5.  The applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Mlini. 6.  The applicant was an employee of the publicly-owned enterprise Mlini Hotels. In 1970 the applicant moved into a flat in Mlini, Dubrovnik, situated in a publicly-owned building. 7.  On 9 July 1997 the Republic of Croatia sold the building where the flat the applicant occupied was situated to Mlini Hotels, which had in the meantime become a private enterprise. 8.  On 9 May 2005 Mlini Hotels brought a civil action in the Dubrovnik Municipal Court, seeking the applicant’s eviction on the ground that she had no legal basis to occupy the flat. 9.  On 19 October 2005 the applicant lodged a counterclaim, requesting the Dubrovnik Municipal Court to recognise her protected tenancy on the flat she occupied and to issue a judgment which would replace the contract on the sale of the flat. 10.  On 25 October 2005 the applicant entered a sale contract, purchasing another flat in Dubrovnik. 11.  On 28 December 2005 the Dubrovnik Municipal Court reached a decision on the basis of documentary evidence. It accepted the plaintiff’s claim and dismissed the applicant’s counterclaim and ordered the applicant to vacate the flat. The relevant part of the judgment reads:
“This court has established in the first place that the premises in dispute are not a flat within the meaning of section 6 § 1(1) of the Housing Act ... which prescribes that a flat is a unit of premises, designed for permanent dwelling, with the necessary pertinent premises, which in principle constitutes a single construction unit and has a separate main entrance. The plaintiff’s submissions, uncontested by the defendant, indicate that the defendant is occupying premises measuring 43 square metres and consisting of four rooms and a communal bathroom with a toilet and hall. It is thus clear that this is not a single construction unit, in other words, that the said premises are not a flat within the meaning of the Housing Act.
Besides, it is undisputed between the parties that the premises in question are situated in the plaintiff’s personnel’s building, as is shown in the documents submitted by the defendant with her counterclaim. Since this building was intended to provide temporary accommodation for the plaintiff’s employees, the defendant could not acquire a protected tenancy of these premises, pursuant to section 8 § 1(1) of the Housing Act ... which provides that a protected tenancy may not be acquired in respect of flats intended for temporary occupation. Besides, since the premises in question are not a flat within the meaning of the Housing Act, the defendant could not acquire a protected tenancy on the basis of section 91 of the Housing Act ... as she stated in her counterclaim, asserting that she had a protected tenancy of the ‘flat’ in question, allegedly given to her by the plaintiff for her occupation until another flat became available, since no other flat had subsequently been given to her. The defendant has not provided documentary proof of her assertion ... nor could this assertion be proved by evidence from witnesses – former tenants in the ‘personal [sic] building’ who had been given other flats - or by testimony from the defendant, as she suggested in her counterclaim, and therefore this court rejects the proposed evidence as superfluous and aimed at delaying the proceedings.
... the defendant could not acquire a protected tenancy of the premises in question because they had been allocated to her, on the same basis as to the plaintiff’s other employees, for temporary occupation without a decision granting the flat for occupation, or any other valid legal basis for acquiring a protected tenancy...
...
Since it has been established that the plaintiff is the owner of the premises object of these proceedings, which premises are occupied by the defendant without a valid legal basis, this court has adopted a decision under point 1 of this judgment [order that the defendant vacate the flat], on the basis of section 161 of the Property Act.” 12.  In her appeal of 20 January 2006 the applicant argued that, owing to the passage of time and the war in Croatia, she had lost [her copy of] the decision granting her the right to occupy the flat. However, she alleged that her entitlement could be proved by evidence from witnesses and by her testimony. The witnesses she proposed would also testify to other relevant matters, for example that the plaintiff had held meetings with tenants at which they had tried to find an optimal solution and it was suggested that another flat would be allocated to her; certain steps were even taken in that direction. One of the tenants had been allocated another flat. Another option discussed was alterations to the building in question, and the plaintiff had even presented a project in that respect. She further argued that the premises she occupied were a single unit, and therefore a flat, since the Housing Act provided that the premises comprising a flat ‘in principle [constituted] a single construction unit’. She further argued that she had lived in the flat for over thirty-five years and that it could not be considered as a place she was occupying on a temporary basis. She argued that the first-instance court, before reaching its conclusion, should have heard relevant evidence and then made an assessment of all relevant matters. 13.  On 31 October 2006 the applicant finalised the purchase of another flat in Dubrovnik (see paragraph 10 above). Her ownership of that flat was entered in the Land Registry of the Dubrovnik Municipal Court in 2007. 14.  On 31 January 2008 the Dubrovnik County Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal against the first-instance judgment. The relevant part of the judgment reads:
“The first-instance court rejected a request by the defendant to hear evidence from the parties and to carry out an on-site inspection, and gave necessary and valid reasons within the meaning of section 8 of the Civil Procedure Act, which reasons are endorsed by this court ...
A party’s testimony is not evidence capable of proving a right to a protected tenancy, especially in a situation where [the first-instance] court has established that the premises have been designated as temporary accommodation and allocated to the defendant as such.
As regards the allegation that by hearing evidence from the defendant the [first-instance] court would have learned that the documentation had been lost during the war and would have known from whom to seek the documentation, it should be noted that the burden of proof is on the defendant and if she knew where the documentation was to be found she should have [obtained] it herself. A court is not obliged or even authorised to [obtain such documentation] of its own motion.
The defendant’s request that evidence be heard from witnesses, former tenants of the same building ... is unclear and does not amount to evidence within the meaning of section 241 of the Civil Procedure Act.
That provision requires that a party who calls for a witness to give evidence must indicate what the witness would testify about, as well as the name, address and occupation of the witness to be called.
...
The case file shows that:
- the plaintiff is registered as the owner of the ... building in which the disputed premises are located;
- the premises in question were designated as temporary occupation for the plaintiff’s employees;
- the defendant is occupying those premises without a decision by the plaintiff granting her the right to occupy them either temporarily or permanently (as a unit of premises defined as a flat within the meaning of section 6 paragraph 1 of the Housing Act ...);
- the defendant has refused to vacate the premises ...
On the basis of the above facts, the first-instance court correctly concluded that the defendant had not acquired protected tenancy on the premises she occupied and that there was no other ground for denying the plaintiff’s request for re-possession of his property.” 15.  The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint whereby she reiterated the arguments from her appeal (see paragraph 12 above), which was dismissed on 30 June 2009. The Constitutional Court entirely endorsed the lower courts’ reasoning, limiting its assessment to the non-existence of a legal basis for the applicant to occupy the flat. That decision was served on the applicant on 20 July 2009. 16.  On 18 July 2008 Mlini Hotels applied to the Dubrovnik Municipal Court, requesting that it enforce its judgment ordering the applicant’s eviction. The writ of execution to that effect was issued on 7 August 2008. The applicant lodged an appeal on 5 November 2008. 17.  On 10 December 2010 the Dubrovnik Municipal Court terminated the enforcement proceedings on the ground that on 25 November 2010 Mlini Hotels had informed that court that the applicant had moved out of the flat. 18.  According to the Government, in 2009 the applicant moved to the flat she had bought in 2006. 19.  According to the applicant, she was forcibly evicted from the flat owned by Mlini Hotels on 19 November 2010.