Army Ground Forces

The Army Ground Forces were one of the three autonomous components of the Army of the United States during World War II, the others being the Army Air Forces and Army Service Forces. Throughout their existence, Army Ground Forces were the largest training organization ever established in the United States. Its strength of 780,000 troops on 1 May 1942 grew to a peak of 2,200,000 by 1 July 1943. Thereafter its strength declined as units departed for overseas theaters.
Origins.
Army Ground Forces traced their origins back to General Headquarters, United States Army (GHQ), which were activated on 26 July 1940. Although inactive before this date, GHQ had long featured in mobilization plans as far back as 1921 as a headquarters for directing US field armies overseas, similar to that of the American Expeditionary Forces in World War I. This was not realized in practice because the war was fought in many theaters, so overall direction was exercised by the War Department's General Staff. GHQ also did not become the equivalent of a theater command for the Zone of Interior; administrative authority was exercised by the G-4 of the War Department's General Staff through the Corps Areas and Service Commands. Instead, GHQ was drawn into the enormous task of raising and training an army.
Nominally, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, George C. Marshall, was the commanding general of GHQ, while his Chief of Staff was Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, who had been Commandant of the Command and General Staff School. However, since Marshall saw him infrequently and seldom visited GHQ (located at the Army War College), it was in practice McNair who directed GHQ.
In March 1942, there was a sweeping reorganization of the Army that reduced the number of officers reporting to the chief of staff. Under Executive Order 9082 "Reorganizing the Army and the War Department" of 28 February 1942 and War Department Circular No. 59 of 2 March 1942, GHQ became Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, and opened at the Army War College on 9 March 1942. The posts of the chiefs of the four traditional combat arms – Infantry, Cavalry, Field Artillery, and Coast Artillery – were abolished and their functions, duties, and powers were transferred to the Army Ground Forces. McNair also became responsible for four new 'pseudo-arms' – airborne, armor, anti-aircraft and tank destroyer. He had the power to reorganize the ground army, cutting across traditional lines without branch rivalries.
Since later commands, such as the Continental Army Command and Forces Command were redesignations of their predecessors, they celebrated their birthday as 9 March 1942, the day Army Ground Forces were established.
Organization of Ground Troops.
In 1942, it was estimated that between 200 and 350 divisions would be required to defeat Germany and Japan. However, only 89 divisions were ultimately readied. This was partially because requirements for service troops and overhead was greater than anticipated, and because the Army's overall strength became fixed at a lower level than expected. Army strength was fixed at 7,500,000 enlisted men in 1942 and was subsequently cut to 7,004,000 enlisted men in 1943. Further cuts of 433,000 men were made by March 1945. As a result, divisions scheduled for activation in the second half of 1943 were postponed to 1944, then canceled entirely, and no new divisions were formed after June 1943.
By May 1945, 96% of all tactical troops were overseas. No new units were forming and there were no reserves. Fortunately, these sufficed to bring about the defeat of Germany and Japan, largely because the Soviet Union carried most of the burden of fighting the German Army on the Eastern Front. However, it also meant that divisions were kept in the line longer than anticipated and took heavier casualties. In three months of intensive combat, an infantry division could expect 100% casualties in its three infantry regiments. Units were maintained by a continuous flow of individual replacements. Such conditions placed great strain on the combat soldier who remained in action until he became a casualty.
Energetic and painstaking efforts were made by Army Ground Forces to optimize the divisions for combat operations. Non-essential troops and equipment were eliminated. The principle was established that a unit would have only the equipment that it would normally need. Other economies were also made. For example, trucks were replaced, wherever possible, by trailers. While admittedly not as useful as trucks, not only were they cheaper to produce, but they required less personnel to maintain, and less space to ship. As a result of economies, 89 divisions were active in 1945 for the same number of personnel as required to man 75 in 1943. General Douglas MacArthur pointed out that the division, while initially well-balanced, soon became unbalanced in combat as the infantry took casualties faster than other arms, requiring the relief of the entire division when most of its components were capable of further effort.
This eventually brought the entire training program down. In 1941, replacements were produced by Replacement Training Centers (RTCs). As new divisions were mobilized, they took their manpower directly from reception centers. The RTCs provided replacements for filler, and were organized to provide replacements in the proportion of units in the army. Army Ground Forces was responsible for training replacements for the four statutory arms (infantry, cavalry, field and coast artillery) and the three new pseudo-arms (armor, antiaircraft artillery, and tank destroyer). Replacements for the other arms and services were handled by the Army Service Forces. Casualties in combat units, particularly infantry units, exceeded the capacity of the RTCs to replace them. By February 1944, some 35,249 men had been taken from combat units in training for use as replacements; another 29,521 had been transferred from low priority units to fill up units preparing to move overseas. Between April and September 1944, as casualties in Normandy began to bite, some 91,747 men were stripped from twenty-two divisions in the United States. Maintaining 700,000 men in infantry units required 1,800,000 men in the infantry arm by April 1945. Over 1,000,000 replacements were shipped between September 1943 and August 1945, of whom 82% were infantry. Volunteers for the infantry were accepted from other arms and services. By 1944, all new inductees were being sent to RTCs, where they were trained for 13 to 17 weeks before being sent to combat units. As casualties mounted, a massive comb-out began as the Army Ground Forces struggled to provide replacements. Personnel from non-combat assignments were pulled from duty, hastily trained, and then reassigned to units as combat infantry replacements.
The result was that divisions embarking for overseas in late 1944 and early 1945 had much less training than those leaving earlier. The last division to depart for overseas, the 65th Infantry Division, fared worst of all:
Special divisions.
In 1942, the 4th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 90th Infantry Divisions were converted to motorized divisions, intended to operate with armored divisions, similar to the German Panzergrenadier divisions. These divisions had more transport than regular infantry divisions. However the proportion of infantry in the armored divisions was increased in 1943, and the regular infantry division actually had sufficient transport if trucks were taken from other duties, so the additional shipping space required for them did not appear worthwhile, and all were converted back to regular infantry divisions.
Three light divisions were formed, in response to combat experience in 1942 and 1943. The 10th Light Division was formed as a light division specializing in mountain warfare, the 71st Light Division as one specializing in jungle warfare, and the 89th Light Division as a light truck division. Theater commanders were lukewarm about the concept. General MacArthur felt that they had insufficient firepower, and they performed unsatisfactorily in training maneuvers, so the 71st and 89th were converted to regular infantry divisions. Despite its jungle training, the 71st Infantry Division was rushed to Europe in response to the German Ardennes Offensive. The 10th remained a special mountain division and fought as such in Italy.
Airborne.
Five airborne divisions (11th, 13th, 17th, 82nd and 101st) were formed, but as early as the Allied invasion of Sicily (Operation Husky) in July 1943 it was apparent that there would not be sufficient troop carrier aircraft to employ them in the manner for which they had been intended. The activation of the 15th Airborne Division in 1943 was canceled, but this did nothing to reduce the disproportionate ratio of airborne to infantry divisions, as all divisions scheduled for activation in late 1943 were eventually canceled. General McNair considered converting the airborne divisions in the United States to light divisions but following the failure of the light division concept, the decision was taken to ship them as airborne divisions, cognizant of the fact that they would operate as light infantry divisions.
The European Theater of Operations (ETO) favored a larger airborne division than Army Ground Forces, developing a larger division with two parachute infantry regiments, a glider infantry regiment almost identical to a standard infantry regiment and more support units, a total of 12,979 men. Airborne divisions in ETO were reorganized on this establishment. The 11th Airborne Division in the South West Pacific Area (SWPA) remained on the old AGF establishment. With a strength of only 8,500 men, it had one parachute infantry regiment and two smaller glider infantry regiments.
Anti-Aircraft.
No arm was in such urgent demand in 1942 as anti-aircraft units, and these units were shipped at high priority as soon as, and sometimes even before, they were fully trained. Once the Allied Air Forces began to get the upper hand, demand tapered off and it became apparent that anti-aircraft units had been over-produced. Many units were then broken up for infantry replacements.
Armor.
While Army Ground Forces endeavored to provide the troops with the best equipment available, they were not always able to provide better equipment than the German enemy. This was particularly apparent with respect to armor. American commanders tended, when forced to make a choice, to prefer mobility to firepower. The result was a number of uninspiring designs. In particular, the M6 Heavy Tank was a dud which convinced Army Ground Forces that heavy tanks were no good and Ordnance Department that Army Ground Forces did not really want one. The M4 Sherman medium tank found itself out-performed by German tanks which began appearing in 1943. Opposition from Army Ground Forces was one of the primary factors for the late and limited introduction of the M26 Pershing into the European Theater.
In 1942, the Operations Division (OPD) of the War Department General Staff estimated that, by the end of 1943, 140 divisions would be mobilized, of which 46 would be armored. A severe shortage of shipping space, combined with Army Ground Forces doubts about whether this was the correct ratio of infantry armored units, led to this being revised downward to just 16 armored divisions actually being active in 1943.
Trimming the tables of organization of the armored divisions in 1943, Army Ground Forces cut the number of tank battalions in the armored division from 6 to 3 and reduced the number of tanks from 390 to 263. In process, the number of non-divisional tank battalions increased to 65, permitting more combined training with the infantry divisions. Later, it became standard practice to attach a non-divisional tank battalion to each infantry division where possible. Almost 4,000 personnel were cut from the division establishment although the number of Sherman tanks was only reduced by a quarter. While the old armored division organization was cumbersome and inefficient, the new was flexible but sometimes too lean and light, requiring supplementing. All armored divisions were converted to the new tables except the 2nd and 3rd, which remained under the old, with some modifications.
Artillery.
Although also frequently out-ranged by their German counterparts, American artillery built up a reputation for effectiveness and the infantry increasingly relied on the artillery to get them forward. The War Department General Staff ignored the Army Ground Force's recommendations for a powerful heavy artillery arm, authorizing only 81 medium and 54 heavy non-divisional artillery battalions instead of the 140 and 101 recommended by Army Ground Forces, only to have combat experience in Italy prove that air power could not substitute for heavy artillery. As a result, over 100 medium and heavy artillery battalions were activated in 1944, mostly through the conversion of coast artillery units.
Cavalry.
Two horse cavalry divisions existed in 1941. The 1st Cavalry Division was shipped to Australia, where it was originally envisioned that it could operate in the mounted role. However, by the time it embarked, the defense of Australia was no longer paramount and it served in the South West Pacific Area in the dismounted role. The 2nd Cavalry Division was formed twice. Originally a bi-racial division, its white components were broken up to provide troops for armored units. It was reformed as a colored division only to be broken up again to provide service units. Two non-divisional cavalry regiments served as infantry in the South West Pacific Area and China Burma India. All other cavalry units were converted to the mechanized cavalry reconnaissance role. However, they only spent about 6% of their time on reconnaissance tasks, leading to a postwar consensus that either they lacked the combat power to perform their assigned role or had simply been misused altogether.
Tank Destroyer.
The tank destroyer arm was probably the most controversial. Tank destroyers based on the M3 Half-track proved too vulnerable in the North African campaign and a decision was made that half of all tank destroyer battalions would be equipped with towed guns, emphasizing the defensive role. This decision was reversed after the towed battalions lost large numbers of guns over-run or stuck in mud and snow during the Ardennes offensive. Later, good self-propelled gun carriages became available, but massed enemy armor became scarce and most tank destroyer units began operating as field artillery. Some 25 tank destroyer battalions were inactivated to fill depleted infantry and armoured divisions.
Post-War.
Army Ground Forces survived the post-war reorganization of the War Department. It became Army Field Forces in 1948, Continental Army Command (CONARC) in 1955, and was ultimately divided into United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 1973. FORSCOM wears the former Army Ground Forces' shoulder sleeve insignia to this day.


