5.  The applicant was born in 1971 and lives in Riga. 6.  The applicant, at the time of the material events, was working for the national television broadcaster Latvijas televīzija (“LTV”). She was a producer, reporter and host of the weekly investigative news programme De facto, aired in prime time every Sunday night. 7.  On 10 February 2010 the applicant received an e-mail from a person who called himself “Neo”, revealing that there were serious security flaws in a database maintained by the State Revenue Service (Valsts ieņēmumu dienests – “the VID”). Allegedly, these flaws made it possible to access the data stored in the Electronic Declaration System (Elektroniskā deklarēšanas sistēma – “the EDS”) without breaching any security protocols. In support of his allegations, “Neo” attached some examples of the data which he had downloaded in this manner (for example, salaries of LTV employees), the veracity of which the applicant could confirm. The applicant concluded that the data were genuine and that, most probably, there was a serious security flaw in the system. She then proceeded to inform the VID of a possible security breach. 8.  “Neo” did not reveal his identity to the applicant during their e-mail correspondence. He told her that there were more data which showed that the austerity measures in the public sector did not affect the highest-paid State officials. It transpired during their correspondence that “Neo” did not wish to reveal his identity. 9.  On 14 February 2010 the applicant, acting in her capacity as a journalist, announced during the broadcast of De facto that there had been a massive data leak from the EDS. She reported that the information concerned the income, tax payments and personal identity details of public officials, as well as private individuals and companies. 10.  One week after the broadcast, “Neo” started to publish data through his Twitter account concerning the salaries paid at various public institutions, at State and municipal levels; in some cases the names of the officials were included, and in others only the salaries were published. The information received wide media coverage. On 18 April 2010 he stopped publishing it. 11.  On 10 February 2010, upon an application by the VID, criminal proceedings were instituted concerning the data leak. 12.  On 19 February 2010 the police went to LTV to take evidence from the applicant as a witness in the criminal proceedings. They asked for a transcript of the 14 February 2010 broadcast, as well as access to the e-mail correspondence with “Neo”. The applicant declined to disclose the identity of her source or any information which could lead to its disclosure, referring to the right of non-disclosure as set forth in section 22 of the Law on Press and Other Mass Media. 13.  On the same date another journalist was also asked to disclose the identity of his journalistic source, as he had had a public communication with “Neo”, which had been aired during another television broadcast. He refused to testify since he did not consider that his source had done anything wrong. 14.  According to the Government, on 11 May 2010 the investigating authorities established that two of the IP address which had been used to connect to the EDS, had been used by a certain I.P. It was also established that I.P. had made several phone calls to the applicant’s phone number. 15.  On 11 May 2010, at about 6.55 p.m., I.P. was arrested in connection with the criminal proceedings; he was released from custody a few months later. 16.  On 12 May 2010 a police investigator informed the investigating judge that on the previous day four urgent searches had taken place at I.P.’s home, work and other premises. She also informed the judge of an urgent search at the applicant’s home (see paragraph 21 et seq. below). She then requested, under section 180, paragraph 5 of the Criminal Procedure Law, that the lawfulness of and the grounds for those searches be examined. 17.  On 14 May 2010 the investigator ordered a technical examination of the data storage devices that had been seized at the applicant’s home on 11 May 2010. According to the Government, all these devices were handed over to the relevant examination body within the State Police in two sealed bags. These packs remained unopened until 17 May 2010, when an expert opened them; their packaging or seals were not damaged. On 17 and 18 May 2010 the expert copied all the information from the data storage devices onto another computer using a special software programme. On 19 May 2010 he sealed the bags and handed them back to the investigator. On 21 May 2010 the data storage devices were returned to the applicant. 18.  On 15 June 2010 the technical examination was completed and, according to the Government, the information that had been copied was destroyed. 19.  The criminal proceedings against I.P. concerning the data leak appear to be pending at the pre-trial investigation stage. 20.  On 11 May 2010 the investigator drew up a search warrant, which was authorised by a public prosecutor the same day. The relevant parts of the warrant read as follows:
“It transpires from the case materials that [I.P.] was using mobile phone number ... at the material time. According to the information provided by the [mobile phone service provider], on 6 July 2009, the registered date of the first attempt to download a nonexistent EDS XML file, and also on 8 July 2009 and 28 October 2009, the established dates on which separate EDS XML files were downloaded via the anonymous ‘TOR’ servers, subscriber ... made outgoing calls to the subscriber with number ... . Periodic communication took place until 14 February 2010, when it ceased completely. According to the call history printouts, on several occasions both subscribers were served by the same electronic communications base stations, indicating the possibility that the subscribers met.
