9.  The first applicant, the Association “21 December 1989” (Asociaţia 21 Decembrie 1989) is an association of participants, injured victims or relatives of those who died in the crackdown on anti-government demonstrations in Romania in December 1989, around the period that the then Head of State, Nicolae Ceauşescu, was overthrown, events which are also referred to as “the Revolution”. The association, which was set up on 9 February 1990, protects the victims’ interests in the criminal proceedings currently being conducted by the prosecution service at the High Court of Cassation and Justice. Those proceedings concern the death or injury by gunshot and the ill-treatment and deprivation of liberty experienced by several thousand persons in a number of cities and towns across the country. 10.  The second applicant, Mr Teodor Mărieş, was born in 1962. He took part in the anti-government demonstrations in Bucharest in December 1989, and in subsequent demonstrations until June 1990. He is currently the president of the applicant association. 11.  The third and fourth applicants, Mrs Elena Vlase and Mr Nicolae Vlase, are the parents of Nicolae N. Vlase (known as Nicuşor), aged 19, who died during the crackdown on demonstrations which took place in Braşov in December 1989. 12.  On 16 December 1989 demonstrations broke out in Timişoara against the totalitarian regime. On 17 December 1989, on an order from Nicolae Ceauşescu, President of the Republic, several high-ranking military officers were sent to Timisoara to re-establish order. There ensued a violent crackdown, resulting in numerous victims. From 21 December 1989 demonstrations began in Bucharest, Braşov and other cities and towns across the country. 13.  The military operations which were conducted at this time caused many civilian victims. According to a letter sent to the first applicant on 5 June 2008 by the military prosecutor’s office at the High Court of Cassation and Justice, “more than 1,200 people died, more than 5,000 people were injured and several thousand people were unlawfully deprived of their liberty and subjected to ill treatment”, in Bucharest, Timişoara, Reşiţa, Buzău, Constanţa, Craiova, Brăila, Oradea, Cluj, Braşov, Târgu Mureş, Sibiu and other towns in Romania. In addition, it appears from Ministry of Defence documents, declassified by Government decision no.  94/2010 of 10 February 2010, that thousands of servicemen, equipped with combat tanks and other armed vehicles, were deployed in Bucharest and other cities. During the period of 17 to 30 December 1989 they used considerable quantities of ammunition. 14.  Many people were killed or wounded by gunshot from 17 December 1989 in Timişoara, and from 21 December 1989 in Bucharest. According to a report of 24 July 1990 by the Directorate of Military Prosecutor’s Offices (Direcţia procuraturilor militare), in the night of 21 to 22 December 1989 “48 persons died and 150 persons were injured in Bucharest as a result of the violent crackdown by the armed forces, including through the use of firearms”. 15.  Many victims were also killed or wounded by gunfire after 22 December 1989, the date on which the then Head of State was deposed. 16.  Thus, in Braşov, the city where Mr and Mrs Vlase’s son was hit by gunshot and died, thirty-eight other persons were killed by gunshot in the night of 22 to 23 December 1989 and even more over the following days. According to a document entitled “Conclusions on the result of the investigations conducted in respect of the events which took place in Braşov during the period of 23 to 25 December 1989”, submitted by the Government and drafted by a joint group of seven prosecutors and seven military police officers, after the official announcement on public radio and television that the dictatorship had fallen, the military forces deployed to defend the totalitarian regime against the demonstrators were initially withdrawn to their barracks and the demonstrators’ representatives were able to occupy the county council’s headquarters. Following information on the likelihood that counter-revolutionary elements (elemente contrarevoluţionare) would launch an attack, in the evening of 22 December 1989 General F., commandant of the Braşov garrison, was instructed to coordinate “the actions to defend” the achievements of the revolution. He ordered 657 soldiers from six military units out of barracks. The first shots were fired during the night, at about 3 a.m. 17.  On several subsequent occasions in 1990 a number of civilian associations, including the applicant association and another association then presided by the second applicant, mobilised their members to protest against “persons and mentalities considered close to communism” on University Square in Bucharest. The demonstrators’ main demands were dentification of those responsible for the armed repression of December 1989 and the resignation of the country’s new leaders. 18.  During 1990 the military prosecutor’s offices in Bucharest, Timişoara, Oradea, Constanţa, Craiova, Bacău, Târgu Mureş and Cluj opened investigations into the use of force and unlawful deprivation of liberty in the final days of December 1989. In a number of cases concerning the events in Timişoara and Cluj‑Napoca, the investigations culminated in transfer to the courts and the conviction of certain senior military officers (regarding the repression in Timişoara from 17 to 22 December 1989, see the case of Şandru and Others v. Romania, no. 22465/03, §§ 6-47, 8 December 2009). 19.  The main criminal investigation into the use of violence, especially against civilian demonstrators, both prior to and following the overthrow of Nicolae Ceauşescu, is still pending and is the subject matter of file no. 97/P/1990. Establishment of the circumstances of Nicuşor Vlase’s violent death and those responsible for it is included in that file. 20.  