7.  The applicant was born in 1960 near Bethlehem, then administered as part of the Kingdom of Jordan. He arrived in the United Kingdom in September 1993, having previously fled Jordan and gone to Pakistan. He made a successful application for asylum, the basis of which was first, that he had been detained and tortured in March 1988 and 1990-1991 by the Jordanian authorities and second, that he had been detained and later placed under house arrest on two further occasions. The applicant was recognised as a refugee on 30 June 1994 and granted leave to remain until 30 June 1998. As is the normal practice, the Secretary of State did not give reasons for his decision for recognising the applicant as a refugee. 8.  On 8 May 1998 the applicant applied for indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom. This application had not been determined before the applicant’s arrest on 23 October 2002. On that date he was taken into detention under the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (see A. and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 3455/05, § 90, 19 February 2009). When that Act was repealed in March 2005, the applicant was released on bail and then made subject to a control order under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (ibid., §§ 83 and 84). On 11 August 2005, while his appeal against that control order was still pending, the Secretary of State served the applicant with a notice of intention to deport (see section 3, paragraph 25 below). 9.  In April 1999, the applicant was convicted in absentia in Jordan of conspiracy to cause explosions, in a trial known as the “reform and challenge” case. He was the twelfth of thirteen defendants. 10.  The case involved an allegation of a conspiracy to carry out bombings in Jordan, which resulted in successful attacks on the American School and the Jerusalem Hotel in Amman in 1998. There were further convictions for offences of membership of a terrorist group, but these matters were the subject of a general amnesty. The applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment with hard labour at the conclusion of the trial. 11.  During the trial, one witness, Mohamed Al-Jeramaine, confessed that he and not the defendants had been involved in the bombings. The State Security Court hearing the case took the view that his confession was false, and demonstrably so, because of discrepancies between what he said about the nature of the explosives, for example, and other technical evidence. Mr Al-Jeramaine was later executed for homicides for which he had been convicted in another trial. 12.  The applicant maintains that the evidence against him was predominantly based upon an incriminating statement from a co-defendant, Abdul Nasser Al-Hamasher (also known as Al-Khamayseh). In his confession to the Public (or State) Prosecutor, Mr Al-Hamasher alleged that the applicant had provided prior encouragement for the attacks. He was also said to have congratulated the group after the attacks. 13.  Mr Al Hamasher, along with several other defendants, had complained during the proceedings before the State Security Court that they had been tortured by the Jordanian General Intelligence Directorate (“the GID”), which shares responsibility for maintaining internal security and monitoring security threats in Jordan with the Public Security Directorate and the military. At the end of the period of interrogation during which they claimed to have been tortured, the Public Prosecutor took a statement from each defendant. 14.  At the trial there was evidence from lawyers and medical examiners and relatives of the defendants that there were visible signs of torture on the defendants. However, the State Security Court concluded that the defendants could not prove torture. 15.  There were a number of appeals to the Court of Cassation and remittals back to the State Security Court, although, as the applicant had been convicted in absentia, no appeals were taken on his behalf. In the course of those appeals, the convictions were upheld on the basis that the relevant statements had been made to the Public Prosecutor. The confessions in those statements thus constituted sufficient evidence for conviction if the court accepted them and if the Public Prosecutor was satisfied with the confessions. The Court of Cassation rejected the claim that the Public Prosecutor had to prove that the defendants had confessed to him of their own accord: the Public Prosecutor’s obligation to prove that a confession was obtained willingly only arose where the confession had not been obtained by him. The confessions in question were authentic and there was no evidence that they had been made under financial or moral coercion. 16.  The Court of Cassation then considered the impact of the allegations that the confessions to the State Prosecutor had resulted from coercion of the defendants and their families while they were in GID detention. Such conduct during an investigation was against Jordanian law and rendered the perpetrators liable to punishment. However, even assuming that the defendants’ allegations were true, that would not nullify the confessions made to the Public Prosecutor unless it were proved that those confessions were the consequence of illegal coercion to force the defendants to confess to things which they had not done. The defendants had not shown that was the case. 17.  As a result of the applicant’s conviction in this trial, the Jordanian authorities requested the applicant’s extradition from the United Kingdom. In early 2000, the request was withdrawn by Jordan. 18.  In the autumn of 2000 the applicant was again tried in absentia in Jordan, this time in a case known as the “millennium conspiracy”, which concerned a conspiracy to cause explosions at western and Israeli targets in Jordan to coincide with the millennium celebrations. The conspiracy was uncovered before the attacks could be carried out. The applicant was alleged to have provided money for a computer and encouragement through his writings, which had been found at the house of a co-defendant, Mr Abu Hawsher. The applicant maintains that the main evidence against him was the testimony of Abu Hawsher. 19.  Most of the defendants were convicted on most charges; some were fully or partly acquitted. The applicant was convicted and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment with hard labour. Other defendants, including Abu Hawsher, were sentenced to death. On appeal certain of the defendants, including, it appears, Abu Hawsher, claimed to have been tortured during 50 days of interrogation when they were denied access to lawyers. The Court of Cassation rejected this ground of appeal, holding that the minutes of interrogation showed that each defendant had been told of his right to remain silent about the charges unless their lawyer was present. The applicant also states that the Court of Cassation found that the alleged ill-treatment in GID custody was irrelevant because the State Security Court did not rely on the defendants’ confessions to the GID but their confessions to the Public Prosecutor. Abu Hawsher remains under sentence of death. 