Battle of Leyte

The Battle of Leyte (Filipino: "Labanan sa Leyte"; Waray: "Gubat ha Leyte;" Japanese: レイテの戦い) in the Pacific campaign of World War II was the amphibious invasion of the island of Leyte in the Philippines by American forces and Filipino guerrillas under the overall command of General Douglas MacArthur, who fought against the Imperial Japanese Army in the Philippines led by General Tomoyuki Yamashita. The operation, codenamed "King Two", launched the Philippines campaign of 1944–45 for the recapture and liberation of the entire Philippine Archipelago and to end almost three years of Japanese occupation.
Background.
Japan had conquered the Philippines in 1942. Controlling it was vital for Japan's survival in World War II because it commanded sea routes to Borneo and Sumatra by which rubber and petroleum were shipped to Japan.
For the U.S., capturing the Philippines was a key strategic step in isolating Imperial Japan's military holdings in China and the Pacific theater. It was also a personal matter of pride for MacArthur. In 1942, just a month before Japan forced the surrender of all USAFFE forces in the Philippines, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had ordered MacArthur to leave the Philippines and organize the U.S. forces gathering in Australia, which were meant to relieve the USAFFE. Those relief forces were non-existent; Roosevelt's true intentions in ordering MacArthur to flee the Philippines had been to prevent his capture by the Japanese. Still, MacArthur had vowed that he would return to the Philippines. He repeatedly stated that it was a moral obligation of the U.S. to liberate the Philippines as soon as possible. In March 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered MacArthur to plan an attack on the southern Philippines by the end of the year, and Luzon in early 1945. In July 1944, Roosevelt met with MacArthur and Chester Nimitz in Hawaii, where the decision was made to invade the Philippines, from which land air bases could be used for the Pacific Theater of Operations.
Over the summer of 1944, planes from the aircraft carriers of the U.S. 3rd Fleet under Admiral William F. Halsey carried out several successful missions over the Philippines and found Japanese resistance lacking. Halsey then recommended a direct strike on Leyte, canceling other planned operations, and the Leyte invasion date moved forward to October.
Leyte, one of the larger islands of the Philippines, has numerous deep-water approaches and sandy beaches which offered opportunities for amphibious assaults and fast resupply. The roads and lowlands extending inland from Highway 1, that ran for along the east coast between Abuyog town to the north and the San Juanico Strait between Leyte and Samar Islands, provided avenues for tank-infantry operations, as well as suitable ground for airfield construction. American air forces based on Leyte could strike at enemy bases and airfields anywhere in the archipelago.
A heavily forested north–south mountain range dominates the interior and separates two sizable valleys, or coastal plains. The larger Leyte Valley extends from the northern coast to the long eastern shore and contains most of the towns and roadways on the island. The other, Ormoc Valley, situated on the west side, was connected to Leyte Valley by a roundabout and winding road, Highway 2; it ran from Palo town on the east coast, then west and northwest through Leyte Valley to the north coast, it then turned south and wound through a mountainous neck to enter the northern Ormoc Valley. This continued south to the port of Ormoc City, then along the western shore to Baybay town. The road then turned east to cross the mountainous waist of the island and it connected with Highway 1 on the east coast at Abuyog. Below these towns, the mountainous southern third of Leyte was mostly undeveloped. High mountain peaks over , as well as the jagged outcroppings, ravines, and caves typical of volcanic islands offered formidable defensive opportunities. The timing late in the year of the assault would force combat troops and supporting pilots, as well as logistical units, to contend with monsoon rains.
Leyte's population of over 900,000 people—mostly farmers and fishermen—could be expected to assist an American invasion, since many residents already supported the guerrilla struggle against the Japanese in the face of harsh repression. Japanese troop strength on Leyte was estimated by U.S. intelligence at 20,000; mostly of the 16th Division under Lieutenant General Shiro Makino.
Opposing forces.
American order of battle.
Southwest Pacific Area
General Douglas MacArthur in light cruiser "Nashville"
US Seventh Fleet
Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid in amphibious command ship "Wasatch"
Allied Air Forces
Lieutenant General George C. Kenney, USAAF
 US Sixth Army
Lieutenant General Walter Krueger
 X Army Corps (Northern Landing Area)
Lieutenant General Franklin C. Sibert
 XXIV Army Corps (Southern Landing Area)
Lieutenant General John R. Hodge
Japanese order of battle.
Southern Army (Southeast Asia)
Field Marshal Count Hisaichi Terauchi at Manila
Air Forces
Fourteenth Area Army
General Tomoyuki Yamashita
Battle.
Landings.
Preliminary operations for the Leyte invasion began at dawn on 17 October 1944, with minesweeping tasks and the movement of the 6th Rangers toward three small islands in Leyte Gulf. Although delayed by a storm, the Rangers were on Suluan and Dinagat islands by 0805. On Suluan, they dispersed a small group of Japanese defenders and destroyed a radio station, while they found Dinagat unoccupied. The third island, Homonhon, was taken without any opposition the next day. On Dinagat and Homonhom, the Rangers proceeded to erect navigation lights for the amphibious transports to follow. Meanwhile, reconnaissance by underwater demolition teams revealed clear landing beaches for assault troops on Leyte. Independently, the 21st Infantry Regiment on 20 October landed on Panaon Strait to control the entrance to Sogod Bay.
Following four hours of heavy naval gunfire on A-day, 20 October, Sixth Army forces landed on assigned beaches at 10:00. X Corps pushed across a stretch of beach between Tacloban airfield and the Palo River. to the south, XXIV Corps units came ashore across a strand between San José and the Daguitan River. Troops found as much resistance from swampy terrain as from Japanese fire. Within an hour of landing, units in most sectors had secured beachheads deep enough to receive heavy vehicles and large amounts of supplies. Only in the 24th Division sector did enemy fire force a diversion of follow-up landing craft. But even that sector was secure enough by 13:30 to allow Gen. MacArthur to make a dramatic entrance through the surf onto Red Beach and announce to the populace the beginning of their liberation: "People of the Philippines, I have returned! By the grace of Almighty God, our forces stand again on Philippine soil."
By the end of A-day, the Sixth Army had moved inland and five miles wide. In the X Corps sector, the 1st Cavalry Division held Tacloban airfield, and the 24th Infantry Division had taken the high ground on Hill 522 commanding its beachheads. In the XXIV Corps sector, the 96th Infantry Division held the approaches to Catmon Hill, and the 7th Infantry Division held Dulag and its airfield.
General Makino spent the day moving his command post from Tacloban, inland to the town of Dagami. The initial fighting was won at a cost of 49 killed, 192 wounded, and six missing. The Japanese counterattacked the 24th Infantry Division on Red Beach through the night, unsuccessfully.
Campaign in the Leyte Valley.
The Sixth Army made steady progress inland against sporadic and uncoordinated enemy resistance on Leyte in the next few days. The 1st Cavalry Division of Maj. Gen. Verne D. Mudge secured the provincial capital, Tacloban, on 21 October, and Hill 215 the next. On 23 October, Gen. MacArthur presided over a ceremony to restore civil government to Leyte. 1st and 2nd Cavalry Brigades initiated a holding action to prevent a Japanese counterattack from the mountainous interior, after which the 1st Cavalry was allowed to move on. The 8th Cavalry established itself on Samar by 24 Oct, securing the San Juanico Strait.
On the X Corps left, the 24th Infantry Division under Maj. Gen. Frederick A. Irving, drove inland into heavy enemy resistance. After days and nights of hard fighting and killing some 800 Japanese, the 19th and 34th Infantry Regiments expanded their beachhead and took control of the high ground commanding the entrance to the northern Leyte Valley. By 1 November, after a seven-day tank-infantry advance supported by artillery fire, both regiments had pushed through Leyte Valley and were within sight of the north coast and the port of Carigara, which the 2nd Cavalry Brigade occupied the next day after Suzuki ordered a withdrawal. In its drive through Leyte Valley, the 24th Division inflicted nearly 3,000 enemy casualties. These advances left only one major port on Leyte—Ormoc City on the west coast—under Japanese control.
From the XXIV Corps beachhead Gen. Hodge had sent his two divisions into the southern Leyte Valley, which already contained four airfields and a large supply center. Maj. Gen. James L. Bradley's 96th Infantry Division was to clear Catmon Hill, a promontory, the highest point in both corps beachheads, and used by the Japanese as an observation and firing post to fire on landing craft approaching the beach on A-day. Under cover of incessant artillery and naval gunfire, Bradley's troops made their way through the swamps south and west of the high ground at Labiranan Head. After a three-day fight, the 382nd Infantry Regiment took a key Japanese supply base at Tabontabon, inland, and killed some 350 Japanese on 28 October. Simultaneously two battalions each from the 381st Infantry Regiment and 383rd Infantry Regiments slowly advanced up opposite sides of Catmon Hill and battled the fierce Japanese resistance. When the mop-up of Catmon Hill was completed on 31 October, the Americans had cleared 53 pillboxes, 17 caves, and several heavy artillery positions.
On the left of XXIV Corps, the 7th Infantry Division under Maj. Gen. Archibald V. Arnold moved inland against the Japanese airfields of San Pablo 1 and 2, Bayug, and Buri, using "flying wedges" of American tanks, the 767th Tank Battalion, which cleared the way for the infantrymen. Between Burauen and Julita, the 17th Infantry overcame fanatical but futile resistance from Japanese soldiers concealed in spider holes, who placed satchel charges on the hulls of the American tanks. A mile north, 32nd Infantry soldiers killed more than 400 Japanese at Buri airfield. While two battalions of the 184th Infantry patrolled the corps' left flank, the 17th Infantry, with the 184th's 2nd Battalion attached, turned north toward Dagami, above Burauen. Using flamethrowers to root the enemy out of pillboxes and a cemetery, US troops captured Dagami on 30 October, which forced Gen. Makino to evacuate his command post further westward. Meanwhile, on 29 October, the 32nd Infantry's 2nd Battalion, preceded by the 7th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, moved south along the east coast to Abuyog for a probe of the area, and then over the next four days patrolled west through the mountains to Baybay, all without opposition.
Japanese counterattacks.
With 432,000 Japanese soldiers in the Philippines, General Yamashita decided to make Leyte the main effort of the Japanese defense, and on 21 October, ordered the 35th Army to coordinate a decisive battle with the Imperial Japanese Navy. The 16th Division was to be reinforced by the 30th Infantry Division from Mindanao, landing on Ormoc Bay. The 102nd Infantry Division would occupy Jaro, where the 1st and 26th Infantry Divisions were concentrating. Battalions from the 55th and 57th Independent Mixed Brigades were on Leyte by 25 Oct.
As the Sixth Army pushed deeper into Leyte, the Japanese struck back in the air and at sea. On 24 October, some 200 enemy aircraft approached American beachheads and shipping from the north. Fifty American land-based aircraft rose to intercept them, and claimed to have shot down between 66 and 84 of the attackers. Day and night air raids continued over the next four days, damaging supply dumps ashore and threatening American shipping. But by 28 October, counterattacks by US aircraft on Japanese airfields and shipping on other islands so reduced enemy air strength that conventional air raids ceased to be a major threat. As their air strength diminished, the Japanese resorted to the deadly "kamikazes", a corps of suicide pilots who crashed their bomb-laden planes directly into US ships. They chose the large American transport and escort fleet that had gathered in Leyte Gulf on A-day as their first target and sank one escort carrier and badly damaged many other vessels.
A more serious danger to the US forces developed at sea. The Imperial Japanese Navy's high command decided to destroy US Navy forces supporting the Sixth Army by committing its entire remaining surface fleet to a decisive battle with the Americans. The Imperial Navy's plan was to attack in three major task groups. One, which included four aircraft carriers with few aircraft aboard, was to act as a decoy, luring the US 3rd Fleet north away from Leyte Gulf. If the decoy was successful, the other two groups, consisting primarily of heavy surface combatants, would enter the gulf from the west and attack the American transports.
On 23 October, the approach of the enemy surface vessels was detected. US naval units moved out to intercept, and the air and naval Battle of Leyte Gulf—the largest naval battle in the Pacific and also one of the largest naval battles in history—was fought from 23 to 26 October—the Japanese suffered a decisive defeat. Nonetheless by 11 December, the Japanese had succeeded in moving more than 34,000 troops to Leyte and over of materiél, most through the port of Ormoc on the west coast, despite heavy losses to reinforcement convoys, including engagements at Ormoc Bay, because of relentless air interdiction missions by US aircraft.
Advance Towards the Ormoc Valley.
The Japanese reinforcement presented severe problems for both Krueger and MacArthur. Instead of projected mopping up operations after clearing the east side of Leyte, the Sixth Army had to prepare for extended combat in the mountains on its western side, which included landing three reserve divisions on Leyte, this pushed MacArthur's operations schedule for the Philippine campaign back and the War Department's deployment plans in the Pacific.
Gen. Krueger planned a giant pincer operation to clear Ormoc Valley, with X Corps forces moving south, and XXIV Corps units pushing north from Baybay. To overcome the expected increased resistance, especially in the mountain barrier to the north, Krueger mobilized his reserve forces, the 32nd and 77th Infantry Divisions, while MacArthur activated the 11th Airborne Division. The 21st RCT pulled out from the Panaon area to rejoin the 24th Division and were replaced by a battalion of the 32nd Infantry. On 3 November, the 34th Infantry Regiment moved out from west of Carigara to sweep the rest of the northern coast before turning south into the mountains. The 1st Battalion soon came under attack from a ridge along the highway. Supported by the 63rd Field Artillery Battalion, the unit cleared the ridge, and the 34th Infantry continued unopposed that night through the town of Pinamopoan, recovering numerous heavy weapons abandoned by the enemy, then halted at the point where Highway 2 turns south into the mountains.
