4.  The applicant was born in 1974 and lives in Zambrów. 5.  On 29 October 2003 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of, inter alia, drug trafficking as part of an organised criminal group. Subsequently, he was remanded in custody. 6.  On 1 August 2004, while the applicant was under psychiatric observation, he fled from hospital. 7.  On 23 September 2005 he was arrested in Belgium on the basis of a European arrest warrant issued against him. He unsuccessfully contested his extradition to Poland. 8.  On 30 November 2005 the applicant was returned to Poland and detained again. 9.  On 15 December 2005 the bill of indictment against the applicant was lodged with the Białystok District Court. The applicant was charged with (I) trafficking in a significant quantity of drugs, (II) leading an organised armed criminal group, (III) attempted armed robbery, (IV) trafficking in arms and (V) escape from a psychiatric hospital. 10.  On 28 December 2005, 13 March, 22 June, 15 September and 12 December 2006, and 21 June 2007 the Białystok Regional Court gave decisions extending the applicant’s detention. 11.  On 13 February 2006 the trial began. 12.  On 27 June 2006 the trial court summoned witness Ł.K. by post. It also requested the police to serve a summons on this witness. The police carried out an inquiry and established that Ł.K. was living in England at an unspecified address and that the date of his return to Poland remained unknown. On 5 July 2006 the Siemiatycze Police informed the court that a summons could not be served on the witness for the above reasons. 13.  At the hearing held on 10 July 2006 the prosecutor requested the trial court to read out the statements of witnesses who were abroad. The applicant’s counsel objected to this request. The trial court decided that the statements of witnesses Ł.K. and M.K. given in the course of the investigation should be read out pursuant to Article 391 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure since they lived abroad and their date of return to Poland remained unknown; thus, there was no possibility to hear them before the court.
The applicant commented that the statements made by Ł.K. were untrue. He admitted that he had sold small quantities of drugs to Ł.K. on two or three occasions. The applicant requested that the court establish Ł.K.’s address because “he had many questions to ask him”. 14.  At the hearing on 1 August 2006 witness D.B. testified. He stated that in 2002 or 2003 he had started receiving drugs from the applicant and that this had continued until October – November 2003. The applicant had been D.B.’s only supplier. During that period there had been a few dozen transactions with the applicant. He had been selling drugs received from the applicant and had then paid him back. D.B. answered questions put to him by the applicant. 15.  Witness Ł.B. testified that he had been selling drugs supplied exclusively by the applicant. 16.  At the same hearing the applicant requested that Ł.K. be questioned by way of international judicial assistance by a court in Ireland. He submitted that the witness was living in Ireland and provided his address there. The prosecutor left the matter to the court’s discretion. 17.  At the hearing on 15 September 2006 the prosecutor supported the applicant’s request as regards the questioning of Ł.K. by means of international judicial assistance. The trial court dismissed the applicant’s request holding that:
“...the witness is abroad and his statements were read out in accordance with Article 391 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” 18.  At the same hearing the applicant explained that he had sold drugs to Ł.K. but not in such large quantities as claimed by Ł.K. in the investigation. He also admitted that he had sold small quantities of drugs to D.B. and Ł.B. All in all, he stated to have sold half a kilogram of marihuana, 500-600 grams of amphetamine and 250-300 ecstasy tablets. 19.  In a pleading of 12 October 2006 the applicant requested the court to hear a group of thirteen witnesses. They were to testify about the quantity of drugs trafficked by the applicant and that the applicant had not been the only supplier of drugs to the witnesses who had incriminated him. At the hearing held on 17 October 2006 the trial court dismissed the applicant’s request to hear those witnesses, considering that their evidence was irrelevant for the outcome of the case. 20.  At the hearing on 16 November 2006, the trial court decided that the statements of witness K.M. given in the course of the investigation be read out in accordance with Article 391 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It noted that it resulted from the police inquiry that a summons could not have been served on this witness as he was not living at his place of residence. The applicant commented that the statements of K.M. were untrue. 21.  At the same hearing, the applicant requested the trial court to establish the address of Ł.K. with the assistance of a probation officer (kurator). He submitted that Ł.K. had been placed under the supervision of a probation officer and argued that Ł.K. was under an obligation to remain in permanent contact with him. The trial court dismissed the applicant’s request holding that:
“...the witness in question is abroad, his statements [made during the investigation] have been read out and attempts to establish his current address are immaterial for the outcome of the proceedings.” 22.  At the hearing on 5 December 2006 the trial court informed the applicant that the third charge (attempted armed robbery) could be reclassified as trespass. 23.  On 12 December 2006 the Białystok District Court gave judgment. It convicted the applicant of drug trafficking on the basis of section 56 § 3 in conjunction with section 59 § 1 of the Drug Addiction (Combating) Act 2005, which provided for a fine and deprivation of liberty for up to ten years for trafficking in psychoactive substances in “significant quantities”.