20.  The findings of the United Kingdom Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC) in respect of the evidence presented at each trial are set out at paragraph 45 below. The further evidence which has become available since SIAC’s findings, and which has been submitted to this Court, is summarised as paragraphs 94–105 below. 21.  In October 2001, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office advised the United Kingdom Government that Article 3 of the Convention precluded the deportation of terrorist suspects to Jordan. In March 2003, after a Government review of the possibility of removing such barriers to removal, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office confirmed that its advice of October 2001 remained extant but that it was considering whether key countries would be willing and able to provide the appropriate assurances to guarantee that potential deportees would be treated in a manner consistent with the United Kingdom’s obligations. In May 2003, the Foreign Secretary agreed that seeking specific and credible assurances from foreign governments, in the form of memoranda of understanding, might be a way of enabling deportation from the United Kingdom. 22.  In November 2003, the British Embassy in Amman was instructed to raise the idea of a framework memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Jordanian Government. In February 2005, after meetings between the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the King of Jordan, and between the Secretary of State for the Home Department and the Jordanian Foreign Minister, agreement was reached on the principle of an MOU. 23.  Further negotiations took place in June 2005 and an MOU was signed on 10 August 2005. That MOU set out a series of assurances of compliance with international human rights standards, which would be adhered to when someone was returned to one State from the other (see paragraph 76 below). The same day, a side letter from the United Kingdom Chargé d’Affaires, Amman, to the Jordanian Ministry of the Interior was signed, which recorded the Jordanian Government’s ability to give assurances in individual cases that the death penalty would not be imposed. In respect of the applicant, further questions as to the conduct of any retrial he would face after deportation were also put to the Jordanian Government and answered in May 2006 by the Legal Adviser at the Jordanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 24.  The MOU also made provision for any person returned under it to contact and have prompt and regular visits from a representative of an independent body nominated jointly by the United Kingdom and Jordanian Governments. On 24 October 2005, the Adaleh Centre for Human Rights Studies (“the Adaleh Centre”) signed a monitoring agreement with the United Kingdom Government. On 13 February 2006, the terms of reference for the Adaleh Centre were agreed (see paragraph 80 below). 25.  On 11 August 2005, that is, the day after the MOU was signed, the Secretary of State served the applicant with the notice of intention to deport. The Secretary of State certified that the decision to deport the applicant was taken in the interests of national security. The applicant appealed to SIAC against that decision arguing, inter alia, that it was incompatible with Articles 2, 3, 5 and 6 of the Convention. Relying on his previous asylum claim, he argued that his high profile would mean he would be of real interest to the Jordanian authorities. If returned, he would also face retrial for the offences for which he had been convicted in absentia. He would thus face lengthy pre-trial detention (in breach of Article 5) and, if convicted, would face a long term of imprisonment. All these factors meant he was at real risk of torture, either pre-trial or after conviction, to obtain a confession from him or to obtain information for other reasons. He was also at risk of the death penalty or rendition to other countries, such as the United States of America. Relying on Article 6, he alleged that his retrial would be flagrantly unfair: the State Security Court, a military court, lacked independence from the executive and there was a real risk that evidence obtained by torture – either of him, his co-defendants or other prisoners – would be admitted against him. 26.  The applicant’s appeal was dismissed by SIAC on 26 February 2007. The appeal had been heard by SIAC in two parts: an “open session”, where the Secretary of State’s case and evidence was presented in the presence of the applicant and his representatives, and a “closed session” where parts of the Secretary of State’s case which could not be disclosed for security reasons were presented (see paragraph 69 below). SIAC heard evidence in closed session relating to the process by which the MOU had been agreed, the extent to which it would mitigate the risk of torture and also evidence as to the national security threat the applicant was alleged to have posed to the United Kingdom (“closed material”). In the closed sessions, the applicant and his representatives were excluded but his interests were represented by special advocates. SIAC then delivered an “open judgment”, which is publicly available, and a “closed judgment”, which was given only to the Secretary of State and the special advocates. 27.  In reaching its decision as to whether the applicant’s deportation was necessary in the interests of national security, SIAC considered the Secretary of State’s case to be “well proved” since the applicant was regarded by many terrorists as a spiritual adviser whose views legitimised acts of violence. However, SIAC did not take into account either of the applicant’s Jordanian convictions in absentia, which were originally advanced as part of the Government’s case. The reason for this was that the Government had adopted what was described as a “pragmatic approach” in withdrawing reliance upon any evidence which it was alleged might have been obtained by torture on the grounds that it would require an investigation as to whether it was obtained by torture. This was done in accordance the House of Lords’ ruling in A. and others (no. 2) to that effect (see paragraphs 136 and 137 below). 28.  SIAC then reviewed the evidence it had heard from various sources including a senior United Kingdom diplomat, Mr Mark Oakden, who gave evidence on the negotiation of the MOU, the monitoring agreement with the Adaleh Centre and on the risk faced by the applicant in Jordan. On behalf of the applicant, it heard evidence on the Jordanian regime from three academics. It also received evidence from an Arabic speaking barrister, Ms Rana Refahi, who had travelled to Jordan to conduct research on the previous two trials including interviews with the defendants and their lawyers. Additionally, it considered evidence of the United States Government’s interest in the applicant and allegations that a Jordanian national had been the subject of extraordinary rendition from Jordan to the United States.
