Sovereign immunity in the United States

In United States law, the federal government as well as state and tribal governments generally enjoy sovereign immunity, also known as governmental immunity, from lawsuits. Local governments in most jurisdictions enjoy immunity from some forms of suit, particularly in tort. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act provides foreign governments, including state-owned companies, with a related form of immunity—state immunity—that shields them from lawsuits except in relation to certain actions relating to commercial activity in the United States. The principle of sovereign immunity in US law was inherited from the English common law legal maxim , meaning "the king can do no wrong." In some situations, sovereign immunity may be waived by law.
Sovereign immunity falls into two categories:
Absolute immunity applies to acts that, if subject to challenge, would significantly affect the operation of government, such as would occur if a legislator could be sued for core legislative acts, and is also typically extended to statements made on the floor of the legislature. Similar protections apply to judges who are acting in a judicial capacity.
Federal sovereign immunity.
In the United States, the federal government has sovereign immunity and may not be sued unless it has waived its immunity or consented to suit. The United States as a sovereign is immune from suit unless it unequivocally consents to being sued. The United States Supreme Court in "Price v. United States" observed: "It is an axiom of our jurisprudence. The government is not liable to suit unless it consents thereto, and its liability in suit cannot be extended beyond the plain language of the statute authorizing it."
The principle was not mentioned in the original United States Constitution. The courts have recognized it both as a principle that was inherited from English common law, and as a practical, logical inference (that the government cannot be compelled by the courts because it is the power of the government that creates the courts in the first place).
The United States has waived sovereign immunity to a limited extent, mainly through the Federal Tort Claims Act, which waives the immunity if a tortious act of a federal employee causes damage, and the Tucker Act, which waives the immunity over claims arising out of contracts to which the federal government is a party. The Federal Tort Claims Act and the Tucker Act are not the broad waivers of sovereign immunity they might appear to be, as there are a number of statutory exceptions and judicially fashioned limiting doctrines applicable to both. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1331 confers federal question jurisdiction on district courts, but this statute has been held not to be a blanket waiver of sovereign immunity on the part of the federal government.
In Federal tax refund cases filed by taxpayers (as opposed to third parties) against the United States, various courts have indicated that Federal sovereign immunity is waived under subsection (a)(1) of in conjunction with Internal Revenue Code section 7422 (), or under section 7422 in conjunction with subsection (a) of Internal Revenue Code section 6532 (). Further, in "United States v. Williams", the U.S. Supreme Court held that in case where an individual paid a federal tax under protest to remove a federal tax lien on her property where the tax she paid had been assessed against a third party, the waiver of sovereign immunity found in authorized her tax refund suit.
Congress has also waived sovereign immunity for patent infringement claims under , but that statute balances this waiver with provisions that limit the remedies available to the patent holder. The government may not be enjoined from infringing a patent, and persons performing work for the government are immune both from liability and from injunction. Any recourse must be had only against the government in the United States Court of Federal Claims. In "Advanced Software Design v. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis", the Federal Circuit expanded the interpretation of this protection to extend to private companies doing work not as contractors, but in which the government participates even indirectly.
Section 702 of the Administrative Procedures Act provides a broad waiver of sovereign immunity for actions taken by administrative agencies. It provides that persons suffering a legal wrong because of an agency action are entitled to judicial review.
State sovereign immunity in federal courts.
Early history and Eleventh Amendment.
In 1793, the Supreme Court held in "Chisholm v. Georgia" that of the United States Constitution, which granted diversity jurisdiction to the federal courts, allowed lawsuits "between a State and Citizens of another State" as the text reads. In 1795, the Eleventh Amendment was ratified in response to this ruling, removing federal judicial jurisdiction from lawsuits "prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State". The validity and retroactivity of the Eleventh Amendment was affirmed in the 1798 case "Hollingsworth v. Virginia".
Later interpretation.