Battles of Breakneck and Kilay Ridges.
On 7 November 21 Infantry went into its first sustained combat on Leyte when it moved into the mountains along Highway 2, near Carigara Bay. The fresh regiment, with the 19th Infantry's 3rd Battalion attached, immediately ran into strong defenses of the newly arrived Japanese 1st Division, aligned from east to west across the road and anchored on a network of fighting positions built of heavy logs and interconnecting trench lines and countless spider holes, which became known as "Breakneck Ridge" to the Americans, or the "Yamashita Line" to the Japanese. General Krueger ordered the 1st Cavalry to join the 24th Infantry Division in the attack south, and the X and XXIV Corps (96th Infantry Division) to block routes through the central mountain range, anticipating General Suzuki's renewed attack with the arrival of his 26th Infantry Division. Additionally the XXIV Corps had the 7th Infantry Division in Baybay. Plus, Krueger had access to the 32nd and 77th Infantry Divisions, and the 11th Airborne Division, which MacArthur was staging in Leyte in preparation of the Luzon invasion.
A typhoon began on 8 November, and the heavy rain that followed for several days further impeded American progress. Despite the storm and high winds, which added falling trees and mud slides to enemy defenses and delayed supply trains, the 21st Infantry continued its slow and halting attack, with companies often having to withdraw and recapture hills that had been taken earlier. The Americans seized the approaches to Hill 1525 to the east, enabling Irving to stretch out the enemy defenses further across a front along Highway 2. After five days of battling against seemingly impregnable hill positions and two nights of repulsing enemy counterattacks proved fruitless, Irving decided on a double envelopment of the enemy defenders.
On the east, the 19th Infantry's 2nd Battalion, under Lt. Col. Robert B. Spragins, swung east around Hill 1525 behind the enemy right flank, cutting back to Highway 2, south of 'Breakneck Ridge', blocking the Japanese supply line. On the west, Irving sent the 34th Infantry's 1st Battalion under Lt. Col. Thomas E. Clifford, over water from the Carigara area to a point west of the southward turn of Highway 2, and moved it inland. This amphibious maneuver was made in eighteen LVTs of the 727th Amphibian Tractor Battalion. After crossing a ridge line and the Leyte River, they approached the enemy left flank at on Kilay Ridge, the highest terrain behind the main battle area. Both battalions reached positions only about apart on opposite sides of the highway by 13 November despite strong opposition and heavy rains. The Americans were aided by the 1st Battalion, 96th Philippine Infantry, a local guide who "owned" Kilay Ridge, and Filipinos carrying supplies.
It took Clifford's men two weeks of struggle through mud and rain—often dangerously close to friendly mortar and artillery fire—to root the Japanese out of fighting positions on the way up Kilay Ridge. On 2 December Clifford's battalion finally cleared the heights overlooking the road, and 32nd Division units quickly took over. Clifford's outfit suffered 26 killed, 101 wounded and two missing, in contrast to 900 Japanese dead. For their arduous efforts against Kilay Ridge and adjacent areas, both flanking battalions received Presidential Unit Citations. Clifford and Spragins both received the Distinguished Service Cross for their actions. It was not until 14 December that the 32nd Division finally cleared the Breakneck–Kilay Ridge area, and linked up with the 1st Cavalry Division on 19 Dec, placing the most heavily defended portions of Highway 2 between Carigara Bay and the Ormoc Valley under X Corps control.
Throughout this phase, American efforts had become increasingly hampered by logistical problems. Mountainous terrain and impassable roads forced Sixth Army transportation units to improvise resupply trains of Navy landing craft, tracked landing vehicles, airdrops, artillery tractors, trucks, even carabaos and hundreds of barefoot Filipino bearers. The 727th Amphibian Tractor Battalion made daily, often multiple, trips with ammunition and rations between Capoocan and Calubian. From Calubian, the 727th tractors would navigate the Naga River to Consuegra and then traverse overland to Agahang. On their return trip, they would evacuate the casualties. Not surprisingly, the complex scheduling slowed resupply as well as the pace of assaults, particularly in the mountains north and east of Ormoc Valley and subsequently in the ridgelines along Ormoc Bay.
Battle of Shoestring Ridge.
In mid-November XXIV Corps had the 32nd Infantry Regiment, under the command of Lt. Col. John M. Finn in western Leyte, and 7th Division remnants securing Burauen, but the arrival of the 11th Airborne Division on 22 November allowed Gen. Hodge to move the rest of the 7th Division to the west. On the night of 23 November the 32nd Infantry suddenly came under attack by the Japanese 26th Division along the Palanas River. The regiment's 2nd Battalion was pushed back off Hill 918 to a defensive position along the highway together with their artillery base, which consisted of Batteries A and B of the 49th Field Artillery Battalion and Battery B of the USMC 11th 155mm Gun Battalion. Gen. Arnold earlier had placed the 2nd Battalion, 184th Infantry, as a reserve for just such a counterattack. Also, a platoon of tanks from the 767th Tank Battalion was stationed at Damulaan. Battery C, 57th Field Artillery Battalion, arrived the next day. That night, the night of 24 November, Japanese attacks put four pieces of Battery B out of action. The 2nd Battalion, 184th Infantry was then released by Gen. Arnold to Col. Finn. The defensive battle for 'Shoestring Ridge', so named to reflect the supply situation, continued until 29 November, when US troops were able to take the offensive. During their failed attacks of the previous days, the Japanese under the command of Col. Saito had committed six infantry battalions.
Battle of the Ridges.
Gen. Arnold finally began his advance toward Ormoc with a novel tactic. On the night of 4 December, vehicles of the 776th Amphibian Tank Battalion put to sea and leapfrogged south along the Leyte coast and positioned themselves west of Balogo. On 5 Dec, the tanks moved to within of the shore and fired into the hills in front of the advancing 17th and 184th Infantry. This tactic proved effective, greatly disorganizing the defenders, except where ground troops encountered enemy pockets on reverse slopes inland, shielded from the offshore tank fire. The 7th Division pushed north with two regiments which encountered heavy enemy fire coming from Hill 918, from which the entire coast to Ormoc City could be observed. By 8 Dec, the American forces had taken Hills 918, 380 and 606, plus the surrounding ridges. By 12 December, Gen. Arnold's lead battalion was less than south of Ormoc City.
Battle of the Airfields.
While Gen. Arnold moved closer to Ormoc, on 6 December, the Japanese made a surprise attack on the Buri Airfield with the 16th, combined with 250 paratroopers of the 2nd Raiding Brigade, the "Takachiho Paratroopers". At the time, the 11th Airborne Division, commanded by General Joseph May Swing defended the Burauen area. The Japanese aimed to recapture eastern Leyte airstrips and use them for their own planes. Descending Japanese paratroopers were "cut to shreds by the antiaircraft and field artillery units," according to one American artillery officer.
Although poorly coordinated – only one battalion of the Japanese 26th Infantry Division reached the battlefield – the enemy attack yielded the seizure of some abandoned weapons which they managed to use against the Americans over the next four days. The 11th Airborne Division, supported by the 149th Infantry, 38th Infantry Division, and the 382nd Infantry, 96th Infantry Division, plus hastily mustered groups of support and service troops, eventually contained the attack, and turned the tide by 9 Dec. With a few American supply dumps and aircraft on the ground destroyed and construction projects delayed, the enemy attacks on the airfields failed to have any effect on the overall Leyte Campaign. Gen. Suzuki ordered a retreat so he could deal with the American landing at Ormac, but with only 200 men returning, the 16th Division ceased to exist.
Fall of Ormoc.
Meanwhile, on the western side of Leyte, the XXIV Corps received reinforcements on 7 December with the landing of the 77th Infantry Division under Maj. Gen. Andrew D. Bruce south of Ormoc City. The 77th Division's 305th and 307th Infantry Regiments came ashore at 0700 unopposed, supported by a company from the 776th Amphibian Tank Battalion. However, Admiral Arthur D. Struble's naval convoy was subjected to "kamikaze" air attacks, fifty-five aircraft making sixteen raids. Yet, the arrival of the 77th Division proved decisive. This enabled the 7th Division to resume its march north, and the enemy defenders were quickly squeezed between the two forces.
Moving north, the 77th Division faced strong opposition at Camp Downes, a prewar Philippine constabulary post. Supported by the newly arrived 306th Infantry Regiment, plus the 902nd and 305th Field Artillery Battalions, Gen. Bruce's troops pushed through and beyond Camp Downes on 9 Dec, and entered Ormoc City on 10 December. The 7th and 77th Infantry Divisions linked up the next day.
In its final drive, US troops killed some 1,506 enemy and took seven prisoners while sustaining 123 killed, 329 wounded and 13 missing. With Ormoc City captured, the XXIV Corps and X Corps were only apart. In between at Cogan, the last enemy salient with its defenses anchored on a concrete blockhouse, north of Ormoc, and held by the 12th Independent Infantry Regiment, resisted the Americans for two days. On 14 December, the 305th Infantry closed on the stronghold, aided by heavy artillery barrages and employing flamethrowers and armored bulldozers. Hand-to-hand combat and the inspiring leadership of Medal of Honor awardee Captain Robert B. Nett cleared the enemy from the blockhouse area, while the leading Company, E, of the 2nd Battalion, 305th Infantry moved forward through intense fire and killed several Japanese soldiers.
Westward march to the coast.
After breaking out of Ormoc, the 77th Division took Valencia airfield, north, on 18 December, and continued north to establish contact with X Corps units. That same day, Gen. Sibert ordered the 1st Cavalry Division to complete the drive south. The 12th Cavalry Regiment pushed out of the mountains on a southwest track to Highway 2, then followed fire from the 271st Field Artillery Battalion to clear a stretch of the road. North of Ormoc Valley, the 32nd Division had met determined opposition from the defending Japanese 1st Division along Highway 2, after moving south past Kilay Ridge and entering a heavy rain forest, which limited visibility and concealed the enemy. Using flamethrowers, hand grenades, rifles, and bayonets, troops scratched out daily advances measured in yards, and in five days of hard fighting, the 126th and 127th Infantry Regiments advanced less than . Contact between patrols of the 12th Cavalry and the 77th Division's 306th Infantry on 21 December marked the juncture of the US X and XXIV Corps and the closing of the Sixth Army's pincer maneuver against Ormoc Valley.
While the 77th and 32nd Divisions converged on the valley, Maj. Gen. Joseph M. Swing's 11th Airborne Division had moved into the central mountain passes from the east. With blocking positions established south of Leyte Valley on 22–24 November, the 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment pushed farther west into the mountains on the 25 November. After an arduous advance, the 511th reached Mahonag, west of Burauen, on 6 December, the same day Japanese paratroops landed at the Buri and San Pablo airfields. On 16 December, the 2nd Battalion, 32nd Infantry, made slow but steady progress into the mountains from the Ormoc Bay area to meet the airborne regiment and assist its passage westward. On 23 December, after battling scattered Japanese defenders on ridges and in caves, the 7th Division infantrymen met troops from the 2nd Battalion, 187th Glider Infantry Regiment, which had passed through the 511th, to complete the cross-island move, and basically destroying the Japanese 26th Infantry Division in the process.
Gen. Bruce opened the drive on Palompon by sending the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 305th Infantry, with armor support, west along the road on the morning of 22 December. The 302nd Engineer Battalion followed, repairing and strengthening bridges for armor, artillery and supply vehicles. Assault units progressed rapidly through sporadic enemy fire until they hit strong positions about short of Palompon. To restore momentum, Gen. Bruce put the 1st Battalion, 305th Infantry, on Navy landing craft and dispatched it from the port of Ormoc to Palompon. Supported by fire from mortar boats of the 2nd Engineer Special Brigade and from the guns of the 531st Field Artillery Battalion, the infantrymen landed at 07:20 on 25 December and secured the small coastal town within four hours.
Learning of the seizure of the last port open to the Japanese, Gen. MacArthur announced the end of organized resistance on Leyte. As these sweeps continued, he transferred control of operations on Leyte and Samar to the Eighth Army on 26 December. Farther north, other US forces made faster progress against more disorganized and dispirited enemy troops. 1st Cavalry Division troops reached the coast on 28 December as 24th Division units cleared the last enemy positions from the northwest corner of Leyte on the same day and two days later met patrols of the 32nd Division. But Japanese defenders continued to fight as units until 31 December, and the ensuing mop-up of stragglers continued until 8 May 1945.
Aftermath.
The campaign for Leyte proved the first and most decisive operation in the American reconquest of the Philippines. Japanese losses in the campaign were heavy, with the army losing four divisions and several separate combat units, while the navy lost 26 major warships and 46 large transports and hundreds of merchant ships. The struggle also reduced Japanese land-based air capability in the Philippines by more than 50%. Some 250,000 troops still remained on Luzon, but the loss of air and naval support at Leyte so narrowed Gen. Yamashita's options that he now had to fight a passive defensive of Luzon, the largest and most important island in the Philippines. In effect, once the decisive battle of Leyte was lost, the Japanese gave up hope of retaining the Philippines, conceding to the Allies a critical bastion from which Japan could be easily cut off from outside resources, and from which the final assaults on the Japanese home islands could be launched.
1998 claims of Japanese intelligence.
In 1998 it was claimed in Australia (see Royal Commission on Espionage) that Allied estimates of Japanese troop strengths including those on Leyte were given to Tokyo via the Soviet consulate in Harbin, Manchuria as Stalin wanted to delay an American victory over Japan until the Soviet Union could participate. MacArthur's G-2 Willoughhby had underestimated the numbers, and the troops were reinforced. The secret "Ultra" estimates were not available to the Soviets, but were given to them by members of Australian Foreign Minister Evatt’s staff.


