What Did Benjamin Graham Mean by Earnings Stability in The Intelligent Investor?
"Yes - this is exactly what it means.  No losses (negative earnings).   With today's accounting methods, you might want to determine whether you view earnings including or excluding extraordinary items.   For example, a company might take a once-off charge to its earnings when revising the value of a major asset.  This would show in the ""including"" but not in the ""excluding"" figure.   The book actually has a nice discussion in Chapter 12 ""Things to Consider About Per-Share Earnings"" which considers several additional variables to consider here too. Note that this earnings metric is different from ""Stock Selection for the Defensive Investor"" which requires 10 years. PS - My edition (4th edition hardback) doesn't have 386 pages so your reference isn't correct for that edition.  I found it on page 209 in Chapter 15 ""Stock Selection for the Enterprising Investor""." "Please note that the following Graham Rating below corresponds to five years: Earnings Stability (100% ⇒ 10 Years): 50.00% Benjamin Graham - once known as The Dean of Wall Street - was a scholar and financial analyst who mentored legendary investors such as Warren Buffett, William J. Ruane, Irving Kahn and Walter J. Schloss. Buffett describes Graham's book - The Intelligent Investor - as ""by far the best book about investing ever written"" (in its preface). Graham's first recommended strategy - for casual investors - was to invest in Index stocks.  For more serious investors, Graham recommended three different categories of stocks - Defensive, Enterprising and NCAV - and 17 qualitative and quantitative rules for identifying them.  For advanced investors, Graham described various ""special situations"". The first requires almost no analysis, and is easily accomplished today with a good S&P500 Index fund. The last requires more than the average level of ability and experience. Such stocks are also not amenable to impartial algorithmic analysis, and require a case-specific approach. But Defensive, Enterprising and NCAV stocks can be reliably detected by today's data-mining software, and offer a great avenue for accurate automated analysis and profitable investment. For example, given below are the actual Graham ratings for International Business Machines Corp (IBM), with no adjustments other than those for inflation. Defensive Graham investment requires that all ratings be 100% or more. Enterprising Graham investment requires minimum ratings of - N/A, 75%, 90%, 50%, 5%, N/A and 137%. International Business Machines Corp - Graham Ratings Sales | Size (100% ⇒ $500 Million): 18,558.60% Current Assets ÷ [2 x Current Liabilities]: 62.40% Net Current Assets ÷ Long Term Debt: 28.00% Earnings Stability (100% ⇒ 10 Years): 100.00% Dividend Record (100% ⇒ 20 Years): 100.00% Earnings Growth (100% ⇒ 30% Growth): 172.99% Graham Number ÷ Previous Close: 35.81% Not all stocks failing Graham's rules are necessarily bad investments. They may fall under ""special situations"". Graham's rules are also extremely selective. Graham designed and backtested his framework for over 50 years, to deliver the best possible long-term results. Even when stocks don't clear them, Graham's rules give a clear quantifiable measure of a stock's margin of safety. Thank you."
