330th Bombardment Group (VH)

The 330th Bombardment Group ("Empire Busters") was a bomber group of the United States Army Air Forces during World War II. It was formed on 1 July 1942 at Salt Lake City Army Air Base, Utah. Initially, the group was equipped with the Consolidated B-24 Liberator, and served as a training unit within the United States until April 1944. On 1 April 1944, the group re-formed as a Boeing B-29 Superfortress-equipped unit as part of the 314th Bombardment Wing and trained for deployment to the Pacific Theater against Japan.
The group moved to North Field, Guam in 1945 as part of the Twentieth Air Force, flying its first combat mission on 12 April 1945. The Group received two Distinguished Unit Citations for incendiary raids on the homeland islands of Japan. The Group returned to the United States in late 1945, and was inactivated on 3 January 1946. Its lineage and honors were carried by the 330th Aircraft Sustainment Wing until it was permanently inactivated on 1 July 2010.
Lineage and honors.
Upon activation 6 July 1942, the 330th Bombardment Group (Heavy) was assigned to Second Air Force as a Consolidated B-24 Liberator Replacement Training Unit (RTU). The Group performed this training at Alamogordo Army Airfield in New Mexico, then later at Biggs Field near El Paso, Texas. On 1 April 1944, the Group was redesignated as the 330th Bombardment Group (Very Heavy), assigned to the Second Air Force and was designated as a Boeing B-29 Superfortress operational bomb group, being assigned to the 314th Bombardment Wing. The Group was assigned to Walker AAFB, Kansas, for equipping and training.
The Group began its deployment to North Field, Guam in early 1945, and was assigned to the XXI Bomber Command of the Twentieth Air Force. It entered combat on 12 April 1945 with an attack on Hodogaya-ku, Yokohama, Japan. The Group received two Distinguished Unit Citations for incendiary raids on the homeland islands of Japan. The 330th Bombardment Group returned to the United States during November and December 1945, and was inactivated on 3 January 1946.
On 27 June 1949, the unit was redesignated as the 330th Bombardment Group (Medium), activated and assigned to the United States Air Force Reserve. On 1 May 1951, the unit was ordered to active duty and its personnel transferred to Korea; and the unit (less personnel) was inactivated on 16 June 1951. On 14 June 1952 the unit was redesignated as the 330th Troop Carrier Group (Medium), but was inactivated on 14 July 1952.
The unit is credited with the American Theater, Air Offensive – Japan, and the Western Pacific campaigns.
History.
When activated in 1942, the Group functioned as an RTU, training B-24 crews in both New Mexico and Texas. In April 1944 on being designated as an operation bomber group, it was assigned to the 20th Air Force. The Group consisted of the 457th, 458th and the 459th Bomb Squadron; the 26th Photo Lab, activated in April 1944 at Walker Army Air Field, near Victoria, Kansas, also became part of the Group.
Two months later its cadres split, part of the Group remaining "on line" at Walker and part setting up manning headquarters at Dalhart, Texas. After a rapid filling up of both echelons, they were reunited at Walker AAF in August 1944. The newly assigned air crews joined them in late September and early October 1944. As a complete bomb group, they were ready for their brief period of intensive flight and ground training in slight B-29 Superfortresses. The Group's advanced ground echelon left Walker AAF by train on 7 January 1945 for the Fort Lawton Staging Area in Seattle, Washington. On 17 January 1945, they left on a 30-day journey on the Army transport Ship "Howell Lykes" en route to Guam. The air crews and the aircraft mechanics support technicians would not join them until mid-March.
Guam 1945.
The Group's ground personnel arrived in the Port of Agana, Guam on 18 February 1945. The 854th Engineer Aviation Battalion was still busy putting the finishing touches on the parking aprons and taxiways for the 330th, which it had been working on since late November 1944. There were two other bomb groups of the 314th Wing just settling into North Field; the 19th Bomb Group and the 29th Bombardment Group had been there for several weeks. The 330th's area of the airfield was still mainly jungle. While the 845th continued work, the ground echelon along with the 502nd Engineering Squadron of the 89th Air Service Group (ASG) began the detailed work of making the airfield operational.
The air crews continued to commute between Walker Army Air Field and Batista (Cayuga) Field in Cuba, to sharpen their combat training. Once back in Kansas in early March, they picked up their new Boeing B-29 Superfortresses and headed to Guam via Mather Field, California, Hawaii and Kwajalein. The first 330th aircraft set down at North Field, Guam on 25 March 1945.
The 330th first flew against the Empire of Japan on 12 April 1945, before its last squadron arrived. Its forty-seventh and final bombing strike was in the air at the hour the Japanese surrender was announced on 15 August 1945. The result was a bomb group with the lowest overall abort rate on the ground, and the highest over-the-target rate of any bomb group in the entire 20th Air Force. The 330th BG flew 1,320 combat sorties, 18,978 combat hours and had dropped of high explosives and incendiary bombs on its targets.
Aircraft.
The sixty or so aircraft that made up the 330th were divided among three Bombardment Squadrons (BS):
On their vertical stabilizers they wore a square black box unit identification mark with a large capital letter K superimposed. This was to assist with identifying squadron aircraft out of a crowded sky to form up on during the daylight missions. In late summer the 'K' was infilled with a bright orange–yellow paint for better recognition. In late summer in 1945, it was ordered that all aircraft would have their undersides painted a glossy black. The intention was to mask them from enemy searchlights.
Nose art.
As it was part of the 314th Wing, the 330th used the "City of ..." style for naming its aircraft. This was a large diameter Navy Blue globe with a bright orange/yellow footprint of North America. Within this would be a thick white flagpole with a wavy white "City of..." flag attached depicting either the hometown of the Aircraft Commander or one of the crewmen whose name was drawn out of a hat. They were allowed to also have other nose art on the starboard side but "bloodthirsty" art was forbidden for fear that if the aircraft was shot down, subsequent Japanese propaganda would reinforce the belief that they were flown by "barbarians" and potentially harm future downed airmen.
Missions.
The 330th Bomb Group (BG) arrived in the middle of an intensive bombing campaign by the Twentieth Air Force with the strategic objective of knocking the Japanese aircraft industry out of the war. To date, this campaign did not appear to be very successful since several major plants, such as the Nakajima Musashino Aircraft Plant north of Tokyo and the Mitsubishi Plant near Nagoya, seemed to be little damaged as a result of persistent daylight precision raids by B-29s flying in formation. A major reason was the weather which hindered both assembling in formation at a remote point and then flying to the target, which might be covered in clouds or haze making visual bombing difficult or impossible.
On a typical daylight mission, aircraft flew individually, one minute apart, from Guam to a predesignated "rallying" point about off the coast of Japan. There, they would form up on a "lead" aircraft and proceed in smaller formations of 10 aircraft or so over the target. They would then drop when they witnessed the "lead" aircraft drop, then return individually to Guam. The aircraft flew thousands of miles for 12 or more hours, and had to conserve as much fuel as possible in order to make it back to base or to Iwo Jima. Flying individually gave the pilots the ability to allow for particular conditions.
On a daylight mission, squadron visibility was the key to a successful mission – the reason for the large tail letters and individual aircraft numbers on fuselages. For some missions, it was imperative that the aircraft commander (AC) found his designated squadron and proceeded over the target at the briefed time, the briefed altitude, and hit his target. If he could not find his particular formation, he would join another group and bomb their target.
On a typical night mission, several 'Pathfinder' B-29s took off first. The rest of the squadron's aircraft took off 10–15 minutes later. Instead of 'rallying' off the coast of Japan, each aircraft would have its own pre-assigned altitude and heading over the target. Minutes before the rest of the squadron was due over the target, the 'Pathfinders' would drop incendiaries, marking it for the rest to drop on.
Whether on a daylight or nighttime mission, if the primary target was obscured, the bombers would either drop by radar or attempt to bomb a predesignated secondary target.
April 1945.
Mission: 1.
Twenty B-29s were scheduled to participate in this mission with each carrying eight general-purpose bombs of Composition B high explosive. The B-29s took off in the early morning hours of 12 April. One B-29 was late in taking off, never made it to the assembly point in time and later dropped its bombs on a target of opportunity (TO). Two others aborted. Two formations were formed from the remaining 17 B-29s, consisting of 12 aircraft and 5 aircraft. The larger formation, at an altitude of up to , was off the briefed heading on its bomb run and had to make a second run with visibility at in haze. The smaller formation attacked the plant on a different heading. Japanese flak was described as meager and inaccurate and there was absolutely no fighter opposition. Thirteen aircraft landed back at Guam late that evening while three were diverted and landed safely at Harmon Airfield.
Bomb results were excellent; all the main buildings in the 330th's target area were damaged or destroyed, comprising 73% of the target roof area. Losses were two aircraft. One ditched in the ocean with the loss of four crew; and the other crashed and caught fire on landing at Agana after suffering damage trying to land at North Field on instruments, only one crewman surviving. As a result, a second beacon was added at North Field to guide aircraft in instrument landings.
Mission: 2.
This mission, classified as a precision night mission, was a three-wing effort by the 73rd, 313th and 314th Bomb Wings (BWs) using combination loads of HE and incendiary bombs. The 330th BG contributed 16 aircraft that deposited 47.5 tons on or near its aiming point (AP) described as the Tokyo Artificial Chemical Fertilizer Plant. The reported burned out area was estimated as . Antiaircraft fire was intense and a B-29 from the 458th Bomb Squadron was one of seven lost during the mission. It was hit over Tokyo and went down in Tokyo Bay.
Mission: 3.
Twenty B-29s from the 330th BG were part of a larger effort by the 73rd, 313th and 314th BWs against the southern Tokyo suburb of Kawasaki, between Tokyo and Yokohama. The Group deposited 95.2 tons on the target. Photo analysis indicated that approximately of Tokyo was burned out that night. It was a clear night in the area and the searchlights, enemy flak and fighters were particularly effective, resulting in a loss of 13 aircraft, although none were from the 330th BG.
Mission: 4.
