5.  The applicant was born in 1981. On 9 January 2013 he was due to be released from Sukhodilska Prison no. 36 in the Lugansk Region, having served his sentence. His current place of residence is unknown. 6.  On 22 October 2005 two people attempted to break into a car belonging to K., who impeded the thieves and caught one of them (“B.”). 7.  On 6 January 2006, at about 6 p.m., the applicant broke into a car belonging to N. and tried to dismantle some equipment therein. N. caught the applicant and handed him over to the police. 8.  On the same date, one of the arresting officers wrote a report to his superior in the Sevastopol Police Department about the aforementioned incident, referring to the car theft, the complaint by N. in that regard, and the applicant’s apprehension and arrest. It was mentioned in the report that the applicant had been drunk and had to be restrained with handcuffs. 9.  On 7 January 2006 the Leninskyy District Court of Sevastopol (“the Leninskyy Court”) ordered that the applicant be placed in administrative detention for three days for being drunk in a public place at 6 p.m. on 6 January 2006. 10.  On 9 January 2006 an investigator of the Leninskyy District Police Department, referring to the events of 6 January 2006, arrested the applicant on suspicion of robbery. 11.  On 12 January 2006 the Leninskyy Court remanded the applicant in custody for two months, allowing an application by the investigator to that effect. The court noted that the applicant had been caught in flagrante delicto. Furthermore, he had committed the offence in question while drunk, and within a year of being released from prison. The court also noted that the applicant was unemployed. It was mentioned in the ruling that the decision could be appealed against within three days. 12.  From 13 January 2006 the applicant was represented by a lawyer. 13.  With regard to the events of 22 October 2005 (see paragraph 6 above), on 7 February 2006 the Leninskyy Court, sitting in a single-judge formation (“Judge R.”), found B. guilty of robbery while drunk and following conspiracy by a group. It relied on the factual account given by B., who had said that he had become acquainted with the applicant (referred to in the verdict as “the other person” and known to B. as “Sergey”) shortly before the incident, and that it had been the applicant’s initiative to steal stereo equipment from cars. According to B., the applicant had undertaken to teach him car theft techniques. 14.  The court also established that the applicant had tried to break into K.’s car using scissors, while B. had been standing by. As the car had had tinted windows, the thieves had not noticed that K. had been inside. He had opened the door and asked them what they had been doing. The applicant had threatened K. with the scissors and had rudely told him to leave the scene, while B. had taken a knife out of his pocket and had pointed it at him. As the owner of the car resisted, the applicant had hit him with a bottle, which had been in his other hand. B. and the applicant had then tried to escape. K. had however managed to catch B. 15.  Judge R. sentenced B. to three years and six months’ imprisonment. The punishment, being more lenient than the minimum sentence prescribed by the criminal legislation, was deemed appropriate given that B. had confessed in full to having committed the crime and had shown genuine remorse. He had compensated the victim for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage suffered, and K. had submitted that he had no further complaints or claims against B. 16.  The applicant was not involved in the above proceedings. 17.  The judgment of 7 February 2006 was not challenged on appeal and became final. 18.  On 23 February 2006 K. identified the applicant as the second thief who had tried to break into his car. B. also identified the applicant as his accomplice. 19.  On 1 March 2006 the applicant requested the investigator to consider replacing his detention with a less restrictive preventive measure; however, on the same date the investigator rejected that request. He noted that the applicant had an extensive criminal record (four convictions), that his pre-trial detention had been authorised by a reasoned court decision, and that, having been legally represented from the day after the decision of 12 January 2006 had been delivered, he could have, but had chosen not to, appeal. 20.  On 7 March 2006 the applicant was indicted on two counts of robbery in respect of the incidents involving K. and N. 21.  On 9 March 2006 the case was sent to the Leninskyy Court for trial. 22.  On 10 March 2006 the applicant’s lawyer, relying on Article 5 §§ 1 and 5 of the Convention, complained to the Leninskyy Court that his client had been unlawfully detained between 6 and 12 January 2006 and had a right to compensation. He requested the court to summon N. and the police officers who had arrested the applicant on 6 January 2006. They had witnessed the events and could potentially confirm that the applicant had in fact been detained as a criminal suspect rather than someone who had committed an administrative offence. 