Battle of Glen Shiel

The Battle of Glen Shiel, or , took place on 10 June 1719 in the West Scottish Highlands, during the 1719 Jacobite Rising. A Jacobite army composed of Highland levies and Spanish marines, was defeated by British troops, reinforced by a Highland Independent Company.
The rising was backed by Spain, then engaged in the 1718 to 1720 War of the Quadruple Alliance with Britain. It was intended to support a landing in South-West England, which was cancelled several weeks before; contemporaries on both sides viewed its failure as having fatally damaged the Jacobite cause.
Glen Shiel was the only battle of the 1688 to 1746 Jacobite Risings where the Jacobites remained on the defensive, rather than employing the Highland Charge. The battlefield is included in the Inventory of Historic Battlefields in Scotland, and protected by Historic Scotland.
The mountain where the action was fought is called Sgurr na Ciste Duibhe; a subsidiary peak named Sgurr nan Spainteach, or 'Peak of the Spaniards', commemorates the Spanish marines.
Background.
When the War of the Spanish Succession ended in 1713, Spain lost its Italian possessions of Sicily and Sardinia, and their recovery was a priority for Giulio Alberoni, the Chief Minister. Sardinia was reoccupied in 1717 but when they landed on Sicily in July 1718, the Royal Navy destroyed the Spanish fleet at the Battle of Cape Passaro, beginning the War of the Quadruple Alliance.
To divert British resources from the Mediterranean, Alberoni devised a plan for 7,000 Spanish troops to land in South-West England, march on London and restore James Stuart. Historians question how serious he was; since Alberoni was one of the few contemporary statesmen with experience of amphibious operations, he was well aware of how unlikely this was. Cape Passaro demonstrated the Royal Navy's power in far less favourable circumstances, which meant the Spanish fleet was unlikely to even reach England, let alone be allowed to disembark large numbers of troops. When the Spanish fleet finally left Cádiz in March, it was battered by a ferocious storm, and took refuge in Coruña, where it remained.
The plan included a simultaneous rising in Scotland, to capture Inverness, and allow a Swedish expeditionary force to disembark. Driven by Charles XII of Sweden's dispute with Hanover, it shows the complexity caused by its ruler George I also being British monarch. Charles died in November 1718, ending any hope of Swedish support, and thus the entire purpose of the Scottish uprising.
In the end, only two frigates carrying George Keith and 300 Spanish soldiers reached Stornoway in the Isle of Lewis. Here they were joined by exiles from France, including the Earl of Seaforth, James Keith, the Marquess of Tullibardine, Lord George Murray and Cameron of Lochiel. On 13 April, they learned of the failure elsewhere; Tullibardine, who was commander of Jacobite land forces, recommended retreat, but Keith prevented this by ordering the two frigates back to Spain.
With no other option, the main force of around 1,000 Highlanders plus the Spanish troops prepared to march on Inverness, leaving their excess stores at Eilean Donan guarded by 40 Spaniards. On 10 May, a British naval squadron captured the castle, blocking any escape by sea, while Joseph Wightman's force of around 1,000 men with four Coehorn mortars advanced towards Glen Shiel. On 9 June, they reached Loch Cluanie, less than 8 miles (13 km) from the Jacobite camp.
The battle.
John Henry Bastide, a subaltern in Montague's regiment who had a long career as a military engineer drew a detailed plan of the battlefield and the movements of the opposing forces soon after the battle. The section detailing the battle itself is missing but it is possible to reconstruct the main elements.
Tullibardine prepared a strong position near the Five Sisters hills, with the Spanish in the centre and the Highlanders on the flanks behind a series of trenches and barricades. Wightman's force arrived about 4:00 pm on 10 June and began the attack an hour later by firing their mortars at the Jacobite flanking positions. This caused few casualties but the Scots had not encountered mortars before, allowing four platoons of Clayton's and Munro's to advance up the hill to their lines, then use grenades to bomb them out of their positions.
Once the Jacobite right had been dislodged, Harrison and Montague attacked the Jacobite left under Lord Seaforth. This was strongly entrenched behind a group of rocks on the hillside but skilful use of the mortars forced Seaforth's men to give way while he himself was badly wounded. Commanded by Colonel Nicolas de Castro Bolano, the Spanish in the centre stood their ground, but had to withdraw up the mountain as their flanks gave way.
The battle lasted until 9:00 pm; several accounts claim the heather caught fire and smoke combined with failing light enabled the bulk of the Scots to disappear into the night. The Spanish surrendered next morning, and as regular troops were later shipped home; Lord George Murray, Seaforth and Tullibardine were wounded but the Jacobite leaders also managed to escape. An analysis by historian Peter Simpson attributes Wightman's victory to skilful use of mortars, the superior firepower of his grenadiers and the aggression shown by his infantry.
Aftermath.
Jacobite casualties were hard to estimate since few bodies were left on the field and the wounded managed to escape, including Seaforth and Lord George Murray; Wightman lost 21 killed and 120 wounded. Lord Carpenter, commander in Scotland, advised London pursuing the rebels was impractical, and it was best to let them go, arguing the Rising had only damaged the Jacobite cause. Tullibardine concurred; in his letter of 16 June 1719 to the Earl of Mar, he provides a description of the battle, and states "it bid fair to ruin the King's Interest and faithful subjects in these parts".
In October 1719, a British naval expedition captured the Spanish port of Vigo, held it for ten days, destroyed vast quantities of stores and equipment, then re-embarked unopposed, with huge quantities of loot. This demonstration of naval power led to Alberoni's dismissal, and ended Spanish support for the Jacobites.
Senior Jacobites like Bolingbroke, Seaforth and Lord George Murray were allowed home, while others took service elsewhere. James Keith became a Prussian general, and was killed at Hochkirch in 1758. George joined the Prussian diplomatic corps; he refused to join the 1745 Rising, and was ambassador to Spain from 1759 to 1761. Although pardoned in 1763, he died in Potsdam in 1778.
Tullibardine remained in exile, took part in the 1745 Rising, and died in the Tower of London in July 1746. Lord George served as one of Prince Charles' senior commanders, and died in the Dutch Republic in October 1760.
Conservation of battlefield.
The area known as 'Spanish Hill' is now owned by the National Trust for Scotland. The stone breastworks built by the Jacobites on the northern slope are a rare example of surviving fieldworks in Britain, and designated a scheduled monument.
In advance of the 300th anniversary of the battle, the National Trust for Scotland was involved in an archaeological survey of the site. Finds included ammunition from the mortars which were deployed against the Jacobite forces.


Battle of Luzon

The Battle of Luzon (; Japanese: ルソン島の戦い) was a land battle of the Pacific Theater of Operations of World War II by the Allied forces of the U.S., its colony the Philippines, and allies against forces of the Empire of Japan. The battle resulted in a U.S. and Filipino victory. The Allies had taken control of all strategically and economically important locations of Luzon by March 1945, although pockets of Japanese resistance held out in the mountains until the unconditional surrender of Japan. While not the highest in U.S. casualties, it is the highest net casualty battle U.S. forces fought in World War II, with 192,000 to 217,000 Japanese combatants dead (mostly from starvation and disease), 8,000 American combatants killed, and over 150,000 Filipinos, overwhelmingly civilians who were murdered by Japanese forces, mainly during the Manila massacre of February, 1945.
Background.
The Philippines were considered to be of great strategic importance because their capture by Japan would pose a significant threat to the U.S. As a result, 135,000 troops and 227 aircraft were stationed in the Philippines by October 1941. However, Luzon—the largest island in the Philippines—was captured by Imperial Japanese forces in 1942. General Douglas MacArthur—who was in charge of the defense of the Philippines at the time—was ordered to Australia, and the remaining U.S. forces retreated to the Bataan Peninsula.
A few months after this, MacArthur expressed his belief that an attempt to recapture the Philippines was necessary. The U.S. Pacific Commander Admiral Chester Nimitz and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest King both opposed this idea, arguing that it must wait until victory was certain. MacArthur had to wait two years for his wish; it was 1944 before a campaign to recapture the Philippines was launched. The island of Leyte was the first objective of the campaign, which was captured by the end of December 1944. This was followed by the attack on Mindoro, and later, Luzon.
Prelude.
Before U.S. forces could launch the attack on Luzon, a base of operation needed to be established close to the island. Airbases in particular had to be established in order to provide the advancing troops with air support. Troops under Brigadier General William C. Dunckel captured the island of Mindoro, with the assistance of the 7th Fleet. By 28 December, two airbases were controlled by the U.S. and were ready to assist in the attack on Luzon, which was scheduled to be launched on 9 January 1945. With the capture of Mindoro, U.S. forces were positioned south of Luzon. However, MacArthur intended to land his forces at Lingayen, further north. This would place his troops close to several roads and railways on Luzon, which led to Manila—the main objective—through the plains in the center of the island.
Deception operations.
U.S. aircraft constantly made reconnaissance and bombing flights over southern Luzon, intending to deceive the Japanese forces into believing that the attack on Luzon would come from the south. In addition, transport aircraft were used to make parachute drops with dummies. Minesweepers were used to clear the bays of Balayan, Batangas, and Tayabas, located to the south of Luzon, and Filipino resistance fighters conducted sabotage operations in southern Luzon. These deception operations failed to convince General Yamashita, the leader of the Imperial Japanese Army in the Philippines, and he built significant defensive positions in the hills and mountains surrounding the Lingayen Gulf in Northern Luzon.
Opposing forces.
Allied.
Allied Forces, Southwest Pacific Area

General Douglas MacArthur
 US Sixth Army (193,901 officers and enlisted)