Willard Varnell Oliver

Willard Varnell Oliver (May 2, 1921 – October 14, 2009) was an American veteran of the United States Marine Corps and a member of the Navajo Code Talkers during World War II. Oliver was part of a unit of Navajos who worked to confuse Japanese forces in the Pacific during World War II through the transmission of messages in the Navajo language. His younger brother, Lloyd Oliver, was also a member of the Navajo Code Talkers.
Oliver grew up in a rural area between Shiprock and Farmington, New Mexico and graduated from the Shiprock Agricultural High School in 1940. He enlisted in the United States Marine Corps on March 23, 1943, and served with the 2nd Marine Division. He was honorably discharged on December 11, 1945.
Willard Oliver died on October 14, 2009, at the Northern Arizona Veterans Affairs Health Care System Hospital in Prescott, Arizona, at the age of 88. He was the fifth member of the Navajo Code Talkers to die since May 2009.
Navajo President Joe Shirley Jr. ordered that American flags on the Navajo Nation be lowered to half staff in Oliver's honor. His funeral was held on October 17, 2009, in his hometown of Lukachukai, Arizona.


Battle of Homildon Hill

The Battle of Holmedon Hill or Battle of Homildon Hill was a conflict between English and Scottish armies on 14 September 1402 in Northumberland, England. The battle was recounted in Shakespeare's "Henry IV, part 1". Although Humbleton Hill is the modern name of the site, over the centuries it has been variously named Homildon, Hameldun, Holmedon, and Homilheugh.
Background.
During the time leading to the repudiation of the Truce of Leulinghem, both Kingdoms began to raid the other. On 22 June 1402, a small force backed by the Scots government, returning from one such raid, was attacked and defeated by George Dunbar, the Earl of March's son, at the Battle of Nesbit Moor, at which no quarter was given.
Archibald Douglas, 4th Earl of Douglas, arguably the most militarily powerful man in Scotland, and a key part of the Duke of Albany's administration, used the pretext of Nesbit Moor to lead a punitive expedition into England. With Murdoch of Fife, Albany's son, Douglas's army marched as far as Newcastle to avenge the battle. At the head of 10,000 men, he laid waste to the whole of Northumberland.
Battle.
March persuaded Henry Percy, 1st Earl of Northumberland, and his son Harry "Hotspur" to lie in wait for the returning Scots at Wooler. Once Douglas's men had made camp at Milfield, relatively low ground, the English army rushed to attack. The Scots, however, had keen sentries and the army was able to retreat to the higher ground of Homildon Hill and organise into traditional Schiltron formations; Douglas had not learned from the lesson of his great uncle's defeat at the Battle of Halidon Hill seventy years previously. The Schiltrons presented a large target for the English Longbowmen, and the formations started to break. A hundred men, under Sir John Swinton of the Swintons of that Ilk, chose to charge the enemy saying: "Better to die in the mellay than be shot down like deer". All perished. It has been suggested that Douglas hesitated to signal the advance of his main force, and when he did, it was too little too late. Douglas's mauled army met the as yet unbloodied English men at arms, and were routed. Many of Douglas's leading captains were captured, including his kinsman George Douglas, 1st Earl of Angus, Thomas Dunbar, 5th Earl of Moray and Murdoch of Fife. Douglas himself was captured having been wounded five times, including the loss of an eye, despite the fact his armour had allegedly taken three years to make.
Aftermath.
With so many of the Scots leaders and chivalry taken prisoner, Albany was left in a precarious position militarily if not politically. It was only due to King Henry's internal and Welsh problems that the English did not press home their victory with a full-scale invasion of Scotland.
Henry IV was keen that so many able soldiers should not return to Scotland to fight against him, so refused to allow those who held noble captives to ransom them.
This act became one of the many grievances that the Percys had with the Crown. In 1403 they allied themselves with Owain Glyndŵr, and went into open rebellion against the English king. Hotspur set his prisoners free, as there was by now no chance of remuneration for them, and many including Douglas decided to join forces with him. Indeed, Douglas fought, and was again badly wounded, at Hotspur's final fight at the Battle of Shrewsbury.
Sir John Mowbray of Barnbougle, Laird of Dalmeny, was knighted by Sir Thomas Erskine at the battle.
As recounted by Shakespeare.
Here is a dear, a true industrious friend,

Sir Walter Blunt, new lighted from his horse.

Stain’d with the variation of each soil

Betwixt that Holmedon and this seat of ours;

And he hath brought us smooth and welcome news.

The Earl of Douglas is discomfited:

Ten thousand bold Scots, two and twenty knights,

Balk’d in their own blood did Sir Walter see

On Holmedon’s plains. Of prisoners, Hotspur took

Mordake the Earl of Fife, and eldest son

To beaten Douglas; and the Earl of Athol,

Of Murray, Angus, and Menteith:

And is not this an honourable spoil?

A gallant prize? ha, cousin, is it not?
---Shakespeare, Henry IV, part 1, act 1, scene 1.
Battle site.
The site of the battle is now located within the Northumberland National Park. The hill contains the remains of an Iron Age hillfort at the summit, built some 1500 years before the battle. During the medieval period the sides of the ruined fort were apparently used for summer settlements and sheep shelters.
The Battle Stone at was traditionally thought to commemorate the 1402 battle, but is actually a standing stone dating to the Bronze Age.