The military prosecutors’ office at the Supreme Court of Justice opened an investigation into the crackdown on the demonstrations of 21 and 22 December 1989. The investigation initially focused solely on the deprivation of liberty of more than a thousand people and the wrongful proceedings brought against several dozen of their number. 21.  In a decision of 24 July 1990 by the military prosecutors’ office in case no. 76/P/1990, the prosecutor’s office decided to sever the part of the case concerning identification of those individuals who, through the use of firearms and other violent means, had caused the death and/or injury of a large number of people. The new case was registered under file no. 97/P/1990. 22.  According to a decision by the same prosecutor’s office dated 20 September 1995, issued in case no. 97/P/1990, the subject-matter of the investigation was specified as follows:
“With regard to the aims of case no. 97/P/1990, it is also necessary to specify the timeframe to be taken into account. Thus, it should be emphasised that the investigations focused on acts committed during the period which elapsed between the dispersion of the demonstration on Palace Square ordered by N. Ceauşescu on 21 December 1989 and the dictator’s flight during the day of 22 December 1989.” 23.  From 1992 the military prosecutor’s office issued decisions separating the investigations with regard to several hundred injured parties who had been subjected to violence and wrongful arrest in the course of 21 December 1989. For example, the decisions of 5 June and 2 July 1992 concern the separation of the investigations in respect of Marius I. and Sorin B., who had been beaten by servicemen. Decisions discontinuing the proceedings were subsequently issued in those cases. They were based on legislative decree no. 3 of 4 January 1990, which amnestied certain offences punishable by a sentence of less than three years’ imprisonment. 24.  On 20 September 1995 prosecutor S. in the military prosecutors’ office at the Supreme Court of Justice issued a decision discontinuing proceedings in case no. 97/P/1990, which concerned persons killed or injured by gunfire. 25.  The above-cited decision did not contain an exhaustive list of victims, the number of which it described as “130 dead and injured”; on the basis of other indications in the same decision, 49 persons were apparently killed and 89 injured by gunshots, including men, women and children – unarmed civilians, of whom only 42 were listed by name. 26.  According to the above decision, the events were as follows: following the demonstrations against the authorities, which had begun in Timişoara, on 17 December 1989 the then Minster of Defence had issued an order to combat the demonstrators (dispoziţie de luptă). The decision of 20 September 1995 stated that the above order had been worded as follows: “The armed forces must follow the warning procedure [using the words] stop, stop, or I will fire; in the event of failure to comply with the warning, shots should be fired in the air then, if the warning is still ignored, shots should be fired towards the feet”. The decision of 20 September 1995 did not specify in what situations an armed intervention was required. 27.  The decision further indicated that it had been impossible to establish the exact order of events, given the scale of the confrontation “between, on the one hand, thousands or tens of thousands of demonstrators and, on the other, hundreds or thousands of servicemen from the security forces”. Furthermore, the prosecutor’s office pointed out that “after the fall of the totalitarian regime, the State institutions suffered from real paralysis, and [were] in a general situation of chaos and confusion”, so that no on-site investigations were conducted, no samples were taken, ballistics reports commissioned or even autopsies conducted on the victims’ corpses. Equally, it was noted that “certain institutions, the staff of which had been involved in dispersing the demonstrations, had failed to cooperate or had not given effective assistance in establishing the facts”. 28.  In addition, although 235 persons, some of had sustained gunshot wounds, had been detained and subjected to ill-treatment at the Bucharest Police Department (Miliţia capitalei), the Ministry of the Interior had refused to identify the hierarchical superiors of the police officers who had committed those offences. 29.  The decision of 20 September 1995 also mentioned that no serviceman or State agent had been a victim of violence on that occasion, so that the opening of fire against the unarmed civilian demonstrators had been unlawful. 30.  With regard to criminal liability for the deaths and injuries caused by the servicemen from the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the Interior and the Directorate for State Security (Securitate), the decision concluded that it lay exclusively with the persons who had ordered the opening of fire, namely the then Head of State, who was also Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, his Ministers of Defence and of the Interior, the Head of the Directorate of State Security, and “other members of the Executive Political Committee of the Communist Party”, who were not named in the decision. With regard to the Minister of the Interior, the Head of the Directorate of Security and the “other members of the Executive Political Committee”, the decision stated that they had already been convicted for the same events, without indicating the case files numbers or references for the conviction decisions. The decision terminated the proceedings in respect of the former Minister of Defence, the individual concerned having died. 31.  