(b)  SIAC’s findings on the MOU 29.  SIAC found that this Court’s judgments in Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑V and Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, ECHR 2005‑I, showed that reliance could lawfully be placed on assurances; but the weight to be given depended on the circumstances of each case. There was a difference between relying on an assurance which required a State to act in a way which would not accord with its normal law and an assurance which required a State to adhere to what its law required but which might not be fully or regularly observed in practice. Referring to a decision of the United Nations Committee Against Torture, Agiza v. Sweden (see paragraph 147 below), where the Swedish authorities had expelled an Egyptian national after receiving assurances from Egypt, SIAC continued:
“The case of Agiza stands as a clear warning of the dangers of simple reliance on a form of words and diplomatic monitoring. There were already warning signs which ought to have alerted the Swedish authorities to the risks, including the role they had permitted to a foreign intelligence organisation. But we note what to us are the crucial differences: the strength, duration and depth of the bilateral relationship between the two countries by comparison with any that has been pointed to between Sweden and Egypt; the way in which the negotiations over the MOU have proceeded and the diplomatic assessment of their significance; the particular circumstances of [the present applicant] and Jordan; the degree of risk at the various stages, in the absence of the MOU, particularly at the early stages of detention which is when the risk from torture by the GID would normally be at its greatest and when the confirmed torture of Agiza in Egypt appears to have occurred; and the speed with which the monitors would be seeking and we believe obtaining access to the Appellant in those early days. The Swedes felt that to seek to see Agiza would betray a want of confidence in the Egyptians, whereas there is no such feeling in either the UK, the [Adaleh] Centre or the Jordanian Government. Quite the reverse applies. One aspect of that case which also troubled the [Committee Against Torture] was that Agiza had been removed without final judicial determination of his case. That would not be the position here.” 30.  In the present case, the political situation in Jordan and the freedom, albeit limited, of non-governmental organisations, the press and Parliament to express concerns would reduce the risks the applicant faced. In addition, the level of scrutiny Jordan had accepted under the MOU could not but show that it was willing to abide by its terms and spirit. Each country had a real interest in preventing breaches of the MOU: the diplomatic relationship between the United Kingdom and Jordan was friendly and long-standing and of real value to Jordan and it would have a real incentive to avoid being seen as having broken its word. Both countries had an interest in maintaining co-operation on counter-terrorism matters. The United Kingdom had a very real concern that it should be able to remove foreign nationals without breaching their rights under Article 3, so failure in such a highly publicised case would be a major setback for that process. That concern would thus act as a further incentive to investigate any breaches of the MOU. While the MOU did not specify what steps would be taken in such an investigation, SIAC accepted evidence from the Mr Oakden that any failure of the Jordanian Government to respond to diplomatic queries would lead to “rapidly escalating diplomatic and Ministerial contacts and reactions”. 31.  SIAC accepted that there were some weaknesses in the MOU and monitoring provisions. Some protections, such as prompt access to a lawyer, recorded interviews, independent medical examinations and prohibition on undisclosed places of detention, were not explicitly present but, in reality, most of these aspects were covered. There was no guarantee that access to the applicant, as required by the Adaleh Centre’s terms of reference, would always be granted but any refusal would be brought to light quite quickly; in the early period of detention, the Centre was expected to visit the applicant three times a week. SIAC also expected the GID and the Jordanian Government to react swiftly to any approach by the United Kingdom were a visit to be refused. It was “disturbing” that the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture had been refused access to a GID facility in June 2006, despite a prior arrangement that he would be permitted free access. However, on the evidence it had heard, SIAC found that there was no real risk of ill-treatment of the applicant by the GID. There was a weakness in the Adaleh Centre’s “relative inexperience and scale”; it would be undertaking a task which would be new to it; and it did not have the expertise among its staff, as it had recognised. It was a fairly new body with limited resources and staff, although this could be overcome and the United Kingdom Government would bear the cost. It was the very fact of monitoring visits which was important and the absence of specialist expertise was not fatal to their value.
