Breed-specific legislation

Breed-specific legislation (BSL) is a type of law that prohibits or restricts particular breeds or types of dog. Such laws range from outright bans on the possession of these dogs, to restrictions and conditions on ownership, and often establishes a legal presumption that such dogs are dangerous or vicious. Some jurisdictions have enacted breed-specific legislation in response to a number of fatalities or maulings involving pit bull–type dogs or other dog breeds commonly used in dog fighting, and some government organizations such as the United States Army and Marine Corps have taken administrative action as well. Due to opposition to such laws, anti-BSL laws have been passed in 21 of the 50 state-level governments in the United States, prohibiting or restricting the ability of jurisdictions within those states to enact or enforce breed-specific legislation.
Background.
It is generally settled in case law that jurisdictions in the United States and Canada have the right to enact breed-specific legislation; however, the appropriateness and effectiveness of breed-specific legislation in preventing dog bite fatalities and injuries is disputed. One point of view is that certain dog breeds are a public safety issue that merits actions such as banning ownership, mandatory spay/neuter for all dogs of these breeds, mandatory microchip implants and liability insurance, or prohibiting people convicted of a felony from owning them. Another point of view is that comprehensive "dog bite" legislation, coupled with better consumer education and legally mandating responsible pet keeping practices, is a better solution than breed-specific legislation to the problem of dangerous dogs. A third point of view is that breed-specific legislation should not ban breeds entirely, but should strictly regulate the conditions under which specific breeds could be owned, "e.g.", forbidding certain classes of individuals from owning them, specifying public areas in which they would be prohibited, and establishing conditions, such as requiring a dog to wear a muzzle, for taking dogs from specific breeds into public places. Finally, some governments, such as that of Australia, have forbidden the import of specific breeds and are requiring the spay/neuter of all existing dogs of these breeds in an attempt to eliminate the population slowly through natural attrition.
Approximately 550 jurisdictions in the United States have enacted breed-specific legislation in response to a number of well-publicized incidents involving pit bull–type dogs, and some government organizations such as the U.S. Army and Marine Corps have taken administrative action as well. These actions range from outright bans on the possession of pit bull–type dogs, to restrictions and conditions on pit bull ownership. They often establish a legal presumption that a pit bull–type dog is "prima facie" a legally "dangerous" or "vicious" dog. In response, 16 states in the U.S. prohibited or restricted the ability of municipal governments within those states to enact BSL, though these restrictions do not affect military installations located within the states.
In a 2014 literature review, the American Veterinary Medical Association stated that "controlled studies have not identified this breed group as disproportionately dangerous", and that "it has not been demonstrated that introducing a breed-specific ban will reduce the rate or severity of bite injuries occurring in the community". In 2012, the American Bar Association passed a resolution urging the repeal of breed-specific legislation, stating that it is "ineffective at improving public safety". In 2013, researchers in Canada found no difference in incidence of dog bites between municipalities with breed-specific legislation and those without it, and in 2008, the Dutch government repealed a 15 year ban on pit bulls, concluding the law was ineffective. A 2017 study examining dog-bite characteristics in Ireland has suggested that targetting specific dog breeds can have significant negative outcomes. The study found that no significant difference existed between legislated and non-legislated dog breeds for the type of bite inflicted, and the medical treatment needed after the bite. The authors found that non-legislated dog breeds were less likely to be reported to the authorities both before and after the bite compared to legislated dog breeds. The publication suggests there is no scientifically valid basis for breed-specific legislation, and suggests significant negative consequences may result from its introduction. A study by the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in 2000 concluded that fatal attacks on humans appeared to be a breed-specific problem (pit bull–type dogs and Rottweilers accounted for half of all fatal dog attacks on humans between 1979 and 1998). However, they also concluded that fatal attacks represent a small proportion of dog bite injuries to humans and suggested that there may be better alternatives for prevention of dog bites than breed-specific ordinances. Given many media sources reported that this study suggested that pit bull–type dogs and Rottweilers are disproportionately more dangerous than other dog breeds, the American Veterinary Medical Association whose journal published the original article released a statement detailing that this study "cannot be used to infer any breed specific risk for dog bite fatalities" (for lack of sufficient data on total breed ownership). 
Australia.