Lastly, the decision indicated that it had been possible to identify only a few of the servicemen who had fired on the demonstrators without having received orders to that effect, such as General A.C. Where they had been identified, the criminal proceedings against them had been separated and were the subject of other case files; they were therefore no longer part of case no. 97/P/1990. 32.  Following an application lodged by Mr Mărieş and the applicant association, the military prosecutor’s office at the High Court of Cassation and Justice set aside, by a decision of 7 December 2004, the decision of 20 September 1995 issued in case no. 97/P/1990, as unlawful and unfounded. Among the grounds of unlawfulness, the prosecuting authorities noted that the decision of 20 September 1995 contained no exact mention of the persons and events concerned by the decision to discontinue proceedings and that it used the impersonal expression “other members” of the Executive Committee of the Communist Party. Another ground of unlawfulness was the fact that the decision had not been communicated to the injured parties or to the persons who had been accused.
In addition, the prosecuting authorities noted that, in spite of the evidence submitted to the investigation file, the decision of 20 September 1995 had not examined the liability of the head of the Patriotic Guards, Colonel P.C., nor that of the servicemen who had played a role in organising the procedure for executing the orders issued by the Head of State or his Ministers.
The prosecuting authorities noted that evidence had not been taken from certain injured parties during the investigation; that servicemen belonging to those regiments which had been deployed to quell the demonstrators had not been questioned; that the registers kept by the military units involved in the repression had not been requested and thus not checked; and that the investigation had not considered the possible involvement of other public institutions, such as, for example, the use of vehicles belonging to the Post Office for transporting prisoners. 33.  By a decision of the same day, namely 7 December 2004, the military prosecutor’s office ordered the indictment of 102 persons, essentially officers, including high-ranking officers, from the Army, police and Securitate forces, for murder (Articles 174-176 of the Criminal Code), genocide (Article 357 of the Criminal Code), inhuman treatment (Article 358 of the Criminal Code), attempts to commit those acts, complicity and instigation in the commission of the above acts and participation lato sensu (participaţie improprie) in them, acts committed “during the period from 21 to 30 December 1989”. Sixteen civilians, including a former President of Romania and a former Head of the Romanian Intelligence Service, were also charged. 34.  Several criminal investigations into the fatal crackdown on the demonstrations of December 1989, which had initially been conducted separately, were joined to the investigation that was the subject matter of case no. 97/P/1990. 35.  By a decision of 9 January 2006, the military prosecution authorities ordered that the file concerning the investigation into the fatal repression in Braşov, in the course of which the son of the applicants Mr and Mrs Vlase had been killed, be joined to case no. 97/P/1990. That decision was justified by the fact that the military commanders who had acted in Braşov from 16 to 30 December 1989 were subordinate to General G.V., head of the First Army. 36.  A letter of 22 May 2009 from the military prosecuting authorities indicates that 126 decisions to discontinue proceedings, issued in the separate investigations, were set aside and the relevant files attached to case no. 97/P/1990. 37.  After the initial decisions to discontinue proceedings had been set aside, the investigations concerning a total of several hundred victims, who had been killed or injured in the area around the public television building and on Antiaeriană Street in Bucharest, and in the towns of Brăila, Constanţa, Târgu Mureş and Slobozia, were also joined to case no. 97/P/1990. The decisions to discontinue proceedings had been based on the absence of criminal liability, particularly on the ground of factual errors and temporary loss of judgment on the part of the persons involved. The decisions to set aside the decisions to discontinue proceedings that those decisions did not indicate the offences to which the proceedings related or the names of the accused persons, and did not mention the victims of the period from 22 to 30 December 1989. 38.  In the letter sent to the applicant association on 5 June 2008, the head prosecutor of the military prosecutor’s office at the High Court of Cassation and Justice indicated that during the period 2005 to 2007 6,370 persons had been questioned in case no. 97/P/1990. In addition, 1,100 ballistics reports had been prepared, and more than 10,000 investigative measures (investigaţii în teren) and 1,000 on-site inquiries (cercetare la faţa locului) had been conducted. He also stated that “among the reasons for the delay [in the investigation], mention should be made of the repetitive measures... concerning the transfer of the case from one prosecutor to another..., the fact that the prosecutors did not promptly inform the injured parties about the decisions to discontinue proceedings... and the fact that the investigation had been reopened several years after the persons concerned had filed their complaints...; the lack of cooperation on the part of the institutions involved in the crackdown of December 1989..., the extreme complexity of the investigation... given that the necessary investigative measures had not been conducted immediately after the impugned homicides and ill-treatment...”