Operation Zebra

Operation Zebra was a July 1945 major mine clearance operation by U.S. Navy minesweepers off Sakishima Gunto, in association with the invasion of Okinawa by Allied Forces in World War II.


Operation Sabre

Operation Sabre was a Royal Navy military operation in World War II. It involved cutting the Japanese submarine communications cable linking Saigon and Singapore. operating from an X-Craft midget submarine in the Saigon River delta on 31 July 1945.
Operation "Sabre" was directed at the Hong Kong to Saigon telephone cable, and carried out by "XE4" , which was towed to within of the Mekong Delta by the submarine HMS "Spearhead". Steered by Vernon "Ginger" Coles "XE4" looked for the two telephone cables by using a towed grapnel. She eventually snagged the first cable, and managed to haul it about off the seabed. "XE4's" diver, Sub-Lieutenant K.M. Briggs, used the net/cable cutter to sever it. The second cable was soon found as well, and was severed by the second diver, Sub-Lieutenant A. Bergius. Two divers were carried due to the operating rule that a diver should not spend more than 20 minutes in depths over and no more than 10 minutes over . "XE4" and "Spearhead" returned to Labuan on 3 August 1945.
Lieutenant Maxwell H. Shean, DSO and bar, Royal Australian Naval Volunteer Reserve, was awarded the American Bronze Star Medal in March 1947 for meritorious achievement as the commanding officer of the midget submarine "HMS XE4".


China War Memorial Medal

This China War Memorial Medal, also known as the Medal in Commemoration of Victory in the Resistance Against Aggression, () was authorized after the Second Sino-Japanese War (World War II) by the Republic of China government for servicemen who assisted the Chinese Government fighting against the Japanese during the war. Members of the Fourteenth Air Force, the Flying Tigers, were eligible to be awarded this medal. The medal was created in 1944 and first distributed in 1946 to those who met the requirements from the Chinese Nationalist Government. Lt. General Claire Lee Chennault and Anna Chennault were a few who had received this medal.
Eligibility.
Those eligible to get the China War Memorial Medal were those who served in Mainland China, Burma, Vietnam and Thailand for 30 days from the time period of December 7, 1941 – September 2, 1945.
Acceptance.
This medal may be accepted under which allows US personnel to wear this medal after all foreign decorations.
Description.
The Marco Polo Bridge is on the observe with two flags of the Republic of China and Chairman Chiang Kai-shek between the flags. On the reverse, is a ribbon for an engraving of the service member's name or serial number.
The ribbon of the medal is yellow with red edges wide, between the red and yellow are blue stripes wide. A round metal Chinese sunburst emblem is placed in the center of the suspension and service ribbons.


Convoys ONS.18/ON 202


San Pedro Boatworks

San Pedro Boatworks also called the San Pedro Boat and Yacht Company was a boatyard in San Pedro, California the entrance to the West Channel of Los Angeles Harbor, at berth 44 and next to fire station 110. The boatyard opened in 1923 and closed in 2002, the site has been abandoned since then. The address is 210 Whalers Walk, San Pedro,with the office at 2945 Miner Street. L.A Harbor Marine operated the site from 1965 to 1969. Pacific American also operated the boatyard for many years, owned by San Pedro Boatworks. In 1974 the operation was taken over by Marin Vincent. Later Billfish Inc. took over operations. In 1993, BCI Coca-Cola took over operations. Over the years the yard continued to build and repair boats including military boats, purse seiners, yachts, fireboats, and lifeboats.
Port of Los Angeles is looking to reopen the site as the L.A. Shipyard to serve the local boats. The project is part of the Berth 44 Boatyard Development project. The new yard would work on boats from 40 to 150 feet and maybe larger. The proposed site would be 3 acres of land and one acre of water, located between Berth 46 and the Cabrillo Way Marina. Currently Al Larson Boat Shop is the only operating boatyard in LA.
World War 2.
San Pedro Boatworks built to support World War 2 US Army Patrol Boats. The series was boats J-1828 to J-1854, these 27 gasoline engine, 37-foot wood boats, design # 243 were built in 1944.
Clean up.
In 2015 a court case went to the US Ninth Circuit court regards to the "ownership" of the boatyard due clean up work done at the site after its closure. The case was the City of Los Angeles v. San Pedro Boatworks.


