Why does Warren Buffett say his fund performance, relatively, is likely to be better in a bear market than in a bull market?
Buffett is a value investor. His goal is to buy good companies when the market is overly worried and prices them below intrinsic value. When the market is highly priced it is much more difficult for him to find things that he thinks are at an attractive price. When people are very worried and the market has crashed, stocks are then priced below their intrinsic value and he can use the cash he keeps in the company to make attractive purchases. Remember that Buffett is not concerned with the ups and downs of the price of Berkshire Hathaway stock, he is concerned with the economic value of the assets that the company owns. So if all stock prices crash and he can buy things that are at bargain prices, he is happy no matter what Berkshire stock price does in the short run. One consequence of value investing is that because you are buying assets at bargain prices, the total value of your assets drops less in a bear market than the highly priced stuff that drives the major indexes. From the letter you link: Our performance, relatively, is likely to be better in a bear market than in a bull market so that   deductions made from the above results should be tempered by the fact that it was the type of year when we   should have done relatively well. In a year when the general market had a substantial advance I would be well   satisfied to match the advance of the Averages. Putting those two sentences together, the word relatively means that his funds perform better than the market in bear markets and perform about the same as the overall market in bull markets. It does not mean that absolute performance is better in bear markets than bull markets. Later on he states  This policy should lead to superior results in bear markets and average performance in bull markets. Warren Buffet and Berkshire Hathaway took a 50% loss in each of the last two bear markets. His stock even lost 10% in 2015 when the S&P lost 8%. He doesn't have a track record to support the claim that his stock performs relatively better in a bear market, so perhaps it's best to take his letter with a grain of salt. Edit: As one commenter points out, Mr. Buffett is comparing the book performance of his fund to the market performance of an index. That is an apples to oranges comparison. It's deceptive at best. If I have $100 and put it under the bed it will return 0%.  Relatively good in a bear market and relatively bad in a bull market. To understand his comments about bear-market performance it's important to take them in context. (My research method was Crtl+F: bear; read around the highlights. This is not a complete survey of 60+ years of letters.)  In his earlier letters, statements about bull market performance are always made in reference to Buffet's belief that many of BH's current holdings are in undervalued securities. Ex:  To the extent possible, therefore, I am attempting to create my own work-outs by acquiring large positions in several undervalued securities. Such a policy should lead to the fulfillment of my earlier forecast – an above average performance in a bear market. It is on this basis that I hope to be judged (p 6; emphasis mine). Similar statements are made throughout the earlier letters, along with this interesting note:  In a year when the general market had a substantial advance I would be well   satisfied to match the advance of the Averages (p 6). So to your question of why BH fund performance is likely to be better in a bear market than in a bull market, I believe the implicit assertion is that undervalued securities are more resilient in a bear market (presumably because they don't have as far to fall, and are also less likely to be subject to a bubble). Buffet is also explicitly asserting that when facing a choice to either (a) position BH to weather a possible downturn or (b) position BH to enjoy a bullish stock that is outpacing the market, he would choose the former over the later. As to your assertion that he always says this, I can find no reference to bear market's in the letters past 1960.
"There is actually a recent paper that attempted to decompose Buffett's outperformance. I've quoted the abstract below: ""Berkshire Hathaway has realized a Sharpe ratio of 0.76, higher than any other stock or mutual fund with a history of more than 30 years, and Berkshire has a significant alpha to traditional risk factors. However, we find that the alpha becomes insignificant when controlling for exposures to Betting-Against-Beta and Quality-Minus-Junk factors. Further, we estimate that Buffett’s leverage is about 1.6-to-1 on average. Buffett’s returns appear to be neither luck nor magic, but, rather, reward for the use of leverage combined with a focus on cheap, safe, quality stocks. Decomposing Berkshires’ portfolio into ownership in publicly traded stocks versus wholly-owned private companies, we find that the former performs the best, suggesting that Buffett’s returns are more due to stock selection than to his effect on management. These results have broad implications for market efficiency and the implementability of academic factors.""" assuming that a couple big players are making the majority of money in the stock market (which is true), it is logical to assume that most smaller players are losing.   