Why was S&P 500 PE Ratio so high on May 2009
"Asking why the p/e was so high is best answered ""because reported earnings were so low"". Recall that the S&P500 bottomed in early March 2009 when the panic of the financial crisis reached exhaustion.  As noted on the page you have linked, the reported p/e ratios are computed using reported earnings from the trailing twelve months.  During those twelve months the banks were writing down all of the bad debt associated with the mortgage backed securities that has lost so much value.  This meant that the banks were reporting negative earnings.  Since the financial sector is a large part of the S&P500, this alone had an enormous effect on the index p/e.  However, the problem was compounded by a general collapse in earnings across the economy as consumers reacted to the resulting uncertainty.  The same site reports earnings for the previous years at $17.11 for the S&P500, compared to $76.17 for the year prior to 2008.  That is a collapse of about 78% in earnings.  Although the S&P500 has suffered badly during this time, stock market investors being forward looking were starting to price in improved earnings by May 2009.  Indeed, the S&P500 was up about 33% in just two months, from its low in March2009 to mid May2009.  Thus, by May of 2009 prices were not suffering to the same extent as reported trailing earnings.  This would account for the anomalous p/e value reporting in May2009."
It could be an endless number of reasons for it.  It could simply just be a break through a long term resistance causing technical traders to jump in.  It could be an analyst putting out a buy recommendation.  If fundamentals have not changed then maybe the technicals have changed. Momentum could have reached an oversold position causing new buyers to enter the market. Without knowing the actual stock, its fundamentals and its technicals, no one will ever know exactly why. PE can be misleading when theres a good risk the company simply goes out of business in a few years. For this reason some people use PEG, which incorporates growth into the equation. Everyone and their grandmother has been expecting QE to taper since May 2013. If the drop is caused by that, then it shouldn't be too serious.  Also, can people stop comparing stuff to 2009? 2009 was a unique once-in-a-lifetime circumstance, and not indicative of actual market values. "Do you recall where you read that 25% is considered very good? I graduated college in 1984 so that's when my own 'investing life' really began. Of the 29 years, 9 of them showed 25% to be not quite so good.  2013     32.42, 2009     27.11,  2003     28.72,  1998     28.73,  1997     33.67,  1995     38.02,  1991     30.95,  1989     32.00,  1985     32.24.  Of course this is only in hindsight, and the returns I list are for the S&P index. Even with these great 9 years, the CAGR (compound annual growth) of the S&P from 1985 till the end of 2013 was 11.32%  Most managed funds (i.e. mutual funds) do not match the S&P over time. Much has been written on how an individual investor's best approach is to simply find the lowest cost index and use a mix with bonds (government) to match their risk tolerance.  ""my long term return is about S&P less .05%"" sounds like I'm announcing that I'm doing worse than average. Yes, and proud of it. Most investors (85-95% depending on survey) lag by far more than this, many percent in fact)" "Probably the biggest driver of the increased volumes that day was a change in sentiment towards the healthcare sector as a whole that caused many healthcare companies to experience higher volumes ( https://www.bloomberg.com/press-releases/2017-07-11/asset-acquisitions-accelerate-in-healthcare-sector-boosting-potential-revenue-growth ). Following any spike, not just sentiment related spikes, the market tends to bounce back to about where it had been previously as analysts at the investment banks start to see the stock(s) as being overbought or oversold. This is because the effect of a spike on underlying ratios such as the Sharpe ratio or the PE ratio makes the stock look less attractive to buyers and more attractive to sellers, including short sellers. Note, however, that the price is broadly still a little higher than it was before the spike as a result of this change in sentiment. Looking at the price trends on Bloomberg (https://www.bloomberg.com/quote/CDNA:US) the price had been steadily falling for the year prior to the spike but was levelling out at just over $1 in the few months immediately prior to the spike. The increased interest in the sector and the stock likely added to a general change in the direction of the price trend and caused traders (as opposed to investors) to believe that there was a change in the price trend. This will have lead to them trading the stock more heavily intraday exacerbating the spike. Note that there traders will include HFT bots as well as human traders. You question the legality of this volume increase but the simple answer is that we may never know if it was the target of traders manipulating the price or a case of insider trading. What we can see is that (taking ""animal spirits"" into account) without any evidence of illegality there are plenty of potential reasons why the spike may have occurred. Spikes are common where traders perceive a change in a trend as they rush to cash in on the change before other traders can and then sell out quickly when they realise that the price is fundamentally out of sync with the firm's underlying position. You yourself say that you have been watching the stock for some time and, by that fact alone, it is likely that others are for the same reasons that you are. Otherwise you wouldn't be looking at it. Where people are looking at a stock expecting it to take off or drop you expect volatility and volatility means spikes!" "&gt;""Those measures all reflect a new way of measuring VaR though, one that switches the model from a four-year look to just one year, removing the rocky years of 2008 and 2009 from the current measure""  From my understanding (and I'm no risk mgmt or quant), and the specifics are lacking some in both articles, excluding 2008 and 2009 reduces the volatility of results in their VaR model. If you look at a chart of S&amp;P Volatility, you can see that 2008 and 2009 were anomalies, even though volatility was prevalent in every year since, until 2012.  [VIX](http://chart.finance.yahoo.com/z?s=%5eVIX&amp;t=5y&amp;q=&amp;l=&amp;z=l&amp;a=v&amp;p=s&amp;lang=en-US&amp;region=US)" Here's the 2009-2014 return of the S&P 500 (SPY) vs. Vanguard FTSE ex-US (VEU) (higher returns bolded) Another argument for them is their low correlation to U.S stocks.   Looking at history however, I don't see it. Most times U.S stocks have   done badly, foreign stocks have also done badly. Looking at the last 6 years (and current YTD), 1 in 3 years have international stocks doing better.    I invest a portion of my investments in international because they aren't well correlated. ETFs have caused many if not most stocks on the SP500 to become correlated.  I think at some point in the last couple of years, 90% of the SP500 were correlated to the index itself.  So you're going to see a lot of movement together of most stocks. There is most likely an error in the WSJ's data.  Yahoo! Finance reports the P/E on the Russell 2000 to be 15 as of 8/31/11 and S&P 500 P/E to be 13 (about the same as WSJ). Good catch, though!  E-mail WSJ, perhaps they will be grateful. Are you implying that Amazon is a better investment than GE because Amazon's P/E is 175 while GE's is only 27?  Or that GE is a better investment than Apple because Apple's P/E is just 13.  There are a lot of other ratios to consider than P/E.  I personally view high P/E numbers as a red flag.  One way to think of a P/E ratio is the number of years it's expected for the company to earn its market cap.  (Share price divided by annual earnings per share)  It will take Amazon 175 years to earn $353 billion. If I was going to buy a dry cleaners, I would not pay the owner 175 years of earnings to take control of it, I'd never see my investment back. To your point.  There is so much future growth seemingly built in to today's stock market that even when a company posts higher than expected earnings, the company's stock may take a hit because maybe future prospects are a little less bright than everyone thought yesterday. The point of fundamental analysis is that you want to look at a company's management style and financial strategies.  How is it paying its debt?  How is it accumulating the debt?  How is it's return on assets?  How is the return on assets trending?  This way when you look at a few companies in the same market segment you may have a better shot at picking the winner over time.  The company that piles on new debt for every new project is likely to continue that path in to oblivion, regardless of the P/E ratio. (or some other equally less forward thinking management practice that you uncover in your fundamental analysis efforts). And I'll add... No amount of historical good decision making from a company's management can prepare for a total market downturn, or lack of investor confidence in general.  The market is the market; sometimes it's up irrationally, sometimes it's down irrationally. The S&P 500 is a market index.  The P/E data you're finding for the S&P 500 is data based on the constituent list of that market index and isn't necessarily the P/E ratio of a given fund, even one that aims to track the performance of the S&P 500.    