7.  The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 8.  The first applicant, originally from Wardak province in central Afghanistan, arrived in the United Kingdom on 30 October 2008 and claimed asylum on 3 November 2008. 9.  The basis of his asylum claim was his fear of both the Taliban and Hizb-i-Islami (“HII”) due to his perceived connections with the Afghan Government and the United Nations (“the UN”). He claimed that a year after his birth he had moved to Kabul with his family and that, in 1996, he and his family had emigrated to Pakistan owing to problems that they had had with the Taliban primarily as a result of their Hazara ethnicity. They had returned to Kabul in 2001 where they had lived until his departure from Afghanistan. The first applicant claimed that between 2004 and 2005, he had worked as a driver distributing leaflets for the elections and that, in that capacity, he had regularly worked with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (“UNAMA”). From 2005 until 2008, he had worked as a driver in Kabul for the United Nations Office for Project Service, a branch of the United Nations Development Programme (“UNDP”). In August 2008, ten days before he had left Afghanistan, he had received a telephone call in the Pashto language from an unknown person (who he had presumed to be a member of the Taliban) threatening his life and that of his family unless he stopped working with “foreigners and non-Muslims”. He had spoken to his friends about the phone call but had initially decided to ignore it. A few days later, he claimed that the Taliban had come to his home, had made further threats against him and, in his absence, had kidnapped his cousin. The first applicant claimed that he had been advised on the phone by his family to leave Afghanistan immediately for his own safety. He had therefore fled to Pakistan, where his family had joined him five days later. However, in Pakistan he had felt that he remained a Taliban target and so he had arranged his journey through Europe to the United Kingdom. 10.  On 17 December 2008, the Secretary of State refused the first applicant’s asylum application considering that he had fabricated aspects of his account and that his credibility was undermined by his failure to claim asylum in the European countries that he had passed through on his journey. Whilst it was acknowledged that the Taliban had been responsible for attacks on Hazara in the past, it was not accepted that the first applicant had ever been targeted by the Taliban or that he would be at risk in the future. It was similarly accepted that there may well have been incidents of the targeting of those working for foreign or international organisations within Afghanistan, but it was considered to be pure speculation that the threatening phone call that the first applicant had received in August 2008 had been from the Taliban. Further, it was considered to be inconsistent that the first applicant would have been able to work for the UN for three years without any incidents occurring earlier. Even if the first applicant’s cousin had been kidnapped, there was nothing to suggest that the incident related to the first applicant’s involvement with the UN or a systematic campaign against him. Even taking the first applicant’s claim at its highest, it was noted that the first applicant had failed to seek assistance from the Afghan authorities, the UN or any other party in Afghanistan. It was therefore considered that he had failed to demonstrate that a sufficiency of protection was not available to him in Afghanistan or that he could not internally relocate to another area of Kabul for safety. 11.  The first applicant appealed against the refusal of his asylum claim and, in a determination published on 4 January 2010, the then Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (“the AIT”) dismissed his appeal. The immigration judge accepted that the first applicant was of Hazara ethnicity and that it was probably true that he had been employed by the UNDP as a driver from 2005 until 2008. The immigration judge also accepted that the first applicant had probably received a veiled threat in a telephone call from the Taliban, which he had decided initially to ignore. He considered that such action demonstrated that the first applicant had had no fear of the Taliban at that time. The immigration judge did not believe that there was any truth in the suggestion that the first applicant had been targeted by the Taliban who had kidnapped his cousin instead of him. The fact that the first applicant had been able to go home and travel to Pakistan before fleeing to Europe was found to indicate that he had not been under any specific threat from the Taliban. Further, the immigration judge did not believe that the first applicant would be known throughout Afghanistan as a UN driver. Finally, even if the whole of the first applicant’s account was true, the immigration judge considered that there was no reason why he could not safely relocate within Afghanistan, particularly to Kabul to where he would be removed in any event. In sum, the immigration judge did not accept that there were substantial grounds for believing that the first applicant would face a real risk of suffering serious harm if he were returned to Afghanistan. 12.  The first applicant applied for reconsideration arguing that he would be at risk because of the level of violence in Afghanistan. On 26 January 2010, a Senior Immigration Judge refused his application for reconsideration noting that the first applicant had not sought to challenge any of the immigration judge’s findings in his case but had instead sought to rely on Article 15 of the Qualification Directive (see paragraphs 36-37 below). 13.  On 15 June 2010, the High Court refused a further application for reconsideration, noting the findings of the Country Guidance determination of GS (Article 15(c): indiscriminate violence) Afghanistan CG [2009] UKAIT 00044 (see paragraph 29 below) and concluding that it would not be unduly harsh or unreasonable to expect a young man, like the first applicant, to return to Kabul. 14.  The second applicant left Afghanistan on 30 April 2011 and arrived in the United Kingdom on 2 June 2011. 15.  He claimed asylum on 3 June 2011 on the basis of his fear of the Taliban due to his work as an interpreter for the United States armed forces and the International Security Assistance Force (“ISAF”) from February 2009 until April 2011. He submitted letters in support from various commanding officers in the US forces which confirmed that he had worked with US forces in Kunar province in north-eastern Afghanistan. He claimed that he had received threats from the Taliban including a threat to behead him if he continued to work with foreigners. He also claimed that, in October 2010, he had been the interpreter involved in the search and rescue operation of an aid worker, which had ultimately led to the aid worker’s death and the death of eight Taliban members. He claimed that he had located the aid worker using a scanner and that the Taliban were aware of the significance of his role in that operation which had heightened their adverse interest in him. The second applicant had eventually fled Afghanistan after seeing armed Taliban outside his house. The second applicant additionally claimed that he would not be able to relocate to Kabul for safety because he had relatives who lived there who were involved in the HII and who would seek to forcibly recruit him into their forces. 