For example, if one big hedge fund makes 20% a year,  it means either 20 funds lost 1%, or 5 funds lost 4%, and etc.   Assuming that the economy is not drastically getting much better, stocks are a zero sum game. Therefore, the couple of funds with the most resources will be taking from the people that aren't as advanced or taking a chance. As a corollary to this; the average investor will never know more than the market. Buffett can buy mispriced securities because he runs a multi-billion dollar company dedicated to finding these mispricings.   My advice for the common man:  1. Invest in both Stocks (for growth) &amp; Bonds (for wealth preservation) 2. Stocks should be almost exclusively Index Funds  That's it.  The stock market has a 'random walk with a positive drift' which means that in general, the market will increase in value. Index funds capture this value and will protect you against the inevitable BoA, AIG, Enron, etc.   It's fine to invest in index funds with a strategy as well, for instance emerging market ETFs could capture the growth of a particular region. Bear ETFs are attractive if you think the market is going to hit a downturn in the future. That is such a vague statement, I highly recommend disregarding it entirely, as it is impossible to know what they meant. Their goal is to convince you that index funds are the way to go, but depending on what they consider an 'active trader', they may be supporting their claim with irrelevant data Their definition of 'active trader' could mean any one or more of the following: 1) retail investor 2) day trader 3) mutual fund 4) professional investor 5) fund continuously changing its position 6) hedge fund. I will go through all of these. 1) Most retail traders lose money. There are many reasons for this. Some rely on technical strategies that are largely unproven. Some buy rumors on penny stocks in hopes of making a quick buck. Some follow scammers on twitter who sell newsletters full of bogus stock tips. Some cant get around the psychology of trading, and thus close out losing positions late and winning positions early (or never at all) [I myself use to do this!!]. I am certain 99% of retail traders cant beat the market, because most of them, to be frank, put less effort into deciding what to trade than in deciding what to have for lunch. Even though your pension funds presentation is correct with respect to retail traders, it is largely irrelevant as professionals managing your money should not fall into any of these traps. 2) I call day traders active traders, but its likely not what your pension fund was referring to. Day trading is an entirely different animal to long or medium term investing, and thus I also think the typical performance is irrelevant, as they are not going to manage your money like a day trader anyway. 3,4,5) So the important question becomes, do active funds lose 99% of the time compared to index funds. NO! No no no. According to the WSJ, actively managed funds outperformed passive funds in 2007, 2009, 2013, 2015. 2010 was basically a tie. So 5 out of 9 years. I dont have a calculator on me but I believe that is less than 99%!   Whats interesting is that this false belief that index funds are always better has become so pervasive that you can see active funds have huge outflows and passive have huge inflows. It is becoming a crowded trade. I will spare you the proverb about large crowds and small doors. Also, index funds are so heavily weighted towards a handful of stocks, that you end up becoming a stockpicker anyway. The S&P is almost indistinguishable from AAPL. Earlier this year, only 6 stocks were responsible for over 100% of gains in the NASDAQ index. Dont think FB has a good long term business model, or that Gilead and AMZN are a cheap buy? Well too bad if you bought QQQ, because those 3 stocks are your workhorses now. See here 6) That graphic is for mutual funds but your pension fund may have also been including hedge funds in their 99% figure. While many dont beat their own benchmark, its less than 99%. And there are reasons for it. Many have investors that are impatient. Fortress just had to close one of its funds, whose bets may actually pay off years from now, but too many people wanted their money out. Some hedge funds also have rules, eg long only, which can really limit your performance. While important to be aware of this, that placing your money with a hedge fund may not beat a benchmark, that does not automatically mean you should go with an index fund. So when are index funds useful? When you dont want to do any thinking. When you dont want to follow market news, at all. Then they are appropriate. "Bob should treat both positions as incomplete, and explore a viewpoint which does a better job of separating value from volatility. So we should start by recognizing that what Bob is really doing is trading pieces of paper (say Stocks from Fund #1 or Bonds from Fund #2, to pick historically volatile and non-volatile instruments.*) for pieces of paper (Greenbacks).  In the end, this is a trade, and should always be thought of as such.  Does Bob value his stocks more than his bonds?  Then he should probably draw from Fund #2.  