In "Hans v. Louisiana", the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Eleventh Amendment re-affirms that states possess sovereign immunity and are therefore immune from being sued in federal court without their consent. In later cases, the Supreme Court has strengthened state sovereign immunity considerably. In "Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak", the court explained that
(Citations omitted). In "Alden v. Maine", the Court explained that while it has
Writing for the court in "Alden", Justice Anthony Kennedy argued that in view of this, and given the limited nature of congressional power delegated by the original unamended Constitution, the court could not "conclude that the specific Article I powers delegated to Congress necessarily include, by virtue of the Necessary and Proper Clause or otherwise, the incidental authority to subject the States to private suits as a means of achieving objectives otherwise within the scope of the enumerated powers." Sovereign immunity as interpreted by the Supreme Court in "Alden v. Maine" means a constitutional prohibition of suits against states by its own citizens in state courts and federal courts.
However, a "consequence of [the] Court's recognition of pre-ratification sovereignty as the source of immunity from suit is that "only" States and "arms of the State" possess immunity from suits authorized by federal law." "Northern Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Chatham County" (emphases added). Thus, cities and municipalities lack sovereign immunity, "Jinks v. Richland County", and counties are not generally considered to have sovereign immunity, even when they "exercise a 'slice of state power.'" "Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency".
Separately, sovereign immunity of a state from lawsuits in other states have been in question. The Supreme Court ruled in "Nevada v. Hall" (1977) that states are not constitutionally immune from being named in lawsuits filed in other states. In the intervening years, many states developed legislation that recognize sovereign immunity of other states; since 1979, there had only been 14 legal cases that did involve a state being named as a litigant in a case heard in another state. The Supreme Court overturned "Nevada" in its 2019 decision of "Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt" (Docket 17-1299) that states did enjoy constitutional sovereign immunity from lawsuits in other states.
State actions in violation of the US or state Constitution.
State sovereign immunity does not extend to cases where a plaintiff alleges the state's action is in violation of the federal or state constitution. In "Department of Revenue v. Kuhnlein", the Florida Department of Revenue claimed that sovereign immunity prevented plaintiffs from bringing a case that alleged that a tax violated the Commerce Clause and, furthermore, that if the tax was unconstitutional, the refund request could not be given because it did not comply with state statutes for tax refunds. The Florida Supreme Court rejected those arguments, stating: "Sovereign immunity does not exempt the State from a challenge based on violation of the federal or state constitutions, because any other rule self-evidently would make constitutional law subservient to the State's will. Moreover, neither the common law nor a state statute can supersede a provision of the federal or state constitutions."
Tribal sovereign immunity.
The federal government recognizes tribal nations as "domestic dependent nations" and has established a number of laws attempting to clarify the relationship between the federal, state, and tribal governments. Generally speaking, Native American tribes enjoy immunity from suit—in federal, state, or tribal courts—unless they consent to suit, or unless the federal government abrogates that immunity.
However, individual members of the tribe are not immune. Under certain circumstances, a tribal official acting in his or her official capacity, and within the scope of his or her statutory authority, may be cloaked with sovereign immunity. But if a tribal official's tortious acts exceed the scope of his or her authority, the official is subject to suit for those acts. See Cosentino vs. Fuller, Cal. Ct. App. (May 28, 2015).
Foreign sovereign immunity in state and federal courts.
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) of 1976 establishes the limitations as to whether a foreign sovereign nation (or its political subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities) may be sued in U.S. courts—federal or state. It also establishes specific procedures for service of process and attachment of property for proceedings against a Foreign State. The FSIA provides the exclusive basis and means to bring a lawsuit against a foreign sovereign in the United States. In international law, the prohibition against suing a foreign government is known as state immunity.
Local governmental immunity.