The trial court further convicted the applicant of trespass, trafficking in arms and escape. It sentenced him to a cumulative penalty of five years’ imprisonment. The applicant was acquitted of the charge of leading an organised armed criminal group. 24.  In respect of the charge of trafficking in drugs, the trial court held:
“With regard to the first charge, i.e. trafficking in drugs, it is first of all the testimonies of persons who were directly involved in the [alleged] criminal activities and who described them in detail, which persuade the court of R. Kostecki’s guilt. It concerns primarily [testimonies] of Ł.K., brothers D.B. and Ł.B. as well as K.M. These witnesses (...) in the course of the proceedings on a few occasions explained in detail their past, indicating persons with whom they had traded in drugs. They indicated not only the names or nicknames of the persons who had sold them drugs, but also indicated their buyers. They also indicated the quantity of drugs sold and their price. What is most important, they described in unison the role of R. Kostecki in the enterprise.
It transpires from the testimonies of D.B. and Ł.B. that the defendant [the applicant] proposed to cooperate with them in distributing drugs. They were to sell drugs supplied by Rafał Kostecki and then to pay him back. (...)
Ł.K. described cooperation with the defendant in a similar manner. (...) K.M. also made statements incriminating the applicant. (...) It is true that in the course of the [separate] trial in a case before the Białystok Regional Court III K 144/04 K.M. attempted to change his statements and argued that Rafał Kostecki had nothing to do with drugs; however, it was difficult to consider these statements convincing in the light of the earlier coherent and detailed depositions.”
The trial court considered the testimonies of those witnesses to be credible as they were concordant, detailed and mutually complementary. According to these testimonies there was no doubt for the court that the applicant had been involved in trafficking in significant quantities of drugs. 25.  The trial court further held that:
“The assessment of the credibility of those testimonies is certainly not affected by the fact that Ł.K. and K.M. could not have been heard directly before the court. These witnesses do not live at their places of residence and the court had good reason to disclose the testimonies of these witnesses in accordance with Article 391 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.” 26.  The trial court considered the applicant’s testimony to be unreliable. It noted that in the course of the investigation the applicant had claimed that we has innocent and had refused to make any statements. At the trial, he had initially refuted the incriminating testimonies of those witnesses, but eventually he had admitted to selling to brothers D.B. and Ł.B. as well as to Ł.K. only small quantities of drugs. In the court’s view, the conduct of the applicant, who had decided to plead guilty in part at the end of the proceedings, was solely motivated by his desire to obtain a more lenient sentence. 27.  The statements of M.K. were not relied on by the trial court. 28.  The first-instance judgment was challenged by the applicant and his counsel. In his appeal the applicant argued, inter alia, that the trial court had breached the rules of criminal procedure by placing excessive reliance on the practice of reading out the statements given by witnesses in the course of the investigation. He alleged that the trial court had failed to clarify all relevant circumstances of the case, in particular by refusing to hear the thirteen witnesses indicated in his pleading of 12 October 2006. The applicant further argued that the trial court had erroneously determined that he had been trafficking in large quantities of drugs. 29.  He also challenged his conviction for escape on the ground that this charge had not been included in the European arrest warrant. The prosecutor appealed against the sentence imposed on the applicant both in respect of individual offences and of the cumulative sentence. 30.  On 20 September 2007 the Białystok Regional Court held a hearing. On 24 September 2007 it partly amended the first-instance judgment. The Regional Court quashed it in part as regards the conviction for escape and discontinued the proceedings in this respect. It found that the charge of escape had not been included in the European arrest warrant and the subsequent decisions of the Belgian courts allowing the applicant’s extradition. 31.  Furthermore, the appellate court increased the penalty in respect of the conviction for drug trafficking to 5 years and 6 months’ imprisonment. In this respect, it found that the trial court had not sufficiently taken into account the circumstances militating against the applicant, such as his leading role in the drug trafficking venture, the very large quantities of drugs involved, his previous convictions and his behaviour during the proceedings (escape from the psychiatric hospital and going into hiding). Consequently, the appellate court increased the cumulative penalty to 6 years and 6 months’ imprisonment. It upheld the remainder of the first‑instance judgment. 32.  The Regional Court found that the trial court had correctly assessed all the evidence in the case. In respect of the charge of drug trafficking, it held that the alleged failure of the trial court to elucidate all relevant circumstances had not been substantiated. With regard to the alleged breach of criminal procedure concerning the excessive use of Article 391 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the appellate court found:
“...the first-instance court undertook a series of measures aimed at a thorough examination of the circumstances of the case. In particular, the court made efforts to hear all key witnesses, including Ł.K. However, since Ł.K. was abroad at the material time (a request to hear this witness by means of international judicial assistance was dismissed by the decision of 15 September 2006) the court had the right to read out his statements made in the investigation stage of the proceedings.