If he values his bonds more, he should probably draw from Fund #1. However, both Bob and his financial adviser demonstrate an assumption: that an instrument, whether stock bond or dollar bill, has some intrinsic value (which may raise over time).  The issue is whether its perceived value is a good measure of its actual value or not. From this perspective, we can see the stock (Fund #1) as having an actual value that grows quickly (6.5% - 1.85% = 4.65%), and the bond (Fund #2) as having an actual value that grows slower (4.5% - 1.15$ = 3.35$).  Now the perceived value of the stocks is highly volatile.  The Chairman of the Fed sneezes and a high velocity trader drives a stock up or down at a rate that would give you whiplash. This perspective aligns with the broker's opinion.  If the stocks are low, it means their perceived value is artificially low, and selling it would be a mistake because the market is perceiving those pieces of paper as being worth less than they actually are.  In this case, Bob wins by keeping the stocks, and selling bonds, because the stocks are perceived as undervalued, and thus are worth keeping until perceptions change. On the other hand, consider the assumption we carefully slid into the argument without any fanfare: the assumption that the actual value of the stock aligns with its historical value.  ""Past performance does not predict future results.""  Its entirely possible that the actual value of the stocks is actually much lower than the historical value, and that it was the perceived value that was artificially higher.  It may be continuing to do so... who knows how overvalued the perceived value actually was!  In this case, Bob wins by keeping the bonds.  In this case, the stocks may have ""underperformed"" to drive perceptions towards their actual value, and Bob has a great chance to get out from under this market. The reality is somewhere between them.  The actual values are moving, and the perceived values are moving, and the world mixes them up enough to make Scratchers lottery tickets look like a decent investment instrument.  So what can we do? Bob's broker has a smart idea, he's just not fully explaining it because it is unprofessional to do so.  Historically speaking, Bobs who lost a bunch of money in the stock market are poor judges of where the stock market is going next (arguably, you should be talking to the Joes who made a bunch of money. They might have more of a clue.).  Humans are emotional beings, and we have an emotional instinct to cut ties when things start to go south.  The market preys on emotional thinkers, happily giving them what they want in exchange for taking some of their money.  Bob's broker is quoting a well recognized phrase that is a polite way of saying ""you are being emotional in your judgement, and here is a phrasing to suggest you should temper that judgement."" Of course the broker may also not know what they're doing!  (I've seen arguments that they don't!)  Plenty of people listened to their brokers all the way to the great crash of 2008.  Brokers are human too, they just put their emotions in different places.  So now Bob has no clear voice to listen to.  Sounds like a trap! However, there is a solution.  Bob should think about more than just simple dollars.  Bob should think about the rest of his life, and where he would like the risk to appear.  If Bob draws from Fund #1 (liquidating stocks), then Bob has made a choice to realize any losses or gains early... specifically now.  He may win, he may lose.  However, no matter what, he will have a less volatile portfolio, and thus he can rely on it more in the long run. If Bob draws from Fund #2 (liquidating bonds) instead, then Bob has made a choice not to realize any losses or gains right away.  He may win, he may lose.  However, whether he wins or loses will not be clear, perhaps until retirement when he needs to draw on that money, and finds Fund #1 is still under-performing, so he has to work a few more years before retirement.  There is a magical assumption that the stock market will always continue rewarding risk takers, but no one has quite been able to prove it! Once Bob includes his life perspective in the mix, and doesn't look just at the cold hard dollars on the table, Bob can make a more educated decision.  Just to throw more options on the table, Bob might rationally choose to do any one of a number of other options which are not extremes, in order to find a happy medium that best fits Bob's life needs: * I intentionally chose to label Fund #1 as stocks and Fund #2 as bonds, even though this is a terribly crude assumption, because I feel those words have an emotional attachment associated to them which #1 and #2 simply do not.  Given that part of the argument is that emotions play a part, it seemed reasonable to dig into underlying emotional biases as part of my wording.  Feel free to replace words as you see fit to remove this bias if desired." From a mathematical point of view the stats do not change depending on past performance. Just because a fund is lucky one year doesn't mean that it will be unlucky the next. Consider tossing a coin, the chance of heads is 50%. If you have just thrown 3 heads, the chance of heads is still 50%. It doesn't go down.  