Counties and municipalities are not entitled to sovereign immunity. In "Lincoln County v. Luning", the court held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar an individual's suit in federal court against a county for nonpayment of a debt. By contrast, a suit against a statewide agency is considered a suit against the state under the Eleventh Amendment. In allowing suits against counties and municipalities, the court was unanimous, relying in part on its "general acquiescence" in such suits over the prior thirty years. William Fletcher, a professor of legal studies at Yale University, explains the different treatment on the ground that in the nineteenth century, a municipal corporation was viewed as more closely analogous to a private corporation than to a state government.
County and municipal officials, when sued in their official capacity, can only be sued for prospective relief under federal law. Under state law, however, the court in "Pennhurst" noted that even without immunity, suits against municipal officials relate to an institution run and funded by the state, and any relief against county or municipal officials that has some significant effect on the state treasury must be considered a suit against the state, and barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Exceptions and abrogation.
There are exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunities derived from the 11th amendment:
Discrimination.
If the state or local government entities receive federal funding for whatever purpose, they cannot claim sovereign immunity if they are sued in federal court for discrimination. The United States Code, Title 42, Section 2000d-7 explicitly says this.
The 2001 Supreme Court decision of "Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett" seems to nullify this; however, numerous appellate court cases, such as "Doe v. Nebraska" in the 8th Circuit and "Thomas v. University of Houston" of the 5th Circuit have held that, as long as the state entity receives federal funding, then the sovereign immunity for discrimination cases is not abrogated, but voluntarily waived. Since the receiving of the federal funds was optional, then the waiver of sovereign immunity was optional. If a state entity wanted its sovereign immunity back, all they have to do in these circuits is stop receiving federal funding.
However, the 2nd Circuit does not share this ideal. Currently, they are the only federal court of appeals to take this approach to the issue.
Arbitration.
In "C & L Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizen Band, Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma", 532 U.S. 411 (2001), the Supreme Court held that sovereigns are not immune under the Federal Arbitration Act. Since arbitration is a matter of contract between the parties, agreeing to participate in arbitration constitutes consent to be subject to the arbitrator's jurisdiction, thus constituting a voluntary waiver of immunity.
Suits brought by the United States.
Because the U.S. is a superior sovereign, it may need to bring suit against a state from time to time. According to the Supreme Court, proper jurisdiction for a contract suit by the United States Federal Government against a state is in Federal District Court.
Suits brought by another state.
Similar to the U.S. v. state exclusion above, a state may also sue another state in the federal court system. Again, there would be a conflict of interest if either state's court system tried the case. Instead, the federal court system provides a neutral forum for the case.
Under Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court of the United States has original jurisdiction over cases between states. Congress, if it so chooses, may grant lower federal courts concurrent jurisdiction over cases between states. However, Congress has not yet chosen to do so. Thus, the United States Supreme Court currently has original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases between state governments.
Suits filed against state officials under the "stripping doctrine".
The "stripping doctrine" permits a state official who used his or her position to act illegally to be sued in his or her individual capacity. However, the government itself is still immune from being sued through respondeat superior. The courts have called this "stripping doctrine" a legal fiction. Therefore, a claimant may sue an official under this "stripping doctrine" and get around any sovereign immunity that that official might have held with his or her position.
When a claimant uses this exception, the state cannot be included in the suit; instead, the name of the individual defendant is listed. The claimant cannot seek damages from the state, because the claimant cannot list the state as a party. The claimant can seek prospective, or future, relief by asking the court to direct the future behavior of the official.