All but one of the remaining missions by the 330th BG in April were against airfields on Kyūshū. This was part of the XXI Bomber Command anti-Kamikaze campaign requested by Admiral Chester Nimitz. Starting with the Philippine Campaign, the Japanese Navy utilized Kamikaze tactics against American warships and carriers.
The 330th BG played an important role in the campaign. Six of the Group's nine Kyūshū airfield raids were against the Kanoya Airdrome complex and code named 'Checkbook'. Kanoya airfield was the headquarters of Admiral Matome Ugaki who skillfully directed the Kamikaze campaign from this base. Checkbook #1 took place on 17 April 1945 against the Kanoya Airdrome by 11 B-29s, which dropped 16.27 tons of HE on the complex. The aiming point (AP) for the Group was a row of buildings on the SW corner of the base. Crew reports stated hangar buildings at the base were hit and burning and, in general, bomb results were reported as good to excellent.
Mission: 5.
The 330th BG bombed the Kanoya Airdrome again the following day. This time 11 aircraft took off, with one aborting. The remaining ten B-29s proceeded in formation to Kanoya where they dropped 26.80 tons of bombs. Fighter opposition was reported as nil and flak meager and inaccurate.
Mission: 6.
Next the 330th BG was assigned to attack the Kushira Naval Air Base and 11 aircraft were dedicated to the mission. The 330th BG was joined by other BGs from the 314th Bombardment Wing. Results from crew reports ranged from unobserved to excellent. In all 40.25 tons of general purpose HE bombs were deposited on this airfield without loss.
Mission: 7.
The 330th BG supplied 11 aircraft to a composite group to attack the Kanoya Airdrome complex, one of nine Japanese air bases attacked that day. The 11 B-29s deposited 48.2 tons of bombs on the target with crews reporting unobserved to excellent results. All aircraft returned safely.
Mission: 8.
This was the second daylight precision bombing raid against a strategic target by the 330th BG. The target was the Hitachi aircraft factory located at Tachikawa (a suburb west of Tokyo). Ten 330th BG aircraft deposited 46.5 tons of bombs on the target with results described as poor. Anti-aircraft fire was reported as generally moderate to intense and accurate. This was confirmed by the six aircraft receiving minor flak damage. Eight Japanese fighters were sighted and two attacked the formation. One B-29 was lost, seen to ditch off the Japanese coast; sinking in about four minutes. Three crewmen survived the war as POWs.
Mission: 9.
This raid was planned as a precision daylight raid on the Miyakonojo airfield on southern Kyūshū, but encountered poor weather. Twenty B-29s took off but couldn't assemble, instead proceeding individually and dropping their bombs by radar. Two aircraft bombed the primary target, 15 bombed the secondary target, Miyazaki Prefecture airfield, and three dropped bombs on targets of opportunity. No enemy aircraft were encountered and only one crew reported flak. All aircraft returned safely.
Mission: 10.
The 330th BG contributed ten aircraft to a composite bomb group of the 314th BW to bomb Kanoya Airdrome. The ten B-29s dropped a total of 49.25 tons. Bombing results were described as good to excellent. All aircraft returned safely.
Mission: 11.
The 330th BG contributed twelve aircraft from one squadron to another squadron from the 19th BG to form a composite group to attack Kanoya Airdrome again. One aircraft aborted due to mechanical failure. Another joined the wrong squadron and bombed Miyakonojō Airfield instead. The ten remaining B-29s dropped a total of 49.25 tons on the target, with reportedly excellent results. There were no casualties and no aircraft lost.
Mission: 12.
Thirteen aircraft were scheduled for Kanoya this day but four failed to take off due to mechanical problems. The Group's bombs landed from the briefed AP with fair results.
Mission: 13.
The target was Tomitaka airfield on the East coast of Kyūshū. Twelve aircraft took off, but one aborted due to engine trouble. Reported results were good to excellent. There were no losses or enemy opposition.
May 1945.
Mission: 14.
Continuing with the anti-Kamikaze campaign, the 457th BS contributed nine aircraft and the 458th BS contributed ten; to a strike against the Matsuyama Naval Air Station. The anti-aircraft fire was weak but 18 enemy fighters attacked the formations, resulting in four enemy aircraft damaged. The bombing results ranged from poor to excellent. There were no casualties among the B-29 crews.
Mission: 15.
Eleven aircraft attacked Ōmura Naval Air Station. A Kawasaki Ki-61 "Hien" dropped a phosphorus bomb in the formation, which came under about six fighter attacks in all. The 314th BW summary states that the Ōmura formation had ten enemy attacks with one enemy aircraft destroyed by the 459th BS gunners. Flak was heavy caliber, meagre and 90% inaccurate. All aircraft returned to base unharmed.
Mission: 16.
In this raid 112 aircraft attacked the Ōtake Oil Refinery on Honshu in a precision daylight bombing raid in formation, including 33 from the 330th BG. The 457th BS contributed twelve B-29s; the 458th BS contributed twelve and the 459th BS contributed nine. It was estimated that 45% of the refinery unit and finished product storage areas were destroyed and the plant was probably put out of operation. Opposition was stiff. Enemy fighters made 54 attacks, damaging five B-29s. On the briefed route, anti-aircraft fire was heavy caliber but meager and inaccurate, but a few formations received intense naval fire while leaving the target. Twenty-three B-29s suffered flak damage.
Mission: 17.
This raid against the Kawanishi Aircraft Plant, near Kobe was a three-Wing effort. The 314th BW contributed 40 aircraft, of which 11 were from the 330th BG, these depositing 50 tons of bombs. The BW Report states that 39% of the plant was damaged or destroyed and collateral damage was received by adjoining Merchant Marine College, residential and manufacturing areas. No aircraft were lost.
Mission: 18.
The 14 May strike was a daylight-bombing mission against Nagoya in formation, with the 330th BG contributing 32 of the 135 aircraft from the 314th BW that hit the city. The 330th dropped 152.4 tons of bombs.
Mission: 19.
In this night raid, the 330th BG had 32 B-29s dropping 176.95 tons of bombs on the South Nagoya Urban area. The damage to Nagoya from Missions # 174 and 176 were or 13.7% of the city's built up area. Damage ranging from slight to complete destruction was inflicted on 29 numbered industrial targets and 7 unnumbered industrial targets.
Mission: 20.
This was to be a precision daylight-bombing raid in formation, with the 330th BG contributing 22 aircraft, to attack industrial targets in the Tokyo area. Due to poor weather the bombs were dropped on the primary radar target, the city of Hamamatsu, instead. It was reported that the four-Wing effort damaged , 5% of the city. One industrial target was 20% destroyed.
Mission: 21.
Taking off at 23/2000G, 35 aircraft from the 330th BG attacked the heavily defended Tokyo South Urban Area. The 330th BG was part of a combined four-Wing attack on the city. One aircraft was reported missing.
Mission: 22.
In the last major strike of the war against Tokyo, the 330th BG contributed 24 bombers and 106.8 tons of incendiary bombs. The south central Tokyo area was the focus of the attack, which included the Imperial Palace. Crews had explicit orders not to bomb Hirohito' s residence, but some bombs fell within the Tokyo Imperial Palace grounds. Total area damaged as a result of BC Missions 181 and 183 was . Most of the bombs fell south and west of the Imperial Palace. Numerous buildings within the Palace grounds were destroyed as well as areas adjacent to the Palace. A minimum of 31 numbered industrial targets were damaged or destroyed. The total city area damaged as a result of all incendiary raids was or 50.8% of the city's built up area.
Mission: 23.
Closing out the month of May, the 330th BG contributed 38 aircraft to a daylight raid against the Yokohama urban area. They dropped 203 tons of bombs on the target out of a total of 621 tons of bombs dropped by the 131 aircraft on the raid.
June.
Mission: 24.
The BG contributed 37 aircraft that dropped 150 tons of incendiaries and 6.4 tons of fragmentation bombs on the Osaka urban area. Keyes identified the target euphemistically as "Home Industries". It was believed at the time that many of the major industrial plants were supplied by factories in homes. This was found to be untrue after the war; actually many small feeder factories were intermingled in residential districts. The Group was part of a 457 effort by the XXI Bomber Command in its continuing campaign to knock out the major Japanese industrial cities. Keyes states that they took off at 02:40 () and assembled in loose formation at Iwo Jima and proceeded through soupy weather to the empire. They climbed to where they reassembled. Proceeding to the IP, they saw flak ahead and many fighters, some in pairs, which they presumed to be North American P-51 Mustangs. Many Japanese fighters; Nakajima J1N, A6M Zero, and Nakajima Ki-44 'Tojo', attacked their formation, and one attacked their plane from 12 o'clock and came within 25 yards of them before going over it. Bombs were dropped at 12:54 and more flak was seen on the way out; Keyes states that it was the most flak he had seen to date. The BG recorded a total enemy fighter toll of 16 down, 9 probable and 24 damaged by B-29 and P-51 fighters (some of these were not verified in post war analysis of Japanese records). The aircraft landed at North Field at about 17:40.
The mission was "Black Friday" for the 20th Air Force with 24 P-15 Mustangs lost. The P-51s used B-29s to guide them over the long overwater flights. Upon entering an unpredicted very large severe weatherfront the fighters lost contact with the B-29 and they had to ditch when they ran out of fuel.
Mission: 25.
Continuing the strategic fire raids against major Japanese cities, the BG contributed 31 planes to a 473-plane armada against Kobe. The BG planes deposited 170.1 tons total, of which 5.6 tons were fragmentation bombs to keep the fire fighters away from the 164.5 tons incendiary bombs deposited. This was a daylight raid with take off between 5/0100G -5/0140G. Planes proceeded to the Japanese mainland at about and, in the case of Keyes, arrived early and circled for 30 minutes before finding their formation. The formation proceeded to the IP climbing to . The target was the rail center and bombs were away at 5/0930G. Passing over the city, the formation encountered fairly accurate flak and passed to the left of a large smoke column rising up to . It was a costly mission for the XXI BC which lost 11 planes, 2.3% of the attacking force. The 330th BG lost one aircraft and all the crew were listed missing in action.
Mission: 26.
Not giving Osaka a chance to recover, the 330th BG contributed 27 planes to a 409-plane armada that struck Osaka again in a daylight raid. According to Keyes, they left Guam at 7/0450G and proceeded to Minami Iwo Jima and assembled into formation at in clear weather. After the clobbering that some formations took from Japanese fighters on 5 June 1945, Keyes was happy to see a flight of 46 P-51s escorting the formation to the Empire that day. The 330th BG planes deposited 152.38 tons of incendiary bombs and 0.8 tons fragmentation bombs on Osaka from approximately at 7/1258G. It was 10/10 cloud cover and bombs were dropped by radar. Flak was coming up close to the formation as well, so the Japanese were using radar to fire their anti-aircraft guns. In addition, crews were dumping much chaff to deceive Japanese RADAR. This was effective since no planes were lost from the BG and only two planes (0.5%) were lost from the entire armada. Aircraft landed at North Field between 7/2000G to 7/2100G.