If you throw 10 heads in a row the chance of a heads is still 50%, in fact you many suspect there is something odd about the coin, if it was an unfair coin then the chance of a heads would be higher than 50%. It could be the fund is better run, but there could be other reasons, including random chance. Some funds will randomly do better and some will randomly do worse What you do know is that if they did better than average other funds have done worse, at least for last year. "I hope a wall of text with citations qualifies as ""relatively easy."" Many of these studies are worth quoting at length. Long story short, a great deal of research has found that actively-managed funds underperform market indexes and passively-managed funds because of their high turnover and higher fees, among other factors.  Longer answer: Chris is right in stating that survivorship bias presents a problem for such research; however, there are several academic papers that address the survivorship problem, as well as the wider subject of active vs. passive performance. I'll try to provide a brief summary of some of the relevant literature.  The seminal paper that started the debate is Michael Jensen's 1968 paper titled ""The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964"". This is the paper where Jensen's alpha, the ubiquitous measure of the performance of mutual fund managers, was first defined. Using a dataset of 115 mutual fund managers, Jensen finds that The evidence on mutual fund performance indicates not only that these 115 mutual funds were on average not able to predict security prices well enough to outperform a buy-the-market-and-hold policy, but also that there is very little evidence that any individual fund was able to do significantly better than that which we expected from mere random chance. Although this paper doesn't address problems of survivorship, it's notable because, among other points, it found that managers who actively picked stocks performed worse even when fund expenses were ignored. Since actively-managed funds tend to have higher expenses than passive funds, the actual picture looks even worse for actively managed funds. A more recent paper on the subject, which draws similar conclusions, is Martin Gruber's 1996 paper ""Another puzzle: The growth in actively managed mutual funds"". Gruber calls it ""a puzzle"" that investors still invest in actively-managed funds, given that their performance on average has been inferior to that of index funds. He addresses survivorship bias by tracking funds across the entire sample, including through mergers. Since most mutual funds that disappear are merged into existing funds, he assumes that investors in a fund that disappear choose to continue investing their money in the fund that resulted from the merger. Using this assumption and standard measures of mutual fund performance, Gruber finds that mutual funds underperform an appropriately weighted average of the indices by about 65 basis points per year. Expense ratios for my sample averaged 113 basis points a year. These numbers suggest that active management adds value, but that mutual funds charge the investor more than the value added. Another nice paper is Mark Carhart's 1997 paper ""On persistence in mutual fund performance"" uses a sample free of survivorship bias because it includes ""all known equity funds over this period."" It's worth quoting parts of this paper in full: I demonstrate that expenses have at least a one-for-one negative impact on fund performance, and that turnover also negatively impacts performance. ... Trading reduces performance by approximately 0.95% of the trade's market value.  In reference to expense ratios and other fees, Carhart finds that The investment costs of expense ratios, transaction costs, and load fees all have a direct, negative impact on performance. The study also finds that funds with abnormally high returns last year usually have higher-than-expected returns next year, but not in the following years, because of momentum effects. Lest you think the news is all bad, Russ Wermer's 2000 study ""Mutual fund performance: An empirical decomposition into stock‐picking talent, style, transactions costs, and expenses"" provides an interesting result. He finds that many actively-managed mutual funds hold stocks that outperform the market, even though the net return of the funds themselves underperforms passive funds and the market itself.  On a net-return level, the funds underperform broad market indexes by one percent a year. Of the 2.3% difference between the returns on stock holdings and the net returns of the funds, 0.7% per year is due to the lower average returns of the nonstock holdings of the funds during the period (relative to stocks). The remaining 1.6% per year is split almost evenly between the expense ratios and the transaction costs of the funds. The final paper I'll cite is a 2008 paper by Fama and French (of the Fama-French model covered in business schools) titled, appropriately, ""Mutual Fund Performance"". The paper is pretty technical, and somewhat above my level at this time of night, but the authors state one of their conclusions bluntly quite early on: After costs (that is, in terms of net returns to investors) active investment is a negative sum game.  