The importation of the Dogo Argentino, Fila Brasileiro, Japanese tosa, American pit bull terrier and Perro de Presa Canario or Presa Canario into Australia is prohibited.
Canada.
The Canadian federal government does not regulate pit bull–type dogs, but two provincial governments and some municipal governments in Canada have enacted breed-specific legislation banning or restricting pit bull–type dogs. The following table discusses a sampling of the restrictions in force.
Legal challenges, Ontario 2007-2009.
In "Cochrane v. Ontario (Attorney General)", 2007 CanLII 9231 (ON S.C.), Ms. Catherine Cochrane sued the Province of Ontario to prevent it from enforcing the Dog Owner's Liability Act (DOLA) ban on pit bull–type dogs, arguing that the law was unconstitutionally broad because the ban was grossly disproportionate to the risk pit bulls pose to public safety, and that the law was unconstitutionally vague because it failed to provide an intelligible definition of pit bulls. She also argued that a provision allowing the Crown to introduce as evidence a veterinarian's certificate certifying that the dog is a pit bull violates the right to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence.
The presiding judge ruled that the DOLA was not overbroad because,
"The evidence with respect to the dangerousness of pit bulls, although conflicting and inconclusive, is sufficient, in my opinion, to constitute a 'reasoned apprehension of harm'. In the face of conflicting evidence as to the feasibility of less restrictive means to protect the public, it was open to the legislature to decide to restrict the ownership of all pit bulls."
The presiding judge found the term "a pit bull terrier" was unconstitutionally vague since it could include an undefined number of dogs similar to the American Pit Bull Terrier, American Staffordshire Terrier, and Staffordshire Bull Terrier. The judge also ruled that the government's ability to introduce a veterinarian's certificate certifying that the dog is a pit bull created a mandatory presumption that the dog was a pit bull, and that this placed an unconstitutional burden of proof upon the defendant.
In 2008, both Ms. Cochrane and the Attorney General of Ontario appealed different aspects of the decision to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.
In "Cochrane v. Ontario" (2008 ONCA 718), the Court of Appeal reversed the lower court's ruling:
On June 11, 2009 the Supreme Court of Canada declined to hear further appeal of the case, thereby upholding the Ontario ban on pit bulls.
Republic of Ireland.
The "Control of Dogs Regulations, 1998" place controls on 11 breeds of dogs: American Pit Bull Terrier, English Bull Terrier, Staffordshire Bull Terrier, Bull Mastiff, Doberman Pinscher, German Shepherd (Alsatian), Rhodesian Ridgeback, Rottweiler, Japanese Akita, Japanese Tosa, and Bandog. Under Irish law the above breeds must be led by someone at least 16 years of age, kept on a short strong lead, be muzzled and wear a collar bearing the name and address of their owner in public at all times.
These dogs, or strains and crosses thereof, must be kept on a strong, short lead (less than 2 metres / 6′ 7″) by a person over 16 years of age who is capable of controlling them. The dogs must be securely muzzled and wear a collar with the name and address of the owner.
United Kingdom.
In the United Kingdom the main piece of breed-specific legislation is the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, which makes it illegal to own any 'Specially Controlled Dogs' without specific exemption from a court. The dogs have to be muzzled and kept on a lead in public, they must be registered and insured, neutered, tattooed and receive microchip implants. The Act also bans the breeding, sale and exchange of these dogs, even if they are on the 'Index of Exempted Dogs'.
Four types of dogs are specifically identified by the Act:
The Act also covers cross-breeds of the above four types of dog. Dangerous dogs are classified by "type", not by breed label. This means that whether a dog is prohibited under the Act will depend on a judgement about its physical characteristics, and whether they match the description of a prohibited "type". This assessment of the physical characteristics is made by a court.
The Act applies in England, Wales and Scotland, with the Dangerous Dogs (Northern Ireland) Order 1991 having a similar effect in Northern Ireland. 
United States.
As of 2018 there is some level of breed-specific legislation in 37 states and over 1,000 cities. Though the Federal Government of the United States has not enacted breed-specific legislation, four of the five branches of the United States Armed Forces have restricted certain breeds at almost 300 installations (mostly with respect to on-base housing and privatized housing). Over 20 American Indian Reservations have also enacted BSL.
Samples of legislation.