Essentially, yes, Peter Lynch is talking about the PEG Ratio. The Price/Earnings to Growth (PEG) Ratio is where you take the p/e ratio and then divide that by the growth rate (which should include any dividends).  A lower number indicates that the stock is undervalued, and could be a good buy. Lynch's metric is the inverse of that: Growth rate divided by the p/e ratio.  It is the same idea, but in this case, a higher number indicates a good value for buying. In either case, the idea behind this ratio is that a fairly priced stock will have the p/e ratio equal the growth rate.  When your growth rate is larger than your p/e ratio, you are theoretically looking at an undervalued stock. From every article I've encountered, the chicken and egg aspect suggests that IV is produced by looking at options pricing, and calculating the IV from that.  The implication is that whatever is known at that time is included in the price. And that when you see a particular option trade an unusual number of contracts at a given price, the implication is that someone thinks they know something that's not already priced in, i.e. that the current price is not accurate, they can profit on the future event. "There is actually a recent paper that attempted to decompose Buffett's outperformance. I've quoted the abstract below: ""Berkshire Hathaway has realized a Sharpe ratio of 0.76, higher than any other stock or mutual fund with a history of more than 30 years, and Berkshire has a significant alpha to traditional risk factors. However, we find that the alpha becomes insignificant when controlling for exposures to Betting-Against-Beta and Quality-Minus-Junk factors. Further, we estimate that Buffett’s leverage is about 1.6-to-1 on average. Buffett’s returns appear to be neither luck nor magic, but, rather, reward for the use of leverage combined with a focus on cheap, safe, quality stocks. Decomposing Berkshires’ portfolio into ownership in publicly traded stocks versus wholly-owned private companies, we find that the former performs the best, suggesting that Buffett’s returns are more due to stock selection than to his effect on management. These results have broad implications for market efficiency and the implementability of academic factors.""" "In this instance ""quotational"" is a reference to a market price quote, not a mathematical function.  Staunch ""value investors"" like Graham, Dodd, Munger, Buffett et al. believe there is a material difference between what security is ""worth"" and what the current market mood quotes as its price.   You, the investor, perform your analysis then derive a value for a security. If there has been no material change to an aspect of the security you analyzed then there hasn't been a change in that security's value, even if there has been a decline in the price quoted by the market, that is a ""quotational loss.""" "You're mixing up rhetoric (aka discussion and argument) with dialectic (the ""logical"" search for absolute truth).  No essay about business could possibly be dialectic. Mine isn't. Paul Graham's certainly aren't. Therefore they are rhetoric, discussion and argument.  And ""This person has much to gain if you do what he says"" is an absolutely valid argument.  BTW - I'm self-taught. If you want to learn more, I highly recommend ""Thank You For Arguing.""" "Your explanation is nearly perfect and not ""hand wavy"" at all. Stock prices reflect the collective wisdom of all participating investors. Investors value stocks based on how much value they expect the stock to produce now and in the future. So, the stability of the stock prices is a reflection of the accuracy of the investors predictions. Investor naivity can be seen as a sequence of increasingly sophisticated stock pricing strategies: If investors were able to predict the future perfectly, then all stock prices would rise at the same constant rate. In theory, if a particular investor is able to ""beat the market"", it is because they are better at predicting the future profits of companies (or they are lucky, or they are better at predicting the irrational behavior of other investors......)" Crisis and volatility benefit financiers and the wealthy, even more now than they did then. Back then, anybody left standing could buy at the bottom of a depression--while it was those who needed wages to eat who really suffered. Nowadays, arbitrage and derivatives (not to mention federal policy) make volatility itself a profitable proposition for people with lots of money to invest.  That said, I don't think it's a necessary conclusion from Garfield's statement that he thought those at the top *intentionally* caused inflation and depression--merely that their actions brought it about. Maybe he was complaining that the economy would be healthier and more stable if it were truly a free market, or maybe he was arguing that greed at the top led to imprudent policy. Here's the original academic backbone that it's based on and expanded upon.  https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modigliani%E2%80%93Miller_theorem  I think thats it's overly conservative in this case (I fully accept academic theories only go so far in the real world) as Damodaran (NYU professor) has made a pretty solid case that cash on balance sheet at large cap tech companies is valued by the markets at less than its after tax $ value. "The argument you are making here is similar to the problem I have with the stronger forms of the efficient market hypothesis.  That is if the market already has incorporated all of the information about the correct prices, then there's no reason to question any prices and then the prices never change.  However, the mechanism through which the market incorporates this information is via the actors buying an selling based on what they see as the market being incorrect. The most basic concept of this problem (I think) starts with the idea that every investor is passive and they simply buy the market as one basket.  