China Expeditionary Army

The was an army group of the Imperial Japanese Army from 1939 to 1945.
The China Expeditionary Army was established in September 1939 from the merger of the Central China Expeditionary Army and Japanese Northern China Area Army, and was headquartered in the pro-Japanese Reorganized National Government's capital city of Nanking. The China Expeditionary Army was responsible for all Japanese military operations in China and was the main fighting force during the Second Sino-Japanese War, with over 1 million soldiers under its command at its peak. The China Expeditionary Army was dissolved upon the Surrender of Japan in August 1945.
In military literature, the China Expeditionary Army is often referred to by the initials "CEA".
History.
After the Lugou Bridge Incident, the Japanese China Garrison Army was reinforced with the Shanghai Expeditionary Army. This force was further supplemented by the Japanese Tenth Army, and marched inland from Shanghai to occupy Hangzhou. In October 1937, this force was renamed the Japanese Central China Area Army. After the fall of Nanking, the Central China Expeditionary Army was formed. On September 12, 1939 by Army Order 362, the China Expeditionary Army was formed with the merger of the Central China Expeditionary Army with the Northern China Area Army. It was headquartered in Nanjing throughout the Second Sino-Japanese War.
The North China Area Army was maintained as a subordinate unit headquartered in Peking and was responsible for operations in the north China plains from the Yellow River to the Great Wall, including Inner Mongolia.
The Japanese Sixth Area Army covered central and southern China, and several independent armies reporting directly to the central command in Nanjing were used for garrison, strategic reserve and for specific operations.
By the war's end it consisted of 1,050,000 men in one armored and 25 infantry divisions. It also contained over 22 Independent brigades; 11 infantry, 1 cavalry, and 10 mixed (combined infantry, artillery, armor and support units). Towards the end of the war much of its ammunition reserve and many of its units had been transferred into the Pacific Theater leaving the China Expeditionary Army weak and undermanned.
The China Expeditionary Army surrendered on August 15, 1945 but its troops remained armed to provide security until Allied troops arrived.


Keith Dayton

Keith W. Dayton (born March 7, 1949) is a retired lieutenant general in the United States Army who currently serves as the director of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. Dayton served as the U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel-Palestinian Authority in Tel Aviv, Israel from December 2005 to October 2010. He has also served as the Director of the Iraq Survey Group, as a senior member of the Joint Staff, and as U.S. Defense Attaché in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, Russia.
Career.
After graduating from the College of William & Mary in 1970, Dayton was immediately commissioned as an artillery officer through the Reserve Officer Training Corps. He received Russian language training at the Defense Language Institute and trained as a foreign area officer (FAO) with an emphasis on the former Soviet Union. Prior to his current assignment, he spent 37 years in a variety of command and staff assignments, most recently serving as the director of the Iraq Survey Group during Operation Iraqi Freedom and as Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3, United States Army, before his assignment as U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority.
Other key assignments include deputy director for Politico-Military Affairs, Joint Staff; United States Defense Attaché, Moscow, Russia; senior Army fellow on the Council on Foreign Relations, New York; commander, Division Artillery, 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized), Germany; and commander, 4th Battalion, 29th Field Artillery; 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Germany.
He has written many technical articles over the course of his career, as well as was one of the co-authors of "The Future of NATO: Facing an Unreliable Enemy in an Uncertain Environment", a study on the future of NATO published in 1991.
Lt. Gen. Dayton served five years as the United States Security Coordinator (USSC) for Israel and the Palestinian Authority. His leadership of the USSC team included overseeing the training of Palestinian Authority forces. Lt. General Dayton was widely lauded for his "rebuilding" of the Palestinian National Security Service, with thousands of members training in neighboring Jordan. He left Israel in October 2010 and retired from the military in December 2010. In 2018, Defense Secretary James Mattis appointed Dayton to serve as the senior U.S. defense advisor to Ukraine.
In December 2019, Politico reported that the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump was considering Dayton to be the nominee for U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine. On May 1, 2020, President Trump announced his intent to nominate Dayton to the position. On May 14, 2020, his nomination was sent to the United States Senate. On January 3, 2021, his nomination was returned to the President under Rule XXXI, Paragraph 6 of the United States Senate.