Lieutenant General Walter Krueger
Western Landing Area (Lingayen):
Eastern Landing Area (San Fabian):
Japanese.
Fourteenth Area Army

General Tomoyuki Yamashita
Northern Luzon:
Central Luzon:
Southern Luzon:
Battle.
The assault on Luzon was launched, as planned, on 9 January 1945, codenamed S-day. The Japanese forces reported more than 70 Allied warships entering the Lingayen Gulf, though the total Allied invasion force involved that month would equal close to 800 ships. Pre-assault bombardment of Japanese shore positions from roughly 70 battleships and cruisers began at 7:00. The landings were commenced an hour later. The landing forces faced strong opposition from Japanese "kamikaze" aircraft. The escort carrier was destroyed by a "kamikaze" attack, with a total of around 47 ships damaged, and four sunk, from January 3-13, primarily by kamikazes.
 Aircraft from the 3rd Fleet assisted the landings with close air support, strafing and bombing Japanese gun positions.
The landings at the Lingayen Gulf on 9 January were carried out by the 6th Army under the command of General Walter Krueger. Approximately 175,000 troops from the 6th Army landed along the beachhead within a few days, while the I Corps protected their flanks. XIV Corps under General Oscar Griswold then advanced south toward Manila, despite Krueger's concerns that his eastern flank was unprotected and vulnerable if the Japanese forces attacked. However, no such attack occurred, and the U.S. forces did not meet much resistance until they reached the Clark Air Base on 23 January. The battle there lasted until the end of January, and after capturing the base, XIV Corps advanced toward Manila.
A second amphibious landing took place on 15 January, southwest of Manila. On 31 January, two regiments of the 11th Airborne Division made an airborne assault, capturing a bridge, and later advanced toward Manila. On 3 February, the 1st Cavalry Division captured the bridge across Tullahan River leading to the city. They advanced into the city that evening, and the battle for the capture of Manila began. On 4 February, the paratroopers of the 11th Airborne—approaching the city from the south—came to the main Japanese defences south of the city of Manila where their advance was halted by heavy resistance. General Yamashita had ordered his troops to destroy all bridges and other vital installations as soon as the U.S. forces entered the city, and Japanese forces entrenched throughout the city continued to resist U.S. forces. General MacArthur announced the imminent recapture of Manila on the same day. On 11 February, the 11th Airborne Division captured the last Japanese outer defences, thus encircling the whole city. U.S. and Filipino forces carried out clearing operations in the city in the following weeks. Military casualties totalled 1,010 Americans, 3,079 Filipinos and 12,000 Japanese.
Aftermath.
Battles continued throughout the island of Luzon in the following weeks, with more U.S. troops having landed on the island. Filipino and American resistance fighters also attacked Japanese positions and secured several locations. The Allies had taken control of all strategically and economically important locations of Luzon by early March. Small groups of the remaining Japanese forces retreated to the mountainous areas in the north and southeast of the island, where they were besieged for months. Pockets of Japanese soldiers held out in the mountains—most ceasing resistance with the unconditional surrender of Japan, but a scattered few holding out for many years afterwards. Casualties were stunningly high for the Japanese. Japanese losses were 217,000 dead, with 9,050 taken prisoners. U.S. losses were far lower, with 8,310 killed and 29,560 wounded. Civilian casualties are estimated at 120,000 to 140,000 dead.


540th Bombardment Squadron


Asiatic-Pacific Theater

The Asiatic-Pacific Theater was the theater of operations of U.S. forces during World War II in the Pacific War during 1941–45. From mid-1942 until the end of the war in 1945, there were two U.S. operational commands in the Pacific. The Pacific Ocean Areas (POA), divided into the Central Pacific Area, the North Pacific Area and the South Pacific Area, were commanded by Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief Pacific Ocean Areas. The South West Pacific Area (SWPA) was commanded by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Allied Commander South West Pacific Area. During 1945, the United States added the United States Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific, commanded by General Carl A. Spaatz.
Because of the complementary roles of the United States Army and the United States Navy in conducting war in the Pacific Theater, there was no single Allied or U.S. commander (comparable to General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower in the European Theater of Operations). There was no actual command; rather, the Asiatic-Pacific Theater was divided into SWPA, POA, and other forces and theaters, such as the China Burma India Theater.


Battle of Palembang

The Battle of Palembang was a battle of the Pacific theatre of World War II. It occurred near Palembang, on Sumatra, on 13–15 February 1942. The Royal Dutch Shell oil refineries at nearby Pladju (or Pladjoe) were the major objectives for the Empire of Japan in the Pacific War, because of an oil embargo imposed on Japan by the United States, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom after the Japanese invaded China and committed massive atrocities such as the rape of Nanking. With the area's abundant fuel supply and airfield, Palembang offered significant potential as a military base to both the Allies and the Japanese.
Prelude.
In January, the American-British-Dutch-Australian Command (ABDACOM) decided to concentrate Allied air forces in Sumatra at two airfields near Palembang: Pangkalan Benteng, also known as "P1" and a secret air base at Prabumulih (Praboemoelih), or "P2".
The British Royal Air Force created No. 225 (Bomber) Group at Palembang. It included two Royal Australian Air Force squadrons and a large number of Australians serving with British squadrons. The group could only muster 40 Bristol Blenheim light bombers and 35 Lockheed Hudson light bombers. The Blenheims had flown from the Middle East and Egypt, where they were considered too old to cope with newer German and Italian fighters. (A handful of United States Far East Air Force B-17 Flying Fortress heavy bombers also operated out of Palembang briefly in January, but these were withdrawn to Java and Australia before the battle commenced.)
No. 226 (Fighter) Group RAF also arrived at Palembang in early February: two squadrons of Hawker Hurricanes transported to Sumatra by the aircraft carrier . They were joined by the remnants of British, Australian and Royal New Zealand Air Force Hurricane and Brewster Buffalo squadrons, which had both inflicted and suffered heavy losses in intense air battles over the Malayan and Singapore campaigns.
The Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (KNIL) South Sumatra Island Territorial Command, its command in the Palembang area, consisted of about 2,000 troops under Lieutenant Colonel L. N. W. Vogelesang: the South Sumatra Garrison Battalion and a "Stadswacht"/"Landstorm" ("home guard/reserve") infantry company in Palembang, a "Stadswacht"/"Landstorm" infantry company in Jambi (Djambi), as well as various artillery and machine gun units. (KNIL units in other parts of Sumatra lacked mobility and played no part in the fighting.) The Royal Netherlands Navy was represented by the minelayer "Pro Patria" and the patrol boats "P-38" and "P-40" on the Musi river.
Battle.
Airborne attack.
While the Allied planes attacked the Japanese ships on 13 February, Kawasaki Ki-56 transport planes of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd "Chutai", Imperial Japanese Army Air Force (IJAAF), dropped "Teishin Shudan" (Raiding Group) paratroopers over Pangkalan Benteng airfield. At the same time Mitsubishi Ki-21 bombers from the 98th "Sentai" dropped supplies for paratroopers. The formation was escorted by a large force of Nakajima Ki-43 fighters from the 59th and 64th "Sentai".
As many as 180 men from the Japanese 2nd Parachute Regiment, under Colonel Seiichi Kume, dropped between Palembang and Pangkalan Benteng, and more than 90 men came down west of the refineries at Pladjoe. Although the Japanese paratroopers failed to capture the Pangkalan Benteng airfield, they did manage to gain possession of the entire Pladjoe oil refinery complex undamaged. A makeshift counter-attack by "Landstorm" troops and anti-aircraft gunners from Praboemoelih managed to retake the complex but took heavy losses. The planned demolition failed to do any serious damage to the refinery, but the oil stores were set ablaze. Two hours after the first drop, another 60 Japanese paratroopers were dropped near Pangkalan Benteng airfield.
On 14 February, the surviving Japanese paratroopers advanced to the Musi, Salang and Telang rivers, near Palembang.
Amphibious assault.
The main Japanese invasion force, an amphibious assault fleet under Vice-Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), was on its way from Cam Ranh Bay in French Indochina. It was made up of the Imperial Japanese Army's 229th Infantry Regiment and one battalion from the 230th Infantry Regiment. A small advance party set out eight transports escorted by the light cruiser "Sendai" and four destroyers. The main force followed in 14 transports, escorted by the heavy cruiser "Chokai" and four destroyers. The covering force included the aircraft carrier "Ryujo", four heavy cruisers, one light cruiser and three destroyers. Additional air cover was provided by land-based IJN planes and the IJAAF 3rd Air Division.
On the morning of 13 February, a river boat commandeered by the British Royal Navy, HMS "Li Wo" — under Lieutenant Thomas Wilkinson — ferrying personnel and equipment between Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, ran into the Japanese fleet. Although "Li Wo" was armed only with a 4-inch (100 mm) gun and two machineguns, its crew fired at the Japanese troop transport ships, setting one on fire and damaging several others, while under fire from the Japanese cruisers. This action continued for 90 minutes until the "Li Wo" ran out of ammunition. Wilkinson then ordered the ramming of the nearest transport, before his ship was destroyed by Japanese fire. Wilkinson received a posthumous Victoria Cross (VC), the highest award for gallantry in the British Commonwealth, and the only VC awarded in the Dutch East Indies campaign.
On 15 February, an ABDA naval force of five cruisers, HNLMS "De Ruyter", and HNLMS "Tromp", , HMAS "Hobart" and 10 destroyers, under Admiral Karel Doorman, made an abortive attempt to intercept the Japanese force. Planes from "Ryujo" and land-based aircraft made a series of attacks on the Allied ships, forcing them to withdraw to the south of Sumatra.
As the Japanese landing force approached Sumatra, the remaining Allied aircraft attacked it, and the Japanese transport ship "Otawa Maru" was sunk. Hurricanes flew up the rivers, machine-gunning Japanese landing craft.
However, on the afternoon of 15 February, all Allied aircraft were ordered to Java, where a major Japanese attack was anticipated, and the Allied air units had withdrawn from southern Sumatra by the evening of 16 February 1942. Other personnel were evacuated via Oosthaven (now Bandar Lampung) by ships to Java or India.


