5.  The applicant, Ms Kisa Abdul-Kadirovna Mezhiyeva, is a Russian national who was born in 1961 and lives in Grozny. 6.  The applicant lived with her husband, Mr Mauda Mezhiyev, in Grozny. In 1999 they temporarily left Chechnya for Ingushetia, but returned in 2000. Her husband was a bus driver. When they returned to Chechnya he resumed his work. The applicant worked as a conductor on the same bus. Usually they worked for two weeks and then had two weeks off. 7.  In March 2001 the applicant’s husband’s employer asked him to work for the two weeks which were supposed to be rest weeks, because the bus station did not have enough buses. He was asked to use his own bus, which was in good condition. The applicant’s husband agreed. 8.  The applicant and her husband worked on route no. 7, which connected the Grozny bus station with Altayskaya Street. It went along Lenin Street and Pobeda Prospekt, which were connected by a bridge over the river Sunzha in the centre of Grozny. The bridge was controlled by, and observed from, two checkpoints of the Russian federal forces. 9.  According to the applicant, in 2001 Russian engineer units checked the main streets of Grozny every morning for explosive devices that might have been installed by rebel fighters. Lenin Street and Pobeda Prospekt were also checked regularly. 10.  In the morning of 6 March 2001 the applicant was working with her husband on route no. 7. When they approached the bridge, it appeared that it had been closed by Russian servicemen. They had therefore to cross another bridge, in Krasnykh Frontovikov Street. They finished the first trip on route no. 7 between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m. The applicant enclosed statements by four witnesses, bus drivers G.Sh., U. M. and V.M., and conductor K.M., corroborating that the bridge between Lenin Street and Pobeda Prospekt had been closed by the military that morning, before the explosion. According to the Government, the closure of the bridge in Lenin Street was evidence that an inspection was being carried out, because it was a strategically important area and took a long time to be checked. 11.  In the afternoon the applicant and her husband made another trip on route no. 7 from Altayskaya Street to Grozny bus station. At about 13-14 minutes to 3 p.m., after they had stopped at the central market and had gone further towards the bus station, they saw another no. 7 bus, operated by driver Sh., crossing the bridge. It was followed by buses nos. 1 and 18 and a convoy of military vehicles. The convoy was headed by a tank, which was followed by three or four Ural vehicles and an armoured personnel carrier (hereinafter “the APC”). The convoy went straight on, but the APC turned left near the bridge and stopped. 12.  When the applicant and her husband saw that the bridge was open, they decided not to make a detour into Krasnykh Frontovikov Street, but to drive across the bridge. They approached the bridge two or three minutes after the military convoy had passed through. 13.  Before crossing the bridge bus drivers always had to register at the checkpoint and pay a fee of ten Russian roubles (RUB). At the checkpoint the applicant’s husband stopped the bus, which had some twenty passengers on board, and got out to register and pay the fee. However, the soldier at the checkpoint neither checked his documents nor took the money for the fee, but told the applicant’s husband to move forward quickly. 14.  When the applicant’s husband’s bus moved towards the bridge, he saw another no. 7 bus coming in the opposite direction. Since the bridge was too narrow for two buses, the applicant’s husband stopped to let that bus pass. While the other bus was passing, the applicant was looking at the bridge but noticed nothing suspicious. When their bus moved forward again, there was a powerful explosion at the edge of the bridge under the front left wheel of the bus on the driver’s side. 15.  Immediately after the explosion the military closed the checkpoint and did not allow anybody to approach the bus. The applicant’s brother, V. M., who was also a bus driver, happened to be behind them. When he saw the explosion, he tried to drive through to the bus which had been blown up, to take the wounded to hospital, but was not allowed to by the military, who opened fire on his bus. Three bullets hit the windscreen, and V. M. was forced to make a U-turn. He decided to approach the bridge from the opposite side and drove towards the other bridge in Krasnykh Frontovikov Street to make a detour. 16.  After the explosion, injured and frightened passengers were screaming, and the applicant lost consciousness. When she came back to her senses the last passenger, a woman with a child, was leaving the bus. The applicant asked her to help, because she herself was injured. By that time the bus was surrounded by federal servicemen. She heard one of them saying: “Bastards, they’re getting out alive”. 17.  As the applicant was trying to get out of the bus, one of the servicemen came to help her. He put a tourniquet on her arm to stop the bleeding and bandaged her leg with his belt. Then he carried the applicant out of the bus and put her next to her husband, who was sitting near the wheel which had exploded. It appeared that he had been thrown out of the bus by the blast. He was badly injured and required urgent medical aid. 18.  