Battle of Morotai

The Battle of Morotai, part of the Pacific War, began on 15 September 1944, and continued until the end of the war in August 1945. The fighting started when United States and Australian forces landed on the southwest corner of Morotai, a small island in the Netherlands East Indies (NEI), which the Allies needed as a base to support the liberation of the Philippines later that year. The invading forces greatly outnumbered the island's Japanese defenders and secured their objectives in two weeks. Japanese reinforcements landed on the island between September and November, but lacked the supplies needed to effectively attack the Allied defensive perimeter. Intermittent fighting continued until the end of the war, with the Japanese troops suffering heavy loss of life from disease and starvation.
Morotai's development into an Allied base began shortly after the landing, and two major airfields were ready for use in October. These and other base facilities played an important role in the Liberation of the Philippines during 1944 and 1945. Torpedo boats and aircraft based at Morotai also harassed Japanese positions in the NEI. The island's base facilities were further expanded in 1945 to support the Australian-led Borneo Campaign, and Morotai remained an important logistical hub and command center until the Dutch reestablished their colonial rule in the NEI.
Background.
Morotai is a small island located in the Halmahera group of eastern Indonesia's Maluku Islands. Most of the island's interior is rugged and covered in thick jungle. The Doroeba Plain in Morotai's south-west corner is the largest of the island's few lowland areas. Prior to the outbreak of war, Morotai had a population of 9,000 and had not been commercially developed. It formed part of the Netherlands East Indies and was ruled by the Dutch through the Sultanate of Ternate. The Japanese occupied Morotai in early 1942 during the Netherlands East Indies campaign but did not garrison or develop it.
In early 1944, Morotai became an area of importance to the Japanese military when it started developing the neighbouring larger island of Halmahera as a focal point for the defence of the southern approaches to the Philippines. In May 1944, the Imperial Japanese Army's 32nd Division arrived at Halmahera to defend the island and its nine airstrips. The division had suffered heavy losses when the convoy carrying it from China (the Take Ichi convoy) was attacked by US submarines. Two battalions from the 32nd Division's 211th Infantry Regiment were initially deployed to Morotai to develop an airstrip on the Doroeba Plain. Both battalions were withdrawn to Halmahera in mid-July, however, when the airstrip was abandoned because of drainage problems. Allied code breakers detected the Japanese build up at Halmahera and Morotai's weak defenses, and passed this information on to the relevant planning staff.
In July 1944, General Douglas MacArthur, the commander of the South West Pacific Area, selected Morotai as the location for air bases and naval facilities needed to support the liberation of Mindanao in the Philippines, which at the time was planned for 15 November. While Morotai was undeveloped, it was preferred over Halmahera as the larger and much better-defended island was judged too difficult to capture and secure. The occupation of Morotai was designated Operation Tradewind. The landing was scheduled to take place on 15 September 1944, the same day as the 1st Marine Division's landing at Peleliu. This schedule allowed the main body of the United States Pacific Fleet to simultaneously protect both operations from potential Japanese counter-attacks.
As little opposition was expected at Morotai, Allied planners decided to land the invasion force close to the airfield sites on the Doroeba Plain. Two beaches in the south-west coast of the island were selected as suitable landing sites, and were designated Red Beach and White Beach. The Allied plan called for all three infantry regiments of the 31st Division to be landed across these beaches on 15 September and swiftly drive inland to secure the plain. As Morotai's interior had no military value, the Allies did not intend to advance beyond a perimeter needed to defend the airfields. Planning for the construction of airfields and other base installations was also conducted prior to the landing, and tentative locations for these facilities had been selected by 15 September.
Prelude.
Opposing forces.
At the time of the Allied landings, Morotai was defended by approximately 500 Japanese soldiers. The main unit was the 2nd Provisional Raiding Unit, which had gradually arrived on the island between 12 and 19 July 1944, to replace the 32nd Division's battalions when they were withdrawn. The 2nd Provisional Raiding Unit comprised four companies and was manned by Japanese officers and Formosan soldiers. Small elements of several other infantry, military police and support units were also present on the island. The 2nd Provisional Raiding Unit's commander, Major Takenobu Kawashima, deployed the unit in the south-west sector of the island and used the smaller units to establish lookout posts and detachments around Morotai's coastline. The largest of these outposts was on the island's north-east end at Cape Sopi, which consisted of about 100 men. The Japanese force was too small and widely dispersed to be able to mount an effective defense, so the 32nd Division ordered it to build dummy camps and use other deceptions in an attempt to trick the Allies into thinking that Morotai was strongly held.
The Allied force assigned to Morotai outnumbered the island's defenders by more than one hundred to one. The Tradewind Task Force was established on 20 August under the command of Major General Charles P. Hall and numbered 40,105 U.S. Army soldiers and 16,915 United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) personnel. The Tradewind Task Force came under the overall command of the United States Sixth Army; its main combat elements were the XI Corps headquarters, the 31st Infantry Division and the 126th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) from the 32nd Infantry Division. These units were supported by engineers and a large anti-aircraft group. The Tradewind Task Force also included large numbers of construction and other line of communications units whose role was to swiftly develop the island into a major base. The 6th Infantry Division was designated the force reserve but remained on the mainland of New Guinea. General MacArthur accompanied the force on board but was not in direct command of the operation.
The landing force was supported by powerful air and naval forces. The United States Fifth Air Force provided direct support while the Thirteenth Air Force and No. 10 Operational Group RAAF conducted strategic missions in the NEI and Philippines. The naval force was designated Task Force 77 and was organised into two attack groups, four reinforcement groups, a support group and an escort carrier group. The attack and reinforcement groups were responsible for transporting the assault force and subsequent support units and comprised twenty-four destroyers, four frigates, two Australian LSIs, five APDs, one LSD, twenty-four LCIs, forty-five LSTs, twenty LCTs and eleven LCIs armed with rockets. The support group was made up of two Australian heavy cruisers, three US light cruisers and eight US and two Australian destroyers. The escort carrier group comprised six escort carriers and ten destroyer escorts and provided anti-submarine and combat air patrol. Task Force 38.4 with two fleet carriers, two light aircraft carriers, one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser and thirteen destroyers was also available to support Task Force 77 if required.
Preliminary attacks.
Preliminary air attacks to suppress the Japanese air forces in the vicinity of Morotai began in August 1944. At this time, the Allied intelligence services estimated that there were 582 Japanese aircraft within of Morotai, 400 of which were in the objective area. The Allied air forces conducted heavy raids on airfields in the Halmaheras, Celebes, Ceram, Ambon, Boeroe and other areas. US Navy carrier-borne aircraft also attacked Japanese air units based at Mindanao and mounted further attacks on Halmahera and Celebes. These attacks were successful, and by 14 September it was estimated that only 60 aircraft remained in the vicinity of Morotai.
To preserve surprise, the Allies did not bombard Morotai prior to the invasion and conducted only a few photographic reconnaissance flights over the island. An Allied Intelligence Bureau patrol had been landed in the island in June but the information it collected was not passed on to the Sixth Army. Although the Tradewind Taskforce had little information on the invasion beaches or Japanese positions, the Sixth Army did not land any of its own reconnaissance patrols on Morotai, as it was feared that these could warn the island's defenders that an attack was imminent.
The Tradewind Taskforce embarked onto the invasion convoy at several bases in north-west New Guinea, and conducted landing rehearsals at Aitape and Wakde Island in early September. The convoy gathered at Maffin Bay on 11 September and set out for Morotai the next day. Its voyage was uneventful, and the convoy arrived off Morotai on the morning of 15 September without having been detected by Japanese forces.
Allied landings.
The battle of Morotai began at 6:30 on the morning of 15 September. Allied warships conducted a two-hour-long bombardment of the landing area to suppress any Japanese forces there. This bombardment set several villages on fire, but caused few Japanese casualties as they did not have many troops in the area.
The first wave of American troops landed on Morotai at 8:30 and did not encounter any opposition. The 155th and 167th RCTs landed at Red Beach and the 124th RCT at White Beach. Once ashore, the assault troops assembled into their tactical units and rapidly advanced inland. By the end of the day the 31st Division had secured all of its D-Day objectives and held a perimeter inland. There was little fighting and casualties were very low on both sides. The Japanese 2nd Provisional Raiding Unit was unable to offer any resistance to the overwhelming Allied force, and withdrew inland in good order. Japanese 7th Air Division aircraft based at Ceram and Celebes began a series of nightly air raids on Morotai on 15 September, but these had little effect on the Allied force.
The lack of resistance was fortunate for the Allies due to unexpectedly poor beach conditions. While the limited pre-invasion intelligence suggested that Red and White beaches were capable of supporting an amphibious landing, they were in fact highly unsuitable for this purpose. Both beaches were muddy and difficult for landing craft to approach owing to rocky ridges and coral reefs. As a result, soldiers and equipment had to be landed through deep surf. This delayed the operation and caused a large quantity of equipment to be damaged. Like many of his soldiers, General MacArthur was forced to wade through chest-high surf when he came ashore. On the morning of D-Day a survey party determined that a beach on the south coast of Morotai was much better suited to LSTs. This beach, which was designated Blue Beach, became the primary Allied landing point from 16 September.
The 31st Division continued its advance inland on 16 September. The division met little opposition and secured the planned perimeter line around the airfield area that afternoon. From 17 September, the 126th Infantry Regiment landed at several points on Morotai's coastline and offshore islands to establish radar stations and observation posts. These operations were generally unopposed, though patrols landed in northern Morotai made numerous contacts with small Japanese parties. The 2nd Provisional Raiding Unit attempted to infiltrate into the Allied perimeter on the night of 18 September but was not successful.
A detachment from the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA) was responsible for civil affairs on Morotai. This detachment came ashore on 15 September, and reestablished Dutch sovereignty over Morotai's civilian population. Many local civilians subsequently provided NICA with intelligence on Japanese dispositions on Morotai and Halmahera and others acted as guides for American patrols.
On 20 September, the 31st Division advanced further inland to secure an expanded perimeter. This was necessary to provide room for additional bivouacs and supply installations after General MacArthur's headquarters decided to expand airfield construction on the island. The advance met little resistance and was completed in one day. On 22 September, a Japanese force attacked the headquarters of the 1st Battalion, 167th Infantry Regiment but was easily repulsed. The following day, a company from the 126th Infantry Regiment unsuccessfully attacked a fortified Japanese unit near Wajaboeta on the island's west coast. The 126th resumed its attack on 24 September and secured the position. US forces continued intensive patrolling until 4 October when the island was declared secure. U.S. casualties during the initial occupation of Morotai numbered 30 dead, 85 wounded, and one missing. Japanese casualties were much higher, numbering over 300 dead and 13 captured.
The American ground troops did not require the heavy air support available to them, and the fast carrier group was released for other duties on 17 September. The six escort carriers remained in support, but their aircraft saw little action. Four of the CVEs were released on 25 September, and the remaining two departed on 4 October. The destroyer escort was sunk by Japanese submarine "Ro-41" on 3 October while escorting the CVE group. Several hours later a TBF Avenger from the escort carrier USS "Midway" attacked north of where "Shelton" had been torpedoed, in the mistaken belief that she was the submarine responsible. After dropping two bombs, the TBF Avenger guided to the area and the destroyer escort sank "Seawolf" after five attempts, killing all the submarine's crew. It was later determined that while "Seawolf" was traveling in a designated "submarine safety lane", the CVE pilots had not been properly briefed on the lane's existence and location, and that the submarine's position had not been provided to USS "Richard M. Rowell".
