7.  The applicant was born in 1934 and lives in Warsaw. 8.  The applicant's father owned the so-called “Kraków Bishops' Palace” situated in the centre of Warsaw and the plot of land on which it stood. The Government submitted that 75 to 80 % of the building had been destroyed during the Second World War. 9.  By virtue of the 1945 Decree on the Ownership and Use of Land in Warsaw (dekret o własności i użytkowaniu gruntów na obszarze m. st. Warszawy) the Warsaw municipality (and after 1950 the State Treasury) became the owner of all plots of land located in Warsaw. The decree gave the former owners the possibility of obtaining a perpetual lease (after 1946 - temporary ownership) of a plot of land on request. 10.  In 1947 the applicant's father concluded, before a public notary, an agreement with a certain state institution, according to which that institution was to obtain the right of use of the property upon its declaration to reconstruct the palace. The Government submitted that the agreement at issue had never been enforced because it was illegal. 11.  In 1948 the applicant's father lodged, under the 1945 Decree, a request to be granted the right of temporary ownership of the plot of land formerly owned by him. It was refused by a decision issued in 1949, which was served neither on him, nor on his lawyer. 12.  In 1951 the applicant's father died. 13.  In 1955 another decision refusing the 1948 request was issued. This decision was also not served. 14.  On 14 March 1990 the applicant, as the sole heir to her father's property (the inheritance proceedings were completed in October 1990), filed with the Warsaw Śródmieście District Office (urząd dzielnicowy) a petition in which she requested the restitution of her property. 15.  Subsequently, the Social Security Board (Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych), which occupied the property, requested the administrative authorities to grant it the right of management (zarząd) of that property, but to no avail. 16.  On 16 September 1991 the applicant was served with the decision of 1955 refusing her father the right of temporary ownership of the land. 17.  On 24 September 1991 she lodged with the Warsaw Governor (wojewoda) a request for the annulment of that decision. 18.  On 11 October 1991 the Warsaw Regional Prosecutor (prokurator wojewódzki) joined the proceedings, considering that in the light of the gravity of the alleged breaches of the law the participation of the prosecutor was necessary. 19.  On 27 July 1992 the applicant lodged with the Supreme Administrative Court (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny) a complaint about the inactivity of the Governor, who had failed to issue a decision concerning her request. 20.  On 11 December 1992 the court rejected the complaint, relying on the temporal limits of its jurisdiction. 21.  On 24 December 1992 the Minister of Construction (Minister gospodarki przestrzennej i budownictwa) quashed the decision of 1955. He found that the impugned decision did not contain any reference to the 1949 decision, whereas they concerned the same matter. The Minister further considered that the reasoning of the decision was not supported by any documents. 22.  On 5 October 1993 the Head of the Warsaw District Office (kierownik urzędu rejonowego) refused to grant the applicant the right of perpetual use (użytkowanie wieczyste, which replaced the former temporary ownership) of the land. He relied, inter alia, on the fact that over 70 % of the palace had been destroyed during the Second World War and that it could therefore, after reconstruction, be considered as a new building. Having reconstructed it on its own land, the State had become that building's owner. 23.  On 1 March 1994 the Warsaw Governor quashed that decision and discontinued the proceedings, considering that they had become devoid of purpose, because the request of the applicant's father had already been refused by the decision of 1949. 24.  On 16 October 1995 the Supreme Administrative Court allowed the applicant's appeal against the decision of 1 March 1994. The court declared the Governor's decision null and void. It found that the Governor had overlooked the fact that the 1949 decision had probably never been served on the applicant's father and that it should not, therefore, have been considered as having valid legal effect. 25.  On 18 March 1996 the Governor quashed the decision of the Head of the District Office issued on 5 October 1993 and remitted the case for re-examination. 26.  On 18 July 1997 the Warsaw District Office sent to the applicant a copy of the 1949 decision by which her father had been refused temporary ownership. 27.  On 1 August 1997 the applicant requested the annulment of that decision. 28.  On 25 August 1997 the Warsaw Governor quashed the 1949 decision and remitted the case for re-examination. 29.  On 12 November 1997 the Head of the Warsaw District Office re-examined the request lodged by the applicant's father in 1948. He granted the applicant the perpetual use of the land and declared that she retained the ownership of the building located there, in accordance with the 1947 agreement. The Head of the District Office found that a plan for the future use of the building, prepared by the applicant, complied with the existing town-planning scheme. 30.  The Social Security Board appealed against that decision. 31.  On 25 February 1998 the Warsaw Regional Prosecutor raised an objection (sprzeciw) to that decision. She submitted, in passing, that the clause concerning the ownership of the building was only of a declaratory nature, i.e. it confirmed something that had already been stipulated in the 1945 Decree. The contested decision should, in the prosecutor's argument, be set aside because the boundaries between the plots did not correspond to the boundaries between the buildings. Following that objection the Warsaw Governor instituted ex officio proceedings for the annulment of that decision. 32.  On 3 April 1998 the Governor rejected an appeal against the decision of 12 November 1997 lodged by the Social Security Board. The Governor considered that only the former owners of properties located in Warsaw, or their legal successors, could have standing in proceedings instituted under the provisions of the 1945 Decree. The Board did not have any rights in rem to the property concerned and, therefore, had no standing in the proceedings. The Board appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court. 33.  On 6 April 1998 the Governor stayed the enforcement proceedings in respect of the decision of 12 November 1997, having regard to the objection lodged by the prosecuting authorities. 34.  On 12 April 1999 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the Governor's decision of 3 April 1998, pointing out that the Governor, having found that the Social Security Board had no standing in the proceedings, should have issued a decision discontinuing the appellate proceedings. 35.  On 31 August 1999 the Regional Prosecutor withdrew her objection and subsequently the proceedings concerning the annulment of the decision of 12 November 1997 were discontinued. However, the proceedings concerning the appeal lodged by the Social Security Board were still pending. 36.  