The above-cited letter mentioned another reason for the delay, namely decision no. 610/2007 of the Constitutional Court of 16 July 2007, which withdrew jurisdiction to conduct investigations in case no. 97/P/1990 from the military prosecuting authorities at the High Court of Cassation and Justice and transferred it to the civil prosecutors, that is, to the prosecutor’s office at the High Court of Cassation and Justice. In the opinion of the head of the military prosecutor’s office, as stated in the above-cited letter of 5 June 2008, the transfer of the case was sufficient to entail new delays in the proceedings, given the significant volume of the case file, the complexity of the case and the time that had elapsed since the events under investigation. 39.  According to data submitted by the Government, following resumption of the investigation, evidence was taken from 2,800 witnesses and 320 injured parties in 2007, while only 72 witnesses and 38 injured parties had been questioned in 2005. Evidence was taken from 460 witnesses and 210 injured parties in 2008. 443 photographic albums and plates were examined in 2006; 175 were examined in 2007. 40.  By a decision of 15 January 2008, the military prosecuting authorities at the High Court of Cassation and Justice decided to separate the investigation concerning the sixteen civilian defendants (including a former President of Romania and a former Head of the Romanian Intelligence Service) from the investigation involving military personnel, and to relinquish its jurisdiction in favour of the prosecutor’s office at the High Court of Cassation and Justice. 41.  According to a press release issued on 10 February 2009 by the Public Information Office at the High Council of the Judiciary, the President of the Council intended to ask the Judicial Inspection Board to identify the reasons which had prevented the criminal investigation from being conducted rapidly (va solicita Inspecţiei Judiciare stabilirea cauzelor nesoluţionării cu celeritate a cercetărilor penale). 42.  According to the death certificate, Nicuşor Vlase died on 23 December 1989. 43.  The criminal investigation into his death was initially the subject of case file no. 158/P/1990 before the Braşov military prosecutor’s office. By a decision of 9 January 2006, that case was joined to case no. 97/P/1990. 44.  A report drawn up on 3 January 1990 following an external forensic examination, without an autopsy, at the Braşov forensic medical laboratory indicated that death had resulted from an injury inflicted by a firearm, which had caused an external haemorrhage. According to a statement of 27 November 2008 by officer C., a medical doctor at the Braşov military hospital at the material time, he had received an order not to conduct autopsies on corpses. 45.  On 26 February 1990 the same doctor C. from the military hospital submitted a “report” to the head of the Braşov county police, following a request from captain [P.]. In this report, he stated that “on 23 December 1989, between 3 a.m. and 5 a.m., the body of Vlase Nicolae, aged 19 years, from Braşov, killed in the Revolution, in the area of the county council building, was brought in” and that “on 26 December 1989, he was transported to the morgue for a post-mortem examination”. 46.  The applicants, who had noticed traces of violence on their dead son’s body and noted that the gunshot wound was still bleeding, suspected that he had not died while being fired on in the crowd of demonstrators in the early morning of 23 December 1989, but at a subsequent date. Following approaches made by them, and at the request of the Braşov military prosecutor, Nicuşor’s remains were exhumed and an autopsy was conducted; a forensic medical report was drawn up on 13 March 1991. In spite of the applicants’ requests, the authorities refused to allow foreign experts or a doctor appointed by the applicants to take part in the autopsy. 47.  Subsequently, in the years 1991-2008, the applicants submitted numerous pleadings to the prosecuting authorities at the Supreme Court of Justice and to the Minister of Justice and the President of the Republic. They asked that those who had tortured and killed their son be identified and held liable. In 1999 they received, for the first time, information about the investigation. According the third applicant (Mrs Vlase), prior to that date the four prosecutors responsible for the investigation had merely recommended to her verbally that she be hospitalised for care and criticised her for failing to keep her son at home, and thus avoid him being killed. 48.  By a decision of 28 December 1994, which was not notified to the applicants, the Braşov military prosecutor’s office issued a decision to discontinue proceedings in case no. 158/P/1990, concerning the deaths of 39 persons, including the son of applicants Mrs and Mr Vlase, and injuries to 82 persons in Braşov in the night of 22 to 23 December 1989.