It was established that [the applicant], identity code ..., residing in ..., was using the phone number ... .
The facts and circumstances established in connection with the criminal proceedings taken together serve as grounds for the conclusion that at the time the criminal offence was committed [the applicant] had frequent communication with [I.P.] and might possibly have information about the unlawful activities of [I.P.] connected with the illegal downloading of EDS XML files, and also on the processing, storage and distribution of these files, his accomplices and other information in connection with the criminal proceedings.
Taking into account that the case materials give reasonable grounds to consider that at [the applicant’s home] there might be data storage devices that contain the XML files illegally downloaded from the EDS database and any derivatives thereof, software for processing these files, information about the obtaining and distribution of these files and other documents and items containing information about the crime that could serve as evidence in the criminal proceedings, it is necessary to carry out the search under the urgent procedure to prevent the destruction, concealment or damaging of such evidence.
On the basis of sections 180(3) and 337 (2)(2) of the Criminal Procedure Law:
DECIDED: 1.  to search [the applicant’s home] with a view to finding and seizing documents and data storage devices containing XML files illegally downloaded from the EDS database and any derivatives thereof, software for processing these files, information about the obtaining and distribution of these files and any other items containing information about the crime under investigation.” 21.  On 11 May 2010, from 9.34 to 10.30 p.m., the police conducted a search at the applicant’s home. 22.  According to the applicant, upon her return home that night a plain‑clothes policeman approached her in the stairwell and, without identifying himself, physically prevented her from closing the doors. Only then did he present a search warrant and proceed to conduct the search together with two other officers. During the search the following data storage devices were seized: a personal laptop, an external hard drive, a memory card and four flash drives. According to the applicant, these devices contained a large body of her personal data as well as most of her work-related material. 23.  The Government did not contest the applicant’s version of the events. 24.  On 12 May 2010 the investigating judge retrospectively approved the search warrant of 11 May 2010 in the form of an “approval” written on that warrant. No reasons were given. 25.  On 14 June 2010 the President of the first-instance court, upon a complaint by the applicant, upheld the investigating judge’s decision and concluded that the search was lawful and that the evidence obtained was admissible in the criminal proceedings. No hearing was held. She examined the applicant’s written complaints, the criminal case file and the investigator’s written explanation. The relevant part of the decision, which was final, reads:
“Having considered the impugned decision of the investigating judge on its merits, I find it to be in compliance with the legal norms and the actual state of affairs. ...
The investigator has taken sufficient actions to protect the rights of [the applicant] as a journalist. In particular, she assigned police officers to question [the applicant] as a witness, and [the applicant] used her right not to disclose her source.
According to the domestic case-law, in most cases the court imposes an obligation on journalists to disclose sources of information only in cases when, purely objectively, there are no other options for solving or preventing a crime or in cases when any further crimes would substantially harm public and national-security interests.
In the present proceedings, although the unlawful processing and uncontrolled dissemination of the personal data of several thousand, even hundreds of thousands of people is considered a substantial violation of the rights of the general public, the investigating authority did not apply to the investigating judge for an order to disclose the information source ... because ... it was decided not to pursue any investigative activities that would concern journalists, in line with the principle of proportionality and the rights of non-disclosure ...
Accordingly, as the material in the case file shows, the further investigation focused on other leads, and the probable suspect was established by processing and analysing the records of the EDS, that is, with no disclosure of a journalist’s source. ...
There is no reasonable ground to believe that the search at [the applicant’s] home was performed for the purpose of identifying the source of the information, because the aim of the search was to find the XML files downloaded from the EDS database and any derivatives thereof, software for processing these files and information about the obtaining and distribution of the files, and to stop any further unlawful dissemination of personal data. ...
The present criminal proceedings were opened in connection with facts directly relating to the exchange of information in electronic form and therefore it is important to take into account the specific features of cybercrime, where the preservation, acquisition and recording of evidence in electronic form is delicate owing to the fact that such evidence can be modified or destroyed very quickly; it is also important to take into account the mens rea of the crime. ... I find that in this particular case the search under the urgent procedure was admissible. ...
Since [the applicant] is an in-house and not a freelance journalist, there are no grounds to assume that material directly related to her professional activity would definitely be stored at her home, especially if she herself did not indicate that this was the case. If any such indications had been given, the investigating judge would have had grounds to evaluate such facts. ...