Attack on Sydney Harbour

In late May and early June 1942, during World War II, submarines belonging to the Imperial Japanese Navy made a series of attacks on the cities of Sydney and Newcastle in New South Wales, Australia. On the night of 31 May – 1 June, three "Ko-hyoteki"-class midget submarines, (M-14, M-21 and M-24) each with a two-member crew, entered Sydney Harbour, avoided the partially constructed Sydney Harbour anti-submarine boom net, and attempted to sink Allied warships. Two of the midget submarines were detected and attacked before they could engage any Allied vessels. The crew of M-14 scuttled their submarine, whilst m-21 was successfully attacked and sunk. The crew of M-21 killed themselves. These submarines were later recovered by the Allies. The third submarine attempted to torpedo the heavy cruiser , but instead sank the converted ferry , killing 21 sailors. This midget submarine's fate was unknown until 2006, when amateur scuba divers discovered the wreck off Sydney's northern beaches.
Immediately following the raid, the five Japanese fleet submarines that carried the midget submarines to Australia embarked on a campaign to disrupt merchant shipping in eastern Australian waters. Over the next month, the submarines attacked at least seven merchant vessels, sinking three ships and killing 50 sailors. During this period, between midnight and 02:30 on 8 June, two of the submarines bombarded the ports of Sydney and Newcastle.
The midget submarine attacks and subsequent bombardments are among the best-known examples of Axis naval activity in Australian waters during World War II, and are the only occasion in history when either city has come under attack. The physical effects were slight: the Japanese had intended to destroy several major warships, but sank only an unarmed depot ship and failed to damage any significant targets during the bombardments. The main impact was psychological; creating popular fear of an impending Japanese invasion and forcing the Australian military to upgrade defences, including the commencement of convoy operations to protect merchant shipping.
Forces.
Japanese.
The Imperial Japanese Navy originally intended to use six submarines in the attack on Sydney Harbour: B1-type submarines , , , and , and C1-type submarines and . The six submarines made up the Eastern Attack Group of the 8th Submarine Squadron, under the command of Captain Hankyu Sasaki.
On 8 June 1942, "I-21" and "I-29"—each carrying a Yokosuka E14Y1 "Glen" floatplane for aerial reconnaissance—scouted various Australasian harbours to select the ones most vulnerable to attack by midget submarines. "I-21" scouted Nouméa in New Caledonia, Suva in Fiji, then Auckland in New Zealand, while "I-29" went to Sydney, Australia.
On 11 May, "I-22", "I-24", "I-27", and "I-28" were ordered to proceed to the Japanese naval base at Truk Lagoon, in the Caroline Islands, to each receive a "Ko-hyoteki"-class midget submarine. "I-28" failed to reach Truk; she was torpedoed on the surface by the US submarine on 17 May. The three remaining submarines left Truk around 20 May for a point south of the Solomon Islands. "I-24" was forced to return a day later when an explosion in her midget submarine's battery compartment killed the midget's navigator and injured the commander. The midget submarine intended for "I-28" replaced the damaged midget.
Allies.
The naval officer-in-charge of Sydney Harbour at the time of the attack was Rear Admiral Gerard Muirhead-Gould of the Royal Navy. On the night of the attack, three major vessels were present in Sydney Harbour; the heavy cruisers and , and the light cruiser . Other warships in the harbour included: destroyer tender , auxiliary minelayer , corvettes , , and , armed merchant cruisers and , and Dutch submarine "K-IX". A converted ferry—HMAS "Kuttabul"—was alongside at Garden Island where she served as a temporary barracks for sailors transferring between ships. The hospital ship "Oranje" had also been in the harbour, but departed an hour before the attack.
Harbour defences.
At the time of the attack, the static Sydney Harbour defences consisted of eight anti-submarine indicator loops—six outside the harbour, one between North Head and South Head, and one between South Head and Middle Head, as well as the partially constructed Sydney Harbour anti-submarine boom net between George's Head on Middle Head and Laing Point (formerly known as Green Point) on Inner South Head. The central section of the net was complete and support piles were in place to the west, but wide gaps remained on either side. Material shortages prevented the completion of the boom net prior to the attack. On the day of the attack, the six outer indicator loops were inactive; two were not functioning and there were not enough trained personnel to man both the inner and outer loop monitoring stations. The North Head – South Head indicator loop had been giving faulty signals since early 1940, and as civilian traffic regularly passed over the loop, readings were often ignored.
Harbour defence craft included the anti-submarine vessels and "Bingera"; the auxiliary minesweepers HMAS "Goonambee" and ; pleasure launches converted to channel patrol boats (and armed with depth charges), namely , "Lolita", "Steady Hour", , "Marlean", and ; and four unarmed Naval Auxiliary Patrol boats.
Prelude.
The Japanese Navy used five "Ko-hyoteki"-class midget submarines in an unsuccessful operation against US battleships during the attack on Pearl Harbor. The navy hoped that upgrades to the submarines, intensified crew training, and the selection of a less well defended target would lead to better results and an increased chance of the crews of the midgets to return alive from their mission. Therefore, on 16 December 1941, the navy initiated plans for a second midget submarine operation.
The plans called for two simultaneous attacks against Allied naval vessels in the Indian and South Pacific oceans. These attacks were intended as diversions ahead of the attack on Midway Island in the North Pacific, with the Japanese hoping to convince the Allies that they intended to attack to the south or west of their conquests. Eleven submarines of the 8th Submarine Squadron were to carry out the two attacks, the five submarines of the Western Attack Group in the Indian Ocean, and the six submarines of the Eastern Attack Group in the Pacific Ocean. The submarine groups were to select a suitable port of attack, based on their own reconnaissance.
The Western Attack Group selected the port of Diégo-Suarez in Madagascar. This attack—which occurred at nightfall on 30 May and resulted in the damaging of the battleship and the sinking of the tanker "British Loyalty"—came 22 days after the British captured the port from Vichy France at the beginning of the Battle of Madagascar.
The four potential targets for the Eastern Attack Group were Nouméa, Suva, Auckland, and Sydney. Identified by reconnaissance flights conducted by Warrant Flying Officer Nobuo Fujita of the Imperial Japanese Navy flying from "I-25"; commencing 17 February over Sydney Harbour, and the eastern Australian harbours of Melbourne and Hobart (1 March), followed by the New Zealand harbours of Wellington (8 March) and Auckland (13 March). "I-21" and "I-29" were sent to select the final target, with "I-29" sailing to Sydney. On the evening of 16 May, "I-29" fired on the Soviet merchant vessel "Wellen", from Newcastle, New South Wales. Although "Wellen" escaped with minimal damage, shipping between Sydney and Newcastle was halted for 24 hours while aircraft and all available anti-submarine ships from Sydney, including Dutch light cruiser HNLMS "Tromp", Australian destroyer and US destroyer , searched unsuccessfully for the submarine. Muirhead-Gould concluded that the submarine had operated alone and had left the area immediately after the attack.
"I-29"s floatplane made a reconnaissance flight over Sydney on 23 May. A secret radar unit set up in Iron Cove detected the flight, but authorities dismissed its report as a glitch, as there were no Allied aircraft operating over Sydney. The aircraft was damaged or destroyed on landing, although its two crew survived. They reported the presence of several capital ships, including two battleships or large cruisers, five other large warships, several minor war vessels and patrol boats, and prolific merchant shipping. The report, which the Allied FRUMEL signals intelligence network partially intercepted, resulted in the Japanese Navy selecting Sydney as the target. The three midget-carrying submarines rendezvoused with "I-29" and "I-21" approximately north-east of Sydney Heads, with all five submarines in position by 29 May.
Midget submarine operation.
Final reconnaissance.
Before dawn on 29 May, "I-21"s floatplane, piloted by Ito Susumu, performed a final reconnaissance flight over Sydney Harbour, with the mission of mapping the locations of the major vessels and of the anti-submarine net. Multiple observers spotted the floatplane but assumed it was a US Navy Curtiss Seagull. No alarm was raised until 05:07, when it was realised that the only ship in the area carrying Seagulls was the U.S. cruiser "Chicago", and all four of her aircraft were on board. Richmond Air Force Base launched RAAF Wirraway fighters, which failed to locate "I-21" or the floatplane. Therefore, the reconnaissance flight did not result in the authorities in Sydney taking any special defence measures. The floatplane was seriously damaged on landing and had to be scuttled, but both aircrew survived.
Plan of attack.
The Japanese planned to launch the midgets one after the other between 17:20 and 17:40, from points outside Sydney Harbour. The first midget was to pass through the Heads just after 18:30, but heavy seas delayed her by over an hour. The other two midgets followed at twenty-minute intervals and were similarly delayed.
The choice of targets was left up to the midget commanders, with advice that they should primarily target aircraft carriers or battleships, with cruisers as secondary targets. The midgets were to operate to the east of the Harbour Bridge, although if no suitable targets were to be found in this area they were to move under the Bridge and attack a battleship and large cruiser believed to be in the inner harbour. When the second reconnaissance flyover revealed that the expected British battleship——was nowhere to be found, USS "Chicago" became the priority target.
After completing their mission, the midgets were to depart Sydney Harbour and head south for to the recovery point off Port Hacking. Four of the mother submarines would be waiting in an east–west line long, with the fifth waiting further south.
Attack.
Midget submarine "M-14"—launched from "I-27"—was the first to enter Sydney Harbour. The Middle Head – South Head loop detected it at 20:01, but dismissed the reading due to heavy civilian traffic. At 20:15, a Maritime Services Board watchman spotted the midget after it passed through the western gap, collided with the Pile Light, then reversed and trapped its stern in the net. The submarine's bow broke the surface; the watchman rowed toward it to determine what it was and then rowed to the nearby patrol boat to report his finding. Despite efforts by "Yarroma" to pass on this information, Sydney Naval Headquarters did not receive the report until 21:52. HMAS "Yarroma" and were dispatched to investigate. Upon confirming that the object in the net was a "baby submarine", "Lolita" dropped two depth charges while "Yarroma"s commander requested permission from Sydney Naval Headquarters to open fire. The depth charges failed to detonate, as the water was too shallow for the hydrostatic fuse setting. At 22:35, while "Yarroma" was waiting for permission to fire, and "Lolita" was setting up to deploy a third depth charge, the two crewmen on "M-14" activated one of the submarine's scuttling charges, killing themselves and destroying the submarine's forward section.
Muirhead-Gould gave the general alarm, along with orders for ships to take anti-submarine measures, at 22:27; the alarm was repeated at 22:36 with advice for ships to take precautions against attack, as an enemy submarine might be in the harbour. At the time of the first alarm, Sydney Harbour was closed to external traffic, but Muirhead-Gould ordered ferries and other internal traffic to continue, as he believed that having multiple ships travelling around at speed would help force any submarines to remain submerged.
Midget submarine "M-24" was the second to enter the harbour. HMAS "Falie" grazed "M-24"s hull and reported the contact to command. The report was not followed up. "M-24" crossed the indicator loop undetected at 21:48, and at approximately 22:00 followed a Manly ferry through the anti-submarine net. At 22:52, "M-24" was spotted by a "Chicago" searchlight operator less than to the moored cruiser's starboard, and on a course roughly parallel to the ship's facing. "Chicago" opened fire with a gun and a quadruple machinegun mount, but inflicted minimal damage as the weapons could not depress far enough. Some of the shells skipped off the water and hit Fort Denison's Martello tower, while fragments were later found in the suburbs of Cremorne and Mosman. The senior officer present aboard "Chicago" ordered the crew to begin preparing for departure, and for USS "Perkins" to begin an anti-submarine screening patrol around the cruiser, orders that were revoked by the sceptical Captain Howard Bode when he arrived on board at around 23:30.