The U.S. Navy established a PT boat base at Morotai on 16 September when the tenders and arrived with motor torpedo boat squadrons 9, 10, 18 and 33 and their 41 boats. The PT boats' primary mission was to prevent the Japanese from moving troops from Halmahera to Morotai by establishing a blockade of the -wide strait between the two islands.
Elements of the 31st Division embarked from Morotai in November to capture several islands off New Guinea from which Japanese outposts could observe Allied movements. On 15 November 1,200 troops from the 2nd Battalion, 167th Infantry Regiment and attached units were landed at Pegun Island in the Mapia islands; the next day, Bras Island was attacked. The Mapia Islands were declared secure on 18 November after resistance from 172 Japanese troops of the 36th Infantry Division was overcome. On 19 November, a force of 400 US troops built around F Company, 124th Infantry Regiment occupied the undefended Asia Islands. These were the first offensive operations overseen by the Eighth United States Army, and the naval commander for both operations was Captain Lord Ashbourne of the Royal Navy on board . Radar and LORAN stations were subsequently established on the islands.
Base development.
The rapid development of Morotai into a major military base was a key goal of the operation. Pre-invasion plans called for the construction of three large airstrips within forty-five days of 15 September, with the first to be operational immediately after the landing. The plans also included accommodation and supply facilities for 60,000 air force and army personnel, a 1,900-bed hospital, bulk fuel storage and handling installations and ship docking facilities. To construct these facilities, the Tradewind Task Force included 7,000 engineer service troops, of whom 84 percent were American and the remainder Australian.
Work began on base facilities before Morotai was secured. Survey parties began transit surveys of the airfield sites on 16 September, which determined that their planned alignment was unworkable. Plans to complete the Japanese airfield were also abandoned, as it would have interfered with larger airfields to be built to the east. It was instead cleared and used as an emergency "crash strip." Work on the first new airstrip (called Wama Drome) began on 23 September after the site was cleared. By 4 October Wama Drome's runway was operable for and was supporting heavy bomber raids on Balikpapan in Borneo. Construction of the even larger Pitu Drome, which was to have two runways parallel to Wama Drome, began in late September and by 17 October it had a usable runway. Construction work was accelerated from 18 October after the United States Third Fleet was withdrawn from providing direct support to the planned landing at Leyte. When the two airstrips were completed in November they boasted three large runways and hardstandings for 253 aircraft, including 174 heavy bombers. Although the air base construction required the destruction of villages, the American and Australian airfield engineers were assisted from 1 October by about 350 laborers locally recruited by the NICA detachment.
Other base facilities were erected concurrently with the construction of the airstrips. Work on fuel storage facilities began shortly after the landing, and the first was ready on 20 September. A jetty for oil tankers and a larger tank farm were completed in early October, and storage facilities continued to be expanded until November, when capacity for of fuel was available. Several docks capable of accommodating liberty ships were constructed on Morotai's west coast, and the first was completed on 8 October. In addition, twenty LST landings were constructed on Blue Beach to facilitate the loading and unloading of these ships. Other major construction projects included an extensive road network, a naval installation, of warehousing, and clearing land for supply dumps and bivouacs. A 1,000-bed hospital was also built after the original plans for a 1,900-bed facility were revised. The main difficulties encountered were overcoming the mud caused by unusually heavy rains and finding sufficient water supplies.
A revision to Allied plans meant that Morotai played a much greater role in the liberation of the Philippines than had been originally envisioned. The invasion of Mindanao was postponed in September 1944 in favour of a landing at Leyte in the central Philippines in late October. The air bases at Morotai were the closest Allied air strips to Leyte, and fighters and bombers based on the island attacked targets in the southern Philippines and NEI in support of the landing at Leyte on 25 October. After airfields were completed at Leyte, Morotai was also used as a staging point for fighters and bombers traveling to the Philippines.
Subsequent fighting.
Japanese response.
The Japanese military recognized that its forces in the Philippines would be threatened if the Allies developed airfields on Morotai. In an attempt to disrupt the airfield construction program, the Japanese Army commanders on Halmahera sent large numbers of reinforcements to Morotai between late September and November. These troops included the main body of the 211th Infantry Regiment, the 3rd Battalion of the 210th Infantry Regiment and three raiding detachments. The commander of the 211th Infantry Regiment, Colonel Kisou Ouchi, assumed command of the Japanese forces on Morotai on 12 October. Allied codebreakers were often able to warn the forces at Morotai of attempts to run the blockade, and PT boats destroyed a large number of the barges the Japanese used to transport troops from Halmahera. The Allies were, however, unable to completely stop the Japanese buildup.
The Japanese counter-offensive on Morotai was not successful. The troops brought to the island suffered from high rates of disease and it proved impossible to bring sufficient supplies through the Allied air and naval blockade. As a result, while the 2nd Provisional Raiding Unit raided the US perimeter on several occasions, the reinforcements were unable to mount larger attacks and did not impede Allied airfield construction activities. The Japanese force subsequently withdrew into central Morotai where many soldiers died from disease or starvation. The last Japanese supply barges from Halmahera reached Morotai on 12 May 1945.
In late December 1944, the US 33rd Infantry Division's 136th Infantry Regiment was brought to Morotai from New Guinea to attack the Japanese 211th Infantry Regiment in the west of the island. After landing on the island's west coast, the American regiment moved into Japanese-held territory on 26 December and advanced on the Japanese position from the south-west and north. The 136th was supported by a battalion of the 130th Infantry Regiment advancing overland from the Doroeba Plain, artillery units stationed on islands off Morotai's coast and one hundred civilian porters. The 3rd Battalion of the 167th Infantry Regiment also participated in this operation and made a difficult march from Morotai's south coast into the interior to prevent the Japanese from scattering into small groups in the island's mountains.
In early January 1945, the American force determined that two battalions of the Japanese 211th Regiment were at Hill 40, about four miles (6 km) north of the Allied perimeter. The attack on this position began on 3 January 1945 when the 136th Infantry Regiment's 1st and 2nd battalions advanced from the south-west and encountered strong resistance. The regiment used a large quantity of ammunition in this attack, and aerial resupply was needed to replenish its supplies. Both American battalions resumed their attack the next day with the support of a highly effective artillery bombardment, and reached the main Japanese position in the afternoon. During this period the 3rd Battalion of the 136th Regiment advanced on Hill 40 from the north, and destroyed the 211th Regiment's 3rd Battalion in a series of battles. This Japanese battalion had been stationed on the coast to receive supplies from Halmahera and mounted several unsuccessful attacks on the American battalion's beachhead after it landed in December.
The 136th Infantry Regiment completed its attack on Hill 40 on 5 January. The Regiment's 1st and 2nd Battalions advanced from the west and south-west and the 3rd Battalion from the north, meeting little resistance. The 1st and 2nd Battalions continued north to pursue Japanese remnants until 14 January, by which time the regiment claimed to have killed 870 Japanese soldiers and captured ten for a loss of 46 killed and 127 wounded and injured. The 3rd Battalion, 167th Infantry Regiment linked up with the 136th on 7 January after overrunning the main Japanese radio station on the island on 4 January. In mid-January, the 136th Regiment was withdrawn to the Allied perimeter where it rejoined the 33rd Division, which was staging through Morotai en route for the Allied landing in Luzon.
Air attacks and Allied mopping up.
The Japanese 7th Air Division continued to raid Morotai for months after the Allied landing. The air division conducted 82 raids on Morotai involving 179 sorties between 15 September 1944 and 1 February 1945. The aircraft used in these raids flew from Ceram and the Celebes and landed at airfields on Halmahera before proceeding to their targets. While 54 of the raids caused no damage, the others resulted in the destruction of forty-two Allied aircraft and damage to another thirty-three. Allied casualties from air attack were 19 killed and 99 wounded. The most successful raid was conducted on the night of 22 November when 15 Allied planes were destroyed and eight damaged. The regular Japanese air raids ceased at the end of January 1945, though a final attack took place on 22 March. USAAF night fighters had only limited success as raiders were normally detected only shortly before they entered anti-aircraft gun defended zones; these guns shot down most of the 26 Japanese aircraft lost over Morotai. The official history of the USAAF's night fighter force states that Morotai "was probably the most difficult task undertaken by American night fighters during World War II" due to the difficulty of detecting incoming raiders.
The PT boat force at Morotai was reduced to a single squadron by February 1945 but remained active until the end of the war. As well as patrolling around Morotai, the boats operated in the eastern NEI to raid Japanese positions and support Australian and Dutch scouting parties. In May 1945 PT boats and the Australian Z Special Unit rescued the Sultan of Ternate along with his court and harem during an operation codenamed Project Opossum after he was mistreated by the Japanese. By the end of the war the PT boats had conducted nearly 1,300 patrols and destroyed 50 barges and 150 small craft off Morotai and Halmahera.
The 31st Division remained at Morotai until 12 April 1945 when it departed to participate in the liberation of Mindanao, and was replaced by the 93rd Infantry Division. The 93rd Division was a segregated African American unit, and was mainly used for security and labor tasks during the war. Once established on Morotai the division conducted intensive patrols with the aim of destroying the remaining Japanese force on the island. At this time most of the Japanese on Morotai were located along the island's west coast, and generally stayed close to civilian gardens. The 93rd Division landed patrols along Morotai's west and north coasts from April onwards, and these fought scattered skirmishes with small Japanese forces. One of the division's main goals was to capture Colonel Ouchi, and this was achieved by a patrol from the 25th Infantry Regiment on 2 August. Ouchi was one of the highest-ranked Japanese officers to be captured before the end of the war. The American force also used propaganda broadcasts and leaflets to encourage Japanese soldiers on Morotai to surrender, with some success.
Aftermath.
Morotai remained an important Allied base after Leyte was secured. Aircraft of the Thirteenth Air Force and Australian First Tactical Air Force (formerly No. 10 Operational Group RAAF) were based at Morotai and attacked targets in the NEI and southern Philippines until the end of the war. From April 1945, the island was also used by the Australian I Corps to mount the Borneo Campaign. Australian Army engineers expanded the base facilities at Morotai to support this operation. Due to overcrowding, some Australian camp sites were located outside the American perimeter.
Morotai was the scene of a number of surrender ceremonies following the surrender of Japan. About 660 Japanese troops on Morotai capitulated to Allied forces after 15 August. The 93rd Division also accepted the surrender of the 40,000 Japanese troops at Halmahera on 26 August after the Japanese commander there was brought to Morotai on a US Navy PT boat. On 9 September 1945, Australian General Thomas Blamey accepted the surrender of the Japanese Second Army at a ceremony held on the I Corps' sports ground at Morotai. Private Teruo Nakamura, the last confirmed Japanese holdout on Morotai or elsewhere, was captured by Indonesian Air Force personnel on 18 December 1974.
The facilities on Morotai continued to be heavily used by the Allies in the months after the war. The Australian force responsible for the occupation and military administration of the eastern NEI was headquartered at Morotai until April 1946, when the Dutch colonial government was reestablished. The island was also one of the sites where the Australian and NEI militaries conducted war crimes trials of Japanese personnel.