The decision indicated that it had not been possible to establish the exact location in the city centre where each of those persons had fallen, since the corpses had been removed before the gunfire had ended, in each case during the night, and they had been identified at a subsequent stage in the military hospital morgue, the county hospital or the forensic medical laboratory to which they had been taken.
Having noted that several hundred armed servicemen had intervened in order to protect the city’s most important institutions from an imminent attack, but without identifying those buildings, the military prosecuting authorities stated that “the gunfire had been started in error, without an order to that effect, in the specific conditions of the moment, namely stress, fear of alleged terrorists and fatigue on the part of the military officers”. The civilians found themselves caught in the crossfire between servicemen occupying opposing positions. The large number of victims on the night of 22 to 23 December 1989 in Braşov city centre was also explained by the fact that the servicemen from the Ministry of National Defence had used more than 270,000 cartridges, the Securitate militia had used 1,079 cartridges and the Patriotic guards and those civilians who had obtained rifles had used 39,480 cartridges. Machine guns had also been used and more than a hundred grenades had been thrown.
The military prosecuting authorities considered that the lack of judgment shown by the commanders of the Braşov garrison in failing to take account of the state of mind of the military personnel placed under their command, their tiredness and the stress they were under, could not engage their criminal liability. In their defence, the military prosecuting authorities noted the military officers’ lack of experience in urban combat and noted that they had not taken measures prior to the opening of fire in order to establish means of communication between the units deployed in the area. 49.  The relevant parts of the decision read as follows:
“When the gunfire began in the city centre, several hundred persons were present, including women and young people, who were responding to an appeal on the national television channel inviting them to take to the streets because the revolution was in danger.
All of those civilians found themselves caught in the crossfire between servicemen occupying opposing positions and those of their number (the women and young people) who had not performed military service did not know that they ought to lie down. Indeed, even serving military personnel, taken by surprise, were standing when the gunfire began.
In those circumstances, dozens of people, including servicemen, were hit by bullets in the first minutes after the gunfire began.
All of the servicemen who were in Braşov city centre that night, the vast majority of whom gave evidence, stated that they were tired, as the majority had been posted there since the previous night, namely 21 to 22 December 1989, that they were all afraid, because they had learned what was happening in Bucharest and that, on their own initiative, they had loaded their weapons, since they were expecting to be attacked from one moment to the next.
In those circumstances, it had been sufficient that civilian I.E. fire the first shots in the direction of persons whom he considered suspect for all of the servicemen in the city centre to open fire in turn, without prior orders from their commanders...
