC standard for certain items. It is NOT indicative of fair market value. It could be useful to compare companies to each other, but again, would not indicate intrinsic value.  Does it make sense, for example, to discount Saudi Aramco at the same exact rate as BP or Exxon? Would make sense that the higher liquidation cost and Transaction costs are driving the share price down.   Higher liq and transaction means higher investors would require higher return, driving down the share price. The other possibilities I can think of off the top of my head, based on looking at the firm for five minutes  1) In transaction costs, did you include tax? Disclaimer: math below done on the back of the envelope in between meetings;  So, NAV says they are at ~$75M. Liquidating that entire portfolio means about 22% capital gains tax rate. Which means after tax value is about $60M. Add in any fees you'd incur from trying to sell this stuff, and it's not unreasonable to assume you'll only get about $55M once all is said and done, which is pretty close to the actual market cap.   If you have accounted for the above, consider ;  2) Bulk of their investments seem to be in private assets. Which implies that they have some discretion in how they mark the value of those investments. And, there is the chance that the market doesn't have confidence in these guys. What's their performance been like in recent years? Especially with a private asset portfolio, I'd be weary.   If I was to invest in them, I'd want a higher return for the opaque portfolio. "The value of a stock ultimately is related to the valuation of a corporation.  As part of the valuation, you can estimate the cash flows (discounted to present time) of the expected cash flows from owning a share.  This stock value is the so-called ""fundamental"" value of a stock.  What you are really asking is, how is the stock's market price and the fundamental value related?  And by asking this, you have implicitly assumed they are not the same.   The reason that the fundamental value and market price can diverge is that simply, most shareholders will not continue holding the stock for the lifespan of a company (indeed some companies have been around for centuries).  This means that without dividends or buybacks or liquidations or mergers/acquisitions, a typical shareholder cannot reasonably expect to recoup their share of the company's equity. In this case, the chief price driver is the aggregate expectation of buyers and sellers in the marketplace, not fundamental evaluation of the company's balance sheet.   Now obviously some expectations are based on fundamentals and expert opinions can differ, but even when all the experts agree roughly on the numbers, it may be that the market price is quite a ways away from their estimates.  An interesting example is given in this survey of behavioral finance.  It concerns Palm, a wholly-owned subsidiary of 3Com.  When Palm went public, its shares went for such a high price, they were significantly higher than 3Com's shares.  This mispricing persisted for several weeks. Note that this facet of pricing is often given short shrift in standard explanations of the stock market.  It seems despite decades of academic research (and Nobel prizes being handed out to behavioral economists), the knowledge has been slow to trickle down to laymen, although any observant person will realize something is amiss with the standard explanations.   For example, before 2012, the last time Apple paid out dividends was 1995.  Are we really to believe that people were pumping up Apple's stock price from 1995 to 2012 because they were waiting for dividends, or hoping for a merger or liquidation?  It doesn't seem plausible to me, especially since after Apple announced dividends that year, Apple stock ended up taking a deep dive, despite Wall Street analysts stating the company was doing better than ever.  That the stock price reflects expectations of the future cash flows from the stock is a thinly-disguised form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), and there's a lot of evidence contrary to the EMH (see references in the previously-linked survey).  If you believe what happened in Apple's case was just a rational re-evaluation of Apple stock, then I think you must be a hard-core EMH advocate. Basically (and this is elaborated at length in the survey above), fundamentals and market pricing can become decoupled.  This is because there are frictions in the marketplace making it difficult for people to take advantage of the mispricing.  In some cases, this can go on for extended periods of time, possibly even years.  Part of the friction is caused by strong beliefs by market participants which can often shift pressure to supply or demand.  Two  popular sayings on Wall Street are, ""It doesn't matter if you're right.  You have to be right at the right time.""  and ""It doesn't matter if you're right, if the market disagrees with you.""  They suggest that you can make the right decision with where to put your money, but being ""right"" isn't what drives prices.  The market does what it does, and it's subject to the whims of its participants."