23.  On the same date the applicant’s lawyer lodged an administrative claim against the Governor of the Simferopol Pre-Trial Detention Centre (SIZO) with the Zaliznychnyy District Court of Simferopol (“the Zaliznychnyy Court”), alleging that the continued detention of the applicant after 6 March 2006 (that is, after the expiry of his two months’ pre-trial detention calculated from 6 January 2006) was unlawful. Relying on Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, the lawyer requested the immediate examination of his complaint and the applicant’s release. 24.  On 21 March 2006 the applicant’s lawyer again requested the SIZO administration to release his client immediately. On the same date he complained to the President of the Zaliznychnyy Court about the delay in the examination of his claim of 10 March 2006. 25.  On 21 March 2006 a judge of the Leninskyy Court rejected the applicant’s request to have witnesses summoned with a view to determining that his detention on 6 January 2006 had been unlawful. 26.  On 29 March 2006 the Leninskyy Court rejected the applicant’s complaint regarding the alleged unlawfulness of his detention from 6 to 12 January 2006. The court noted in its ruling as follows:
“The court has established that the pre-trial investigation authority was clearly aware of the fact that the applicant had been arrested immediately after having committed a criminal offence on 6 January 2006. Nevertheless, his arrest [as a criminal suspect] only took place on 9 January 2006. Those circumstances disclose a violation by the pre-trial investigation authority of the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure ... concerning detention and would justify the delivery of a special ruling”. 27.  Nevertheless, the court arrived at a general conclusion that there had been no significant violation of the criminal procedural legislation and rejected the complaint. 28.  The applicant appealed. 29.  On 7 April 2006 the Leninskyy Court held a preparatory hearing for the trial. It rejected the applicant’s request for release given, in particular, his criminal record, lack of employment and the fact that he had no permanent place of residence. 30.  On 1 June 2006 the applicant’s mother was admitted in the proceedings as his lay representative in her capacity as a close relative. 31.  On 6 June 2006 the Sevastopol Court of Appeal (“the Court of Appeal”) upheld the ruling of the Leninskyy Court of 29 March 2006 (see paragraphs 26-27 above). It noted that the issue of the applicant’s administrative detention from 6 to 9 January 2006 was beyond the scope of the examination. The subsequent detention was regarded as being in compliance with the law. As to the applicant’s unsuccessful request to have the witnesses to his arrest on 6 January 2006 summoned, the appellate court pointed out that such a request had no basis in the applicable provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 32.  On 19 September 2006 the applicant requested the Leninskyy Court to release him subject to him giving an undertaking not to abscond. He contended that there were no reasons to fear that he would abscond or impede the investigation if at liberty. The applicant provided his address and stated that before the arrest he had been working on a construction site. He further stated that his past criminal convictions should not be used to justify his pre-trial detention in the ongoing criminal proceedings. 33.  On the same date the Leninskyy Court rejected the request. It noted that, in the light of all the circumstances, the applicant could not be trusted to cooperate with the investigation or to not commit further offences. 34.  On 10 December 2006 the term of office of the judge dealing with the applicant’s case in the Leninskyy Court expired. 35.  On 25 April 2007 the case was referred to Judge R., the same judge who had earlier tried B. (see paragraphs 13-15 above). 36.  On 12 October 2007 Judge R. sought to recuse herself from the case. Her reasons were as follows:
“Given that I have examined the criminal case of [B.] and that I have already expressed my opinion as regards the incident involving both [the applicant] and [B.], I withdraw from the case.” 37.  On 22 October 2007 the President of the Leninskyy Court rejected Judge R.’s application for self-recusal, having found no grounds for it under Article 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 56 below). 38.  