Operation Agas

Operation Agas was a series of reconnaissance operations carried out by Australia's Z Special Unit in 1945 during the final stages of World War II. This operation was part of the Borneo Campaign, supporting Allied operations to secure North Borneo (present day Sabah). Another closely related operation codenamed Semut was carried out in Sarawak. Both operations combined and relayed their intelligence through the Stallion Project to Australian forces and carried out guerrilla warfare against the Japanese in the region with support of the local population. A total of five operations were undertaken, commencing in March 1945, continuing up to September and October 1945.
Background.
Early in the Pacific War, the Japanese had landed in north-west Borneo and had quickly captured the area's vital oilfields, which had begun contributing to their war effort by 1943. Allied efforts to interdict the flow of oil had been limited largely to aerial bombing in the intervening period as Allied ground efforts had focussed upon the drive on the Philippines. Nevertheless, by late 1944 – early 1945 the Allies had begun planning operations to retake the area. Allied operations to re-capture Labuan and Brunei Bay were scheduled for mid-June 1945. To support this, Operation Agas was launched in March 1945 by Australian Services Reconnaissance Department (SRD), utilising Z Special Unit personnel. The operation had two main objectives: to gather intelligence and to train the indigenous people to undertake a guerrilla campaign against the Japanese. Subsequently, a series of five operations were undertaken in the Japanese occupied areas of North Borneo in the final stages of the war under the auspices of Operation Agas – the Malay word for sandfly – which were undertaken in conjunction with Operation Semut in Sarawak. The Japanese troops occupying north Borneo at the time were drawn from the 37th Army.
Planning for covert operations in Borneo by Allied forces had begun in December 1941 when Second Lieutenant P. M. Synge, a British intelligence officer who had undertaken an expedition in Sarawak in 1932, proposed sending a small group of officers into the area to organise a guerrilla force with the aim of disrupting Japanese efforts to exploit the vital oilfields. While Synge's proposal was not acted upon at the time, several other British officers made similar proposals. Throughout 1942 and 1943, British and Australian Army planning staff worked to exchange information and sought out personnel who might be suitable. In October 1943 and January 1944, a reconnaissance operation was undertaken around Labian Point, Lahad Datu, designated Operation Python. Conducted in two phases, the operation was tasked with relaying information about Japanese shipping and supporting Filipino guerrillas who were working in the area under an American officer. Both phases were concluded without much success. In late 1944 and early 1945, the Allies began planning a campaign to retake Borneo. As a result of the commitment of US forces to the recapture of the Philippines, the task of recapturing Borneo was allocated primarily to Australian ground forces.
Execution.
Agas 1.
In early March 1945, Major F. G. L. Chester, who led the Operation Python 1 previously, landed at the Labuk Bay, Sandakan, along with six other personnel. Having been carried from Darwin aboard the submarine USS "Tuna", the party had paddled ashore in rubber inflatable craft. Kayaks were then used to carry out reconnaissance in the smaller waterways along the shore of Labuk Bay. They were able to establish a signals station at Lokopas and a hospital was established at Jambongan Island for the guerrillas. Information such as the train schedule to and from Beaufort, cargo movements, and details of local timber milling and railway operations was collected. Agas 1 also made contact with two Chinese men named Chin Sang and Ah Lee. They refused long-term cooperation with Agas 1 members but were willing to provide the details of Japanese movements in the area. Information was also sought about Allied prisoners of war (POWs) being held at Sandakan, although they were unable to get close enough to the camp to make a thorough investigation, and ultimately reported in error that the camp had been abandoned. In reality around 800 prisoners remained, and a planned rescue operation was cancelled as a result of the report.
Agas 2.
Two months later, Agas 2, a five man team led by Major R. G. P. N. Combe, landed at Paitan Bay, Sandakan, to obtain information in support of the Australian assault on Brunei Bay and Labuan. Arriving by parachute in early May, the team set up an intelligence network and undertook guerrilla activities at the Pitas, Kudat; throughout the operation, they were reinforced by nine other personnel and undertook a number of raids around Banggi Island, Pitas, Maruda Bay, Dampirit and Pituru. Finally, in the closing stages of the war, Kudat was captured when the Japanese withdrew without resistance.
Agas 3.
Commencing on 21 June, Agas 3, also led by Chester, focussed its activities at Jesselton–Keningau–Beaufort sector. Agas 3 was later incorporated into the Stallion Phase IV network, an intelligence sharing network between Semut and Agas. The Stallion Phase IV project focused their reconnaissance on the Kimanis Bay area. In mid August, seven reinforcements were dropped by parachute on the Ranau Plateau by the Royal Australian Air Force's No. 200 Flight, to assist in locating prisoners of war who had escaped from Ranau camp. Agas 3 remained in their area until being withdrawn in mid-October 1945.
Agas 4 and 5.
Two more Agas operations followed in July: Agas 4, consisting of three personnel under Major R. Blow, landed by PT boat in the Semporna area on 21 July. They were reinforced by some personnel from the North Borneo Armed Constabulary and the crew of a Royal Australian Navy whaleboat. Meanwhile, personnel from Agas 5 under Major J. McLaren, landed around Lahad Datu on 27 July.
On 7 August, three Agas 5 personnel and five local guerrillas moved to Talesai, to the north of Darvel Bay. Agas 4 was tasked with collecting information about Japanese troops in the Tawau–Mostyn and Lahad Datu area, ascertaining their strength, movements and combat capability. They also undertook minor harassment attacks and worked to recruit local guerillas, and continued operations until October 1945. Agas 5 also gathered intelligence information, establishing and maintaining contact with several agents in their area, and worked to establish hospitals and casualty collection points in the jungle, and worked to relieve food shortages in the area. They ceased operations on 10 September 1945; after this, Agas 5 personnel concentrated with Agas 4 around Semporna where a Catalina was to extract them.
Aftermath and impact.
Assisted by the Agas and Semut operations, the Australian 9th Division was able to secure north Borneo, with major combat ending largely by July 1945. As the regular forces remained confined to the coastal areas, the Japanese moved inland and the irregular forces continued to play a role, calling in airstrikes on the withdrawing Japanese and working to restore civil administration. Following the cessation of hostilities, the regular Australian troops remained in north Borneo to restore law and order, and to facilitate the surrender of Japanese troops. Extensive civic actions began even before the end of the war, with efforts being turned to rebuilding the oil facilities and other damaged infrastructure, establishing schools, providing medical care to local civilians and restoring the water supply. Martial law was initially imposed, but eventually a civil administration was established under the British Borneo Civil Affairs Unit.
A total of 44 personnel took part in the Agas operations. Overall, the Agas operations were able to supply reliable information to Australian forces. The total estimated number of Japanese troops reported at 31,000 in May 1945 was not too far off the official number given in October 1945 (35,000). It also provided the crucial information that the Japanese in the area intended to evacuate the coast and move into the North Borneo interior.
In analysing the operation, Alan Powell has stated that "Agas succeeded politically", but "...had little direct military value and failed as a POW rescue operation". This was due to the general "apathy, fear, and the desire to return home" expressed by the local guerrilla units after the failed 1943 Jesselton Revolt. This had prevented the guerrilla force from launching significant attacks against the retreating Japanese. Although AGAS 1 provided information about the Sandakan Death March, it did not execute any rescue missions for the POWs. Nevertheless, it provided information that guided successful bombing raids at Sandakan. It also trained 250 people as part of the local guerrilla force, and more than 2,000 local inhabitants were able to receive treatment from the hospital set up by the mission. The effectiveness of the Agas-recruited guerrillas was limited, although around 100 Japanese were killed by these personnel.
Agas 2 also successfully set up a local guerrilla force of 150 to 250 people and successfully contacted Chinese guerillas at Kota Belud. It also set up a hospital in the Lokopas area for the local population. Meanwhile, Agas 3 was proved largely unsuccessful. Many of its objectives were not met due to the high concentration of Japanese troops in the area, which numbered up to 6,000 troops between Jesselton and Beaufort. The Chinese in this region also refused to provide any cooperation because of their fear of retaliation after the failed Jesselton Revolt in 1943. Nevertheless, intelligence gathered from this region enabled the Allies to avoid a direct assault against the Japanese during Operation Oboe Six (the Battle of North Borneo).


Charles McMorris

Charles Horatio "Soc" McMorris (August 31, 1890 – February 11, 1954) was an American rear admiral during World War II, most notably commanding forces at the Battle of the Komandorski Islands during the Aleutian Islands Campaign.
Early life and career.
Born in Wetumpka, Alabama, McMorris attended public schools in Wetumpka for several years before entering the United States Naval Academy on June 26, 1908. After graduating fifth in his class on June 8, 1912, McMorris served as an ensign aboard several battleships including the , , and , later taking part in the occupation of Veracruz in 1914 as part of the United States' intervention into Mexico. He also served aboard the battleship , which salvaged the submarine following its sinking off the coast of Honolulu, Hawaii in 1915.
World War I.
A junior officer during World War I, McMorris saw combat in the Atlantic aboard the destroyers and prior his promotion to lieutenant in 1918. During the inter-war years, McMorris was stationed in various sea and shore posts before his graduation from the Naval War College in 1938, serving as operations officer to the Hawaiian-based US fleet from 1939 until 1941.
World War II.
Appointed war plans officer to the United States Pacific Fleet following the attack on Pearl Harbor, McMorris remained in this post until April 1942 when he was assigned command of Cruiser Task Force 8 led by the cruiser . After engaging the Imperial Japanese Navy several times, both in the Aleutian Islands Campaign, specifically at the Battle of the Komandorski Islands and (as well as winning distinction for bravery and the award of the Navy Cross during the Battle of Cape Esperance on October 11–12, 1942), McMorris was named Chief of Staff of the Pacific Fleet in June 1943, as well as a personal advisor to Admiral Chester Nimitz, a post in which he would remain until the end of the war.
Post-war.
Briefly serving as vice admiral from September 23, 1944 until July 1948, McMorris would serve as commander of the United States Fourth Fleet and President of the General Board, before assuming command of Pearl Harbor's Fourteenth Naval District on August 25, 1948. McMorris would eventually command the Pearl Harbor naval base before retiring to Marietta, Pennsylvania, where he lived until his death in 1954.
Namesake.
The destroyer escort was named for McMorris.


British Expeditionary Force (World War II)

The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was the name of the British Army sent to France in 1939 after Britain and France declared war on Nazi Germany on 3 September, beginning the Second World War. The BEF existed from 2 September 1939 when the BEF GHQ was formed until 31 May 1940, when GHQ closed down and its troops reverted to the command of Home Forces. During the 1930s, the British government had planned to deter war by abolishing the Ten Year Rule and rearming from the very low level of readiness of the early 30s. The bulk of the extra money went to the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force but plans were made to re-equip a small number of Army and Territorial Army divisions for service overseas.
General Lord Gort was appointed to the command of the BEF on 3 September 1939 and the BEF began moving to France on 4 September 1939. The BEF assembled along the Belgian–French border. The BEF took their post to the left of the French First Army under the command of the French 1st Army Group (1re ) of the North-Eastern Front (). Most of the BEF spent the 3 September 1939 to 9 May 1940 digging field defences on the border. When the Battle of France () began on 10 May 1940, the BEF constituted 10 percent of the Allied forces on the Western Front.
The BEF participated in the Dyle Plan, a rapid advance into Belgium to the line of the Dyle River, but the 1st Army Group had to retreat rapidly through Belgium and north-western France, after the German breakthrough further south at the Battle of Sedan (12–15 May). A local counter-attack at the Battle of Arras (1940) (21 May) was a considerable tactical success but the BEF, French and Belgian forces north of the Somme River retreated to Dunkirk on the French North Sea coast soon after, British and French troops being evacuated in Operation Dynamo (26 May – 4 June) to England after the capitulation of the Belgian army.
Saar Force, the 51st (Highland) Infantry Division and reinforcements, had taken over part of the Maginot Line for training. The force fought with local French units after 10 May, then joined the Tenth Army south of the Somme, along with the improvised Beauman Division and the 1st Armoured Division, to fight in the Battle of Abbeville (27 May – 4 June). The British tried to re-build the BEF with Home Forces divisions training in Britain, troops evacuated from France and lines-or-communications troops south of the Somme river (informally known as the 2nd BEF) but BEF GHQ was not reopened.
After the success of the second German offensive in France (), the 2nd BEF and Allied troops were evacuated from Le Havre in Operation Cycle (10–13 June) and the French Atlantic and Mediterranean ports in Operation Ariel (15–25 June, unofficially to 14 August). The Navy rescued 558,032 people, including 368,491 British troops but the BEF lost of whom killed or died of wounds, and missing or captured. About 700 tanks, 20,000 motor bikes, 45,000 cars and lorries, 880 field guns and 310 larger equipments, about 500 anti-aircraft guns, 850 anti-tank guns, 6,400 anti-tank rifles and 11,000 machine-guns were abandoned. As units arrived in Britain they reverted to the authority of the Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces.
Background.
1918–1932.
After 1918, the prospect of war seemed so remote, that Government expenditure on the armed forces was determined by the assumption that no great war was likely. Spending varied from year to year and between the services but from July 1928 to March 1932, the formula of the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) was
and spending on equipment for the army varied from £1,500,000 to £2,600,000 per year from 1924 to 1933, averaging £2,000,000 or about 9 percent of armaments spending a year. Until the early 1930s, the War Office intended to maintain a small, mobile and professional army and a start was made on motorising the cavalry and the artillery. By 1930, the Royal Army Service Corps (RASC) had been mechanised, some of the artillery could be moved by tractors, and a few engineer, signals and cavalry units had received lorries. From 1930–1934, the Territorial Army (TA) artillery, engineer, signals units were equipped with lorries and in 1938 the regular army gained its establishment of wheeled vehicles and half of its tracked vehicles, except for tanks. From 1923 to 1932, vehicles were ordered at a rate of about year, just under half being six-wheeler lorries. By 1936, the army had of which light tanks and mediums; considered obsolete; the light tanks were modern but did not begin to reach the army until 1935. The rule had reduced war spending from £766 million in 1920 to £102 million when it was abolished on 23 March 1932. The British army had fewer men than in 1914, no organisation or equipment for a war in Europe, and it would have taken the War Office three weeks to mobilise only an infantry division and a cavalry brigade.
Rearmament.
Limited Liability.
In March 1932, the Ten-Year Rule was abolished and in 1934, the Cabinet resolved to remedy equipment deficiencies in the armed forces over the next five years. The army was always the least favoured force but equipment spending increased from £6,900,000 from 1933–1934 financial year (1 April to 31 March), to £8,500,000 the following year and to more than £67,500,000 by 1938–1939 but the share of spending on army equipment only grew beyond 25 percent of all military equipment spending in 1938. The relative neglect of the army led to a theory of "limited liability" until 1937, in which Britain would not send a great army to Europe in time of war. In 1934, the Defence Requirements Sub-Committee (DRC) of the CID assumed that a regular field army of five divisions was to be equipped as an expeditionary force, eventually to be supplemented by parts of the Territorial Army. The force and its air support would act as a deterrent greatly disproportionate to its size; plans were made to acquire sufficient equipment and training for the TA to provide a minimum of two extra divisions on the outbreak of war. It was expected that a British army in Europe would receive continuous reinforcement and in 1936, a TA commitment of twelve divisions was envisaged by Alfred Duff Cooper, the Secretary of State for War.
As rearmament of the navy and the air force continued, the nature of an army fit to participate in a European war was kept under review and in 1936, the Cabinet ordered the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee of the CID to provide a report on the role of an expeditionary force and the relative values of the army and the air force as deterrents for the same cost. The chiefs were in favour of a balanced rearmament but within financial limits, the air force should be favoured. In 1937, the Minister argued that a continental commitment was no longer feasible and that France did not now expect a big land army along with the navy and air force, Germany had guaranteed Belgian neutrality and that if the quantity of money was limited, defence against air attack, trade protection and the defence of overseas territories were more important and had to be secured before Britain could support allies in the defence of their territories. The "continental hypothesis" came fourth and the main role of the army was to protect the empire, which included the anti-aircraft defence of the United Kingdom (with the assistance of the TA). In 1938, "limited liability" reached its apogee, just as rearmament was maturing and the army was considering the "new conspectus", a much more ambitious rearmament plan.
In February 1938, the CID ruled that planning should be based on "limited liability"; between late 1937 and early 1939, equipment for the five-division field army was reduced to that necessary for colonial warfare in the Far East. In Europe, the field force could only conduct defensive warfare and would need a big increase in ammunition and the refurbishment of its tank forces. The field force continued to be the least-favoured part of the least-favoured military arm and in February 1938, the Secretary of State for War, Leslie Hore-Belisha, warned that possible allies should be left in no doubt about the effectiveness of the army. The re-armament plans for the field force remained deficiency plans, rather than plans for expansion. The July 1934 deficiency plan was estimated at £10,000,000 but cut by 50 percent by the cabinet; by the first rearmament plan of 1936, the cost of the deficiency plan for the next five years had increased to £177,000,000. In the first version of the "new conspectus", spending was put at £347,000,000, although in 1938 this was cut to £276,000,000, still substantially more than the deficiency plan for 1936 but much of this sum was for anti-aircraft defence, a new duty imposed on the army.
Continental commitment.
Obtaining equipment for the Field Force benefited from plans for the TA which, sometimes covertly, was used as a device to get more equipment which could be used by the regular army. At first it was admitted in the deficiency programmes of 1935–1936, in which an expansion of the TA in three stages to twelve divisions, was to complement the five regular divisions. The Cabinet postponed this plan for three years, during which the policy of limited liability precluded such developments, except for the purchase of the same training equipment for the TA as that used by the army, equivalent to that needed to equip two regular divisions, which was the maximum commitment promised to the French in 1938. The mobile division was split into two divisions and some extra equipment went to artillery and engineer units. By 1938 the deficiency programme was due to mature; in the wake of the Munich Crisis in September and the loss of the 35 divisions of the Czechoslovak Army, the Cabinet approved a plan for a ten-division army equipped for continental operations and a similar-sized TA, in early 1939. By reacting to events, the British Cabinet made it inevitable that
The British made a commitment on 21 April 1939 to provide an army of six regular and 26 Territorial divisions, introduced equipment scales for war and began conscription to provide the manpower. In February 1939, the first four regular army divisions of the Field Force had been promised to the French, scheduled to reach the assembly area in France on the thirtieth day after mobilisation. Until this commitment, no staff work had been done, there was no information about French ports and railways and no modern maps.
Prelude.
Despatch of the BEF.
After the Invasion of Poland by Germany on 1 September 1939, the Cabinet appointed General John Vereker, 6th Viscount Gort (Lord Gort) to the command of the BEF on 3 September, subordinate to General Alphonse Georges, the French commander of the North-eastern Theatre of Operations, with the right of appeal to the British government. The BEF was to assemble on the Franco-Belgian border and advanced parties of troops left Portsmouth on 4 September under "Plan W4" and the first troop convoy left the ports on the Bristol Channel and Southampton on 9 September, disembarking at Cherbourg on 10 September and Nantes and Saint Nazaire two days later. German submarines had been held back by Hitler to avoid provoking the Allies and only a few mines were laid near Dover and Weymouth. By 27 September, tons of ammunition, of petrol and of frozen meat had been landed in France.
On 3 October, I Corps with the 1st Infantry Division and 2nd Infantry Division began to take over the front line allocated to the BEF and II Corps with the 3rd Infantry Division and 4th Infantry Division followed on 12 October; the 5th Infantry Division arrived in December. By 19 October, the BEF had received 25,000 vehicles to complete the first wave. The majority of the troops were stationed along the Franco-Belgian border but British divisions took turns to serve with the French Third Army on the Maginot Line. In April 1940, the 51st Highland Infantry Division, reinforced by additional units and called Saar Force took over part of the French line. Belgium and the Netherlands were neutral and free of Allied or German military forces and for troops along the Maginot Line, inactivity and an undue reliance on the fortifications, which were believed to be impenetrable, led to "Tommy Rot" (portrayed in the song "Imagine Me on the Maginot Line"). Morale was high amongst the British troops but the limited extent of German actions by 9 May 1940, led many to assume that there would not be much chance of a big German attack in that area.
From January to April 1940, eight Territorial divisions arrived in France but the 12th (Eastern) Infantry Division, 23rd (Northumbrian) Division and 46th Infantry Division, informally called labour divisions, were not trained or equipped to fight. The labour divisions consisted of 26 new infantry battalions which had spent their first months guarding vulnerable points in England but had received very little training. Battalions and some engineers were formed into nominal brigades but lacked artillery, signals or transport. The divisions were used for labour from St Nazaire in Normandy to Saint-Pol-sur-Ternoise (St Pol) in French Flanders, on the understanding that they would not be called upon to fight before they had completed their training.
By May 1940 the BEF order of battle consisted of ten infantry divisions ready for field service, in I Corps, II Corps, III Corps and Saar Force. BEF GHQ commanded the Field Force and the BEF Air Component Royal Air Force (RAF) of about 500 aircraft but the Advanced Air Striking Force (AASF) long-range bomber force was under the control of RAF Bomber Command. GHQ consisted of men from Headquarters (HQ) Troops (consisting of the 1st Battalion, Welsh Guards, the 9th Battalion, West Yorkshire Regiment and the 14th Battalion, Royal Fusiliers), the 1st Army Tank Brigade, 1st Light Armoured Reconnaissance Brigade, HQ Royal Artillery and the 5th Infantry Division.
Phoney War.
The period from September 1939 to 10 May 1940 was known as the "Phoney War", which consisted of little more than minor clashes by reconnaissance patrols. The section of the Franco-Belgian border to be held by the BEF at that time stretched from Armentières westward towards Menin, then south to the junction of the border and the River Escaut (the French name for the Scheldt) at Maulde, forming a salient around Lille and Roubaix. The British began to dig trenches, weapons pits and pill boxes of the Gort Line. The first BEF fatality was 27-year-old Corporal Thomas Priday, from the 1st Battalion, King's Shropshire Light Infantry, attached to the 3rd Infantry Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division, killed on 9 December 1939, when his patrol set off a booby-trap and was fired upon by friendly troops. By November 1939, the French had decided that a defence along the Dyle Line in Belgium was feasible but the British were lukewarm about an advance into Belgium. Gamelin talked them round and on 9 November, the Dyle Plan/Plan D was adopted and on 17 November, Gamelin issued a directive that day detailing a line from Givet to Namur, the Gembloux Gap, Wavre, Louvain and Antwerp. For the next four months, the Dutch and Belgian armies laboured over their defences, the BEF expanded and the French army received more equipment and training.
Dyle plan, Breda variant.
By May 1940, the 1st Army Group defended the Channel coast to the west end of the Maginot Line. The Seventh Army Henri Giraud), BEF (General Lord Gort), First Army ( Georges Maurice Jean Blanchard) and Ninth Army ( André Corap) were ready to advance to the Dyle Line, by pivoting on the right (southern) Second Army. The Seventh Army would take over west of Antwerp, ready to move into Holland and the Belgians were expected to delay a German advance and then retire from the Albert Canal to the Dyle, between Antwerp to Louvain. The BEF was to defend about of the Dyle from Louvain to Wavre and the First Army on the right of the BEF was to hold from Wavre across the Gembloux Gap to Namur. The gap from the Dyle to Namur north of the Sambre, with Maastricht and Mons on either side, had few natural obstacles and led straight to Paris. The Ninth Army would take post south of Namur, along the Meuse to the left (northern) flank of the Second Army.
The Second and Ninth armies were dug in on the west bank of the Meuse on ground that was easily defended and behind the Ardennes, giving plenty of warning of a German attack. After the transfer of the Seventh Army, seven divisions remained behind the Second and Ninth armies and other divisions could be moved from behind the Maginot Line. All but one division were either side of the junction of the two armies, GQG being more concerned about a German attack past the north end of the Maginot Line and then south-east through the Stenay Gap, for which the divisions behind the Second Army were well placed. On 8 November, Gamelin added the Seventh Army, containing some of the best and most mobile French divisions, to the left flank of the 1st Army Group to move into Holland and protect the Scheldt estuary. In March, Gamelin ordered that the Seventh Army would advance to Breda to link with the Dutch. The Seventh Army, on the left flank of the Dyle manoeuvre, would be linked to it and if the Seventh Army crossed into the Netherlands, the left flank of the 1st Army Group was to advance to Tilburg if possible and certainly to Breda. The Seventh Army was to take post between the Belgian and Dutch armies turning east, a distance of , against German armies only distant from Breda.
Battle.
10–21 May 1940.
At the German invasion of France and the Low Countries commenced. The French Seventh Army drove forward on the northern flank and advanced elements reached Breda on 11 May. The French collided with the 9th Panzer Division and the advance of the 25e Division d'Infanterie Motorisée was stopped by German infantry, tanks and Ju 87 () dive-bombers, as the 11re Division Légère Mécanisée was forced to retreat. (French heavy tanks were still on trains south of Antwerp.) The Seventh Army retired from the Bergen op Zoom–Turnhout Canal Line from Antwerp, to Lierre away on 12 May; on 14 May the Dutch surrendered.
In Belgium, German glider troops captured fort Eben-Emael by noon on 11 May; the disaster forced the Belgians to retreat to a line from Antwerp to Louvain on 12 May, far too soon for the French First Army to arrive and dig in. The fought the XVI Panzer Corps in the Battle of Hannut the first ever tank-against-tank battle and the then withdrew behind the First Army, which had arrived at the Dyle Line. On 15 May, the Germans attacked the First Army along the Dyle, causing the meeting engagement that Gamelin had tried to avoid. The First Army repulsed the XVI Panzer Corps but during the Battle of Gembloux (14–15 May) GQG realised that the main German attack had come further south, through the Ardennes. The French success in Belgium contributed to the disaster on the Meuse at Sedan and on 16 May, Blanchard was ordered to retreat to the French border.
Operation David.
The armoured cars of the 12th Royal Lancers crossed the border at on 10 May, cheered on by Belgian civilians. The BEF sector ran along the Dyle about from Louvain, south-west to Wavre. The 3rd Division (II Corps) took the north with the 1st Division and 2nd Division (I Corps) the south, some battalions defending a frontage double that recommended in British manuals. The rest of the BEF formed a defence in depth back to the River Escaut. The Dyle north of Louvain was occupied by Belgian troops who refused to give way, even when Brooke appealed to the King of the Belgians and Georges ordered them out. The British infantry began to arrive on the Dyle on 11 May and dug in screened by light tanks and Bren carriers operating west of the river until 14 May, when the front line units were ready; the bridges were then blown. Later that day probes by reconnaissance troops of three German infantry divisions were dispersed. Next day, attacks on Louvain by the German 19th Division were repulsed by the 3rd Division. Further south, the river was only about wide, preventing tanks from crossing but passable by infantry. Richard Annand of the Durham Light Infantry in the southern sector was awarded a Victoria Cross. German bridgeheads across the Dyle were either eliminated or contained by British counter-attacks.
Ardennes.
From the XIX Panzer Corps engaged the two cavalry divisions of the Second Army, surprising them with a far larger force than expected and forced them back. The Ninth Army to the north had also sent its two cavalry divisions forward, which were withdrawn on 12 May, before they met German troops. The first German unit reached the Meuse in the afternoon but the local French commanders thought that they were far ahead of the main body and would wait before trying to cross the Meuse. From 10 May, Allied bombers had been sent to raid northern Belgium, to delay the German advance while the First Army moved up but attacks on the bridges at Maastricht had been costly failures, the day bombers being reduced to aircraft by 12 May. At on 13 May, the began bombing the French defences around Sedan and continued for eight hours with about in the biggest air attack in history.
Little material damage was done to the Second Army but morale collapsed. In the French 55e Division at Sedan, some troops began to straggle to the rear and in the evening panic spread through the division. German troops attacked across the river at and had gained three footholds on the west bank by nightfall. The French and the RAF managed to fly and sorties on the Sedan bridges on 14 May but only in formations of The RAF lost aircraft and the French were reduced to sending obsolete bombers to attack in the afternoon, also with many losses. On 16 May, the 1st Army Group was ordered to retreat from the Dyle Line, to avoid being trapped by the German breakthrough against the Second and Ninth armies but on 20 May, the Germans reached Abbeville on the Channel coast, cutting off the northern armies.
BEF retreat.
The plan for the BEF withdrawal was that under cover of darkness, units would thin-out their front and make a phased and orderly withdrawal before the Germans realised what was happening. The objective for the night of 16/17 May was the Charleroi to Willebroek Canal (the Line of the Senne), the following night to the River Dendre from Maubeuge to Termonde and the Escaut to Antwerp (the Dendre Line), and finally on 18/19 May, to the Escaut from Oudenarde to Maulde on the French border (the Escaut Line). The order to withdraw was greeted with astonishment and frustration by the British troops who felt that they had held their own, but they were unaware of the deteriorating situation elsewhere. The withdrawal went mainly according to plan but required hard fighting from the corps rearguards. A communication breakdown caused a loss of co-ordination with the Belgian Army to the north-west of II Corps and a dangerous gap opened up between the two; fortunately it was covered by British light armour before the Germans could discover and exploit it.
Loss of the construction divisions.
The three Territorial divisions, which had arrived in April equipped only with small arms, intended for construction and labouring tasks, were distributed across the path of the German spearhead. On 16 May, Georges realised that the Panzer divisions might reach the coast and outflank all the Allied armies to the north of them. He asked for the 23rd Division to defend the Canal du Nord at Arleux. The British Staff was of the opinion that the German breakthrough consisted of small detachments of light reconnaissance troops and that using these lightly armed and largely untrained troops against them did not seem unreasonable. The area was otherwise devoid of Allied units, so there was little alternative. The three divisions were grouped together in an improvised corps called Petreforce and on 18 and 19 May, the Territorials, lacking motor transport, began to march or entrain towards their defence positions.
The 70th Brigade of the 23rd Division dug in on the Canal Line but was ordered to withdraw towards Saulty on 20 May; in the process they were caught in the open by elements of 6th and 8th Panzer Divisions, from which only a few hundred survivors escaped. The 69th Brigade defended Arras and the 12th Division fought to delay 2nd Panzer Division on the Canal Line near Arras, at Doullens, Albert and Abbeville. The 138th Brigade of the 46th Division fought on the Canal Line but the 137th Brigade trains were attacked by the en route; the survivors were able to withdraw to Dieppe and later fought on the Seine Crossings. The 139th Brigade fought on the River Scarpe and later defended the Dunkirk perimeter. By the end of 20 May, the divisions had ceased to exist, in most cases having only delayed the German advance by a few hours.
21–23 May.
The push by Army Group A towards the coast, combined with the approach of Army Group B from the north-east, left the BEF surrounded on three sides and by 21 May, the BEF had been cut off from its supply depots south of the Somme. The British counter-attacked at the Battle of Arras on the same day. This was well to the south of the main BEF force on the Escaut, where seven BEF divisions were placed in the front line. The British divisions were facing nine German infantry divisions, who began their attack on the morning of 21 May with a devastating artillery barrage. Shortly afterwards, infantry assaults started along the whole front, crossing the canalised river either by inflatable boats or by clambering across the wreckage of demolished bridges. Although the Escaut line was penetrated in numerous places, all the German bridgeheads were either thrown back or contained by vigorous but costly British counter-attacks and the remaining German troops were ordered to retire across the river by the night of 22 May. Later that same night, events further south prompted an order for the BEF to retire again, this time back to the Gort Line on the Franco-Belgian border. The Channel ports were at risk of capture. Fresh troops were rushed from England to defend Boulogne and Calais but after hard fighting, both ports were captured by 26 May in the Battle of Boulogne and Siege of Calais. Gort ordered the BEF to withdraw to Dunkirk, the only port from which the BEF could still escape.
Retreat to Dunkirk.
Le Paradis massacre.
Detached rifle companies of the 2nd Battalion, Royal Norfolk Regiment of the 1st Battalion and Royal Scots of the 2nd Infantry Division provided rearguards during the evacuation of troops from Dunkirk. The 2nd Royal Norfolks held the line at La Bassée Canal with the 1/8th Lancashire Fusiliers, while the 2nd Royal Norfolks and 1st Royal Scots held the villages of Riez du Vinage and Le Cornet Malo, protecting the battalion headquarters at Le Paradis for as long as possible. After an engagement with German forces at dawn on 27 May in Le Cornet Malo, C Company and HQ Company of the 2nd Royal Norfolks fell back to the headquarters at the Cornet Farm outside Le Paradis. They were told by radio that their units were isolated and would not receive any assistance.
German forces attacked the farmhouse with tanks, mortars and artillery, which destroyed the building and forced the Norfolks to retreat to a nearby barn. The Royal Norfolks continued their defensive stand into the evening, by which point many had been wounded by the German bombardment. The last contact with Brigade Headquarters at L'Epinette occurred at but despite a lack of support the Norfolks held on until at which point they finally ran out of ammunition.
Cornered, outnumbered and with many wounded, 99 Royal Norfolks made a rush into the open but eventually, under the orders of their commander Major Lisle Ryder, the Norfolks surrendered. In the confusion of battle and in part due to battle fatigue, the Norfolks had surrendered not to the German company they had been fighting, but rather to the 2nd Infantry Regiment of the SS "Totenkopf" Division (Death's Head) (SS- and Fritz Knöchlein), which had been fighting another isolated BEF unit, the Royal Scots, at an adjacent farm. The Knöchlein unit, notorious for their ruthlessness, had previously been engaged in mopping-up operations against Allied forces to the north and east of Cambrai. The 99 prisoners were marched to farm buildings on a nearby farm and lined up alongside a barn wall. They were then fired upon by two machine guns; Knöchlein then armed his men with bayonets to kill the survivors. All but two of the Norfolks were killed and their bodies buried in a shallow pit. Privates Albert Pooley and William O'Callaghan, hiding in a pigsty, were discovered later by the farm's owner, Mme Creton and her son. The two soldiers were later captured by a Wehrmacht unit and spent the rest of the war as prisoners of war.
II Corps rearguard.
The II Corps commander Lieutenant General Alan Brooke, was ordered to conduct a holding action with the 3rd, 4th, 5th and 50th Infantry Divisions along the Ypres–Comines canal as far as Yser, while the rest of the BEF fell back. At mid-day on 27 May, the Germans attacked south of Ypres with three divisions. German infantry infiltrated through the defenders and forced them back. On 27 May, Brooke ordered Major-General Bernard Montgomery to extend the 3rd Division line to the left, freeing the 10th and 11th Brigades of the 4th Division to join the 5th Division at Messines Ridge. The 10th and 11th Brigades managed to clear the ridge of Germans and by 28 May, the brigades were dug in east of Wytschaete. Brooke ordered a counter-attack led by the 3rd Battalion, Grenadier Guards and the 2nd Battalion, North Staffordshire Regiment of the 1st Division. The North Staffords advanced as far as the Kortekeer River, while the Grenadiers managed to reach the Ypres–Comines Canal but could not hold it. The counter-attack disrupted the Germans, holding them back a little longer while the BEF continued its retreat.
Dunkirk.
The Germans failed to capture Dunkirk and on 31 May, General Georg von Küchler assumed command of the German forces on the Dunkirk perimeter and planned a bigger attack for on 1 June. The French held the Germans back while the last troops were evacuated and just before midnight on 2 June, Admiral Bertram Ramsay, the officer commanding the evacuation, received the signal "BEF evacuated"; the French began to fall back slowly. By 3 June, the Germans were from Dunkirk and at on 4 June, the Germans hoisted the swastika over the docks. Before Operation Dynamo, were embarked from Dunkirk; most of the remaining a total of troops along with and some Belgian troops, were evacuated from Dunkirk between 26 May and 4 June, though having to abandon much of their equipment, vehicles and heavy weapons.
After Dunkirk.
Lines-of-communication.
Allied forces north of the Somme were cut off by the German advance on the night of which isolated the BEF from its supply of Cherbourg, Brittany and Nantes. Dieppe was the main BEF medical base and Le Havre the principal supply and ordnance source. The main BEF ammunition depot and its infantry, machine-gun and base depots were around Rouen, Évreux and Épinay. Three Territorial divisions and three lines-of-communication battalions had been moved north of the Seine on 17 May. Rail movements between these bases and the Somme was impeded by German bombing and trains arriving from the north full of Belgian and French troops; the roads also filled with retreating troops and refugees. Acting Brigadier Archibald Beauman lost contact with BEF GHQ.
Beauman improvised Beauforce from two infantry battalions, four machine-gun platoons and a company of Royal Engineers. Vicforce (Colonel C. E. Vickary) took over five provisional battalions from troops in base depots, who had few arms and little equipment. The Germans captured Amiens on 20 May, setting off panic and the spread of alarmist reports. Beauman ordered the digging of a defence line along the Andelle and Béthune to protect Dieppe and Rouen. From the 51st Highland Division (formerly Saar Force) a Composite Regiment and the remnants of the 1st Support Group, 1st Armoured Division, relieved the French opposite the Abbeville–St Valery bridgehead. The Beauman Division held a line from Pont St Pierre, south-east of Rouen to Dieppe on the coast, which left the British units holding of the front line, of the Bresle and of the Andelle–Béthune line, with the rest of IX Corps on the right flank.