So every paycheck, the index fund buys some more stock in the market in a completely static way.  This means the demand for each stock is the same.  No one is paying attention to the actual companies' performance so a poor performer's stock price never moves.  The same for the high performer.  The only thing moving prices is demand but that's always up at a more or less constant rate. This is a topic that has a lot of discussion lately in financial circles.  Here are two articles about this topic but I'm not convinced the author is completely serious hence the ""worst-case scenario"" title. These are interesting reads but again, take this with a grain of salt.  You should follow the links in the articles because they give a more nuanced understanding of each potential issue.  One thing that's important is that the reality is nothing like what I outline above. One of the links in these articles that is interesting is the one that talks about how we now have more indexes than stocks on the US markets.  The writer points to this as a problem in the first article, but think for a moment why that is.  There are many different types of strategies that active managers follow in how they determine what goes in a fund based on different stock metrics.  If a stocks P/E ratio drops below a critical level, for example, a number of indexes are going to sell it.  Some might buy it.  It's up to the investors (you and me) to pick which of these strategies we believe in. Another thing to consider is that active managers are losing their clients to the passive funds.  They have a vested interest in attacking passive management." To be fair, the analyst is talking about the book value of the firm. Basically, the value of all the stuff it owns now. There are plenty of companies with negative book value that can justify a positive share price. Ford, for instance, had negative book value but positive future earnings. "The company was paying ""only"" $1 a share in dividends, compared to $10 a share in earnings. That is a so-called payout ratio of 10%, which is low. A more normal payout ratio would be 40%, something like $4 a share. If a $13 stock had a $4 dividend, the dividend yield would be about 30%, which would be ""too high,"" meaning that the price would go up to drive down the resulting yield. Even $1 a share on a $13 stock is a high dividend of about 7%, allowing for appreciation to say, the $20-$25 range. Graham was a great believer in the theory that management should pay out ""most"" of its earnings in dividends. He believed that by holding dividends so far below earnings, the company was either being ""stingy,"" or signalling that the $10 a share of earnings was unsustainable. Either of these would be bad for the stock. For instance, if $1 a share in dividends actually represented a 40% payout ratio, it would signal management's belief that they could normally earn only $2.50 a year instead of $10." "There is only one book worth reading in my opinion: One Up on Wall Street. It's short and no other book even comes close to it for honesty, correctness and good sense. Also, it is written by the second most successful investor of all time, Peter Lynch. The Intelligent Investor has some good technical content, but the book is dated and a lot of it is irrelevant to the modern investment environment. When I was younger I used to ready books like this and when a friend of mine asked for investment advice. I said ""Look at stocks with a PE ratio of 5-10"". A few days later he comes back to me and says ""There are none"". Right. That pretty much sums up the problem with the I.I. Graham himself in interviews during the 1970s said that his book was obsolete and he no longer recommended those methods." "What you are seeking is termed ""Alpha"", the mispricing in the market. Specifically, Alpha is the price error when compared to the market return and beta of the stock. Modern portfolio theory suggests that a portfolio with good Alpha will maximize profits for a given risk tolerance. The efficient market hypotheses suggests that Alpha is always zero. The EMH also suggests that taxes, human effort and information propagation delays don't exist (i.e. it is wrong). For someone who is right, the best specific answer to your question is presented Ben Graham's book ""The Intelligent Investor"" (starting on page 280). And even still, that book is better summarized by Warren Buffet (see Berkshire Hathaway Letters to Shareholders). In a great disservice to the geniuses above it can be summarized much further: closely follow the company to estimate its true earnings potential... and ignore the prices the market is quoting. ADDENDUM: And when you have earnings potential, calculate value with: NPV = sum(each income piece/(1+cost of capital)^time) Update: See http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2014/02/24/warren-buffett-berkshire-letter/ ""When Charlie Munger and I buy stocks..."" for these same ideas right from the horse's mouth" "That's the key to modern finance: removing undesirable conditions until the model outcome supports the desired policy or sales pitch.  We're safe because our model says so, and if it doesn't, change the model until it does.  Anything that negatively affects the outcome is an ""anomaly"" - that anomalies are unavoidable, and will recur, is just an inconvenience better left out." "Been a long while since I've read it but if I remember correctly with quotational loss Graham refers to an unjustified decline in stock price because of Mr. Market's fear and loathing where the business prospects of the company are actually still sound.  This is opposed to ""actual"" loss of capital which he would consider to be a company going bankrupt or just more generally turning out to have way worse business prospects than expected with the justified decline in stock price that entails."