Stop and identify statutes

"Stop and identify" statutes are laws in several U.S. states that authorize police to lawfully order people whom they reasonably suspect of a crime to state their name. If there is not reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed, is being committed, or is about to be committed, an individual is not required to provide identification, even in these states.
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and requires warrants to be supported by probable cause. In "Terry v. Ohio" (1968), the U.S. Supreme Court established that it is constitutional for police to temporarily detain a person based on an articulable reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed, and then to conduct a patdown for weapons based on a reasonable belief that the person is armed. Then in "Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada" (2004), the Supreme Court held that statutes requiring suspects to disclose their names during a valid "Terry" stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
However, some "stop and identify" statutes that are unclear about how people must identify themselves violate suspects' due process through the void for vagueness doctrine. For instance, in Kolender v. Lawson (1983), the Court invalidated a California law requiring "credible and reliable" identification as overly vague. The court also held that the Fifth Amendment could allow a suspect to refuse to give his name if he has a reasonable belief that giving his name could be incriminating.
The Nevada "stop-and-identify" law at issue in "Hiibel" allows police officers to detain any person they encounter under circumstances which reasonably indicate that "the person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime"; the person may be detained only to "ascertain his identity and the suspicious circumstances surrounding his presence abroad." In turn, the law requires the officer to have reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal involvement, and that the person detained "identify himself", but does not compel the person to answer any other questions put to him by the officer. The Nevada Supreme Court interpreted "identify" under the state's law to mean merely stating one's name.
As of April 2008, 23 other states have similar laws. Additional states (including Texas and Oregon) have such laws just for motorists.
Encounters between law enforcement and the general public.
In the United States, interactions between police and others fall into three general categories: consensual ("contact" or "conversation"), detention (often called a "Terry" stop, after "Terry v. Ohio", ), or arrest. "Stop and identify" laws pertain to detentions.
Different obligations apply to drivers of motor vehicles, who generally are required by state vehicle codes to present a driver's license to police upon request.
Consensual.
At any time, police may approach a person and ask questions. The objective may simply be a friendly conversation; however, the police also may suspect involvement in a crime, but lack "specific and articulable facts"
that would justify a detention or arrest, and hope to obtain these facts from the questioning. The person approached is not required to identify himself or herself or answer any other questions, and may leave at any time.
Police are not required to tell a person that he or she is free to decline to answer questions and go about their business;
however, a person can usually determine whether the interaction is consensual by asking, "Am I free to go?"
Reasonable suspicion.
A person is detained when circumstances are such that a reasonable person would believe he is not free to leave.
Police may briefly detain a person if they have reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. Many state laws explicitly grant this authority. In "Terry v. Ohio", the U.S. Supreme Court established that police may conduct a limited search for weapons (known as a "frisk") if they reasonably suspect that the person to be detained may be armed and dangerous.
Note that while the police officer must have reasonable suspicion to detain a person, they have no obligation to inform the person what that suspicion was. The only time the officer would have to articulate the suspicion is if the person was arrested, and challenged the validity of the stop in court.
Police may question a person detained in a Terry stop, but in general, the detainee is not required to answer.
However, many states have "stop and identify" laws that explicitly require a person detained under the conditions of "Terry" to identify himself to police, and in some cases, provide additional information.
Before "Hiibel", it was unresolved whether a detainee could be arrested and prosecuted for refusing to disclose his name. Authority on this issue was split among the federal circuit courts of appeal,
and the U.S. Supreme Court twice expressly refused to address the question.
In " Hiibel", the Court opinion implied that a detainee was not required to produce written identification, but could satisfy the requirement merely by stating his name. Some "stop and identify" laws do not require that a detainee identify himself, but allow refusal to do so to be considered along with other factors in determining whether there is probable cause to arrest.
, the Supreme Court has not addressed the validity of requirements that a detainee provide information other than his name; however, some states, such as Arizona, have specifically codified that a detained person is not required to provide any information aside from their full name.
Arrest.
A detention requires only that police have reasonable suspicion that a person is involved in criminal activity. However, to make an arrest, an officer must have probable cause to believe that the person has committed a crime. Some states require police to inform the person of the intent to make the arrest and the cause for the arrest.
