Is UK house price spiral connected to debt based monetary system?
"There are a few factors at work here, supply and demand being the main one. The Office for National Statistics has some good information: http://visual.ons.gov.uk/uk-perspectives-housing-and-home-ownership-in-the-uk/ Supply has historically struggled to compete with demand in the UK and this situation has been exacerpated since the 1980s when Margaret Thatcher was Prime Minister.  She set up a variety of schemes to encourage people to own their own home, such as tax relief (MIRAS) and since then home ownership in the UK has increased dramatically. The then conservative government also set up the ""right to buy"" scheme (in 1980) that allowed council tenants to purchase their council houses at a discounted rate.  The effect of this was to increase the number of home owners whilst reducing the amount of housing available for councils to rent to new tenants.  Anecdotal evidence (I can't find a documented source to back this up) suggests that councils did not build sufficient new homes to replace those purchased by their ex-tenants. The population of the UK has also increased, by around 10 million since 1980 (around 20%) and this has pushed up demand for housing.  House building in the UK has not kept pace with these factors that has led to a shortage of supply that has pushed up prices. http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/pop-estimate/population-estimates-for-uk--england-and-wales--scotland-and-northern-ireland/2013/sty-population-changes.html There's another factor at play here as well.  If you go back to the 1970s around 53% of women would go out to work but in 2013 this figure increased to 67% as it became more common for households to have double incomes.  This extra supply of cash also pushed up house prices. http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171776_328352.pdf Your question regards a debt based monetary system is not entirely clear, but there are limitations put onto how much money people can borrow that are potentially limiting how much house prices can rise by.  Today most lenders are more conservative in how much they will lend but this wasn't the case in the mid 2000s when house prices rose very quickly.   Lenders are more cautious today after the crash of the late 2000s, but things are begining to relax again and they are starting to lend more which could in turn lead to further house price rises in line with what was seen in the 2000s. Recessions have coincided with house prices falling back or at least being stable.  In the 1980s house prices trebled from 1980 to 1988 but then fell back a little as the recession hit, before starting to rise again in 1997.  This rise was sustained until 2008 during which time prices trebled again.  Based on this you could assume prices will treble again as we come out of the recession, as long as this is sustained for 8 years or so. However, as the potential for more households to become double income is reduced (high female employment already) and wages are unlikely to raise that quickly, this may not be realistic, unless the mortgage lenders become extremely lax, to the point of reckless! To answer your other question, about the affordability of housing, this will be based on the level of wages in the UK and how strict or lax the lenders are, also taking into effect the availability of housing for purchase.  If wages rise, house prices will rise, if lenders are willing to lend more money, house prices will rise and if demand continues to outrstip supply, prices will rise. None of the major UK political parties are likely to solve the problems of population growth and not enough houses being built so it is likely prices will rise but you could argue that they are not far off a peak based on current wages and lenders attitudes.  If the UK economy continues to recover from the recession, it is possible they will fuel another housing boom by lending ever increasing salary multiples as happened in the 2000s, unless there is government intervention, ie regulation of the lenders." "No. Rural Scotland has exactly the same monetary system, and not the same bubble. Monaco (the other example given) doesn't even have its own monetary system but uses the Euro. Look instead to the common factor: a lot of demand for limited real estate. Turning towards the personal finance part of it, we know from experience that housing bubbles may ""burst"" and housing prices may drop suddenly by ~30%, sometimes more. This is a financial risk if you must sell. Yet on the other hand, the fundamental force that keeps prices in London higher than average isn't going away. The long-term risk often is manageable. A 30% drop isn't so bad if you own a house for 30 years."