Emphasis mine. In short, expense ratios, transaction costs, and other fees quickly diminish the returns to active investment. They find that The [value-weight] portfolio of mutual funds that invest primarily in U.S. equities is close to the market portfolio, and estimated before fees and expenses, its alpha is close to zero. Since the [value-weight] portfolio of funds produces an α close to zero in gross returns, the alpha estimated on the net returns to investors is negative by about the amount of fees and expenses. This implies that the higher the fees, the farther alpha decreases below zero. Since actively-managed mutual funds tend to have higher expense ratios than passively-managed index funds, it's safe to say that their net return to the investor is worse than a market index itself. I don't know of any free datasets that would allow you to research this, but one highly-regarded commercial dataset is the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free US Mutual Fund Database from the Center for Research in Security Prices at the University of Chicago. In financial research, CRSP is one of the ""gold standards"" for historical market data, so if you can access that data (perhaps for a firm or academic institution, if you're affiliated with one that has access), it's one way you could run some numbers yourself." I think you're missing Simon Moore's point. His point is that, due to low inflation, the returns on almost all asset classes should be less than they have been historically, so we shouldn't rebalance our portfolio or withdraw from the market and hold cash based on the assumption that stocks (or any other asset) seem to be underperforming relative to historical trends.  His last paragraph is written in case someone might misunderstand him, he is not advocating to hold cash, just that investors should not expect as good returns as has happened historically, since those happened in higher inflation environments. To explain: If the inflation rate historically has been 5% and now it's 2%, and the risk-free-market return should be about 2%, then historically the return on a risk-free asset would be 7% (2%+5%), and now it should be expected to be 4% (2%+2%). So, if you have had a portfolio over some time you might be concerned that the rate of return is worsening, but Simon's point is that before you sell off your stocks / switch investment brokers, you should try to figure out if inflation is the cause of the performance loss. On the subject  of cash: cash always loses value over time from inflation, since inflation is a measure of the increase in prices over time-- it's a part of the definition of what inflation is.  That said, cash holdings lose value more slowly when inflation is lower, so they are relatively less worse than before. The future value of cash doesn't go up in low inflation (you'd need deflation for that), it just decreases at a lower rate, that is, it becomes less expensive to hold- but there still is a price. As an addendum, unless a completely new economic paradigm is adopted by world leaders, we will always see cash holdings decrease in value over time, since modern economics holds that deflation is one of the worst things that can happen to an economy. Interesting stuff, but I'd want to know how it occurred to them to check for a Citigroup Bear Run.  It sounds like they simply datamined for one case which fit their hypothesis.  I'd also like to see (1) how other finance companies fared in the same period and (2) how many upticks were available to sell on. Buffet is in a different league from other value investors. He looks for stable companies with no debt and good management. Then he looks to deeply understand the industries of candidate companies, and looks for companies that are not in commodity businesses or sell commodities that can be bought for 25% of the valuation that he believes reflects the true value of the company. Deeply understanding the market is really the key.  Consider the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad, which Buffet purchased last year. Railroads benefit from higher oil prices, as they can transport cargo much cheaper than trucks. They also tend to have natural monopolies in the regions they operate in. Buffet bought the railroad just as production of oil and natural gas in North Dakota started picking up. Since pipeline capacity between North Dakota and refineries in Texas/Oklahoma is very limited, the railroad is making alot of money transporting crude. My view is that hedge funds and high-frequency traders tend to create this correlation because they're making directional bets on individual stocks, grouped as a whole, and then share these ideas with so many other funds (who, in turn, do the same thing).  I think Beta and inflated share prices are related to this effect, but are not the cause of this effect. "Despite Buffett's nearly perfect consistent advice over the past few decades, they don't reflect his earliest days.  His modern philosophy seemed to solidify in the 1970s. You can see that Buffett's earliest days grew faster, at 29.5 % for those partners willing to take on leverage with Buffett, than the last half century, at 19.7%. Not only is Buffett limited by size, as its quite difficult to squeeze one half trillion USD into sub-billion USD investments, but the economy thus market is far different than it was before the 1980s.  