With regard to the incident involving K., on 14 November 2007 the Leninskyy Court, sitting in a single-judge formation (Judge R.), found the applicant guilty of robbery following conspiracy with B. and sentenced him to seven years’ imprisonment with confiscation of all his personal property. Referring to the judgment of 7 February 2006 in respect of B., the court relied on the evidence given by B. during that trial (see paragraphs 13-14 above), which were read out at the hearing. The applicant’s submissions that he and B. had been merely looking at K.’s car without any intention of breaking into it, and that the applicant had hit K. with a bottle in self-defence, were dismissed by Judge R. as untruthful. 39.  As to the incident with N., the Leninskyy Court classified the applicant’s actions as attempted petty theft, an administrative (minor) rather than a criminal offence. Accordingly, the applicant was acquitted in that regard for lack of corpus delicti in his actions. 40.  Lastly, the Leninskyy Court stated that the term of imprisonment was to be calculated from 9 January 2006. It also decided that the applicant should remain in detention as a preventive measure pending the verdict’s entry into force. 41.  In the course of the trial, the applicant had unsuccessfully requested the attendance and questioning of B. as a witness. According to the Government, his request had been made at an inappropriate stage of the proceedings and never repeated thereafter. 42.  The applicant appealed. He submitted, in particular, that it was unacceptable to rely on the statements B. had made in a trial in which the applicant himself had not participated. Alleging a breach of Article 6 § 3 (d) of the Convention, the applicant emphasised that B. had not been summoned to attend his (the applicant’s) trial, and that he had therefore not had the opportunity to contest his submissions or to have him questioned as a key witness. The applicant further pointed out in this connection that Judge R., who had dealt with both his and B.’s cases, had in fact admitted to having a preconceived opinion about the circumstances of the case and had asked to withdraw from it. 43.  The applicant further complained that his actions had wrongly been classified as robbery following conspiracy by a group. He contended that he and B. had been surprised that K. had been in the car, and that they could not have possibly planned to assault him. The applicant also noted several inconsistencies and changes to B.’s statements. He stated, in particular, that he had not met B. on the day of the events, but that they had once served a sentence together in the same prison. That being said, the applicant denied that it had been his initiative to steal property from cars or that he had undertaken to teach B. anything in that domain, given that the latter had himself already had a criminal conviction for several counts of car theft. 44.  On 28 July 2009 the Court of Appeal, following a hearing with the participation of the applicant’s lawyer, but in the absence of the applicant, upheld the judgment of 14 November 2007, without undertaking its own judicial investigation of the witnesses’ statements and other evidence in the case. At the same time, it invited the first-instance court to clarify the date from which the term of imprisonment was to be calculated. While acknowledging that the Leninskyy Court had relied on the statements B. had made in the framework of a different trial, the Court of Appeal noted that those statements were concordant with the other evidence and that there was therefore no reason to question their credibility. 45.  On 16 September 2009 the applicant, relying on the above-mentioned ruling, requested the Leninskyy Court to rectify the calculation of his term of imprisonment to have started running from 6 January 2006. On 20 October 2009 his request was rejected as unfounded. 46.  On 30 December 2009 the applicant’s mother, acting in his interests, lodged an appeal on points of law against the judgment of 14 November 2007 and the Court of Appeal’s ruling of 28 July 2009. She complained, in particular, relying on Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (d) of the Convention, that the applicant had been deprived of the opportunity to challenge B.’s depositions, which had been given in a different trial and which had been used for the applicant’s conviction. 47.  On 14 January 2010 a judge of the Supreme Court, in written proceedings without the parties’ notification or participation, rejected the applicant’s mother’s request for leave to appeal on points of law. 48.  According to a letter of the Supreme Court to the applicant’s lawyer of 28 December 2010, sent in reply to an enquiry by the latter about how the case was progressing, the aforementioned ruling had been sent to the applicant’s mother on 14 January 2010. 49.  According to the applicant, his mother had never received the Supreme Court’s letter with the ruling. The applicant also submitted a document from the local authorities, which suggested that there was another street in the town with the same name as the street where his mother lived. 50.  The applicant submitted that he, his lawyer and his mother as his lay representative only found out about the Supreme Court’s ruling of 14 January 2010 in December 2010.