 and also fired upon "M-24" as it fled west toward the Sydney Harbour Bridge, before the midget was able to submerge and escape. When it returned to periscope depth, the midget found itself west of Fort Denison. It turned and sailed east for about , then took up a firing position south-west of Bradley's Head, from where its commander could see "Chicago"s stern silhouetted against the construction floodlights at Garden Island's new Captain Cook Graving Dock.
Midget submarine "M-21"—from "I-22"—probably entered the harbour at the same time that USS "Chicago" opened fire on "M-24". The unarmed Naval Auxiliary Patrol boat "Lauriana" (later commissioned HMAS "Lauriana") spotted "M-21" and illuminated the submarine's conning tower, while sending an alert signal to the Port War Signal Station at South Head, and the nearby anti-submarine vessel HMAS "Yandra". "Yandra" attempted to ram the submarine, lost contact, regained contact at 23:03, and fired a full pattern of six depth charges. At the time of the attack, it was assumed that the depth charges had destroyed or disabled the midget, but "M-21" survived. Historians believe that the midget took refuge on the harbour floor and waited until the Allied vessels had moved away before it resumed the attack.
At 23:14, Muirhead-Gould ordered all ships to observe blackout conditions. Just after 23:30, he set off on a barge towards the boom net, to make a personal inspection. The Admiral reached "Lolita" at about midnight and indicated to her crew that he did not take the reports of enemy submarines seriously, reportedly saying: "What are you all playing at, running up and down the harbour dropping depth charges and talking about enemy subs in the harbour? There's not one to be seen." The crew reiterated that a submarine had been seen, but Muirhead-Gould remained unconvinced and before he left, added sarcastically: "If you see another sub, see if the captain has a black beard. I'd like to meet him."
Despite the blackout order, the Garden Island floodlights remained on until 00:25. About five minutes later, "M-24" fired the first of its two torpedoes; it delayed firing the second torpedo for several minutes as the midget submarines would lose longitudinal stability immediately after firing a torpedo. Historians are divided as to the exact paths of the torpedoes relative to "Chicago", although all agree that the US cruiser was the intended target. Both torpedoes missed "Chicago", while one torpedo may have also passed close to "Perkins"' starboard bow. One of the torpedoes continued underneath the Dutch submarine "K-IX" and HMAS "Kuttabul", then hit the breakwater "Kuttabul" was tied up against. The explosion broke "Kuttabul" in two and sank her, and damaged "K-IX". The attack killed 19 Royal Australian Navy and two Royal Navy sailors, and wounded another 10. The explosion shook residences in the area and damaged Garden Island's lights and telecommunications. The other torpedo ran aground on the eastern shore of Garden Island without exploding. "M-24" then dived and moved to leave the harbour.
A crossing over the indicator loop that was recorded at 01:58 was initially believed to be another midget submarine entering the harbour, although later analysis showed that the reading indicated an outbound vessel and was therefore most likely represented "M-24"s exit. "M-24" did not return to its mother submarine, and its fate remained unknown until 2006.
Ships were ordered to make for the open ocean. "Chicago" left her anchorage at 02:14, leaving a sailor behind on the mooring buoy in her haste to depart. "Bombay", "Whyalla", "Canberra", and "Perkins" began their preparations to depart.
Just before 03:00, as "Chicago" was leaving the harbour, the lookouts spotted a submarine periscope passing alongside the cruiser. At 03:01, the indicator loop registered an inbound signal; "M-21" was re-entering Sydney Harbour after recovering from the attack four hours previously. fired on "M-21" in Neutral Bay at 03:50, and at 05:00, three auxiliary patrol boats—HMAS "Steady Hour", "Sea Mist", and "Yarroma"—spotted the submarine's conning tower in Taylors Bay. The patrol boats had set their depth charge fuses to , and when "Sea Mist" passed over where the submarine had just submerged and dropped a depth charge, she had only five seconds to clear the area. The blast damaged "M-21", which inverted and rose to the surface before sinking again. "Sea Mist" dropped a second depth charge, which damaged one of her two engines in the process and prevented her from making further attacks. "Steady Hour" and "Yarroma" continued the attack, dropping seventeen depth charges on believed visual sightings and instrument contacts of the midget over the next three and a half hours. At some point during the night, the crew of "M-21" killed themselves.
At 04:40, HMAS "Canberra" recorded that the Japanese may have fired torpedoes at her. This may have been one of many false alarms throughout the night. However, "M-21" had attempted to fire its two torpedoes, but failed because of damage to the bow either from HMAS "Yandra"s ramming or depth charges, or a possible collision with USS "Chicago", making it possible that "M-21" attempted to attack the cruiser. The observer aboard "Canberra" may have seen bubbles from the compressed air released to fire the torpedoes.
Secondary missions.
As per the operation plan, the five mother submarines waited off Port Hacking on the nights of 1 and 2 June for the midget submarines to return. FRUMEL picked up wireless traffic between the five submarines, leading the RAAF to task three Lockheed Hudsons and two Bristol Beauforts with finding the source of the communications. They were unsuccessful. On 3 June, Sasaki abandoned hope of recovering the midget submarines, and the submarines dispersed on their secondary missions.
Attacks on Allied merchant shipping.
Four of the submarines began operations against Allied merchant shipping. "I-21" patrolled north of Sydney, while "I-24" patrolled south of Sydney. "I-27" began searching off Gabo Island for ships departing Melbourne, and "I-29" travelled to Brisbane. "I-22" left the group to conduct reconnaissance operations, first at Wellington and Auckland in New Zealand, and then at Suva in Fiji.
Between 1 and 25 June, when the four submarines arrived at Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands to re-supply before proceeding to Japanese shipyards for maintenance, the four submarines attacked at least seven Allied merchant vessels. Three of these were sunk: "Iron Chieftain" by "I-24" on 3 June, "Iron Crown" by "I-27" on 4 June, and "Guatemala" by "I-21" on 12 June. The first two attacks resulted in 12 and 37 fatalities respectively, though the third attack killed no one. The attacks forced the authorities to institute changes in merchant traffic; travel north of Melbourne was restricted until a system of escorted convoys was established.
"I-21" was the only submarine to return to Australian waters, where she sank three ships and damaged two others during January and February 1943. During her two deployments, "I-21" sank of Allied shipping, which made her the most successful Japanese submarine to operate in Australian waters.
Bombardment.
On the morning of 8 June, "I-24" and "I-21" briefly bombarded Sydney and Newcastle. Just after midnight, "I-24" surfaced south-south-east of Macquarie Lighthouse. The submarine's commander ordered the gun crew to target the Sydney Harbour Bridge. They fired 10 shells over a four-minute period; nine landed in the Eastern Suburbs and one landed in water. "I-24" then crash dived to prevent successful retaliation by coastal artillery batteries. Only one shell detonated, and the only injuries inflicted were cuts and fractures from falling bricks or broken glass when the unexploded shells hit buildings. A United States Army Air Forces pilot, 1st Lieutenant George Cantello, based at Bankstown Airport disobeyed orders and took off to try and locate the source of the shelling, but was killed when engine failure caused his Airacobra to crash in a paddock at Hammondville. In 1988, following efforts by residents and the US Consulate in Sydney, the City of Liverpool established a memorial park, the Lt. Cantello Reserve, with a monument in his honour.
At 02:15, "I-21" shelled Newcastle, from north-east of Stockton Beach. She fired 34 shells over a 16-minute period, including eight star shells. The target of the attack was the BHP steelworks in the city. However, the shells landed over a large area, causing minimal damage and no fatalities: the only shell to detonate damaged a house on Parnell Place, while an unexploded shell hit a tram terminus. Fort Scratchley returned fire, the only time an Australian land fortification has fired on an enemy warship during wartime, but the submarine escaped unscathed.
Analysis.
The attack on Sydney Harbour ended in failure on both sides, and revealed flaws in both the Allied defences and the Japanese tactics. During the primary attack, the Japanese lost all three midget submarines in exchange for the sinking of a single barracks ship. The subsequent operations were no more successful as the five large Japanese submarines sank only three merchant ships and caused minimal property damage during the two bombardments. The performance of the Allied defenders was equally poor. However, one historian states that the lack of damage in Sydney Harbour was due to "a combination of good luck and aggressive counter-attack".
The main impact of the midget submarine attack and subsequent operations was psychological; dispelling any belief that Sydney was immune to Japanese attack and highlighting Australia's proximity to the Pacific War. There was no official inquiry into the attacks, despite demand from some sections of the media, as there was concern that an inquiry would lead to defeatism and reduce faith in John Curtin's government, particularly after the damaging inquiry into Australian defences that had followed the Japanese aerial attack on Darwin three months earlier.
Failures in Allied defences.
The Allies failed to respond adequately to several warnings of Japanese activity off the east coast of Australia prior to the attack; they simply ignored the warnings or explained them away. They attributed the unsuccessful attack on the freighter "Wellen" on 16 May to a single submarine, and assumed it had departed Australian waters immediately after the attack. The first reconnaissance flight went unnoticed, and although FRUMEL intercepted the report and distributed it to Allied commanders on 30 May, Muirhead-Gould apparently did not react. New Zealand naval authorities detected radio chatter between the Japanese submarines on 26 and 29 May, and although they could not decrypt the transmissions, radio direction finding indicated that a submarine or submarines were approaching Sydney. The Allies considered dispatching an anti-submarine patrol in response to the 29 May fix, but were unable to do so as all anti-submarine craft were already committed to protecting a northbound troop convoy. The only response to the second reconnaissance flight on 29 May was the launching of search planes. No other defence measures were put into place. Although the midget attack on Diego Suarez in Madagascar occurred on the morning of 31 May (Sydney time), the Allies sent no alert to other command regions, as they believed that Vichy French forces had launched the attack.
Historians have questioned the competence of the senior Allied officers. Muirhead-Gould had been hosting a dinner party on the night of the attack, and one of the main guests was the senior United States Navy officer in Sydney Harbour, Captain Howard Bode of USS "Chicago". Both officers were sceptical that any attack was taking place. Muirhead-Gould arrived aboard HMAS "Lolita" at approximately midnight, an action he described as attempting to learn about the situation. But members of "Lolita"'s crew later recounted that when Muirhead-Gould came aboard he immediately chastised the patrol boat's skipper and crew, and quickly dismissed their report. Junior officers on "Chicago" provided similar descriptions of Bode's return on board, and members of both crews later claimed that Muirhead-Gould and Bode were intoxicated. It was only after the destruction of HMAS "Kuttabul" that both officers began to take the attack seriously.