3d Troop Carrier Squadron

The 3d Troop Carrier Squadron is an inactive United States Air Force unit. It was last assigned to the 63d Troop Carrier Group at Donaldson Air Force Base, South Carolina, where it was inactivated in 1960.
The squadron was one of the earliest airlift units of the United States Army Air Corps, first activating in 1935 as the 3d Transport Squadron. During World War II, the squadron acted as a training unit until disbanded in 1944.
After the end of the war, the squadron was again active in the reserve from 1947 until mobilized for the Korean War in 1951, transferring its personnel and equipment to other organizations before inactivating. Its last active period began in 1953, when it was equipped with Douglas C-124 Globemaster IIs as a heavy troop carrier unit.
History.
Early Air Corps airlift.
Prior to the early 1930s, transport aircraft in the Air Corps had been assigned to air depots and to service squadrons, although provisional transport squadrons had been formed for special projects. By 1932 Major Hugh J. Kerr, Chief of the Field Service Section of the Materiel Division, proposed the formation of a transport squadron at each air depot to act as a cadre for the transport wing the Air Corps proposed to support a field army in the event of mobilization. Major General Benjamin Foulois approved the formation of four provisional squadrons in November 1932.
The 3d Provisional Transport Squadron was constituted in October 1933 and allotted to the Fifth Corps Area. By March 1934 it was a Regular Army Inactive unit at Schoen Field, Indiana. Although inactive, it had reserve officers assigned.
In the spring of 1935, the first transport squadrons, including the 3d Transport Squadron at Duncan Field, Texas, were made regular units and activated with Bellanca C-27 Airbus aircraft assigned. With enlisted men as pilots, the squadron hauled engines, parts, and other equipment to airfields in their assigned depot area, returned items to the depot, and transferred materiel between depots. They also furnished transportation for maneuvers. The rapid transport of supplies by the squadrons permitted the Air Corps to maintain low levels of materiel at its airfields, relying on replenishment from depot stocks only when needed.
In May 1937, the squadron was reassigned from the San Antonio Air Depot to the newly-activated 10th Transport Group, which assumed command of all four squadrons. The squadron received two-engine Douglas C-33s, the military version of the DC-2 in 1936 and Douglas C-39s (DC-2s with tail surfaces of the DC-3) in 1939 to replace the single engine Bellancas. These, and various other militarized DC-3s remained as the squadron's equipment until the entry of the United States into World War II.
World War II.
As the United States began to build up its armed forces prior to its entry into World War II, it formed several new transport groups. In May 1941, the 3d was reassigned to one of these, the 63d Transport Group. Not until May 1942, after the 63d Group was reassigned to Air Transport Command, did the squadron and group headquarters (which had been located at Wright Field, Ohio) join at Camp Williams Army Air Field, Wisconsin. In July 1942, the squadron became the 3d Troop Carrier Squadron in a renaming of all Army Air Forces transport units.
It was decided that the 63d Group would become a Douglas C-47 Skytrain training organization and it and its squadrons moved south, where more favorable flying weather could be found. The group initially acted as an Operational Training Unit (OTU). The OTU program involved the use of an oversized parent unit to provide cadres to "satellite" groups. In July 1943, its mission switched to acting as a Replacement Training Unit (RTU). RTUs were also oversized units which trained aircrews prior to their deployment to combat theaters. However, the Army Air Forces found that standard military units, based on relatively inflexible tables of organization, were not well adapted to the training mission. Accordingly, it adopted a more functional system in which each base was organized into a separate numbered unit, while the groups and squadrons acting as RTUs were disbanded or inactivated. This resulted in the squadron disbanding on 14 April 1944 and transferring its personnel and equipment to the 813th AAF Base Unit (Combat Crew Training School, Troop Carrier).
Air Force reserve.
In 1947, the squadron was reconstituted as a reserve unit under Air Defense Command at Burlington Municipal Airport, Iowa and assigned directly to Second Air Force. Realignment of reserve areas of responsibility and transfer of the reserve program to Continental Air Command (ConAC) in 1948 resulted in a reassignment of the squadron to Tenth Air Force. In June 1949, the squadron moved to Fort Slocum, New York and was assigned to First Air Force. The squadron does not appear to have been manned or equipped during this period.
In June 1949, ConAC reorganized its reserve units under the wing base organization system, in which tactical and support units on a base were organized under a single wing. In this reorganization, the squadron moved to Floyd Bennett Field, New York and was once more assigned to the 63d Troop Carrier Group. With the 63d, the squadron, which was manned at only 25% of its authorized strength, trained under the supervision of the 2230th Air Force Reserve Training Center and performed limited troop carrier operations with the Skytrain beginning in the middle of 1950.
The 3d, along with all reserve combat units, were mobilized for the Korean war. The squadron was called to active duty on 1 May 1951. Its personnel and equipment were transferred to other units and the squadron was inactivated on 9 May.
Heavy troop carrier operations.
The squadron was activated as a heavy troop carrier unit at Altus Air Force Base, Oklahoma in June 1953 and equipped with Douglas C-124 Globemaster IIs as part of Tactical Air Command (TAC). After initial training, the unit moved to Donaldson Air Force Base, South Carolina that fall. At Donaldson, the squadron trained, transported personnel and supplies and participated in exercises with airborne troops. In the spring of 1955, the squadron transported construction materiel from main bases in southern Canada to locations north of the Arctic Circle to establish the Distant Early Warning Line. The operation was conducted in harsh weather with limited navigational equipment, earning the squadron an Air Force Outstanding Unit Award.
The squadron also participated in resupply of temporary scientific research bases established on ice islands in the Arctic. On the opposite end of the world, it provided crews and aircraft supporting Antarctic research in Operation Deep Freeze. After 1956, the squadron contributed to the rotational squadron-sized unit maintained by the 63d Troop Carrier Wing in Europe. In 1957, C-124 heavy troop carrier operations were transferred from TAC to Military Air Transport Service (MATS), which also operated the Globemaster II in the strategic airlift role.
In July 1958, President Eisenhower directed the implementation of Operation Blue Bat, the deployment of a Composite Air Strike Force, to support the United States Sixth Fleet, which had landed marines in Lebanon in response to the crisis there. Globemasters began to depart from Donaldson on the evening of 14 July, and by 17 July 44 wing aircraft were deployed to Rhein Main Air Base, Germany, including the detachment already maintained there. Some of these planes moved to Erding and Fürstenfeldbruck Air Bases to move the Army's Task Force Alpha to Adana, Turkey to support forces in Lebanon. Despite delays caused by congestion at the airports at Adana and Beirut, the task force was in place by 19 July. While operating as part of the Composite Air Strike Force, unit planes and crews fell under the operational control of the 322d Air Division. Once the crisis had abated, Operation Hat Rack, the withdrawal of Army forces began, ending on 28 October.
In late 1959, MATS began to consolidate its C-124 units at Donaldson, beginning by inactivating the 61st Troop Carrier Group and transferring its squadrons to the 63d Group. As the consolidations continued, the squadron was inactivated in December 1960.