Mission: 27.
This was a precision daylight raid on the Kasumigaura Naval Seaplane base northeast of Tokyo. Thirty-two airplanes were airborne at 10/0100G and returned at 10/1600G. Two planes aborted and 26 planes bombed the primary target and four planes bombed the secondary target, the city of Gifu. The Group deposited 143.75 tons of high explosive on the seaplane base. The presumed reason for this strike was to neutralize the base's capability of launching reconnaissance seaplanes to monitor the movements of the U.S. Third Fleet. This was Adm. Halsey's mobile naval task force and he was preparing a major sortie against the Empire starting on 1 July 1945. The 330th BG did not lose any aircraft although a number of crewman were injured.
Mission: 28.
As part of a large armada of 494 B-29s from the XXI BC that attacked the Amagasaki urban area northwest of Osaka, the 330th BG contributed 26 planes to the raid. The planes departed at 15/0230G and landed at 15/1800G. One plane from the 330th BG hit a secondary target and six planes aborted. The bomb load was as follows: 88.75 tons from the 457th BS, 65.5 tons from the 458th BS and 48.0 tons from the 459th BS. The average bomb load for each squadron was as follows: 457th: 7.4 tons per AC; 458th: 9.4 tons per AC; 459th: 6.9 tons per AC. The surprise in these figures is the heavy bomb load per AC carried by the 458th BS. There were 33 planes hitting the primary. This fire raid was the last of the major raids that laid waste to the industrial heartland of Japan and certainly must have convinced any doubters among the Japanese military that Japan's days as a military power were rapidly diminishing. Despite the heavy bomb loads, no Group aircraft were lost. Osaka, as a result of these fire raids, as well as the strangulation on their food and raw materials caused by aerial mining, ceased to function as a viable city by the end of July 1945.
Mission: 29.
This was the first in a series of night fire raids against minor Japanese cities (cities with a population of less than 300,000 persons). At this juncture in the bombing campaign against Japan, the XXI BC had four Bomb Wings to draw upon but attacking the urban areas of minor Japanese cities normally required only one BW to do the job. Therefore, on attack night, each BW was assigned a separate Japanese city. On this date, the 330th BG joined the three other BGs of the 314th BW to attack the city of Kagoshima on the south coast of Kyūshū with a population of 182,000. The BG deposited 203 tons of IE and the average tons per aircraft were as follows: 457th Squadron 7.4 tons per AC, the 458th Squadron 9.2 tons per AC and the 459th Squadron 7.3 tons per AC These average masked large individual plane differences. Planes departed at about 17/1700G and returned at 18/0800G. These night missions typically lasted 14 to 15 hours. In this case, later photo analysis of damage to Kagoshima indicated that approximately 44% of the built-up area was burned out. Keyes indicated that on this night mission the AP was military installations and staging areas. The night was clear over the target for K-58 with bombs away at 18/0033G from . The 314th BW History states that 74 planes bombed by radar, 8 visually and 21 by radar with visual correction. There were no planes lost and no casualties from the 330th BG.
Mission: 30.
Continuing the offensive against the minor Japanese cities, the 314th BW attacked the city of Shizuoka, located on the coast on the main rail line between Tokyo and Nagoya. It was presumably an easy target to identify by radar. The 330th BG contributed 33 planes and with three aborts 30 planes deposited 189.22 tons of incendiary bombs on the city. The tons per AC by Bomb Squadron were as follows: 457th: 5.8 per AC; 458th: 7.1 tons per AC and 459th: 6.2 per AC. They were aloft at 19/2030G and climbed to up past Iwo Jima and then up to over the city at a speed of 250 mph (CAS). Bombs were away at 20/0314G. They experienced little flak over the target but they received flak from naval ships in Suruga Bay where a major port is located. There was smoke up to but a stiff breeze was blowing it away from the city. Of the 123 planes hitting the target from the 314th BW, 54 planes bombed visually. 31 planes bombed by radar with visual correction and 37 planes bombed by radar; 1 plane could not see the target but could see the offset reference point. It was estimated that 66% of the city's built up area was consumed in the fire started by the incendiary bombs. The raid effectiveness factor was per ton. Two planes from the 314th BW were lost but none from the 330th BG. The elapsed time of this mission was 13 hours, a short mission relative to some of the daylight missions.
Mission: 31.
On this mission, the BG went back to precision daylight bombing in formation against the Japanese aircraft industry. The 330th BG sent 33 planes aloft, four of which aborted. The 29 planes assembled in formation and attacked the Mitsubishi aircraft plant at Tamashima, which produced. the Mitsubishi G4M 'Betty' aircraft. The BG deposited 174 tons of high explosive, with aircraft loads as follows: 457th: 4.9 tons per AC; 458th: 6.4 tons per AC and 459th 6.7 tons per AC. Planes were aloft at 22/0200G and returned at 22/1'715G. The 330th BG lost one aircraft will all the crew but one killed in action.
Mission: 32.
Another clear day was predicted over Honshū and a number of strategic targets that could, only be attacked in daylight were chosen for attack by the XXI BC. The 330th BG attacked the Sumitomo Duralumin Plant near Nagoya. Other BGs of the 314th BW attacked other industrial plants in the Nagoya area. The Sumitomo plant produced duralumin, the hard aluminium alloy used in airframe construction. The 33 planes took off from North Field at 26/0200G and landed at 26/1800G. Two planes aborted. two planes hit secondary targets and the remaining 29 planes dropped 155.5 tons of high explosive on the plant. The tons per aircraft were: 457th: 6.7 per AC; 458th.1: 3.5 per Aircraft and 459th: 5.6 per Aircraft. The planes were over the target at 26/1020G at . But, whatever the weather predictions, the weather at the target was otherwise. Weather in the assembly area made assembly difficult.
Mission: 33.
Continuing with the night attacks against minor Japanese cities, the 330th BG contributed 246.6 tons of incendiary bombs on Nobeoka, a relatively small city on the east coast of Kyūshū and on the main rail line running along the east coast of the island. This seemingly insignificant raid was in fact the start of an intensive bombing campaign of cities and the railroad system on this coast since it was directly in the path of the projected invasion of Kyūshū by Gen. Douglas MacArthur on 1 November 1945. The 32 planes were airborne from North Field, Guam at 28/2000G and landed at 29/1100G with bomb loads per AC as follows: 457th: 6.1 tons per AC; 458th 8.9 tons per Ac and 459th: 8.4 tons per Ac. One notes the dramatic increase in bomb loads permitted by these night incendiary raids compared to the early daylight raids over Tokyo at with planes averaging 2 to 3 tons per AC. The consensus of the crews was that this was a good mission. The target area was burning well. Scattered fires were seen with smoke rising to . But, later crews started their bomb run in clouds and smoke.
July.
Mission: 34.
The city of Shimonoseki, population 196,000, was the target of this night raid. Thirty-eight aircraft took off with one aborting. The BG deposited 180.5 tons of incendiary bombs; part of the overall load of 833 tons dropped by four groups, burning out an estimated 36% of the built up area. One B-29 dubbed "Porcupine" was using radar countermeasures for 90 minutes jamming Japanese radar. Despite the heavy concentration of anti-aircraft guns in and around Shimonseki, all aircraft returned safely.
Mission: 35.
On this mission, the Bomb Group deposited 328.5 tons; another reference gives 314.9 tons of incendiary bombs (IB) on Tokushima, a railroad hub on the eastern shore of Shikoku Island, the smallest island of the four Japanese home islands. The bomb loads were the highest of the war to date with the 457th: 10; 458th: 9.8; and 459th: 10 tons per AC. The total 314th BW deposited 1,051 tons of bombs, burning out an estimated of the town. This was 74% of the total built up area of the town for a bombing efficiency factor of per ton. Take off time on this mission was 3/1900G and the planes returned at about 4/1100G.
There were no planes lost or casualties.
Mission: 36.
The 314th BW attacked the city of Kōfu, an inland city west of Tokyo. Bombing through cloud cover, the 330th BG contributed 33 aircraft with one aborting. The BW deposited a total of 970 tons of incendiary bombs, burning down 64% or of the town with an effectiveness factor of per ton. The 330th BG flew as BW lead and received the Distinguished Unit Citation for this mission. The citation stated: " This source of power was permanently eliminated as a target and 2/3 of its industrial region was leveled in this magnificent demonstration of determination and bombing skill".
Mission: 37.
The 330th BG contributed 243.4 tons of incendiary bombs, all E-46 cluster bombs, to the 899 tons of incendiary bombs deposited by the 314th BW this night on Gifu. Thirty-four planes were aloft with three aborts and the average bomb loads were distributed as follows: 457th: 7.8; 458th: 7.8; and 459th: 8.0 tons per AC. The planes left at about 9/1700G and returned at approximately 10/0800G with bombs away between 10/0117G and the last at 10/0200G at an altitude of 14.000 -16.000 feet resulting in the bombs for the 31 planes being dropped in 43 minutes. This equates to an average time interval of 1.4 minutes between planes. This interval is important in determining the overall effectiveness of a fire raid. Later analysis indicated that (74%) of the city were burned out. The bombing efficiency factor was per ton. There was only meager, inaccurate, heavy caliber anti-aircraft fire (15,000–25,000 feet), but inaccurate and intense automatic weapon fire (2,000–5,000), which was ineffective at the bombing altitude. Again, the estimated and actual fuel consumption was very close. The calculated value was and the actual average used was . There were no planes lost or casualties.
Mission: 38.
This mission was planned as a night mission against a relatively small city, Uwajima, of 50,000 population on the west coast of Shikoku. Thirty-three planes from the 330th BG took off at 12/1700G and landed about 13/0800G. Weather was the determining factor in the poor results of this mission. There was a weather front which was north of the predicted position and close to the target, so crews flew at 14,000 -17,000 feet in the soup on instruments for 55 minutes from the front to the target and back to the edge of the front. The lower cumulus clouds over the target confused the radar pictures making identification of the target difficult. Bombs were scattered all over the countryside as only (16%) of the target area was burned as a result of the 873 tons of incendiary bombs dropped by the 314th BW on this target. The efficiency factor for this mission was per ton. The target had to be revisited at the end of July to complete the job. Radio discipline was good as no one broke radio silence in the 330th BG, but three planes in the other BGs did break radio silence. Cruise control worked out very well with the calculated average fuel consumption of comparing favorably with the actual fuel consumption of . One plane had 22 of its 187 M-47 incendiary bombs hang up in the bomb bay and they were dropped on Rota (island) before landing. There were no planes lost or casualties.