During the attack, there were several delays between events and responses to them. Over two hours passed between the observation of "M-14" in the boom net and Muirhead-Gould's first order for ships to commence anti-submarine actions. It took another two hours to mobilise the auxiliary patrol boats, which did not leave their anchorage for a further hour. Part of these delays was due to a lack of effective communications. None of the auxiliary patrol craft in the harbour had radio communications, so all instructions and reports came from signal lights via the Port War Signal Station or Garden Island, or by physical communication via launches. In Muirhead-Gould's preliminary report on the attack, he stated that the Port War Signal Station was not designed for the volume of communications traffic the attack caused. Telephone communications with Garden Island were unreliable during the early part of the attack, and then the first torpedo explosion disabled them completely.
The need to keep information secret may also have contributed to the delays and the defenders' scepticism. As the auxiliary patrol boat crews, the indicator loop staff, and other personnel manning defensive positions would have been outside 'need to know' and would not have been informed about any of the incidents prior to the attack, they would not have been alert, contributing to the disbelief demonstrated in the early hours of the attack.
Flaws in Japanese tactics.
The main flaw in the Japanese plans was the use of midget submarines for the primary attack. Midget submarines were originally intended to operate during fleet actions: they would be released from modified seaplane carriers to run amok through the enemy fleet. This concept went out of favour as changing Japanese naval thinking and experience led to recognition that naval warfare would centre around carrier-supported aerial combat. As a result, the midget program's focus changed to the infiltration of enemy harbours, where they would attack vessels at anchor. This concept failed completely during the attack on Pearl Harbor, where the midgets had no effect, and tying up 11 large submarines for six weeks in support of further midget submarine attacks on Sydney and Diego Suarez proved a waste of resources.
Moreover, the failures at Sydney Harbour and Diego Suarez demonstrated that the improvements to the midget submarines made after Pearl Harbor had not increased the overall impact of the midget program. The modifications had various effects. The ability to man and deploy the midgets while the mother ships were submerged prevented the Army coastal radars from detecting the mother submarines. However, the midgets were still difficult to control, unstable, and prone to surfacing or diving uncontrollably. These manoeuvrability issues contributed to "M-14"s entanglement in the anti-submarine net, and the repeated detection of "M-21" and "M-24".
Beyond the use of the unreliable midgets, historians have identified areas in the plan of attack where the Japanese could have done significantly more damage. If the Japanese midget submarines had conducted a simultaneous, co-ordinated attack, they would have overwhelmed the defences. A chance for more damage came following the destruction of "Kuttabul", when several naval vessels headed to sea, including USS "Chicago", USS "Perkins", Dutch submarine "K-IX", HMAS "Whyalla", and HMIS "Bombay". The five mother submarines were already en route to the Port Hacking recovery position, and although Sasaki's plan at Pearl Harbor had been to leave some submarines at the harbour mouth to pick off fleeing vessels, he did not repeat this tactic.
USS "Chicago"s survival.
Several factors beyond the control of any of the combatants contributed to the survival of USS "Chicago". At the time of "M-24"s attack on "Chicago", the latter had spent some time preparing to depart from Sydney Harbour, and although still moored and stationary, was producing large volumes of white smoke as the boilers warmed up. This smoke, streaming aft under the influence of the wind, and contrasting against the dark, low-lying cloud, may have given the impression that "Chicago" was moving, causing "M-24" to lead the target when firing its torpedoes, and consequently sending its torpedoes across the bow. Another factor that may have influenced "Chicago"s survival was the extinguishing of Garden Island's floodlights minutes before "M-24" fired its first torpedo, impeding targeting.
Bombardment impact.
The bombardments failed to cause significant physical damage, but had a major psychological impact on the residents of Sydney and Newcastle. Due to the inaccuracy of the submarines' range-finding equipment, coupled with the unstable firing platform of a submarine at sea, specific targeting was impossible. The intention of the submarine bombardment was to frighten the population of the target area.
The failure of the majority of the shells to detonate may have had various causes. As the submarines fired armour-piercing shells, intended for use against steel ship hulls, the relatively softer brick walls may have failed to trigger the impact fuses. Sea water may have degraded the shells, which the Japanese had stored in deck lockers for several weeks. The age of the shells may also have been a factor; some of the shells recovered from the Newcastle bombardment were found to be of English manufacture: surplus munitions from World War I.
In Sydney, fear of an impending Japanese invasion caused people to move west; housing prices in the Eastern Suburbs dropped, while those beyond the Blue Mountains rose significantly. The attack also led to a significant increase in the membership of volunteer defence organisations, and strengthening of defences in Sydney Harbour and Port Newcastle.
Aftermath.
The papers did not publish news of the submarine attack until 2 June, as most of the attack occurred after the newspapers went to press on the morning of 1 June. Instead, on the morning after the attack, the front pages carried news of Operation Millennium, the Royal Air Force's first 1,000-bomber raid, although several newspapers included a small interior article mentioning the final reconnaissance flyover. The Federal Censor ordered total censorship of the events, issuing an official statement on the afternoon of 1 June which reported that the Allies had destroyed three submarines in Sydney Harbour, and described the loss of "Kuttabul" and the 21 deaths as the loss of "one small harbour vessel of no military value". "Smith's Weekly" finally released the real story on 6 June, and follow-up material in 13 June issue caused more political damage, prompting the Royal Australian Navy to attempt to charge the newspaper with releasing defence information.
It was several days before the 21 dead sailors aboard "Kuttabul" could all be recovered. On 3 June, Muirhead-Gould and over 200 Navy personnel attended a burial ceremony for these sailors. On 1 January 1943, the Navy base at Garden Island was commissioned as in commemoration of the ferry and the lives lost.
The Australians recovered the bodies of the four Japanese crew of the two midget submarines sunk in Sydney Harbour and had them cremated at Eastern Suburbs Crematorium. For the cremation, the Allies draped the Japanese flag over each coffin and rendered full naval honours. Muirhead-Gould was criticised for this, but defended his actions as respecting the courage of the four submariners, regardless of their origin. Australian politicians also hoped that the Japanese Government would notice the respect paid to the sailors and improve the conditions Australian prisoners-of-war were experiencing in Japanese internment camps. Japanese authorities noted the funeral service, but this did not lead to any major improvement in conditions for Australian POWs. Following the use of the midget submariners' funeral by the Japanese for propaganda purposes, the Australian High Command forbade similar funerals for enemy personnel in the future.
An exchange of Japanese and Allied diplomatic personnel stranded in the opposing nations occurred in August 1942, which allowed Tatsuo Kawai, the Japanese ambassador to Australia, to return home with the ashes of the four Japanese submariners. When the exchange ship "Kamakura Maru" arrived in Yokohama, several thousand people were present to honour the four men.
The two main targets of the attack, USS "Chicago" and HMAS "Canberra", were both lost within the next year: "Canberra" sinking on 9 August 1942 during the Battle of Savo Island, and "Chicago" on 30 January 1943 following the Battle of Rennell Island. None of the Japanese submarines involved in the attack survived the war. and sank "I-21" on 5 February 1944 off the Marshall Islands. An American torpedo boat sank "I-22" on 25 December 1942 off New Guinea. An American patrol craft sank "I-24" on 10 June 1943 near the Aleutian Islands. and sank "I-27" on 12 February 1943 off the Maldives. Lastly, sank "I-29" on 26 July 1944 in the Philippines.
"M-14" and "M-21".
The Allies located and recovered "M-21" on 3 June and "M-14" on 8 June. Although both were damaged during the attack, it was possible to assemble a complete submarine from the two vessels. The centre section of the rebuilt submarine was mounted on a trailer and taken on a tour throughout southern New South Wales, Victoria, and western South Australia. The purpose of the tour was twofold; it allowed Australians to see a Japanese midget submarine up close, and was used to raise A£28,000 for the Naval Relief Fund and other charities. The submarine arrived at the Australian War Memorial in Canberra on 28 April 1943, flying the White Ensign and a paying-off pennant. The submarine was originally displayed outside the museum in three separate pieces, but was moved inside in the 1980s due to heavy vandalism; on one occasion in 1966, a group of university students painted it bright yellow in response to The Beatles' song "Yellow Submarine." The composite submarine was restored and remains on display inside the Memorial as part of a permanent exhibition on the attack, next to the recovered wheelhouse of HMAS "Kuttabul".' The conning tower from "M-21" is on display at the Royal Australian Navy Heritage Centre on Garden Island. Leftover material from "M-21" was melted down and made into souvenirs following the construction of the combined vessel.
"M-24".
Over the 64 years following the disappearance of "M-24" after the attacks, more than 50 people approached the Royal Australian Navy claiming to have found the submarine. All of these claims were found to be false. One early theory about the midget's fate was that it was damaged or destroyed, along with "M-21", in or around Taylors Bay, which would account for reports from "Steady Hour" and "Yarroma" of multiple submarines during their three-hour attack against "M-21". A second theory was that the midget attempted to return to the mother submarines but exhausted its battery power before reaching the Port Hacking recovery point and would therefore be outside and to the south of Sydney Heads. The third theory was that the midget's crew decided to avoid endangering the five larger submarines during the recovery process, and either ran straight out to sea or headed north.
A group of seven amateur scuba divers solved the mystery in November 2006, when they found a small submarine sitting upright on the seabed, below sea level and approximately from Bungan Head, off Sydney's Northern Beaches. Commander Shane Moore, the officer responsible for the Royal Australian Navy's heritage collection, confirmed that the wreck was "M-24" after viewing footage from multiple dives, along with measurements the group had taken. The wreck had several bullet holes in it, most likely from "Chicago"s quadruple machine-gun mount. The location of the wreck was kept secret by both the divers and the navy, with Defence Minister Brendan Nelson promising to have the wreck protected as a war grave. The wreck was gazetted on 1 December 2006 as a heritage site. A exclusion zone was established around the wreck site, and any vessel entering the zone is liable to a fine under New South Wales law of up to A$1.1 million, with additional fines and confiscation of equipment under Commonwealth law. Shore- and buoy-mounted surveillance cameras and a sonar listening device further protect the site.
On 7 February 2007, during JMSDF Admiral Eiji Yoshikawa's visit to Australia, Yoshikawa and RAN Vice Admiral Russ Shalders presided over a ceremony held aboard to honour "M-24"s crew. Relatives of the midget submarines' crews, one of the survivors from "Kuttabul", and dignitaries and military personnel from Australia and Japan attended another ceremony on 6 August 2007 at HMAS "Kuttabul". then carried relatives of "M-24"s crew to the wreck site, where they poured sake into the sea before being presented with sand taken from the seabed around the submarine.
In May 2012, the NSW state government announced that, with the approval of the Japanese government and the submariners' families, divers would be allowed to observe the "M-24" wreck for a short period of time. Divers would enter a ballot for places on controlled dives run on several days. If successful, opening the site would become an annual event to commemorate the attack.