All of the armed individuals – both servicemen and civilians – who used their weapons in the city centre during the night of 22 to 23 December 1989 were acting in good faith and were attached to the revolution, and were convinced that they were acting to protect it. They used their weapons on account of the prevailing confusion and the considerable fear and suspicion which had taken hold of everyone who was in the streets.” 50.  By a letter of 9 July 1999, the head prosecutor at the Braşov military prosecutor’s office informed applicant Nicolae Vlase that the investigation into the death of his son had ended with a decision to discontinue the proceedings “on account of factual error, which ruled out any criminal liability”. According to that letter, the investigation had established that the applicants’ son had died “in the course of the events of December 1989”, without any further precision as to the place, time or other circumstances surrounding his death. The letter then reported the findings of a forensic report drawn up on 13 March 1991, after the corpse had been exhumed, stating that Nicolae N. Vlase had died a violent death, resulting from external bleeding subsequent to severing of the left femoral artery caused by shots from a firearm. The letter also indicated that the forensic report had not found any further traces of violence on the victim’s body, with the exception of an excoriation measuring 2 cm2 on the back of his right hand. 51.  The applicant Elena Vlase challenged that decision before the military prosecuting authorities at the Supreme Court of Justice. 52.  By a decision of 30 August 1999, the military prosecuting authorities set aside the decision of 28 December 1994 to discontinue proceedings, on the ground that the investigation had been incomplete and “that there was no evidence to justify exonerating from criminal liability the persons who had been under an obligation to direct and coordinate the servicemen’s actions ... in such a way as to maintain control of the situation and avoid loss of life or injuries to innocent persons”. In the same decision, the military prosecuting authorities noted that the circumstances in which 600 “ZB-type” rifles had been distributed to civilians who had not been trained in their use had not been elucidated. In addition, the persons directly responsible for the death of 39 persons and the injuries caused to 82 other servicemen and civilians had not been identified. 53.  On 23 March 2001, 21 July and 25 November 2003, 25 January, 18 October and 24 December 2005 and 3 January 2006, the applicants reiterated their criminal complaints against the police officers, Securitate agents and doctors who, they alleged, had been involved in their son’s violent death. 54.  By a letter of 11 July 2001, the military prosecuting authorities at the Supreme Court of Justice informed Elena Vlase that the investigation into her son’s death was ongoing. 55.  By a letter of 21 October 2002, the Governor of Codlea Prison sent the military prosecuting authorities a statement made by prisoner M.C. in 1990, which referred to the murder of the applicants’ son in December 1989. According to that witness, Nicuşor had been killed by a police officer while in custody in the headquarters of the Braşov county police. 56.  By a letter of 18 December 2003, the Ministry of Justice replied to Elena Vlase, stating that the complaint about delays in the criminal investigation into her son’s death had been transferred to the prosecutor’s office at the High Court of Cassation and Justice. 57.  By a decision of 9 January 2006, the prosecutor’s office ordered that the case file concerning the investigation into the fatal crackdown in Braşov be attached to case no. 97/P/1990, since the military commanders who had acted in Braşov from 16 to 30 December 1989 were subordinated to General G.V., Head of the First Army. 58.  By letters of 27 January and 5 November 2007, on the basis of statements by witness M.C., the applicants requested that the military prosecuting authorities at the High Court of Cassation and Justice question several persons, including military prosecutors and a forensic medical examiner, for the purpose of the investigation. In addition, they asked that a video recording, submitted by them, be examined; it allegedly depicted their son’s corpse with signs of torture on it. 59.  According to a letter sent to Mrs Vlase by the military prosecutor’s office at the High Court of Cassation and Justice on 4 April 2008, the criminal investigation into the death of the applicants’ son was continuing in the context of case no. 97/P/1990 (see part A above). 60.  By letters of 16 October 2008 and 29 January 2009, the High Council of the Judiciary replied to a complaint from applicant Elena Vlase, alleging a lack of effectiveness in the investigation into her son’s death. The Council had found that, in the years 1994 to 2001 and 2002 to 2005, no investigative measure had been taken to establish those responsible for the death of her son. It further noted that no measure could be ordered, since prosecutors’ disciplinary liability could only be established within one year of an offence.
Finally, the Council indicated that investigative measures had indeed been taken after December 2004, so that no liability could be incurred by the prosecutors responsible for the investigation. 61.  On an unspecified date in 2004 the applicants brought proceedings against the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the Interior and the Romanian Intelligence Service. They claimed compensation from those institutions, which they considered liable for the death of their son and for hindering the related investigation. 62.  By a decision of 31 January 2005, the Braşov County Court declared their action inadmissible for failure to pay the full stamp duty (insuficienta timbrare a acţiunii), despite the fact that the court had taken note of a statement by the applicants indicting that they did not have the resources to pay the full amount due. That decision was upheld by the Braşov Court of Appeal on 5 May 2005. The applicants appealed on points of law. On 1 March 2006 they asked the Court of Cassation to defer its decision on their appeal until the prosecutor’s office had reached a decision on the investigation into their son’s death and to order the prosecutor’s office to notify them of that decision. The applicants’ appeal subsequently lapsed. On 14 February 2008 the High Court of Cassation and Justice found that the case had been struck out for inaction.