Mission: 39.
The target for this night's mission was Hiratsuka, a relatively small town south of Tokyo with an estimated population of 53,000, on the main railroad line linking Tokyo and Nagoya. Bombing by radar through complete cloud, the BG dropped 335.75 tons; and the 314th BW dropped a total of 1,163 tons of bombs on the city. This resulted in about , or 41.9% of the city destroyed for an efficiency factor of per ton. Later, crews reported a glow in the clouds with smoke mushrooming up to and explosions in the target area. All aircraft returned safely.
Mission: 40.
The 330th BG, with 31 planes, teamed up with the 19th and 29th BGs to attack Okazaki: a town lying 20 miles (30 km) to the southeast of Nagoya. The 330th BG planes were loaded with 184 M-47 IB's, each weighing about 100 lbs for a total bomb Ioad of 196.2 tons. The other BGs used M-17 and E-46 incendiary devices. The total incendiary bomb load dropped on the town was 850 tons, burning down or 68% of the total built-up area for an effectiveness factor of per ton. There were scattered clouds above the target above . This permitted nine planes to bomb visually and 22 by synchronous radar from 14,200 to . Bombs were away between 20/0152G to 20/0234G. All aircraft were back at North Field at about 20/0830G. Crews reporting on the bombing results indicted that the bombs dropped in the target area causing fires and one reported a large explosion lighting up a city block. One crew reported five trains of bombs burning in the river. Another crew saw a string of bombs north of the course near Koromo. While radio discipline appeared to be good overall, communication with the weather ship on the VHF channel appeared to leave room for improvement. Only four sightings were made of enemy aircraft and no heavy anti-aircraft fire was experienced and meager, inaccurate automatic weapon fire at lower altitude was observed. But with three BGs, totaling 94 aircraft, in the area and apparently scheduled fairly close together, mistakes were made. The 330th BG lost one aircraft.
Mission: 41.
This was the only daylight precision bombing mission in formation by the 330th BG during July. The primary visual target was the Nakajima aircraft plant near Nagoya. When the formation got there it was cloud covered. The formation then traveled to the secondary visual target and it was cloud covered as well. The formations then proceeded to the city of Tsu, Mie, about southwest of Nagoya, the primary radar target. This mission had what the Royal Air Force called a "Master of Ceremonies" when one aircraft took off before the others and was over the various targets to direct traffic. Despite flying to three targets in formation, all aircraft returned safely.
Mission: 42.
As with most night missions during July, there were scattered clouds from the base up to 6,000 to and a clear sky with visibility up to 10 miles (16 km) between 8,000 and , and clouds above that altitude. Ōmuta was a major town on the west side of Kyūshū. The 58th BW attacked it on 17–18 June 1945 with only minor damage. It had a population of 177,000 and was the focus of the 314th BW's efforts with all four bomb groups participating this night. The 330th BG had 33 planes scheduled with 11 from each Bomb Squadron. Two aircraft aborted the mission and the remaining 31 planes dropped 252.84 tons of M-47 and M-17 incendiary bombs on Omuta from 14,000 to . Altogether, the four BGs dropped 965 tons of IB on the town, burning or 46.6% of the total built up area. The efficiency factor was per ton. Despite the complaint about the weather, it was an efficient bombing strike. Its strategic value lay in the fact that Omuta was a rail hub and a port on the western side of Kyūshū and would need to be isolated before the Kyūshū invasion. The raid was planned as a classic night area-bombing mission with Pathfinder planes. This concept works only if the Pathfinders correctly mark the town and the follow-on aircraft can see the marker bombs. Otherwise, the crews were on their own. There were six Pathfinder Planes over the target between 27/0113G and the last 27/0133G and the main force was over the target from 17/0133 – 27/0201G. On many past missions, there were complaints that the weather planes provided weather information that was outdated by the time the planes reached the target. In this case the reverse was true when one Pathfinder was on its bomb run when the wind data came in. The Nav's complained that the forecasted wind directions and actual wind directions between Iwo Jima and the target were off by 90 to 100 degrees. These late and inaccurate weather reports may be the reason that one of the 457th BS Patfinder aircraft almost had its wing torn off by bombs falling on it from an aircraft overhead.
The Japanese were aware that this was an important target as well; they sent up night fighters (they had very few) and shot down one B-29 and badly damaged another -neither plane from the 330th BG -but the demise of the B-29 was vividly described by the returning crews. Several crews saw a B-29 with one engine flaming, fired on by two sets of tracers beyond the target area; it exploded once in the air and again when it hit the ground at 27/0158G. Heavy and medium anti-aircraft fire was observed over the town but it was meager and inaccurate.
There were no planes lost or casualties on this mission.
Mission: 43.
This was a memorable mission for the 330th Bomb Group. The target was Ōgaki urban area with a population of 56,000. In the first instance one aircraft had on board Ray Clark, a newsman from Station WOW, Omaha who broadcast live back to Guam and the States. He gave a running account of the anticipation and excitement of the bomb run. This unprecedented broadcast was sent out live over three networks and recorded for repeat broadcast by two other networks. Later, Ray Clark was able to get the aircraft and crew back to Nebraska in October 1945 to participate in a Victory Bond drive. The second highlight of the mission was that the City of Ogaki was part of a 20th Air Force Psychological Warfare Effort involving the Japanese people. Certain cities, Ōgaki being one of them, was the recipient of propaganda leaflets stating it would be, along with 10 other cities, firebombed in the near future and the civilians were warned to evacuate the city. The pamphlets warned that certain cities were to be bombed and they should evacuate the cities. Therefore, many Japanese cities in July and August 1945 were forewarned, including Hiroshima and Nagasaki (although the warning to Nagasaki may have come too late since the date of that mission was moved up a day due to weather predictions). The 330th BG sent 33 planes against Ogaki, dropping 227.26 tons of bombs consisting of E-46 and M-47 incendiaries. The 330th BG was joined by the 29th and 39th BGs; the 19th BG hit a different target. The total bomb load dropped on the town was 659 tons IB, burning of Ogaki for an efficiency factor of per ton, not a very effective mission. Planes left North Field, Guam at 28/1807 -1940G and returned between 29/0900G -29/1000G. Bombs were away between 29/0201 – 29/0318G. Bombing results as reported by crews was good to excellent, with the last crew over the target reporting smoke up to . Enemy opposition was stronger than met on previous night raids. Enemy fighters teamed with search lights in attacking planes with 5 passes made at three planes from the 330th BG. Meager to moderate heavy caliber anti-aircraft fire and meager to intense medium caliber anti-aircraft fire was encountered in the area with 15 to 20 searchlights with planes caught in the lights catching the most flak. The crews due to the pamphlets forewarning the Japanese of the attack and the clear night, which made a raid likely, believed the aggressive defenses. Calculated gas consumption was and the mission average was .
Three planes landed at Iwo Jima for fuel. The 330th BG lost no planes and no casualties.
August.
Mission: 44.
The 330th BG scheduled a maximum effort with 43 aircraft. Two aborted, the remaining 41 bombed the primary target, Mito urban area. An estimated 73.1% or of the town were burned for an efficiency rating of per ton. The town was located about northeast of Tokyo. The 330th BG contributed 289.71 tons to the 314th BW total of 1,145 tons. Enemy opposition was meager. Two searchlights were observed with meager and inaccurate heavy anti-aircraft and medium anti-aircraft fire. Six enemy aircraft were observed in the target area but made no attacks. All aircraft returned safely.
Mission: 45.
A minor city, Nishinomiya, population 112,000 between Kobe and Osaka was attacked this night with 6/10 cloud cover over the target during the bomb run. Thirty-three aircraft were scheduled for the mission with one 'Super Dumbo' ("a group B-29 temporarily stripped of ammunition and filled with extra fuel tanks, liferafts, BC-778 "Gibson Girl" rescue radios and supplies that could be dropped to a downed crew"), K-8, and one radar countermeasure (RCM) aircraft, K-55. Six Pathfinder aircraft carried mixed loads of M-47 and one T4/E4 and one M-46 bomb while the main force J carried E-46 incendiary clusters. The average bomb load was 7.5 tons per aircraft. The bomb run was made between 06/0125 -06/0208G at an average altitude of . Of the 27 aircraft returning directly to base, 14 bombed by radar and 13 bombed visually with crews reporting good to excellent results. Later analysis indicated that (29.65%) of the built up area was burned down. This was a joint mission with the 314th and 73rd BGs participating, dropping a total of 2,004 tons IB for an efficiency factor of per ton. It called for an average gas consumption of and the average used for the 26 planes that returned to North Field was . One plane lost an engine on the way up and bombed a target of opportunity instead of the main target.
There were no planes lost or casualties.
Mission: 46.
This was the last daylight raid of the war for the 330th BG and it was an old favorite of the XXI Bomber Command. The target was Nakajima Aircraft Engine plant northwest of Tokyo. The first strategic target hit by the B-29s in November 1944 from the Marianas and had been hit 12 times previously by the 73rd. 58th BWs and Navy Carrier Task Force planes. Just to show how sometimes the larger picture reports are misleading as to what was actually bombed, this mission is a good example. The 314th BW summary reports that 60 planes from the 314th BW bombed the Tokyo arsenal, the radar target for the Bomber Command Mission #320. The Tokyo arsenal was the primary radar target and secondary visual target. The 330th BS's assembled into four formations over a small volcanic island due south of Tokyo, called Torishima, Toshima. They then proceeded to the target with the 458th BS in the lead followed by 459th BS, 457th BS and a composite formation. Flak was encountered from landfall to the target with heavy anti-aircraft (HAA), meager to moderate and generally accurate as to altitude. Approaching the target, HAA fire increased in intensity and accuracy and continued until the formations climbed out of the target area. The 458th BS formation attacked on an axis of 70 degrees and dropped its bombs from . The 459th attacked on an axis of 175 degrees, overran the 458th BS formation, made a 360-degree turn and went over the primary target again. But, the formation could not see the target the second time around and went for the secondary visual target -Tokyo Army Arsenal. The 457th BS formation, on a heading of 72 degrees, dropped its bombs from and the composite formation on a heading of 73 degrees dropped its bombs from . Why the 459th BS was on a heading of 175 degrees is not known. The weather over the primary target was almost ideal for a precision daylight-bombing raid with a few scattered clouds and visibility of 20 miles (30 km). Despite some snafus the 330th BG received its second DUC for its performance on this mission.
There were no planes lost and no casualties.
Mission: 47.
Since 12 April 1945, when the 330th BG went into action, until 8 August 1945, the normal time interval between missions was 2 to 3 days, sometimes one day and on rare occasions, 5 days. The time between the Nakajima mission and the Kumagaya mission was six days. Two atom bombs were dropped earlier this month. One on 6 August and the other on 9 August, and there were reports that the Japanese were thinking of surrendering, but this did not materialize in any concrete message from the Japanese. So the 330th BG was forced to go out again. This time against the Kumagaya urban area with a population of 47,000 located northwest of Tokyo but it was on a main rail line to the West Coast. Departure was at 14/1800 to 14/1907G and return was 15/0814 to 15/0915G. While some of the planes were landing the ROs reported that Japan had accepted the surrender terms offered by the Allies. Forty planes had taken off from North Field with four aborts due to trouble with the Wright Cyclone engines (three aborts lost an engine and one had an engine backfire). The remaining 36 aircraft included one Super Dumbo and one RCM craft. The RCM plane carried two 2 ton HE bombs and the other 34 aircraft carried E-46 and M-47 incendiary bombs. The average bomb load depending on the reference was 7.5 tons per aircraft or 6.3 tons per aircraft. Bombs were dropped by radar as the target was completely cloud covered. There was only meager and inaccurate flak and no enemy aircraft sighted. This was a joint mission with the 313th BW and a reported total of 593 tons of IB were dropped on Kumagaya burning for an efficiency rating of per ton -not one of the most efficient area bombing missions.
Although this was the last official 'Combat' Mission for the 330th, it did not end the war for some crews. Until the Armistice was signed aboard the USS Missouri
on 2 September 1945, crews flew food packages to POW camps and participated in show-of-force missions for which they got combat mission time (important in the point system that sent troops back to the US in the following months).
So ended the war, which started for the Americans on Monday, 8 December 1941 (Tokyo time; Sunday, 7 December 1941 Washington, D.C. and Hawaii time) and ended 15 August 1945 (Tokyo time).
Miscellaneous missions.
12 April 1945 to 2 September 1945
North Field, Guam
There were four main types of reconnaissance : weather, photography, radar scope photo and measuring the enemy's radar signals. The BG also provided navigational escort for P-51 Mustangs from Iwo Jima to Japan and back. Occasionally a crew would be called upon to conduct a sea search for a downed aircraft. On 6/7 August 1945 Howard McClellan led a radar scope photography mission of various cities in southern Honshū. They saw the still-smoldering ruins of Hiroshima at twilight on 6 August 1945. On return, they described the devastation seen at Hiroshima stating that there must have been a large raid on the city to cause such damage though McClellan was not aware of any scheduled air raid on that city. Later the same night, McClellan was awakened and he personally had to describe what he had seen to General Power.
Radar jamming missions.
Early in the war, it was identified that although the Japanese had sophisticated radar, it was not used effectively.
The job of the 330th BG Radar Countermeasures Section (RCM) was to ensure that this was the case. The dramatic fall in 330th BG losses to zero in July and August 1945 was due, no doubt, to luck, but also to the work of this section. The RCM participated in all BG missions from 4 May 1945 till 15 August 1945. They searched for Japanese radar, spot jammed individual Japanese radar units and barrage jammed target areas with specially equipped B-29s called "Porcupines". Locating Japanese radar required specialized electronic equipment which was installed in these aircraft. The equipment included; a) a tuner-analyzer to measure the radar frequencies and strength and presumably the pulse width and pulse repetition frequency and b) four to five transmitters producing static noise, in effect drowning out Japanese radar signals.
They could determine whether the signals were emitted by gun laying radar or radar-directed searchlights or air-to-air radar carried by Japanese fighters. The radar countermeasures observer also noticed the coincidence of enemy signals with enemy action and the weather. What was not observed was just as important. The Japanese night fighters had no airborne radar. In a few cases, they were observed to have air-to-surface vessel (ASV) type radar. The Japanese radar operated on 75 and 200 megahertz bands but no 540-megahertz band radar was observed. The latter was the frequency of German Wurzburg radar which produced devastating results for the Eighth Air Force in the European theater.
On BG missions from 4 to 25 May 1945, radar signal analyzers were carried, but no radar jamming was permitted. Only "chaff" was used during this period. Due to the concentration of gun-laying radar around Tokyo, jamming was requested but it was denied. The 20th Air Force lost the largest number of B-29s over Tokyo on 25–26 May 1945. On all subsequent missions, either spot jamming or barrage jamming of enemy radar signals was done. The "chaff" consisted of spools of foil packaged in breakout containers and each spool gave the impression on enemy radar of a B-29. B-29 gunners stated that searchlight beams sometimes followed the chaff as it floated down. A variation on the foils were packets of "straws" -straw shaped strips coated with aluminium- packed 20 to a packet and dropped by the Navigator; these gave the impression on enemy radar of 20 B-29s.
Further reports stated that the foils falling across bare electric power and communication lines shorted them out, further complicating Japanese existence.
There were 42 RCM missions starting on 4 May 1945, which included 35 regular BG missions; two missions to assist the 315th BW, which had no RCM capability, and five special radar signal search missions. During this period, 440 enemy radar signals were observed and analyzed and this information was forwarded to higher echelons for collation with information from other sources. On the regular BG missions, the RCM observer would spot or barrage jam the detected Japanese signals but, since the aircraft would be in the area for only 10 to 15 minutes, it was not effective during the entire time that the group was over the target. The Group had six Porcupine aircraft and more were being added when the war ended. These B-29s were dedicated mainly to analyzing and jamming Japanese radar signals. They were used over targets with heavy concentrations of gun-laying and searchlight-controlling radar. They would stay in the target area during the entire bombing period. RCM activities were very effective based on numerous crew reports of searchlights frantically searching the sky with little degree of accuracy when there was partial undercast cloud cover. At times of completely undercast skies, the anti-aircraft fire was totally inaccurate when radar jamming was employed. Over Shimonoseki, with over 200 anti-aircraft guns, a Porcupine was in the area and no Group planes were lost. The 315th BW planes, employing the AN/APQ-7 Eagle radar, had a long bomb run lasting 15 minutes, ideal for gun-laying radar. But at the heavily defended Kawasaki oil refinery no B-29's were lost due to the effects of the Porcupine jammers.
POW missions.
The Americans had a pretty good idea where the Japanese POW camps were located and they also knew about the atrocious living conditions in the camps since the liberation of the POW camps in the Philippines and South East Asia. The Air Force launched a humanitarian effort to immediately relieve the POWs suffering by dropping food supplies to the camps, which were spread all over the Far East. The 330th BG participated in this effort. The 73rd BW Service Center on Saipan made up the packages and the appropriate mechanism to effectively drop these supplies by parachute. It was a massive effort and the 73rd BW alone dropped 2,000 tons from 472 effective sorties to POW camps on the Japanese home islands, Korea and China. Ten planes from the 330th BG flew to Saipan to pick up the supplies. The following day, 31 August 1945, they flew to Japan and dropped the supplies on POW camps around Osaka Flying back over Tokyo, one crew, K-3 got a close look at the devastation in Tokyo and a view of the naval flotilla steaming into Tokyo Bay with the USS "Missouri" on which the surrender took place two days later. The crew of K-5 were given the task of dropping supplies to a POW camp near Hong Kong. To accomplish this they had to fly to Clark Field in the Philippines and pick up supplies and information on the location of the camp.
One aircraft was asked to fly medical and food supplies to Okinawa which had been struck by an enormous typhoon days before. They did this with wooden platforms devised to be hung in the bomb bays. These platforms were loaded with supplies and lashed into place. Upon reaching Okinawa they were met by a crew of GIs who unloaded the supplies. After topping off the gas tanks they would head back to Guam. When they flew the aircraft to the states during the Sunset Project, they used the platforms again. This time they had about six passengers. Five Army enlisted men and one officer, all of whom had priority to return to the States. They had been in the Pacific area since before Pearl Harbor.
The 330th BG lost no planes in this effort, but the 73rd BW lost four planes in the effort, including one to the Russians who forced down a B-29 over Korea. The Cold War started early in the Far East.
Show of force missions.
When Col. Reynolds moved up to Chief of Staff, 314th BW, the 330th BG continued to get important assignments. One such mission was to ferry the photographs of the Japanese surrender signing aboard the USS "Missouri" to Washington as quickly as possible. So a composite crew, consisting was formed for K-52. Since there was no runway around Tokyo long enough to land a B-29, the crew picked up the photos at Iwo Jima where they had been delivered by a B-17. The B-29 flew to Hawaii where the crew had four hours of sleep and then headed to Washington, DC. The plane lost an engine over the Rockies so they landed at Wright-Patterson AAF, Dayton, Ohio, and the photos were taken on by train to Washington, D.C.
Sept–Nov 1945 and Sunset Project.
With victory in the Pacific achieved, the return of aircraft and crews not required for the occupation began under the Sunset Project. The aircraft were operated under ATC control flown by combat crews and with passengers assigned as extra crew members. The returning aircraft passed through the Marianas, Kwajalein, Johnston Island, and John Rodgers Field (Oahu) to Mather Field, California. This effort continued through the rest of the year and on into early 1946. By New Year's Day, 653 B-29's and 601 B-24's had made the homeward journey.


Convoy HG 73

Convoy HG 73 was a trade convoy of merchant ships during the Second World War. It was the 73rd of the numbered HG convoys Homeward bound to the British Isles from Gibraltar. The convoy departed Gibraltar on 17 September 1941 and was found on 18 September and was attacked over the next ten days. Nine ships were sunk from the convoy before the submarines exhausted their torpedo inventory on 28 September. Surviving ships reached Liverpool on 1 October.
Forces involved.
HG 73 comprised 25 ships homeward bound from Gibraltar, many in ballast, or carrying trade goods.
The convoy commodore was Rear admiral. K.E.L Creighton in the cargo liner "Avoceta"
and the convoy was protected by a Western Approaches Command escort group. This consisted of the sloop HMS "Fowey" and eight corvettes, reinforced by the auxiliary anti-aircraft cruiser/Fighter catapult ship HMS "Springbank". The convoy escort was augmented during the first few days by the destroyers "Duncan", "Vimy" and "Farndale", and was reinforced at various times throughout the voyage as warships came and went.
Ranged against HG 73 was an "ad hoc" wolfpack of five U-boats ("U-124", "U-201", "U-203", "U-205", and "U-371"), in concert with a group of four Italian submarines ("Da Vinci", "Malaspina", "Morosini" and "Torelli") on patrol west of the Straits of Gibraltar. They were assisted by aircraft from "Kampfgeschwader" 40 (KG40), flying long-range Fw 200 Condors, based at Bordeaux.
Action.
HG 73 sailed from Gibraltar on 17 September 1941, and was reported almost immediately by German agents across the bay in neutral Spain; these were able to report the convoy's composition, escort strength and departure time.
The Condors from KG40 and the four Italian submarines (unbeknownst to "Befehlshaber der U-Boote]]" "U-boat Command" (BdU) one of these, "Malaspina", had already been destroyed the previous week) were ordered to search for the convoy, while three U-boats further north were deployed in a search patrol line across the convoy's probable route.
On 18 September a Condor sighted HG 73 off Cape St Vincent, but this was driven off by the Fulmar launched from "Springbank".
On 19 September the convoy was sighted again, first by "Morosini", and later by "U-371", though both lost contact; "Morosini" fell out of the pursuit with engine trouble, while "U-371", en route to the Mediterranean, was ordered to continue on her way.
On 20 September the destroyers "Duncan" and "Farndale" departed, but were replaced by destroyer "Wild Swan".
Also on 20 September "U-124" made contact, but this proved to be a southbound convoy, OG 74. Unaware of this, BdU ordered "U-201" to join her and over the next two days and nights both U-boats attacked OG 74, succeeding in sinking five ships, though both received damage and depleted their store of torpedoes.
Meanwhile, HG 73 was attacked by the Italian boats, though without success: On the night of 21/22 September "Vimy" made a promising attack on a contact, and was later credited with the destruction of "Malaspina", though it was later suggested this attack had been on "Torelli", which survived, but was badly damaged and forced to return to base.
On 22 September the two destroyers, "Vimy" and "Wild Swan", left the escort, replaced by destroyer "Highlander".
On 23 September "Da Vinci" made contact, and shadowed the convoy throughout the day, but was unable to make an attack.
On 24 September a Condor spotted the convoy and reported three ships on fire, though British records show no ships hit. BdU diverted two more U-boats ("U-203" and "U-205") to the attack from France; these arrived over the next two days .
On 25 September "U-124" made contact in heavy seas and fired on a ship identified as a cruiser; this may have been "Springbank", but no hits were achieved, and no attack was noticed by any Allied ship.
That night "U-203" joined, and both U-boats attacked, scoring several hits. Just after midnight "U-203" sank "Avoceta" and "Varengberg", but came under attack from the corvette "Larkspur".
A few hours later "U-124" sank "Cortes" and "Petrel". The coaster, "Lapwing", stopped to pick up survivors from these two ships, but was herself torpedoed just before dawn. Of the 109 men on these three ships only 18 men survived, reaching land after a two-week voyage in an open lifeboat.
On 26 September, "Highlander" departed from the escort, while "U-124" and "U-203" continued to shadow. "U-201" and "U-205" also joined, but during the day "U-205" was attacked by an Allied aircraft; she was damaged and forced to return to base.
During the night of 26/27 September the three U-boats in contact attacked again; just before midnight "U-124" sank Siremalm, while at 2am "U-201" torpedoed and sank "Cervantes" and torpedoed "Springbank". "Springbank"s survivors were taken off and "Jasmine" sank "Springbank" with gunfire rather than leave her as a hazard.
During 27 September the three boats continued to shadow, and that night "U-201" made a final attack, sinking "Margareta"; neither "U-124" nor "U-203" were able to attack again.
With this the pursuing U-boats were obliged to abandon the operation, and return to base to re-arm. HG 73 was left to continue without further incident, arriving at Liverpool on 1 October.
Aftermath.
Despite the best efforts of the escort force, of the 25 ships that departed Gibraltar nine were lost, and one escort vessel, making this the worst loss of any HG convoy, and one of the worst of the entire Atlantic campaign.
Of the 117 convoys of the HG series run during the three years between September 1939 and September 1942, thirteen (just over one in ten) were attacked: Of the 2994 ships conveyed, 55 (approximately one in twenty) were lost; 39 to attacks on convoys, such as this one, and a further 16 losses out of convoy.
The operation was a victory for the attacking forces, though the successes claimed were inflated considerably. The three U-boat commanders were credited with sinking 15 ships, of 91,000 GRT, while the three ships spotted sinking on 24 September were credited to "Malaspina", which had failed to return, and was thus unable to report otherwise. The actual tonnage of the nine ships sunk was 25,800 GRT; the discrepancy is attributable to the generally smaller coasters of the Gibraltar route being misidentified as larger, ocean-going freighters.
It was, however, the high point of Axis success on the Gibraltar route; just two months later the losses incurred attacking HG 76 forced BdU to abandon operations here in favour of softer targets elsewhere.
Ships in the convoy.
Allied merchant ships.
A total of 25 merchant vessels joined the convoy in Gibraltar.
Convoy escorts.
A series of armed military ships escorted the convoy at various times during its journey.


Operation Majestic


Roulement

Roulement is a term used by the British Army to signify major combat units (usually battalion strength) that are deployed on short tours of duty, normally for six months. It is also used in the wider British Military to mean the deployment of a strength of personnel on continuing operations. Translate from the French Language, roulement means rolling.
The British Army has historically deployed infantry battalions for 6-month and 24-month roulement tours of Northern Ireland. Other Corps such as the Royal Armoured Corps (R.A.C.), when being used as infantry are deployed only on 4-month tours. During Operation Banner, this was more to do with the cost of re-training back to role than any operational reason. An R.A.C. crewman cost an estimated £500,000 to train and skills were lost during any longer tour. Royal Marine commando battalions and Royal Artillery serving as infantry in Northern Ireland are also roulement units.
The British Army currently deploys roulement units to Afghanistan as part of Operation Herrick, to the Falkland Islands and to Cyprus on Operation Tosca with the United Nations.


Captured German equipment in Soviet use on the Eastern front

During World War II, losses of major items of equipment were substantial in many battles all throughout the war, with no exception on the Eastern Front. Due to the expense of producing such equipment as replacements, many armies made an effort to recover and re-use enemy equipment that fell into their hands, applicable to both Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.
Equipment capture.
Small items of equipment such as personal firearms, clothing and uniforms and so forth are routinely lost as personnel are wounded, killed, or taken prisoner. There is often a perception amongst soldiers that foreign equipment is better or more convenient than the equipment issued by the soldier's own army. Thus, it was not uncommon for Soviet troops to make use of German boots, knives, mess-kits, flashlights and other personal items such as shavers and sidearms. Likewise, German troops often sought Soviet winter boots (vаlenki) and hats. Oddly, troops on both sides each favored the other's submachine guns. Photos of German troops using Soviet PPSh-41 submachine guns are as common as photos of Red Army troops (and Soviet partisans) using captured German MP-40s.
For larger items such as tanks, cannons or artillery pieces, equipment can be lost when they are immobilized through vehicle breakdowns or minor damages. In general, a retreating force tends to lose a lot of heavy equipment regardless of actual combat losses. The heavy maintenance demands of armored fighting vehicles are both a cause of loss and an obstacle to re-use. For example, after the Battle of Stalingrad in 1943, several hundred German Panzer III tanks and similar StuG III assault guns/tank destroyers were captured. So many were available that a significant effort was made to repair and re-use them. More than 100 were rebuilt as the SU-76i self-propelled gun, with some even serving as Soviet SG-122 self-propelled howitzer vehicle prototypes. Besides Panzer IIIs and StuG IIIs, the Soviets also used about a hundred ex-German Panzer IV medium tanks and (at least) some Panther tanks. Tiger I and II tanks seized by the Soviets were only largely used for testing rather than fighting on the frontline (no photographic evidence of any serving on the front). Artillery pieces can also be lost during retreats, when battery positions are overrun (often easily once the frontlines are punctured) or when they are immobilized during hindered road movements or maneuvers.
On the other side, Nazi Germany fielded a large quantity of their own captured enemy weapons ranging from rifles to tanks. In particular, the German military used hundreds of T-34/76 tanks which fell into their hands early on in the war, as did several hundred other older and lighter models such as the T-26 and a handful of KV-series heavy tanks. Captured Soviet rifles and submachine guns were also operated by German soldiers, as were artillery guns of various types, such as the 76mm anti-tank/field gun, that were lost by the Soviet Red Army as they rapidly retreated eastwards all throughout 1941.
Use of captured equipment.
Captured equipment was of more value to the Soviets as a source of intelligence on German equipment capabilities and weaknesses than they were for use on the battlefield. The first examples of German Tiger I tank and Königstiger tanks captured in combat were sent to Soviet proving grounds for evaluation. Photographic evidence does exist of usage of German equipment by the Soviets, but their use was usually for short periods of time.
Use of captured equipment has obvious benefits and less-obvious drawbacks. When Axis tanks were captured and could be repaired for use, they were often used in deception operations. A common tactic was for a Soviet tank unit to approach a German position using one or two captured German tanks in the lead. The hope was that the German defenders, recognizing a "friendly" tank, would not fire, or would delay their fire long enough for the Soviet unit to make a close approach.
Axis tanks and other AFVs were also re-marked and sometimes re-armed with Soviet weapons. One such example is the SU-76i assault gun based on captured Panzer III. Evidence also exists of German Panzer I-based command vehicles re-armed with Soviet 20mm ShVAK cannons. Usually, however, the vehicles were neither modified nor re-marked.
The drawbacks to using enemy equipment are significant. First, the captured vehicles are very often mistaken as enemy and thus are subject to friendly fire. Second, it is difficult to repair or maintain them; the simple act of obtaining ammunition or minor engine parts can be insurmountable. Third, equipment such as radios may not be compatible with other friendly equipment. Fourth, troops may not understand the maintenance requirements of the unfamiliar enemy equipment.
With the exception of the Panzer III tank, most of the vehicles listed below were captured in very small numbers and never contributed significantly to Red Army strength in any operation.


Hodgson-Greene-Haldeman Shipbuilders

Hodgson-Greene-Haldeman Shipbuilders was a wood shipbuilding company in Long Beach, California. To support the World War II demand for ships, Hodgson-Greene-Haldeman US Army passenger boats, Type B ship barges and Type V ship wood tugboatss. Before the war, Hodgson-Greene-HaldemanHodgson-Greene-Haldeman built fishing boats. At the end of the war the shipyard purchased by Long Beach Marine Repair Company, which was next to the shipyard. Long Beach Marine Repair Company closed in 1970. The Hodgson-Greene-Haldeman shipyard was located at 1409 West 7th Street, Long Beach, California. Hodgson-Greene-Haldeman was a partnership of: Frank W. Hodgson, Greene and Haldeman.


Operation Sunbaker

Operation Sunbaker was a military operation by the Services Reconnaissance Department of Australian Army in Timor in May 1945. The aim was to insert a team of operatives behind enemy lines. A B-24 Liberator A72-159 of 200 Flight RAAF taking the team was shot down on 17 May near Dili with the loss of all on board.
The dead were:
AIRCRAFT CREW
"Z" SPECIAL OPERATION MEMBERS