He would have to acquire at least 500 billion USD companies outright, and there simply aren't that many available that satisfy all of his modern conditions. The market is much different now than it was when he first started at Graham-Newman because before the 1960s, the economy thus market would collapse and rebound about every few years.  This sort of variance can actually help a value investor because a true value investor will abandon investments when valuations are high and go all in when valuations are low.  The most extreme example was when he tried to as quietly as possible buy up an insurance company selling for something like a P/E of 1 during one of the collapses.  These kinds of opportunities are seldom available anymore, not even during the 2009 collapse. As he became larger, those investments became off limits because it simply wasn't worth his time to find such a high returner if it's only a bare fraction of his wealth.  Also, he started to deviate from Benjamin Graham's methods and started to incorporate Philip Fisher's. By the 1970s, his investment philosophy was more or less cemented.  He tried to balance Graham's avarice for price with Fisher's for value. All of the commentary that special tax dodges or cheap financing are central to his returns are false.  They contributed, but they are ancillary. As one can see by comparing the limited vs general partners, leverage helps enormously, but this is still a tangent. Buffett has undoubtedly built his wealth from the nature of his investments.  The exact blueprint can be constructed by reading every word he has published and any quotes he has not disavowed.  Simply, he buys the highest quality companies in terms of risk-adjusted growth at the best available prices.  Quantitatively, it is a simple strategy to replicate.  NFLX was selling very cheaply during the mid-2000s, WDC sells frequently at low valuations, up and coming retailers frequently sell at low valuations, etc. The key to Buffett's method is emotional control and removing the mental block that price equals value; price is cost, value is revenue, and that concept is the hardest for most to imbibe.  Quoting from the first link: One sidelight here: it is extraordinary to me that the idea of buying dollar bills for 40 cents takes immediately to people or it doesn't take at all. It's like an inoculation. If it doesn't grab a person right away, I find that you can talk to him for years and show him records, and it doesn't make any difference. They just don't seem able to grasp the concept, simple as it is. A fellow like Rick Guerin, who had no formal education in business, understands immediately the value approach to investing and he's applying it five minutes later. I've never seen anyone who became a gradual convert over a ten-year period to this approach. It doesn't seem to be a matter of IQ or academic training. It's instant recognition, or it is nothing. and I'm convinced that there is much inefficiency in the market. These Graham-and-Doddsville investors have successfully exploited gaps between price and value. When the price of a stock can be influenced by a ""herd"" on Wall Street with prices set at the margin by the most emotional person, or the greediest person, or the most depressed person, it is hard to argue that the market always prices rationally. In fact, market prices are frequently nonsensical. and finally  Success in investing doesn’t correlate with I.Q. once you’re above the level of 25. Once you have ordinary intelligence, what you need is the temperament to control the urges that get other people into trouble in investing. There is almost no information on any who has helped Buffett internally or even managed Berkshire's investments aside from Louis Simpson. It is unlikely that Buffett has allowed anyone to manage much of Berkshire's investments considering the consistent stream of commentary from him claiming that he nearly does nothing except read annual reports all day to the extent that he may have neglected his family to some degree and that listening to others will more likely hurt performance than help with the most striking example being his father's recommendation that he not open a hedge fund after retiring from Graham-Newman because he believed the market was topping, and he absolutely idolized his father." This is 100% accurate.  Most mega funds are successful for many reasons including value and growth.  The real reason that fund in particular crushes it has a lot to do with it's DRIP and the fact that the fund has a large influence on the market itself. I have a personal theory that due to Warren Buffett having the entire faith and backing of Wall Street, that it definitely plays into his returns. Look at the mortgage originator he sank money into that was truly a terrible business. A whole lot of Wall Street poured money into it right after as well. I don't think he would be as consistent if he were only buying a handful of shares and couldn't influence the entire price as a whole, but I'm not denying historically he's made a lot of good picks. I suppose if you consider tax liability, and when you moved back in with your parents they started claiming you as a dependent on their taxes, but otherwise single-filer means you are your own household regardless of who rents to you.