(c)  SIAC’s findings on Article 3 32.  The United Kingdom Government did not contest the general thrust of the available material in relation to Jordan’s human rights record and, in SIAC’s view, details of human rights violations in Jordan remained relevant to the assessment of the risk faced by the applicant. The Government also took the position that it could not return the applicant to Jordan, in conformity with its international obligations, in the absence of the particular measures contained in the MOU. Nevertheless, SIAC found it important to consider the risks faced by the applicant by reference to the likely sequence of events if he were to be returned. It found that the MOU might not be necessary for each risk but rather reinforce the protection available. 33.  SIAC accepted that, on return, the applicant would be taken into the custody of the GID and retried on the two charges for which he had been convicted in absentia. He would be accompanied by a representative of the Adaleh Centre to his place of detention and be medically examined. SIAC also accepted that the GID would interrogate the applicant with a view to obtaining a confession for use at trial and for more general intelligence purposes, though SIAC found it to be speculative that GID would interrogate the applicant about other offences in order to bring further charges against him; there was no evidence of any other charges outstanding. SIAC also accepted that the United States would seek to question the applicant and that this would take place soon after his arrival in Jordan. However, there was no real risk that Article 3 would be breached before the conclusion of the retrial. 34.  There was a real risk of torture or ill-treatment of an “ordinary Islamist extremist” in GID detention before charge since such ill-treatment was widespread and longstanding and there was a climate of impunity and evasion of international monitoring in the GID. However, the applicant would be protected by his high profile, by the MOU and the monitoring agreement, especially since the Adaleh Centre would be “keen to prove its mettle” and would itself be subject to the vigilance of other non‑governmental organisations. This would also prevent any real risk of the use by the GID of tactics such as last-minute refusals of access, claims that the applicant did not wish to see the monitors or moving him elsewhere without notification. Access by the Adaleh Centre would also prevent the applicant’s incommunicado detention. 35.  The MOU would also counteract the climate of impunity prevailing in the GID and toleration of torture by its senior members. The MOU and the monitoring arrangements were supported at the highest levels in Jordan – the King of Jordan’s political power and prestige were behind the MOU – so it was reasonable to assume that instructions on how to treat the applicant had been given to the GID and it would be aware that any breaches would not go unpunished. Moreover, senior members of the GID had participated in the MOU negotiations and therefore would know the consequences of any failure to comply. Even if abuses were normally the work of rogue officers, the specific and unusual position of the applicant and the effect of the MOU would lead to senior officers preventing ill-treatment in his case, even if they did so only out of self-interest. 36.  Questioning by the United States was not forbidden by the MOU and, to SIAC, it was probable that the United States Central Intelligence Agency would be allowed to question the applicant directly with the GID present. However, the United Kingdom would have made clear to the United States its interests in ensuring that the MOU was not breached. The Jordanian authorities and United States would be careful to ensure that the United States did not “overstep the mark”. Assuming that the applicant remained in GID custody and was not surrendered to the United States, there would be no real risk of ill-treatment at the pre-trial stage. It was also highly unlikely that the applicant would be placed in any secret GID or CIA detention facility in Jordan. 37.  The same factors applied to any questioning which might take place soon after the conviction or acquittal of the applicant. The MOU would continue to apply and it would be in the interests of both the Jordanians and the Americans to conduct any interrogation at the earliest opportunity rather than wait until after trial. The applicant’s high profile was also found to be “unlikely to diminish much for some years”. 38.  There was little likelihood of the Jordanian authorities bringing any subsequent charges which carried the death penalty or seeking the death penalty in respect of the charges for which the applicant was to be retried. Instead, if he were convicted, the applicant would face a lengthy period of imprisonment. There was a real risk of a life sentence in respect of the Reform and Challenge conspiracy, although there was a greater prospect that it would be considerably less because of the way in which sentences on the other defendants appeared to have been reduced on appeal, to 4 or 5 years. There was no real risk of a life sentence in the millennium conspiracy retrial. There was no rule that would prevent a higher sentence being imposed than the 15 year sentence that had been imposed in absentia. However, the clear practice was against imposing higher sentences in retrials following initial convictions in absentia and there was no reason why a more unfavourable view would be taken of the applicant when he was present than when he was absent. The applicant would serve any sentence in an ordinary prison and not a GID detention facility; the sentence of hard labour did not connote any additional punishment. General conditions would not breach Article 3 and, although beatings sometimes occurred, there was no evidence that the applicant would be targeted as a political Islamist prisoner. His status would again act to protect him. 39.  In respect of rendition, there were “powerful incentives” for the Jordanian and United States Governments not to allow this to happen, not least the real domestic political difficulties this would create for the Jordanian Government and the unwillingness of the United States to destabilise the Jordanian regime. Any instances of alleged rendition from Jordan had involved people of other nationalities or, in one case, of a dual US/Jordanian national. It was also very unlikely that the applicant would be removed to a secret CIA facility in Jordan since this would require the connivance of the Jordanian authorities contrary to the MOU. It was also unlikely that the United States Government would seek the extradition of the applicant from Jordan when it had not sought his extradition from the United Kingdom and there would be political difficulties for Jordan to accede to such a request.
(d)  SIAC’s findings on Article 5 40.  In relation to the applicant’s detention following his removal to Jordan, SIAC found that the time limits for notifying the legal authorities of an arrest (48 hours) and for bringing formal charges (15 days) were regularly and lawfully extended by the courts at the request of the prosecutor, in stages of up to 15 days to a maximum of 50 days. It would therefore be compatible with Jordanian law for the applicant to be held in detention for 50 days without being physically brought before a court before being charged. Such extensions were approved by a judicial authority, although not necessarily in the physical presence of the suspect. 41.  SIAC noted that the MOU did not explicitly require that there be no extensions of time beyond the initial 15 day detention but required that a returned person be brought promptly before a judge or other person authorised by law to determine the lawfulness of his detention. Though “promptly” was not defined in the MOU, SIAC found that this part of the MOU would be carried out, particularly since this was one of the earliest points at which the MOU would be engaged, and that the applicant’s first appearance before a judicial authority would be within 48 hours. It would not breach the MOU if the applicant were to be detained for a maximum of 50 days, by means of judicially approved 15 day extensions, or if he were absent when those later decisions were taken. However, in reality the total period of 50 days was unlikely to be sought, even without the MOU, because the applicant faced a retrial and the case dossiers had already been through the trial and appeal process a number of times.