Battle of Kula Gulf

The naval Battle of Kula Gulf (Japanese: クラ湾夜戦) took place in the early hours of 6 July 1943 during World War II. The battle involved United States and Japanese ships off the eastern coast of Kolombangara in the Solomon Islands. It took place during the early stages of the New Georgia campaign when a Japanese force landing reinforcements at Vila was intercepted by a force of US Navy cruisers and destroyers. One US light cruiser was sunk during the engagement while two Japanese destroyers were sunk and two more were damaged. The Japanese withdrew after the engagement, having landed 1,600 troops.
Background.
In mid-1943, in the wake of the Guadalcanal campaign, the Allies launched their next offensive in the Solomon Islands, landing troops on the island of Rendova on 30 June as a preliminary step to seizing the major Japanese airstrip at Munda on New Georgia Island. The US landing on Rendova took place to set up an initial beachhead from which to move troops across Blanche Channel to New Georgia. After Rendova had been secured, the move to Zanana on the mainland took place on 2 July, after which US forces began the westward advance on Munda. In order to support this effort, and cut off Japanese reinforcements from moving down the Munda trail from Bairoko, the Allies decided to land a force on the north shore of New Georgia on 5 July. Meanwhile, the Japanese sought to reinforce the Munda area, moving troops and supplies via barge from the Shortlands, via Kolombangara.
The night before the battle in the Kula Gulf, Rear Admiral Walden L. Ainsworth's United States Navy Task Group 36.1 (TG 36.1) conducted a cruiser bombardment of Vila on Kolombangara Island and Bairoko. This operation was undertaken to support a landing at Rice Anchorage on the northern shore of New Georgia, by U.S. Marine and United States Army troops tasked with capturing Enogai and Bairoko.
At the same time as the Marines were landing at Rice Anchorage two US Navy destroyers, USS "Strong" and "Chevalier", entered Bairoko Harbor to provide naval gunfire support. In the early hours of the morning a torpedo was spotted closing which hit "Strong" on her port side aft, resulting in the loss of the destroyer. A total of 241 survivors were rescued by "Chevalier" while "O'Bannon" attempted to return fire; 46 US sailors lost their lives during the attack. The fatal Type 93 torpedo was a "Long Lance". It came from a salvo of 14 torpedoes fired by a group of four Japanese destroyers, led by . The torpedo traveled a distance of and is believed to be longest successful torpedo attack of the war. After firing their torpedoes the Japanese destroyers departed the area without being detected. Such was the distance of the shot, the US commander believed that his force had been attacked by a Japanese submarine.
Battle.
Ainsworth's task group consisted of the light cruisers , , and , plus four destroyers, "Nicholas", "O'Bannon", "Radford" and "Jenkins". On the afternoon of 5 July, they were returning to the Coral Sea to resupply, when Admiral William Halsey was informed of another "Tokyo Express" mission down "the Slot" in the Solomon Islands, from Buin, on Bougainville. Ordered to intercept the Japanese, Ainsworth changed course, and proceeded northwest past New Georgia Island. "Chevalier" had been damaged picking up survivors from "Strong", and left the area; they were replaced by "Radford" and "Jenkins", who left Tulagi at 16:47 hours and 18:37 hours on 5 July respectively, after replenishing.
The American ships passed Visu Visu Point, on the northwest coast of New Georgia, just after midnight on 6 July. About an hour later, Ainsworth's task force was off the east coast of Kolombangara, about half a mile from Visu Visu Point, and roughly northeast of Waugh Rock, when they came into contact with a Japanese naval reinforcement group consisting of two transport units carrying troops, escorted by a support unit, under Admiral Teruo Akiyama. The Japanese force consisted of ten ships in total, all of which were destroyers. The support unit was made up of three ships from the 3rd Destroyer Squadron, while the first transport unit (designated the 30th Transport Division) was made up of three destroyers, and the second transport unit (designated the 11th Transport Division) consisted of four destroyers.
The Japanese ships were carrying 2,600 ground troops and were bound for Vila, which was being used as a staging point for moving reinforcements to Munda. When the battle began, Akiyama's force was divided into two parts: the three escorts of the support unit ("Niizuki", "Suzukaze" and "Tanikaze") trailing the main column consisting of the four ships from the second transport unit ("Amagiri", "Hatsuyuki", "Nagatsuki" and "Satsuki"). Meanwhile, the three ships of the first transport unit, "Mochizuki", "Mikazuki" and "Hamakaze", were unloading at Vila, about away.
The escorts of the Japanese support unit were the first to be engaged. The U.S. ships, having tracked their opponents with radar, opened fire at 01:57 hours, firing 612 shells in 21 minutes and six seconds, quickly sinking the destroyer "Niizuki" and killing Admiral Akiyama. However, "Helena" had expended all of her flashless powder the previous night, and she was forced to use smokeless powder, thus illuminating herself to the Japanese ships with every salvo. Two of the Japanese destroyers launched their Long Lance torpedoes and hit "Helena", fatally damaging her. After heading away from Vila following first contact, the main Japanese force broke away behind a smokescreen. In the process, was hit by a single 6-inch shell, and ran aground near Bambari Harbor, on Kolombangara, north of Vila, while was damaged slightly by two shells, which failed to explode.
Around 03:30 hours, Ainsworth began retiring towards Tulagi, while the Japanese headed for Buin. Two American destroyers, "Radford" and "O'Bannon", remained behind to rescue survivors, as did the Japanese destroyer, . At about 05:00, "Amagiri" and "Nicholas" exchanged torpedoes and gunfire; hit four times, "Amagiri" withdrew. The beached "Nagatsuki" was abandoned by her crew in the morning, and was later bombed and destroyed by American aircraft. "Mikazuki" and "Hamakaze" completed unloading, and departed through the Blackett Strait, while "Mochizuki" lingered for another hour before leaving through the Kula Gulf along the coast of Kolombangara, clashing briefly with "Nicholas", around 06:15 before withdrawing behind a smoke screen.
Aftermath.
US losses during the battle amounted to one light cruiser sunk and 168 killed, all of whom were from "Helena", while the Japanese lost two destroyers sunk and two destroyers damaged, with 324 men killed. The breakdown of casualties for the Japanese by ship was as follows: "Niizuki" (300 killed), "Amagiri" (10 killed), "Nagatsuki" (eight killed and 13 wounded), and "Hatsuyuki" (six killed). The Japanese succeeded in landing 1,600 troops at Vila, as well as 90 tons of supplies. For his actions leading the column of cruisers at Kula Gulf and earlier in the campaign, Captain Robert W. Hayler of the "Honolulu" received his second Navy Cross.
The destroyers "Radford" and "Nicholas" returned to rescue survivors from "Helena". While rescuing over 750 men, "Radford" and "Nicholas" had to reengage the Japanese three times; they were awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for their rescue. "Amagiri" escaped and later rammed and cut in half the motor torpedo boat USS "PT-109", captained by future President of the United States John F. Kennedy (1917–1963), in the Blackett Strait, southwest of Kolombangara on 2 August. "Hatsuyuki" and "Satsuki" returned to Buin via the Blackett Strait.
Following the engagement in the Kula Gulf, the Japanese continued to move reinforcements south to New Georgia. On 9 July, 1,200 troops were moved to Kolombangara successfully without opposition. Another effort on 12/13 July, however, resulted in the Battle of Kolombangara. Meanwhile, ashore, US troops had secured Enogai on the northwestern coast on 10–11 July, while around Munda the Japanese stubbornly resisted US efforts to advance towards the airfield, which stalled and was eventually halted by a Japanese counterattack on 17 July.
Namesake.
The U.S. Navy escort aircraft carrier —in commission from 1945–1946, 1951–1955, and 1965–1969—was named for this battle.