Below are summaries of some of the breed-specific legislation enacted in the United States. This is "not" an all-inclusive list of BSL throughout the USA.
Legal challenges.
Court challenges to breed-specific legislation on constitutional grounds have been largely unsuccessful. Dana M. Campbell summarized the legal challenges and the general court findings as of July 2009:
Court cases challenging BSL have focused on constitutional concerns such as substantive due process, equal protection, and vagueness. Most BSL will survive the minimum scrutiny analysis allowed by the due process clauses of the Constitution's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because there is no fundamental right at issue. This analysis requires that the law being challenged must be rationally related to a legitimate government goal or purpose. Because state and local jurisdictions enjoy broad police powers, including protecting the public's safety and welfare, courts have not had trouble finding that BSL is rationally related to the goal of protecting the public from allegedly dangerous breeds.
This has caused big problems for many who use them as police, guide or other service dogs, as they are not always excluded, and in some cases are confiscated and put down.
Challenges based on equal protection arguments are similarly difficult to sustain. Here courts are looking at whether there is a rational purpose for treating pit bull breeds differently from other dog breeds. Dog owners have attacked the rational purpose requirement by arguing either that BSL is over-inclusive, because it bans all dogs of a breed when only certain individuals within the breed have proven to be vicious, or under-inclusive, because many types of dogs have injured people and the BSL fails to include those other breeds. However, again under minimum scrutiny review, BSL will survive as long as the government can establish that the BSL is rationally related to its purpose, even if the law is found to be over-inclusive or under-inclusive.
Claims that BSL is unconstitutionally vague have brought dog owners mixed success. Procedural due process requires that laws provide the public with sufficient notice of the activity or conduct being regulated or banned. Here owners of pit bulls or other banned breeds argue that the breed ban laws do not adequately define just what is a "pit bull" (or other banned breed) for purposes of the ban. Another argument is that the laws are too vague to help the dog-owning public or the BSL enforcement agency—such as animal control or police—to be able to identify whether a dog falls under the BSL if the dog was adopted with an unknown origin or is a mixed breed.
Federal courts.
"Sentell v. New Orleans and Carrollton Railroad Company".
In "Sentell v. New Orleans and Carrollton Railroad Company", 166 U.S. 698 (1897), Mr. Sentell sued the New Orleans and Carrollton Railroad Company to recover the value of his female Newfoundland dog that he alleged to have been negligently killed by the railroad company. The company claimed that Louisiana law held that only people who licensed their dogs were entitled to sue for compensation if the dog were killed, and that Mr. Sentell was not entitled to damages since he had not licensed his dog. The trial court in Orleans Parish found for Mr. Sentell and awarded him $250 US, so the railroad company appealed to the Louisiana Court of Appeal, which reversed the decision of the trial court. The Louisiana Supreme Court declined to hear the case, so Mr. Sentell then appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, which agreed to hear the case.
The Supreme Court ruled against Mr. Sentell and established the precedent in U.S. jurisprudence that the regulation of dogs was within the police power of the state, and that the dogs were not as valuable as horses, cattle, sheep, or other domesticated animals:It is true that under the Fourteenth Amendment, no state can deprive a person of his life, liberty, or property without due process of law, but in determining what is due process of law, we are bound to consider the nature of the property, the necessity for its sacrifice, and the extent to which it has heretofore been regarded as within the police power. So far as property is inoffensive or harmless, it can only be condemned or destroyed by legal proceedings, with due notice to the owner; but, so far as it is dangerous to the safety or health of the community, due process of law may authorize its summary destruction...
Although dogs are ordinarily harmless, they preserve some of their hereditary wolfish instincts, which occasionally break forth in the destruction of sheep and other helpless animals. Others, too small to attack these animals, are simply vicious, noisy, and pestilent. As their depredations are often committed at night, it is usually impossible to identify the dog or to fix the liability upon the owner, who, moreover, is likely to be pecuniarily irresponsible [not responsible for financial compensation]. In short, the damages are usually such as are beyond the reach of judicial process, and legislation of a drastic nature is necessary to protect persons and property from destruction and annoyance. Such legislation is clearly within the police power of the state. It ordinarily takes the form of a license tax, and the identification of the dog by a collar and tag, upon which the name of the owner is sometimes required to be engraved, but other remedies are not uncommon.