Desert Training Center

The Desert Training Center (DTC), also known as California–Arizona Maneuver Area (CAMA), was a World War II training facility established in the Mojave Desert and Sonoran Desert, largely in Southern California and Western Arizona in 1942.
Its mission was to train United States Army and Army Air Forces units and personnel to live and fight in the desert, to test and develop suitable equipment, and to develop tactical doctrines, techniques and training methods.
It was a key training facility for units engaged in combat during the 1942–1943 North African campaign. It stretched from the outskirts of Pomona, California eastward to within 50 miles of Phoenix, Arizona, southward to the suburbs of Yuma, Arizona and northward into the southern tip of Nevada.
History.
This simulated theater of operation was the largest military training ground in the history of military maneuvers. A site near Shavers Summit (now known as Chiriaco Summit) between Indio and Desert Center, was selected as the headquarters of the DTC. The site, called Camp Young, was the world's largest army post.
Major General George S. Patton Jr. came to Camp Young as the first commanding general of the DTC. As a native of southern California, Patton knew the area well from his youth and from having participated in army maneuvers in the Mojave Desert in the 1930s. His first orders were to select other areas within the desert that would be suitable for the large-scale maneuvers necessary to prepare American soldiers for combat against the German Afrika Korps in the North African desert.
Patton and his advanced team designated various locations within the area where tent camps would be built. The camps were situated so that each unit could train individually without interfering with the other. Airfields, hospitals, supply depots and sites for other support services were selected as was a corps maneuvering area. The plan was that each division and or major unit would train in its own area, and near the end of its training period would participate in a corps (two divisions or more) exercise in the corps maneuvering area at Palen Pass. Upon completion of the corps exercise, the trained units would leave the DTC, and new units would arrive to begin their training and the process repeated.
By March 1943, the North African campaign was in its final stages and the primary mission of the DTC had changed. By the middle of 1943, the troops who originally came for desert training maneuvers, were now deployed worldwide. Therefore, to reflect that change in mission, the name of the center was changed to the California-Arizona Maneuver Area (C-AMA or CAMA). The CAMA was to serve as a theater of operations to train combat troops, service units and staffs under conditions similar to those which might be encountered overseas. The CAMA was enlarged to include both a communications zone and combat zone, approximately 350 miles wide and 250 miles long. Due to a severe deficit of service units beginning in the winter of 1943, it was decided that maneuvers in CAMA would cease as of 15 April 1944, with internal operations continuing until 1 May, after which the center would be officially discontinued.
Mohave Maneuver Area C.
In May of 1964 part of the former Desert Training Center was reacquired for the purpose of Exercise Desert Strike. The former Mohave Maneuver Area C was included in this area and used as part of the training ground for the two-week exercise. The exercise had large maneuvers and some river crossing training. Mohave Maneuver Area C was 781,452 acres located in Mohave County, Arizona.
Present day sites.
Most of the sites can be visited, but some are difficult to reach. In most cases the only things that remain at the camp sites are streets, sidewalks, building foundations, patterns of hand-laid rocks for various purposes and trash dumps.
Monuments have been erected at some of the camp sites and there are areas within CAMA that are fenced off with danger signs warning of unexploded ordnance.
The General George S. Patton Memorial Museum is located near the former entrance of Camp Young.
California Historical Landmark.
California Historical Landmarks Marker at Desert Training Center sites reads:
Camp Pilot Knob – Imperial
Camp Young – Riverside
Camp Granite – Riverside
Camp Coxcomb – Riverside
Camp Iron Mountain – San Bernardino
Camp Clipper – San Bernardino
Camp Ibis – San Bernardino


USS Hornet (CV-8)