Not anytime soon, I suspect, but not necessarily for financial reasons. I found this interesting, including the link to the five tests, but I think that this topic is only partially judged through financial eyes, there's a lot of political issues around this with national identity/immigration issues already in the spot light as well as political aspirations. If there will be a call in the near future to join the Euro, how would that reflect on the financial industry in the UK from a PR perspective? and on the political leadership and how it managed the financial crisis?  I believe that it is in the interest of all the people in the high positions to show the country getting back on track rather than making ground shaking moves. But what do I know....:-) While debt increases the likelihood and magnitude of a crash, speculation, excess supply and other market factors can result in crashes without requiring excessive debt. A popular counter example of crashes due to speculation is 16th century Dutch Tulip Mania.  The dot com bubble is a more recent example of a speculative crash. There were debt related issues for some companies and the run ups in stock prices were increased by leveraged traders, but the actual crash was the result of failures of start up companies to produce profits. While all tech stocks fell together, sound companies with products and profits survive today. As for recessions, they are simply periods of time with decreased economic activity. Recessions can be caused by financial crashes, decreased demand following a war, or supply shocks like the oil crisis in the 1970's. In summary, debt is simply a magnifier. It can increase profits just as easily as can increase losses. The real problems with crashes and recessions are often related to unfounded faith in increasing value and unexpected changes in demand. "To understand the Twist, you need to understand what the Yield Curve is.  You must also understand that the price of debt is inverse to the interest rate. So when the price of bonds (or notes or bills) rises, that means the current price goes up, and the yield to maturity has gone down.  Currently (Early 2012) the short term rate is low, close to zero. The tools the fed uses, setting short term rates for one, is exhausted, as their current target is basically zero for this debt. But, my mortgage is based on 10yr rates, not 1 yr, or 30 day money. The next step in the fed's effort is to try to pull longer term rates down. By buying back 10 year notes in this quantity, the fed impacts the yield at that point on the curve. Buying (remember supply/demand) pushes the price up, and for debt, a higher price equates to lower yield. To raise the money to do this, they will sell short term debt. These two transactions effectively try to ""twist"" the curve to pull long term rates lower and push the economy." Yes there is an inverse relationship but that's how it's meant to work.  Debt creates money. Banks do lend out customers savings for return interest as the bank can make a profit rather than the cash just sitting there. The process of Lending pumps money into the economy that wouldn't be there otherwise so it creates money. The banks will either have a cash deficit or surplus at end of each day and either need to borrow from other banks to balance their books or if in surplus lend to other banks to make interest because that's more profitable than holding the cash surplus. The overnight cash rate then determines interest rates we pay.    High private debt occurs when lots of people are investing &amp; buying things so there is stimulation and growth in the economy. A lot more tax is being paid in these periods so government debt is lower because they are getting lots of tax money. Also To stimulate the economy into this growth period the government usually sells off large cash bonds (lowering their debt) to release cash into the economy, the more cash available the less banks have to borrow to cover deficits on overnight cash market and the lower interest rates will be. Lower interest rates = more borrowing and higher Private debt.   The government can't let growth get out of control as they don't want high inflation so they do the opposite to slow down growth, I.e buy up cash bonds and take money out of economy causing higher interest rates and less borrowing = More debt for government less for private. "I'm not intimately familiar with the situation in Australia, but in the US the powers that be have adopted an interventionist philosophy. The Federal Reserve (Central Bank) is ""buying back"" US Gov't debt to keep rates low, and the government is keeping mortgage rates low buy buying mortgages with the proceeds of the cheap bond sales. While this isn't directly related to Australia, it is relevant because the largest capital markets are in the US and influence the markets in Australia. In the US, the CPI is a survey of all urban consumers. If you're a younger, middle class consumer with income growth ahead of you, your costs are going to shift more rapidly than an elderly or poor person who already owns or is in subsidized housing, and doesn't spend as much on transportation. For example, my parents are in their early 60's and are living in the house that I grew up in, which they own free and clear. There are alot of people like them, and they aren't affected by the swing in housing prices that we've seen in the last decade." "This is the best tl;dr I could make, [original](https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2073.en.pdf) reduced by 99%. (I'm a bot) ***** &gt; Inflation Housing Demand + 0 + + 0 0 Mon Pol  +  + 0 0 Loans Supply Lend Rates 0 +  0  + A. Supply A. Demand +  + + The first column lists the endogenous variables of the VAR, which react to the shocks reported in the first row: housing demand shocks, monetary policy innovations, shocks to the credit supply, aggregate supply and demand shocks.  &gt; The patterns used to distinguish aggregate demand and supply shocks are commonly used in the literature, we are able to discriminate house prices shocks from loans supply and lending rates shocks on the ground of economic theory.  &gt; In Spain, in the absence of other shocks, if the growth rates of real consumption had been driven exclusively by housing demand shocks, they would have been largest around 1995 and 2004, and lowest in 2012.18 The cumulative effect of housing demand shocks is rather muted in the remaining countries.   ***** [**Extended Summary**](http://np.reddit.com/r/autotldr/comments/6gxbr4/ecb_house_prices_and_monetary_policy_in_the_euro/) | [FAQ](http://np.reddit.com/r/autotldr/comments/31b9fm/faq_autotldr_bot/ ""Version 1.65, ~142717 tl;drs so far."") | [Feedback](http://np.reddit.com/message/compose?to=%23autotldr ""PM's and comments are monitored, constructive feedback is welcome."") | *Top* *keywords*: **shock**^#1 **price**^#2 **House**^#3 **housing**^#4 **policy**^#5" I don't know much about the convertible debt space, but it seems like this regulation may be a positive sign that the government is being proactive in preventing financial institutions from developing overly complex debt structures (at least on an on-going basis) that get the global economy back into trouble.  Does anyone with a more informed opinion than my own have something to share? "I don't know what angle you're trying to push or why, but are you also saying that Kenichi Ueda of the IMF and Beatrice Weder Di Mauro of the University of Mainz are similarly lacking the understanding of financial concepts when they published a [paper](http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12128.pdf) ""Quantifying Structural Subsidy Values for Systemically Important Financial Institutions""?  Are you suggesting a similar ""entire shaker of salt"" when they ""estimate[d] the structural subsidy values by exploiting expectations of state support embedded in credit ratings and by using long-run average value of rating bonus""?  Should we really be so skeptical when they conclude:  &gt;Section III has provided estimates of the value of the subsidy to SIFIs in terms of the overall ratings. Using the range of our estimates, we can summarize that a one-unit increase in government support for banks in advanced economies has an impact equivalent to 0.55 to 0.9 notches on the overall long-term credit rating at the end-2007. And, this effect increased to 0.8 to 1.23 notches by the end-2009 (Summary Table 8). At the end-2009, the effect of the government support is almost identical between the group of advanced countries and developing countries. Before the crisis, governments in advanced economies played a smaller role in boosting banks’ long-term ratings. These results are robust to a number of sample selection tests, such as testing for differential effects across developing and advanced countries, for both listed and non-listed banks, and also correcting for bank parental support and alternative estimations of an individual bank’s strength.  I ask because this article is founded on that study - linked to by Bloomberg which is then linked to in OP's Huffpo article.  While you can certainly claim that Mark Gongloff ""shows a basic lack of understanding"" of whatever, why don't you put some skin in the game and demonstrate how he somehow misses the entire point of that study, or better yet really wow us by de-bunking that study." Yes, but only because the US had a huge crash. Other economies have, in the absence of any credible *real* growth strategy, continued pumping housing.  I still think student debt will erode incomes further as it's simply pulling forward demand that will drag on incomes later. When nearly everyone has a degree then nearly everyone doesn't get paid much more for having one.  By the same principle of supply and demand all the boomer downsizing vs impoverished 30-something lack of upsizing will mean prices will fall. "As Michael McGowan says, just because gold has gone up lots recently does not mean it will continue to go up by the same amount. This plot:  shows that if your father had bought $20,000 in gold 30 years ago, then 10 years ago he would have slightly less than $20,000 to show for it. Compare that with the bubble in real estate in the US:  Update: I was curious about JoeTaxpayer's question: how do US house prices track against US taxpayer's ability to borrow?  