"Vanater v. Village of South Point".
In "Vanater v. Village of South Point", 717 F. Supp. 1236 (D. Ohio 1989), the Ohio federal district court held that the criminal ordinance of South Point, Ohio, prohibiting the owning or harboring of pit bull terriers within the village limits was not overly broad, concluding:
The Court concludes that the definitions of a Pit Bull Terrier in this Ordinance are not unconstitutionally vague. An ordinary person could easily refer to a dictionary, a dog buyer's guide or any dog book for guidance and instruction; also, the American Kennel Club and United Kennel Club have set forth standards for Staffordshire Bull Terriers and American Staffordshire Terriers to help determine whether a dog is described by any one of them. While it may be true that some definitions contain descriptions which lack "mathematical certainty," such precision and definiteness is not essential to constitutionality.
The court made the following findings of fact when it determined the village showed that pit bull terriers are uniquely dangerous and therefore, are proper subjects of the village's police power for the protection of the public's health and welfare:
"American Dog Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Dade County, Fla.".
In "American Dog Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Dade County, Fla.", 728 F.Supp. 1533 (S.D.Fla.,1989), dog owners sued in the federal district court of Florida to prevent Dade County from enforcing a pit bull ban, claiming that there is no such thing as a pit bull dog but rather three separate breeds; however, their own expert witnesses repeatedly identified dogs from the three separate breeds as "pit bull dogs" during the trial. The court upheld the Dade County ordinance, concluding:
Based upon the substantial evidence presented at trial, this court finds that Dade County Ordinance No. 89-022 provides sufficient guidance to dog owners, both in its explicit reference to pit bull dogs, and in its definitional section, to enable pit bull owners to determine whether their dogs fall within the proscriptions of the ordinance...Certainly there are some applications of the ordinance which pass constitutional muster. As long as the enactment is not impermissibly vague in all its applications, this court must uphold its constitutionality. Upon consideration of the evidence presented at trial, the pleadings, memoranda, exhibits and arguments of counsel and upon application of the controlling authority, this court finds that plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of proof and that the Court is required to uphold the constitutionality of Dade County Ordinance No. 089-22.
"American Canine Federation, v. City of Aurora, CO".
In "American Canine Federation and Florence Vianzon v. City of Aurora, Colorado", 618 F.Supp.2d 1271 (2009), the plaintiffs sued in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado to prevent Aurora, Colorado, from enforcing a pit bull ban on the grounds that the law was unconstitutionally vague, that the law was an abuse of the city's police power, and that the ban represented an unconstitutional taking of property. The court rejected each of these claims based on existing legal precedents and upheld the city's ordinance.
State courts.
Arkansas.
In "Holt v. City of Maumelle", 817 S.W.2d 208 (AR., 1991), Mr. Steele Holt sued the city of Maumelle, Arkansas, in 1988 in an attempt to have its prohibition against pit bulls overturned on the grounds that the ordinance was impermissibly vague, that it was unreasonable to ban pit bull–type dogs, and that the city's Board of Directors committed a breach of contract by passing a pit bull ordinance that it had previously agreed to forego; Mr. Holt also asked that the city pay compensatory damages, punitive damages, and his attorney's fees. The Pulaski County circuit court made a summary judgment dismissing the suit, and Mr. Holt appealed. In 1991, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision, finding that the pit bull ordinance was not impermissibly vague, that the restrictions were reasonable, and that any agreement made by the city to limit its own legislative powers was null and void since the city's first duty was to protect the public interest.
Colorado.
In "Colorado Dog Fanciers, Inc. v. City and County of Denver", 820 P.2d 644, Colo., 1991, the Colorado Supreme Court upheld a Denver city ordinance that dog owners had complained was unconstitutional, along the following lines:
In "City & County of Denver v. State of Colorado", 04CV3756, Denver challenged a 2004 law passed by the Colorado General Assembly that prohibited breed specific laws on the grounds that the state law violated the city's home rule authority in regard to animal control legislation. The Denver District Court Judge ruled in favor of Denver, finding that:
Florida.