Siamese Expeditionary Forces

The Siamese Expeditionary Force () (also known as Siamese Volunteer Corps) consisted of the Royal Siamese Army sent to Europe under the command of in 1917 to help the Triple Entente fight in World War I.
Background.
Siam's decision to declare war was a shrewd political move, but there were precedents from other non-European small states. The decision to send an expeditionary force to Europe, however, was radical. It was designed to demonstrate both Siam's modernity and civilization to the West and the seriousness with which King Rama VI and elite viewed the need to uphold the principles of international law and morality. It was further designed to strengthen Siam's claim to equal treatment in a post-war settlement.
The decision likely evolved from a suggestion by the French government that a volunteer ambulance unit be set up by Siamese students in Europe. French diplomats further suggested that Siam could provide automobile drivers to assist in supplying the troops and aviators, who could be trained at French flying schools as pilots and mechanics.
Siam's army in 1917 was not particularly well-equipped or well-trained for participation in the slaughter of World War I. It possessed little modern equipment or artillery and had no experience of operating in Europe or in a climate or terrain other than its own. It did, however, possess officers trained in modern warfare and military strategy and, importantly, it had a modern flying squadron. No other arm of the military was considered as modern as the air force. The king and his senior diplomats and military officers gladly picked up on the French suggestion.
That the army of a sovereign East Asian nation should fight in Europe was unprecedented and electrifying for the elite and large parts of the general population in Bangkok. Opposition to the decision to become actively involved in the war was limited. Some opponents were politically motivated, as was true of the pro-German members of the elite; opposition also came from religious groups who argued more fundamentally against the involvement of Buddhists in war.
Opposition notwithstanding, the minister of war issued a call for volunteers in September 1917 to form a contingent to display the Siamese National Flag in Europe. He spelled out three objectives: to actively aid the Allies; to gain active military experience; and to uphold national dignity, honor and glory. The assembled expeditionary force consisted of a 414-men-strong aviation corps of pilots and aircraft mechanics and an 870-men-strong motor corps of automobile drivers, mechanics, medical and support staff.
At the Western Front.
While the troops were being assembled, trained and receiving smallpox vaccinations, an advance mission led by Major-General Phraya (1877-1951), commander of the expeditionary force, traveled to Europe in January 1918 to make preparations for the troops’ arrival. Phraya Bijai had spent several years in Belgium and France, where he had received military training; he spoke French and understood French military culture. In Europe, George V, King of Great Britain (1865-1936) and French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau (1841-1929) received him and his fellow-officers; they visited the front and made arrangements for the troops in Marseilles and elsewhere.
Months passed with preparations and training in Siam. Once suitable transportation was secured, nearly 1,230 officers and enlisted men boarded the S.S. Empire for Europe on 20 June. They were given a grand send-off by the king and senior princes and by cheering crowds along the banks of the Chao Phraya River. Via Singapore, Colombo and Port Said, the S.S. Empire sailed safely to Marseilles, where she arrived five weeks later on 30 July 1918. While the send-off had been festive, the welcome was rather unceremonious. Although the central purpose of the expeditionary force was to display Siam's military ability and its pride as a sovereign kingdom, French officials briefly mistook the troops for Indochinese troops, to the horror of Siam's diplomats and senior officers assembled in Marseilles. Moreover, the Siamese contingent arrived at a time when some ten thousand American soldiers were arriving in France every day, further diminishing the attention they received from their hosts.
After disembarking, the aviation corps was transferred to training camps at Istres, Avord and Pau, while the transport corps was transferred to a camp at Lyon, where the troops received basic training. After two months in camp, in October 1918 the motor corps was moved to the vicinity of Chalons in the Champagne region behind the front and began supplying troops using French trucks.
Tensions between the Siamese troops and their French liaison officers had been building during the weeks in camp, but under combat conditions they came to a head. The language barrier was a problem; while both the Siamese and the French had recruited as many suitable interpreters as possible, it remained a challenge to communicate effectively with the French officers under battlefield conditions. More importantly, the French army was ill-prepared to integrate the Siamese troops into on-going military operations, largely due to the condescending and racist attitudes prevalent among the French liaison officers. They increasingly abandoned their assigned roles as advisers and began ordering the Siamese troops directly, sidelining the Siamese commanders.
The effect of French behavior on the morale of the troops was disastrous, upsetting the senior Siamese officers, diplomats in Paris, high-ranking military and civilian officials in Bangkok, and even the king himself. When confronted with Siamese accusations, officials at the French foreign ministry understood the danger the situation posed to their goals of having the Siamese troops in France: namely, improving political and commercial relations with Indochina's neighbor. The situation deteriorated so much that the king and his senior advisers contemplated aborting the mission.
End of mission.
On 11 November the armistice was signed and fighting ceased, removing much of the pressure from the situation. It was in reaction to these tensions that the French foreign ministry triggered the military command to order the Siamese motor corps to cross into German territory behind their own troops. The Siamese occupation of Germany was thus not the result of a tactical military decision but of a political effort to appease the upset ally. The decision greatly pleased all involved, from the military commanders in Europe to the king in Bangkok himself. In the end, the Siamese were willing to put the animosities behind them and focus on reaping the political benefits from the tremendous effort of deploying troops to Europe.
King Vajiravudh went so far as to describe the day his troops entered German territory as the proudest day of his life. These extraordinary events served the king's ambition to fashion himself as a soldier-king and comrade of the troops. He also wished to use Siam's participation in the war as a vehicle to strengthen national unity and patriotism, with the soldier-king standing at the center of both the nation and the war effort.
The main contingent of the motor corps stayed in the German region of the Palatinate from December 1918 until July 1919, operating primarily in the area around Neustadt. Before embarking for their return journey, Siamese troops participated in the victory parades the Allies organised in Paris, London and Brussels. These parades in July 1919 were highly symbolic opportunities to visually demonstrate Siam's presence in the capitals of the great European powers under the eyes of kings and presidents. Siam had affirmed its presence among the victorious states that had fought to uphold international law, justice and civilization and had defeated brute force and aggression.
In total, nineteen members of the Siamese expeditionary force lost their lives; half of them fell victim to the influenza pandemic, while the remaining deaths resulted from accidents. Looking at the location of death two of the soldiers died in Bangkok during pre-departure training, nine died in France and eight died in Germany during the military occupation. Looking at the times of death half of the deaths occurred over about a one-month period from 22 January to 15 February 1919, including all five deaths in the American Hospital in Paris. These deaths would have been during the first winter the Thai soldiers had ever experienced. None of the Siamese troops died from the enemy fire or other battle-related injuries. The World War Volunteers Memorial honoring the Siamese soldiers who died in the conflict opened on 22 July 1921, in Sanam Luang, central Bangkok. The last surviving member of the Siamese Expeditionary Corps, Yod Sangrungruang, died on 9 October 2003 at age 106.
The expeditionary force returned to Bangkok in two batches. The 400 officers and men of the aviation corps left France without having been to the front and arrived in Siam in May 1919. The motor corps returned to Bangkok in September. For this occasion the government organised the official peace celebrations in which the entire capital and the provincial centres throughout the kingdom seem to have participated. At the end of four days of festivities and religious ceremonies, the ashes of the fallen soldiers were enshrined in a memorial built at a central location close to the Grand Palace and the ministry of war.


Operation Suncob

Operation Suncob was a military operation by the Australian Army in Timor in 1945 to investigate what happened to Operation Cobra. It consisted of Captain P. Wynne and Corporal J.B. Lawrence, both AIF and Z Special Unit. They were inserted into Timor on 2 July 1945 despite the Services Reconnaissance Department not hearing back from Operation Sunlag which had been undertaken shortly prior. Both men were captured and tortured by the Japanese.
It had the same aim as Operation Pigeon.


Convoy SC 20

Convoy SC 20 was the 20th of the numbered series of World War II Slow Convoys of merchant ships from Sydney, Cape Breton Island to Liverpool. The trade convoy left Halifax on 22 January 1941 and was found by U-boats of the 2nd and 9th Flotillas, operating from Lorient and Brest, respectively. Five ships were sunk before the convoy reached Liverpool on 8 February.