On 15 December 1999 the Governor discontinued the appeal proceedings, relying on the Social Security Board's lack of standing in the proceedings under the provisions of the 1945 Decree. 37.  On 7 January 2000 the applicant, relying on the fact that the appeal proceedings against the award of the right to perpetual use had been discontinued by the decision of 15 December 1999, summoned a representative of the State Treasury to appear before a specified public notary for the purpose of concluding an agreement concerning the grant of perpetual use of the land. No representative of the State Treasury complied with the summons. 38.  On 24 January 2000 the applicant requested the Supreme Administrative Court to dismiss the Board's petition to have the enforcement of that decision stayed. In reply, the court informed the applicant that the enforcement had been stayed ex lege. 39.  On 18 January 2000 the Board appealed against the decision of 15 December 1999, submitting that the buildings it occupied were constructed in such a way that their walls did not run along the boundary between the plots of land underneath and, therefore, the 1997 decision awarding the applicant the right to perpetual use was impossible to enforce. The Board also argued that, being a State-owned entity occupying the property, it should take part in the proceedings in order to ensure the proper representation of the interests of the State. 40.  In its pleadings of 13 March 2000 the Governor's Office (Urząd Wojewódzki) requested the Supreme Administrative Court to dismiss the Board's appeal, reiterating that it had no rights in rem to the property concerned. 41.  On 21 November 2000 the Supreme Administrative Court allowed the Social Security Board's appeal and quashed the decision of 15 December 1999. It noted that in 1984 the Board had been granted the use of a neighbouring plot of land and, on the strength of a law enacted in 1998, had become the owner of that plot. The court found that it was necessary to establish whether the plot owned by the Board overlapped with the plot covered by the 1997 decision granting the right to perpetual use to the applicant. If this was the case, the Board should be allowed to take part in the proceedings as a party. 42.  On 23 July 2001 the Governor quashed the decision of 12 November 1997. He pointed out that in the course of further proceedings the line of the boundary in question should be established and, consequently, it should be decided whether the Board had standing. The Governor referred to legislation which had entered into force on 1 January 1999, under which the Board had become ex lege the owner of lands it had been managing. The applicant appealed against that decision to the Supreme Administrative Court. She stressed that the case had already been examined by that court five times. She also submitted that the Governor could have ruled on the Board's rights in the proceedings himself on the basis of the ample material already contained in the case-file. 43.  Meanwhile, on 26 November 1999 the President of the Office for Housing and Urban Development (Prezes Urzędu Mieszkalnictwa i Rozwoju Miast), on the request of the Ministry of Labour, instituted proceedings for the annulment of the decision of 25 August 1997 (quashing the above-mentioned 1949 decision). 44.  On 19 October 2001 the applicant lodged with the Supreme Administrative Court a complaint about the inactivity of the President of that office. 45.  On 13 December 2001 the President of the Office for Housing and Urban Development annulled the decision of 25 August 1997, by which the 1949 refusal to grant temporary ownership to the applicant's father had been quashed. He considered that the Governor had not been competent to issue that decision as following many legislative changes he was not to be considered as legal successor of the authority which had been competent to give this decision under the provisions of the 1945 Decree. 46.  On 18 December 2001 the Supreme Administrative Court asked the applicant whether she was pursuing her complaint about inactivity, despite the fact that the authority concerned had given a decision. She withdrew her complaint. 47.  On 30 April 2002 the President of the Office for the Housing and Urban Development, after the re-examination of the case requested by the applicant, upheld his own decision of 13 December 2001. He reiterated that following changes in the legislation concerning the powers of local authorities and their hierarchy, the Warsaw Governor, on the strength of an interpretation of this legislation given on 19 August 1999 by the Prime Minister, had not been competent to issue the decision of 25 August 1997. 48.  The applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court. She submitted that the interpretation relied on by the President of the Office for Housing had been given two years after the decision of August 1997 on the basis of which she could have acquired her rights. She stressed that before that interpretation had been given, the established practice considered that the Warsaw Governor was competent to give decisions such as in her case. 49.  On 25 March 2004 the Warsaw Regional Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's appeal. It acknowledged that the interpretation given in 1999 could not have been validly relied on in support of the quashing of the 1997 decision as it had been given in a different case and concerned different legal issues. However, the court, having analysed the evolution of the legislation regulating the powers of local administration since 1938, concluded that it did not change the fact that the Warsaw Governor had lacked competence to give the 1997 decision. 50.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law against this judgment with the Supreme Administrative Court, arguing that the legal analysis of the lower court as to the competence to give the 1997 decision was erroneous. 51.  The proceedings are currently pending before the Supreme Administrative Court. 52.  In 1990 the applicant enquired about the legal status of the disputed property. She received a certificate from a public notary office stating that in the land-and-mortgage register her father was mentioned as the owner of property no. 496. Although in 1983 the State authorities had requested that an entry be made in the register declaring that the State Treasury was the owner, the request was not granted, as they had failed to submit the 1955 decision refusing the applicant's father the right to temporary ownership with a clause confirming its legal force. In 1985 the proceedings concerning that request were stayed. Another entry in the register concerned the 1945 decree, following which the State Treasury became the owner of the land. The certificate contains a clause stating that it does not concern the ownership rights to the buildings located on the plot. 53.  On 28 January 1991 the public notary office refused the applicant's request to make an entry replacing the name of her father by her name in the land register. The office pointed out that, as long as the issue of perpetual use was not decided, it could not make any amendments to the register. 54.  Similar information is contained in a certificate issued on 4 April 1996 by the land-and-mortgage register department of the Warsaw District Court.