Second Happy Time

The "Second Happy Time" (), also known among German submarine commanders as the "American Shooting Season", was the informal name for the Operation Paukenschlag (or Operation Drumbeat), a phase in the Battle of the Atlantic during which Axis submarines attacked merchant shipping and Allied naval vessels along the east coast of North America. The first "Happy Time" was in 1940–1941 in the North Atlantic and North Sea. Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini declared war on the United States on 11 December 1941, so their navies could begin the "Second Happy Time".
The "Second Happy Time" lasted from January 1942 to about August of that year and involved several German naval operations, including Operation Neuland. German submariners named it the "Happy Time" or the "Golden Time," as defense measures were weak and disorganized, and the U-boats were able to inflict massive damage with little risk. During this period, Axis submarines sank 609 ships totaling 3.1 million tons. This led to the loss of thousands of lives, mainly those of merchant mariners, against a loss of only 22 U-boats. Although fewer than the losses during the 1917 campaign of the First World War, those of this period equaled roughly one quarter of all ships sunk by U-boats during the entire Second World War.
Historian Michael Gannon called it "America's Second Pearl Harbor" and placed the blame for the nation's failure to respond quickly to the attacks on the inaction of Admiral Ernest J. King, commander-in-chief of the U.S. fleet. Because King also refused British offers to provide the US navy with their own ships, the belated institution of a convoy system was at least in substantial part due to a severe shortage of suitable escort vessels, without which convoys were seen as actually more vulnerable than lone ships.
Campaign.
Background.
Upon Germany's declaration of war on the United States on 11 December 1941 just after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the U.S. was, on paper at least, in a fortunate position. Where the other combatants on the Allied side had already lost thousands of trained sailors and airmen, and were experiencing shortages of ships and aircraft, the U.S. was at full strength (save for its recent losses at Pearl Harbor). The U.S. had the opportunity to learn about modern naval warfare by observing the conflicts in the North Sea and the Mediterranean, and through a close relationship with the United Kingdom. The U.S. Navy had already gained significant experience in countering U-boats in the Atlantic, particularly from April 1941 when President Franklin D. Roosevelt extended the "Pan-American Security Zone" east almost as far as Iceland. The United States had massive manufacturing capacity and a favorable geographical position from a defensive point of view: the port of New York, for example, was 3,000 miles to the west of the U-boat bases in Brittany.
U-boat commander "Vizeadmiral" Karl Dönitz saw the entry of the U.S. into the war as a golden opportunity to strike heavy blows in the tonnage war and Hitler ordered an assault on America on 12 December 1941. The standard Type VII U-boat had insufficient range to patrol off the coast of North America (although, in due time, Type VII submarines were successfully able to patrol off the eastern seaboard of North America, due to refueling, rearming, and resupply logistical support by Type XIV "Milk Cow" submarine vessels); the only suitable weapons he had on hand were the larger Type IX boats. These were less maneuverable and slower to submerge, making them much more vulnerable than the Type VIIs. They were also fewer in number.
Opening moves.
Immediately after war was declared on the United States, Dönitz began to implement Operation Paukenschlag (often translated as "drumbeat" or "drumroll", and literally as "timpani beat"). Only six of the twenty operational Type IX boats were available, and one of those six encountered mechanical trouble. This left just five long-range submarines for the opening moves of the campaign.
Loaded with the maximum possible amounts of fuel, food and ammunition, the first of the five Type IXs left Lorient in France on 18 December 1941, the others following over the next few days. Each carried sealed orders to be opened after passing 20°W, and directing them to different parts of the North American coast. No charts or sailing directions were available: "Kapitänleutnant" Reinhard Hardegen of , for example, was provided with two tourist guides to New York, one of which contained a fold-out map of the harbor.
Each U-boat made routine signals on exiting the Bay of Biscay, which were picked up by the British Y service and plotted in Rodger Winn's London Submarine Tracking Room, which were then able to follow the progress of the Type IXs across the Atlantic, and cable an early warning to the Royal Canadian Navy. Working on the slimmest of evidence, Winn correctly deduced the target area and passed a detailed warning to Admiral Ernest J. King, the commander-in-chief of the U.S. fleet, of a "heavy concentration of U-boats off the North American seaboard", including the five boats already on station and further groups that were in transit, 21 U-boats in all. Rear-Admiral Edwin T. Layton of the U.S. Combined Operations and Intelligence Center then informed the responsible area commanders, but little or nothing else was done.
The primary target area was the Eastern Sea Frontier, commanded by Rear-Admiral Adolphus Andrews and covering the area from Maine to North Carolina. Andrews had practically no modern forces to work with: on the water he commanded seven Coast Guard cutters, four converted yachts, three 1919-vintage patrol boats, two gunboats dating back to 1905, and four wooden submarine chasers. About 100 aircraft were available, but these were short-range models only suitable for training. As a consequence of the traditionally antagonistic relationship between the U.S. Navy and the Army Air Forces, all larger aircraft remained under USAAF control, and in any case the USAAF was neither trained nor equipped for anti-submarine work.
Allied response.
British experience in the first two years of World War II, which included the massive losses incurred to their shipping during the "First Happy Time" confirmed that ships sailing in convoy — with or without escort – were far safer than ships sailing alone. The British recommended that merchant ships should avoid obvious standard routings wherever possible; navigational markers, lighthouses, and other aids to the enemy should be removed, and a strict coastal blackout be enforced. In addition, any available air and sea forces should perform daylight patrols to restrict the U-boats' flexibility.
For several months, none of the recommendations were followed. Coastal shipping continued to sail along marked routes and burn normal navigation lights. Boardwalk communities ashore were only 'requested' to 'consider' turning their illuminations off on 18 December 1941, but not in the cities; they did not want to offend the tourism, recreation and business sectors. On 12 January 1942, Admiral Andrews was warned that "three or four U-boats" were about to commence operations against coastal shipping (in fact, there "were" three), but he refused to institute a convoy system on the grounds that this would only provide the U-boats with more targets.
Despite the urgent need for action, little was done to try to combat the U-boats. The USN was desperately short of specialized anti-submarine vessels. President Roosevelt's 1941 decision to "loan" fifty obsolete World War I-era destroyers to Britain in exchange for foreign bases, was largely irrelevant. These destroyers had a large turning circle that made them ineffective for anti-submarine work; however, their firepower would have been a significant defense against surface attack, which was the major threat in the early part of World War II. The massive new naval construction program had prioritized other types of ships. While freighters and tankers were being sunk in coastal waters, the destroyers that were available remained inactive in port. At least 25 Atlantic Convoy Escort Command Destroyers had been recalled to the US East Coast at the time of the first attacks, including seven at anchor in New York Harbor.
When sank the 9,500-ton Norwegian tanker "Norness" within sight of Long Island in the early hours of 14 January, no warships were dispatched to investigate, allowing the "U-123" to sink the 6,700-ton British tanker "Coimbra" off Sandy Hook on the following night before proceeding south towards New Jersey. By this time there were 13 destroyers idle in New York Harbor, yet none were employed to deal with the immediate threat, and over the following nights "U-123" was presented with a succession of easy targets, most of them burning navigation lamps. At times, "U-123" was operating in coastal waters that were so shallow that they barely allowed it to conceal itself, let alone evade a depth charge attack.
Operation Drumbeat.
For the five Type IX boats in the first wave of attack, known as Operation Drumbeat, it was a bonanza. They cruised along the coast, safely submerged through the day, and surfacing at night to pick off merchant vessels outlined against the lights of the cities.
When the first wave of U-boats returned to port through the early part of February, Dönitz wrote that each commander "had such an abundance of opportunities for attack that he could not by any means utilize them all: there were times when there were up to ten ships in sight, sailing with all lights burning on peacetime courses."
A significant flaw in U.S. pre-war planning was the failure to provide ships suitable for convoy-escort work. Escort vessels travel at relatively slow speeds; carry a large number of depth charges; must be highly maneuverable; and must stay on station for long periods. The fleet destroyers equipped for high speed and offensive action that were available were not the ideal design for this type of escort work. When the war started, the U.S. had no equivalent of the more effective British "Black Swan"-class sloops or the in their inventory. This blunder was highly surprising since the American Navy (USN) had previously been involved in anti-submarine work in the Atlantic (see ) and at the time was marginally aggravated by the loss of the destroyers "loaned" to Britain through Lend-Lease; however, these vessels would have been largely obsolete for anti-submarine purposes due to their counter-attack vulnerability and inherent inability to maneuver as required to combat submarines. The U.S. also lacked both aircraft suitable for anti-submarine patrol and any aircrew trained to use them at that time.
Offers of civilian ships and aircraft to act as the Navy's "eyes" were repeatedly turned down, only to be accepted later when the situation was clearly critical and the admiral's claims to the contrary had become discredited.
Operation Neuland.
Meanwhile, the second wave of Type IX U-boats had arrived in North American waters, and the third wave (Operation Neuland) had reached its patrol area off the oil ports of the Caribbean. With such easy pickings available and all Type IX U-boats already committed, Dönitz began sending shorter-range Type VII U-boats to the U.S. East Coast as well. This required extraordinary measures: cramming every conceivable space with provisions, some even filling the fresh water tanks with diesel oil, and crossing the Atlantic at very low speed on a single engine to conserve fuel.
In the United States there was still no concerted response to the attacks. Overall responsibility rested with Admiral King, but he was preoccupied with the Japanese onslaught in the Pacific. Admiral Andrews' North Atlantic Coastal Frontier was expanded to take in South Carolina and renamed the Eastern Sea Frontier, but most of the ships and aircraft needed remained under the command of Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet, who was often at sea and unavailable to make decisions. Rodger Winn's detailed weekly U-boat situation reports from the Submarine Tracking Room in London were available but ignored.
U.S. propaganda.
Popular alarm at the sinkings was dealt with by a combination of secrecy and misleading propaganda. The US Navy confidently announced that many of the U-boats would "never enjoy the return portion of their voyage" but that unfortunately, details of the sunken U-boats could not be made public lest the information aid the enemy. All citizens who had witnessed the sinking of a U-boat were asked to help keep the secrets safe.
Allied counter-measures.
The decision to implement convoys and blackout coastal towns to make ships more difficult to see came slowly. The situation began to change on 1 April when Andrews restricted ships to traveling only during daylight hours between protected anchorages. On 14 May 1942 the first coastal convoy sailed from Hampton Roads for Key West; and convoys later extended northward to Boston, where they connected with the BX convoys to Halifax initiated by the Royal Canadian Navy in March. Full convoys produced an immediate reduction of Allied shipping losses off the East Coast as Dönitz withdrew the U-boats to seek easier pickings elsewhere. The convoy system was later extended to the Gulf of Mexico with similar dramatic effects, thus proving that King and Andrews' initial rejection of the convoy system was wrong.
In March, 24 Royal Navy anti-submarine trawlers and 10 corvettes were transferred from the UK for the defense of the U.S. East Coast. The British also transferred 53 Squadron, RAF Coastal Command to Quonset Point, Rhode Island to shield New York Harbor during July 1942. This squadron moved to Trinidad in August, with a U.S. squadron, to protect the critical sea-lanes from the Venezuelan oil fields back to Norfolk, Virginia until the end of 1942. Royal Navy and Royal Canadian Navy ships took over escort duties in the Caribbean and on the Aruba–New York tanker run. Fast CU convoys were organized to maintain petroleum fuel stockpiles in the British Isles.
The "Kriegsmarine", while enormously effective during this period, did not go without losses. Sinkings of German U-boats at the hands of Allied forces during this time included:


Kanchazu Island incident

The occurred in late June 1937 on the Amur River (Soviet–Manchukuo border).
Background.
Kanchazu (also spelled "Kanchatzu" ) Island is an unoccupied island. It is located in the center of the Amur River that acted as the official border between Manchuria and the USSR.
Events.
On June 19, two Soviet motorboats crossed the center line of the river, unloaded twenty troops and occupied Kanchazu Island.
On June 20, 17 Manchurian police and soldiers were sent to investigate the border intrusion. Soviet troops, numbering around 40 men, were now entrenched on Kanchazu Island and building fortifications. The Manchurian patrol was driven back by Soviet soldiers.
On 29 June, a planned operation by the Imperial Japanese Army's (IJA) 1st Division headquarters was approved for a night attack on Kanchazu for the expulsion of Soviet troops from the island. The operation was ultimately delayed and rescheduled for the following day.
On the morning of June 30, IJA soldiers from the 49th Regiment of the 1st Division led by Colonel Mihara Kanae launched a prolonged attack against the Soviets. The attack began with the use of two horse-drawn 37 mm artillery pieces. The Japanese soldiers proceeded to hastily set up improvised firing sites, and load their guns with both high-explosive and armor-piercing shells. The shelling was successful in sinking the lead gunboat, killing seven crew members, and crippling the second, and driving off the third. During the confrontation the Soviets responded with minimal return gunfire that did not result in any Japanese casualties.
Soviet crewmen of the first sunken gunboat were left stranded and forced to swim to the north side of the bank into Soviet territory. Many casualties were inflicted when Japanese troops opened fire on the swimming crewmen with a barrage of machine-gun fire. Around 37 Soviet troops were killed in this incident. The island was left abandoned and was reclaimed afterwards by IJA troops.
Aftermath.
Shigemitsu Mamoru, the Japanese ambassador to the Soviet Union, met with Commissar of Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinov on June 29 to discuss the turn of events. The Soviets insisted the Amur islands belonged to them following an 1860 agreement and their placement on a Soviet map. During negotiations, the Soviets, however, agreed to pull back their forces from the Amur river to defuse the situation. Apparently, the Soviets were more concerned with events unfolding in North China and Europe, as well as internal strife. In the aftermath, seven Soviet gunboats appeared sometime in July, but the Japanese took no action.
Eventually, as part of the agreement the Soviets were allowed to salvage the sunken gunboat, which was accomplished between October 22–29 in the same year.


Bombing of Akita in World War II

The , also known as the , on the night of August 14, 1945, was part of the strategic bombing campaign waged by the United States against military and civilian targets and population centers during the Japan home islands campaign in the closing stages of World War II. This was reportedly the farthest-range and also the last bombing mission in World War II, coming only hours before Japan announced its surrender.
Background.
The town of Tsuchizaki was a major port on the Sea of Japan coast, railway nexus, and an important center for oil refineries fed by nearby oil fields. The town was incorporated into the neighboring city of Akita on April 1, 1941. Despite its military significance, it had not been attacked during the initial stages of the strategic bombing campaign, partly due to its remote location.
Air raid.
On August 14, 1945, the night before the surrender of Japan, a force of 134 B-29 Superfortress bombers from the USAAF 315th Bombardment Wing launched a major bombing attack on the central part of the city.
The bombers arrived over target without opposition at 2230 hours on the night of August 14, and dropped a total of 7,360 100-kg and 4,687 50-kg bombs, with the final bomber departing the target area at 0330 on the morning of August 15. The bombs completely destroyed the oil refinery belonging to Nippon Oil (the current JX Nippon Oil & Energy Co) and adjacent port facilities, and the resulting fire spread to the neighboring town. The estimated civilian casualties were more than 250 people killed, and an estimated 200 were severely injured.