
Ex parte Grossman

Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the President of the United States can pardon criminal contempt of court. Grossman had been convicted of criminal contempt, but was pardoned by the President; the district court had subsequently sent him back to prison.
Background.
During the time of Prohibition, Philip Grossman owned a business in Chicago that sold alcoholic drinks. Charged under the Volstead Act, the enforcement mechanism for Prohibition, a judge placed an injunction on him, forbidding him from selling alcohol. Grossman violated that order, and was found guilty of criminal contempt of court in district court. Sentenced to one year in prison and a fine of $1,000 (), he was pardoned by the President, Calvin Coolidge, in December 1923, on the condition that the fine be paid. Grossman's prison sentence was removed after he paid the fine, and he was released.
The district court, claiming the pardon would subvert the independence of the judiciary, ordered Grossman back to prison on May 15, 1924, to serve out the rest of his sentence.
Before the Supreme Court, lawyers for Grossman requested the release of their client; opposed by lawyers for the Department of Justice, who supported the district court. The United States Attorney General, who appeared before the Court supporting the President's power to pardon, was Harlan Fiske Stone; he would go on to replace Justice McKenna within a few months of oral argument.
Opinion of the Court.
Chief Justice William Howard Taft wrote for a unanimous Court, rejecting the arguments of the district court, and ordering Grossman to be freed.
First, examining the history of the pardon power, he looked to the common law and the monarchy of England, where, as he noted, monarchs "had always exercised the power to pardon contempts of court", just like ordinary crimes; and, just as in the United States, civil and criminal contempt existed. Here, a distinction between civil and criminal contempt was made: civil contempt was remedial for the contemnor, and pardons cannot stop it; while criminal contempt is punitive, serving a deterring effect against transgression of court orders.
He next looked at the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention, and how the pardon clause had originated in the Committee of Detail, was refined by the Committee on Style, and was ultimately added to the Constitution, as it now stands: "And he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States except in cases of impeachment".
Referring to "United States v. Hudson", the Chief Justice then rejected the idea that the offenses covered by the pardon clause extended only to those for which the Congress had defined as crimes, and instead looked at the plain meaning of the words "offenses against the United States": 
Taft further determined that the pardon power had been exercised many times with regard to criminal contempt (over 85 years, the pardoning power had been used 27 times), citing opinions by Attorneys General Henry D. Gilpin, John Nelson, John Y. Mason, and William H. H. Miller; along with statements by Attorneys General Philander C. Knox and Harry M. Daugherty. The weight of long-standing practice could not be ignored, stated the Chief Justice, and served to bolster the argument that the usage of the pardon power was not incorrect.
Finally, Taft turned to the argument about judicial independence, and that the usage of the power of pardon here would undermine a functioning judiciary. Cognizant that the Constitution allowed for separation of powers, he determined that the system of checks and balances allowed for the discretion of the President in determining the use of the pardon power, insofar as it pertained to criminal contempt. After all, criminal contempt does not require the restraint of a jury, and, as such, it is possible that a mistake could creep in; and while a president could pardon all criminal contempt, such a thing would be an improbable absurdity. Nevertheless, limits still existed: the pardon could only be issued for contempt that had already occurred, and a capricious President could face impeachment.
Nevertheless, in light of the weight of history, precedent, Constitutional function, and justice, the Chief Justice concluded: