Convoy Faith

Convoy Faith was a small, fast Allied convoy of World War II. It suffered heavy casualties when attacked by German Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor long-range bombers while en route from Britain to West Africa in July 1943. The convoy comprised two large troopships and a freighter, later joined by two destroyers and two frigates as escorts at various dates after it sailed on 7 July 1943. The two troopships, SS "California" and SS "Duchess of York", both former liners, were carrying military personnel to West Africa, where locally recruited troops were to be embarked as reinforcements for the Allied forces in Burma and the Middle East. The freighter MV "Port Fairy", carrying ammunition, was ultimately bound for Australia and New Zealand via the Panama canal.
On the evening of 11 July, four days after sailing, Convoy Faith was attacked by three Condors. Both troopships were severely damaged and subsequently sunk by torpedoes from the escorts; over 100 of the personnel aboard the two ships were killed. The freighter escaped unscathed, but was damaged in a second air attack on 12 July en route to Casablanca. The loss of the two troopships delayed the movement of a division of West African soldiers to India until four replacements arrived.
The British military was surprised by the attack on Convoy Faith, as it had been believed that the Condors no longer posed a serious threat. In response, the convoy route between Britain and Africa was moved to the west. The German Condor force attempted to repeat its success against Convoy Faith by carrying out similar attacks on other convoys, but sustained heavy losses from Allied anti-aircraft guns and aircraft.
Background.
From August 1940 to June 1941, the German Luftwaffe (air force) unit III./KG 40, which was based at Bordeaux–Mérignac Airport in southern France and equipped with Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condors, attacked Allied shipping travelling in the Atlantic. The unit made a number of successful attacks on convoys and individual ships traveling in the Western Approaches as well as on the route between Britain and Gibraltar. In response, the Allies increased the anti-aircraft armament carried by many merchant ships, and began to deploy CAM ships and escort carriers to provide fighter protection for convoys. During the last six months of 1941 these improved defences inflicted heavy losses on the Condor force, and it ceased attacking shipping in early 1942. In 1942, III./KG 40 mainly operated in the reconnaissance role and reported targets for U-boats to attack. A small number of attacks were made on ships travelling between Britain and Gibraltar from May onwards, but these cost the unit eight Condors destroyed in action and seven in accidents for no sinkings. As a result of the Condor's vulnerability to Allied defences, the commander of the Luftwaffe's Atlantic anti-shipping force (Fliegerführer Atlantik) recommended in December that the aircraft be withdrawn from service.
The British military conducted regular convoys to transfer personnel from the United Kingdom to the Middle East and India from mid-1940 until late 1943. This convoy route was assigned the code "WS", which was widely believed to be an abbreviation for "Winston Special" in honor of Prime Minister Winston Churchill. The WS convoys typically comprised several large ocean liners which had been converted to troopships protected by a strong force of warships. As the Mediterranean Sea was a war zone, the convoys normally traveled from the Clyde in Scotland to the Middle East or South Asia via the Cape of Good Hope at the southern tip of Africa. En route, the ships typically stopped at Freetown in West Africa to refuel and embark water, and again at either Cape Town or Durban in South Africa. German aircraft, submarines and surface ships attacked the WS convoys on occasion.
Prelude.
Despite its poor performance during most of 1942, III./KG 40's ability to attack Allied shipping was improved late in the year. During the last months of 1942 the unit received 18 C-4 variants of the Fw 200 which were fitted with the Lotfe 7D bombsight. This sight reduced the Condors' vulnerability to anti-aircraft fire by allowing them to bomb targets from medium altitudes; previously they had only been able to attack accurately from low levels. Several of the unit's Condors were also fitted with surface search radar, which improved their ability to locate Allied ships. In early 1943 it was decided to use these aircraft to renew attacks on convoys travelling to Gibraltar in an attempt to disrupt the Allied buildup in the Mediterranean during the Tunisia Campaign. These attacks began in early March and were conducted off Portugal between Lisbon and Cape St Vincent; this area was beyond the range of Allied fighter aircraft based in Gibraltar, and few escort carriers were available to protect convoys. III./KG 40 sank five merchant ships and damaged another two between March and the start of July, for the loss of at least five Condors. In response, the British began to use de Havilland Mosquito fighters to patrol the Bay of Biscay, deployed four additional squadrons of patrol aircraft to Gibraltar, and embarked signals intelligence teams on board warships in the Bay of Biscay to monitor KG 40's radio communications.
In February 1943 the British Government decided to transfer the recently raised 81st (West Africa) Division from West Africa to India to take part in the Burma Campaign. This unit required much more shipping space than other British divisions, as its fighting units were supported by thousands of porters. To facilitate the division's movement, additional troopships were assigned to the regular WS convoys. The 81st Division's advance parties departed Freetown with Convoys WS 29 and WS 30 in April and May, and the 6th (West Africa) Brigade embarked on ships of Convoy WS 31 at Lagos between 2 and 10 July. It was planned to transport the division's two remaining brigades in convoys WS 32 and WS 33.
The 5th (West Africa) Brigade was the second of the 81st Division's brigades to be shipped from West Africa. The brigade comprised 12,000 personnel and was scheduled to depart with Convoy WS 32 on 31 July. The liners "Britannic", "Largs Bay" and "Tamaroa" were available in Freetown to carry 8,528 of these men, and it was decided to sail the troopship SS "California" directly from the Clyde to provide the remaining berths.
"California" was a liner that had spent the first years of the war as an armed merchant cruiser before being converted to a troopship. She had previously carried troops to Bombay in India as part of convoys WS 22 and 26. She returned to the Clyde from Gibraltar on 4 June as part of Convoy MFK 15 and spent the next month docked in Glasgow undergoing repairs. Once this work was complete, "California" began to embark 470 personnel bound for West Africa on 4 July. She was to be accompanied on this voyage by SS "Duchess of York", which had been tasked with carrying 600 Royal Air Force personnel and civilians to West Africa, but had missed an earlier convoy owing to electrical problems. Like "California", "Duchess of York" was a pre-war liner which had been converted to a troopship. Prior to the ships' departure it was decided to use "Duchess of York" to transport elements of the 5th (West Africa) Brigade to Bombay after the ships arrived at Freetown, while "California" would instead carry other West African personnel to the Middle East.
Attack.
"California" and "Duchess of York" sailed from Greenock on the afternoon of 7 July. They spent the night at anchor in the Clyde; shortly after getting underway early the next day they were joined by the storeship MV "Port Fairy", bound for Australia and New Zealand via West Africa and the Panama Canal. The master of the "Duchess of York", Captain W.G. Busk-Wood, probably served as the Convoy Commodore. Busk-Wood had been the master of the liner SS "Duchess of Bedford" prior to the war, and remained in command of this ship until November 1942 when he transferred to "Duchess of York". He also held the rank of commander in the Royal Naval Reserve. The merchant ships were escorted by the destroyer and frigate from 9 July, and the Canadian destroyer joined the convoy the next day. While "Iroquois" commanding officer, Commander W.B.L Holms, was the most senior officer present, he chose to not assume command of the convoy as his destroyer would not remain with the troopships for their entire journey. The route taken by Convoy Faith was similar to that of other recent convoys sailing between Britain and Africa. While the strength of the escort force was much smaller than that assigned to the regular convoys, it was believed that submarines posed the main threat and that three warships would provide adequate protection.
Convoy Faith was detected by a German Condor at 8:00 pm on 11 July while about off the Portuguese coast. This aircraft circled near the ships, broadcasting a homing signal. Two other Condors joined the first aircraft at about 9:00 pm, and they commenced their attack on the convoy shortly thereafter. At this time, Convoy Faith was deployed in a formation intended to protect the ships from submarines. The two troopships and "Port Fairy" were sailing line abreast ("Duchess of York" was the westernmost of the three ships, "California" was in the centre and "Port Fairy" at the east of this group), "Iroquois" was located ahead and the two other escorts were on each flank of the troopships. Busk-Wood had maintained this formation after the first Condor was spotted in the belief that the aircraft would call in submarines rather than conduct an attack.
The three Condors made their attack from an altitude of about . Despite heavy anti-aircraft fire from the escorts, "California" was badly damaged by a near miss from the first plane to attack, and was hit by two bombs dropped by the second attacker. The damage caused by these bombs flooded one of the ship's holds and set her on fire. "California"s passengers were evacuated on board lifeboats while the crew tried to save the ship. This proved unsuccessful, however, and they abandoned ship later that night. "Duchess of York" also came under attack; several bombs hit the centre of the ship and set her on fire. This fire could not be brought under control, and she too was abandoned, at 10:40 pm on 11 July. "Port Fairy" was also straddled by two near misses, but did not suffer significant damage. Both troopships were subsequently torpedoed and sunk by their escorts, "Duchess of York" by "Douglas", for fear their blazing hulks would attract German submarines to the area.
While there are differing accounts of the casualties on board the two troopships, the official figures state that 89 people were killed on board "Duchess of York" and 26 on board "California". The survivors were rescued by the two destroyers and "Moyola", including 660 by "Iroquois" alone. They were subsequently taken to Casablanca in North Africa by the warships, from where the seamen returned to Britain and military personnel continued to West Africa on board the troopship .
The frigate , despatched from Gibraltar to make a scheduled rendezvous, sighted the convoy under attack at 10:10 pm, and was herself attacked by Condors, the bombs falling astern. After conducting an A/S sweep around the convoy, "Swale" was ordered to detach and escort "Port Fairy" to Casablanca. At 6:45 pm the following day, "Swale" rescued eight survivors from a PBY Catalina, but within an hour the two ships were again attacked by Condors returning from a reconnaissance mission. Despite the intervention of two United States Navy Catalinas sent to their aid, a bomb hit "Port Fairy" on her starboard quarter, starting a fire next to the magazine and disabling her steering. The Catalinas eventually drove off the Condors with machine gun fire; one of the German aircrew was seriously wounded in this engagement. At 10:05 pm "Swale" came alongside "Port Fairy" to aid the extinction of the fire with her hoses. With "Port Fairy" in danger of exploding, 64 survivors from the two troopships and 8 passengers were transferred to "Swale". The blaze was eventually extinguished at 00:41 am, and both ships continued the remaining to Casablanca without further incident, "Port Fairy" steering by her engines. "Port Fairy" did not suffer any casualties in the attack and was repaired on arrival at Casablanca.
Aftermath.
The losses suffered by Convoy Faith shocked the British military, as it had been believed that the Condor force no longer posed a significant threat. The decision to use a route which was similar to that used by previous convoys despite Convoy Faith's small escort made it an attractive target. In his assessment of the action Admiral Charles Forbes, the Commander-in-Chief, Plymouth strongly criticised the troopships for not taking evasive action during the attack. He also criticised the captain of "Iroquois" for not assuming command of the convoy. However, the Canadian official history argues that "it is doubtful whether Holms would have acted differently under the circumstances". In order to prevent a repetition of the attack, the convoy routes between Britain and West Africa were moved further to the west so that they were almost at the limit of the Condors' range.
The loss of "California" and "Duchess of York" represented a heavy blow to the Allies' already heavily committed fleet of large troopships. "Duchess of York"s intended role was filled by "Nea Hellas" after she disembarked Convoy Faith's survivors at Freetown. "Nea Hellas" embarked the Gold Coast elements of the 5th (West Africa) Brigade at Takoradi from 2 August while "Britannic", "Tamaroa" and "Largs Bay" loaded the remainder of the unit at other West African ports. Convoy WS 32 sailed from Freetown on 5 August, and "Nea Hellas" joined it at sea two days later. The liner was left behind at Durban owing to a mechanical fault, but eventually disembarked its soldiers at Bombay in late September after sailing there as part of Convoy CM 45. The West African personnel which were to be transported to the Middle East on board "California" were embarked on Convoy WS 33 in September and arrived at their destination in early November.
The Germans attempted to build on their success against Convoy Faith by carrying out further medium-altitude attacks on convoys. III./KG 40 sank another four ships between July and September 1943, but suffered heavy losses from Allied aircraft and anti-aircraft guns. From October, Heinkel He 177s largely took over the Condors' anti-shipping role, and the last Condor sorties were made over the Atlantic in early 1944.
Notes.
There were 64 confirmed casualties on the S.S. California - 46 merchant crew; 3 Army personnel (RAMC); 3 Royal Navy personnel; & 12 civilians. Merchant crew are commemorated at Tower Hill, London; the Halifax memorial in Halifax, Nova Scotia; and the Ben M'Sik European cemetery in Morocco. Royal Navy personnel are commemorated at Plymouth; Army personnel commemorated at Brookwood. <TNA BT 381/2396> <TNA WO 361/438> <TNA ADM 358/3117>
Citations
Bibliography


East Hebei Army

The East Hopei Army was raised from the former soldiers of the Peace Preservation Corps that had been created by the Tangku Truce of 31 May 1933. The Demilitarized Zone Peace Preservation Corps had been the "neutral" force policing the Demilitarized area south of the Great Wall when Yin Ju-keng at the instigation of the Japanese proclaimed an Autonomous Government of Eastern Hopei in November 1935, with its capital at Tungchow.
The Peace Preservation Corps was disbanded and absorbed by the East Hopei Army and was trained by Japanese advisors, officers from the Kwantung Army, who drilled the men by day and gave them Anti-communist lectures by night. The Japanese officers had final say in all matters pertaining to the army. Trained for a year, the Japanese believed they had created a reliable and well trained force. Intended for local policing they were only equipped with rifles and sidearms, and had no machine guns or artillery.
Organization.
The East Hopei Army had four Corps divided into three Brigades each and a Training Corps. Each brigade (called "Divisions") was divided into three sub-brigades; each sub-brigade had an attached Japanese Advisor. "Strength and organization July, 1937:"
- East Hopei Army - Yin Ju-keng [2]
-- 1st Corps "Tungchow" - Chang Ching-yu 4,000 men—2nd Corps "Tsunhua" - Chang Yen-tien 4,000 men—3rd Corps "Tungchow" - Li Yen-sheng 4,000 men—4th Corps "Tsunhua" - Han Tze-hsi 4,000 men—Training Corps "Tungchow" - Yin Ju-keng 2,000 men
Operations.
December 1935, 4th Detachment of the East Hopei Army attacked the Nationalist held towns of Taku and the port of Tangku. Forces from the 32nd Army killed two of the East Hopei soldiers and the rest retreated. Threats were made by the Japanese and the 32nd Army was withdrawn. The East Hopei Army then occupied the two towns.
July 1937 they were involved in the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and Battle of Beiping-Tianjin until they revolted in the Tungchow Mutiny on the morning of 29 July 1937. After the mutiny was put down by the Japanese, the East Hopei Army was dissolved, as was the Autonomous Government.


Lynch Shipbuilding

Lynch Shipbuilding was a wooden shipbuilding company in San Diego, California. To support the World War II demand for ships, Lynch Shipbuilding built US Navy rescue tugs and coastal cargo ships. Lynch Shipbuilding yard was started in the 1930s. Lynch was in the lumber business at the time also. In 1952 the yard was sold to Martinolich Shipbuilding Company, as Martinolich Shipbuilding San Diego. Martinolich's main shipyard was in Dockton, Washington. John A. Martinolich died in 1960. Martinolich's sons operated boatyards from 1940s to 1970 in Tacoma and San Diego also. Martinolich sold the San Diego shipyard in 1957 to National Steel and Shipbuilding Company which is at the current site, 1400 South 28th Street, San Diego.


Kabul Field Force

The Kabul Field Force was a field force created in September 1879 during the Second Anglo-Afghan War, under the command of General Frederick Roberts. It combined British and Indian Army regiments, and initially its numbers were around 7,500 men, but they later reached about 14,000.
The second phase of the Second Afghan War was set in motion by the murder of Cavagnari and his staff at Kabul on September 3, 1879. The only British troops then in Afghanistan were the Kurram Valley Field Force, commanded by Roberts. This was speedily reinforced by new units and ordered to advance on Kabul, with the objective of restoring Abdur Rahman Khan to the throne there. Roberts led his Force over the Shutargardan Pass into central Afghanistan.
With twenty field guns and 7,500 men, infantry, cavalry, artillery, and Sappers & Miners. Roberts's force moved up the Kurram Valley, winning various skirmishes and receiving envoys from Ayub Khan denying responsibility for the murders. By the beginning of October the force was at Char Asiab, twelve miles from Kabul, where 8,000 Afghans were dug in, and it defeated the Afghan Army at Char Asiab on 6 October 1879. The subsequent capture of Kabul on 13 October was described by Howard Hensman, correspondent of the "Daily News" of London.
On 11 November, a fall of snow caused the death of some of the force's elephants. By mid-November, the Force was divided into two Divisions, the first at and around Kabul, the 2nd on the Khyber line. The 1st Division contained 100 British Army officers and 2,783 other ranks, plus 71 Indian Army officers and 5,060 other ranks; while the 2nd Division contained 90 British Army officers and 2,385 other ranks, plus 118 Indian Army officers and 8,590 other ranks.
In December 1879, 10,000 Afghans rose against the invaders, but Roberts was well prepared and was victorious at the Battle of Sherpur. In an action at Killa Kazi on 11 December 1879, James Adams, a chaplain to the Force, rescued some men of the 9th Lancers from a ditch while under enemy fire, for which he was later awarded the Victoria Cross.
The Kabul Field Force was succeeded by the Kabul-Kandahar Field Force, formed in August 1880 for the march on Kandahar.


Mike Layton (journalist)

Mike Layton (November 24, 1922 – March 20, 2011) was an American newspaper journalist who wrote for The Seattle Post-Intelligencer and The Olympian from the 1960s through the 1980s, often covering Washington state politics. Before and after Pearl Harbor, Layton served in the US Army remote Aleutian Islands. Later, in 1944–45, he served as a paratrooper in the European theater of World War II, in the 82nd Airborne Division. Layton was also a veteran of the Korean War, serving in the 11th Airborne Division and 10th Special Forces Group. Layton wrote the book "Easy Blood: Ronald Reagan's Proxy Wars in Central America", about his research and experiences travelling in Central America (in particular Nicaragua), and "My Very Worst Friend", a memoir and autobiography.


Convoy ON 92

Convoy ON 92 was a trade convoy of merchant ships during the Second World War. It was the 92nd of the numbered series of ON convoys Outbound from the British Isles to North America. The ships departed from Liverpool on 6 May 1942 and were joined on 7 May by Mid-Ocean Escort Force Group A-3.
The convoy was discovered by Wolfpack Hecht on 11 May; seven ships were sunk before the U-boats lost contact with the convoy on 13 May. Surviving ships reached Halifax, Nova Scotia on 21 May.
U-boats.
The convoy was attacked by Wolfpack Hecht, which consisted of U-boats, namely:
In Popular Culture.
The song "Wolfpack" from the Sabaton album Primo Victoria covers the attack on Convoy O-92 by Wolfpack Hecht.


Robert C. Giffen

Robert Carlisle Giffen (1886 – 1962) was an admiral in the United States Navy.
Birth to the beginning of World War I.
Robert Carlisle Giffen was born in West Chester, Pennsylvania, on 29 June 1886. He attended the University of Notre Dame, in South Bend, Indiana, before appointment to the U.S. Naval Academy from the State of Nebraska in 1903. Midshipman Giffen graduated with the Academy's class of 1907 and was assigned to the battleship USS "Virginia", in which he voyaged around the world with the "Great White Fleet" between late 1907 and early 1909. During the next four years, Giffen served in several ships and also participated regularly in the National Rifle Matches. Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Giffen served at the Washington Navy Yard in 1913-15 and was then assigned to the new destroyer USS "Wainwright".
World War I and inter-war years.
During 1917-1918, Lieutenant Commander Giffen commanded the destroyer USS "Trippe" in European waters and served with the Sixth Battle Squadron, attached to the British Grand Fleet in the North Sea. In mid-1918 he took command of the new destroyer USS "Schley", serving in her at Gibraltar and in the Mediterranean Sea until August 1919. From then until the middle 1930s he had shore duty at San Francisco, California, at the Naval Academy and at Keyport, Washington; served afloat as Executive Officer of USS "Huron"; and was Commanding Officer of the gunboat USS "Sacramento", a destroyer squadron and the oiler USS "Neches". Between 1934 and 1937, Captain Giffen was again stationed at the Naval Academy, followed by a tour in command of the light cruiser USS "Savannah" in 1938-1940.
World War II.
Atlantic service.
Giffen attended the Naval War College in 1940 and spent several months in Washington, D.C., as Director of the Naval Reserve Policy Division of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
In March 1941, Rear Admiral Giffen became commander of a cruiser division. He led the North Atlantic Neutrality Patrol on increasingly "warlike" operations during the latter part of 1941. Once war formally began for the United States in December, he commanded surface forces that escorted convoys and, at times, operated with the British Home Fleet. In November 1942, he participated in the North Africa invasion, during which his task force actively engaged French warships and aircraft off Casablanca, Morocco.
Pacific and Caribbean service.
During 1943 and into 1944, Rear Admiral Giffen commanded battleship and cruiser task forces in the Pacific, participating in the latter stages of the fight for Guadalcanal (and was the losing commander in the Battle of Rennell Island), the Aleutians campaign, the invasions of the Gilbert and Marshall Islands, and raids against Japanese bases in the central Pacific. In May 1944, with the rank of vice admiral, he became Commandant of the Tenth Naval District and Commander, Caribbean Sea Frontier, with headquarters at San Juan, Puerto Rico from 14 May 1944 until 20 August 1945.
Final career assignments and retirement.
Vice Admiral Giffen was Commander Service Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, from August 1945, and retired from active duty at the beginning of September 1946.
He died at Annapolis, Maryland on 10 December 1962.


Fulton Shipyard

Fulton Shipyard was a shipbuilding company in Antioch, California. The shipyard was founded in 1924 by Frank Fulton and Angeline Fulton Fredericks. To support the World War II demand for ships, Fulton Shipyard built minesweepers, tugboats, and troopships. The shipyard was located on the Stockton Channel at 701 Fulton Shipyard Rd, Antioch, near Antioch pier and the Antioch Dunes National Wildlife Refuge. The site was the former Jarvis Brothers, opened in 1918, then Laurtzen shipyard. In 1977 the site became the California Corporation. The shipyard closed in 1999 and the land is owned by the Fulton Family Trust. Fulton Shipyard was on the San Joaquin River and an inland port located more than from the ocean, emptying into Suisun Bay. Fulton Shipyard was featured in a 1914 movie called "The Stolen Yacht", a short drama film released on November 5, 1914. Frank Fulton and Angelines son James Lloyd Fulton (August 7, 1928–August 25, 2011) became an operator of a Fulton Shipyard tugboat.
ATR-1 class rescue tug.
"ATR-1" class - ATR is the US hull classification symbol meaning Auxiliary Tug Rescue. The "ATR-1" class was a Type V wooden-hulled rescue tug built by Fulton Shipyard in 1944 and 1945. The "ATR-1" tugs serviced World War II in both Asiatic-Pacific Theater and the European theatre of World War II. The 40 "ATR-1"-class vessels had a displacement of 852 tons light and 1,315 tons fully loaded. They had a length of , a beam of and a draft of . The tugs had a top speed of . The largest boom had a capacity of 4 tons. They were armed with one 3"/50 caliber gun and two single Oerlikon 20 mm cannon. The crew had five officers and 47 enlisted men. They had a fuel capacity of . The propulsion was one Fulton Iron Works vertical triple-expansion reciprocating steam engine with two Babcock & Wilcox "D"-type boilers with a single propeller creating . They had two turbo drive Ships Service Generators, rated at 60 kW 120 V D.C. An example is .
Small coastal transport.
Fulton Shipyard built troopships of the APc-1-class small coastal transports design. The ship had a displacement of 100 tons light, 258 tons fully loaded with a length of , a beam of , a draft of , and a top speed of . The crew was composed of 3 officers and 22 enlisted men and could transport up to 66 troops. The vessels had a large boom with a capacity of 3 tons. They were armed with four single 20 mm AA guns. the "APc-1" class had a fuel capacity of of diesel fuel. They were powered by one Enterprise Engine DMG-6 diesel engine with a single propeller creating . For electrical they had two diesel 30 kW 120V D.C. service generators. The ship moved troops in the Pacific War. A notable ship was .
"Accentor"-class minesweeper.
Fulton Shipyard built s, with a displacement of , a length of –, a beam of –, and a draft of –. The minesweepers were powered by a diesel engine with and a top speed of . A crew of 17 manned the ship and deck guns. Armament was a two .50 cal. M2 Browning machine guns. "Accentor"-class minesweepers were used to sweep naval mines in harbors, bays, and other littoral waters, due to their small size. Notable ships: , , , , and .
"Agile"-class minesweeper.
Fulton Shipyard built s with a displacement of 853 tons full, a length of , a beam of , and a draft of . The vessels were powered by four Packard ID1700 diesel engines, with and two controllable pitch propellers. The ships had a top speed of . The ship crew was 7 officers and 70 enlisted men. The minesweepers were armed with one Bofors 40 mm gun and two .50 cal (12.7 mm) twin machine gun. Notable ships: and .


Drive on Munda Point

The Drive on Munda Point was an offensive by mainly United States Army forces against Imperial Japanese forces on New Georgia in the Solomon Islands from 2–17 July 1943. The Japanese forces, mainly from the Imperial Japanese Army, were guarding an airfield at Munda Point on the western coast of the island that the U.S. wished to capture as one of the key objectives of the New Georgia campaign. After landing around Zanana on 2 July from Rendova, U.S. troops began a westward advance towards the airfield at Munda. Held up by difficult terrain and stubborn Japanese defense, elements of three U.S. regiments advanced slowly along the Munda trail over the course of two weeks. The slow progress resulted in a reorganization of the U.S. forces assigned to the drive, and preparations were made for a corps-level offensive, but before this could be launched, the Japanese launched a counterattack on 17 July.
Background.
Munda Point lies on the western coast of mainland New Georgia. To its northwest lies Bangaa Island and to its south lies Rendova, from which it is separated by the Blanche Channel and the Munda Bar. At the time of the battle, the location's significance was derived from the airfield that the Japanese had established there. In the wake of the Guadalcanal campaign, concluded in early 1943, the Allies formulated plans to advance through the Central Solomons towards Bougainville, in conjunction with further operations in New Guinea, as part of the effort to reduce the main Japanese base around Rabaul under the guise of Operation Cartwheel. Capture of the airfield at Munda would facilitate further assaults on Vila, on Kolombangara, and Bougainville. For the Japanese, New Georgia formed a key part in their defenses along the southern approaches to Rabaul and they sought to defend the area strongly, moving reinforcements by barge along the Shortlands–Vila–Munda supply line.
The campaign plan for securing New Georgia, designated Operation Toenails by U.S. planners, involved several landings by elements of Major General Oscar Griswold's XIV Corps to secure staging areas and an airfield in the southern part of New Georgia at Wickham Anchorage, Viru Harbor and Rendova. These would then be garrisoned to support the movement of troops and supplies from Guadalcanal to Rendova, which would be built up as base for further operations in New Georgia focused on securing the airfield at Munda.
Efforts by U.S. forces to secure a lodgment on the west coast of New Georgia began early on 30 June when two companies from the 169th Infantry Regiment were landed offshore from Zanana, to secure several islands that sat at the mouth of the Onaiavisi Entrance to Roviana Lagoon. After linking up with a small party of local guides and a reconnaissance force that had been sent ahead, these troops consolidated their position and then moved to the mainland to begin scouting the area around Zanana towards the Barike River, and also between the Japanese airfield at Munda Point and Bairoko Harbor. To support this effort, a company of the 4th Marine Raider Battalion had been scheduled to reinforce the 169th Infantry Regiment, but they were unable to be released from operations to secure Segi Point and Viru Harbor and in their stead a company of Fijian and Tongan troops from a New Zealand-trained commando unit was detailed to assist.
Battle.
On 2 July, after the landings on Rendova, a company from the 169th Infantry Regiment and the entire 1st Battalion, 172nd Infantry Regiment, began to move to the New Georgia mainland as part of efforts to secure Munda Point. Detached from Major General John H. Hester's 43rd Infantry Division, these troops formed part of the force designated as the Southern Landing Group under the command of the assistant division commander, Brigadier General Leonard F. Wing. After night time reconnaissance patrols proved unsuccessful, on the afternoon of 2 July, a daylight crossing was undertaken utilizing a force of twelve Landing Craft Infantry vessels and four Landing Craft Tank vessels. Guided by local scouts in canoes, and covered by three artillery battalions, the U.S. troops crossed the Blanche Channel before passing through Onaiavisi Entrance and into Roviana Lagoon and landing around Zanana, east of Munda. After establishing a perimeter at Zanana, and building up further artillery support—four U.S. Army artillery battalions and two Marine batteries—the remaining elements of both regiments began arriving around the beachhead in preparation for the advance westward. This concentration was completed by 6 July. Meanwhile, reconnaissance troops, including elements from the New Zealand-led 1st Company, South Pacific Scouts and coastwatchers began preliminary operations.
Prior to the start of the New Georgia campaign, Allied intelligence had assessed that there were between 2,000 and 3,000 Japanese personnel in the Munda area. In reality there were 4,500 men defending Munda, of which 2,000 were Imperial Japanese Army personnel while the remainder were drawn from the Imperial Japanese Navy. Commanded by Colonel Genjiro Hirata, the Japanese forces defending Munda consisted of several battalions from the 229th Infantry Regiment as well as artillery, engineer, signals and medical support elements. These troops had been detached from Major General Minoru Sasaki's Southeast Detachment and from 13 July, the 229th was reinforced with 1,300 troops from the 13th Infantry Regiment, which moved from Bairoko via barge, where they had been relieved by the 2nd Battalion, 45th Infantry Regiment.
On 4 July, the U.S. troops undertook a preliminary move prior to beginning their advance, marching towards a line of departure along the Barike River about away. Meanwhile, on the northern coast of New Georgia, a force of U.S. Marines and Army troops landed at Rice Anchorage in an effort to block the movement of Japanese reinforcements down the Munda trail. The 172nd reached the river on 6 July, but the 169th, which had adopted the inland route, was held up by a company from the Japanese 229th Infantry Regiment, and did not reach the river until 8 July. The U.S. troops, under orders from Hester, began a general attack the following day, supported by 155 mm guns firing from Rendova. The terrain between the landing beach at Zanana and the objective at Munda Point was not conducive to a quick approach, and U.S. planners had failed to appreciate the difficulty the troops would have traversing the single, narrow track or through the dense jungle, which was crossed by fast flowing creeks and streams, and flanked by rocky ridges and deep ravines. The advancing U.S. troops found navigation difficult and were forced into a narrow front as the Japanese resistance mounted.
In an effort to breakthrough, on 9 July, Hester ordered the 172nd Infantry Regiment to carry out a flanking move to the north to attack the Japanese position in the rear, while the 169th Infantry Regiment continued its frontal assault; although the attack was supported by heavy artillery, naval gunfire support and air strikes, Sasaki correctly appreciated the U.S. commander's intent and responded quickly to the attack, moving troops to counter the flanking move, while in the forward areas movement was held up by Japanese snipers who concealed themselves in baskets in the trees and fired upon the U.S. troops with flashless rifles. That day, the 172nd gained about , while the 169th was unable to gain any ground at all.
By 11 July, Hester decided to divert the 172nd Infantry Regiment to the south towards Laiana, while the 169th continued their advance up the Munda trail. On the evening of 11/12 July, a naval task force under Rear Admiral Aaron S. Merrill, having departed Ironbottom Sound in the afternoon, fired over 8,600 shells during a 40-minute bombardment from the Blanche Channel to clear the jungle in front of the advancing troops; this ultimately proved ineffective, being fired over a mile in front of the U.S. troops for safety reasons. The following day, the 172nd resumed their advance but made only limited progress. Allied efforts to interdict the Munda trail from the north proved unsuccessful, and during this time the Japanese were able to land reinforcements from 16 barges that sailed from Vila; Japanese operations to move further reinforcements through the Slot on 12/13 July led to the naval Battle of Kolombangara.
On 12 July, three battalions from the U.S. 169th Infantry Regiment carried out an attack against Japanese positions overlooking the junction of the Munda–Lambeti trail. The 1st and 2nd Battalions carried the attack initially, but were held up. The following day, the 3rd Battalion, 169th Infantry Regiment gained the south ridge—later dubbed "Reincke Ridge"—after several hours of fighting supported by dive bombers and artillery. A Japanese battalion found a gap in the line between the 169th and 172nd Infantry Regiments on 13 July, having resulted from the 172nd's diversion to Laiana, cutting off the American regiment around the high ground. They were then subjected to repeated counterattacks over the course of several days, resulting in over one hundred casualties on the first day alone. The 172nd finally reached their objective at Laiana on 13 July, having found the going difficult to push through the swamp and coming under Japanese mortar fire. By the time they reached the beach, the regiment was running short of water and supplies. The following day, a second landing was carried out at Laiana, in an effort to shorten lines of supply and bring in reinforcements from the 3rd Battalion, 103rd Infantry Regiment, which linked up with the 172nd.
As part of efforts to break through to the cut-off 169th, the U.S. Army 118th Engineers, having previously pushed a track from Zanana, bridged the Barike River and ran a jeep trail towards the 169th's lines. Japanese troops harassed the bulldozer operators throughout this effort. Stores were moved to the head of this trail by an antitank company, but by 14 July it was still short. To relieve the supply situation, the 169th received supplies by parachute on 14 July. The following day, a battalion of the 145th Infantry Regiment arrived at Zanana as reinforcements, detached from the 37th Infantry Division. The same day, the advancing U.S. troops reached the Japanese main defensive line, consisting of a line of pillboxes, bunkers and fighting positions, supported by light and heavy machine guns, mortars and mountain guns of varying calibers. By this time many of the Americans were suffering from dysentery. As instances of combat stress began to rise fire discipline declined.
At this time, U.S. commanders made plans for a coordinated offensive to take Munda, and requested further reinforcements. The preparations would take time, though, which the Americans sought to buy with harassing fire from artillery and air strikes, coupled with minor advances aimed at securing some of the trails between Laiana and Zanana to relieve the 169th. Around this time, the troops advancing on Munda were reinforced by six United States Marine Corps tanks from the 9th Defense Battalion. These went in to action by 16 July. At least four tanks were damaged over two days of fighting after becoming isolated from their infantry support and coming under attack by Japanese infantry armed with magnetic mines.
Aftermath.
The U.S. offensive made small gains because of the limited combat experience by its soldiers, poor leadership by inexperienced U.S. Army officers, harsh terrain and conditions on New Georgia, and effective defensive measures by the Japanese. Casualties amongst the U.S. 43rd Division amounted to 90 men killed and 636 wounded; another 1,000 were evacuated due to illness. The U.S. soldiers experienced an unusually high number of severe cases of combat stress reaction. In analyzing the battle, historian Samuel Eliot Morison assessed that the choice of Zanana as a landing site had been a mistake and that Hester's decision to send the 172nd Infantry Regiment south, thereby exposing the 169th, had also been ill considered, writing:
Author Mark Stille writes that the initial drive as resulting in "limited tactical progress" for the U.S. forces. To break the deadlock, the U.S. command structure on New Georgia was reorganized. After carrying out an inspection of the situation and reporting back to Admiral William Halsey on Guadalcanal, the U.S. corps commander, Griswold, arrived to take overall command in the field, assuming this role at midnight on 15 July. While Hester retained command of his division, the regimental commander of the 169th Infantry Regiment—Colonel John Eason—was relieved of his command, being replaced by Colonel Temple Holland of the 145th Infantry Regiment. One of the 169th's battalion commanders was also relieved. Meanwhile, supplies and reinforcements from the 161st Infantry Regiment (detached from the 25th Infantry Division), as well as tanks from the 10th Defense Battalion, were dispatched from Guadalcanal and the Russell Islands in preparation for a corps-level offensive. Before this could begin, though, the Japanese launched a counterattack on 17 July using the reinforcements that had arrived from Vila, effectively bringing the Allied drive on Munda temporarily to a halt. After this effort was defeated, the Americans eventually secured the airfield in the Battle of Munda Point in early August.


Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command

The Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command was formed in the fall of 1942 to establish a single command to control antisubmarine warfare (ASW) activities of the Army Air Forces (AAF). It was formed from the resources of I Bomber Command, which had been carrying out the antisubmarine mission in the Atlantic and Caribbean since the Attack on Pearl Harbor due to the lack of long range Naval aviation in that area.
The command's units conducted ASW along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts of the United States, in the Caribbean Sea and in Europe, where it used bases in England and French Morocco. Its operations were marked by disagreements between the AAF and the Navy concerning the conduct of air ASW. In the fall of 1943, the ASW mission was transferred to the Navy and the command became a bomber training unit until it was inactivated in 1946.
History.
Initial Army Air Forces involvement in antisubmarine warfare.
Within a day after the declaration of war by the United States the Army Air Forces (AAF) began patrols of both the East and West coasts. Defense plans drawn up before the war began assigned the Navy responsibility for operations beyond the coastline, with Army aircraft serving in a supporting role. Because naval aviation that could perform long range patrols was nearly non-existent along the Atlantic coast in early 1942, the burden for aerial antisubmarine patrols fell on the AAF, which had available aircraft, but whose crews had not been trained for the mission.
German Navy submarines began operating in American coastal waters. By March 1942 fifty-three ships had been sunk in the North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier. As a result, the Commander of the North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier requested the Army's Eastern Defense Command to undertake offshore patrols with all available aircraft. The first patrols were performed by elements of I Bomber Command, which would be the primary AAF command involved in antisubmarine warfare (ASW) in early 1942, with assistance from I Air Support Command. However, although I Bomber Command was primarily involved in conducting ASW, it was doing so on an emergency basis, and was subject to withdrawal from these duties to perform its primary bombardment function. It soon became apparent that if the AAF were to continue with the ASW mission, its units would have to be organized under a specially trained and equipped command.
AAF Antisubmarine Command organizes.
In May 1942, General Arnold, Commanding General of the AAF, proposed to Admiral King, the Chief of Naval Operations, that the AAF establish a "coastal command", similar to RAF Coastal Command, operating "when necessary, under the proper Naval authority." That same month saw both a new high in sinkings by U-boats and a shift in their attacks from the Atlantic coast to the Caribbean Sea. In response, the AAF established the Gulf Task Force, with elements of Third Air Force augmenting I Bomber Command, at Miami, Florida to augment the Gulf Sea Frontier. The command situation had only worsened, with two air forces, two navy sea frontiers, and two army defense commands, with differing areas of responsibility, all involved in aerial ASW with ad hoc command relations and separate administrative and operational command arrangements. Later in the month, the War Department requested General Arnold to reorganize I Bomber Command to fulfill the requirements of ASW air operations, either in support of, or in lieu of, naval forces to protect Allied shipping.
Disagreements between the Army and the Navy over command relationships delayed activation of the command until October 1942. The activation of the single Army Air Forces Antisubmarine Command at New York City to control all Army Air Forces units conducting antisubmarine warfare reflected the Army's desire for a single mobile force. The command drew its personnel and equipment from I Bomber Command, which was simultaneously inactivated. In November 1942, the command's units were organized into two wings, reflecting the Navy desire that forces in a sea frontier be unified under a single command. The 25th Antisubmarine Wing, Located in New York City, was responsible for patrols off the Atlantic Coast, while the 26th Antisubmarine Wing in Miami, Florida conducted operations in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico.
Overseas operations.
By late 1942, German strategy had shifted to one of defending against planned Allied offensives in Europe and North Africa by striking at their lines of communication, rather than striking merchant shipping wherever it was most vulnerable. As a result, the Kriegsmarine concentrated its U-boats in the northern and eastern Atlantic. To meet this challenge, the command moved two squadrons to England in November, where they operated with RAF Coastal Command. The two units were attached to the 1st Antisubmarine Group (Provisional), which became the 2037th Antisubmarine Wing (Provisional). The decision to deploy the squadrons was made quickly and preparations for their reception and the maintenance of their aircraft were almost nonexistent. Lack of hangar space at RAF St Eval forced them to perform major maintenance outside during the winter.
A deployed squadron was responsible for the first confirmed sinking of an enemy sub by one of the command's aircraft. Although they did not initially sink a large number of U-boats, their harassing tactics required German subs to adopt evasive tactics and reduced the number and effectiveness of attacks on convoys crossing the Atlantic. In February 1943, The squadrons participated in Operation Gondola, whose goal was to attack every U-boat traversing the Bay of Biscay at least once.
The Navy believed that more antisubmarine forces were required to protect convoys in the North Atlantic, where attacks were becoming more concentrated. In March, the 19th Antisubmarine Squadron relocated to Gander Airport in Newfoundland, soon joined by two other squadrons.
Eventually the command formed two groups in England and Morocco. In June 1943, the 480th Antisubmarine Group was formed at Craw Field, French Morocco to conduct patrols north and west of Morocco along the Atlantic approaches to the Strait of Gibraltar. The group was formed with the 1st and 2d Antisubmarine Squadrons, which had moved to Morocco from England. In July 1943, German submarines concentrated off the coast of Portugal to intercept convoys bound for the Mediterranean Sea. The group damaged and sank several subs, protecting supply lines for Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily. Portions of the 480th deployed to Sicily to provide coverage for Operation Avalanche, the landings on mainland Italy. In November 1943, the 480th Group returned to the United States. In January 1944, it moved to Clovis Army Air Field, and was reassigned to form cadres for heavy bombardment units being activated by Second Air Force.
Following the activation of the 480th Group, the 479th Antisubmarine Group was formed at RAF St Eval. Squadrons from Newfoundland had moved to England to replace those moved to Morocco. The group conducted patrols over the Bay of Biscay, achieving its greatest success in the first two months it was active. Following this period, German U-boats adopted tactics that kept them submerged in the group's area of operations during daylight hours. The group continued its patrols, occasionally engaging Luftwaffe aircraft until October. It was disbanded in England in November.
Despite the deployment of command units to Newfoundland, England and Morocco, the majority of the command remained in the United States conducting patrols and covering convoys in an area where the threat of submarine attack had substantially diminished. The Navy insisted that forces be retained in this area because of the ability of the German submarine force to rapidly shift its forces. The command's wings were assisted by Navy units and the Civil Air Patrol, but flew the only long range aircraft. Activity in this region was at such a low level that for three months, from December 1942 to February 1943, not a single enemy U-boat was sighted. An exception was in the waters near Trinidad, where German subs were attacking merchant shipping. From December 1942, air echelons from various squadrons deployed to Trinidad, where they joined elements of the 25th Bombardment Group, a Sixth Air Force unit, that was also engaged in antisubmarine patrols. Finally, the 23d Antisubmarine Squadron deployed to Edinburgh Field, Trinidad to defend against this threat and to experiment with its 75mm cannon armed North American B-25 Mitchells.
Transfer of mission to the Navy.
Disagreements between the AAF and the Navy over command of long range aviation units engaged in antisubmarine warfare and of whether those forces would best be employed (offensively or defensively) continued into 1943, and in June, the AAF agreed that "The Army is prepared to withdraw Army Air Forces from anti-submarine operations at such time as the Navy is ready to take over those duties completely." In July, plans were made for 77 of the command's Consolidated B-24 Liberators equipped for antisubmarine warfare to be exchanged for an equal number of B-24s assigned to the Navy. Navy squadrons relieved the 479th Group in October, and its personnel and planes were transferred to Eighth Air Force to form a pathfinder unit. By mid November, the 480th Group had been relieved and was on its way back to the US. Its two squadrons were inactivated in October and their personnel assigned elsewhere. The majority of the command's squadrons were redesignated as bombardment squadrons and transferred to Second Air Force, while the 25th and 26th Wings were disbanded.
Bomber training.
In August 1943, the command was redesignated I Bomber Command and reassigned to First Air Force. It continued to oversee antisubmarine units in the United States through October 1943 and overseas through December. It began to train bomber crews in early 1944, when Replacement Training Units were reassigned to the command from Second Air Force (heavy bombers) and Third Air Force (medium and light bombers). However, the AAF was finding that standard military units, based on relatively inflexible tables of organization, were not well adapted to the training mission. Accordingly, in April 1944, a more functional system was adopted in which each base was organized into a separate numbered Army Air Force Base Unit, that could be adjusted to the proper size for that base's mission. Using this organization, it continued to train bomber organizations and personnel (at a reduced level after the end of the war) until inactivated in March 1946.
The command remained inactive until it was disbanded on 8 October 1948.


Bernard Loeffke

Bernard "Burn" Loeffke is a retired major general of the United States Army. He fought and was wounded in the Vietnam War and later served as the commanding general of U.S. Army South. He was awarded four Silver Stars, five Bronze Stars, and a Purple Heart. In the 1980s, he was the first American general to serve in the U.S. embassy in Beijing, as defense attache. He wrote the book "China, Our Enemy?", which espouses peaceful relations between the U.S. and China.
Biography.
Loeffke graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1957. He has a B.S. in Engineering, an M.A. in Russian Language and Soviet Area Studies, and a Ph.D. in International Relations. He taught Russian at the U.S. Military Academy and U.S. Foreign Policy at Georgetown University.
Loeffke was an Army Ranger and a pilot. He commanded Special Forces, an Infantry battalion, and was a paratroop advisor to Vietnamese units during the Vietnam War. He was wounded in Vietnam by Chinese and Vietnamese troops, and received four Silver Stars, five Bronze Stars, and a Purple Heart.
While serving as a junior officer in Vietnam, Loeffke said he was forever changed by the combat death of one of his soldiers, Sergeant Larry Morford. Morford opposed the war, but explained to Loeffke that even during a time of the draft, when his unit was predominantly draftees, he chose to volunteer to be a soldier because "war is a beastly job and the least beastly of us should be doing it." Loeffke dedicated the Friendship Fund at West Point in Morford's honor to inspire cadets to increase their understanding of Russian and Chinese relations. He likened Morford to Chinese corporal Lei Feng, a national icon in China who symbolizes selfless service. During the war, a total of 34 soldiers died under his command and 200 were wounded.
After the Vietnam War, he served as the Army Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, a staff officer in the White House, and Director of the Commission on White House Fellows. He visited China for the first time in 1973, and befriended the Chinese general Xu Xin, who had been wounded by American fire during the Korean War. In 1982, Loeffke became the first American general to serve in the U.S. embassy in Beijing, as defense attache. He learned to speak Mandarin in the following three years. His experience in China changed his views about the country, and he began to advocate for the U.S. to treat China as a friend rather than an enemy. In 2012, he published the book "China, Our Enemy?", which recounts his 40 years of experiences with China and espouses peaceful relations between the two countries.
Loeffke culminated his military career as the commanding general of U.S. Army South. In 1992, he retired from the military and started his medical career. After finishing his studies as a physician assistant in 1997, he participated in medical missions in war-torn or impoverished areas such as Bosnia, Haiti, Kenya, Iraq, Niger, Darfur and the Amazon jungles. In his view, differing nations perceive and value things differently, and one common language that everyone speaks is health; working to improve the health of a population builds lasting friendships and allies, not enemies.


Japanese orphans in China

Japanese orphans in China consist primarily of children left behind by Japanese families following the Japanese repatriation from Huludao in the aftermath of World War II. According to Chinese government figures, roughly 2,800 Japanese children were left behind in China after the war, 90% in Inner Mongolia and northeast China (then Manchukuo). They were adopted by rural Chinese families.
In 1980, the orphans began returning to Japan, but they faced discrimination due to their lack of Japanese language skills and encountered difficulties in maintaining steady employment. As of August 2004, 2,476 orphans had settled in Japan, according to the figures of the Japanese Ministry of Labor. They receive monthly payments of ¥20,000-30,000 yen from the Japanese government. In 2003, 612 orphans filed a lawsuit against the Japanese government, claiming that it bears responsibility for their having been left behind. Each plaintiff sought ¥33 million.
Besides the orphans, most other Japanese left behind in China were women. These Japanese women mostly married Chinese men and became known as "stranded war wives" (zanryu fujin). Because they had children with Chinese men, the women were not allowed to bring their Chinese families back with them to Japan, and most of them stayed. Japanese law allowed only children with Japanese fathers to become Japanese citizens.


Bombing of Fukuoka

The Japanese city of Fukuoka was attacked by United States Army Air Forces Boeing B-29 Superfortress heavy bombers on 19 June 1945. This operation formed part of the Allied Air raids on Japan, and destroyed 21.5 percent of the city. B-29s also dropped naval mines near Fukuoka harbor on seven occasions between May and July 1945, and the city was attacked twice by American fighter aircraft.
19 June 1945 raid.
The single bombing raid on Fukuoka formed part of a campaign by the USAAF's XXI Bomber Command targeting medium-sized Japanese cities which began in mid-June 1945 and continued until the end of the war. These attacks used firebombing tactics to destroy the cities, and were conducted as a follow-on from raids which had devastated most of Japan's major cities. Fukuoka, with a population of 323,200, was the largest city targeted in this campaign. Most of these raids were conducted by a single wing of B-29s, which allowed XXI Bomber Command to attack four cities a night. However, Fukuoka and Ōmuta (on 26 July) were targeted by two wings due to their size.
The 73rd and 313rd Bombardment Wings were assigned to attack Fukuoka. These units dispatched a total of 239 B-29s. Of these, 223 bombed the primary target. Another four bombed targets of opportunity in Tomitaka, Chichijima, Miyazaki and Fukuoka. All of the B-29s returned to base.
On 20 June, four American B-29 airmen who were being held as prisoners of war at Fukuoka were murdered by Japanese soldiers. These killings were motivated by the casualties and damage caused by the raid and a belief among the personnel involved that Japan would soon be invaded. Another 29 captured American airmen were murdered at Fukuoka in August 1945.
Minelaying.
Fukuoka harbor was targeted as part of a large-scale aerial minelaying campaign. The first minelaying operation targeting the harbor took place on 25 May 1945. 15 B-29s from the 9th Bombardment Group were dispatched, of which 14 laid mines. All of the bombers returned to base. The 9th Bombardment Group dropped further mines off Fukuoka harbor on 27 May.
Fukuoka harbor was targeted again in June. On 7 June, ten B-29s of the 505th Bombardment Group were dispatched, and six laid mines. Eight 505th Bombardment Group aircraft dropped further mines off the city on 15 June. The 505th Bombardment Group struck again on 23 June, with nine B-29s laying mines. One of these aircraft was lost during the operation.
Further operations were conducted in July. On 13 July, three B-29s of the 6th Bombardment Group were dispatched to lay mines near Fukuoka harbor. Historian Robert Mann has written that it is not known how many of these aircraft dropped mines. Another minelaying operation was conducted by six B-29s from the 504th Bombardment Group on 29 July, but Mann also notes that the number which actually dropped mines is not known.
Other operations.
Fukuoka was attacked twice by USAAF fighter aircraft. On 23 June, Republic P-47 Thunderbolt fighters from the Seventh Air Force attacked an airfield at Hakata in Fukuoka. North American P-51 Mustang fighters of the Fifth Air Force attacked Fukuoka harbor on 3 July. The fighters destroyed several floatplanes.
On 17 July a B-29 from the 39th Bombardment Group conducted a radar reconnaissance mission against Fukuoka.
Results.
The 19 June raid destroyed 1.37 square miles of Fukuoka's urban area, representing 21.5 percent of the city. Wartime Japanese reports stated that 953 people were killed in all the attacks on Fukuoka.


Operation Infatuate

Operation Infatuate was the code name given to an Anglo-Canadian operation in November 1944 during the Second World War to open the port of Antwerp to shipping and relieve logistical constraints. The operation was part of the wider Battle of the Scheldt and involved two assault landings from the sea by the 4th Special Service Brigade and the 52nd (Lowland) Division. At the same time the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division would force a crossing of the Walcheren causeway.
Background.
The city of Antwerp and its port was captured by British 2nd Army in early September 1944. While 21st Army Group's priority at the time was Operation Market Garden, no sense of urgency was placed in securing the approaches to the port facilities there. Walcheren Island, at the western end of the Beveland Peninsula, overlooked the Scheldt Estuary, and was strongly garrisoned by the German 15th Army who had emplaced strong concrete fortifications and large calibre guns which made it impossible to transit the waterway into Antwerp. Because of this delay, the remnants of the 15th Army "had been given the time to escape and reinforce the island of Walcheren and the South Beveland Peninsula".
The First Canadian Army was tasked by 21st Army Group to open the Antwerp area; but in the meantime had also been detailed by Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery to capture the Channel ports of Boulogne, Dunkirk and Calais, in order to ease the logistical concerns associated with drawing supplies from the Normandy beaches. German tenacity in the Channel ports meant that the Allied supply lines would continue to extend the further away the front line advanced. The Channel ports were eventually "masked" when Montgomery changed his priorities to clearing the Scheldt after the failure of Operation Market Garden and the Canadians turned their attention to the Battle of the Scheldt. The First Canadian Army advanced north-west from the bridgehead in Antwerp and, after heavy fighting in early and mid-October, broke out onto the narrow isthmus which connected South Beveland to the mainland.
On 9 October 1944 Field Marshal Montgomery issued a directive directing the Canadian Army to give absolute priority to the clearing of the Scheldt over any other offensive operations. and ten days later the Canadians began their approach to Walcheren Island along the isthmus. To the south of the Scheldt, the Germans had been cornered in Zeebrugge, surrendering the Breskens Pocket on November 2. Both Zuid (South) and Noord-Beveland (North Beveland) had been virtually cleared and the time was right for the assault of Walcheren itself. For the Allies, failure to take Middelburg after the Battle of Walcheren Causeway was a disappointing prelude to Operation Infatuate.
Prelude.
A three-pronged assault was planned with British Commandos and part of the 52nd (Lowland) Division landing at Westkapelle in the west of the island and at Flushing in the south. The 2nd Canadian Infantry Division was to cross by a water channel close to the causeway in the east. However, in the Battle of Walcheren Causeway, it soon became clear that the tidal flats around the water channel were virtually impassable leaving the Canadians with the hazardous option of a direct assault along the well-defended causeway — an exposed stretch 40 yards wide and 1500 yards long. The Canadians established a bridgehead on the island through which the British 52nd Lowland Division attempted to pass. Against much scepticism and opposition, the plan of Lieut.-Gen. Guy Simonds (acting commander of First Canadian Army) to breach the island's dykes, and flood the interior, was adopted.
The plan to flood the island by bombing breaches in the dykes at Westkapelle, Flushing, and Veere, was controversial from the start. General Simonds, the main protagonist, thought that it would enable the attackers to approach the German positions from both the sea and the inundated-inland sides with landing craft. But the Canadian engineer, brigadier G. Walsh, who advised upon the matter pointed out that the breach would be too shallow for landing craft to pass through. The plan was apparently not discussed with the Dutch government-in-exile. When Prime Minister Gerbrandy got wind of the plan, he immediately demanded to see Winston Churchill, but Churchill denied any knowledge of the plan. When general Dwight D. Eisenhower approved of the bombing on 1 October, he appears not to have consulted the Dutch either. The military advantages of flooding the interior of the island were questionable, as it hampered both attackers and defenders. The German defenses were concentrated on the high-lying rim of the island; apart from the land-facing front in Flushing, there were no defensible positions inside the flooded area. The civilians living on the island were warned with leaflets dropped from planes to leave the area, but they had nowhere to go.
The bombing of Walcheren in October by RAF Bomber Command had deliberately breached the dykes around the island and had turned it into a massive lagoon, rimmed by broken dykes. The Germans had installed defences on the dykes to virtually turn them into a continuous fortification bristling with guns of every calibre. The British Marines placed great reliance on Weasel and Buffalo amphibious landing craft. The Royal Marine Commandos were to seize the shoulders of the gap in the dyke and then to fan out north and south to roll up the remainder of the German defences by linking up with the southern thrust. The RAF provided air support and the 79th Armoured Division provided specialist vehicles in support of the ground assault, naval gunfire support was from warships and landing craft equipped with artillery (e.g. Landing Craft (Gun)) and Land Mattress multiple-rocket launch systems.
Commando Units.
No. 2 Dutch Troop of No. 10 (Inter-Allied) Commando moved to Bruges in Belgium on 20 October 1944 and was incorporated into No. 4 Commando Brigade. They split up and were attached to other fighting units where, in the case of some officers and men, their native language skills helped Allied liaison with the local population, while others fought alongside their comrades in arms.
The three RM Commandos of 4th Special Service Brigade, along with the No.4 (Belgian) and No.5 (Norwegian) troops of No. 10 (Inter-Allied) Commando, commanded by Peter Laycock, landed at Westkapelle on the western side of the island. No.4 Commando, with Nos.1 and 8 (French) troops under command, crossed from Breskens and attacked Flushing. In support were 155 Infantry brigade. The brigade had trained for this assault in the Ostend area during October.
Landings.
After some debate over the sea conditions the operation was planned for 1 November.
On the day of the assault a heavy mist over Dutch and Belgian airfields limited RAF support for the actual landings, although the skies over Walcheren itself were clear.
Landing at Flushing (operation Infatuate I).
No. 4 Commando landed at 05:45 hours just east of the "Oranjemolen", a windmill on the sea dyke at Flushing, with the main part of the troops arriving ashore at 06:30 hours.
No. 4 Commando, under Lt-Colonel Robert W.P. Dawson DSO, had problems finding a suitable place to get ashore. Dawson sent a small reconnaissance party (known as Keepforce) ashore in two Landing Craft Personnel (LCPs). They were followed by Nos. 1 and 2 Troop, who secured the beachhead with minimal casualties and soon began to take prisoners. The main body came in at 06:30 hours, but by this time the Germans were alert and opened heavy fire with machine guns and 20 mm anti-aircraft cannon. Nevertheless, the Commandos got ashore with only a few casualties, although the Landing Craft Assaults (LCAs) containing the heavier equipment, including 3-inch mortars, hit a stake and sank some offshore. The mortars were salvaged.
The Commandos now fought their way through the German strongpoints. They were somewhat encumbered by the need to leave rearguards against infiltration. However, they were aided when the leading battalion of 155 Infantry Brigade began to land at 08:30 hours despite having lost two LCAs to heavy fire from one of the coastal batteries. German prisoners were pressed into service unloading stores and supplies. A good proportion of the defenders of Walcheren were poor-quality troops and many suffered from stomach complaints. The defence positions were well stocked with food and ammunition. By 16:00 hours the Commandos had reached most of their objectives and they decided to consolidate as the day drew to a close.
Landing at Westkapelle (operation Infatuate II).
Brigadier Leicester's plan for the attack on Westkapelle called for three troops of No. 41 (Royal Marine) Commando, under Lt-Colonel E C E Palmer RM, to land on the north shoulder of the gap blown in the dyke with the objective of clearing the area between there and the village of Westkapelle. The remainder of the Commando, along with the two No. 10 (IA) Commando troops, would then come ashore in M29 Weasels and Buffaloes launched from Landing Craft Tanks (LCTs). Their mission would be to clear Westkapelle and then move north. No. 48 (Royal Marine) Commando, under Lt-Colonel J. L. Moulton DSO, would use the same methods, but come ashore south of the gap. From there they would advance on Zoutelande some to the southeast. Finally No. 47 (Royal Marine) Commando, under Lt-Colonel C.F. Phillips, landed behind 48 Commando and drove on to meet up with 4 Commando near Flushing.
The force sailed from Ostend at 03:15 hours and by 09:30 hours they were off the objective. The ships bombarded the German defences with everything at their disposal including the guns of , "Erebus" and "Roberts", the Landing Craft (Gun)s, the rockets of LCT(R)s. The first German fire at 8:09 was followed by the other batteries. Most of the German fire was concentrated on the support landing craft rather than those carrying the troops. Several landing craft were hit including a rocket LCT which received a direct hit, causing it to fire rockets at LCT(G)s located closer to the island, hitting five and wounding thirty, while some rockets from the other LCT(R)s fell short, hitting friendly craft. The RAF was able to provide a squadron (No. 183 Squadron) of explosive rocket-firing Typhoon fighter-bombers just at the point the LCTs were due to land.
Part of the naval Support Squadron of 27 small craft, under Commanders Sellar and Leefe, closed to engage the eleven still-operational German shore-based batteries, on the direction of Captain A.F. Pugsley, R.N., DSO, the naval commander of the amphibious landings. This they did with conspicuous gallantry, but with very heavy casualties. By 12.30pm, nine of the Support Squadron's craft had been sunk, eleven put out of action, and a high percentage of their crews killed or wounded. Ultimately the Support Squadron was recalled as so many of the craft had been damaged or destroyed, but their aim, of drawing the fire of the defending batteries from the landing craft making the primary assault, had succeeded.
In a tribute to the bravery of the Support Squadron, General Robert Laycock, Chief of Combined Operations, wrote to Captain A.F. Pugsley with the following words:
"I understand that the success of the landings and the comparatively light casualties sustained by No. 4 Special Service Brigade at Walcheren was due largely to the efforts of the Naval Support Craft who, at great cost to themselves, effectively silenced the coastal defences.
I should like to express the appreciation of all ranks, Special Service Group, and particularly that of General Sturges and Brigadier Leicester and all ranks of No. 4 Special Service Brigade for the self-sacrifice shown by all naval personnel during the landings, which had such splendid results."
The naval haul of gallantry awards was significant. Of particular note were the actions of Leading Seaman Owen Joseph McGrath who was Coxswain of a Landing Craft (LCP(L) 144) during the assault on Westkapelle. McGrath's citation for the Conspicuous Gallantry Medal (the highest award for gallantry available to non-commissioned naval personnel short of the Victoria Cross) reads as follows: "[LCP(L) 144's] duty was to make smoke on the Southern flank. Many craft were hit by the accurate enemy fire, and some blew up very close inshore under the enemy guns. LCP(L) 144 was ordered to close, make smoke and pick up survivors. This was done at point blank range with an off-shore wind making effective smoke difficult. By his courageous action Leading Seaman McGrath rescued over twenty survivors".
Back on the island of Walcheren, 41 Commando overran a pillbox in their path and pushed on into Westkapelle where they were met by a battery of four guns. These were reduced with the help of some tanks and the Commando then moved north along the dyke.
48 Commando came up against a battery of guns. The leading troop commander was killed and several men wounded in an attack on the position. Another attempt was met with intense mortar fire. Supporting fire was called in from the field batteries in the Breskens area together with Typhoon attacks. Following this action another troop went in under cover of smoke and reached the centre of the battery putting it out of action.
The next day 4 Commando, together with the 5th Battalion of the King's Own Scottish Borderers, continued with the battle for Flushing. No. 5 (Norwegian) Troop of 10 (IA) Commando were involved in an action against a strongpoint nicknamed 'Dover'. One section of the troop gained the roof of a cinema and opened fire on the strongpoint with their PIAT. The other sections moved along the street and through back gardens. As the Troop was preparing for the final assault, Typhoons attacked the enemy position. That afternoon the Troop resumed their advance and reached the corner overlooking their objective. One house remained occupied by the Germans and as they made for the strongpoint they suffered several casualties from the fire of No. 5 Troop. No. 1 Section was now by an anti-tank wall and firing PIAT bombs into the embrasures of the strongpoint at very short range. Corporal Lafont was on the point of breaching the strongpoint with a made-up charge at the ready when the German defenders surrendered.
No. 48 (RM) Commando pushed on at first light and took Zoutelande, meeting light opposition. 47 Commando took over the advance but soon came up against a strong fortified position with an anti-tank ditch and Dragon's Teeth. The weather had closed in and no air support was available so they attacked supported only by artillery. They came under heavy mortar fire and suffered several casualties. The other half of the Commando having moved along the dyke were confronted by another battery at Dishoek. Their approach was obstructed by pockets of resistance to the front of the battery which were not cleared until nightfall. The three Troops halted in front of the battery and repulsed a German counterattack just after they had been replenished with much-needed food and ammunition.
Defensive stakes and mines on the beaches made it difficult for supply craft to land stores. By the third and fourth days the Commando were forced to use captured German rations. To the relief of all concerned supplies were parachuted in on 5 November near Zoutelande.
Nos. 41 and 10 Commando reached Domburg on the morning of 2 November where they encountered strong resistance. That evening Brigadier Leicester ordered No. 41, less one Troop, to assist No. 47 Commando in the south, leaving the Troops of No. 10 and one of No. 41 to finish mopping up Domburg. No. 4 Commando was relieved by 155 Brigade and embarked on Buffaloes to assault two batteries, W3 and W4, situated north-west of Flushing. They had been fighting for 40 hours and needed a well-earned rest. After landing in a gap in the dyke, about which little was known, Lt-Colonel Dawson asked Brigadier Leicester for a break of some 24 hours to rest his men. This was agreed, but it was well after dark before the Commando was relieved by 155 Brigade. In the event No. 47 (RM) Commando overcame the opposition at Dishoek later that day and linked up with 4 Commando. Meanwhile, No. 10 cleared Domburg, with the Commando's Norwegian Troop showing particular courage in the face of heavy opposition which cost them a number of casualties.
In the after-action report of the battle Captain J. Linzel of No. 10 Commando stated:
This operation had more impact on me. The objective was to clear the seaway to Antwerp. We went to Belgium, where the Nr4 Troops Brigade and the No10 Commando were billeted. We were an attached unit of 14 men. We entered our LCT's Buffalo's amphibious vehicles to go to Walcheren where we experienced heavy German Artillery. Our vehicle got hit direct by a grenade, setting our flame throwers and ammunition on fire. This was a chaos. Our burning Buffalo was pushed into the sea and I can remember that together with 10 other men I ended-up in another Buffalo and landed at Westkapelle. We experienced some serious fighting there and a lot of the Brigade were killed. It took us 3 days to capture the German dyke at Vlissingen, there were about 300 casements. Captain J. Linzel.
Aftermath.
Nos. 4, 47, 48 Commandos then concentrated at Zoutelande and a two-day pause ensued while they re-supplied. The remaining enemy resistance was concentrated in the area north-west of Domburg. Nos.4 and 48 Commando set off on foot, although they used landing vehicles to cross the gap at Westkapelle, in order to reinforce No.10 and No.41. While No. 41 assaulted the last remaining battery, W19, No.4 cleared the Overduin woods and pushed on to Vrouwenpolder opposite North Beveland. No.48 remained in reserve - this phase of the operation began on November 8.
At 08:15, four Germans approached the Allied troops to ask for a surrender of all remaining German troops in the area. After some negotiation 40,000 Germans surrendered. No.4 SS Brigade had lost 103 killed, 325 wounded and 68 missing during eight days of fighting. By the end of November after a massive minesweeping operation of the Scheldt, the first cargoes were being unloaded at Antwerp.
Long-term after-effects for the civilians.
The Inundation of Walcheren with which Operation Infatuate started, had long-term after-effects for the civilian population of Walcheren. Twice a day, at high tide and ebb tide, the sea water streamed with force through the breaches in the sea dykes, widening and deepening them. As a consequence, areas that fell dry at low tide were inundated again at high tide. Only the areas that were normally above sea level, like the town and village centres, remained permanently dry. Other low-lying areas, on the other hand, remained permanently flooded. This played havoc with Walcheren agriculture, as valuable land was permanently spoiled by salination. Because the pace of the flooding had been slow, loss of human life due to drowning had been minor, but most of the livestock drowned. Of 19,000 dwellings 3,700 were destroyed; 7,700 had severe damage and 3,600 minor damage.
Attempts to close the breaches already started in November 1944, but lack of building materials, and of heavy construction equipment, and the destroyed infrastructure, together with the extensive minefields, hampered these efforts. When in July 1945 the operations of closing the breaches started in earnest, the total width of the breaches had already increased to three kilometers. The great depth of the scoured-out breaches made simply moving earth into them infeasible. Therefore, surplus caissons that had not been needed to form the Phoenix breakwaters of the Mulberry harbours were used to block the deepest part of the breaches, after which normal dyke-building operations could proceed. The breach at Flushing was finally closed on 2 October 1945, followed by the breach at Westkapelle on 12 October. The third breach, at Veere, was closed on 23 October. Then the work of draining the flooded areas could start. To that end a breach was made in the western levee of the Canal through Walcheren. This made it possible to slowly drain the main mass of water through the locks at Veere and Flushing by opening them at ebb tide. But to completely drain the area additional pumping was necessary, which required opening the drainage ditches that had been silted up. The draining operation was finished in early 1946.