In "State of Florida v. Peters", 534 So.2d 760 (Fla.App. 3 Dist. 1988), the Florida Third District Court of Appeal reviewed the city of North Miami ordinance regulating the ownership of pit bull dogs within the city limits, and held: (1) the ordinance did not violate the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution since the city's action in light of the evidence was neither arbitrary or irrational; (2) the ordinance's requirement to obtain liability insurance did not violate due process since the city had the right to regulate dogs under its police powers; (3) the definition of "pit bull" was not unconstitutionally vague, citing substantial precedent that laws requiring "substantial conformance" with a standard are not considered vague; and that mathematical certainty of a dog's identity as a pit bull was not required for a legal determination that a dog was in fact a pit bull.
Kansas.
In "Hearn v. City of Overland Park", 772 P.2d 758 (Kan. 1989), the Supreme Court of Kansas reviewed the ruling of a county court that overturned an ordinance of the city of Overland Park regulating the ownership of pit bull dogs within the city limits, and held: (1) The ordinance is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad; (2) the ordinance does not violate the due process rights of plaintiffs under the United States and Kansas Constitutions; (3) the ordinance does not violate the equal protection clauses of the United States and Kansas Constitutions; and (4) the district court did not err in dismissing the plaintiffs' claim for damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
Kentucky.
In "Bess v. Bracken County Fiscal Court", 210 S.W.3d 177 (Ky.App.,2006), the Kentucky Court of Appeals reviewed a Bracken County ordinance that banned pit bull terriers. The appellants (Mr. Bess and Mr. Poe) had sought a temporary injunction against the ordinance in the Bracken County Circuit Court. The court dismissed the motion on the grounds that the police power of the Fiscal Court allowed it to ban pit bull terriers and seize them without compensation. The appellants appealed on the grounds that:
The Appeals court upheld the Bracken County ordinance, finding that:
Massachusetts.
In "American Dog Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Lynn", 404 Mass. 73, 533 N.E.2d 642 (Mass.,1989), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reviewed a series of ordinances enacted by Lynn, Massachusetts, targeting dogs variously referred to as "American Staffordshire Terrier[s], a/k/a American Pit Bull Terrier[s] or Bull Terrier[s]" (July 1985); "American Staffordshire, Staffordshire Pit Bull Terrier or Bull Terrier, hereinafter referred to as 'Pit Bulls'" (June 1986); and ""American Staffordshire, Staffordshire Pit Bull Terrier, Bull Terrier or any mixture thereof" (September 1986).
The Supreme Judicial Court determined that the issue was technically moot since each of the ordinances in question had been repealed by passage of a subsequent "pit bull" ordinance in June 1987; however, the court specifically observed (but did not rule) that the 1987 ordinance relied on the "common understanding and usage" of the names of the breeds in question, and warned that 
the Lynn Pit Bull ban ordinance depends for enforcement on the subjective understanding of dog officers of the appearance of an ill-defined "breed," leaves dog owners to guess at what conduct or dog "look" is prohibited, and requires "proof" of a dog's "type" which, unless the dog is registered, may be impossible to furnish. Such a law gives unleashed discretion to the dog officers charged with its enforcement, and clearly relies on their subjective speculation whether a dog's physical characteristics make it what is "commonly understood" to be a "Pit Bull."
As a result of this case, breed-specific legislation in the United States often relies on the published standards of the American Kennel Club and United Kennel Club to clearly identify the characteristics of dogs subject to regulation as "pit bulls."
New Mexico.
In "Garcia v. Village of Tijeras", 767 P.2d 355 (1988), the New Mexico Court of Appeals reviewed an ordinance of the Village of Tijeras that banned the ownership or possession of a breed of dog "known as American Pit Bull Terrier"; any dog found in violation of the ordinance after a court hearing would be euthanized. The court held against each of the defendants' claims and upheld the ordinance on the following grounds:
New York.
The New York City Housing Authority updated their pet policy in 2010 to exclude dogs over 25 pounds and specifically prohibit Doberman Pinschers, Pit bulls, Rottweilers, and any mixes thereof.
Ohio.
In "Toledo v. Tellings" – Reversed – 871 N.E.2d 1152 (Ohio, 2007), the Ohio Sixth District Court of Appeal struck down a portion of the Toledo, Ohio, municipal code that limited people to owning only one pit bull. The law relied on a state definition of a vicious dog as one that has bitten or killed a human, has killed another dog, or "belongs to a breed that is commonly known as a Pit Bull dog." The court held that the legislation was void for violation of a Pit Bull owner's right to due process since the owner could not appeal a designation of his pet as a vicious dog. The court held that,"Since we conclude that there is no evidence that pit bulls are inherently dangerous or vicious, then the city ordinance limitation on ownership is also arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory."