Second BEF.
On 31 May, GHQ BEF closed and 2 June, Brooke visited the War Office and was given command of a new II Corps, comprising the 51st (Highland) Infantry Division and the 1st Armoured Division, with the 52nd (Lowland) Infantry Division and the 1st Canadian Infantry Division from Home Forces in Britain, then the 3rd Infantry Division as soon as it was ready. Brooke warned that the enterprise was futile, except as a political gesture. On 6 June, the Cabinet decided to reconstitute the BEF (Second BEF is an informal post-war term) with Gort remaining as commander in chief.
The 157th (Highland Light Infantry) Brigade (a brigade group) of the 52nd (Lowland) Division departed for France on 7 June and Brooke returned five days later. On 9 June, the French port Admiral at Le Havre reported that Rouen had fallen and that the Germans were heading for the coast. Ihler, the IX Corps commander and Fortune decided that their only hope of escape was via Le Havre. The port admiral requested British ships for but this contradicted earlier plans for the IX Corps retirement and Dill hesitated, ignorant that the original plan was untenable. Karslake urged that the retirement be accelerated but had no authority to issue orders. Only after contacting the Howard-Vyse Military Mission at GQG and receiving a message that the 51st (Highland) Division was retreating with IX Corps towards Le Havre, did Dill learn the truth.
St Valery.
The retreat to the coast began after dark and the last troops slipped away from the Béthune river at Units were ordered to dump non-essential equipment and each gun were reduced to to make room on the RASC transport for the men. The night move was difficult as French troops, many horse-drawn, encroached on the British route and alarmist rumours spread. Fortune and Ihler set up at a road junction near Veules-les-Roses to direct troops to their positions and by the morning of 11 June, IX Corps had established a defence round St Valery. French transport continued to arrive at the perimeter and it was difficult in some places to recognise German troops following up, which inhibited defensive fire. That night, Fortune signalled that it was now or never. Troops not needed to hold the perimeter moved down to the beaches and the harbour. An armada of ships and craft had been assembled but few had wireless; thick fog ruined visual signalling and prevented the ships from moving inshore. Only at Veules-les-Roses at the east end of the perimeter, were many soldiers rescued, under fire from German artillery, which damaged the destroyers , "Boadicea" and "Ambuscade"; 2,137 British and 1,184 French troops were evacuated. Near dawn, the troops at the harbour were ordered back into the town and at Fortune signalled that it might still be possible to escape the next night, then discovered that the local French commander had already surrendered.
Le Havre.
Fortune had detached Arkforce comprising the 154th Infantry Brigade, A Brigade of the Beauman Division, two artillery regiments and engineers to guard Le Havre. Arkforce moved on the night of towards Fécamp, where most had passed through before the 7th Division arrived. A Brigade managed to force its way out but lost the wireless truck for liaison with the 51st (Highland) Division and Stanley-Clarke ordered Arkforce on to Le Havre. On 9 June, the Admiralty ordered Le Havre to be evacuated and the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth sent a flotilla leader, across the channel, accompanied by six British and two Canadian destroyers, smaller craft and Dutch coasters (known as schuyts). On 10 June, escorted three blockships to Dieppe and two were sunk in the approach channel. Beach parties landed at Le Havre on 10 June and the evacuation began on 11 June, hindered somewhat by bombing. The troopship was beached and the electric power was cut, rendering the cranes on the docks useless and improvised methods to embark heavy equipment were too slow. On 12 June, RAF fighters deterred more raids and the quartermaster of the 14th Royal Fusiliers got the transport away over the Seine via the ferry at Caudebec and ships at Quillebeuf at the river mouth. The Navy got 2,222 British troops from Le Havre to England and 8,837 were taken to Cherbourg to join the forces being assembled for the new II Corps (Second BEF).
Retreat from Normandy.
By 13 June, the Germans were across the Seine and the Tenth Army was isolated on the Channel coast. The AASF was ordered to retreat towards Nantes or Bordeaux, while supporting the French armies and flew armed reconnaissance sorties over the Seine from dawn, which cost ten aircraft and crews; bad weather limited fighter sorties to the coast. On 14 June, attacks resumed against German units south of the Seine but the weather deteriorated and fewer sorties were flown. Seven Blenheims were shot down raiding Merville airfield but ten Fighter Command squadrons patrolled twice in squadron strength or provided bomber escorts, the biggest effort since Dunkirk, as fighters of the AASF patrolled south of the Seine. The remnants of the 1st Armoured Division and two brigades of the Beauman Division had got south of the river, with thousands of lines-of-communication troops but only the 157th Infantry Brigade, 52nd (Lowland) Division was in contact with the Germans, occupying successive defensive positions. The French armies were forced into divergent retreats, with no obvious front line. On 12 June, Weygand had recommended that the French government seek an armistice, which led to an abortive plan to create a defensive zone in Brittany.
On 14 June, Brooke was able to prevent the rest of the 52nd (Lowland) Division being sent to join the 157th Infantry Brigade Group and during the night Brooke was told that he was no longer under French command and must prepare to withdraw the British forces from France. Marshall-Cornwall was ordered to take command of all British forces under the Tenth Army as Norman Force and while continuing to co-operate, to withdraw towards Cherbourg. The rest of the 52nd (Lowland) Division was ordered back to a line near Cherbourg to cover the evacuation on 15 June. The AASF was directed to send its remaining bomber squadrons back to Britain and use the fighters to cover the evacuations. The German advance began again during the day, with the 157th Infantry Brigade Group engaged east of Conches-en-Ouche with the Tenth Army, which was ordered back to a line from Verneuil to Argentan and the Dives river, where the British took over an front. German forces followed up quickly and on 16 June, Altmayer ordered the army to retreat into the Brittany peninsula.
Operation Ariel.
From British and Allied ships were covered by five RAF fighter squadrons in France, assisted by aircraft from England as they embarked British, Polish and Czech troops, civilians and equipment from the French Atlantic ports, particularly St Nazaire and Nantes. The attacked the evacuation ships and on 17 June, sank the troopship in the Loire estuary. About and crew were saved but thousands of troops, RAF personnel and civilians were on board and at least died. Some equipment was embarked but ignorance about the progress of the German Army and alarmist reports, led some operations to be terminated early and much equipment needlessly was destroyed or left behind. About 700 tanks, 20,000 motor bikes, 45,000 cars and lorries, 880 field guns and 310 larger equipments, about 500 anti-aircraft guns, 850 anti-tank guns, 6,400 anti-tank rifles and 11,000 machine-guns were abandoned.
The official evacuation ended on 25 June, according to the terms of the Armistice of 22 June 1940 but informal departures continued from French Mediterranean ports until 14 August. From Operation Cycle at Le Havre, elsewhere along the Channel coast, to the termination of Operation Ariel, another troops were rescued, bringing the total of military and civilian personnel returned to Britain during the Battle of France to British troops. Left behind in France was eight to ten divisions' worth of equipment and ammunition. As troops returned to Britain, they increased the manpower of the Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces (General Edmond Ironside 27 May to 20 July, then Brooke) but the trained and equipped units had been stripped from Home Forces and sent to France; only about two divisions' worth of equipment remained in the country. The equivalent of twelve divisions returned to Britain but these could only be re-equipped by the Ministry of Supply from production. Deliveries of 25-pounder field guns had increased to about 35 per month by June but the establishment of one infantry division was 72 guns.
Aftermath.
Analysis.
In 1953, Lionel Ellis, the British official historian, wrote that by the end of the informal evacuations on 14 August, another had been evacuated after the by Operation Dynamo, a total of British troops. In 2001, Brodhurst wrote that many civilians escaped from French Atlantic and Mediterranean ports to England via Gibraltar and that civilians left the Channel Islands, from Much military equipment was lost but cycles. of ammunition, of stores, of petrol, and were recovered. During the BEF evacuations anti-aircraft guns and anti-tank guns were destroyed or abandoned along with consisting of cycles and 45,000 cars and lorries, of ammunition, of supplies and equipment and of petrol.
For every seven soldiers who escaped through Dunkirk, one man was left behind as a prisoner of war. The majority of these prisoners were sent on forced marches into Germany to towns such as Trier, the march taking as long as twenty days. Others were moved on foot to the river Scheldt and were sent by barge to the Ruhr. The prisoners were then sent by rail to POW camps in Germany. The majority (those below the rank of corporal) then worked in German industry and agriculture for five years. An intelligence report by the German IV Corps, which had been engaged against the BEF from the Dyle line to the coast, was circulated to the divisions training for Operation Sealion. The report said of the men of the BEF,
Casualties.
The BEF suffered or died of wounds, and missing or taken prisoner.
Map gallery.
Commemoration.
No campaign medal was awarded for the Battle of France but serviceman who had spent 180 days in France between 3 September 1939 and 9 May 1940, or "a single day, or part thereof" in France or Belgium between 10 May and 19 June 1940, qualified for the 1939–1945 Star.


