Questions of Assessing the Level of State Support to Industry and Its Impact on Economic Indicators of Development in Regional Integration Associations

Abstract— In the article, based on the analysis of world theoretical and practical ideas, a methodological approach has been developed to assess the level of state support for industry based on the use of a set of indicators: the amount of state support in GDP, industrial production, and industries. Separately, an approach is proposed to assess the level of state support for exports, taking into account the possibility of determining the volume of industrial subsidies in order to facilitate the promotion of goods to foreign markets. In addition, the article proposes a methodological approach to facilitate the impact of the volume of industrial subsidies on certain economic indicators related to the goals of implementing state support measures based on an analysis of the industrial support policy in regional integration associations.

The practice of providing state support in regional integration associations (RIA) varies significantly. A wide range of support measures can be implemented both at the national and supranational levels. At the same time, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has led to a significant increase in the number of government support measures provided by countries in order to offset the adverse effects on the economy in general, and the industrial sector in particular. In view of the increase in budget expenditures of countries, including those that are members of the RIA, the problem of assessing the level of state support provided to industry and its impact on certain economic development indicators in order to measure the scale of possible economic distortions becomes relevant. This implies the formation of adequate methodological approaches to assessing the level of state support for industry within the framework of the RIA.
Literature review. Theoretical and practical ideas about assessing the level of state support for industry and its impact are formed by the international and domestic scientific community, as well as international economic organizations. The issues of assessing the level of state support are considered to a greater extent as part of the development of approaches to the formation of reviews of budget expenditures. So, in the works of foreign scientists Robinson [1,2], and Vandierendonck [3], the analysis of the size of budget expenditures is consid-ered in terms of efficiency/inefficiency based on certain criteria. Approaches to assessing the level of state support in regional integration associations are being developed in the European Union (hereinafter EU) as part of the formation by the European Commission (hereinafter EC) of annual Reports on the provision of state assistance. 1 Such reports contain an analysis of the support provided in the EU countries: absolute and relative indicators of the volume of assistance provided, the total number of measures implemented, the target distribution of the allocated amounts of state assistance, the spending of each state on the largest state aid schemes by purpose, etc. [4][5][6][7]. The problem of assessing the level of state support in the works of domestic scientists is also presented in the framework of reviews of budget expenditures in domestic literature in the works of Rykova [8], Bogacheva,and Smorodinova [9,10]. However, more attention in these works is paid to the issues of increasing the efficiency of budget expenditures and the problems associated with their use, based on an analysis of the implementation of state programs for the development of the real sector of the economy.
In terms of the impact of support measures, a number of EU countries regularly conduct an appropriate assessment, but most often it is aimed at monitoring costs, rather than a full assessment of the impact of implemented measures. For example, in Finland 2 TEKES innovation agency is holding comprehensive assessments ranging from individual projects to large scale schemes. Such an assessment shows that, for example, for every euro invested by TEKES, companies increase their R&D spending by two euros, and that supported small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have 20% higher turnover growth and 17% higher employment growth than the control group of SMEs, and the annual turnover growth of young innovative companies is 150%.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is also involved in assessing market distortions due to government support. The OECD has developed an Evaluation System for Support to Producers and Consumers in the Monitoring and Evaluation of Agricultural Policy. 3 The OECD maintains a database on various aspects of public support for agriculture, and publishes an annual Agricultural Policy Monitoring and Evaluation report that reviews ongoing developments and provides updates for the OECD and the European Union as a whole, as well as key emerging market economies. It should be noted that the OECD is actively working to develop approaches to assessing the distortions of the international market of certain industries associated with the provision of state support, for example, extractive industries and subsidies for fossil fuels, fisheries and fishing subsidies, and the aluminum sector [11][12][13][14][15]. For example, in 2019, a report on the assessment of misstatements associated with aluminum subsidies was released-Assessing misstatements in international markets: the aluminum value chain. 4 The results of this report confirm that subsidies are provided in the aluminum sector at all stages of value creation, and that significant support is provided in China and the Gulf countries. The report notes that market distortions in this sector are a problem for global competition and regulation of the provision of state support. Thus, at the international level, there is now a need to create a system for assessing the impact of subsidies to industries on potential market distortion and competition.
At the same time, since the countries that are part of the RIA differ in terms of the size of their economies and budget possibilities, it becomes necessary to assess the level of state support for industry and its impact, taking into account these features within the framework of the functioning of regional integration associations.
Methodology for assessing the level of state support for industry in regional integration associations. The primary information for assessing the level of state support is data on: -The total volume of state support in the RIA countries.
-The volume of state support for the development of exports of the RIA countries.
-Provision of support at the state and (if available) regional levels.
-Volumes of GDP of the RIA countries.
-Volumes of industrial production, including in the sectoral context of the RIA countries.
-Volumes of foreign and mutual trade of the RIA countries.
The assessment of the level of state support for industry is carried out on the basis of the algorithm presented in Fig. 1.
In accordance with Fig. 1, assessment of the level of state support includes: -Assessment of the level of state support for the entire industry of each RIA country and the integration association as a whole.
-Sectoral assessment of the level of state support for each country of the RIA and the integration association as a whole.
Assessing the level of state support for the entire industry, the following calculations are made: 1. Estimation of the volume of state support provided to industry: 1.1. Calculation of the volumes of state support provided to industrial enterprises in absolute terms for each RIA country. where is the level of state support to the GDP in the country ; is the volume of industrial subsidies provided in the country ; is the volume of the country's gross domestic product .
2.2. Calculation of the level of state support to the total volume of GDP as a whole in RIA according to the following formula: where is the level of state support to GDP in RIA as a whole; is the total number of RIA countries.
3. Ranking of RIA member states that provide state support to industrial enterprises, according to the level of state support to the total GDP. where is the level of state support in industrial production in the country ; is the volume of industrial production in value terms in the country .

3.2.
Calculation of the level of state support for industry to the total volume of industrial production in the whole RIA according to the following formula: where is the level of state support for industrial production in the RIA as a whole. 3.3. Ranking of each RIA country that provides state support to industrial enterprises by the share of state support in total industrial production. 4. Calculation of the level of state support for exports to the total volume of exports of industrial goods: 4.1. Calculation of the volume of state support for exports based on statistical data/acts on the execution of the budgets of the RIA countries, adjusted for the share of industrial goods in the volume of total exports (intraregional and external).
4.2. Calculation of the level of state support for exports to the total exports of manufactured goods of each RIA country using the following formula: where is the level of state support for exports to the total volume of exports of the country ; is the amount of allocated budget funds to support exports in the country ; is the total volume of exports of manufactured goods of the country . 4.3. Calculation of the level of state support for exports to the total exports of industrial goods of RIA according to the following formula: where is the level of state support for RIA exports.
4.4. Calculation of the share of state support for exports in the total amount of state support in each RIA country using the following formula: where is the share of state support for exports in the total volume of state support of the country .  where is the share of state support in the expenditure side of the RIA budget.
6. An industry assessment of the level of state support in a regional integration association is made on the basis of the following calculations: 6.1. Calculation of the level of state support in the total volume of industrial production of a single industry in each RIA country using the following formula: where is the level of state support for a particular industry in the country ; is the amount of subsidies provided to support a particular industry of the country ; is the volume of industrial production of a single industry in the country .
6.2. Calculation of the level of state support in the total volume of industrial production of a single industry in the whole RIA according to the following formula: where is the level of state support in the total volume of industrial production of a single industry in the RIA.
6.3. Ranking of industries of countries by the level of state support provided in each country and in general by regional integration association.
Methodology for assessing the impact of state support on individual economic development indicators. The main task of assessing the impact of state support is to determine whether and to what extent the goals originally set by it were achieved, as well as whether it affected the overall RIA market. Figure 2 shows a diagram of the stages of assessing the impact of support.
In accordance with the first stage, the authors analyzed the world experience in providing state support to industry in the RIA, which revealed that the main goals of providing support are most often: -Development of domestic production.
-Attraction of foreign investments.
-Stimulating the creation of innovative industries.
-Creation of jobs.
-Support for small and medium enterprises.
In this regard, at the second stage, a generalized assessment of the achievement of these goals can be carried out on the basis of the following indicators presented in Fig. 3.
Thus, at the third stage, using the method of correlation analysis, the presence and tightness of the relationship between the volume of state support (the volume of state support for exports) and the identified variables are revealed, and the values of the corresponding linear coefficients of pair correlation are calculated. However, it should be noted that the provision of industrial subsidies may have a delayed effect. Thus, the provision of subsidies in the current year may have a greater effect in subsequent years, and in

Approbation of the proposed methodology for assessing the level of state support for industry in regional integration associations.
Using the proposed methodology, the level of state support in two regional integration associations, the Free Trade Area between the United States, Mexico and Canada (USMCA) and the EU. At the same time, due to the lack of information in open sources on the volume of subsidies aimed at supporting exports, the level of state support will be calculated without calculating the level of export support. The table provides the necessary statistics for the evaluation.
In the period from 2016 to 2019 in the USMCA countries, the volume of government subsidies provided 5 increased by almost 21% (the largest volume is provided in the United States). As for the level of state 5 Calculated based on data from the International Monetary Fund. According to the IMF Government Finance Statistics Manual, subsidies include current grants that governments provide to businesses based on their level of productive activity, or the quantity or value of the goods or services they produce, sell, export, or import. support to GDP, it barely changed in the countries of the USMCA during the study period and did not exceed 0.41% (Fig. 4). The level of state support for industrial production is also quite stable and amounted to no more than 2.16% in 2019. The share of state subsidies in budget expenditures in the study period was approximately the same and amounted to no more than 1.17%.
It should be noted that in the USMCA countries the provision of state support is regulated at the national level. In accordance with the Agreement on the Establishment of a Free Trade Zone USMCA, the Parties, when providing state support, are guided by the provisions Agreements on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures of the World Trade Organization (hereinafter SSCM WTO), as well as consult on the possibility of developing more effective rules and regulations regarding the use of public subsidies. At the national level, the United States, Canada, and Mexico have developed systems of state support.
The United States has the most developed and comprehensive industry support system. The main feature of state support is to increase the competitiveness of the national industry and stimulate the rapid development of the latest industries and industries (nuclear energy, electronics, biotechnology, advanced materials, renewable energy resources and energy saving, technical means of communication, etc.). Various forms of support are used: grants, state guarantees, preferential loans, etc. It is common to provide government support at both the federal and state levels. In accordance with the US notification sent to the WTO, 6 at the state level, tax incentives, grants, blended financing, soft loans, etc. are provided.
In Canada, government support comes in a variety of forms. A significant amount of support is realized at the regional level. Measures to support SMEs in the form of 7 grants, concessional loans, financing of superclusters, state guarantees, etc. In accordance with Canada's notification to the WTO, 8 there is a program to support the entrepreneurship of native Canadians in order to develop competitive enterprises, in accordance with which grants and loans are provided on preferential terms. In addition, there is a business development program for enterprises to increase their number and increase their competitiveness (subsidies are provided in the form of repayable, conditionally repayable and nonrepayable loans). The practice of support through development institutions is widespread. For example, innovation activities are subsidized through the Atlantic Innovation Fund (ACOA). 6  In Mexico, special programs are being implemented to support promising industries, for example, there is a program for the development of the aerospace industry. In addition, much attention is paid to stimulating innovative sectors of the economy and the development of research and development work. The practice of supporting small and medium-sized businesses is widespread: the state provides concessional loans and grants for training, some assistance programs for small and medium-sized enterprises are aimed at stimulating the expansion of their activities in the foreign market.
In the period from 2016 to 2019 in the EU countries, the volume of state aid 9 increased by 52.4% and the level of state support to GDP increased significantly from 0.73% in 2016 to 0.99% in 2019 (see Fig. 4). The level of state support to the volume of industrial production increased from 3.22% in 2016 to 4.61% in 2019, and the share of state support in budget expenditures is steadily growing and in 2019 amounted to 9  2.37%, which indicates a significant role states in support of industrial development.
Describing the system of state support in the EU, it should be noted that it has its own general rules for the provision of state support. The basis for the legal regulation of the provision of such support is laid down in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union of 1957 (Articles 107-109). The central condition for the provision of state aid in the EU countries is compliance with common European interests (environmental protection and energy conservation, research, development and innovation, regional development, sectoral development). However, they can complement each other and coincide with national subsidizing interests. For example, national state aid schemes may provide support exclusively for SMEs located in the state. Among the EU member states, the share of spending on environmental protection and energy conservation is high, the leaders of such assistance are Germany, Denmark and the Czech Republic. Research, development and innovation are most supported in Finland, Hungary, Belgium, the Czech Republic and Poland [4].
The forms of state aid applied in the EU are quite diverse: grants, tax incentives (exemptions, deferrals,  . It should be noted that the EC is actively improving the rules for granting state aid. For example, in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic, the EC has temporarily adjusted certain rules for granting state support. In view of the fact that the coronavirus is considered as an unusual event that is beyond the control of governments, the EC has adopted temporary exemptions from the rules for granting state support.
The developed methodology for assessing the level of state support for industry makes it possible to determine the level of support for the industrial sector by the countries included in the RIA, the level of assistance to countries in promoting exports, as well as the level of support for industries. The calculation of these indicators will make it possible to assess the policy of countries and the RIA as a whole in relation to industry, as well as to develop common approaches to the directions of convergence of measures of state support for industry in general and individual industries in particular.
The methodology for assessing the impact of the state support provided to industry on individual economic indicators makes it possible to determine the positive and negative effects of the provided support measures and provides conditions for the use of reasonable decisions at the supranational and national levels in terms of developing a set of tools and the amount of state support, as well as indirectly assessing whether the provided support measures market support.
The methodology proposed in the article is applicable within the framework of any integration associations if the necessary information is available, access to which may be limited by the powers of the RIA bodies. In addition, the methodology is universal and, depending on the initial data, can be used to assess any form of state support.


s2fieldsofstudy: Economics Medicine

text:
Estimates of the Global Burden of COVID-19 and the Value of Broad and Equitable Access to COVID-19 Vaccines

The objectives of this research were to produce a macro-level overview of the global COVID-19 burden and estimate the value of access to COVID-19 vaccines. A targeted literature review collated evidence of the burden. Linear modelling and data analysis estimated the health and economic effects of COVID-19 vaccines delivered in 2021, and whether additional value could have been achieved with broader and more equitable access. By 1 December 2020, there had been an estimated 17 million excess deaths due to COVID-19. Low-income countries allocated more than 30% of their healthcare budgets to COVID-19, compared to 8% in high-income countries. All country income groups experienced gross domestic product (GDP) growth lower than predicted in 2020. If all 92 countries eligible for COVAX Advance Market Committee (AMC), access had reached 40% vaccination coverage in 2021, 120% more excess deaths would have been averted, equivalent to USD 5 billion (109) in savings to healthcare systems. Every USD spent by advanced economies on vaccinations for less advanced economies averted USD 28 of economic losses in advanced economies and USD 29 in less advanced economies. The cost to high-income countries when not all countries are vaccinated far outweighs the cost of manufacturing and distributing vaccines globally.

Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic has had many far-reaching effects on health, the economy and society, which continue to evolve and are often intertwined. There is already a rich and wide-ranging body of literature on the consequences of COVID-19, but this is highly disparate in terms of outcomes considered, geographic scope, and methodological approach. Challenges related to data availability in some low-and middle-income countries (LMICs) also mean that the burden of the pandemic in these countries has often been underestimated [1][2][3].
Vaccines for COVID- 19 have been developed at an unprecedented speed [4], and individuals in some countries have received four doses [5,6]. Yet as of 19 March 2022, only 14% of people in low-income countries had received at least one dose of a COVID-19 vaccine, compared to 79% of people in high-income countries [7]. There are compelling arguments to suggest that broad and equitable access to vaccines is not only a humanitarian imperative but is in everyone's economic interest-global economies are highly interconnected through trade linkages, ongoing pandemic-related disruption in one country can affect the economic performance of other countries [8,9]-as well as being our best line of defence against new and emerging variants of SARS-CoV-2 [10,11].
This study had two objectives. Firstly, to provide an international perspective on the health and economic burden of COVID-19, by summarising the current literature on the magnitude and distribution of these effects worldwide. Secondly, to estimate the health and economic value generated by COVID-19 vaccines as of 1 December 2021 and the potential additional value generated by broader and more equitable access to vaccines.

Estimating the COVID-19 Burden
This search aimed to identify geographically representative evidence relating to four elements of the COVID-19 burden of particular significance to patients, healthcare systems, and society overall. We considered effects on mortality using the indicators of estimated official deaths and excess deaths, because we recognise that official death counts provided may be limited by countries' testing capacity and that COVID-19 can indirectly cause deaths among non-infected individuals, which makes excess deaths a more comprehensive-if uncertain-estimate of the total impact of the pandemic on deaths than the confirmed COVID-19 death count alone [12]. We also considered effects on quality of life (QoL), the second dimension through which COVID-19 and other infections can impact on the health of individuals. To consider QoL, we used the indicator of estimated quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) due to COVID-19. The quality-adjusted life year or QALY is a generic measure of disease burden, including both the quality and the quantity of life lived. 1 QALY is equal to 1 year in perfect health. QALYs are routinely used as a summary measure of health outcomes in economic evaluation, and thus are useful to contextualize the scale of COVID-19's effects on health [13]. However, QALY estimates and other measures of the health effects of COVID- 19 are not yet available for most countries, and so we complemented this indicator with the number of COVID-19 infections to provide insight into the scale of the expected health effects in different countries and country income groups worldwide. To estimate effects on healthcare system functioning, we used the indicator of the percentage of total per capita healthcare budgets which have been allocated to COVID-19. This indicator provides insight into how far the burden of COVID-19 has disrupted existing health system functioning, and allowed us to make use of robust crosscountry data collected by the WHO [14]. To estimate effects on the macroeconomy, we used the indicator of changes in GDP, the 'gold standard' measure of an economy's size and overall performance [15]. We complemented this with the indicator of changes in working hours due to COVID-19 to provide insight into how affected macroeconomic performance have impacted the livelihoods of populations. Definitions of these elements are provided in Appendix A. We searched PubMed, Scopus, Web of Science, and EconLit for English-language papers published up to 31 August 2021 using the search strategy provided in Appendix A. This search was complemented with an additional snowballing search strategy (using the reference lists of identified papers to identify further papers and grey literature, from Greenhalgh and Peacock 2005). We then updated any quantitative results which were derived from live datasets on 1 December 2021.
For each value element (except effects on the macroeconomy, where the endogeneity between direct and indirect effects prevents identification of how these effects contributed to the total burden), we defined COVID-19's effects on health and the economy as either direct or indirect. Direct effects of COVID-19 are produced by a COVID-19 infection, for example, a death caused by an infection or a loss of productivity because a patient with a COVID-19 infection cannot go to work. All effects which cannot be directly attributed to an individual's infection with COVID-19 but are instead consequences of the circulation of COVID-19 in the population, and policy measures to address this, such as the QoL effects of mental health conditions created or exacerbated by lockdowns, are indirect [16]. Excess deaths measure the number of observed deaths compared to what would have been expected in the same time frame without the pandemic. It captures not only the confirmed deaths (reported direct deaths), but also COVID-19 deaths that were not correctly diagnosed and reported (unreported direct deaths) as well as deaths from other causes that are attributable to the overall crisis conditions (indirect deaths) [12].
The results are presented in a narrative synthesis structured by element, which describes the evidence identified for each outcome, and the distribution of these outcomes between lower-and higher-income countries. The results are disaggregated by country income groups, according to the World Bank's classification [17], which categorises countries discretely as either high-income (HICs), upper-middle-income countries (upper MICs), lower-middle-income countries (lower MICs) or low-income countries (LICs), based on their gross national income per capita.
Additionally, a heatmap/matrix of the identified evidence is used to demonstrate the availability of evidence, by geographic region, for the four elements. The colour-coding is used to demonstrate its credibility based on the quality of the indicator of the burden and its source.  [20]. The target was to vaccinate at least 40% in each country worldwide by the end of 2021, and the proposal was estimated to cost approximately USD 9 trillion, mainly in additional upfront grants to COVAX for purchasing vaccines [20].
Full details of our model are available in Appendix B.

The Economic Value of Global Access to COVID-19 Vaccines
To estimate the macroeconomic value of vaccines, we combined estimates from the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and IMF of the value and costs of global access to COVID-19 vaccines.

•
Estimates from the ICC: The ICC's paper "The Economic Case for Global Vaccinations" [21] uses an epidemiological susceptible−infected−recovered (SIR) model with an international trade and production network to estimate the economic costs of COVID-19 during a single year that were solely due to international linkages. The most realistic scenario (as identified by the authors) assumed that, in advanced economies, half of the susceptible population was vaccinated within the first 30 days of the vaccination programme starting, and the remaining half was vaccinated within the following 90 days. In less advanced economies, the vaccination program started at the same time, but it took a full year to vaccinate half of the susceptible population. The model estimated the economic losses associated with this scenario, compared to a hypothetical scenario of full vaccination in both advanced economies and less ad- Highly credible (i.e., from a highly credible source, either peer-reviewed or key data repositories) evidence on the direct mortality burden of COVID-19 is available across all regions, but an evidence gap exists regarding the indirect burden of COVID-19 in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (see Figure 1). Direct fatalities stemming from the pandemic may be underreported in these regions, which are predominantly comprised of LICs and lower MICs [17].
The number of official COVID-19 deaths reported globally and by country income group is presented in Figure 2 (per million population) and Table 1 (absolute figures). Due to differences in definitions, reporting, and testing facilities, it is likely that these results underestimate the number of deaths directly due to COVID-19 in some countries [12]. Furthermore, the pandemic has indirectly caused deaths by disrupting the provision of and access to healthcare.

Category Definition
Highly credible At least one indicator from a highly credible source, either peer-reviewed or key data repositories Credible At least one indicator from a credible source (can include grey literature) Credible proxy At least one proxy indicator from a highly credible or credible source Missing No credible indicators or proxy indicators identified The number of official COVID-19 deaths reported globally and by country income group is presented in Figure 2 (per million population) and to differences in definitions, reporting, and testing facilities, it is likely that these results underestimate the number of deaths directly due to COVID-19 in some countries [12]. Furthermore, the pandemic has indirectly caused deaths by disrupting the provision of and access to healthcare.  As Table 1 shows, rates of official deaths are highest in upper MICs and HICs. However, the much higher ratios of excess deaths to official deaths in lower MICs and particularly LICs indicates that official deaths have been significantly underestimated in these country income groups. Figure 1 shows that there is a lack of high-quality evidence on COVID-19′s direct and indirect effects on QoL worldwide, particularly in the sub-Saharan Africa region. Only one study to date, which used data from the UK, has estimated the number of QALYs lost due (directly and indirectly) to COVID-19 between March 2020 and February 2021 [23]. A total of 81,000 QALYs were lost due to morbidity from COVID-19 in the UK during this period. Far more data is available on COVID-19 infections. The number of COVID-19 infections reported globally and by country income group is shown in Figure 3 (per million population) and Table 2 (absolute figures). As for effects on length of life, differences in definitions, testing, and reporting mean that these results likely underestimate the number of infections in some countries [12], and the true number of cases is estimated to be far higher. Infection rates are highest in HICs, followed by upper MICs and lower MICs. The infection rates observed in HICs are more than 100 times higher than the rates observed in LICs. However, this is likely to be partly explained by correlation between countries' income and capacity for reporting and testing [12]. More research is needed to understand how COVID-19 infections affect QoL, and in particular the full consequences of long COVID, which are as yet unknown. As Table 1 shows, rates of official deaths are highest in upper MICs and HICs. However, the much higher ratios of excess deaths to official deaths in lower MICs and particularly LICs indicates that official deaths have been significantly underestimated in these country income groups. Figure 1 shows that there is a lack of high-quality evidence on COVID-19 s direct and indirect effects on QoL worldwide, particularly in the sub-Saharan Africa region. Only one study to date, which used data from the UK, has estimated the number of QALYs lost due (directly and indirectly) to COVID-19 between March 2020 and February 2021 [23]. A total of 81,000 QALYs were lost due to morbidity from COVID-19 in the UK during this period. Far more data is available on COVID-19 infections. The number of COVID-19 infections reported globally and by country income group is shown in Figure 3 (per million population) and Table 2 (absolute figures). As for effects on length of life, differences in definitions, testing, and reporting mean that these results likely underestimate the number of infections in some countries [12], and the true number of cases is estimated to be far higher. Infection rates are highest in HICs, followed by upper MICs and lower MICs. The infection rates observed in HICs are more than 100 times higher than the rates observed in LICs. However, this is likely to be partly explained by correlation between countries' income and capacity for reporting and testing [12]. More research is needed to understand how COVID-19 infections affect QoL, and in particular the full consequences of long COVID, which are as yet unknown. There are at present no available estimates of COVID-19 s indirect effects on QoL, nor of proxy indicators, at the global or country income group level.   There are at present no available estimates of COVID-19′s indirect effects on QoL, nor of proxy indicators, at the global or country income group level.

Impact on Health System Resource Use
As Figure 1 shows, there are significant evidence gaps across all regions in estimates of COVID-19′s direct and indirect effects on health system resource use. Table 3 shows per capita budget allocations for the COVID-19 response in 2020 by country income group, in absolute terms and as a proportion of per capita government spending on health in 2018, for a sample of 16 LICs, 60 upper and lower MICs, and 37 HICs (data are available only for lower MICs and upper MICs collectively). This provides a proxy indicator of the direct impact of COVID-19 on health system resource use. Even though low-income countries allocated far less to the COVID-19 response than middleand high-income countries, this equates to a much larger proportion of their overall health spending, which indicates that the COVID-19 burden is larger relative to health system capacity in low-income countries. Table 3. Spending on COVID-19 as a proportion of health system budgets [14] 1.

Indicator HICs Upper MICs and Lower MICs LICs
Per capita budget allocations for the COVID-19 response in 2020 USD 205 USD 20 USD 3.20 Per capita government spending on USD 2519 USD 158 USD 8.9

Impact on Health System Resource Use
As Figure 1 shows, there are significant evidence gaps across all regions in estimates of COVID-19 s direct and indirect effects on health system resource use. Table 3 shows per capita budget allocations for the COVID-19 response in 2020 by country income group, in absolute terms and as a proportion of per capita government spending on health in 2018, for a sample of 16 LICs, 60 upper and lower MICs, and 37 HICs (data are available only for lower MICs and upper MICs collectively). This provides a proxy indicator of the direct impact of COVID-19 on health system resource use. Even though low-income countries allocated far less to the COVID-19 response than middleand high-income countries, this equates to a much larger proportion of their overall health spending, which indicates that the COVID-19 burden is larger relative to health system capacity in low-income countries. In addition to the direct impact of COVID-19 on health system resource use, there will also be indirect consequences. Delays in diagnosis and treatment during the pandemic, when resources have been diverted to COVID-19, are expected to lead to permanent deteriorations in patients' conditions that will not only have negative effects on patients' lives but make those conditions more expensive to treat [24]. However, there is very little evidence available on these indirect consequences, the full effects of which will not be felt for several years. Macroeconomic effects can be produced directly by reducing the productivity of workers infected with COVID-19, and indirectly through lockdowns and other pandemicrelated restrictions. However, it is not possible using available data to disaggregate overall effects on GDP into those attributable to direct and indirect causes. There are credible proxy measures of COVID-19 s overall impact on macroeconomic performance available in every country, which exist in the form of deviation from the pre-COVID-19 projections of GDP (see Figure 1). Table 4 summarises these results by country income group and shows that the difference between project and estimated GDP growth in 2020 were largest in upper MICs, followed by HICs, lower MICs, and LICs. One channel through which COVID-19 has affected macroeconomic performance is reduction in working hours and employment. Across the world, people's ability to work during the pandemic has been hindered by government restrictions on workplaces, supply disruption, and macroeconomic contraction in general. Table 5 shows the percentage change in working hours from 2020 to 2019 by country income group. The decline was largest in lower MICs, followed by HICs, upper MICs, and LICs. 3 million excess (direct and indirect) deaths and 6.0 million hospitalisations have been averted and hospital resources worth USD 59 billion have been saved by COVID-19 vaccinations. Results for Scenario 2 show that, if the 40% vaccination target had been reached, a total of 1.8 million direct deaths, 9.5 million excess deaths, and 7.6 million hospitalisations of COVID-19 patients could have been averted, and hospital resources worth USD 64 billion have been saved. This is equivalent to more than twice the number of excess deaths averted under Scenario 1, and more than 25% more direct deaths and potential hospitalisations averted. The smaller increase in hospital resource use reflects relatively lower healthcare resource use costs in countries eligible for COVAX AMC access. Our results state that hospitalisations and hospital resource use could have been potentially averted, as opposed to averted. This is because the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) data used in our modelling predict the total need for hospital care, but do not consider healthcare system capacity constraints for delivering this care [25]. Figure 4 provides estimates of the value of vaccination in avoiding direct deaths, excess deaths, and hospitalisations under Scenario 1 and Scenario 2. Table 6 shows our estimates of the value of vaccines for these outcomes, as well as effects on the number of hospital beds, ICU beds, and the value of these effects on bed usage to healthcare systems under Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, including ranges based on +/− 5 percentage point input values for vaccine efficacy.
Vaccines 2022, 10, 1320 9 of 20 lower healthcare resource use costs in countries eligible for COVAX AMC access. Our results state that hospitalisations and hospital resource use could have been potentially averted, as opposed to averted. This is because the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) data used in our modelling predict the total need for hospital care, but do not consider healthcare system capacity constraints for delivering this care [25]. Figure 4 provides estimates of the value of vaccination in avoiding direct deaths, excess deaths, and hospitalisations under Scenario 1 and Scenario 2.  Table 6 shows our estimates of the value of vaccines for these outcomes, as well as effects on the number of hospital beds, ICU beds, and the value of these effects on bed usage to healthcare systems under Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, including ranges based on +/− 5 percentage point input values for vaccine efficacy.

The Economic Value of COVID-19 Vaccines
By increasing the size of the healthy workforce and reducing the need for lockdowns and other pandemic-related restrictions, vaccines are key to a country's recovery from the macroeconomic burden caused by COVID-19 [26]. However, because global economies are highly interconnected through trade linkages, ongoing pandemic-related disruption in one country can affect the economic performance of other countries. To date, the most

The Economic Value of COVID-19 Vaccines
By increasing the size of the healthy workforce and reducing the need for lockdowns and other pandemic-related restrictions, vaccines are key to a country's recovery from the macroeconomic burden caused by COVID-19 [26]. However, because global economies are highly interconnected through trade linkages, ongoing pandemic-related disruption in one country can affect the economic performance of other countries. To date, the most extensive macroeconomic model estimating the costs of delays to vaccination suggests a global loss of USD 3.8 trillion over one year if less advanced economies reached 50% vaccination as opposed to a hypothetical 100% vaccination (the model assumes 100% vaccination and therefore full economic recovery in advanced economies; the authors used the IMF's categorisation of countries as advanced economies, emerging market, and middle income economies, and low-income developing countries.). These results are conservative, given that many less advanced economies did not reach this threshold, and translate to a loss of more than 4% of pre-pandemic global GDP [21,27]. Of the USD 3.8 trillion loss, the model estimates that 49% (USD 1.86 trillion) would fall on advanced economies. This is due to their trade linkages with less advanced economies, which would bear the remaining 51% (USD 1.91 trillion).
The analysis below estimates that it will cost USD 66 billion to reach 100% vaccine coverage in the 92 countries eligible for AMC access. This is consistent with the figures published by the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator [28]. By dividing the expected macroeconomic benefits to advanced economies of increasing global vaccine coverage from 50% to 100% (USD 1.86 trillion) by this cost (USD 66 billion), we generated a conservative estimate of the return on investment for HICs if they were to finance 100% of the vaccination coverage in the AMC92. As Figure 6 illustrates, our estimates suggest that, for every 1 USD spent by advanced economies, they could expect to avert 28 USD of economic losses in a single year. A further 29 USD of economic losses would also be averted in less advanced economies (USD 1.91 trillion ÷ USD 66 billion). The collective cost to HICs when not all countries are vaccinated therefore heavily outweighs the cost of manufacturing and distributing vaccines globally. The size of the economic losses averted in a specific country depend on the sectoral composition of its economy. In HICs, the sectors which bear the highest economic costs are those that are most exposed to trade with less advanced economies, such as textiles and apparel, basic metals, and food and beverages [21]. Therefore, countries whose economy depends to a large extent on these sectors will be most affected by the continuing Figure 6. The return on investment to spending on broader and more equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines. The size of the economic losses averted in a specific country depend on the sectoral composition of its economy. In HICs, the sectors which bear the highest economic costs are those that are most exposed to trade with less advanced economies, such as textiles and apparel, basic metals, and food and beverages [21]. Therefore, countries whose economy depends to a large extent on these sectors will be most affected by the continuing disruption caused by the pandemic and accrue the greatest benefits from investing in global access to vaccination.

Estimates of the COVID-19 Burden
This paper collates the evidence of the global burden of COVID-19 for four key outcomes: length of life, QoL healthcare system resource use, and macroeconomic performance. While credible estimates of COVID-19 s effects on length of life and macroeconomic performance are available in every region worldwide, there are gaps in evidence for COVID-19 s indirect effects on QoL in sub-Saharan Africa, and major gaps worldwide in evidence for COVID-19 s effects on healthcare system resource use. This paper also summarises the best available evidence on the same four outcomes and provides evidence that countries in all income groups have been affected by the pandemic across all of these dimensions. While infection and mortality rates have been highest in HICs and upper MICs, there is also evidence that official death rates in LICs and lower MICs significantly underestimate the true burden in these countries. Governments in LICs have also allocated a much greater proportion of their healthcare budgets to the COVID-19 response than those in upper and lower MICs and HICs, which is likely to have major repercussions for the delivery of other healthcare and therefore the indirect health impact of COVID-19. Moreover, the absolute amounts spent by LICs per capita are absolutely much smaller than in other countries, meaning that they are worst affected in terms of access to vaccines. COVID-19 s impact on macroeconomic performance in 2020 was largest in HICs and upper MICs, although there is emerging evidence that these countries are also recovering faster [29].

Estimates of the Health Value of COVID-19 Vaccines
Our estimates of the health value of vaccines demonstrate that COVID-19 vaccines had substantial positive effects on deaths, hospitalisations, and healthcare system resource use in 2021, but that these effects could have been increased-by more than 50% in the case of excess deaths-if all 92 countries eligible to receive COVAX AMC access had achieved a 40% vaccination rate in their population by the end of 2021, as per the WHO and IMF targets [19,20].

Estimates of the Economic Value of COVID-19 Vaccines
Our estimates of the economic value of vaccines rely on the model produced by Çakmaklı et al. [21]. A full description of the limitations is available in the paper but include the limited sample of 65 countries to which the model is calibrated and the assumption of static global value chains, where producers and suppliers do not optimise as a response to the pandemic shock (by therefore restricting the scope to the first-round effects of the pandemic, this produces a conservative estimate of macroeconomic disruption and therefore of the economic value of vaccines).

Limitations
Our estimates of the COVID-19 burden are limited by gaps in the available evidence, along with the uncertainty associated with COVID-19 s long-term effects. The long-term QoL effects of 'long COVID' and disruption to the provision of other healthcare during the pandemic are still unknown, and there are also very limited data available on short-term QoL effects, while the scale of COVID-19 s macroeconomic effects are challenging to discern when many COVID-19-related unemployment and financial support programmes are still ongoing. These limitations suggest that our results are likely to be conservative.
The main limitation of our modelling to estimate the health value of vaccines is that it likely significantly underestimates the value of vaccinations for preventing death and hospitalisation-although in doing so it provides a conservative estimate from which to calculate the relative value of broader and more equitable access to vaccines. The most important reason for the underestimation is that these outcomes are mainly observed in older age groups and vulnerable populations. We, however, calculated coverage rates across the total population based on fully vaccinated individuals independent of their age or risk status. As most governments prioritised the vaccination of people of higher age or higher vulnerability, our model leads to significantly lower estimates compared to models that applied age-group-specific coverage rates. In addition, we only considered fully vaccinated individuals. This is conservative as it ignores the value of administered first shots within a 2-dose schedule in the primary vaccine series. Finally, the estimates for the indirect death to direct deaths ratios may be biased by measurement error and may have a larger impact in LICs due to the small numbers of observed deaths.
In addition, there are two potential key sources of additional value which our model does not attempt to capture: the value of vaccines in reducing transmission and mutation to new variants. In reducing transmission, COVID-19 vaccines help to reduce the total number of infections (among the vaccinated and unvaccinated), and consequently the associated mortality, morbidity, and healthcare system resource use. More complex, dynamic transmission models would be needed to quantify these additional benefits. By offering the virus fewer opportunities to mutate, COVID-19 vaccines may reduce the risk of new variants emerging [10,11]. Not only this, but by 'priming' the immune system, they can also reduce the severity of disease experienced by vaccinated patients infected with new variants, as emerging evidence on the Omicron variant suggests [30,31]. However, there is also some evidence to suggest that the Omicron variant may exhibit immune escape, which could in theory increase the probability of new variants [32].
Our estimates of the economic value of vaccines rely on cost estimates produced by the IMF, which are subject to high levels of uncertainty. However, the scale of the return on investment in vaccines to advanced economies which we estimate (USD 28 of benefit, to every USD 1 invested in vaccines) provides confidence in our key result, which is that it is in the economic interest of advanced economies to invest in global access to vaccines.

Conclusions
In conclusion, we have demonstrated that COVID-19 has placed a substantial burden on health, health systems, and the macroeconomy of countries worldwide. Although healthcare systems in LICs have allocated the highest proportion of their budgets to COVID-19, the absolute levels of this spending are much lower than in other countries, suggesting that additional investment in COVAX or similar programmes would be required to facilitate access to vaccines in these countries. We have also demonstrated that it is in the self-interest of richer countries to invest in this access. Broader and more equitable access COVID-19 vaccines would not only reduce the health burden in lower-income countries, but simultaneously provide global macroeconomic benefits that far outweigh their cost. Advanced economies are conservatively expected to make a 28-fold return on investment in providing vaccine access to less advanced economies. While the true value of vaccination is impossible to fully quantify, the COVID-19 pandemic has shown the true scale of its benefits and impact. Broader and more equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines is not only a humanitarian imperative, but in the world's economic interest. Finally, we note that as data about the pandemic increasingly become available, there will be an unprecedented opportunity for researchers to quantify many of the broader dimensions of the value of vaccines, which have historically been challenging to measure. Such research has a vital role to play in demonstrating the importance of investment in vaccine research and development and pandemic preparedness, and thereby reducing the risk posed by pandemics in the future. To ensure geographical representativeness, we searched for data relating to specific elements of the COVID-19 burden (effects on length of life, effects on QoL, effects on health system resource use and effects on the macroeconomy) in the three most populous countries of each region worldwide (see the list in the search strategy below). Definitions of these value elements are provided below in Table A1. When these three countries' populations did not account for more than 50% of the region's total, we included the next most populous countries in our searches to reach this threshold. We also included Israel because the speed of its initial vaccine rollout makes it an unparalleled source of data on the real-world effects of COVID-19 vaccines [12]. A list of the journals we searched is below. To avoid providing potentially misrepresentative results without sufficient context, we applied an exclusion criterion that evidence presented should cover a minimum period of 6 months. Our search strategy was formulated as follows: (COVID-19) AND ("value element name" OR "synonym") AND (country selection). An example for the value element length of life is shown below: (COVID-19) AND ("length of life" OR "death" OR "mortality") AND ("China" OR "Indonesia" OR "Japan" OR "France" OR "Germany" OR "Italy" OR "Russian Federation" OR "Turkey" OR "United Kingdom" OR "Brazil" OR "Colombia" OR "Mexico" OR "Algeria" OR "Egypt" OR "Iran" OR "Israel" OR "Canada" OR "United States of America" OR "USA" OR "Bangladesh" OR "India" OR "Pakistan" OR "Congo" OR "DRC" OR "Ethiopia" OR "Kenya" OR "Nigeria" OR "South Africa" OR "Uganda" OR "Global" OR "Worldwide") Reduced long-term physical functioning due to long COVID.
Mental health deterioration because of a lockdown.
Economic effects Impact on health system resource use While there are costs associated with any health care intervention, vaccines may also create value in the form of cost offsets.
The costs associated with treating a patient hospitalised with COVID-19.
Initial reduction in cost for alternative treatments which have been cancelled or paused.

Macroeconomic impact
The COVID-19 pandemic will have effects on GDP in the short run, for example because of lower productivity during lockdowns. The pandemic will also have long-run effects on GDP. For example, interruptions to education will reduce lifetime productivity.
A country with higher COVID-19 infection rates has a smaller healthy workforce.
Lockdown measures increase unemployment. relevant factors. Further details on the IHME model and data are provided on the IHME website [25].
Where required, we cleaned the dataset and matched each country to its region and income classifications defined by the World Bank and excluded countries where a matching was not possible. We then calculated the overall coverage rate for each country based on their respective population estimate and the provided data points on cumulative fully vaccinated people per country.
The final global dataset used for the analysis contained 161 countries representing more than 7.5 billion people globally. The countries and their representative population were distributed across income groups as shown below in Table A2. From this dataset, we created a subset of 56 countries (33 lower MICs and 23 LICs) that are on the AMC92 list, and for which the IHME's projections indicate that they will not reach 40% of their population being fully vaccinated by the end of 2021. A list of the 92 low-and middle-income economies eligible to get access to COVID-19 vaccines through Gavi COVAX AMC. Table A3. Distribution of countries and population across country income groups.

Number of infections
The number of people that are infected with COVID-19 each day, including those not tested, estimated by IHME.
Total number of direct deaths from COVID-19 The estimated number of deaths attributable to COVID-19, including unreported deaths, estimated by IHME.
Total number of hospital admission related to COVID-19 The mean of daily hospital admissions due to COVID-19, estimated by IHME

Appendix B.3. Vaccine Effectiveness Rates against Outcomes
Vaccine efficacy was calculated as an average of reported efficacy estimates of six vaccines listed on the WHO's Emergency Use Listing (WHO EUL) and contributed to the WHO's COVAX scheme at the time. The average efficacy estimates for preventing infections, hospitalisations, and deaths are reported below and were then fed into the model.

. Global Value of Vaccination Model
A linear model estimated the value of vaccination within both scenarios for all outcomes. Scenario 1: For each country and outcome of interest in 2021, the model calculated the differences between the counterfactual (what would have happened without any vaccination) and the observed outcomes, given the cumulative vaccination rates in each month. The annual country estimates were then aggregated by geographical region or income class. To estimate the counterfactual, each observed outcome was divided by the impact of the vaccine (based on efficacy and cumulative coverage).
Scenario 2: For each country, the model calculated the differences between the observed outcomes and the counterfactual (what would have happened if all AMC92 countries reached 40% coverage by the end of 2021). We therefore limited the analyses to those AMC92 countries that would not reach 40% coverage by the end of 2021 according to the IHME projections and applied a new linear trajectory starting in January 2021 to reach 40% coverage by the end of 2021. In this case, the counterfactual CF in each month, was estimated as follows where, O is the individual observed outcome, VE is the vaccine efficacy against each outcome, C new is the new coverage rate in the total population per month, and C Org is the actually observed coverage rate in each month. Indirect deaths due to COVID-19 were derived from ratios of recorded deaths to the amount that would be expected had the pandemic not occurred (referred to here as excess deaths). This can be thought of as deaths caused by the pandemic rather than COVID-19 directly. To calculate the ratios, data on total excess deaths [33] and total recorded direct deaths [12] up to 30 September 2021 were used. These data were reported by country and aggregated to give totals by World Bank income group. Subsequently, for each income group, the sum of excess deaths was divided by the sum of total deaths to give the following ratios: for HICs, the ratio was 1.19, for upper-middle-income countries, the ratio was 2.21, for lower MICs, the ratio was 7.98, and for LICs the ratio was 25.37. This implies that for every official death in LICs there are estimated to be more than 25 excess deaths.
The model estimated the hospital resource use avoided due to the vaccine, measured in hospital bed days and ICU bed days avoided. The difference between the two was taken to calculate the number of non-ICU bed days and ICU bed days, which were then used to weight estimates on the cost of these bed days. WHO-CHOICE [19] estimates on the unit cost of a hospital bed day were taken per region in USD and adjusted for inflation to 2021 USD using the appropriate USA inflation factor.
The WHO data does not provide regional cost estimates of an ICU bed day. We therefore leveraged a variety of studies that had estimated the average cost of an ICU bed day in specific countries across the globe and compared these to respective figures on the cost of a non-ICU bed day. This gave a distribution of ratios that showed how much more expensive an ICU bed day is versus a non-ICU bed day. These ratios fell in a range between 5-7. The WHO estimates on average regional non-ICU bed day costs were therefore increased by a factor of six (midpoint) to proxy values on ICU bed day unit costs. The relevant unit costs were then applied to estimates on non-ICU and ICU bed days avoided to derive hospital resource costs that were avoided due to the vaccine.