To try to answer this, I used the house price data from here, the 30 year fixed mortgages here and the US salary information from here. To calculate the ""ability to borrow"" I took the US hourly salary information, multiplied by 2000/12 to get a monthly salary. I (completely arbitrarily) assumed that 25 per cent of the monthly salary would be used on mortgage payments.  I then used Excel's ""PV"" (Present Value) function to calculate the present value of the thirty year fixed rate mortgage. The resulting graph is below.  The correlation coefficient between the two plots is 0.93.  There are so many caveats on what I've done in ~15 minutes, I don't want to list them... but it certainly ""gives one furiously to think"" !! Update 2:  OK, so even just salary information correlates very well with the house price increases.  And looking at the differences, we can see that perhaps there was a spike or bubble in house prices over and above what might be expected from salary-only or ability-to-borrow." "This is the best tl;dr I could make, [original](https://www.cityfalcon.com/blog/investments/student-loan-debt-new-mortgage-crisis/?utm_campaign=ao_reddit) reduced by 94%. (I'm a bot) ***** &gt; Costs of living, especially for those attending universities in cities like New York or London, also account for a nontrivial portion of the debt.  &gt; Is the student debt bubble in the United States the next mortgage crisis?  &gt; One major difference between the student debt problem and the mortgage crisis is the lack of CDOs and CDSs. The thread that connected banks, governments, individuals and economies were the CDO and CDS. With a complex system of mortgage securitization and insurance against those securities, the system effectively collapsed itself.   ***** [**Extended Summary**](http://np.reddit.com/r/autotldr/comments/79mt1s/student_loan_debt_the_new_mortgage_crisis_in_2018/) | [FAQ](http://np.reddit.com/r/autotldr/comments/31b9fm/faq_autotldr_bot/ ""Version 1.65, ~237528 tl;drs so far."") | [Feedback](http://np.reddit.com/message/compose?to=%23autotldr ""PM's and comments are monitored, constructive feedback is welcome."") | *Top* *keywords*: **debt**^#1 **student**^#2 **education**^#3 **economy**^#4 **borrowed**^#5" NB - I live in Surrey and bought my house in January 2014. If you don't have a very social life, it does pay to stay outside London. Places outside London are cheap and you will get a better deal in relation to houses or flats as compared to London. I feel very priced out of the market regarding London mortgages I will strongly question you logic behind this ? Why only London ? Why not live in the commuter belt outside London. Good places to reside, good schools, nice neighbourhood and away from the hustle and bustle of London. Many of my colleagues commute from Cambridge and Oxford daily into Central London and they laugh at people who want to buy a house in London, just for the sake of buying a house. It seems that the housing market is generally in a bubble due to being distorted by the finance market London house market is different from the rest of UK. People from overseas tend to invest in London property market, so it is always inflated. Even the property tax hasn't deterred many. I could look into buying somewhere and renting it out You are trying to join the same people, because of whom you have been put out of the housing market. I strictly question this logic unless your mortgage is less than the rent you pay and what rent you get. Buy a roof over your head first, then think of profiting from property. "So I'm in Australia and we have our very own housing price/credit bubble right now (which is finally deflating) and I'll try explain it as I understand. I welcome anyone to chime in and correct me.  The problem we faced (still face to a large degree) is the idea of rising asset prices and how this fuels a feedback loop into increasing personal debt, all based on the false assumption that house prices always go up. Now before I continue, house prices *do* always go up in the long run, but so does the cost of everything and we call that inflation, adjusting for this effect usually reveals that house prices are cyclical in the long term and never really 'grow'. So that aside we in Australia recently saw a long period of increasing house prices (as did the USA and Europe, and more recently China), the thing about house price is it is your 'equity', I'll try and explain: (all figures are made up to provide a simple example) if you borrow $200,000 to buy a house that costs $250,000 you owe the bank 80% of the equity (what your home is 'worth', and notionally this is value that you own) in your home and the bank will be happy, remembering that they make money on your interest payments, not your principal repayments. If your house then increases in value to $300,000 but you still owe $200,000 then you now owe only 66% of your equity. The bank sees you as a lower risk and encourages you to borrow more to get back up to that sweet spot they had before of 80% - this is a nice tradeoff between risk and reward for the bank. You, the consumer, have just been mailed a new credit card with a 50k limit (hypothetical) and theres a new iMac being released next week, and you really did want to trade in your 5yr old car (see where this is going yet?). Not only is this type of spending given a mighty boost but consumers feel like this house thing has done them very well and suddenly they have the ability to borrow lots more money, why not get a second house and do it all over again? The added demand for investment housing drives prices, throw in some generous government incentives (here and in the USA) and demand is pushed hard, prices grow more and the whole thing feeds back into itself. People feel richer, spend more from their credit cards, buy another house, etc.  