... 80.  On 31 July 2008 the applicant association applied to the High Council of the Judiciary in connection with what it considered an attempt to influence the prosecutors responsible for the investigations into the events of December 1989 to June 1990. The association indicated in its pleadings that, on an initiative by a non-governmental organisation, namely the Association of Reserve and Retired Military Officers, the Ministry of Defence had on 18 July 2008 communicated to the military prosecuting authorities, through its legal directorate, a draft amnesty law in respect of the acts committed by military personnel in December 1989. The applicant association also stated that the head of the military prosecutor’s office had disseminated the bill to all prosecutors, expressly requesting their opinion on the expediency of such a law and its content. The association viewed this as an attempt to influence the prosecutors and to suppress definitively the investigations into the impugned events; it regretted the fact that a private member’s bill intended to speed up those investigations and improve their effectiveness, which had previously been lodged by several non-governmental organisations, including the applicant association, had not been disseminated to prosecutors, as the draft amnesty law had been.
In a press release of 8 September 2008, the Ministry of Defence indicated that it had received the draft amnesty law from the Defence Committee in the Chamber of Deputies and specified that no opinion had been drawn up in that connection.
... 87.  In addition, the applicant association and its president, the second applicant, considered that they had been subjected to secret surveillance measures, in particular telephone tapping. The second applicant submitted two intelligence files in his name, dated 28 June and 6 December 1990, and a summary report from the Romanian Intelligence Service (hereafter, the “SRI”) dated 24 November 1990. 88.  A report, dated 28 June 1990 and classified secret, prepared by the operational department of the Bucharest Police Inspectorate and signed by the head of that department, Major M., which was submitted by Mr Mărieş and the authenticity of which has not been contested by the Government, provides a detailed description of, in particular, the applicant’s living conditions, and those of his companion. It includes information on their shared life, parents, professional activities, leisure activities at home and meetings with friends, their intention to purchase a car, the applicant’s relations with his neighbours, his political opinions and the content of an interview given by him to a radio station. The same report notes the applicant’s “active participation” for four consecutive days in the demonstrations of December 1989, and his presence in the building that had housed the headquarters of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party. 89.  Another document from the SRI, dated 24 November 1990, a certified copy of which was issued on 13 November 2006, concerns the activities of several individuals, including the applicant, in the period from April to June 1990, and especially their participation in the anti-government demonstrations of that period. The document states, inter alia, that the applicant, Mr Mărieş, was one of the persons to whom “the American Embassy had offered accommodation so that [he] could rest”. 90.  The 6 June 2002 edition of the newspaper Evenimentul zilei published an article entitled “The 13 persons under surveillance by the SRI”, accompanied by a facsimile copy of an alleged SRI document. The document contained a list of thirteen persons who were under surveillance and included the applicant’s companion, in whose name the landline telephone used by him had been registered. 91.  In a letter of 14 April 2008 the association asked the SRI to send it the official references of the tapping warrants issued in respect of the association’s three mobile phones and two landline telephones. 92.  On 16 February 2009 the applicant Mr Mărieş repeated the request to the SRI, asking whether, between December 1989 and the date of his request, surveillance warrants had been issued in his regard and whether his telephone communications had been monitored. 93.  By a letter of 19 February 2009, the SRI replied, stating that, under the National Security Act (Law no. 51/1991) and the SRI (Activities) Act (Law no. 14/1992), it was impossible to confirm or deny what he was requesting (necesitatea respectării prevederilor imperative ale legislaţiei în vigoare determină imposibilitatea confirmării ori infirmării cererii dumneavoastră). By letters of 9, 10 and 17 March 2009, three other bodies with powers in the area of national security, namely the External Information Service (hereafter, the “SIE”), the special forces (the Protection and Watch Service – Serviciul de Protecţie şi Pază (hereafter, the “SPP”) and the General Directorate of Information and Internal Protection at the Ministry of the Interior, replied to the applicant, stating that he had not been subject to activities by the relevant institution (the SPP), or that they had no information on that subject (the SIE and the Directorate of Information in the Ministry of the Interior). 94.  The letter of 23 February 2009 from the military prosecuting authorities indicates that in, the prosecution service had not ordered or requested interception of the applicants’ telephone conversations in relation to file no. 97/P/1990 and that no orders to that effect had been issued.