Syrmian Front

The Syrmian Front () was an Axis line of defense during World War II. It was established as part of the Eastern Front in late October 1944 in Syrmia and east Slavonia, northwest of Belgrade.
After the Yugoslav Partisans and the Red Army expelled the Germans from Belgrade in the Belgrade Offensive, the retreating Wehrmacht and the Croatian Armed Forces used fortifications to protect the withdrawal of German Army Group E from the Balkans. With help from their Soviet allies, the Partisans (by then recognized as the Yugoslav army), joined by Bulgarian and Italian forces, fought a difficult winter campaign and finally broke through the front on 12 April 1945.
After the Syrmian front was broken, occupied Yugoslavia was liberated.
Operative background and significance.
After the September advance through Romania and Bulgaria in October 1944, The Red Army, together with Yugoslav forces, took Belgrade (central communication node of the Balkans) in the Belgrade Offensive. Due to Yugoslav partisan activity, the Yugoslav-Allied Operation Ratweek, and pressure from the Bulgarian Army, the Germans failed to prevent this while they awaited the redeployment of Army Group E troops from Greece. The Red Army decided to exploit this delay and continued to advance with the 3rd Ukrainian Front from Belgrade to south-west Hungary. The aim of the advance was to separate and protect their main attack in Hungary from attacks on the flank by Army Group E from the south.
From September 1944 to January 1945, Army Group E pushed its way through Macedonia, Kosovo, Sanjak, and Bosnia, and soon their sole available escape route was in a line between Sarajevo and Slavonski Brod. For this reason, it was of vital significance for the Germans to defend the zone around Slavonski Brod, which was threatened by the Soviet-Yugoslav advance through Syrmia. To prevent Army Group E from being cut off, the German South-East command prepared seven successive fortified defense lines between the Danube and Sava river from Ruma to Vinkovci. The Syrmian Front campaign consisted of Yugoslavian attempts to break through these lines of defense.
Operations.
The Syrmian Front saw some of the most difficult fighting in Yugoslavia in World War II. It lasted for almost six months. As the bulk of the Red Army involved in the Belgrade operation continued their offensive in Hungary, the Yugoslav Army, accustomed to guerrilla warfare in the mountainous terrain of the Dinaric Alps, remained to fight the entrenched front line heavily contested by the Axis on the flat ground of the Pannonian plain. Young men from Vojvodina and Central Serbia, many from freshly liberated regions, were drafted "en masse" and sent to the front, and the amount of training they received and their casualty levels remain in dispute.
Although mostly stationary, the front moved several times, generally westward, as the Axis forces were pushed back. The fighting started east of Ruma and stabilized in January 1945 west of Šid after the town changed hands due to Axis counterattacks. In late March and early April 1945, Yugoslav Army units mounted a general offensive on all fronts. The Yugoslav First Army, commanded by Peko Dapčević, broke through German XXXIV Corps defenses in Syrmia on 12 April, quickly capturing the cities of Vukovar, Vinkovci, and Županja, and enabling further advances through Slavonia toward Slavonski Brod and Zagreb in the last month of the war.
The campaign can be divided into four distinct phases:


East Africa Station

The Royal Navy was active in East African waters from the 1850s to the 1960s.
Elements of the Royal Navy from the East Indies were involved in suppressing the slave trade in the 1860s, and during the First World War, the Commander-in-Chief at the Cape, Admiral King-Hall, expended much effort to destroy the elusive German light cruiser "Königsberg."
During the Second World War a distinct East African formation was established, commanded by the Flag Officer, East Africa.
History.
During the 1850s and 1860s the Royal Navy fought to suppress the slave trade operating out of Zanzibar up to the North Coast of the Arabian Sea. An East African Squadron was active in suppressing slavery in 1869, part of the East Indies Station. The mission of Sir Bartle Frere in 1869 "produced.. a recommendation that a guardship be permanently stationed off the Zanzibar coast." Britain's real intentions in East Africa was to stop other European naval powers from establishing any similar bases in the region, and the station's purpose was to protect British trade interests passing through the Western Indian Ocean. Rawley writes that Captain George Sulivan and his successor directed the activities of the old ship-of-the-line , reequipped as both prison and hospital, with some success. "London" served as a base for cruisers operating against the slaving dhows, for four years.
In the early twentieth century HMNB Zanizibar was primarily used as a coaling station. Prior to World War I British naval operations were gradually scaled down.
British forces' principal role was to protect British commerce from German surface raiders – seen as a priority in 1914–1915. As the likelihood of war with Germany increased, the Commander-in-Chief, Cape Station, Rear Admiral Herbert King-Hall, moved his ships in order to counter the threat posed by the German light cruiser , based at Dar es Salaam. On 31 July 1914, the British protected cruiser sighted "Königsberg" leaving Dar es Salaam, but was unable to keep track of the faster German cruiser. King-Hall recognised that "Königsberg" outclassed "Pegasus" and intended that "Pegasus" should operate with the cruiser while his flagship operated independently to protect the trade routes around the Cape, but on 12 August, the Admiralty ordered "Astraea" to join "Hyacinth" off the Cape to escort troop convoys, leaving "Pegasus" unsupported at Zanzibar. On 20 September 1914, "Königsberg" surprised and sank "Pegasus" in the Battle of Zanzibar.
"Königsberg" then retreated into the Rufiji River to repair her engines. Before the repairs could be completed, British cruisers located "Königsberg"; the Navy List for April 1915 lists on the East Coast of Africa under Part XI, Other Foreign Stations, page 22 (1363), the light cruisers Hyacinth, , and . Unable to steam into the river to destroy "Konigsberg", the Royal Navy ships set up a blockade. Aircraft were sent to join the effort and Squadron Commander Robert Gordon was appointed in January 1915 as commander of the Royal Naval Air Service in East Africa. After several attempts to sink the ship during the Battle of Rufiji Delta, the British sent two monitors, and , to destroy the German cruiser. On 11 July 1915, the two monitors got close enough to severely damage "Königsberg", forcing her crew to scuttle the ship.
After the seizure of German East Africa, the Royal Navy added a base in Tanganyika to the existing one at Zanzibar.
Naval Officers-in-Charge were in post at Tanganyika (12 September 1918 – April 1919) and Zanzibar (20 November 1918 – 1919) later in the war.
A base at Kilidini in Kenya was re-established in September 1939 at the start of the Second World War; Kenya was a British colony. Kilindini became the temporary home of Force B, the old R-class battleships of the Eastern Fleet, along with other ships, from early 1942, until the Japanese naval threat to Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) subsided.
During this period at least two naval air stations were established: RNAS Kilidini (HMS "Kipanga") ; RNAS Mackinnon Road (HMS "Kipanga II") both used 1942–44. RAF Port Reitz nearby was also used by the Fleet Air Arm while the Eastern Fleet was in the area. Rear-Admiral F. Elliott served as Commodore, Naval Air Stations, East Africa, from 19 August 1943 until 1 January 1945.
Local European naval reserve forces included the Tanganyika Naval Volunteer Force (1939–1942), responsible for minesweeping, coast watching and coastal patrol duties and manning of signal stations and the Zanzibar Naval Volunteer Force (also 1939–1942). From 1942 the two were merged into the East African Naval Force, active until 13 May 1952, and then renamed the Royal East African Navy until 1962. Kilidini became the force's headquarters.
Naval units which served in East Africa.
Ships and units that served in East Africa included:


No. 242 Group RAF

No. 242 Group was a group of the British Royal Air Force (RAF) formed on 24 August 1942. Its first commander was Air Commodore George Lawson.
History.
Air Commodore Kenneth Cross took over command on 22 February 1943 when the group was a sub-command of the Northwest African Tactical Air Force (NATAF) under Acting Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham. NATAF itself had just become one of the three major combat commands of the Northwest African Air Forces (NAAF) as a result of the major Allied air force reorganization that occurred at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943. At Casablanca, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder persuaded American President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and their staffs to establish an air force command structure based on the previously successful coordination of No. 205 (Heavy Bomber) Group, No. 201 (Naval Co-operation) Group, and AHQ Western Desert during the North African Campaign of 1942, primarily in Egypt and Libya.
The Casablanca planners saw merit in Tedder's plan and established the Mediterranean Air Command (MAC) with Tedder as Air Commander-in-Chief of the Allied air forces in the North African and Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTO). NAAF under the command of Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz became the major sub-command of MAC and based on Tedder's "tri-force" model, was invested with three major sub-commands:
The new unified "tri-force" command structure was implemented and practiced during the Tunisian, Pantellerian, Sicilian, and Italian campaigns. The intended successful coordination of these "tri-forces" was immediately put into practice when Spaatz placed most of the strategic bombers at Coningham's disposal during a critical period of the Tunisian campaign at the end of February and the beginning of March 1943.
While the subordinate commands of NASAF, NACAF, and NATAF were fixed and permanent throughout most of 1943, No. 242 Group was a major exception to this rigidity. It was the largest air force unit that was assigned to two different "tri-forces": NATAF and NACAF. This unique history imparts a certain degree of flexibility, versatility, and importance to the group. During the same critical period of the Tunisian campaign mentioned above, No. 242 Group flew over 1,000 offensive sorties in just five days against ground targets as part of Coningham's NATAF.
Prior to the Allied invasion of Sicily (Operation Husky), No. 242 Group was transferred from NATAF to NACAF. At this time, the group consisted of the units indicated in the table below.
Order of Battle, 10 July 1943.
No. 242 GroupAir Commodore Kenneth Cross,Headquarters at La Marsa, Tunisia.
Notes:
ASR=Air Sea Rescue; RAAF=Royal Australian Air Force.
MACAF.
When MAC was disbanded on 10 December 1943 and the Allied air forces in the MTO were again reorganized, No. 242 Group was assigned to the Mediterranean Allied Coastal Air Force also commanded by Lloyd. Air Commodore G. Harcourt-Smith took over command of No. 242 Group on 24 February 1944 until the group was disbanded on 14 September 1944.


San Diego Marine

San Diego Marine was a shipbuilding company in San Diego, California. To support the World War 2 demand for ships San Diego Marine built: minesweepers and sub chasers. San Diego Marine was opened in 1915 as San Diego Marine Construction shipyard Captain Oakley J. Hall. The company was sold to Campbell Industries in 1972. It was sold again in 1979 and renamed Southwest Marine. Boatbuilding ended in 1983. Southwest Marine was sold to U.S. Marine Repair in 2003. The named changed to BAE Systems Ship Repair in 2005. The shipyard is located at 2205 East Belt Street, San Diego.
"YMS-1"-class minesweeper.
San Diego Marine built s for the United States Navy in 1942 and 1943. The ships had a displacement of 270 tons, a length of , a beam of , a draft of , and a top speed of . The ships had a crew of 32. The vessels were armed with one 40 mm gun.
Ships:
"PCS-1376"-class patrol craft sweeper.
San Diego Marine built "PCS-1376"-class patrol craft sweepers (planned as a submarine chaser) that had displacement of light, and full load. They had a length of , a beam of , a draft of . Power from two General Motors 8-268A diesel engines with each.
They used a Snow and Knobstedt single reduction gear to two shafts. The vessels had a top speed of . They housed complement of 57 officers and enlisted. The patrol craft sweepers were armed with one 3"/50 caliber gun, one 40 mm gun, two 20 mm guns, four depth charge projectors, one Hedgehog anti-submarine mortar and two depth charge tracks.
Built:
District Patrol Craft.
San Diego Marine built District Patrol Craft of , , a length , a beam of , and a draft of . They were powered by one diesel engine connected to one propeller with . These were built in 1930 and 1931 and taken over by the United States Navy in 1941.
Landing Craft Mechanized.
San Diego Marine built 15 Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM) or "Mike Boat" in 1979. LCMs are river boats and mechanized landing craft. These are used by the United States Navy and Army during the Vietnam War. LCM stands for "Landing Craft Mechanized, Mark 8", a use of the phonetic alphabet, LCM being "Lima Charlie Mike". LCMs have a displacement of , and light and loaded. The LCM had a length of , a beam of , a draft of a draft of and draft of loaded. Power is from two Pak GMC 6-71 or Gray Marine 6-71 diesels paired to two hydrostatic transmissions Detroit 12V-71 diesel engines, with twin screws. LCM have a top speed of light and loaded. LCM have a capacity of of cargo and a crew of 4 to 6. They were armed with two .50 caliber M2 Browning machine guns.


Second Battle of Narvik