(e)  SIAC’s findings on Article 6 42.  It was common ground before SIAC that the applicant’s previous convictions would be set aside and he would face retrial before the State Security Court on the same charges. 43.  In addition to his two challenges to the retrial process (the impartiality of the State Security Court and the use of evidence obtained by torture) the applicant also argued that he would be questioned in detention without the presence of a lawyer by the GID, United States officials or the Public Prosecutor. The latter had the power under Article 64(3) of the Jordanian Criminal Trial Procedures Code to conduct an investigation in the absence of a lawyer “whenever he [deemed] it necessary in order to reveal the truth”. This decision was not subject to review, though SIAC also noted that a confession before the Public Prosecutor was not admissible unless the individual had been warned that he need not answer questions without his lawyer present. SIAC thought it unlikely that the applicant would have a lawyer present during questioning by the GID or United States officials but very likely he would have access to a lawyer for any appearance before a judge or the Public Prosecutor. In terms of pre-trial preparation by the defence, the period and facilities available would be less extensive than in the United Kingdom but nonetheless better than would normally be the case in Jordan. 44.  With regard to the lack of independence and impartiality of the State Security Court, SIAC found that the court would consist of three judges, at least two of whom would be legally qualified military officers with no security of tenure. The Public Prosecutor would also be a military officer. Appeal would lie to the Court of Cassation, a civilian court, though that court could not hear argument on any unfairness of the trial arising from the military composition of the State Security Court. 45.  As to the potential use of evidence obtained by torture in the applicant’s retrial, SIAC found as follows:
“418.  The Jordanian legal system, by its terms, does not therefore permit the use of involuntary confession or incriminatory statements. There is a judicial examination of allegations of that nature before the evidence is admitted. Those allegations can themselves be tested by evidence. How far those allegations can be practicably tested is affected by certain features of the system. The burden of proof for excluding confessions made to the Prosecutor lies on the defendant. There is obvious difficulty in proving prior acts or threats by the GID in the absence of systems for recording questioning, for ensuring the presence of lawyers during questioning, and independent prompt medical examinations. There is likely to be considerable reluctance on the part of the Court to accept that confessions to the Prosecutor, a common source of evidence, are tainted by ill-treatment. The Court or Prosecutor does not appear prepared to compel the appearance of GID officials to testify about these allegations. There may be a sense that these allegations are made routinely, as a matter of defence strategy. 419.  There may well be a greater willingness to test the nature of confessions made only in the course of GID questioning. There is some evidence that at least at Court of Cassation level, confessions alleged to have been obtained by torture have been excluded, (though it is not clear whether those were made to the GID or to the Prosecutor). 420.  However, the general background evidence and that specific to the two trials in question shows that there is at least a very real risk that the incriminating statements against the [applicant] were obtained as a result of treatment by the GID which breached Article 3 ECHR; it may or may not have amounted to torture. It is very improbable that those statements would be excluded on the retrial, because the SSCt is unlikely to be persuaded that they were so obtained, particularly having already rejected that assertion at the first trials, although the makers could give evidence that they were so obtained and were in fact untrue.”
There was, therefore, a high probability that the past statements made to the Public Prosecutor which incriminated the applicant would be admitted. SIAC further found that those statements would be of considerable, perhaps decisive, importance against him. On this aspect of the retrial, SIAC held:
“439.  To us, the question comes back to whether or not it is unfair for the burden of proof in Jordan to lie where it does on this issue; we do not think that to be unfair in itself. However, this burden of proof appears to be unaccompanied by some of the basic protections against prior ill-treatment or means of assisting its proof eg video or other recording of questioning by the GID, limited periods of detention for questioning, invariable presence of lawyers, routine medical examination, assistance from the Court in calling relevant officials or doctors. The decisions are also made by a court which lacks independence and does not appear to examine closely or vigorously allegations of this nature. It is taking these points in combination which leads us to conclude that the trial would be likely to be unfair within Article 6 because of the way the allegations about involuntary statements would be considered.” 46.  SIAC concluded that, despite its findings in respect of the independence and impartiality of the State Security Court and the real risk of the admission of evidence obtained contrary to Article 3, there would be no flagrant denial of justice under Article 6 of the Convention if the applicant were retried in Jordan. SIAC stated that the retrial would take place “within a legally constructed framework covering the court system, the procedural rules and the offences”, the applicant would be present and it would be in public. The dossier from the original trial would be before the retrial court but the applicant could effectively challenge its contents. The execution of Al-Jeramaine and the difficulty faced by other witnesses, notably Abu Hawsher, would not make the retrial unfair. SIAC concluded:
“446.  We accept the lack of institutional independence in the SSCt. The lack of independence for SSCt Judges is in the structure and system. There is no evidence as to why particular judges might be chosen for particular cases, or that they are ‘leaned on’. But the SSCt is not a mere tool of the executive: there is sound evidence that it appraises the evidence and tests it against the law, and acquits a number of defendants. It has reduced sentences over time. 447.  Its judges have legal training and are career military lawyers. There is a very limited basis beyond that for saying that they would be partial, and that has not been the gravamen of the complaint. Their background may well make them sceptical about allegations of abuse by the GID affecting statements made to the Prosecutor. They may instinctively share the view that allegations of ill-treatment are a routine part of a defence case to excuse the incrimination of others. The legal framework is poorly geared to detecting and acting upon allegations of abuse. The way in which it approaches the admission of evidence, on the material we have, shows no careful scrutiny of potentially tainted evidence. There would be considerable publicity given to the retrial and public trials can encourage greater care and impartiality in the examination of the evidence. This would not be a mere show trial, nor were the first trials; nor would the result be a foregone conclusion, regardless of the evidence. 448.  Reasons are given for the decisions, and an appeal to the Court of Cassation is available. The fact that such an appeal cannot cure the want of structural independence in the SSCt is not a reason for discounting its existence in the overall assessment of whether there would be a complete denial of Article 6 rights. This Court is a civilian court and the evidence of undue executive influence through appointment or removal is quite sparse. There is no evidence again as to how its panels are chosen, nor that they are “leaned on” by the executive. It plainly operates as a corrective to the rulings of the SSCt on law and procedure, and is of some relevance to factual matters, even though it does not hear the evidence all over again or have a full factual jurisdiction except on Prosecutors’ appeals. The probable sentences are not wholly disproportionate to the offences. 449.  We have discussed at length the approach of the SSCt to the admission of statements to a prosecutor allegedly given as a result of prior ill-treatment. Although we take the view that a contribution of factors would probably make the retrial unfair in that respect, they do not constitute a complete denial of a fair trial. The existence of a legal prohibition on the admissibility of such evidence cannot be ignored, nor the fact that the SSCt would hear evidence relating to the allegations. The role of the Court of Cassation in reviewing and at times overturning the conclusions of the SSCt on this issue is material. The want of evidential or procedural safeguards to balance the burden of proof, and the probable cast of mind towards statements made to a prosecutor/judge in a civil law system, all within a security court dominated by military lawyers, does not suffice for a complete denial of justice. 450.  There is a danger, given the inevitable focus on what is said to be potentially unfair about the retrial, in focussing exclusively on deficiencies when deciding whether there would be a total denial of the right to a fair trial, rather than looking at the picture of the trial as a whole. That is what has to be done however and it is that picture as a whole which has led us to our conclusion on this issue. 451.  The various factors which would be likely to cause the retrial to breach Article 6 are to a considerable degree interlinked. Taking them in the round does not persuade us that there is a real risk of a total denial of the right to a fair trial.” 47.  Finally, while there was the real prospect of a long term of imprisonment, this did not alter SIAC’s conclusion that the overall nature of the retrial would not be a total denial of the applicant’s rights. 48.  The applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal, which gave judgment on 9 April 2008, unanimously allowing the appeal in respect of Article 6 and the risk of the use of evidence obtained contrary to Article 3 and dismissing it on all other grounds ([2008] EWCA Civ 290). 49.  For the applicant’s complaints under Article 3 as to the use of closed evidence by SIAC and the reliance on the assurances in the MOU, the Court of Appeal considered it was bound by its previous ruling on these questions in MT (Algeria), RB (Algeria), U (Algeria) v. the Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWCA Civ 808, which had found that: (i) SIAC could consider closed evidence on safety on return; and (ii) the relevance of assurances to safety on return was a matter of fact not law and thus it had no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal on that ground. The Court of Appeal also rejected the applicant’s appeals based on Article 5, finding that SIAC was entitled to find as it did. 50.  For Article 6, the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s argument that there was a real risk of a “flagrant denial of justice” in his retrial in Jordan by reason of a lack of independence and or impartiality of the State Security Court: SIAC had been entitled to find as it did on this point and this conclusion was not altered by the later decision of this Court in Al‑Moayad v. Germany (dec.), no. 35865/03, 20 February 2007. 51.  However, the Court of Appeal accepted the applicant’s argument that there was a real risk that he would suffer a “flagrant denial of justice” by reason of the risk that statements obtained through treatment contrary to Article 3 would be admitted as evidence against him in his retrial. The Court of Appeal observed:
“45.  SIAC understated or misunderstood the fundamental nature in Convention law of the prohibition against the use of evidence obtained by torture. Counsel for the Secretary of State said that it was no part of his submission to say that if it is clear that a trial will take place on the basis of evidence obtained under torture, whether of the individual themselves, or third parties, that that would not involve flagrant denial of justice. Accordingly, once SIAC had found as a fact that there was a high probability that evidence that may very well have been obtained by torture (SIAC, § 436); or in respect of which there was a very real risk that it had been obtained by torture or other conduct breaching article 3 (SIAC, § 437); would be admitted at the trial of Mr Othman; then SIAC had to be satisfied that such evidence would be excluded or not acted on. The grounds relied on by SIAC for not finding a threatened breach of article 6 in that respect were insufficient. 46.  We emphasise that that is not or not primarily a criticism of SIAC’s reasoning in terms of rationality, though we do consider additionally that SIAC’s conclusions did not follow rationally from its findings of fact. Rather, our principal finding is that SIAC erred by applying an insufficiently demanding test to determine the issue of whether article 6 rights would be breached.