For example, "Ex parte Young" allows federal courts to enjoin the enforcement of unconstitutional state (or federal) statutes on the theory that "immunity does not extend to a person who acts for the state, but [who] acts unconstitutionally, because the state is powerless to authorize the person to act in violation of the Constitution." Althouse, "Tapping the State Court Resource", 44 Vand. L. Rev. 953, 973 (1991). "Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman" (465 U.S.) ("the authority-stripping theory of "Young" is a fiction that has been narrowly construed"); "Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho" (""Young" rests on a fictional distinction between the official and the State"). The "Young" doctrine was narrowed by the court in "Edelman v. Jordan", which held that relief under "Young" can only be for prospective, rather than retrospective, relief; the court reasoned that the Eleventh Amendment's protection of state sovereignty requires the state's coffers to be shielded from suit. Prospective relief includes injunctions and other equitable orders, but would rarely include damages. This limitation of the "Young" doctrine "focused attention on the need to abrogate sovereign immunity, which led to the decision two years later in "Fitzpatrick"." Althouse, "Vanguard States", supra, at 1791 n.216
The 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows state officials to be sued in their individual or official capacities, a principle which was demonstrated again in "Brandon v. Holt".
Suits as to which Congress has abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The federal government and nearly every state have passed tort claims acts allowing them to be sued for the negligence, but not intentional wrongs, of government employees. The common-law tort doctrine of "respondeat superior" makes employers generally responsible for the torts of their employees. In the absence of this waiver of sovereign immunity, injured parties would generally have been left without an effective remedy. See "Brandon v. Holt".
Under the abrogation doctrine, while Congress cannot use its Article I powers to subject states to lawsuits in either federal courts, "Seminole Tribe v. Florida", or "a fortiori" its own courts, "Alden", supra, it "can" abrogate a state's sovereign immunity pursuant to the powers granted to it by §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and thus subject them to lawsuits. "Seminole", supra; "Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer". However:
The Court has found that somewhat different rules may apply to Congressional efforts to subject the states to suit in the domain of federal bankruptcy law. In "Central Virginia Community College v. Katz", the Court held that state sovereign immunity was not implicated by the exercise of "in rem" jurisdiction by bankruptcy courts in voiding a preferential transfer to a state. Justice Stevens, writing for a majority of five (including Justice O'Connor, in one of her last cases before retirement, and Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer), referred to the rationale of an earlier bankruptcy decision, but relied more broadly on the nature of the bankruptcy power vested in Congress under Article I. "The question", he stated, "[was] not whether Congress could 'abrogate' state sovereign immunity in the Bankruptcy Act (as Congress had attempted to do); rather, because the history and justification of the Bankruptcy Clause, as well as legislation enacted immediately following ratification, demonstrate that [the Bankruptcy Clause] was intended not just as a grant of legislative authority to Congress, but also to authorize limited subordination of state sovereign immunity in the bankruptcy arena." In reaching this conclusion, he acknowledged that the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe and succeeding cases had assumed that those holdings would apply to the Bankruptcy Clause, but stated that the Court was convinced by "[c]areful study and reflection" that "that assumption was erroneous". The Court then crystallized the current rule: when Congressional legislation regulates matters that implicate "a core aspect of the administration of bankrupt estates", sovereign immunity is no longer available to the States if the statute subjects them to private suits.
The Court in "Central Virginia Community College v. Katz" added this caveat: "We do not mean to suggest that every law labeled a 'bankruptcy' law could, consistent with the Bankruptcy Clause, properly impinge upon state sovereign immunity".
Certain contracts with the government.
By way of the Tucker Act, certain claims of monetary damages against the United States are exempt from sovereign immunity. These cases are heard by the United States Court of Federal Claims, or, for cases involving less than ten thousand dollars, a district court has concurrent jurisdiction.
Examples of contracts where immunity is waived include:
Actions taken in bad faith.
If a plaintiff can demonstrate that the government's action was done in bad faith, the plaintiff can receive damages despite sovereign immunity. Typically if a party can demonstrate that the government intentionally acted wrongly with the sole purpose of causing damages, that party can recover for injury or economic losses. For example, if access lanes to a major bridge are closed for repair and the closure results in severe traffic congestion, the action was in good faith and the state could not be sued. However, if, as in the Fort Lee lane closure scandal, the lanes were closed in retaliation against a mayor who declined to support a politician's campaign, with the explicit purpose of causing traffic jams, such lawsuits could proceed.