Battle of Prestonpans

The Battle of Prestonpans, also known as the Battle of Gladsmuir, was fought on 21 September 1745, near Prestonpans, in East Lothian; it was the first significant engagement of the Jacobite rising of 1745.
Jacobite forces led by the Stuart exile Charles Edward Stuart defeated a government army under Sir John Cope, whose inexperienced troops broke in the face of a Highland charge. The battle lasted less than thirty minutes and was a huge boost to Jacobite morale, leading to the invasion of England.
Background.
The War of the Austrian Succession meant that by early 1745 the bulk of British forces were committed in Flanders; encouraged by French victory at Fontenoy in April 1745, Charles Edward Stuart sailed for Scotland in July, hoping to take advantage. When he landed at Eriskay in the Outer Hebrides on 23 July, most of those contacted advised him to return to France, but enough were eventually persuaded, notably Donald Cameron of Lochiel, whose tenants provided a large proportion of the Jacobite force. The rebellion was formally launched at Glenfinnan on 19 August.
Sir John Cope, government commander in Scotland, was a competent soldier with between 3,000 and 4,000 troops available, but many were inexperienced recruits. He was hampered by poor intelligence and advice, particularly from the Marquess of Tweeddale, then Secretary of State for Scotland, who consistently underestimated the severity of the revolt. Once Charles' location was confirmed, Cope left his cavalry and artillery at Stirling under Thomas Fowke and marched on Corrieyairack Pass, the primary access point between the Western Highlands and the Lowlands. Control would allow Cope to block the route into Eastern Scotland but he found the Highlanders already in possession, and withdrew to Inverness on 26 August.
Jacobite objectives remained unclear until early September, when Cope learned they were using the military road network to advance on Edinburgh. Concluding the only way to reach the city first was by sea, his troops were loaded onto ships at Aberdeen. They began disembarking at Dunbar on 17 September but once again he was too late; Charles had entered the Scottish capital earlier the same day, although Edinburgh Castle remained in government hands.
Battle.
Joined at Dunbar by Fowke and the cavalry, Cope was confident he was strong enough to defeat a poorly-armed Jacobite army of less than 2,000. At the same time, Charles ordered his forces to move north from Edinburgh and the two armies made contact on the afternoon of 20 September; Cope drew up his forces facing south, with a marshy area immediately in front, park walls protecting their right and cannon behind the embankment of the Tranent to Cockenzie Waggonway, which crossed the battlefield.
The court-martial set up in 1746 to review Cope's conduct agreed the ground was well chosen and the disposition of his troops appropriate. However, this was undermined by various factors, one being the poor quality of some senior officers, including James Gardiner whose dragoons fled in panic from a small party of Highlanders in the so-called 'Coltbridge Canter' of 16 September. In addition, much of Cope's infantry lacked experience; until May, Lascelles' Regiment had been employed building a military road near Loch Lomond. Finally, his gunners were so poorly trained that he sent a messenger to Edinburgh Castle asking for replacements, who never reached him.
Charles wanted to attack immediately, but Murray argued their charge would be slowed by the marshy ground in front of Cope's centre, exposing the Highlanders to his superior firepower. While his assessment was correct, it was the first in a series of fierce arguments between the two that would fatally undermine the Jacobite leadership. Murray convinced the majority that only an attack against the open left flank of Cope's army stood any chance of success, and Robert Anderson, a local farmer's son who knew the area well, told him of a route through the marshlands. At 4 am, the entire Jacobite force began moving three abreast along the Riggonhead defile, east of Cope's position.
To prevent a surprise attack during the night, Cope kept fires burning in front of his position and posted no fewer than 200 dragoons and 300 infantry as pickets. A company of Loudon's Highlanders under Macpherson of Cluny had deserted from Cope a few days before; the remaining three companies were detailed to guard the baggage park in Cockenzie and Port Seton, while some 100 volunteers were dismissed until the next morning and missed the battle. Warned by his pickets of the Jacobite movement, Cope had enough time to wheel his army to face east (see map) and reposition his cannon. As the Highlanders began their charge, his artillerymen fled, leaving the guns to be fired by their officers.
The two dragoon regiments on the flanks panicked and rode off, leaving Gardiner mortally wounded on the battlefield and exposing the infantry in the centre. Attacked on three sides, they were overrun in less than 15 minutes, with their retreat blocked by the park walls to their rear; some escaped when the Highlanders stopped to loot the baggage train. Government losses were from 300 to 500 killed or wounded and 500 to 600 taken prisoner, many later paroled to save the expense of holding them; the Jacobites estimated their own casualties as 35 to 40 dead and 70 to 80 wounded.
Deserted by his gunners, the artillery commander, Lt-Colonel Whitefoord, made his escape after being spared by Stewart of Invernahyle; he later returned the favour by obtaining a pardon for him after he was captured at Culloden. Cope also escaped and Lascelles fought his way out, although most of his regiment were captured; with Fowke and the dragoons, they reached Berwick-upon-Tweed the next day with 450 survivors. Gardiner was later carried from the field to Tranent, where he died during the night and an obelisk commemorating his death was set up in the mid-19th century. In 1953, a memorial to the dead of both sides was erected near the battle site, with a coal bing providing a vantage point for visitors.
Aftermath.
Several hours after the battle, Cope wrote to Tweeddale, disclaiming responsibility for the defeat; "I cannot reproach myself; the manner in which the enemy came on was quicker than can be described...and the cause of our men taking on a destructive panic..." Along with Fowke and Lascelles, he was later tried by a court-martial; all three were exonerated, the Court deciding defeat was due to the 'shameful conduct of the private soldiers' but Cope never held a senior command again.
The Battle of Killiecrankie in 1689 showed even experienced troops struggled with the ferocity of the Highland charge, a lesson reinforced at Prestonpans and Falkirk Muir in January 1746. Its weakness was that if the initial charge failed, the Highlanders were not equipped to hold their ground; by the time of Culloden in April, Cumberland's troops had been drilled in countering this tactic and inflicted heavy losses on the Scots as a result.
Victory meant the rebellion was now taken more seriously; in mid-October, two French ships arrived at Montrose, bringing money, weapons and an envoy, the Marquis d'Eguilles. Cumberland and 12,000 troops were recalled from Flanders, including 6,000 German mercenaries who arrived in Berwick-upon-Tweed a few days after Cope. These were immediately available, having been captured at Tournai in June, then released on condition they did not fight against the French.
The argument prior to the battle between Prince Charles and Lord Murray was the first episode in an increasingly fractious relationship and the Jacobite Council spent the next six weeks arguing strategy. Reversing the 1707 Union was a significant factor in Scottish Jacobite support, which now appeared possible and they wanted to consolidate their position. Charles and his exile advisors argued only the removal of the Hanoverian regime could ensure the end of the Union, and that meant an invasion of England. The Scots eventually agreed after Charles assured them of substantial English and French support; they left Edinburgh on 4 November, entering England on 8 November; and government forces under General Roger Handasyd retook Edinburgh on the 14th.
On the march south, the Council met daily to discuss strategy, and at Derby on 5 December, its members overwhelmingly counselled retreat, the only significant dissenter being Charles. There was no sign of the promised French landing, and despite the large crowds that turned out to see them, only Manchester provided a significant number of recruits; Preston, a Jacobite stronghold in 1715, supplied three. News of another French supply convoy arriving in Montrose seemed to validate the original preference for remaining in Scotland, and the Jacobites turned north the next day. The rising ended with defeat at Culloden in April 1746.
Legacy.
In 2006, the Battle of Prestonpans 1745 Heritage Trust was established locally to provide information on the battle, while the battlefield site is included in the Inventory of Historic Battlefields in Scotland and protected by Historic Scotland under the Scottish Historical Environment Policy of 2009.
Popular perception of the battle and Cope's role has largely been set by accounts by third parties, none of whom were present and in one case not yet born. In his 1747 book "Life of Colonel Gardiner", nonconformist minister Philip Doddridge turned evangelical convert Gardiner into a hero, largely by ridiculing Cope; this is an enduring myth which is still recycled today.
Gardiner also features in Sir Walter Scott's 1817 novel "Waverley", whose hero is an English Jacobite; Gardiner's heroic death helps convince him that the future lies not with the Stuarts but in the Union. The often-quoted comment by Lord Mark Kerr that Cope was the first general to bring news of his own defeat was another embellishment by Scott which also appears in the song "Hey Johnnie Cope".
The best known legacy comes from Skirving, a local farmer who visited the battlefield later that afternoon where he was, by his own account, mugged by the victors. He wrote two songs, "Hey, Johnnie Cope, Are Ye Waking Yet?" and "Tranent Muir"; the former is quite well known, and is a short, catchy, and mostly historically inaccurate insult to Cope. The tune is still played by some Scottish regiments for "Reveille" and was also played as the 51st (Highland) Division disembarked on Juno Beach in Normandy on 6 June 1944. While Cope's troops fled the battle, he himself did not; nor is it true that he slept the night before. Poet Robert Burns later wrote his own words to the song, but these are not as well known as Skirving's. The participants included Allan "Breac" Stewart, a soldier in Lee's Regiment; he switched sides after being taken prisoner and joined the Jacobite Stewart of Appin's regiment. Scots author Robert Louis Stevenson used him as a lead character in his 1886 novel "Kidnapped".
In 2019 a new visitor centre was proposed for the battle site. It would permanently house the Prestonpans Tapestry, a depiction of the events leading up to the battle. The site has been partly developed for housing and the former Cockenzie power station.
The historical drama television series "Outlander" depicts the battle during Season 2, episode 10.


Convoy SC 2

SC 2 was an Allied North Atlantic convoy of the SC series which ran during the Battle of the Atlantic in World War II. It was attacked by a wolfpack of German U-boats, losing five merchant ships.
Background.
SC 2 was an east-bound convoy of 54 ships which sailed from Sydney, Cape Breton in Nova Scotia on 25 August 1940 bound for Liverpool. It carried war materials and was led by Commodore EK Boddam-Whitham in SS "Harpoon".
For the Atlantic crossing SC 2 was escorted by HMS "Scarborough", a pre-war sloop that had seen previous service as a survey vessel.
At this stage of the campaign escorts against U-boat attack could only be provided in the Western Approaches; the Ocean escort, in this case a sloop, but usually an Armed Merchant Cruiser, was provided to give some protection against surface raiders.
SC 2 was opposed by a patrol line of three U-boats, positioned at the limit of endurance to intercept east-bound convoys before the Western Approaches escort had joined.
U-boat Command (BdU) had been informed of SC 2's passage by "B-Dienst", the German signals intelligence branch, which had cracked the Royal Navy's codes. BdU had just five U-boats on station in the Atlantic, and ordered "U-47" to intercept and shadow while the other boats homed in on his directions. One of these, "U-124", was unavailable, being on weather reporting duty; while another, "U-28" was short of fuel and unable to head further west. The remaining two, "U-65" and "U-101", moved west to join the search.
"U-47" headed west to find SC 2; on the way she met convoy OB 207, which she attacked on 3 September, sinking a freighter.
On 4 September the three U-boats formed a patrol line at Longitude 20 West, on the fringe of the Western Approaches.
Action.
On 6 September 1940 "U-65" sighted the convoy and notified BdU and the others, but was unable to attack in heavy seas. "U-101" fell out of the chase with engine trouble, leaving only "U-47" to join the attack.
Early hours of 7 September "U 47" made a series of attacks, succeeded in sinking three ships, the freighters "Neptunian", "Jose de Larrinaga" and the Norwegian, "Gro".
On the same day SC 2 was joined by its Western Approaches escort, a mixed bag of 2 destroyers, a sloop, a corvette and 2 trawlers, which arrived from other duties at various times during the day. As was common at this point in the campaign this force was an ad hoc formation, with no background of having worked or exercised together; command was exercised by the senior officer present, and could change with each new arrival. All told the arrivals were: the destroyer "Westcott"; the sloop "Lowestoft" and two trawlers; and the destroyer "Skeena" and corvette "Periwinkle".
"U 47" continued to shadow but was unable to mount a further attack until the night of 8/9 September when she sank the Greek freighter "Possidon", at a point west of the Hebrides. Before dawn on 9 September "U 28" also made contact, and attacked, sinking "Mardinian".
With this the assault on SC 2 ended; the pack had sunk five ships without suffering loss or damage. Later that day the convoy met its local escort, and, entering the North Channel arrived without further loss in Liverpool on 10 September 1940.
Conclusion.
This was one of the first occasions where the U-boat Arm had carried out a successful wolf pack attack. Previous attempts to form wolf packs, with control exercised at sea by a senior U-boat commander, had met with failure. Following the fall of France and BdU's move to Kerneval on the French Atlantic coast, a new approach was being tried, with Donitz micro-managing operations from headquarters. This was a success, and set the pattern for wolf pack operations throughout the rest of the Atlantic campaign.
For Britain, the loss of five ships was unpleasant, as was the failure of the escort to inflict any damage on the attackers. However the safe arrival of forty nine ships was an overall success.
Tables.
Allied ships sunk