89th Attack Squadron

The 89th Attack Squadron is a United States Air Force unit assigned to the 432d Wing as a tenant unit at Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota. It has been active as a remotely piloted aircraft (drone) squadron there since 2011.
The squadron was first activated as the 89th Aero Squadron at Kelly Field, Texas during World War I. It deployed to France in 1917, where it constructed fields and trained observers, In 1918 it briefly trained as an observation unit, but the unit did not move to the front before the Armistice.
It was consolidated in the mid 1930s with the 89th Observation Squadron as the 89th Reconnaissance Squadron but remained inactive until 1940, when it was attached to the 17th Bombardment Group at March Field, California and equipped with medium bombers. In 1942 members of the squadron participated in the Doolittle Raid against Tokyo. The squadron, now named the 432d Bombardment Squadron, moved to the Mediterranean Theater of Operations and participated in combat until 1945, earning two Distinguished Unit Citations and the French Croix de Guerre with Palm before returning to the United States in late 1945 and being inactivated.
The 432d was reactivated as the 432d Attack Squadron in October 2011 at Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota as a MQ-9 Reaper remotely piloted aircraft squadron.
Mission.
The 89th Attack Squadron mission is to remotely employ MQ-9 Reaper aircraft from ground control facilities located at Ellsworth Air Force Base to support combatant commander requirements around the world. The squadron, which operates the aircraft, and the Reaper ground control station are based at Ellsworth. Its aircraft are deployed overseas, supporting continuing operations.
History.
World War I.
The first predecessor of the squadron was activated at Kelly Field, Texas as the 89th Aero Squadron on 19 August 1917. The men who formed the squadron had been inducted into the Army ten days earlier at Fort Logan, Colorado. After processing, they departed for Kelly and upon arrival, formed the 89th and 88th Aero Squadrons and were trained on assembling new aircraft. The squadron moved to the Aviation Concentration Center at Camp Mills, Garden City, New York in October to prepare for overseas movement.
The 89th arrived at the 1st Air Depot, American Expeditionary Force at Colombey-les-Belles Airdrome, France on 16 November where it began work on constructing facilities for the depot. In February 1918, the squadron moved to Châtillon-sur-Seine, where it began work on construction of a flying field for the 2d Corps Aeronautical School. However, the squadron was quartered on a large farm some distance from the flying field, so construction of the field and supporting facilities took a month to complete and training of observers did not begin until May.
The squadron was assigned the first pilots to arrive at Chatillon and began training observers in artillery adjustment, photography, and gunnery. A photographic detachment of squadron enlisted men developed the pictures taken by the students at the school. These men formed the cadre for the 101st Photographic Section later in the year.
The 89th prepared for combat as an observation unit in July 1918, but never went to front, and in September all pilots assigned to the school were transferred to the headquarters of the Aeronautical School. The squadron returned to the United States where it was demobilized in 1919.
In 1936 the 89th was consolidated on the inactive list with the 89th Observation Squadron.
World War II.
The second predecessor of the 89th was constituted as the 89th Observation Squadron on the inactive list in 1935. In October 1936, the two squadrons were consolidated as the 89th Reconnaissance Squadron, but remained inactive until 1940. The squadron was activated and assigned to General Headquarters Air Force at March Field, California, but attached to the 17th Bombardment Group. The squadron was reassigned to Northwest Air District in June 1940, with its primary mission being reconnaissance with a secondary mission of bombardment. It was initially equipped with Douglas B-18 Bolos, but soon converted to Douglas B-23 Dragons.
In 1941, the squadron replaced its B-23s with North American B-25 Mitchells. After Japan attack on Pearl Harbor, the 89th flew antisubmarine patrols off the Oregon and Washington coastline.
The 89th moved to Lexington County Airport, South Carolina in early 1942 to perform antisubmarine patrols over southeast Atlantic coast and the Gulf of Mexico. There it became the fourth bombardment squadron of the 17th group as the 432d Bombardment Squadron. Meanwhile, aircrews from the squadron trained with its B-25s at Hurlburt Field, Florida for the Doolittle Raid. Some aircrews from the squadron participated in the raid, while the balance of the squadron transitioned into Martin B-26 Marauders, and completed training in Louisiana before being deployed to the Mediterranean Theater of Operations shortly following Operation Torch, the North Africa invasion.
During December 1942 the squadron became part of XII Bomber Command. It engaged in combat operations over North Africa supporting American and later Allied ground forces in Tunisia. The unit flew interdiction and close air support, bombing bridges, rail lines, marshalling yards, harbors, shipping, gun emplacements, troop concentrations and other enemy targets, helping defeat Axis forces in North Africa.
During 1943, the 432d participated in the reduction of Pantelleria. It supported Operation Husky, the Allied invasion of Sicily and Operation Avalanche, the invasion of Italy. During the drive toward Rome, the squadron was awarded a Distinguished Unit Citation for its attacks on airfields near Rome on 13 January 1944. It was also awarded the French Croix de Guerre with Palm for its operations in Italy between April and June.
The unit provided tactical air support in the liberation of Sardinia and Corsica. From airfields in Corsica, the 432d supported Allied ground forces during Operation Dragoon, the invasion of southern France in August 1944. It moved to Southern France and bombed enemy targets during the Allied drive northward. It earned a second Distinguished Unit Citation for bombing attacks on enemy defenses near Schweinfurt, Germany just before the end of the war on 10 April 1945.
The squadron remained in Europe after German capitulation. It became part of the occupation forces, and participated in the disarmament of Germany after V-E Day. It was assigned to the American Occupation Zone in Austria. The squadron returned to France to stage for its return to the United States, where it was inactivated in late November 1945.
Remotely piloted aircraft operations.
The squadron was activated in October 2011 at Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota as an MQ-9 Reaper squadron. The squadron replaced Detachment 1, 28th Operations Group, which had been activated in April 2011 to act as the lead organization to prepare Ellsworth for the activation of the remotely piloted aircraft unit. The squadron was reassigned from the 28th Bomb Wing to the 432d Wing in October 2015 when the 28th Wing was reassigned to Air Force Global Strike Command. The following June, the squadron returned to its original number and became the 89th Attack Squadron.
Lineage.
89th Aero Squadron
89th Attack Squadron


Galicia and World War II

The participation of Galicia, Spain, in World War II was marked by its location on Spain's Atlantic coast. Despite Spain's neutrality in the war, the country was affected due to its strategic location. The tungsten mines, such as the Mines of San Fins, were used for the Axis war industry. The extraction and transport of the mineral carried out by front companies, such as the Finance and Industrial Corporation (Galician: "Sociedade Financeira e Industrial").
Hundreds of Galicians traveled to fight with the Germans on the Eastern Front, in the Blue Division. On the other side, former republican combatants fought with the allies, many of them having been confined in French concentration camps.
Tungsten.
Raw materials were vital in economic warfare. Tungsten was one of those used to manufacture armaments. Before the war, the main producers were China (36%), Burma (17%) and the United States of America (11%). During the war, British sea power gave the Allied powers access to these countries, and denied them to the Axis powers. Germany had to seek sources in Europe. Spain and Portugal were the only producers, with Galicia accounting for almost 70% of Spanish reserves. For this reason, it became the main center of extraction.
Lorenz beam.
In 1939, the Germans built a 112m high aerial, in Arneiro in the municipality of Cospeito. It carried the communications of the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe, with a radius of a thousand miles. The station had two repeating lower and auxiliary buildings.
It formed part of a German network of nineteen stations. The Allies' sabotage plans were not carried out, since Spain was treated as a neutral country. The Lorenz beam was also eventually used by the British and Americans.