But it is not always obvious when a detention becomes an arrest. After making an arrest, police may search a person, his or her belongings, and his or her immediate surroundings.
Whether an arrested person must identify himself may depend on the jurisdiction in which the arrest occurs. If a person is under arrest and police wish to question him, they are required to inform the person of his Fifth-Amendment right to remain silent by giving a Miranda warning. However, "Miranda" does not apply to biographical data necessary to complete booking.
It is not clear whether a "stop and identify" law could compel giving one's name after being arrested, although some states have laws that specifically require an arrested person to give his name and other biographical information,
and some state courts
have held that refusal to give one's name constitutes obstructing a public officer. As a practical matter, an arrested person who refused to give his name would have little chance of obtaining a prompt release.
Obligation to identify.
States not listed do not have a requirement to show Identification to law enforcement officers. Some states listed have "Stop and ID" laws which may or may not require someone to identify themselves during an investigative detention.
While Wisconsin statutes allow law enforcement officers to "demand" ID, there is no statutory requirement to provide them ID nor is there a penalty for refusing to, hence Wisconsin is not a must ID state. "Henes v. Morrissey", 194 Wis.2d 338, 353-54 (1995). Annotations for Wisconsin §968.24, however, state "The principles of "Terry" permit a state to require a suspect to disclose his or her name in the course of a "Terry" stop and allow imposing criminal penalties for failing to do so", citing "Hiibel" as authority.
Hiibel held that statutes requiring suspects to disclose their names during police investigations did not violate the Fourth Amendment if the statute first required reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal involvement. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held in Henes v. Morrissey that "A crime is made up of two parts: proscribed conduct and a prescribed penalty. "The former without the latter is no crime. ... In this case no statute penalizes a refusal to identify oneself to a law enforcement officer, and no penalty is set forth in the statute for refusing to identify oneself. This statute is part of Chapter 968 entitled "Commencement of Criminal Proceedings. By its very terms sec. 968.24 empowers a law enforcement officer to stop and question "in the vicinity where the person was stopped." The statute does not authorize a law enforcement officer to make an arrest."(These quotes comes from the dissenting opinion but is in line with the majority opinion.) Additionally Henes v. Morrissey held that a detained person not providing their name isn't on its own a violation of 946.41 Resisting or obstructing officer as the act of not identifying one's self
isn't a false statement with intent to mislead the officer in the performance of his or her duty.
Neither is Illinois, since the Illinois Second District Appellate Court Decision in "People v. Fernandez", 2011 IL App (2d) 100473, which specifically states that section 107-14 is found in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, not the Criminal Code of 1961, and governs the conduct of police officers. The fact remains that there is no corresponding duty in the Criminal Code of 1961 for a suspect to identify himself
or herself.
, there is no U.S. federal law requiring that an individual identify himself during a "Terry" stop, but "Hiibel" held that states may enact such laws, provided the law requires the officer to have reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal involvement, and 24 states have done so. The opinion in "Hiibel" implied that persons detained by police in jurisdictions with constitutional "stop and identify" laws listed are obligated to identify themselves, and that persons detained in other jurisdictions are not.
The issue may not be that simple, however, for several reasons:
Variations in "stop and identify" laws.
, the validity of a law requiring that a person detained provide anything more than stating his or her name has not come before the U.S. Supreme Court.
Interaction with other laws.
In states whose "stop and identify laws" do not directly impose penalties, a lawful arrest must be for violation of some other law, such as one to the effect of "resisting, obstructing, or delaying a peace officer".
For example, the Nevada "stop and identify" law challenged in "Hiibel" did not impose a penalty on a person who refused to comply, but the Justice Court of Union Township, Nevada, determined that Hiibel's refusal to identify himself
constituted a violation of Nevada "obstructing" law.
A similar conclusion regarding the interaction between Utah "stop and identify" and "obstructing" laws was reached in "Oliver v. Woods" (10th Cir. 2000).
Interpretation by courts.
"Stop and identify" laws in different states that appear to be nearly identical may be different in effect because of interpretations by state courts. For example, California "stop and identify" law, Penal Code §647(e) had wording
similar to the Nevada law upheld in "Hiibel", but a California appellate court, in "People v. Solomon" (1973), 33 Cal.App.3d 429 construed the law to require "credible and reliable" identification that carries a "reasonable assurance" of its authenticity. Using this construction, the U.S. Supreme Court held the law to be void for vagueness in "Kolender v. Lawson", .