346th Bombardment Group

The 346th Bombardment Group is a former United States Army Air Forces unit. It was last assigned to the 316th Bombardment Wing at Kadena Airfield, Okinawa, where it was inactivated on 30 June 1946. The group was originally a heavy bomber training unit, but was inactivated in a general reorganization of Army Air Forces training units in 1944. It was reorganized as a Boeing B-29 Superfortress group later that year. It moved to Okinawa in 1945, but arrived too late to participate in combat.
History.
Heavy bomber training unit.
The group was first activated at Salt Lake City Army Air Base, Utah in September 1942, with the 502d, 503d, 504th and 505th Bombardment Squadrons assigned The following month, it moved to Smoky Hill Army Air Field, Kansas, where it began operating as an Operational Training Unit (OTU). The Army Air Forces (AAF) OTU program involved the use of an oversized parent unit to provide cadres to "satellite groups". Initially, the goup's 503d and 504th Squadrons were equipped with Boeing B-17 Flying Fortresses, but by the end of the year, the group was entirely equipped with the Consolidated B-24 Liberator.
With the Liberator, the mission changed to acting as a Replacement Training Unit (RTU). Like the OTUs, RTUs were oversized units, but their mission was to train individual aircrews, rather than units. However, the AAF was finding that standard military units, based on relatively inflexible tables of organization were not well adapted to the training mission. In response, the group's squadrons lost their aircraft and the training mission was concentrated in group headquarters in October 1943. Ultimately, The AAF adopted a functional system in which each base was organized into a separate numbered unit, which would be manned and organized specifically for the mission. The 346th Group and its squadrons were inactivated on 1 April 1944, along with support organizations at Dyersburg Army Air Base, Tennessee, and replaced by the 223d AAF Base Unit (Combat Crew Training Station, Bombardment, Heavy)
Very heavy bomber operations.
The group was reactivated at Dalhart Army Air Field, Texas in August 1944 as a very heavy bomber unit. However, the group's component squadrons were not activated with it. Instead, the 461st, 462d and 463d Bombardment Squadrons, which had been components of the 331st Bombardment Group were assigned to the 346th. The group trained with Boeing B-29 Superfortress at Dalhart and at Pratt Army Air Field, Kansas until late June 1945, when it departed the United States for the Pacific Theater.
The group did not arrive at its combat station, Kadena Airfield, on Okinawa until 7 August 1945 and the war ended before it could participate in combat operations, although members of the unit intended to be lead crews flew missions with other units from Saipan, Tinian and Guam. After the war the group participated in several show-of-force missions over Japan and for a time ferried Allied prisoners of war from Okinawa to the Philippine Islands. It served with the occupation forces until it was inactivated in June 1946.


Joe Hosteen Kellwood

Joe Hosteen Kellwood (August 20, 1921 – September 5, 2016) was a United States Marine, best known for serving as a Navajo code talker during World War II.
Born in Steamboat Canyon, Arizona, on the Navajo Reservation, Kellwood was a carpenter. He served in the First Marine Division and served in the Pacific front, seeing battle in Cape Gloucester, Peleliu and Okinawa. He received the Congressional Silver Medal for his service. Kellwood died at the veterans hospital in Phoenix, Arizona.


66th Military Intelligence Brigade

The 66th Military Intelligence Brigade ("Six-Six-M-I" and 66th MIB) is a United States Army brigade, subordinate to United States Army Intelligence and Security Command and based at Wiesbaden Army Airfield, Wiesbaden, Germany. After years of history as a counter intelligence/intelligence group with headquarters in Munich and geographically dispersed detachments, it became a brigade on 16 October 1986, but was inactivated in July 1995. Reformed again as an intelligence group in 2002, it became a brigade again in 2008.
The unit's mission is to provide intelligence support to U.S. Army Europe and U.S. Army Africa. Part of the 66th Military Intelligence Brigade supports near real-time missions for deployed soldiers such as operations in Afghanistan and also Iraq. Members of the brigade provide mission support by utilizing databases running on computer clusters and communicate on encrypted networks, such as the NSA-certified TACLANE encrypted network.
The 66th MIB includes the 2nd Military Intelligence Battalion. Soldiers of the 66th MIB can be individually attached to other U.S. Army units in the course of their duties. Members are also on duty at U.S. Air Force installations, such as RAF Mildenhall. One brigade soldier was killed in action near a Forward Operating Base in Afghanistan in 2010. Unit members analyze sources in, among other languages, Russian and Persian.
Soldiers in the brigade ideally hold qualifications in military intelligence and counter-intelligence, depending on their specific roles. Some also hold military (NWC, NDU, AFSC etc.) and/or civilian academic degrees. Entrance and intermediate training of military intelligence personnel is provided by the United States Army Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.
Organization.
The current composition of the brigade;
Leadership.
The current head of the unit is the Brigade Commander, COL Bryan E. Hooper.
Shoulder sleeve insignia.
Description
On a silver gray hexagon, one point up, with a oriental blue border in height and in width overall, an oriental blue hexagon bearing a yellow sphinx superimposed by a silver gray dagger hilted black.
Symbolism
Oriental blue and silver gray, representing loyalty and determination, are the colors of the Military Intelligence branch. Yellow/gold symbolizes excellence. The hexagon borders reflect the numerical designation of the unit. The sphinx, a traditional military intelligence symbol, indicates observation, wisdom and discreet silence. The unsheathed dagger reflects the aggressive and protective requirements and the element of physical danger inherent in the mission of the unit.
Background
The shoulder sleeve insignia was approved on 27 August 1987 for the 66th Military Intelligence Brigade. It was cancelled on 17 July 2002. The insignia was reinstated effective 18 June 2003 and redesignated as an exception to policy for the 66th Military Intelligence Group, with description and symbolism updated. (TIOH Drawing Number A-1-740)
Distinctive unit insignia.
Description
A Gold color metal and enamel device in width overall consisting of a hexagon composed of a chequy of (6) Black and White sections (one angle up), surmounted throughout by a smaller hexagon (flat side up) composed of a chequy of nine sections of Gold and Blue (oriental) with the center square charged with a Gold sphinx head, facing to the right, all above a Gold scroll inscribed "HONOR VALOR AND SECURITY" in Blue (Oriental) letters.
Symbolism
The black and white symbolize enlightenment and knowledge both day and night around the world. The chequy represents the unit's tactical and strategic capabilities in counterintelligence. The sphinx is a traditional intelligence symbol and indicates observation, wisdom and discreet silence. The hexagon within a hexagon "6-6" further distinguishes the numerical designation of the organization.
Background
The distinctive unit insignia was originally approved for the 66th Military Intelligence Group on 16 July 1969. It was redesignated for the 66th Military Intelligence Brigade on 8 October 1986. The insignia was redesignated effective 16 October 2002, with the description updated, for the 66th Military Intelligence Group.
Lineage.
Constituted 21 June 1944 in the Army of the United States as the 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment.
Activated 1 July 1944 at Camp Rucker, Alabama.
Inactivated 12 November 1945 at Camp Kilmer, New Jersey.
Activated 10 November 1949 in Germany.
Allotted 20 September 1951 to the Regular Army.
Reorganized and redesignated 20 December 1952 as the 66th Counter Intelligence Corps Group.
Reorganized and redesignated 1 January 1960 as the 66th Military Intelligence Group.
Redesignated 25 July 1961 as the 66th Intelligence Corps Group.
Redesignated 15 October 1966 as the 66th Military Intelligence Group.
Reorganized and redesignated 16 October 1986 as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 66th Military Intelligence Brigade.
Reorganized and redesignated 16 October 1992 as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 66th Military Intelligence Brigade.
Inactivated 16 July 1995 in Germany.
Redesignated 28 February 2002 as Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, 66th Military Intelligence Group.
Activated 16 October 2002 in Germany.
Redesignated July 2008 as the 66th Military Intelligence Brigade.