...
The first-instance court correctly dismissed the request to hear other witnesses proposed by the defendant, including those indicated in his pleading of 12 October 2006 (...). The circumstances on which they were to testify would have been irrelevant for the determination of the case, in particular in the light of other items of evidence...
The first-instance court did not infringe the principle of directness [pursuant to which all evidence should normally be produced at a public hearing] and the applicant’s right to defence. (...)
In any event, M.K., as well as the above-mentioned Ł.K., were abroad. While, K.M. [also] referred to in the defendant’s appeal was beyond the reach of the police. (...)
There can be no agreement with the appellants who allege that the first-instance court determined the quantity (and the value) of drugs in an arbitrary manner. On the contrary – as it transpires from the written reasoning of the impugned judgment – the court’s findings in this respect result from detailed (in so far as this is possible in this type of cases) [analysis of] witnesses’ testimonies given – understandably, in particular in the circumstances of the present case – at the initial stage of the criminal proceedings, and in particular the testimonies of D.B. and Ł.B. (...)
Significantly, as it transpires from the reasoning of the impugned judgment, the first-instance court took into account the minimum quantity and value [of drugs]. Therefore, it did not infringe Article 5 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the in dubio pro reo principle).” 33.  The applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court. He argued, inter alia, that the trial court had read out the statements of Ł.K., which constituted one of the most important items of evidence in his case, and by doing so had prevented the applicant from putting questions to him. He alleged a breach of his defence rights, invoking Article 391 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 34.  The applicant claimed that the courts had not used all available means to secure the presence of Ł.K. at the trial. He pointed to the fact that, at the material time, Ł.K. was under the supervision of a probation officer and that it would have been possible to summon him or to question him by means of international legal assistance. 35.  The applicant further contested the refusal to hear a group of thirteen witnesses indicated in the pleading of 12 October 2006. In his view, their evidence would have been relevant for the outcome of the case. He also alleged that he could not have been convicted of trespass as this charge had not been listed in the European arrest warrant. 36.  On 24 June 2008 the Supreme Court held a hearing in the presence of the applicant’s lawyer and gave judgment. It quashed the Regional Court’s judgment in respect of the applicant’s conviction for trespass and discontinued the proceedings in this part. The Supreme Court dismissed the remainder of the cassation appeal as manifestly ill-founded. 37.  With regard to the complaint about the refusal to hear a group of thirteen witnesses and the reading out of Ł.K.’s statements, the Supreme Court held:
“As regards the complaints of an alleged violation of criminal procedure as a result of the trial court’s refusal to hear thirteen witnesses and its reading out of the statements given by Ł.K. before the prosecutor, these are in fact directed against the trial court’s judgment and it is obvious that, in a cassation appeal, only the judgment of the second-instance court may be challenged. The above complaints have already been raised in appeals and have been properly dismissed as ill-founded by the appellate court.” 38.  The Supreme Court’s judgment with reasoning was served on the applicant on 8 September 2008. 39.  On 22 December 2008 the applicant asked the Białystok Detention Centre authorities to send his application to the Court. 40. The applicant produced copies of envelopes and a letter from the authorities of the Białystok Detention Centre of 15 July 2008 confirming that the correspondence with his lawyer had been interfered with on 20 March and 4 September 2006.