Battle of Samarinda

The Battle of Samarinda (29 January–8 March 1942) was a mopping up operation in the series of the Japanese offensive to capture the Dutch East Indies. After capturing the oil refineries at Balikpapan, Japanese forces advanced north to capture the strategic oil drilling site in and around Samarinda and the oil pipelines that linked both cities.
Background.
Before the war, Samarinda held a strategic significance due to the oilfields of the "Bataafse Petroleum Maatschappij" (BPM; Batavian Petroleum Company) that was located north and south of the Mahakam River. The drilling site in Sanga Sanga (named "Louise"), in particular, supplied a large amount of oil for the refineries in Balikpapan. Oil from Sanga Sanga went through a 70 km pipeline via Sambodja (Samboja) to Balikpapan. Furthermore, the Dutch also established a coal mine in the Loakoeloe (Loa Kulu) area, run by the "Oost Borneo Maatschappij" (OBM; East Borneo Company).
The Japanese had also recognized Samarinda's importance as a center of oil and coal production, in addition to its substantial port and replenishing facilities. In 1939, the Sanga Sanga Oilfields produced around 1 million tons of oil annually, about 20% of the annual quantity that Japan needed. And with that, Samarinda became one of Japan's major seizure target in its plan to annex the Dutch East Indies.
Order of Battle.
Japan.
Ground Forces.
Kume Detachment (Commander: Lt. Col. Motozō Kume):
Netherlands.
Ground Forces.
Samarinda Detachment (Commander: Capt. G.A.C. Monteiro):
Dutch Plans.
In December 1941, the General Headquarters in Bandung assigned the Samarinda Detachment the following tasks:
Since the Sanga Sanga drilling sites can be easily accessed from the sea through the large number of arms of the Mahakam delta, the Dutch have placed several defensive measures and detectors in the approaches to Mahakam River. To signal suspicious ship movements, Monteiro set up telephone posts at various delta mouths that will inform him of any ship movements. A Dutch battery of 3x 75 mm guns had also been installed near Mariam River to prevent enemy ship from approaching the mouth of the Sanga Sanga River.
At the junction of Sanga Sanga River and Mahakam (Sanga Sanga Moeara), the Dutch also set up concrete casemates as part of a defensive position to delay an enemy landing near the mouth of the river. In addition, Monteiro also placed a strong guard at Dondang stream bridge in Tiram River, near where the oil pipeline was laid. To help prevent the drilling sites to be captured intact, the Dutch have prepared the destruction plan since early January 1942 and have evacuated the families of BPM staff at Sanga Sanga and Anggana to Samarinda.
Japanese Plans.
Even though its oilfields held a special significance, the Japanese plan for the capture in Samarinda solely consisted of a mopping up operation. At first, the plan was for Japanese troops enter the city via landing boats through the Mahakam Delta. However, in late January, the plan was changed to having Sanga Sanga and Samarinda be seized by land.
For this operation, the Kume Detachment will advance from Balikpapan via Mentawir to Loa Djanan (Loa Janan) up north, while the main force will advance along the Balikpapan — Sambodja (Samboja) — Samarinda road and conducted mopping up operation in Samarinda's vicinity.
The Battle.
Sanga Sanga Oilfield Demolition.
On 18 January, Col. C. van den Hoogenband, commander of Dutch forces in Balikpapan telephoned Monteiro, informing him that the demolition of oilfields in Balikpapan will commence, after Dutch planes spotted the Japanese invasion fleet near Cape Mangkalihat. Based on the phone call, Monteiro also decided to begin the demolition process of the Sanga Sanga oilfield. Under the command of Lt. Naber, and aided by conscripted BPM employees, the demolition began at 09:00 on 20 January. The well-organized and properly executed plan means that by 18:00, Sanga Sanga oilfield had been thoroughly and systematically destroyed. The demolition teams then left for Samarinda II Airfield, before being evacuated to Java.
Dutch Defense Realigment.
On 22 January, the General Headquarters (AHK) in Bandung instructed Monteiro to leave 4 brigades (ca. 15-18 man each) in Sanga Sanga to prevent enemy landing along the Mahakam River. Monteiro perceived that since his forces does not have the adequate manpower for this order, he advised for his force to focus on the defense of the road that ran from the Mahakam River all the way to Samarinda II (2,5 km long). AHK ignored his advice, and the original order had to be carried out. But then, AHK clarified their position again, and instructed Monteiro to conduct the delaying action on the river, in boats. At the time, Monteiro only had two available vessels for this task: "Triton" (A Gouvernementsmarine vessel) and the "P-1" patrol boat that escaped from Tarakan and arrived on 19 January. Monteiro ordered Sgt. Maj. J. Schrander to stay behind with 80 men and several remaining demolition engineers at Sanga Sanga. After conducting the final destruction to the oilfields, Schrander's detachment must inflict as much casualty on the Japanese as possible. In the meantime, Monteiro requisitioned all available sailing vessels - ca. forty ships, ranging from small motor boats to 100 tonnes coasters - and divided them into four groups, staffed by about 250 people under a commander. Monteiro also moved his headquarter from Sanga Sanga to Samarinda and had Lt. Hoogendorn destroyed the oil pipeline along the Dondang stream. Finally, any troops that are not suitable for the river delaying action are withdrawn to Samarinda II.
On 24 January, Hoogenband evacuated his troops from Balikpapan, rendering Monteiro to rely on civilian reports for intelligence sources. Even though reports gave unclear picture of the situation at Balikpapan, it pointed out that Japanese forces intended to advance through the pipeline to Sanga Sanga and also over the water, with expectations that they will arrive in Samarinda by February.
Advance of Kume Detachment.
On 29 January, Monteiro was informed that the Kume Detachment began to cross the Doendang River. He immediately instructed Schrander to conduct the final demolitions of Sanga Sanga, and take offensive actions against the enemy. Shortly after giving the order, connection with Sanga Sanga was broken. As the skirmish between Schrander's and Kume's forces began, the former quickly lost control of his four brigades, as the brigade commanders had already lost their footing. Before long, Schrander's troops was shattered and retreated in disarray westwards to Loa Djanan. Monteiro soon realized that the Kume Detachment will advance along a partially constructed road that runs from Balikpapan to Loa Djanan. On 31 January, Samarinda was razed and Monteiro moved his headquarters to Loa Djanan.
On 1 February, what's left of Schrander's detachment reached Loa Djanan and informed Monteiro that the Kume Detachment had beaten them back. They also informed that on January 30, Kume's forces had crossed the Tiram River from the south. Monteiro sent a patrol to Sanga Sanga to find Schrander, to no avail. Civilian reports also indicated that there was heavy fighting in Sanga Sanga. Because of this Monteiro realized that it would be useless to maintain the Dutch battery at Marian River. He ordered van Brussel, commander of the battery, to destroy the guns and fall back to Loa Djanan.
On 2 February, Dutch sentries placed 12 km from Loa Djanan engaged a Japanese column that had been moving from Balikpapan to Mentawir. Underpowered, the sentries were beaten back to Loa Djanan by the evening, after which Monteiro moved his headquarters northward to Tenggarong in order to continue delaying the Japanese advance along the Mahakam River to Samarinda II. At Loa Koeloe (Loa Kulu), Dutch forces destroyed the OBM coal mine, before receiving intelligence that Kume's forces have occupied Loa Djanan. Taking no respite, Kume moved his troops east and captured Samarinda on 3 February. Along his advance, the Japanese have also attempted to entered Mahakam river via sea but failed, with two destroyers running aground in one of the delta arms.
Monteiro's Delaying Actions.
To conduct the delaying action on the river, the Dutch equipped "Triton" with a light gun, a pair of high-level machine guns and added improvised armor plates to the hull. The ship left Tenggarong on 3 February at 04:00 hours to recon in force the area around Loa Djanan. Five hours later, the ship returned with the information that Japanese forces had occupied the town. The ship, raked with machine gun fire, had caused substantial casualties on the Japanese force for the cost of two injured crews.
From his view, since the Japanese has not shown any intention to advance further inland after occupying Samarinda, Monteiro planned to use his remaining available troops to raid Samarinda. Once again, AHK rejected the plan since he does not even have enough troops to delayed a still-possible enemy advance, which occurred on 8 February, as Japanese forces began marching towards Tenggarong. Before the town was occupied by the afternoon on the same day, Monteiro had already moved his headquarters again 15 minutes further upstream.
"Triton", now under the command of Lt. Scheltens, moved into Tenggarong on 10 February and promptly came under heavy fire. During the skirmish, many of its civilian crew jumped overboard, and the ship to begin to drift off. Scheltens took the helm and regain the steering control. Throughout a 20-minute firefight, he managed to prevent outright panic and lead the counterfire. Nevertheless, the engagement created an atmosphere of shell-shock among the remaining civilian crew. As they began to desert the fight, morale among the Dutch forces began to be strained, as the local troops followed in their footsteps and went back to their families in Samarinda. To kept the delaying action going, AHK sent naval personnel replacements from Java.
By 15 February, the remainder of Samarinda detachment based themselves in Kota Bangoen (Kota Bangun) and sent 4 brigades under Scheltens southward to Benua Baroe (Benua Baru) to close the route from Tenggarong to the town. At that point, Monteiro only had three weakly armed combat vessels to delay any attack from the river. In addition to the "Triton", there was also the "Mahakam", a former "Binnenlands Bestuur" (BB; Interior Administration) ship. Dutch troops armed "Mahakam" with a 20-mm gun and several machine guns. "P-1"'s defective features, however, had rendered it out of service. Monteiro also evacuated the soldiers families westwards to prevent further desertion.
Trying to regain the initiative, he sent spies to Samarinda and Tenggarong to gather intelligence on possible attacks; Scheltens even disguised himself as an Arab Haji and gathered information from visiting many kampungs (villages). Meanwhile, the commander of Samarinda II, Maj. Gerard du Rij van Beest Holle was appointed as the acting commander of all Dutch military forces in Borneo. Monteiro immediately urged him to relay the delaying action's futility and the need to attack Samarinda to AHK, due to several factors:
Still, van Beest Holle remained adamant about continuing the fight along the river to ensure Samarinda II's safety. On 1 March, however, AHK consented to Monteiro's plan, if he agreed to continue to river action in case of failure. Yet the few troops at his disposal means that Monteiro could not meet this term; he pointed out that he need at least two more companies, to no avail. On 5 March, the spies sent reports of an imminent attack on Kota Bangoen via land and river.
The next day, a patrol from Benua Baroe came in contact with Japanese patrols and retreated back to the town, as Japanese troops began to make camp just one hour away. At dawn on 7 March, Tenggarong came under a fierce attack. The fighting continued for three hours until 10:00, when the weight of Japanese machine guns and mortars forced the brigade to retreat in panic and disorder to Kota Bangoen. Out of 80 troops at Benua Baroe, 10 of them, along with their commander Lt. Van Mossel did not reached Kota Bangoen at 02:00 the next day. Monteiro instructed the "Triton", an OBM tug and a speedboat to wait for him until 06:00, before falling back upstream.
As the troops from Benua Baroe reached Kota Bangoen, they immediately boarded river vessels along with the rest of Monteiro's troops and left for Moeara Moentai (Muara Muntai) under cover of the aforementioned ships. The convoy docked and set up their command post in the town by 05:00 under the distant sound of gunfire. Two hours later, several Dutch soldiers arrived in a battered speedboat and informed Monteiro that the combat vessels at Kota Bangoen had engaged with Japanese armored sloops. With "Triton" badly shot up and the OBM tug could no longer be used from the fight, "Mahakam," along with disorganized KNIL troops in wooden boats are all that remained of the river force.
Monteiro decided to organized the last resistance in Samarinda II and went there immediately to inform van Beest Holle of his disposition. While en route, however, he received a telegram about the ongoing negotiation between Dutch and Japanese commanders on Java at 09:00. At noon, the radio announced the unconditional surrender of all Dutch forces in the Netherlands East Indies, forcing him to lay down his arms and ended the last resistance in East Borneo.
Aftermath.
Lt. Van Hossel evaded capture until 11 March, when Japanese troops caught up with him at Moeara Moentai. By 19 March, Japanese forces had rounded up all Dutch troops and detained them in Samarinda. Maj. van Beest Holle died in captivity in Tarakan on 4 June, 1944.
On the 30th of July 1945 around 144 to about 148 inmates (sources vary) were rounded up and driven to the mine at Loa Kulu. There the inmates were told they were sentenced to death after which the women were separated from the men and children. First the Japanese soldiers mutilated the women to death, after which they threw all the children down the mine shaft, then finally the men who first had to witness what happened to their wives and children were decapitated by Japanese soldiers. Their bodies and severed heads were thrown down the mine shaft as well, just as the mutilated bodies of the women.
After the war, Capt. Monteiro was awarded the Bronze Lion and Lt. Scheltens received the Bronze Cross.
Liberation.
Samarinda remained under Japanese occupation until September 1945, when it was liberated by the 2/25th Battalion of the Australian 7th Division. The Australians also discovered the human remains in the mine shaft at Loa Kulu. A monument has been erected to commemorate the victims of what is now known as the Loa Kulu Massacre.