USS "Hornet" (CV-8), the seventh U.S. Navy vessel of that name, was a of the United States Navy. During World War II in the Pacific Theater, she launched the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo and participated in the Battle of Midway and the Buin-Faisi-Tonolai Raid. In the Solomon Islands campaign, she was involved in the capture and defense of Guadalcanal and the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands where she was irreparably damaged by enemy torpedo and dive bombers. Faced with an approaching Japanese surface force, "Hornet" was abandoned and later torpedoed and sunk by approaching Japanese destroyers. "Hornet" was in service for a year and six days and was the last US fleet carrier ever sunk by enemy fire. For these actions, she was awarded four service stars, a citation for the Doolittle Raid in 1942, and her Torpedo Squadron 8 received a Presidential Unit Citation for extraordinary heroism for the Battle of Midway. Her wreck was located in late January 2019 near the Solomon Islands.
Construction and commissioning.
Because of the cap on aggregate aircraft carrier tonnage included in the Washington Naval Treaty and subsequent London treaties, the United States had intended to build two "Yorktowns" and use up the remaining allocated tonnage with a smaller, revised version of the same design, which eventually became . However, with war looming in Europe, and the repudiation of the naval limitation treaties by Japan and Italy, the Navy's General Board decided to lay down a third carrier to the "Yorktown" design immediately - followed by the first carrier of the follow-on CV-9 ("Essex") class when that design was finalized; authorization from Congress came in the Naval Expansion Act of 1938.
"Hornet" had a length of at the waterline and overall. She had a beam of at the waterline, overall, with a draft of as designed and at full load. She displaced at standard load and at full load. She was designed for a ship's crew consisting of 86 officers and 1280 men and an air complement consisting of 141 officers and 710 men.
She was powered by nine Babcock & Wilcox boilers providing steam at and to four Parsons Marine geared steam turbines each driving its own propeller. The turbines were designed to produce a total of giving her a range of at a speed of . She was designed to carry of fuel oil and of Avgas. Her designed speed was . During sea trials, she produced and reached .
"Hornet" was equipped with eight /38 caliber dual purpose guns and 16 /75 caliber antiaircraft guns in quad mounts (four guns operating together). Originally, she had 24 M2 Browning machine guns but these were replaced in January 1942 with 30 20-mm Oerlikon antiaircraft cannon. An additional quad mount was later added at her bow and two more 20 mm antiaircraft guns were added for a total of 32 mounts. In addition, her athwartships hangar-deck aircraft catapult was removed. In June 1942, following the battle of Midway, "Hornet" had a new CXAM radar installed atop her tripod mast, and her SC radar was relocated to her mainmast. Unlike her sisters, "Hornet"s tripod mast and its signal bridge were not enclosed when the CXAM was installed, making her unique among the three ships.
For armor, she had an armor belt of special treatment steel (STS) that was thick. The flight and hangar decks had no armor but the protective deck had of STS. Bulkheads had armor while the conning tower had 30–16 mm splinter pro armor on the sides with on top. The steering gear had protection on the sides with 60–16 mm on the deck.
Her flight deck was and her hangar deck was and high. She had three aircraft elevators each with a lifting capacity of . She had two flight-deck and one hangar-deck hydraulic catapults and equipped with Mark IV Mod 3A arresting gear with a capability of and . She was designed to host a Carrier Air Group of 18 fighters, 18 bombers, 37 scout planes, 18 torpedo bombers, and 6 utility aircraft.
"Hornet" was laid down on 25 September 1939 by Newport News Shipbuilding of Newport News, Virginia and was launched on 14 December 1940, sponsored by Annie Reid Knox, wife of Secretary of the Navy Frank M. Knox. She was commissioned at Naval Station Norfolk on 20 October 1941, with Captain Marc A. Mitscher in command.
Service history.
During the period before the attack on Pearl Harbor, "Hornet" trained out of Norfolk. A hint of a future mission occurred on 2 February 1942, when "Hornet" departed Norfolk with two Army Air Forces B-25 Mitchell medium bombers on deck. Once at sea, the planes were launched to the surprise and amazement of "Hornet"s crew. Her men were unaware of the meaning of this experiment, as "Hornet" returned to Norfolk, prepared to leave for combat, and on 4 March sailed for the West Coast via the Panama Canal.
Doolittle Raid, April 1942.
"Hornet" arrived at Naval Air Station Alameda, California, on 20 March 1942. With her own planes on the hangar deck, by midafternoon on 1 April, she loaded 16 B-25s on the flight deck. Under the command of Lieutenant Colonel James H. Doolittle, 70 United States Army Air Corps officers and 64 enlisted men reported aboard. In company of her escort, "Hornet" departed Alameda on 2 April under sealed orders. That afternoon, Captain Mitscher informed his men of their mission: a bombing raid on Japan.
Eleven days later, "Hornet" joined the aircraft carrier at Midway, and Task Force 16 turned toward Japan. With "Enterprise" providing combat air patrol cover, "Hornet" was to steam deep into enemy waters. Originally, the task force intended to proceed to within of the Japanese coast; however, on the morning of 18 April, a Japanese patrol boat, "No. 23 Nitto Maru", sighted the American task force. sank the patrol boat. Amid concerns that the Japanese had been made aware of their presence, Doolittle and his raiders launched prematurely from out, instead of the planned . Because of this decision, none of the 16 planes made it to their designated landing strips in China. After the war, it was found that Tokyo received the "Nitto Maru"'s message in a garbled form and that the Japanese ship was sunk before it could get a clear message through to the Japanese mainland.
As "Hornet" came about and prepared to launch the bombers, which had been readied for take-off the previous day, a gale of more than churned the sea with crests; heavy swells, which caused the ship to pitch violently, shipped sea and spray over the bow, wet the flight deck, and drenched the deck crews. The lead plane, commanded by Colonel Doolittle, had only of flight deck, while the last B-25 hung its twin rudders far out over the fantail. Doolittle, timing himself against the rise and fall of the ship's bow, lumbered down the flight deck, circled "Hornet" after take-off, and set course for Japan. By 09:20, all 16 were airborne, heading for the first American air strike against the Japanese home islands.
"Hornet" brought her own planes on deck as Task Force 16 steamed at full speed for Pearl Harbor. Intercepted broadcasts, both in Japanese and English, confirmed at 14:46 the success of the raids. Exactly one week to the hour after launching the B-25s, "Hornet" sailed into Pearl Harbor. That the Tokyo raid was the "Hornet"s mission was kept an official secret for a year; until then, President Roosevelt referred to the ship from which the bombers were launched only as "Shangri-La." Two years later, the Navy would give this name to an aircraft carrier.
"Hornet" steamed from Pearl Harbor on 30 April to aid and at the Battle of the Coral Sea, but the battle ended before she reached the scene. On 4 May Task Force 16 crossed the equator, the first time ever for "Hornet". After executing, with "Enterprise", a feint towards Nauru and Banaba (Ocean) islands which caused the Japanese to cancel their operation to seize the two islands, she returned to Hawaii on 26 May, and sailed two days later to help repulse an expected Japanese assault on Midway.
Battle of Midway, June 1942.
On 28 May 1942, "Hornet" and Task Force 16 steamed out of Pearl Harbor heading for Point "Luck," an arbitrary spot in the ocean roughly northeast of Midway, where they would be in a flank position to ambush Japan's mobile strike force of four frontline aircraft carriers, the "Kidō Butai". Japanese carrier-based planes were reported headed for Midway in the early morning of 4 June. "Hornet", "Yorktown", and "Enterprise" launched aircraft, just as the Japanese carriers struck their planes below to prepare for a second attack on Midway. "Hornet" dive bombers followed an incorrect heading and did not find the enemy fleet. Several bombers and all of the escorting fighters were forced to ditch when they ran out of fuel attempting to return to the ship. 15 torpedo bombers of Torpedo Squadron 8 (VT-8) found the Japanese ships and attacked. They were met by overwhelming fighter opposition about out, and with no escorts to protect them, they were shot down one by one. Ensign George H. Gay, USNR, was the only survivor of 30 men.
Further attacks by "Enterprise" and "Yorktown" torpedo planes proved equally disastrous, but succeeded in forcing the Japanese carriers to keep their decks clear for combat air patrol operations, rather than launching a counter-attack against the Americans. Japanese fighters were shooting down the last of the torpedo planes over when dive bombers of "Enterprise" and "Yorktown" attacked, causing enormous fires aboard the three other Japanese carriers, ultimately leading to their loss. "Hiryu" was hit late in the afternoon of 4 June by a strike from "Enterprise" and sank early the next morning. "Hornet" aircraft, launching late due to the necessity of recovering "Yorktown" scout planes and faulty communications, attacked a battleship and other escorts, but failed to score hits. "Yorktown" was lost to combined aerial and submarine attack.
"Hornet"s warplanes attacked the fleeing Japanese fleet on 6 June and they assisted in sinking the heavy cruiser , damaging a destroyer, and leaving the heavy cruiser , heavily damaged and on fire, to limp away from the battle zone. The attack by "Hornet" on the "Mogami" ended one of the great decisive battles of naval history. Midway Atoll was saved as an important base for American operations into the Western Pacific Ocean. Of greatest importance was the crippling of the Japanese carrier strength, a severe blow from which the Imperial Japanese Navy never fully recovered. The four large carriers took with them to the bottom about 250 naval aircraft and a high percentage of the most highly trained and experienced Japanese aircraft maintenance personnel. The victory at Midway was a decisive turning point in the War in the Pacific.
On 16 June 1942, Captain Charles P. Mason became commanding officer of "Hornet" upon her return to Pearl Harbor. "Hornet" spent the next six weeks replenishing her stores, having minor repairs performed, and most importantly: Having additional light anti-aircraft guns and the new RCA CXAM air-search radar fitted. She did not sail in late July with the forces sent to re-capture Guadalcanal, but instead remained at Pearl Harbor in case she was needed elsewhere.
Solomons campaign, August–October, 1942.
"Hornet" steamed out of harbor on 17 August 1942 to guard the sea approaches to the bitterly contested Guadalcanal in the Solomon Islands. Bomb damage to "Enterprise" on 24 August, torpedo damage to on 31 August, and the sinking of on 15 September left "Hornet" as the only operational U.S. carrier in the South Pacific. She was responsible for providing air cover over the Solomon Islands until 24 October 1942, when she was joined by "Enterprise" just northwest of the New Hebrides Islands. These two carriers and their escorts then steamed out to intercept a Japanese aircraft carrier/battleship/cruiser force closing in on Guadalcanal.
Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands.
The Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands took place on 26 October 1942 without contact between surface ships of the opposing forces. That morning, "Enterprise"s planes bombed the carrier , while planes from "Hornet" severely damaged the carrier and the heavy cruiser . Two other cruisers were also attacked by "Hornet"s warplanes. Meanwhile, "Hornet" was attacked by a coordinated dive bomber and torpedo plane attack. In a 15-minute period, "Hornet" was hit by three bombs from Aichi D3A "Val" dive bombers. One "Val," after being heavily damaged by anti-aircraft fire while approaching "Hornet", crashed into the carrier's island, killing seven men and spreading burning aviation gas (Avgas) over the deck. Meanwhile, a flight of Nakajima B5N "Kate" torpedo planes attacked "Hornet" and scored two hits, which seriously damaged the electrical systems and engines. As the carrier came to a halt, another damaged "Val" deliberately crashed into "Hornet"'s port side near the bow.
With power knocked out to her engines, "Hornet" was unable to launch or land aircraft, forcing its aviators to either land on "Enterprise" or ditch in the ocean. Rear Admiral George D. Murray ordered the heavy cruiser to tow "Hornet" clear of the action. Since the Japanese planes were attacking "Enterprise", this allowed "Northampton" to tow "Hornet" at a speed of about . Repair crews were on the verge of restoring power when another flight of nine "Kate" torpedo planes attacked. Eight of these aircraft were either shot down or failed to score hits, but the ninth scored a fatal hit on the starboard side. The torpedo hit destroyed the repairs to the electrical system and caused a 14-degree list. After being informed that Japanese surface forces were approaching and that further towing efforts were futile, Vice Admiral William Halsey ordered "Hornet" sunk, and an order of "abandon ship" was issued. Captain Mason, the last man on board, climbed over the side, and the survivors were soon picked up by the escorting destroyers.
American warships next attempted to scuttle the stricken carrier, which absorbed nine torpedoes, many of which failed to explode, and more than 400 rounds from the destroyers and . The destroyers steamed away when a Japanese surface force entered the area. The Japanese destroyers and finally finished off "Hornet" with four Long Lance torpedoes. At 01:35 on 27 October, "Hornet" was finally sunk with the loss of 140 of her 2,200 sailors.
Legacy.
"Hornet" was struck from the Naval Vessel Register on 13 January 1943. However, her name was revived less than a year later when the newly constructed "Kearsarge" was commissioned as . CV-8 is honored aboard her namesake, which is now the USS "Hornet" Museum docked in Alameda, California.
"Hornet" was the last American fleet carrier CV ever sunk by enemy fire, albeit the light carrier and a number of much smaller escort carriers were sunk in combat in other battles.
Wreck discovered.
In late January 2019, the research vessel located the wreck at a depth of more than off the Solomon Islands. The expedition team, largely funded by Paul Allen, aboard the "Petrel" used information from the archives of nine other U.S. warships that saw the carrier shortly before it was sunk. One of two robotic vehicles aboard the "Petrel" found the "Hornet" during its first dive mission. The carrier lies upright on the ocean floor, with her signal bridge and a section of her stern that broke away coming to rest around her.
Awards.
"Hornet" was awarded four battle stars during World War II.
In addition, Torpedo Squadron 8 flying from "Hornet" was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation. "for extraordinary heroism and distinguished service beyond the call of duty" during the Battle of Midway.