But what happens if your house 'value' then drops to $240k? The bank now sees you as a high risk, so do the bank's investors, you have negative equity, the bank demands the difference paid back to it or it might take your home. Somehow, nobody believed this would happen.  Hopefully you start to see the picture? In Australia we are now facing a slow melt in housing prices which has not yet hurt en masse but it has dried up the credit cards, retails spending has collapsed and everyone is worried about the future.  Now to realise where the USA got to you have to also understand that banks were not merely asking for a maximum of 80% owed on the asset, many of them let this figure go to 100%, since hey prices always go up, right? They then in some cases went further and neglected to look into your income and confirm you could even *repay* your loan. Sounds dodgey? This is just the setup.  Remember I mentioned the bank's investors? Well banks/smart people basically figured out a clever way of 'dealing with' the risk of a few outliers with bad financial situations by collecting large numbers of home loans into a single entity and selling it on. Loans were graded according to risk and I believe they were even cut up into smaller pieces (10% of your high risk loan assigned to 10 different 'debt objects' with different risk profiles). These 'collateralised debt obligations' were traded from one bank/investment firm to another with everyone happily accepting the risk profiles until eventually nobody knew what risk was where. Think about it like ""I'll throw 10 high risk loans, 50 medium risk loans and 40 low risk loans into a pot, stir it up and sell the soup as 'pretty safe' "". This all seemed like a very good idea until it gradually became clear just how much of these loans were in the 'extremely stupid high risk' category. This is probably extremely confusing by now, but thats the point, investors could no longer judge how risky an investment in a bank or financial institute was, the market did not correct for any of this until it was all too late.  The moral of the story is when people tell you an investment is guaranteed to make you money, you stay away from that investment. And to specifically answer your question you can't solely blame government incentives as you might be able to see, but they play a part in a giant orchestra, there are many factors that drive this sort of stupidity, stupidity being the primary one." The Shiller data is inflation adjusted. In effect, a flat line means that long term, housing rises with inflation, no more no less. There's no argument, just the underlying data to support his charts. This, among them.   As much as I respect Nobel Prize winning Robert Shiller, his approach and analysis of the boom ignored interest rates. Say we look at a $50K earning couple. This is just below median income. At 9%, they qualify to borrow $145K. As rates fell to 4%, they qualify for $244K. Same fixed 30 term. Ignoring all other factors, the swing in rates will generate an oscillation around the long term trend. And my own data crunching suggests the equilibrium median home price will tend toward the price supported by the median income.  A similar, but not identical question - Why can't house prices be out of tune with salaries? In response to Chan-Ho's comment - I'd imagine Shiller understood the interest impact. To clarify, the chart, as presented, ignores it. Most people today (and maybe regardless of era) are irrational and don't properly valuate many of their purchases, nor are they emotionally equipped to do the math properly, including projection into the future and applying probabilities. This compounds.  Imagine that each individual is bound to others by a rubber band and can stretch in a certain direction.  The more your neighbors stretch, the more you are both motivated to stretch and able to stretch.  These are crudely analogous to consumer wants as well as allowed consumer debt.  The banks are also within this network of rubber bands and much of their balance sheet is based on how far they've stretched on the aggregate of all connected bands (counting others debts as their credit because it will presumably be repaid), and every so often enough people's feet slip that a lot of rubber bands snap back.  This is a bubble bursting.