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Court of Appeal ("Toledo v. Tellings", 114 Ohio St.3d 278, 2007-Ohio-3724), and reinstated the Toledo ordinance for the following reasons:
Mr. Tellings appealed the case to the Supreme Court of the United States, which declined to hear the case.
Texas.
In "City of Richardson v. Responsible Dog Owners of Texas", 794 S.W.2d 17 (Tex. 1990), several people ("Responsible Dog Owners") sued the city of Richardson, Texas, to prevent it from enforcing restrictions on pit bulls within its city limits on the grounds that the Texas state legislature had passed legislation preempting the a city's power to adopt an ordinance regulating the keeping of dogs. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the city, but the Texas Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision (781 S.W.2d 667). The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals and upheld the original decision on the grounds that
Under article XI, section 5 of the Texas Constitution, home-rule cities have broad discretionary powers provided that no ordinance "shall contain any provision inconsistent with the Constitution of the State, or of the general laws enacted by the Legislature of this State..." Thus, the mere fact that the legislature has enacted a law addressing a subject does not mean that the subject matter is completely preempted...Although there is a small area of overlap in the provisions of the narrow statute and the broader ordinance, we hold that it is not fatal.
Texas Health and Safety Code.
In the state of Texas, the State Health and Safety Code prohibits breed-specific legislation as stated
Sec. 822.047. LOCAL REGULATION OF DANGEROUS DOGS. A county or municipality may place additional requirements or restrictions on dangerous dogs if the requirements or restrictions:
(1) are not specific to one breed or several breeds of dogs; and
(2) are more stringent than restrictions provided by this subchapter.
Added by Acts 1991, 72nd Leg., ch. 916, Sec. 1, eff. September 1, 1991.
Washington.
In "McQueen v. Kittitas County", 115 Wash. 672, 677 (1921), the Washington Supreme Court established the broadly accepted precedent that cities have the power to regulate dogs, even to the point of banning specific breeds.[D]ogs do not stand on the same plane as horses, cattle, sheep, and other domesticated animals...On the general question, it is the almost universal current of authority that dogs are a subject of the police power of the state, and their keeping subject to any kind of license or regulation, even to absolute prohibition...since dogs are a subject of the police power, we see no reason why the legislature may not make distinctions between breeds, sizes and the localities in which they may be kept. The object of the statute is protection. The purpose is to prevent injuries to persons and property by dogs. Any distinction founded upon reasons at least, is therefore valid..."
In "American Dog Owners Ass'n v. City of Yakima", 777 P.2d 1046 (Wash.1989, "en banc"), the Washington Supreme Court reviewed a pit bull ban in the city of Yakima. The dog owners asked a state court to prevent Yakima from enforcing its ban on pit bull dogs. The trial court issued a temporary injunction against the city and accepted motions for summary judgment from both the dog owners and the city. The court decided in favor of the city and lifted the injunction, whereupon the dog owners appealed to the Washington Supreme Court on the grounds that the ordinance was vague because a person of ordinary intelligence could not tell what was prohibited, and that the trial court had improperly decided the summary judgment in favor of the city.
The Washington Supreme Court ruled that the ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague because it specified the dog breeds that together fit the definition of "pit bull", whereas an earlier case in Massachusetts, "American Dog Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Lynn", 404 Mass. 73, 533 N.E.2d 642 (1989), had resulted in the pit bull ban being annulled because the ordinance did not specify in sufficient detail what a "pit bull" was; in addition, the higher court ruled that the summary judgment had been properly awarded, thus upholding the Yakima pit bull ban.
Wisconsin.
In "Dog Federation of Wisconsin, Inc. v. City of South Milwaukee", 178 Wis.2d 353, 504 N.W.2d 375 (Wis.App.,1993), the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reviewed the appeal of a trial court decision upholding a pit bull ban in South Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court on the following grounds:
Worldwide.
Fifty-two countries have some form of breed-specific legislation, and 41 of those have BSL at the national level, as of December 2018.