Philip Johnston (code talker)

Philip Johnston (September 14, 1892, in Topeka, Kansas – September 11, 1978, in San Diego, California) proposed the idea of using the Navajo language as a Navajo code to be used in the Pacific during World War II.
Early years.
Johnston was born in Topeka, Kansas, on September 14, 1892, the son of a missionary, William Johnston. The elder Johnston brought his family to Flagstaff, Arizona, on September 16, 1896, to serve Navajos residing on the western part of the Navajo Reservation. Philip's father was able to intervene and defuse a potentially violent clash known as the Padre Canyon Incident, which revealed underlying tensions between Navajos and Anglos involving livestock rustling. For resolving that incident in a peaceful manner, local Navajo leaders allowed Reverend Johnston to build a mission 12 miles north of Leupp, Arizona. After that incident, Philip's father worked to expand the boundaries of the western part of the Navajo reservation in order to resolve livestock rustling disputes on which developing tensions were generally centered.
On the reservation, young Philip learned to speak Navajo while playing with Navajo children. In 1901, Philip traveled to Washington, D.C., with his father and local Navajo leaders when they spoke to the newly appointed President Theodore Roosevelt to persuade him to add more land to the Navajo Reservation via an Executive Order. Philip was the Navajo/English translator between the local Navajo leaders and President Roosevelt.
Around 1909–10, Johnston attended the Northern Arizona Normal School, now Northern Arizona University, where he earned an academic degree. In March 1918 he enlisted in the U.S. Army's 319th Engineers, where he received a reserve commission. Between March and September 1918 he trained in Camp Fremont at Menlo Park, California, before being shipped to France as part of the AEF to participate in World War I. It is here that he may have heard about Comanches being used as code talkers by U.S. Army units.
Johnston attended the University of Southern California, Los Angeles, where he earned his graduate civil engineering degree in 1925. Afterwards he took a job with the city of Los Angeles water department.
The Navajo code talkers project.
Though he worked in Los Angeles he maintained his social connections with the Navajo people with whom he grew up. He was working as a civilian in Los Angeles when the Imperial Japanese Navy attacked Pearl Harbor. After the attack he had read of the U.S. Army using Comanches in their Louisiana field maneuvers to transmit military communications and began to think that the Navajo language could also be applied in this manner. He presented this idea to the United States Marine Corps (USMC), and he was directed to present his proposal.
Johnston recruited four Navajos who were working in the Los Angeles shipyards, and arranged to demonstrate the utility of using the Navajo language to transmit military communications. The officer in charge of this demonstration was Communications Officer, Amphibious Force, Fleet Marine Force (FMF) Major James E. Jones, USMC at Camp Elliot, San Diego and Commanding Officer; Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet General Clayton Barney Vogel heard of the event and attended the demonstration. Initially Philip thought the Navajo language could be used unmodified to transmit military communications, using conversational Navajo. Just before the actual demonstration started, the Navajos received their samples of common military expressions they were to convey to each other. They informed the gathered personnel that in order to send the military messages they would have to use word and letter substitution methods to convey the messages, due to the lack of direct equivalents in Navajo of many technical English terms. After some deliberation to agree upon which Navajo words would represent English equivalents the Navajos were divided into two groups and put into separate rooms, where field phones had been installed, at opposite ends of the same building.
At that point they transmitted the common military expressions they were assigned to be coded into Navajo and decoded into English, by verbally encrypting, transmitting and decoding the messages nearly verbatim from English, to Navajo and back into English. Philip indicated that this Camp Elliot exercise revealed limitations to using conversational Navajo for military communications and that he was inspired to use the letter and word substitution methods to encrypt Navajo. On the other hand, USMC documents indicate that it was after this demonstration, when they were independently investigating the logistics of using the Navajo language as a code, that it was Bureau of Indian Affairs personnel who stated that a coding system for Navajo had to be created.
General Vogel was so impressed with the Camp Elliot demonstration that he asked the Commandant of the Marine Corps to recruit 200 Navajos. But Vogel was given authorization to recruit only 30 Navajos, under a pilot program status to investigate the feasibility of this proposed program with actual Navajos. On the morning of May 4, 1942, 29 Navajo recruits boarded the bus at Ft. Defiance, Arizona, were transported to the induction center at Ft. Wingate, New Mexico, and, after lunch, were transported overnight to Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego (MCRD, SD) for administrative in-processing, then to start their seven weeks of standard recruit training. Upon completion of recruit training the first all-Navajo Platoon 382 graduated from MCRD, SD on June 27, 1942, where they were immediately ordered to report to Camp Elliot for about eight weeks of basic communications training and to develop a code based on the Navajo language. As for developing the code, the Navajos were guided by a cryptographic officer under the command of now Lieutenant Colonel Jones in the basics of employing letter and word substitution encryption methods in the formulation of the code. Shortly after the beginning of this project three additional Navajo Marines were added to the program, and together the 32 Navajos worked to develop the code. Their stay in Camp Elliot ended in the latter half of August 1942.
Based upon the successful training of the pilot talker program on August 25, 1942, the authorization to fulfill the recruitment of 200 Navajos commenced and Marine units "were asked to submit recommendations relative to the number of Navajos they could usefully employ".
After training, one group of 50 were assigned to the 1st Marine Division, a second group of 16 were assigned to the 6th Marines and the 2nd Signal Company of the 2nd Marine Division. Three individuals were retained stateside to recruit and train Navajos to become code talkers. The first group of Navajo code talkers arrived at Guadalcanal on September 18, 1942, near Lunga Point. The second group arrived with the 6th Marines on January 4, 1943, and relieved the 1st Marine Division code talkers and then participated in the latter stages of the Battle of Guadalcanal.
After the USMC officially instituted the "talker" program, Johnston asked the USMC for a special dispensation to serve in the Navajo Code Talking Program as a Staff Sergeant. His request was granted on September 22, 1942, and he served as a school administrator for the "confidential" program. By October 26, 1942, Staff Sergeant Philip Johnston USMCR and Corporal John A. Benally USMC, one of the three stateside code talkers, were sent out to recruit more Navajos to join the program. From late October through November 1942, they recruited Navajos throughout the western portion of the reservation, until they were recalled back to Camp Elliot. On December 7, 1942, the Navajo Communication School at Camp Elliot began formal lessons under Johnston's supervision. Navajo recruits trickled in and went through standard Marine Corps boot camp, whereupon after graduation they were sent to Camp Elliot. The next all-Navajo platoon to go through boot camp was Platoon 297 in March 1943 at MCRD, SD.
Johnston may have proposed the idea of using the Navajo language to encrypt USMC tactical communications, but he was not yet on active duty with the USMC to be present during its creation by the first 29 + 3 Navajos who created the vocabulary with guidance by a USMC cryptographic officer.
Later years.
Philip Johnston died on September 11, 1978, at the VA Hospital in San Diego, California. He is buried at Glendale, California.


Convoy HG 84

HG 84 was an Allied convoy of the HG (Homeward from Gibraltar) series during World War II.
Background.
Following the U-boat Arm's defeat whilst attacking convoy HG 76, "Befehlshaber der U-Boote" (BdU), the U-boat high command, had temporarily discontinued further attacks against convoys on the Gibraltar route. This was overtaken by the shift in focus to Operation Drumbeat, the offensive against US shipping off the American east coast, and for six months the route was left undisturbed.
Seven outbound and seven homebound convoys, averaging 20 ships each, sailed without loss over a six-month period.
In June 1942 BdU determined that renewing the attack there would be profitable once more as it would achieve strategic surprise.
Forces involved.
HG 84 comprised 20 ships homeward bound from Gibraltar, many in ballast, or carrying trade goods.
The convoy commodore was Captain H.T. Hudson in "Pelayo", and the convoy was protected by an understrength escort group. This was 36th Escort Group, consisting of the sloop HMS "Stork" and three corvettes , and , under the command of F.J. Walker. The convoy was accompanied by a CAM ship, , and the rescue ship "Copeland".
Ranged against them was the wolfpack "Endrass" (named for the U-boat ace Engelbert Endrass) of nine U-boats ("U-71", "U-84", "U-89", "U-132", "U-134", "U-437", "U-552", "U-571", "U-575").
Action.
HG 84 sailed from Gibraltar on 9 June 1942, undetected by Axis patrols. and on 11 June was joined by three ships bound from Lisbon to the UK. However these ships had been shadowed by German aircraft, Fw 200 Condors based at Bordeaux, and these maintained contact while the Endrass boats moved to intercept. On 14 June "U-552" (KL Erich Topp) made contact with the convoy, to be joined that evening by three others, "U-89", "U-132" and "U-437".
However the escorts were able to pinpoint the shadowing U-boats by HF/DF and conducted an aggressive defence, attacking the U-boats as they attempted to close.
"Stork" and "Gardenia" attacked "U-132", causing severe damage and forcing her to abandon the battle and leave the pack. "Marigold" and "Convolvulus" attacked "U-89" and "U-437" over a period of 31 hours. However "U-552" was able to penetrate the screen and made two attacks. The first, just after midnight on 14/15 June, hit three ships "Etrib", "Pelayo" and "Slemdal", sinking all three. Four hours later, having reloaded, "U-552" again penetrated the escort screen and sank two more ships, and .
During the next day, 15 June, five more boats arrived, but Walker's ships continued their aggressive defence, fiercely attacking all attempts by the U-boats to close. During this period "U-552" and "U-71" both suffered damage and had to withdraw. "U-575" managed to close and fire, but her torpedoes missed and there was no damage.
On 16 June the convoy was joined by three more warships, the destroyer HMS "Wild Swan" and frigates HMS "Rother" and HMS "Spey". The convoy also came within range of Coastal Command aircraft, and these were able to further suppress any U-boat attacks.
However the convoy was also in range of German aircraft, and during the day the convoy was attacked by Ju 88 dive-bombers. During this period, "Wild Swan" came under attack while investigating a group of Spanish trawlers which came close to the convoy. She, and the trawlers, were bombed and "Wild Swan", with four of the Spanish trawlers, were sunk.
On 17 June, with the arrival of yet more Allied aircraft, BdU called off the attack. HG 84 arrived at Liverpool on 20 June without further loss.
Conclusion.
Whilst the U-boat Arm had had some success, it was not the victory BdU had expected.
Three of the nine U-boats had been severely damaged, though only two, "U-71" and "U-552" had to return to base; "U-132" was able to carry out repairs at sea and was able to continue her patrol.
HG 84 had lost five ships, yet 17 ships arrived safely. Walker was commended for his handling of the defence, and it was recognized he had been able to prevent further losses despite the disparity in numbers and to avert a major defeat.