Mission Davidson

Mission Davidson was a World War II Special Operations Executive (SOE) military expedition to Yugoslav Partisans led by Basil Davidson, a peacetime journalist, Sergeant William Ennis and a wireless operator Sergeant Stanley Brandreth. Codenamed "Savannah", the mission landed by parachute at Petrovo Polje in central Bosnia on 16 August 1943. They were welcomed by the local British Liaison Officer, Major William Deakin who took Davidson to meet Marshall Tito. Once he explained that his ambition was to get into Hungary, Tito suggested Davidson joins General Kosta Nađ and his troops on their way towards Belgrade.
Background.
Davidson was a journalist and in the autumn of 1939 he worked as the Paris correspondent for The Economist. He returned to London and was shortly approached by the SOE for a post in the Balkans. He left for Hungary, via Yugoslavia in January 1940. On the long train journey he was accompanied by a fellow SOE colleague and sacks of explosives for which they bribed the Hungarian customs not to inspect. They arrived safely to Budapest and delivered the sacks to the British legation building. Davidson soon set up an above-board news agency to deliver British news to the local press and radio, and a clandestine operation "to promote resistance" to the subsumption of Hungary into the German war machine. He organised the printing and distribution of leaflets written by George Paloczi-Horvath suggesting the existence of a large anti-Nazi organisation. By the autumn of 1940, the flow of news from London ceased, and Davidson started making-up his own, greatly exaggerating British military might and German and Italian frailties and losses. Although in safety of Budapest, he found the news of London being ferociously bombed and Britain's survival at stake difficult to take.
Things went from bad to worse, and when the British ambassador (most likely Owen O'Malley) found the sacks of plastic explosives and magnetised metal casings in the embassy basement, he ordered it be thrown away. Davidson realised that they will no longer be able to disrupt German oil and raw material shipping on the Danube. By March 1941, through , his contact at the Hungarian Foreign Office, he realised that the escalation of war was imminent and that he had to flee. On 3 April he boarded the train to Belgrade in Yugoslavia.
The escape.
On 6 April, Davidson was in Belgrade's Hotel Majestic when the German saturation bombing started. Operation Punishment was in full force and much of the city was left in ruins. The SOE members joined a convoy of over one hundred evacuees led by the British ambassador Sir Ronald Campbell heading slowly towards the Adriatic coast. They reached Herceg Novi and managed to evacuate the most exposed members, including George Paloczi-Horvath using a Sunderland flying boat. Ambassador Campbell remained with the rest of the group and tried to label the remaining SOE members as Press Attaches hoping that they would be treated as diplomats, although they had no such passport or other evidence. A British submarine was able to reach Herceg Novi but the Italian troops had already taken the town and the group was in their custody. They were loaded onto trucks and driven to Albania for internment. Finally, they were exchanged for Duke of Aosta, the Italian commander in Ethiopia who had been captured by the British Army in East Africa. Davidson eventually reached Gibraltar. Together with the locally posted officers, he was surprised at the news of German invasion of Russia on 22 June and the timing and reasoning behind it.
Davidson returned to London and spent the next twelve months at the SOE HQ in Baker Street before being posted to the Middle East.
In Cairo.
Davidson travelled between Cairo, Jerusalem and Istanbul as the fortunes of the war in Africa were changing. In July 1942, he de-briefed Stanislav Rapotec, who recently arrived to Istanbul from a covert mission to Yugoslavia. In October he was promoted to Major and appointed the Acting Head of SOE Yugoslav Desk in Cairo assisted by Lieutenant James Klugmann and Major William Deakin. They ultimately reported to Brigadier C M Keble who was in charge of all operational sections of SOE Cairo.
The remnants of the Royal Yugoslav Army (RYA) rebranded as the Yugoslav Army in the Fatherland (Chetniks) and led by Colonel Draža Mihailović, although frequently accused of complicity with the enemy and reluctance to fight, continued to receive British assistance and military missions.
At the same time, SOE officers went to Canada to recruit mission volunteers among Yugoslav emigrants. The rumours about an active Partisan resistance movement continued as well as an inexplicable presence of numerous German divisions, desperately needed on the Eastern Front, stuck in parts of the country not known for any recognised opposition. It became clear that there was much fighting on the ground. By January 1943, intercepted and decoded German Military Security Service (SD) radio signals detailed continuous fighting between the Partisans and the Germans.
Keble asked Davidson to work closely with Deakin and plot all SD reported Partisan positions on a map. Using the German confidential sources it shortly became obvious that "The Partisans were active in most regions of Yugoslavia. They were strong, effective and aggressive. They were a formidable fighting force in constant use".
On 28 January Deakin and Keble met Winston Churchill in Cairo and showed him their map of Partisan activity. The PM asked for a memo which Keble duly provided - named "Operations in Yugoslavia". The memo stated that aid to Mihailović should continue in areas where his troops are known to be active. It stated that 'Other resisting elements' in Slovenia and Croatia were holding down thirty divisions in areas which are vital to both Italian and German communications - without having received any external aid at all. Their leadership was politically 'extreme left' but the rank and file were 'not necessarily politically minded'. It claimed that it was inaccurate to adopt the German branding of the whole movement as 'communist'. Finally, it asked for a few long-range Liberator aircraft so that the aid could be delivered to both sides. They received four smaller Halifax bombers instead.
It was thanks to Davidson's map that the first two missions of Yugoslav Canadians were successfully parachuted blind into the occupied territory, hoping to stumble across local Partisans on 20 April. Both Operation Hoathley 1 and Operation Fungus reached the targeted groups and reported back to Cairo HQ. The team prepared the first British Liaison mission and on 26 May six soldiers led by Deakin successfully dropped to the Partisan GHQ at Black Lake in Montenegro. Codenamed Operation Typical, they landed in the middle of a large German offensive - Operation Schwarz which aimed to surround and destroy the Partisan forces. They followed the GHQ out of the encirclement and less than three months later Davidson joined them.
Arrival.
Shortly after the landing, Davidson met the battle-hardened partisan leadership around Tito's command table "an affair of rough-hewn planks" where "his counsellors sat on logs ranged on both sides". In addition to Vlatko Vladimir Velebit who was assigned to work with the British mission, there were Arso Jovanović, Marko Aleksandar Ranković, Veljko Pavle Ilić and Kosta Nađ. Most communications were done in a "hotch-potch of German and French"
Approximately ten days later, Davidson joined Nađ's HQ slow move towards Belgrade so that he could reach Hungarian border. His additional task was to welcome and assist other SOE agents get into Hungary via Yugoslavia. Steve Markos, a Canadian agent, infiltrated himself successfully via this route, and was able to send "valuable reports about German and Hungarian armies' movements and about factories making war materials" back to Davidson for onward transmission to Cairo.
Journey.
The Mission had a long way on foot and horseback over the mountainous terrain of central Bosnia, often intersected with river valleys with limited crossings, strongly guarded by enemy troops. They paused in the village of Maslovare, where they learnt about Italian capitulation, which enabled the partisan movement to expand their territory and strengthen their fighting capability. Their first major challenge was to cross river Bosna and the key road and railway lines that run alongside it whilst under aerial reconnaissance. After just missing an armoured train the column reached the river at a spot where it was divided into branches by shingle spits. Mainly on foot and holding onto each other the troops crossed the deep river in a single file and reached the eastern bank. From there, they continued onto Gradačac, and Srebrenik before reaching Tuzla. The long journey gave Davidson an opportunity to understand the origins and motivation of the Partisan movement, local attitudes and customs as well as the poverty, illiteracy and communal tensions. By now, he had met many senior Partisan commanders including Todor Vujasinović Toša, Vladimir Popović and as well as Canadian miners George Diklić and Stevan Serdar who arrived in April 1943 as part of the Operation Hoathley 1.
In Srem.
In October, the mission crossed the river Sava and arrived at Sremska Rača, an encircled enclave that a small group of Partisans managed to keep for the time being. It was an opportunity to see Partisan civic, military and Party administration at first hand.
The days were spent in conversation with local fighters, including a senior officer Savo Orović, discussing news, half-truths and rumours which were plentiful. Their plan to move north across Danube into the Hungarian controlled territory of Bačka suffered a set back as the enemy offensive, by "Vlasov troops", pushed them onto Jamena, and back across Sava into northern Bosnia. There, they worked with the commander Danilo Lekić in order to communicate with the British HQ and arrange for further drops of military and medical materiel. By December, they were chased out again, crossed Sava and finally arrived to Fruška Gora overlooking Danube.
Davidson worked closely with the local Partisan unit, observing the burnt out and heavily damaged villages of Prnjavor, Graboš, Rakovac, Ledinci, Sviloš, Neštin, Susek, Banoštor and others. He joined them in action to blow up the railway link between Beočin cement works and the main railhead, while continuing onward to log the positions of the 24 barrage balloons that were flying above key railway bridge across Danube before returning to the base at Jazak.
In-between the operations, Davidson thought about the circumstances in which the Partisan movement had developed and the reasons he thought it had strong local support:
In January 1944, the Mission was told that the situation in Bačka had worsened and that the infiltration would be impossible. They decided to return towards Bosut and Sremska Rača. There they learnt that the British party further south had been ambushed. Sergeants Enis and Pavichich were killed and Captain Jeffries, Sergeant-Major Evans and Sergeant Chudich were taken prisoner. The intelligence and enemy movements indicated an even bigger intervention, and by late February the Partisans had to withdraw farther back to North-eastern Bosnia.
On 11 March Davidson heard German mortar attack facilitating their crossing of river Sava from Bosnia into Srem. It was done by the 13th SS Division (Handschar). His mission marched further south and joined the 16th and 36th Partisan divisions at Koraj. There, they organised additional war aid drops as well as personnel reinforcements, Captains Ted Howe and Irwin and a wireless operator, Corporal Wardle. On 4 April the team started their return to Srem.
Rača murders.
Returning to Sremska Rača, Davidson encountered the war at its worst. The Serb civilians left behind, too old or sick to move had been slaughtered by the SS.
Davidson went to his old house in the village and found it in ruin, with both his hosts killed and their bodies dumped in the back garden.
Bačka and back.
The mission found Fruška Gora in April looking very different to the dark, muddy and wet place they left in December. They quickly established the communications and were able to arrange for aid drops to Šuljam where they were staying. Soon they moved onto Neštin hoping to cross Danube into the Hungarian-occupied Bačka. They did this in a leaky RAF rescue rubber boat, circular and designed for emergency landings in the sea and "hopelessly impractical when floating free". The group paddled and pumped the dinghy vigorously and were able to cross unnoticed by the enemy bunkers strewn across the bankside. They quickly established the contacts and were able to reach the local town of Bačka Palanka where they were welcomed by the local organiser Leposava Andrić "Baba".
Soon after, the news of Normandy landings had spread throughout the movement, and the promises of the Second Front were finally realised. This was of "inestimable moral value to the movement" as the end of the war was finally in sight. Davidson returned to Fruška Gora and continued to work on organising the air-drops. Germans could not abandon Srem as it was the main transport route for the incoming goods and supplies to their troops in Greece. On June 8 Partisans realised that the Germans are bringing reinforcements and that they had to leave the villages and hide deep into the forest. Those who could not leave had to hide in underground shelters waiting for the enemy offensive to end. Some felt that it was the "last one".
The mission moved further south and via Šašinci and Ašanja arrived to their new HQ in the village of Popinci. They were chased by the Germans who torched the nearby village of Pećinci in reprisal. By mid-July, the Partisans were back in Fruška Gora, fighting to reclaim their lost ground. Davidson now arranged for the first airborne evacuation of the 56 wounded fighters and left with them to southern Italy.
Epilogue.
After a short treatment for dysentery, he was back to the same airstrip on September 8. The sense of German loss of control was evident and he was able to station himself in the town of Novi Sad and wait for further instructions unmolested by either German or Hungarian authorities. From there, he moved back to Srem and met up with Kosta Nađ once again. On October 17, they flew together out of Srem and further east into Banat behind the Soviet troops and setup the new military and civilian authority led by Ivan Milutinović. It was his first opportunity to see the Soviet infantry, mostly made of Ukrainians, in action and the new civilian authorities and order the Partisans were trying to establish.
This included some locals who disagreed with the new order:
Shortly afterwards Basil Davidson returned to London and his career in journalism.
Sources.