5.  On 16 May 2006 the applicant’s husband filed a petition for divorce with the Larnaca Family Court. This was on the ground that his marriage to the applicant had broken down irretrievably because, among other reasons, he and the applicant had been separated for five years (that is, one year longer than the minimum period required by law: see relevant domestic law and practice at paragraph 25 below). 6.  The case was set for a directions hearing on 14 June 2006. On that date the applicant appeared in person and asked for additional time to file her defence to the petition: the Family Court acceded to her request and adjourned the hearing to 4 October 2006. 7.  On 14 June 2006 the applicant applied to the Family Court for legal aid. The hearing of that legal aid application was fixed for 15 September 2006. On 15 September the applicant appeared before the court and asked for a one-month extension as she was not sure if she would maintain her application. The court adjourned the legal aid hearing to 19 October 2006. 8.  On 4 October 2006, the applicant attended court and requested a further extension for filing her defence to the petition on the ground that her legal aid application was pending. The court adjourned the case to 1 November 2006 and directed that the applicant file her defence by that date. 9.  The applicant did in fact decide to maintain her legal aid application. When this legal aid application came before the Family Court on 19 October 2006, the court considered that the application came within the scope of the Law on Legal Aid (see relevant domestic law and practice at paragraph 23 below) so it instructed the Welfare Office to prepare a social welfare report on the applicant and adjourned the hearing of the legal aid application to 17 November 2006. 10.  The applicant failed to file her defence to the petition for divorce by 1 November 2006 as directed. She also failed to appear in court on that date. In her absence, counsel for the applicant’s husband requested that the case be set for trial. The court acceded to this request and a trial date of 22 November 2006. 11.  The legal aid application came before the court on 17 November 2006 as scheduled. The applicant attended court. However, because no one from the Welfare Office was present, the court adjourned its examination of the application to 21 December 2006. 12.  On 22 November 2006 the applicant did not appear at court for the trial in the main proceedings. The applicant’s husband attended with counsel. In the applicant’s absence, the court proceeded to hear the evidence of her husband who stated that the couple had been suffering problems and had been separated since December 2000. No other witnesses were heard. The court gave an ex tempore judgment granting the petition for divorce. 13.  Although the petition for divorce had been granted, the hearing in the legal aid application went ahead as scheduled on 21 December 2006. The applicant was not present at court. A representative of the Welfare Office informed the court that, from a letter in the court file dated 20 December 2006, which had been sent by a welfare officer to the court registrar, it appeared that the applicant was no longer interested in receiving legal aid. The court accordingly dismissed the legal aid application for want of prosecution. 14.  On 29 December 2006 the applicant appealed against the Family Court’s judgment to the Family Court of Appeal. She was legally represented on appeal. 15.  The applicant submitted two grounds of appeal: that the Family Court had wrongly proceeded with the hearing of the petition for divorce in her absence, and that it had wrongly decided on the dissolution of the marriage. In respect of both grounds, she submitted that the Family Court had acted in breach of Article 30 of the Constitution (the right of access to court and to a fair trial: see paragraph 22 below), the Law on Legal Aid, and the rule of natural justice, including the right to be heard (audi alteram partem). 16.  In the reasons accompanying her grounds of appeal, she again made reference to Article 30 of the Constitution and the right of litigants to present their case before the court and to be defended by counsel. The applicant again submitted that the rules of natural justice safeguarded the right to be heard. She further stated that she had informed the Family Court that she had applied for legal aid. She had been under the impression that her legal aid application would be examined by the same bench that would hear the petition for divorce. As the legal aid application had been fixed to be examined at a date subsequent to the date the divorce petition was fixed (21 December for the legal aid hearing as against 22 November for the divorce petition hearing), she presumed that the divorce petition would be examined following the granting of legal aid so she could file a defence through a lawyer. It was for this reason that she had not appeared in court on 1 and 22 November 2006. 17.  On 21 September 2007, the applicant’s husband died. In his will he bequeathed part of his property to another woman. As a consequence of the divorce, the applicant was not entitled to inherit from his estate or to receive a widow’s pension. The applicant maintained her appeal against the Family Court’s judgment. 18.  On 19 December 2008, the Court of Appeal directed the parties to file skeleton arguments (written outlines of their submissions), in effect accepting the applicant’s notice of appeal. The Court of Appeal further directed that once the skeleton arguments were submitted, the appeal was to be set down for a hearing. 19.  In her skeleton argument dated 9 January 2009, the applicant developed her ground of appeal relating to Article 30, stating that the Family Court had acted contrary to Articles 30(1) (the right of access to court), Article 30(3)(b) (the right to present one’s case and to have sufficient time for its preparation), and Article 30(3)(d) (the right to counsel and to free legal assistance). She relied on both the relevant case-law of the Cypriot courts on these provisions and on the relevant case-law of this Court on the corresponding provisions of Article 6 of the Convention, including Airey v. Ireland, 9 October 1979, Series A no. 32. In respect of her submission as regards the rules of natural justice, she referred to Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th ed., Vol 1, § 76) and the court’s duty to provide every party with a fair chance to set his case before the court. 20.  A hearing on the merits of the appeal took place before the Court of Appeal on 6 March 2009. At the hearing, the applicant adopted her written submissions. Counsel for the applicant’s ex-husband submitted that Airey could be distinguished on the basis that the Convention did not grant a general right to legal aid and, in any event, the present case was not so complex as to require it. The hearing was adjourned to 8 May 2009. On that date, counsel for the applicant provided the court with copies of the relevant case-law cited in the applicant’s written submissions. No further submissions were made and the court reserved judgment. 21.  On 30 June 2009 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It found:
“It is the appellant’s position that she had informed the court that she had submitted an application for legal aid and, because she believed that her application would be examined by the court which would examine the substance of the petition for the dissolution of the marriage, she failed to appear on 1 November 2006, with the consequence that the case was heard in her absence and the petition for divorce was granted against her.
Regarding the allegations of violation of the provisions of Law 165(I)/2002 and the principles of natural justice, no specific reasons have been put forward which could substantiate the above allegations, which are accordingly dismissed.
Regarding the alleged violation of Article 30 of the Constitution, the appellant has not specified which particular paragraph has been violated and this allegation is dismissed for vagueness. Independently of this conclusion, we have already made detailed reference to what took place both in the proceedings concerning the application for legal aid and the divorce proceedings. From the above, it appears that judgment under appeal was the result of the complete indifference of the appellant to respond to the directions of the Court to file her defence and her failure to appear before the court. The appellant cannot claim that her failure to appear was due to the fact that she believed that the divorce petition would be examined by another court.
The appeal is dismissed with costs.”