5.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Ireland. 6.  Further to a complaint in 1995, in September 1995 the applicant was requested to attend a local police station to be interviewed. In October 1995 he was arrested for further questioning, following which a summons issued in September 1996 charging him with sexual assault. Over a number of hearings before the District Court (October 1996-January 1997) the applicant argued that the case should be disposed of by summary trial. 7.  In February 1997 he was granted leave by the High Court to apply for judicial review on two grounds: that the prosecution had brought unlawful pressure to bear on him as it would not consent to a summary trial unless he pleaded guilty and, further, that there was a pattern of abuse of process and fundamental unfairness amounting to oppression and a denial of justice. 8.  Between July 1997 and October 2002 the High and Supreme Courts made several orders essentially in the applicant’s favour concerning discovery by the prosecution to him of documents, ending with the production, in November 2002, of a letter. 9.  In December 2002 the applicant obtained leave to add a ground to his pending judicial review application: he argued that delay in his prosecution was contrary to the Constitution and to Article 6 of the Convention. 10.  In February 2003 the High Court judicial review hearing was adjourned (the trial judge was unavailable to finish it) and it ended in March 2003. Judgment was delivered in March 2004 staying the prosecution as there had been a breach of his constitutional right to trial with reasonable expedition and because there was a real risk that he would not receive a fair trial. In May 2004 the prosecution appealed. 11.  The Supreme Court delivered judgment in July 2006 reversing that of the High Court. As to his contention that he had been subjected to pressure to plead guilty, there could be no objection to the District Court ascertaining whether an accused wished to plead guilty. The applicant, who was legally represented, was clearly not oppressed or induced to plead guilty and, importantly, he was never asked how he proposed to plead, he never pleaded and he was never “put on his election”. As to his right to a speedy or expeditious trial, the Supreme Court found that the stay on prosecution was not justified by delay: the applicant’s judicial review process interrupted the criminal process; his judicial review application was without merit as it must have been obvious to his legal advisers that he was not put under any pressure to plead; and, while there had been undoubtedly unnecessary delay by the prosecution, the applicant had equally delayed. The principal reason for the failure to go to trial was that the applicant had brought unfounded judicial review proceedings in the course of which he conducted a “war of attrition” with the prosecution in respect of discovery from which he secured minimal benefit. 12.  On 25 January 2007 the prosecution successfully applied to the District Court for the applicant to be forwarded for trial on indictment in the Circuit Criminal Court. The latter adjourned his trial three times (in February, May and June 2007) pending the prosecution furnishing documents. On the last date the trial was fixed for November 2007. 13.  The applicant died in July 2007, bringing the criminal proceedings to an end.