At that time V. M. was driving along Krasnykh Frontovikov Street There he saw an ambulance driving in the opposite direction. He stopped it and asked its driver to take those injured in the explosion to hospital. The driver agreed and followed V. M.’s bus. They approached the blown-up bus from Lenin Street. However, according to the applicant, the servicemen again refused to let anybody near the bus and fired shots in the air. Nevertheless, V. M. and the ambulance driver ran to the bus. They carried the applicant and her husband to the ambulance and put other passengers in V. M.’s bus. They took them all to Grozny Town Hospital no. 9. 19.  As nobody was allowed near the bus immediately, the applicant’s husband, who was bleeding heavily from numerous shrapnel wounds, was only taken to hospital fifty minutes after the explosion. He died in the hospital fifteen to twenty minutes later. On the same day his relatives took his body from the hospital for burial. 20.  The applicant was also badly injured, in the head, arm and leg. She had surgery, and her left arm was amputated above the elbow. The next day, 7 March 2001, her relatives took her to a hospital in Stariye Atagi. They did not immediately tell her about her husband’s death, to spare her worry while she was recovering. They told her that he had been taken to a hospital in Makhachkala. She was told about his death about a month later when she was feeling better. During the following year the applicant had to undergo outpatient treatment for her injuries, which caused her severe pain. 21.  On 6 March 2001, thus on the very day of the explosion, the Grozny Prosecutor’s Office opened investigation file no. 11076 in connection with the explosion. According to the Government, the ground for the initiation of the criminal case was the availability of sufficient information pointing to the signs of the crime under Articles 105 § 1 and 205 § 1 of the Criminal Code. The case was subsequently transferred to the Leninsky District Prosecutor’s Office. 22.  On the same date the investigating authorities examined and photographed the scene of the explosion. They also heard two servicemen of the checkpoint who described the events which had taken place shortly before and after the explosion. It appears from their statements that they could see the bridge well, but none of them had seen “a red car” mentioned in the report of 9 March 2001 on an on-site investigation (see paragraph 24 below). The Government, accepting that the fact that the servicemen could see the bridge well, maintained that this did not mean that the bridge was wholly controlled by the servicemen and that unforeseen circumstances could happen. 23.  According to the Government, the official check concluded that the servicemen at checkpoint no. 17 could not observe the moment of planting of the explosive because of the distance. 24.  From the report of 9 March 2001 on an on-site investigation, written by a psychologist who was attached to the mobile unit of the Ministry of the Interior of the Chechen Republic, it appears that several residents of Grozny had confirmed that shortly before the explosion a red VAZ 2107 car had gone on to the bridge over the river at high speed, had made a U-turn, the driver or a passenger had put something at the edge of the bridge, and the car had immediately left. An internal enquiry had established that the personnel on duty at the checkpoint at the time had not seen who had placed the explosive device and when this had occurred. This report was transmitted to the prosecuting authorities. 25.  According to the applicant, by March 2001 the bridge over Sunzha was partially destroyed and was in such a poor condition that no “red car” could have made a U-turn on the bridge, let alone making at high speed. She also stated that no car could have travelled between federal checkpoints no. 17 and no. 19 unnoticed or without the authority of those agents of the Government’s forces in Chechnya who were manning the checkpoints at the material time. 26.  On 6 May 2001 the preliminary investigation was suspended pursuant to Article 195 § 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 27.  The applicant learned from her relatives that the investigation had been opened, but she did not apply to the prosecuting authorities on her own initiative. However, as for more than one year she had neither been called to the prosecutor’s office for questioning, nor had she been informed of the investigative measures taken, on 31 October 2003 she requested to be informed of the progress of the investigation and to be given the decision to institute the criminal investigation of the explosion. 28.  On 2 November 2003 the Prosecutor’s Office of the Chechen Republic forwarded her request to the Leninsky District Prosecutor’s Office. 29.  On 6 November 2003 the Deputy Prosecutor of the Leninsky District Prosecutor’s Office quashed the decision of 6 May 2001 and reopened the preliminary investigation. On the same day, the applicant was questioned and granted victim status. She was also provided with a copy of the decision to institute the criminal investigation of the explosion of 6 March 2001. According to the Government, this copy was given to her only on 9 November 2003. 30.  On 26 November 2003 a medical expert examination was ordered, which confirmed the injuries that the applicant had suffered as a result of the explosion. The expert report was submitted on 9 January 2004. Two other medical expert reports concerning two other wounded persons had been drawn up on 29 December 2003. 31.  On 12 and 24 December 2003 two witnesses testified, inter alia, that they had heard a detonation in March 2001 in the afternoon. 32.  On 1 January 2004 an expert examination of wrecks of the bus concerned was carried out and finalised on 24 March 2004. 33.  