6.  In 1994 – in the context of a much wider criminal investigation involving many suspects – a preliminary judicial investigation (gerechtelijk vooronderzoek) was opened against the applicant, who was suspected of participation in a criminal organisation. On 6 March 1995 the investigating judge (rechter-commissaris) of the Middelburg Regional Court (rechtbank) authorised the Middelburg public prosecutor to issue a garnishee order (conservatoir beslag) against the applicant in the context of this investigation, the scope of which had been extended to offences under the Opium Act (Opiumwet). Also in this context, a house in Rotterdam owned by the applicant's daughter was searched on 21 March 1995, during which the front door, the alarm installation and bedroom furniture were damaged. This search took place under the direction of the Rotterdam investigating judge and on the basis of an authorisation issued by the Middelburg Regional Court. A number of objects found during this search were seized under the garnishee order, including two cars: a Jeep and a Mercedes. The Jeep was returned to the lease company that owned it on 28 June 1995. The applicant was charged with various offences under the Opium Act and the Arms and Ammunition Act (Wet Wapens en Munitie). 7.  By judgment of 5 June 1997, the Middelburg Regional Court convicted the applicant of various charges brought against him and sentenced him to eighteen months' imprisonment and payment of a fine of 100,000 Netherlands guilders (“NLG”). The applicant lodged an appeal. 8.  The Mercedes car seized on 21 March 1995 was sold at a public auction on 11 July 1997. 9.  On 9 February 1998, the Court of Appeal (gerechtshof) of The Hague accepted the appeal filed by the applicant, quashed the judgment of 5 June 1997 and acquitted the applicant of all charges, finding that they had not been lawfully and convincingly proven (niet wettig en overtuigend bewezen). 10.  On an unspecified date, the applicant lodged a claim with the Court of Appeal of The Hague under Article 591a of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van Strafvordering), seeking the reimbursement of an amount of more than NLG 200,000 for costs and expenses incurred by him in the course of the criminal proceedings. 11.  On 29 June 1998 the Court of Appeal of The Hague awarded the applicant NLG 100,000 for costs and expenses incurred, and rejected his claim under Article 591a for the remainder. No further appeal lay against this decision. 12.  On 3 March 1999, the proceeds of the sale of the Mercedes car plus accrued statutory interest were paid to the applicant. 13.  On 13 July 1999, considering that the criminal proceedings taken against him had not only entailed the incurring of legal costs and expenses but had also caused him and his daughter pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, the applicant and his daughter brought civil proceedings against the Netherlands State before the Regional Court of The Hague. Alleging a wrongful act (onrechtmatige daad) within the meaning of Article 6:162 of the Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek), the applicant and his daughter claimed that a body for whose acts the State was liable had acted in a wrongful manner towards them by having brought criminal proceedings against the applicant, and by using criminal investigation tools (search and seizure) on the basis of a suspicion that had been unfounded from the outset. 14.  The applicant claimed compensation in the amount of NLG 1,500,000 for non-pecuniary damage and NLG 475,055.30 for pecuniary damage (loss of profits, extra accountants' and financing costs, costs incurred in relation to the two cars seized). The applicant's daughter claimed compensation of NLG 2,000 for non-pecuniary damage and NLG 7,760 for pecuniary damage caused to her house and furniture in the course of the search of 21 March 1995. 15.  In its judgment of 11 July 2001, the Regional Court rejected the applicant's claims. It considered that, according to the relevant case-law under Article 6:162 of the Civil Code, the institution of criminal proceedings or use of criminal investigation tools could only be regarded as wrongful when such proceedings had been brought or such tools used in breach of the law or with disregard of fundamental requirements (in strijd met de wet dan wel met verontachtzaming van fundamentele vereisten), or where it appeared retrospectively from the criminal investigation – either from the final decision or otherwise – that the suspicion on the basis of which the criminal proceedings had been brought or the criminal investigation tool used had been unjustified (dat de verdenking ten onrechte heeft bestaan). It held that the first situation did not arise in the applicant's case as, during the preliminary judicial investigation against the applicant, the investigating judges of Middelburg and Rotterdam and the Middelburg Regional Court had given an affirmative answer to the question whether there was a reasonable suspicion against the applicant and that consequently it had to be assumed that a reasonable suspicion had existed at the time. Furthermore, in its judgment of 9 February 1998, the Court of Appeal had found that the criminal investigation methods used in the applicant's case had not been illicit. The Regional Court found that the second situation did not arise in the applicant's case either, as it did not follow from the applicant's acquittal or from the contents of the criminal case-file as made available to the court that the applicant had not carried out the acts of which he had been suspected. Consequently, and absent an automatic right to compensation for lawful acts on the part of the State in the context of the criminal investigation against him, the only possibility for the applicant to obtain compensation in connection with the criminal proceedings brought against him and the use of criminal investigation methods in this investigation was to avail himself of the possibilities provided under Articles 89, 90, 591 and 591a of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 16.  