Second Battle of Heligoland Bight

The Second Battle of Heligoland Bight, also the Action in the Helgoland Bight and the , was an inconclusive naval engagement fought between British and German squadrons on 17 November 1917 during the First World War.
Background.
British minelaying.
The British used sea mining defensively to protect sea lanes and trade routes and offensively to impede the transit of German submarines and surface ships in the North Sea, the danger of which was illustrated on 17 October 1917 by the sortie of the German "Brummer"-class cruisers and (the action off Lerwick) against the Scandinavian Convoy. (During 1917, six U-boats were sunk by British mines and in two years, the German minesweeping counter-effort suffered the loss about 28 destroyers and 70 minesweepers and other ships.)
The Germans had been forced into minesweeping up to into the Heligoland Bight and in the southern Baltic Sea, covered by light cruisers and destroyers, with occasional distant support by battleships. After the action off Lerwick, several proposals for attacks on the German minesweepers and escorts were canvassed at the Admiralty. On 31 October, the British sent a large force of cruisers and destroyers into the Kattegat, which sank , an armed merchant ship and nine trawlers.
German test trips.
The prolific British laying of mines and net barrages outside the main German mine belts between Horns Reef and Terschelling, close to the bases of the High Seas Fleet () forced the into surveying the British minefields, to find routes through them for transit into and back from the North Sea. Test trips were carried out, being substantial operations with ships to find the mines, minesweepers, torpedo boats (usually a continental term for destroyers), U-boats, barrier breakers and light cruisers, with air reconnaissance by Zeppelins and seaplanes. The Test trips were also protected by battleships on routes known to be free of mines.
Prelude.
North Sea operations.
On 20 October, the British code breakers of Room 40, part of the Naval Intelligence Division of the Admiralty, decrypted orders to the submarine SM UB-61 to scout to the north of Bergen to find the new route of the Scandinavian Convoy. Agent reports from Copenhagen disclosed an imminent German attack by seven light cruisers and 36 destroyers. During the week ending 11 November, British light cruisers, destroyers and a battlecruiser escort, conducted an abortive sweep along the fringe of the Heligoland Bight minefields. By mid-November the Admiralty had obtained enough intelligence to intercept one of the big German minesweeping operations, provided that the ships based at Rosyth, in Scotland, could sail in time. The Admiralty decided that an offensive operation should begin on 17 November.
Test trip, 17 November.
The Germans planned a Test trip for 17 November 1917, comprising the 2nd and 6th Auxiliary Mine Sweeper Half-Flotillas, the 12th and 14th Torpedo Boat Half-Flotillas, Barrier Breaking Division IV and light cruisers of Scouting Group Division II, commanded by Rear-Admiral () Ludwig von Reuter from the 6th Mine Sweeper Half-Flotilla. The "Kaiser"-class battleships, and from Squadron IV, each with ten guns, led by Captain () Kurt Graßhoff in "Kaiserin", were to act as covering force for the group. The battleships were to reach a point west of Heligoland by while the Test trip group rendezvoused in the Heligoland Bight about half-way between Horns Reef and Terschelling. With poor weather grounding Zeppelins and making it impossible for light cruisers embark seaplanes, after they had alighted on the sea, the Test trip relied on reconnaissance patrols by two land-based seaplanes from Borkum on the German coast, just east of the Netherlands, for reconnoitring ahead of the group.
British plan.
The German Test trip had been revealed by the code breakers of Room 40, allowing the British to plan an ambush. On 16 November, orders for an attack on the Test trip were sent to Admiral Sir David Beatty, Commander-in-Chief of the British Grand Fleet. On 17 November 1917 a force of cruisers under Vice Admiral Trevylyan Napier was sent to attack the German minesweepers as they were mineweeping.
Battle.
The action began at roughly west of Sylt, when sighted German ships. She opened fire at Admiral Reuter, the German commander, with four light cruisers and eight destroyers, advanced towards the British ships, to cover the withdrawal of the minesweepers, all of which escaped except for the trawler which was sunk. The battle developed into a stern chase as the German forces, making skilful use of smoke-screens, withdrew south-east at their best speed, under fire from the 1st Cruiser Squadron, the 1st Light Cruiser Squadron and the 6th Light Cruiser Squadron. was detached from the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron and came up at high speed to join the battle. Both sides were hampered in their manoeuvres by the presence of naval minefields.
At about the same time, the light cruisers came under fire from two German "Kaiser"-class battleships, and which had come up in support of Reuter's ships; was struck by a shell, which did little damage; shortly afterwards, the British ships gave up the chase as they reached the edge of more minefields. A shell went through the upper conning tower of the light cruiser , killing the conning tower crew and mortally wounding the Captain, Herbert Edwards, on the bridge and knocking unconscious the navigator, Lieutenant-Commander M. F. F. Wilson. All personnel on the lower bridge were killed and the gunner officer, Lieutenant H. C. C. Clarke took command, which was made more difficult because the shell also cut all electrical communications and reduced the rate of fire. The battle cruiser "Repulse" briefly engaged the German ships at about achieving a hit on the light cruiser that started a serious fire.
Aftermath.
Analysis.
In 1984, Patrick Beesly wrote that the British operation was daring but that Napier was unjustly blamed for its failure to pursue the German ships with sufficient vigour. Room 40 was well informed about the positions of German minefields and the British fields which the Germans were trying to clear. The information had been added to Room 40's naval charts but the information was denied to Napier who made decisions based on the charts he did have. Admiralty reluctance to disclose that their information was derived from the decoding of wireless intercepts had led to the naval commander being ill-informed. The Admiralty did at least supply operational intelligence to the Naval commanders, after Beatty had made an emergency request when he was at sea. Napier was informed in ninety minutes, by the Admiralty that German capital ships had sailed at and the location of German cruisers, leading to "Königsberg" receiving severe damage. At the least, Room 40 had prevented the British operation degenerating from fiasco to disaster.
Casualties.
In 1920, Admiral Reinhard Scheer wrote that the Germans suffered casualties of killed, ten seriously wounded and thirty men slightly wounded. An Admiralty communiqué listed British casualties as one officer and killed, four officers and wounded; were taken.
Victoria Cross.
Able Seaman John Carless of Walsall in was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross for his bravery in continuing to man a gun despite mortal wounds from shell-splinters.
Orders of battle.
British forces.
1st Cruiser Squadron: Vice Admiral Trevylyan Napier CB, MVO
6th Light Cruiser Squadron: Rear Admiral Edwyn Alexander-Sinclair CB MVO
1st Light Cruiser Squadron: Commodore Walter Cowan CB, MVO, DSO
1st Battle Cruiser Squadron (detachment: Rear Admiral Richard Phillimore CB, MVO)
Other forces at sea in support (none of which engaged)
German forces.
2nd Scouting Group: Rear Admiral Ludwig von Reuter
7th Torpedo-Boat Flotilla: KKpt Hermann Cordes
Minesweepers
4th Battle Squadron (detachment): KptzS Kurt Graßhoff
Other forces at sea in support (none of which were engaged)