Campaign to Suppress Bandits in Northern China

The Campaign to Suppress Bandits in Northern China was a counter-guerrilla / counterinsurgency campaign the communists fought against the nationalist guerrilla that mostly consisted of bandits and nationalist regular troops left behind after the nationalist government withdrew from mainland China. The campaign was fought during the Chinese Civil War in the post-World War II era, and resulted in communist victory.
Campaign.
Before the nationalist government withdrew from North China, it ordered troops left behind to join local bandits to fight guerrilla war against the communists. To further boost the fighting capabilities of bandits, many military professionals were sent to the bands of bandits without any significant former nationalist troop presence, so that their military operations could be strengthened. The size of each band of bandits various, from the smallest of barely a dozen to the largest consisting of several thousands, usually, the typical size was several hundred. In March 1949, the bandit activity reached its peak, totaling a hundred and three attacks.
The future field marshal of the communist force, Nie Rongzhen was in charge of eradicating bandits in northern China. In April 1949, orders were given to suppress local bandits, emphasizing on not to underestimate these bandits. A month later, a conference on bandit suppression was held, setting the strategies that included adopting political pressure against bandits, and mobilizing the general populace to eliminate the social bases of bandits. In June 1949, further strategies were devised, concentrating on using small striking force in quick assaults, instead of ineffective large formation that was easy to be discovered and slow moving.
The communists came to important realization that the nationalist force left behind and deserters would be a huge reserve for bandits if left unattended. Nie Rongzhen ordered communist forces to immediately accept the surrender of deserters of nationalist force and providing for them so that their livelihood would be stabilized, and thus preventing them from turning into bandits. By June 1949, over thirty-seven thousand former nationalist troops left behind had surrendered, and the communists eliminated a huge potential threat. After a year of fighting, the campaign was finally concluded with a communist victory with the annihilation of over twenty-nine thousand bandits. The communist victory ensured that Beijing, the new capital of the People's Republic of China became relatively safe in the infancy of the new nation.
Outcome.
Although sharing the common anticommunist goal, the nationalist guerrilla and insurgency warfare was largely handicapped by the enlistment of bandits, many of whom had fought and killed nationalist troops earlier in the eradication / pacification campaign, and also looted, kidnapped and even killed landlords and business owners, an important faction that supported the nationalist government, but now must united against the common enemy, which is half-hearted at the best. Compounding the problem further with additional differences within the ranks of the nationalist guerillas themselves, the futile nationalist guerrilla and insurgency warfare against its communist enemy was destined to fail.