... 48.  The use of evidence obtained by torture is prohibited in Convention law not just because that will make the trial unfair, but also and more particularly because of the connexion of the issue with article 3, a fundamental, unconditional and non-derogable prohibition that stands at the centre of the Convention protections. As the ECtHR put it in §105 of its judgment in Jalloh v Germany 44 EHRR 32:
‘incriminating evidence-whether in the form of a confession or real evidence-obtained as a result of acts of violence or brutality or other forms of treatment which can be characterised as torture-should never be relied on as proof of the victim’s guilt, irrespective of its probative value. Any other conclusion would only serve to legitimate indirectly the sort of morally reprehensible conduct which the authors of Art.3 of the Convention sought to proscribe or, as it was so well put in the US Supreme Court’s judgment in the Rochin case 342 US 165, “to afford brutality the cloak of law”.’
That view, that the use of evidence obtained by torture or ill-treatment is prohibited not just, or indeed primarily, because of its likely unreliability, but rather because the state must stand firm against the conduct that has produced the evidence, is universally recognised both within and outside Convention law.
What is, with respect, a particularly strong statement to that effect, citing a multitude of equally strongly worded authorities, is to be found in §17 of the speech of Lord Bingham in A v Home Secretary (No2) [2006] 2 AC 221. 49.  SIAC was wrong not to recognise this crucial difference between breaches of article 6 based on this ground and breaches of article 6 based simply on defects in the trial process or in the composition of the court. Rather, in its conclusions in §§ 442‑452 of its determination... it treated the possible use of evidence obtained by torture pari passu with complaints about the independence of the court: see in particular SIAC at §§ 449-450. That caused it not to recognise the high degree of assurance that is required in relation to proceedings in a foreign state before a person may lawfully be deported to face a trial that may involve evidence obtained by torture.” 52.  The Court of Appeal noted that SIAC had reached its conclusion that there would not be a complete denial of justice in relation to the use of evidence obtained by torture by relying on the process, admittedly not wholly satisfactory, before the State Security Court and the Court of Cassation. For the Court of Appeal that conclusion sat very ill with SIAC’s own findings about the State Security Court process, in particular SIAC’s own concern as to the difficulties in proving that evidence had been obtained by torture. In the opinion of the Court of Appeal, SIAC’s concern was “amply justified by the litany of lack of the basic protections against prior ill-treatment” in Jordan. It also criticised SIAC’s “disturbing failure” to give proper weight to the findings as to the defects in the State Security Court. The Court of Appeal concluded:
“It was not open to SIAC to conclude on that evidence that the risk of the total denial of justice that is represented by the use of evidence obtained by torture had been adequately excluded. SIAC could not have so concluded if it had properly understood the status in Convention law of this aspect of article 6.” 53.  The Secretary of State appealed to the House of Lords in relation to the Court of Appeal’s conclusion on Article 6. The applicant cross-appealed in relation to his other Convention complaints. The appeal was heard with the appeals of two of the appellants in MT (Algeria), RB and U (see paragraph 48 above). In the conjoined appeals the House of Lords was therefore able to consider the use of closed material before SIAC, the reliance on the assurances contained in the MOU and the applicant’s Articles 5 and 6 complaints. The House of Lords gave judgment on 18 February 2009 unanimously allowing the Government’s appeal and dismissing the applicant’s cross-appeal ([2009] UKHL 10).
(a)  Article 3: the “closed” proceedings before SIAC 54.  Lord Phillips held that SIAC was lawfully entitled to consider closed material in evaluating safety on return and there were cogent considerations of policy for doing so. A distinction had to be drawn between closed material on safety on return and the use of closed material in other proceedings, for example to establish the national security threat posed by an individual. For the former, the individual would normally be aware of the nature of any risk on return and, in any event, it was for the individual himself, and not the State, to make out his case on whether he would be at risk on return. It was not likely to be critically important for a special advocate to be able to obtain input from the person to be deported in relation to closed evidence. As regards the impracticality of obtaining an appropriate expert witness with security clearance to see the material, Lord Phillips did not regard the problem as unfair. SIAC’s rules of procedure enabled the special advocate to ask SIAC to call for more evidence and SIAC, as an expert tribunal, could be relied upon “to make a realistic appraisal of the closed material in the light of the special advocate’s submission”. In respect of the assurances, Lord Phillips endorsed the view that the assurances contained in the MOU had to be disclosed but details of the negotiations leading to the MOU could be closed material. 55.  Lord Hoffmann rejected the applicant’s argument on the more fundamental basis that he viewed this Court’s case-law as making it clear that the determination whether a deportation order might infringe Article 3 did not require “the full judicial panoply of article 6 or even 5(4)”. Citing Chahal, cited above, he emphasised that all that was required was “independent scrutiny of the claim”, which had occurred in the applicant’s case. 56.  Lord Hope agreed, albeit accepting that this Court had not yet had the opportunity to analyse whether the SIAC system met the requirements of the Convention. In his view, it did so. Lord Brown also agreed, emphasising that with regard to safety on return, no case was being made against the applicant; rather it was he who was making a case against the returning State.
(b)  Article 3: assurances and the MOU 57.  Lord Phillips (with whom the other Law Lords agreed) construed the this Court’s case-law from Mamatkulov and Askarov, cited above, onwards as treating assurances “as part of the matrix that had to be considered” when deciding whether there were substantial grounds for believing that the applicant would face treatment contrary to Article 3. He referred to the “abundance” of international law material, which supported the proposition that assurances should be treated with scepticism if they are given by a country where inhuman treatment by State agents was endemic. However, for Lord Phillips this came “close to a ‘Catch 22’ proposition that if you need to ask for assurances you cannot rely on them”. In rejecting that proposition, he held that the only basis to interfere with the view of SIAC was if its conclusions that the assurances could be relied upon were irrational and SIAC’s conclusions in the present case were not.