Independence Army Airfield

Independence Army Airfield was a World War II training base of the United States Army Air Forces Central Flying Training Command (CFTC). It is currently the city-owned Independence Municipal Airport.
History.
In January 1941 the Independence Chamber of Commerce, resolved to sell the citizens of the Kansas community the idea of a municipal airport. On 26 June 1941, after six months of effective "selling", the city commission decided to ask the voters to approve a $100,000 bond issue for financing work on the airport. The citizens approved by a vote of 1,219 to 173 on 1 August 1941. A short time later the city commission entered into contract with Paulette and White, consulting engineers from Topeka, to survey potential sites for the field. Several locations were considered before any selection was made. The site chosen was in Montgomery county, six miles southwest of Independence.
Early in 1942 the government indicated it was interested in acquiring the site for an United States Army Air Forces airfield. During April and May civic leaders met with government officials in a series of conferences. Army Engineers made surveys from 8 to 11 April. About six weeks later, on 23 May 1942, the Army officially notified Independence City Government that it would purchase approximately 1,433 acres.
The contract for planning and supervising the construction of the airfield was awarded to Black and Veatch, architectural engineers from Kansas City, Missouri. Work began on 6 June 1942, when Ottinger Brothers of Oklahoma City moved in with a labor crew and began grading operations. Shortly thereafter, work began on the drainage and sewerage systems. During the summer the Missouri Pacific Railroad constructed a spur to the site. In August work began on runways and buildings. Three concrete runways were constructed, aligned 5500x150(N/S), 5500x150(NE/SW), 5500x150(NW/SW). Each runway had a ten-inch gravel base placed in layers on a six-inch compacted earth subbase, and surfaced with one and one-half-inch asphalt cement; the service strip (80 feet wide) was a six-inch concrete slab, thickened to nine inches at the expansion and construction joints. three taxiways, 50 feet wide, completed the runway system. Fronting on the field, three squadron hangars, 120 by 80 feet, were built with a parking apron a mile long and 450 feet wide. '
During the fall of 1942 clearing and grading operations began at four locations that had been selected for auxiliary fields. The four sites were located 8 to 20 miles from the main field. The auxiliaries were located at:
Work progressed satisfactorily throughout the winter despite interruptions caused by heavy rains and sub-zero temperatures. By January 1943 three concrete runways 5,000 feet in length had been constructed. Electric, gas and water lines also had been completed and sufficient troop housing was available. Most of the buildings were Theater of Operations construction while some were of the Mobilization type. The Mobilization type buildings included the station hospital, theater, chapel, and Link training buildings. Where before there had been only open farm land, this new city now contained about 200 buildings, with pot-bellied coal stoves for heating. The major construction work, which cost more than $8,000,000, ended in May 1943.
Basic Flying School.
Independence Army Airfield was activated as a Basic Flying School on 12 October 1942, under the 32d Flying Training Wing (Basic), Perrin Army Airfield, Texas. However, the personnel to operate the base did not begin arriving until December 1942.
Basic flying training began when 152 cadets arrived for the first class on 26 January 1943. The trainer used at Independence AAF was the North American BT-14, with some Vultee BT-13 Valiants as well. Some of the classes that arrived later had as many as 345 students. The cadets, who had completed primary flying training, received a nine-week course that was divided into flying training and classroom instruction. Flight training consisted of several subjects that included, takeoffs and landings, aerobatics, cross-country navigation, and night flying. Ground school involved navigation, meteorology, radio communications, and aircraft recognition. Normally ground school was given between flying lessons. Sometimes it was done in the very early AM or after the evening meal.
Typically the day would start with Reveille at 6:15 AM, followed by breakfast at 6:30. Flying would begin at 7:45 AM. If a student was not scheduled to fly he would be in ground school, drill, or involved in required athletics. Sometimes it was necessary to schedule Sunday flying when inclement weather prevented flying during the week. Normal flying periods were one hour, except cross-country flights. Usually cross-country flights took place between Independence and Claremore, Oklahoma, and Neosho, Joplin, and Nevada, Missouri. Others were flown between Independence, Chanute, and Fort Scott, Kansas.
In May 1944, flying training ended at nearby Coffeyville Army Airfield, and students in training who had not yet graduated were moved to Independence. Most were in Basic flying training, but some advanced twin-engine Cessna UC-78 Bobcats were also flown up from Coffeyville along with some AT-6 Texans. Basic flying training at Independence continued until January 1945. Nineteen classes, totaling 4,933 students, graduated from the school. The last class completed training on 29 January 1945.
Aircraft storage base.
The termination of flying training at Independence resulted in the reassignment of personnel and equipment. Flying personnel were reassigned to airfields in Kansas and Texas during February and March. The BT-13's and BT-14's were moved to airfields in Georgia, Oklahoma, and Missouri. On 15 March Independence Army Airfield was placed on a standby basis.
On 11 April 1945, however, the Army announced that the airfield would be used to store aircraft not needed in the war effort as a Class II storage depot. This classification was for aircraft being placed in an operational reserve state that could be flown out within 7 days. Jurisdiction was transferred to Air Technical Service Command, and during the next two months civilian employment on the field jumped from 44 to 505 and military personnel increased from 2 to 272. Aircraft began arriving on 13 April 1945. At first, bomber aircraft (B-17 Flying Fortress; B-24 Liberator heavy bombers and B-25 Mitchell medium bombers) were prepared for storage and kept at Independence. These were primarily older training aircraft used in the United States.
With the war ended in October 1945, however, all of the B-24 and B-17 aircraft were re-classified as class IV (surplus) and moved to Kingman AAF, Arizona for recycling. At the same time P-47 Thunderbolts and AT-6 Texan trainers began arriving for long-term Type C extended storage. During a period of two and a half years the aircraft stored at Independence included 1,542 P-47's, 1,118 AT-6's, 72 B-25's, 401 B-24's, and 260 B-17's.
Closure.
In the fall of 1947 Air Technical Service Command consolidated its storage depots and all of the stored aircraft were moved from Independence to RFC Walnut Ridge, Arkansas for sale or recycling. Military personnel were transferred to other bases effective 11 December 1947.
Four days later Independence Army Airfield, which had been listed as surplus, was turned over to the Army's District Engineer, Seventh Service Command at Omaha, Nebraska who assumed jurisdiction over the field, pending disposition. Excess buildings and demilitarized equipment were sold or transferred to other bases. Some were torn down and sales were held for scrap lumber of torn down buildings, fence posts, barbed wire and other items which no longer had a useful need.
Current status.
The War Assets Administration eventually turned the air base over to local government officials. Since then the installation has been operated by the city of Independence as its municipal airport.
The SW/NE runway is used today by the airport, and the main E/W taxiway. About half of the parking apron is maintained and used by Cessna Aircraft, where the facility assembles, paints, installs the interior and delivers several of the single engine piston models produced by Cessna: the 172 Skyhawk, the 182 Skylane and the 206 Stationair. The plant also produces the Citation Mustang. The Independence facility consists of five buildings on campus: the main assembly plant, the sand and fill building, the paint facility, the Flight building and the new Customer Center. The remainder of the former airfield runways and taxiways remain, although unused.
The ground station consists of streets remaining along with the outline of the base parade ground and headquarters. The Independence Airport Industrial Park consists of companies which have built new structures on it, but generally it is unused and vacant.