On 6 January 2004 one of the injured persons who had travelled in the bus was heard. On the same day, the preliminary investigation was suspended under Article 208 paragraph 1(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, on 1 April 2004 the Prosecutor of the Leninsky District Prosecutor’s Office quashed this decision and resumed the investigation. 34.   On 9 April 2004 the head of the Leninsky district department of the interior in Grozny was ordered to identify persons travelling in the bus before the explosion and those who were concerned by the crime in question. On the same day, the investigator drew up a record of splinters collected at the place of the explosion. 35.  On 10 April 2004 an expertise in technology and explosive was ordered. 36.  On 30 April 2004 the preliminary investigation was again suspended, this time under Article 208 § 1(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 37.  On 9 March 2005 an expert examination of splinters found at the scene of the explosion was conducted. According to the results of the examination, the objects submitted for examination were splinters from an artillery shell of 122-mm calibre. The explosion had most likely been caused by a makeshift explosive device consisting of the artillery shell and an activating device. It was not possible to establish the precise construction of the activating device, because no parts of it were submitted for examination. On the surfaces of the objects submitted for examination were found micro particles of a high-explosive substance, trotyl, with which artillery shells of 122 mm calibre are loaded. The maximum radius the artillery shell splinters would scatter is 800 metres. 38.  As since her questioning in November 2003 the applicant had not been provided with any information on the progress of the investigation, on 2 May 2006 she applied to the Leninsky District Prosecutor’s Office for leave to study the case file. 39.  On 6 May 2006 the Deputy Prosecutor of the Leninsky District Prosecutor’s informed the applicant that the investigation had been suspended and that she could study the case file. 40.  On 27 May 2006 the applicant came to study the case file. Investigator S. provided her with copies of the following documents: the report of the inspection of the scene of the blast on 6 March 2001, photographs of the explosion scene, psychologist K.’s report of 9 March 2001, the transcript of the applicant’s questioning on 6 November 2003, and the reports of the expert examinations of 26 November 2003 and 9 March 2005. According to the investigator, the case file contained nothing else that could be of interest to the applicant, did not allow the applicant to study the whole case file and make photocopies of the documents. He did not confirm his refusal in writing. It is not clear whether the applicant requested him to do so. 41.  According to the applicant, the investigator told her that no servicemen from the checkpoint near the bridge had been questioned. When she expressed her doubts as to the credibility of the report of 9 March 2001, he allegedly said that Russians had made the report to divert suspicions from them. 42.  On 20 June 2006 the applicant complained to the Leninsky District Prosecutor’s Office that the investigation was ineffective. 43.  On 28 June 2006 she lodged a complaint with the Leninsky District Court concerning the suspension of the investigation, its ineffectiveness and procrastination, and failure to provide her with the complete investigation file. It is not clear whether the complaints have been examined. 44.  On 6 December 2006 the preliminary investigation was suspended. This decision was subsequently quashed and the investigation was resumed. However, on 9 December 2006 the Deputy Prosecutor of the Leninsky District Prosecutor Office closed the criminal investigation opened against unidentified persons under Article 205 of the Criminal Code concerning terrorism. According to the applicant, as a general rule, the Russian authorities opened criminal proceedings under this provision whenever explosions or arson attacks or other acts threatening the lives of civilians, or likely to cause significant damage to property, or having any other adverse consequences for the public, were committed in Chechnya by members of rebel armed units opposing the federal troops. Thus, the investigators must have obtained some evidence to the effect that the explosion on the bridge was not perpetrated by rebel fighters, and there was no “red car”. 45.  On 30 June 2009 the Deputy Head of the Investigation Office of the Investigation Committee quashed this decision and resumed the investigation. 46.  The Court requested the Government to provide a copy of the complete investigation file in the criminal case instituted in relation to the explosion that caused the applicant’s husband’s death. Initially, the Government refused to do so, citing the absence of guarantees from the Court in terms of non-disclosure of confidential data. According to the Government, the applicant and her representatives provided no guarantees that the case file would be kept confidential. Taking into account a substantial volume of complaints of violations of human rights in the territory of the Chechen Republic during counterterrorism operations, disclosure of legally protected information contained in documents of criminal cases under investigation would lead to substantial damage to the legitimate interests of both the State and participants in criminal trials. 47.  On 28 October 2009 the Government finally provided the main parts of the relevant criminal case file. 48.  The criminal investigation was still pending in June 2011, thus ten years and three months after it had been initiated.