I'm sure similar metrics exist for other market indexes, but unless Vanguard is publishing it's specific holdings in it's target date funds there's no market index to look at. You are correct about the first two questions.  At the time it was last measured those were the percent invested in the Basic Materials sector for the ETF and its benchmark.  Note, this ETF will be significantly different from its benchmark as it is an equal-weight index rather than the more common capitalization-weighted index.  Meaning that this ETF could have materially different performance from its benchmark. The third column is the average sector weights of all the ETFs in Morningstar's Large Blend category.  These are ETFs that generally invest in a broad collection of large U.S. stocks and (weighted?) average of all of them will be generally fairly close to the benchmark. "This is a good question and my answer below, being the first rationale that crossed my mind, is far from fleshed-out. It's just a reply based on many books on the historical cycles of markets and it's something I've discussed at work (I work in finance).   Historically we can observe that periods of financial ""booms"" entailing high valuations of public equities tend to lead to lower returns. It's a fairly simplistic notion, but if you're paying more now for something - when it's potentially close to a high water mark - then you're returns in the short term are likely to be somewhat stunted. Returns from the underlying companies have a hard time keeping up with high valuations such that investors aren't likely to see a bountiful return in the short run." "The June 2014 issue of Barclays Wealth's Compass magazine had a very nice succinct article on this topic: ""Value investing – does a rules-based approach work?"".  It examines the performance of value and growth styles of investment in the MSCI World and S&P500 arenas for a few decades back, and reveals a surprisingly complicated picture, depending on sector, region and time-period. Their summary is basically: A closer look however shows that the overall success of value   strategies derives mainly from the 1970s and 1980s. ... in the US, value has underperformed growth for over 25 years   since peaking in July 1988. Globally, value experienced a 30% setback   in the late 1990s so that there are now periods with a length of   nearly 13 years over which growth has outperformed. So the answer to ""does it beat the market?"" is  ""it depends..."". Update in response to comment below: the question of risk adjusted returns is interesting.  To quote another couple of fragments from the piece: Since December 1974, [MSCI world] value has outperformed growth by   2.6% annually, with lower risk. This outperformance on a risk-adjusted   basis is the so-called value premium that Eugene Fama and Kenneth   French first identified in 1992... and That outperformance has, however, come with more risk. Historical   volatility of the pure style indices has been 21-22% compared to 16%   for the market. ... From a maximum drawdown perspective, the 69% drop   of pure value during the financial crisis exceeded the 51% drop of the   overall market." Long story short, 8% turned out to be the tipping point because it was the average subordination level of the A rated tranches of the subprime MBS bonds.    The reason this was the magic number is because of the way bonds were placed during the period.  Basically no end user wanted to take on the risk of buying below A-rated paper, so instead of being sold directly, these BBB rated and below bonds were re-packaged into CDOs and tranched off.  Again, the higher rated paper was sold off to whomever, while the BBB and below stuff got reshuffled and repackaged into other CDOs or CDO^2 , further levering up the initial subprime bonds.    Now, back to the magic 8% number. Remember how I said that 8% was the subordination level for the A rated subprime paper? The other way of saying that is once defaults reached 8%, the BBB and below tranches of the the MBS were completely wiped out.  Since the CDOs were largely made up of these BBB and below MBS, once they started getting written down so did the CDOs.  When the lower rated CDO tranches started to go, because they were also repackaged in the same way, it just continued the negative feedback loop and before long even the  AA and AAA rated paper was seeing massive losses.    As more and more supposedly safe paper started to get wiped out, highly leveraged CDS contracts started coming due, causing AIG (which had written contracts on over $500 billion in assets) to get downgraded by the rating agencies, putting it on the brink of going under.  Because basically every major bank had exposure to AIG, had they gone under, the other banks would have all had to write down those contracts at the same time, essentially causing the entire financial system to collapse.