UK Carrier Strike Group

The UK Carrier Strike Group (UKCSG) is a carrier battle group of the British Royal Navy. It has existed in various forms since the mid-2000s. Between 2006 and 2011, the formation centered around the Royal Navy's s until the retirement of their Harrier GR9 strike aircraft in 2011 as a result of the Strategic Defence and Security Review. The UKCSG subsequently returned in February 2015 ahead of the entry into service of the new s, and . The aim of the CSG is to facilitate carrier-enabled power projection.
Overview.
As a unit within the Royal Navy, the UK Carrier Strike Group's role is to facilitate carrier-enabled power projection (CEPP) in support of the UK's interests. As a self-contained force, it is capable of operating independently or as part of a wider operation. The unit is centered around either of two "Queen Elizabeth"-class aircraft carriers, which are designed to carry up to 40 aircraft, with surface ships and submarines providing protection from air, surface and undersea threats. Whilst the Royal Navy has two aircraft carriers, the Royal Navy only plans to maintain one carrier strike group at a time.
Size and composition.
The size and composition of the UKCSG varies depending on operational requirements which are decided upon during operational planning. A typical CSG consists of a "Queen Elizabeth"-class aircraft carrier, two surface escorts (with one being a Type 23 frigate for anti-submarine warfare and the other being a Type 45 destroyer for anti-air warfare), a submarine and a fleet tanker. In the future, escort duties will also be provided by the Royal Navy's new Type 26 frigate. For replenishment-at-sea, the Royal Fleet Auxiliary provides its Tide-class fleet tankers, which were specifically designed to refuel the aircraft carriers, in addition to RFA "Fort Victoria" for dry stores. Currently, "Fort Victoria" is the only ship capable of resupplying the aircraft carriers with dry stores, however a programme to replace her with three new solid support ships is currently underway. Additionally, escorts and support ships may be provided by allies. Overseas, the UK has established a number of naval facilities to support the UKCSG, including the naval base HMS "Jufair" and the UK Joint Logistics Support Base, which are located in Bahrain and Oman, respectively.
The "Queen Elizabeth"-class aircraft carriers are designed to carry around 40 aircraft but can carry up to 72 at maximum capacity. Its Carrier Air Wing (CVW) will consist of up to 24 F-35B Lightning II multirole fighters by 2023. This is in addition to around 14 helicopters of varying types. For a Maritime Force Protection tasking, the CVW may consist of nine Merlin HM2 anti-submarine warfare helicopters and five Merlin HM2 Crowsnest for airborne early warning (AEW). Alternatively, for a Littoral Manoeuvre package, it may consist of a mixture of Chinook and Merlin Mk3i/4 transport helicopters and Apache AH1 and Wildcat AH1 attack helicopters. By 2030, the Royal Navy aims to replace some of these helicopter platforms with medium-sized fixed wing unmanned aerial vehicles, currently known as Vixens, capable of undertaking strike, air-to-air refueling, electronic warfare and airborne early warning missions.
Operational history.
2006–2011.
The earliest iteration of the UK Carrier Strike Group originally formed in 2006 with Commodore Alan Richards in command. It centered around either of two s, and . In one of its final deployments, it demonstrated its capabilities alongside the U.S. Navy off the east coast of the United States during Exercise Auriga in 2010. Following the exercise, the captain of "Ark Royal" remarked: "Today was a great opportunity for us to demonstrate some of the capabilities that the UK Carrier Strike Group has, particularly the GR9 Harrier and Merlin ASW helicopters operating from HMS Ark Royal". As an example of the size and composition of a UK CSG of that era, the Auriga CSG consisted of the aircraft carrier HMS "Ark Royal", along with her air wing of Harrier GR9 strike aircraft, Merlin HM1 anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopters and Sea King MK7 airborne surveillance and control (ASaC) helicopters. The aircraft carrier was escorted by the Type 42 destroyer and Type 23 frigate , in addition to French Navy submarine "Perle" and U.S. Navy destroyer . of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary provided replenishment.
In 2010, the British government announced that all Harriers would be retired from service, along with HMS "Ark Royal". This left "Illustrious" serving in a helicopter carrier role whilst replacement aircraft carriers and their associated air wings were procured. The UK Carrier Strike Group dissolved in 2011 with Commodore Simon J. Ancona as its final commander. "Illustrious" later went on to decommission in 2014, three years ahead of her replacement.
2015–present.
In 2015, the UKCSG was re-formed with Commodore Jerry Kyd as its commander. Under his direction, the UK CSG battle staff grew to include 22 core one-star battle staff by 2016. Kyd was later succeeded by Commodore Andrew Betton during the same year, who himself was succeeded in 2018 by Commodore Mike Utley, before the current commander, Commodore Stephan Moorhouse, took command in 2019. Prior to the entry into service of HMS "Queen Elizabeth" and her sister ship "Prince of Wales", the Royal Navy cooperated with its allies to preserve and develop its skills in carrier strike group operations. This primarily involved Royal Navy ships and personnel training with U.S. Navy and French carrier strike groups.
The current UKCSG assembled at sea for the first time in October 2020 during Exercise Joint Warrior. It comprised a total of nine ships, 15 fighter aircraft (five from the Royal Air Force and 10 from the U.S. Marine Corps), 11 helicopters and 3,000 personnel. The Royal Navy ships included the aircraft carrier HMS "Queen Elizabeth" along with two frigates, two destroyers, a replenishment ship and a solid support ship. The U.S. Navy and Royal Netherlands Navy also provided an escort each. The exercise saw the largest number of aircraft on a British aircraft carrier since 1983, in addition to the largest number of F-35B’s at sea across the globe. The exercise was a rehearsal for an operational deployment scheduled for 2021, known as CSG21.
Following Exercise Joint Warrior, the UK CSG reached its initial operating capability (IOC) milestone in January 2021. This milestone marked the successful operation of all components of the CSG and made it available for operational deployments for the first time.
CSG21.
In May 2021, the CSG will undertake its first operational deployment, named CSG21. It will cover and will take the CSG from the North Atlantic, through the Mediterranean and into the Indo-Pacific, visiting more than 40 countries. The CSG will include the aircraft carrier HMS "Queen Elizabeth", Type 45 destroyers and , Type 23 frigates and and an . Underway replenishment will be provided by and . No. 617 Squadron RAF will provide F-35B Lightning II strike fighters, whilst 815 Naval Air Squadron, 820 Naval Air Squadron and 845 Naval Air Squadron will provide various helicopters, including the newly-introduced Merlin HM2 Crowsnest airborne early warning system. Foreign contributions to the carrier strike group will include the surface escorts of the U.S. Navy and of the Royal Netherlands Navy, as well as F-35B aircraft from the United States Marine Corps' VMFA-211 "Wake Island Avengers" Along with MWCS-38 BOOM RED LIGHTNING Marines.


Convoy HX 49

Convoy HX 49 was a North Atlantic convoy of the HX series which ran during the Battle of the Atlantic in World War II. It was the 49th of the numbered series of merchant convoys run by the Allies from Halifax to Liverpool. The convoy was attacked by German U-boats, losing three of its 50 ships sunk. Another ship was lost after dispersal.
Background.
HX 49 was formed of two sections sailing from the Americas.
The main body, of 26 ships, departed Halifax on 9 June 1940 with ships gathered from the US eastern seaboard; it was led by convoy commodore V.Adm. LD Mackinnon RN in the steamship "Eurybates". It was accompanied by its ocean escort, the Armed Merchant Cruiser "Ausonia", and a local escort of two RCN destroyers.
On 13 June the convoy was joined by BHX 49, 24 ships from the Caribbean and South America, that had gathered at Bermuda, departing there on 8 June escorted by the AMC "Ragputana" and a local escort.
Ranged against HX 49 were U-boats of the German Navy's U-boat Arm, on patrol in Britain's South West Approaches. The UBW had five U-boats in area when contact was made on 21 June 1940.
Action.
On 20 June HX 49's Western Approaches escort arrived; the sloops , from escorting the outbound OB 169, and , from OA 169.
During the crossing two ships had dropped out of convoy; both arrived safely. A third, "Moordrecht", was detached for a port in neutral Spain: She was found by on 20 June and torpedoed, without examination.
The following evening found HX 49 about 50 miles south of Cape Clear Island. Her commander, rising star Gunther Prien, took her into the middle of the convoy and sank the tanker "San Fernando". The U-boat then had to crash-dive to avoid being run down by a freighter, but the attack caused the convoy to scatter.
Later that night two more ships were found and sunk; "Randsfjord" by and "Eli Knudsen" by .
At daybreak on 22 June the two sloops began to gather the ships back together, and HX 49 continued without further loss. The main body arrived in Liverpool on 24 June.