As regards the applicant's daughter, the Regional Court found no indication that there had ever been any suspicion of her involvement in the facts on which the charges brought against the applicant were based. Consequently, it found that the damage suffered by her – caused by criminal investigation methods directed against her father – should not be borne by her. On the basis of the elements before it, the Regional Court assessed this damage at NLG 3,000 and ordered the Netherlands State to pay this amount to the applicant's daughter. It rejected the remainder of both plaintiffs' claims. 17.  On 30 August 2001, the applicant and his daughter lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeal of The Hague. The Netherlands State lodged a cross‑appeal (incidenteel beroep). 18.  In its judgment of 11 November 2004, the Court of Appeal quashed the ruling of 11 July 2001 but only in respect of the compensation award to the applicant's daughter, which it reduced to 750 euros, rejecting the remainder of her claim for lack of substantiation. It upheld the impugned ruling for the remainder. Referring to the constant case-law of the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), the Court of Appeal held, in so far as relevant, as follows:
“2.2.  ... The Regional Court has rightly declined to consider the acquittal by the criminal court to be of decisive importance but instead considered whether the criminal investigation – the final judgment or otherwise – demonstrated that [the applicant] had not committed the crimes with which he had been charged. According to the consistent case-law of the Supreme Court this does not contravene the presumption of innocence of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. The Convention case-law cited by [the plaintiffs], which does not substantially differ from the Convention case-law taken into account by the Supreme Court in its consistent case-law, does not shed any different light on the case. Nor can allegation that the criminal case file is inaccessible, if correct, cannot lead to the conclusion that the cited criterion is applicable. 2.3.  To the extent that [the plaintiffs] also wish to argue that [the applicant] has been prosecuted without justification because, as they state, no reasonable suspicion of guilt of a criminal offence in his respect existed, the Court of Appeal notes the following. For the search and the garnishee order permission was granted by the Middelburg Regional Court and the investigating judge, respectively. In the present proceedings it cannot be successfully argued that these judicial authorities in so doing took an incorrect decision. That would, after all, imply that it was for the civil court to examine whether the criminal court had taken a correct decision and this is incompatible with the closed system of legal remedies (gesloten system van rechtsmiddelen) [in the Netherlands legal order]. It has not been argued, nor is it apparent, that there are special circumstances which might justify making an exception to this principle. 2.4.  The argument that [the applicant] has been prosecuted without justification because a reasonable suspicion of guilt was lacking has hardly at all been substantiated by [the applicant], whereas in the case at hand the onus of proof lies with [the applicant] and not the State. [The applicant] has only submitted that the suspicion in this case rested solely on the fact that [the applicant] knew the co-suspect F. and on some meaningless taps. This is however insufficient, given the contents of the [items of evidence set out in the judgment of 7 June 1997 by the Middelburg Regional Court as submitted by the defendant in response to the plaintiffs' summons in the present proceedings] which could give rise to the suspicion that H. and F. were involved in trafficking hashish ... and that [the applicant] had regular – business – contacts with F. and H. 2.5.  The Court of Appeal agrees with the Regional Court that the criminal investigation – the final judgment or otherwise – does not show that [the applicant] was innocent (onschuldig) of the crimes charged. The Court of Appeal notes that such a conclusion can only be drawn if the suspect's innocence is reasonably obvious (de onschuld van de verdachte met enige evidentie naar voren komt). This is not the case here given – on the one hand – the items of evidence [as set out in the judgment of 7 June 1997] and – on the other – the absence from the criminal case file, in so far as made available [in the present proceedings], of convincing disculpatory material (overtuigend ontlastend materiaal). There is no need to consider, as the Regional Court did, whether the evidence relied on points in a different direction [i.e. to the applicant's guilt].” 19.  The applicant and his daughter lodged an appeal on points of law (cassatie) – limited to points of law and procedural conformity – with the Supreme Court. On 16 June 2006, referring to Article 81 of the Judicial Organisation Act (Wet op de Rechterlijke Organisatie) and without stating any further reasons, the Supreme Court rejected this appeal in cassation as not prompting a determination of legal issues in the interest of legal unity and legal development.