6th Canadian Infantry Division

The 6th Canadian Infantry Division was an infantry division of the Canadian Army, formed in 1942 during the Second World War. It was attached to Pacific Command. The division had a brigade sent to the Aleutian Islands Campaign, particularly at Kiska, but never saw action. The 6th Division was to have been part of a proposed Commonwealth Corps, formed for a planned invasion of Japan, but was disbanded in 1945, after the war was ended by the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
History.
The 6th was raised as part of a home-defence scheme in Canada, the culmination of various mobilizations throughout 1941 and 1942. The 6th was raised in March 1942 with its headquarters on Vancouver Island in British Columbia. Various composite units were stationed at Port Alberni, Vancouver Island and Vernon. Throughout 1943, the division lost its artillery units to coastal defence work, and other battalions were shipped overseas. In June 1943, these units were sent to Kiska only to find the island abandoned, and in late 1943, the 7th Canadian Infantry Division was disbanded and various battalions were amalgamated into the 6th. By January 1944, the units had returned from Kiska, having not taken part in any fighting. On 1 December 1944, the need for coastal defence having lessened, it was decided that the division should be disbanded.
However, planning for a proposed Allied invasion of Japan called for a Canadian division to be a component of a combined Commonwealth Corps. Disbandment of the 6th halted and it was re-formed as the main component of the Canadian Army Pacific Force, with the inclusion of units that served with other divisions.
The re-formed division was commanded by Major General Bert Hoffmeister and its primary units were named after the components of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division. However, its battalions were to be organized along the lines of a US Army infantry division and would be equipped primarily with US-made weapons, vehicles and equipment.
Following the surrender of Japan, the division's disbandment continued. The remaining units were disbanded by 31 January 1945.


Operation Seagull II

Operation Seagull II ("Unternehmen Möve II" or ""SeeMöve"" in German) was an Abwehr II. sanctioned mission planned in June 1942 as a refinement of Operation Seagull I. The plan envisioned in Seagull II was to use an Irish Abwehr agent ("V-Manner"), who would parachute into the area of south-east of Ballycastle in Northern Ireland, recruit a sabotage team from any willing IRA personnel in the area, and attack important "targets of opportunity" in the immediate vicinity. Both operations were to be controlled by radio and with each sabotage team in Ireland and Scotland liaising with each other via radio contact.
Agents involved and failure of mission.
The agent selected for Seagull II was James Brady aka. "Agent Metzger". Brady was a native of Strokestown in Roscommon, Ireland who had been stationed in Norway with the British Army. He had been captured by the German Army after they occupied the Channel Islands on 30 June 1940. At the time of the invasion he had been in jail on Guernsey convicted of the attempted murder of a British police officer. Following his capture he was detained in Stalag XX A (301) where he came into contact with fellow Irishmen, possibly including IRA member Frank Ryan under his pseudonym "Mr. Richards". Brady was recruited by the Abwehr around mid 1941 and subsequently issued a South American passport under the identity of "de Lacy." In preparation for the Seagull II mission Brady underwent a series of intensive Abwehr supervised training courses including a radio course at the Abwehr school at Stettin.
Following the completion of their training both agents- Brady for Seagull II and Andrew Walsh aka. "Agent Vickers" for Seagull I were to fly to occupied Norway and prepare for their flight aboard a Focke-Wulf Fw 200 Condor to their dropzone. Shortly before takeoff to Norway, Haller received a call from Abwehr II HQ in Berlin who ordered him to return to Berlin with both of the Irish agents immediately. On arrival it was explained that prior to their takeoff for Norway, Andrew Walsh had been overheard confiding to fellow POW Thomas Cushing that he planned to turn himself into the police on landing in England after hiding the money the Abwehr had given him for operational funds. Cushing had informed on Walsh and both were arrested by the Gestapo. After this, Operation Seagull I was permanently cancelled.
Military context.
Operation Seagull II was planned in tandem with Operation Seagull I, its genesis can be seen in the context of 1940 - 1941 Abwehr successes in recruiting agents from POW Irish nationals held at Stalag XX A (301), sometimes referred to as "Friesack Camp". The overall focus of the Abwehr was intelligence gathering but there was a great deal of latitude at the regional planning level in the Abwehr's structure. This led to a series of missions which with the benefit of hindsight appear to be entirely flawed.
The agent taking part in Seagull II would have found a rich target environment in Northern Ireland. The presence of US Army Troops from early 1942 onwards, and the activities of the RAF operating from the region would have presented targets the Abwehr were interested in hurting. However, IRA assistance in the operation may have been harder to come by. By 1942 the organisation had all but been destroyed in Éire, and the complete failure of the IRA Northern Command's Northern Campaign, (September - December 1942), demonstrated that the organisation was entirely curtailed by wartime restrictions, internment, and in Northern Ireland, the activities of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and British Army. It is fair to say that Abwehr staff both at regional Ast level and in Berlin were largely unaware of the problems the IRA faced, and its overall ineffectiveness as an organisation or guerilla force.
Involvement of the IRA.
There was no involvement or prior knowledge of Operation Seagull II by the IRA in Ireland, although it is possible that Frank Ryan, an IRA member located/stranded in Germany and working with the Abwehr, was aware of the mission.


Taihoku Air Strike

The Taihoku Air Strike () was an air raid by the military of the Republic of China against the metropolitan perimeter of Taihoku (modern-day Taipei), the capital of Japanese Taiwan, during January 1938. The raid was the first attack on Imperial Japanese territory during the course of World War II, and one of the few offensive operations conducted by China directly against Japan during the course of the war.
Operation.
The Taihoku Air Strike Operation was conducted by the Republic of China Air Force, using a squadron of nine Martin 139 bombers. The aircraft were deployed from an airfield in either Chekiang or Fukien province, and flew uncontested over the Taiwan Strait. Once over metropolitan Taihoku, the aircraft dropped leaflets, or according to some sources made a minor bombing strike, and successfully returned to the mainland, under Japanese antiaircraft fire. Contemporary newspaper accounts stated that eight people were killed and 25 were wounded.
While achieving little militarily, this represented the first instance of an air raid over Japanese territory, preceding the Doolittle raid against Tokyo by four years.
One foreign eyewitness, American diplomat George H. Kerr, described the air raid to the foreign press, and mentioned that as a result, sand barricades were built around important government and commerce buildings, anti-aircraft guns were deployed, and internal security strengthened against possible fifth column activity by the local ethnic Chinese population.