Some courts have recognized a distinction authorizing police to demand identifying information and specifically imposing an obligation of a suspect to respond.
Other courts have apparently interpreted "demand" to impose an obligation on the detainee to comply.
Wording and interpretation by state courts of "obstructing" laws also varies; for example, New York "obstructing" law
apparently requires physical rather than simply verbal obstruction;
likewise, a violation of the Colorado "obstructing" law appears to require use or threat of use of physical force. However, the Colorado Supreme Court held in "Dempsey v. People", No. 04SC362 (2005) (PDF) that refusing to provide identification was an element in the "totality of the circumstances" that could constitute obstructing an officer, even when actual physical interference was not employed.
Utah "obstructing" law does not require a physical act, but merely a failure to follow a "lawful order . . . necessary to effect the . . . detention";
a divided court in "Oliver v. Woods" concluded that failure to present identification constituted a violation of that law.
It is not universally agreed that, absent a "stop and identify law", there is no obligation for a detainee to identify himself. For example, as the U.S. Supreme Court noted in "Hiibel", California "stop and identify" statute was voided in "Kolender v. Lawson". But in "People v. Long",
decided four years after "Kolender", a California appellate court found no constitutional impropriety in a police officer's demand for written identification from a detainee whom they reasonably suspect of having committed a crime. The issue before the "Long" court was a request for suppression of evidence uncovered in a search of the defendant's wallet, so the issue of refusal to present identification was not directly addressed; however, the author of the "Long" opinion had apparently concluded in a 1980 case that failure to identify oneself did not provide a basis for arrest.
Nonetheless, some cite "Long" in maintaining that refusal to present written identification constitutes obstructing an officer.
Others disagree, and maintain that persons detained by police in California cannot be compelled to identify themselves.
Some courts, e.g., "State v. Flynn" (Wis. 1979)
and "People v. Loudermilk" (Calif. 1987),
have held that police may perform a search for written identification if a suspect refuses to provide it;
a later California decision, "People v. Garcia" (2006), strongly disagreed.
In the case of "Utah v. Strieff" (2016), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that an officer's stop of Edward Strieff and his demand for identification from Strieff was unlawful under Utah state law, but that the evidence collected pursuant to the stop was admissible due to the determination that Strieff was subject to a pre-existing arrest warrant. Therefore, the pre-existing warrant "attenuated" the unlawful stop-and-identify. 
In North Carolina, State v. White interpreted North Carolina's "Resisting officers" statute to apply to suspects who fail to identify themselves to police officers. Conversely, West Virginia's courts decided that their resisting arrest statute did not include individuals who refused to identify themselves.
Recommendations of legal-aid organizations.
Some legal organizations, such as the National Lawyers Guild and the ACLU of Northern California,
recommend to either remain silent or to identify oneself whether or not a jurisdiction has a "stop and identify" law:
In a more recent pamphlet, the ACLU of Northern California elaborated on this further, recommending that a person detained by police should:
Other countries.
Many countries allow police to demand identification and arrest people who do not carry any (or refuse to produce so). Normally these countries provide all residents with national identity cards, which have the identity information the police would want to know, including citizenship. Foreign visitors need to have their passport available to show at all times. In some cases national identity cards from certain other countries are accepted.
For example, in Portugal it is compulsory to carry the state ID card at all times. This card named Cartão de Cidadão - Citizen Card is an electronic card which includes biometric information, id number, social security number, fiscal information etc. Police can only ask for the ID card in public or a place open to public and only if there is a reasonable suspicion the person committed a crime. A certified copy of the ID card can be presented in such situations. If a citizen does not carry the ID card or its certified copy, the police will escort the person to the police department to remain detained until clear identification can be obtained.
In other countries like Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, police generally have no power to demand identification unless they have a statutory power to do so. For example, these countries have laws that require those driving to produce their licence (or state their name, address, etc.) when stopped by police. Police may also require people to identify themselves if they have reasonable grounds to believe that they have committed a crime.