(c)  Article 5 58.  The House of Lords unanimously refused to interfere with the finding of fact by SIAC that the applicant’s exposure under Jordanian law to 50 days’ detention without access to a court or a lawyer, would not arise. Lord Phillips found that, even if it would arise, 50 days’ detention would not constitute a flagrant breach of Article 5. A flagrant breach was a breach whose consequences were so severe that they overrode the right of a State to expel an alien from its territory. That might be satisfied by arbitrary detention which lasted many years but not 50 days’ detention.
(d)  Article 6 59.  On Article 6, taking the test to be whether there would be a “complete denial or nullification” of the right to a fair trial, Lord Phillips observed:
“136.  This is neither an easy nor an adequate test of whether article 6 should bar the deportation of an alien. In the first place it is not easy to postulate what amounts to ‘a complete denial or nullification of the right to a fair trial’. That phrase cannot require that every aspect of the trial process should be unfair. ... What is required is that the deficiency or deficiencies in the trial process should be such as fundamentally to destroy the fairness of the prospective trial. 137.  In the second place, the fact that the deportee may find himself subject in the receiving country to a legal process that is blatantly unfair cannot, of itself, justify placing an embargo on his deportation. The focus must be not simply on the unfairness of the trial process but on its potential consequences. An unfair trial is likely to lead to the violation of substantive human rights and the extent of that prospective violation must plainly be an important factor in deciding whether deportation is precluded.” 60.  Having reviewed, the relevant case-law of this Court, including Bader and Kanbor v. Sweden, no. 13284/04, § 42, ECHR 2005‑XI, which he took to exemplify the need to consider the risk of a violation of Article 6 in combination with other Articles such as Articles 2 and 3, Lord Phillips found:
“[T]he Strasbourg jurisprudence, tentative though it is, has led me to these conclusions. Before the deportation of an alien will be capable of violating article 6 there must be substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk (i) that there will be a fundamental breach of the principles of a fair trial guaranteed by article 6 and (ii) that this failure will lead to a miscarriage of justice that itself constitutes a flagrant violation of the victim’s fundamental rights.” 61.  In the present case, the second limb was met by the potential sentences of imprisonment the applicant faced. For the first limb, Lord Phillips concluded that, although the military constitution of the Jordanian State Security Court would render the trial contrary to Article 6 if it were held in a Convention State, he agreed with SIAC and the Court of Appeal, that it could not amount to a “flagrant denial of justice” sufficient to prevent deportation in a removal case. 62.  In respect of the applicant’s complaint that there was a real risk that the evidence against him had been obtained by torture, Lord Phillips held that the Court of Appeal erred. It had required too high a degree of assurance that evidence that might have been obtained by torture would not be used in a foreign trial. He stated:
“[T]he prohibition on receiving evidence obtained by torture is not primarily because such evidence is unreliable or because the reception of the evidence will make the trial unfair. Rather it is because ‘the state must stand firm against the conduct that produced the evidence’. That principle applies to the state in which an attempt is made to adduce such evidence. It does not require this state, the United Kingdom, to retain in this country to the detriment of national security a terrorist suspect unless it has a high degree of assurance that evidence obtained by torture will not be adduced against him in Jordan... The issue before SIAC was whether there were reasonable grounds for believing that if Mr Othman were deported to Jordan the criminal trial that he would there face would have defects of such significance as fundamentally to destroy the fairness of his trial or, as SIAC put it, to amount to a total denial of the right to a fair trial. SIAC concluded that the deficiencies that SIAC had identified did not meet that exacting test. I do not find that in reaching this conclusion SIAC erred in law.” 63.  Lord Hoffmann found that there was no Convention authority for the rule that, in the context of the application of Article 6 to a removal case, the risk of the use of evidence obtained by torture necessarily amounted to a flagrant denial of justice. 64.  Lord Hope agreed. He accepted that this Court had adopted an “uncompromising approach” to the use at trial of evidence obtained by torture but the evidence before SIAC did not come up to that standard. There were allegations but no proof. The assertion that there was a real risk that the evidence was obtained by torture was not enough to prohibit removal. He recalled SIAC’s findings that the retrial would probably not comply with Article 6 if Jordan were a party to the Convention but would take place within a legally constructed framework. There was sound evidence that the State Security Court, which was not a mere tool of the executive, appraised the evidence and tested it against the law. SIAC had therefore been entitled to find as it did on the evidence. 65.  Lord Brown agreed with Lord Phillips and, referring to the majority of the Grand Chamber in Mamatkulov and Askarov, cited above, stated: “if extradition was not unlawful even in the circumstances arising there, in my judgment expulsion most certainly is not unlawful here.” 66.  Lord Mance, who agreed with the other Law Lords on Article 6 and all other points of appeal, noted a considerable resemblance between the concept of “flagrant unfairness” in this Court’s case-law and the concept of denial of justice in public international law generally. For the latter, the modern consensus was that the factual circumstances had to be egregious for State responsibility to arise in international law.