Seishin Operation

The Seishin Operation (, ), also called Chongjin Landing Operation, was an amphibious assault on northern Korea between August 13-17, 1945, carried out by the forces of the Soviet Northern Pacific Flotilla of the Pacific Fleet during the Soviet–Japanese War at the end of World War II.
Prelude.
During the Soviet invasion of Manchuria in August 1945, the 1st Far Eastern Front under Kirill Meretskov advance south along the coast of northern Korea. It was decided to conduct three amphibious landings in the rear of the Japanese Kwantung Army.
From 11 to 13 August, the first two landings by the Pacific Fleet were executed, in which they occupied seaports Yuki (today Sonbong) and Racine (today Rason) on the Korean coast, which encountered only some small resistance in Racine.
Encouraged by the success, the fleet commander, Admiral Ivan Yumashev ordered the launch of the next amphibious assault at the port of Seishin (now Chongjin).
Unlike the previous ports, Seishin was well fortified and had a strong Japanese garrison. It had some 4,000 soldiers and was enforced by retreating units of the 3rd Japanese Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Keisaku Murakami of the Kwantung Army.
In view of the successful development of the offensive of the 1st Far Eastern Front, the front commander, Marshal of the Soviet Union, Kirill Meretskov, on August 12 ordered to cancel the previously scheduled landing in Seishin. However, the fleet command continued preparations for the landing, hoping for an easy success. Yumashev managed to get permission to conduct the operation from the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet troops in the Far East, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky. But, with the previous decision of Meretskov to cancel the operation, the fleet did not receive the rifle division previously planned for the landing in Seishin, and Yumashev was forced to go ahead with a limited number of troops, a brigade of marines and some individual units.
To compensate for his small force, he ordered powerful pre-strikes of aviation and torpedo boats on the port (daily bomb-assault strikes from August 9 to 13). Nevertheless, the overall plan of the operation remained unchanged - preliminary landing of a reconnaissance group, and then building up the strength of the landing force.
Since August 9, continuous air strikes were inflicted on the port of Seishin in which, according to Soviet data, about 10 Japanese ships were sunk. On August 12, some Soviet ships entered the harbour and established the absence of Japanese warships there. As a result, it was decided to start the operation, without waiting for the final completion of the battle in Racine and the redeployment of the light forces of the fleet there. Therefore, the starting point for the operation remained Vladivostok, significantly remote from Seishin, which immediately deprived the Soviet command of the ability to quickly respond to a changing situation.
Forces of the parties.
The Soviets force was composed of 1 destroyer, 1 minelayer, 8 patrol ships, 7 minesweepers, 2 small hunter boats, 18 torpedo boats, 12 landing ships and 7 transports. For aviation support, 261 aircraft were allocated, 188 bombers and 73 fighters. The commander of the Naval forces was Captain First Rank A.F. Studenichnikov, and the commander of the landing party was Major General Vasily Trushin. The general command of the operation was in the hands of fleet commander Admiral I. S. Yumashev.
The Japanese had an infantry battalion, an officer's school, and a naval base in the city. During the operation, the number of Japanese troops was increased with retreating units of the Kwantung Army — first 2 infantry regiments, then the Guards Infantry Division. The Japanese troops were led in battle by the commander of the Ranan fortified area, Lieutenant-General Munekichi Nishiwaki.
Operation.
In the afternoon of August 13, 10 torpedo boats entered the port of Seishin, from which the 140th reconnaissance unit of the Pacific Fleet headquarters under the command of Lieutenant Viktor Leonov and a company of submachine gunners from the 13th Naval Infantry brigade (in total 181 men under command of Colonel A. Z. Denisin) entered the city. Leaving 2 boats for cover from the sea, the rest of the ships returned to Vladivostok.
The assault force easily occupied the port and the surrounding urban areas, taking advantage of the enemy's complete surprise. However, the Japanese soon launched a counterattack, at first disorderly and fragmented. Quite quickly, the Japanese command restored order and launched an organized offensive against the landing force. The position of the scouts immediately deteriorated : they were cut off from the coast in an unfamiliar city and the Japanese also succeeded in cutting the detachment in two. By 18:30 pm, 7 more torpedo boats landed 90 more soldiers (a machine-gun company) away from the battlefield. This unit could not break through to join the reconnaissance detachment, suffered heavy losses and was forced to conduct a defensive battle. Thus, the situation for the Soviet landing force became critical and they were threatened with annihilation.
Meanwhile, by the end of the day, the fleet commander sent 1 EK-2 sentry ship and 2 minesweepers from Vladivostok with the 355th separate battalion of marines on board, which could reach Seishin only the next day. Another major flaw was also revealed - aviation spotters were not included in the landing, so fleet aviation struck at a distance from the battlefield to avoid bombing its own troops. As such, direct air support for the landing was absent.
During the night, the paratroopers fought an extremely fierce battle in three separate groups, beating off continuous counterattacks and soon lacking ammunition.
In the morning of August 14, the detachment of ships that had left Vladivostok the previous day, reached Seishin and landed a battalion of marines (710 men under command of Major M.P. Barabolko). The battalion commander led his troops into the city and advanced 1-3 kilometers. However, by introducing fresh forces into battle and supported by the artillery fire of an armored train, the Japanese command pushed the paratroopers back to the port by the night of August 14, where they held a bridgehead 2 km along the front and 1 km deep. Only part of the battalion led a defensive battle at the piers, several more groups of soldiers were cut off from their unit and fought separately in high-rise buildings in the city. In addition, because of the lack of knowledge of the situation, the battalion had been landed too far away from all three advanced landing groups in the city and therefore could not unite with them.
The critical situation persisted. A volunteer detachment (25 men, commander of the 3 rd rank GV Ternovsky) hastily formed from the crews of the ships, landed on the shore. During the night, the Soviets had to repel 14 enemy attacks. Only thanks to exceptional courage and a high level of combat training, the Marines managed to survive. The ships that arrived in the morning remained in the harbor and supported the troops with their artillery fire. Due to the bad weather on that day, aviation was practically not used in the operation (only 2 bombers could fly to Seishin, but they had little impact). The main detachment (23 ships) left Vladivostok with the 13th Marine Brigade aboard, and at night, also the destroyer Voikov and a tank landing barge with 7 T-26 tanks sailed for Seishin.
At about 4 o'clock in the morning on August 15, the ships entered the port of Seishin and the main forces of the landing force (up to 5,000 men) began to disembark at the occupied bridgehead in the port under heavy enemy fire. The resistance of an ever-increasing adversary was so powerful that the launch of an entire brigade into battle did not lead to a turning point in the battle. Only in the middle of the day with the help of tanks and artillery fire from the ships that damaged the Japanese armored train, which was forced to leave the battlefield, the port was finally cleared from the enemy and the fighting began to take the city. By evening, the city was almost completely cleared of the Japanese, saving the surviving advanced groups of paratroopers. Stubborn fighting continued in the outskirts of the city. The commander, Lieutenant-General S. I. Kabanov, arrived at the port and assumed leadership of the operation.
In the afternoon, another detachment of ships left Vladivostok (1 destroyer, 2 minesweepers, 3 transports, one patrol and border boat), carrying the third echelon of assault forces: 615 soldiers, 60 guns and mortars, 94 cars.
Almost all the ships remained in the harbor and supported the offensive with artillery fire. The enemy tried to counteract them with fire from the still surviving coastal artillery and with attacks of individual aircraft. In the harbor of Seishin, a minesweeper was damaged by a US naval mine.
On August 16, the third echelon of the landing force was landed in the port, while two more minesweepers were significantly damaged by mines.
The fleet command, realizing that it had underestimated the enemy, was now fully building up the power of the landing force. At first, another tank landing barge with 7 T-26 tanks and 2 vehicles aboard was sent to Seishin. Then, the next detachment of ships, not initially planned, left Vladivostok : 1 patrol ship, 1 minesweeper, 6 landing craft, 1 tank landing ship, carrying the 205th infantry regiment and military equipment.
During the day, the landing forces executed a limited offensive from Seishin towards the north and north-west.
Japanese troops in the area of the city received a message about the order of the Emperor of Japan about the cessation of resistance. Although a number of units refused to lay down their arms, organized resistance had almost ceased by the end of the day. In some areas, the surrender of Japanese soldiers began.
On August 17, the ships that had left Vladivostok the previous day, arrived at the port and the landing of the troops was carried out safely. There were small skirmishes and shootouts with individual groups and subunits of the enemy. The Japanese were taken prisoner, some of their units left the front and tried to go south overland.
Around 11:30, a forward detachment of the 25th Army under command of Colonel General Ivan Chistyakov of the 1st Far Eastern Front reached the positions of the landing force.
The Seishin Landing Operation had ended.
Awards.
Several hundred soldiers and commanders were awarded. The commander of the 140th reconnaissance unit, Sr. Lt. Viktor Leonov received his second Hero of the Soviet Union on September 14, 1945. Red Army Nurse Mariya Tsukanova, who had been captured and tortured to death by the Japanese, was posthumously awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union by decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, becoming the only woman that fought in the Soviet-Japanese war to receive the title.