16.  On 20 June 2011, the Secretary of State refused his asylum application. It was accepted that he had worked as an interpreter for US forces in Afghanistan. However, it was not accepted that the second applicant had been involved in the search for the aid worker given that the information that he had given regarding the same contradicted the information which was available in the public domain. Additionally, it was not accepted that the second applicant had received threats as he had claimed from the Taliban given, inter alia, the discrepancies in his account over the dates of the same; and the fact that it was not plausible that the Taliban would have continued to threaten him rather than harm him, even after he had continued to work as an interpreter despite their earlier warnings. It was also considered that the fact that he had continued to work for US forces, despite the threats against him, was at odds with his claimed fear of the Taliban. Furthermore, it was not accepted that Taliban members had attended his home to kill him in April 2011 given that they had not fired at him and that he had been able to escape. The second applicant’s credibility was also considered to be undermined by the fact that he had failed to claim asylum in France, despite having spent twenty-two days there on his way to the United Kingdom. 17.  In sum, even taking the second applicant’s claims at its highest, it was not accepted by the Secretary of State that his fear of the Taliban was well-founded because it was not accepted that he had had any real difficulties with them in the past. Furthermore, it was considered that he had failed to establish a sustained and systemic failure of state protection on the part of the Afghan authorities and he could therefore seek protection from the Afghan authorities against the Taliban. Finally, it was considered that he could internally relocate to Kabul for safety if necessary as a fit and healthy man of twenty-three years of age. In that regard, it had not been accepted that he was at any risk of being forcibly recruited by HII given that he was uncertain whether or not his relatives were even still alive and because such a fear was entirely speculative. 18.  The second applicant appealed against the refusal of his asylum claim and, in a decision of 30 June 2011, the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (“the First-tier Tribunal”) dismissed his appeal. The immigration judge accepted that the second applicant had worked as an interpreter for US forces in Kunar province, had probably used a scanner and had been given a weapon for his own protection given that he had been working in a volatile area. 19.  However, the immigration judge did not accept that the second applicant had been involved in the rescue operation of the aid worker and found that he had fabricated that part of his claim and spoken of a well known and well publicised incident to embellish a claim that he would be at enhanced risk upon return to Afghanistan. In that regard, the immigration judge considered, inter alia, that the second applicant would have known the aid worker’s surname had he been so involved in the search operation; that there were inconsistencies between his account and the account set out in newspaper articles; and that the dates that he had given were inaccurate and inconsistent with when the rescue of the aid worker had taken place. Furthermore, the immigration judge considered that, if the second applicant had had such a pivotal role in the operation, the US forces would have provided a more recent and specific letter of recommendation rather than the general and comparatively out of date letters that he had submitted at his appeal. Furthermore, the immigration judge did not accept that the second applicant would have been the only interpreter involved in such a rescue operation, given the sensitivity of the same, the number of personnel involved and the number of villages that had been searched. The immigration judge also found that the second applicant had not given a credible explanation as to how the Taliban would have been aware that he had been the interpreter who had identified the location of the aid worker and that he had been inconsistent about when he had allegedly received threats from the Taliban. 20.  The immigration judge further entirely disbelieved that there would be any risk to the second applicant in Kabul from members of his family who would force him to join HII and considered that that issue had been an embellishment of his claim. In that regard, the immigration judge noted that the second applicant had not submitted any evidence regarding the same and that in his asylum interview he had stated that those relatives were missing and may even have died. 21.  The immigration judge commented that during the course of the hearing he had found the second applicant to be an untruthful witness who had been anxious to give a rehearsed story. 22.  Additionally, the immigration judge considered the second applicant’s claim with reference to the country guidance determination of GS (see paragraph 29 below) and stated that he had considered with care whether the second applicant would fall within an enhanced risk category because of his work as an interpreter for the US forces but had concluded that that could not be considered to be the case given that many Afghan nationals would have worked for the US and international forces. The immigration judge further considered that, as a young man in good health who had been able to travel independently from Afghanistan, it was not likely to be unduly harsh or unreasonable to expect him to relocate to Kabul particularly given that he had married sisters apparently living safely there. Finally, the immigration judge considered that the second applicant’s failure to claim asylum in France damaged his credibility. 23.  On 6 July 2011, a Senior Immigration Judge refused an application for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal finding that, in a very careful and detailed determination, the immigration judge had given cogent and sustainable reasons, which had been fully open to her on the evidence, for concluding that the second applicant had not left Afghanistan because of persecution and that he could return there without facing a real risk of serious harm. The immigration judge had given ample justification for the adverse credibility findings she had made and had adequately explained why the second applicant would not be at risk in Kabul, to where he could viably relocate.