In view of the above, I find that the 12 May 2010 decision by the investigating judge is justified and lawful and there are no grounds to revoke it; I am also of the opinion that there are no reasons to consider that the results of the actions under consideration are void.
At the same time it should be explained to [the applicant] that any complaints of alleged breaches during the search or other investigative activities ought to be submitted in accordance with the procedure laid down in section 337 of the Criminal Procedure Law ...” 26.  On 21 May 2010 a senior prosecutor replied to the applicant’s complaints about the investigator’s decision to conduct the search, its authorisation by the supervising prosecutor and the police officers’ actions while carrying it out. He stated that he could not examine the grounds for the search; these had in any case been examined by the investigating judge and the President of the court. 27.  Moreover, he found that on 11 May 2010 the supervising prosecutor had lawfully authorised the search warrant. As to the return of the seized items, the matter was to be discussed with the competent investigating authority. Finally, a note was added that the applicant could lodge a complaint against the senior prosecutor’s reply with another branch of the prosecutor’s office. 28.  The Internal Security Bureau of the State Police (Valsts policijas Iekšējās drošības birojs), of its own motion, examined the police officers’ conduct during the search. On 20 July 2010 the applicant was informed that no breaches of either the Criminal Procedure Law or the general principles of police officers’ ethics had been found. 29.  On 13 May 2010 the Ombudsman opened an inquiry into the search at the applicant’s home with a view to ascertaining whether the search had interfered with her freedom of expression and whether the domestic authorities had had sufficient regard to the assessment of the limitations imposed on the freedom of the press. 30.  On 28 September 2010 he delivered his opinion, which was not binding on the domestic authorities. He examined not only whether the alleged violation of the applicant’s freedom of expression had taken place, but also whether there was an effective monitoring system in the country in that regard. As concerns the alleged interference with freedom of expression, and proportionality, he noted the following [emphasis as in the original]:
“The protection of journalistic sources is provided for under section 22 of the Law [on Press and Other Mass Media] ... This does not mean the absolute immunity of a journalist in criminal proceedings, but the necessity to respect journalists’ professional interests and legal guarantees.
The decision of the competent investigating authorities to search the applicant’s place of residence was based on the information made public in the De facto broadcast. According to the list of objects searched, it was important to secure the evidence and to clarify how the journalist had received the information about the data “leak” from SRS EDS, and who was guilty. The wording used in the search warrant – “information about the obtaining and distribution” – clearly demonstrates the purpose of the competent investigating authorities to identify the journalistic source.
That being so, the activities of the competent investigating authorities in the particular case concern[ed] the protection of journalistic sources and thus interfere[d] with the journalist’s freedom of expression.
At the same time, the protection of journalistic sources is not absolute and may be restricted in certain cases in the public interest. This means that the competent investigating authorities, when taking a decision affecting a journalist, should evaluate the aspects of restriction of freedom of expression and the proportionality of such action - is the disclosure of such information truly necessary? Or maybe there are reasonable alternative measures, as specified in Principle 3 of the Recommendation [No. R(2000) 7].
[Reference to sections 12, 154, 179 and 180 of the Criminal Procedure Law] Therefore, there is a legal basis for disclosure of journalistic sources, for searches and also for the lawful and proportionate restriction of human rights in criminal proceedings. It follows that such restrictions are prescribed by law.
To assess the proportionality of those restrictions and the possibility of applying less harmful alternative means of achieving the aim, the Ombudsman asked the responsible authorities whether, for the purpose of obtaining information from the journalist, there had been sufficient grounds to opt for an emergency search out of all options offered by the [Criminal Procedure Law], rather than for a disclosure order under section 154 of the [Criminal Procedure Law].
[The prosecutor’s office] replied that the purpose of the search had been to substantiate and obtain evidence in criminal proceedings, and not to identify the journalistic source, which was already known to the police; that was why disclosure under section 154 of the [Criminal Procedure Law] was not ordered. The prosecutor’s office held the view that it had no right to give any opinion on the validity of the investigative action, since the activities of the investigating judge who approved the search had been examined by the President of the court.
The court substantiated the need for a search under the urgent procedure by the fact that in criminal proceedings involving a flow of electronic documents it was necessary to take into account the specifics of cybercrimes, where the preservation, obtaining and recording of electronic evidence was rather delicate because such evidence could be altered and destroyed very quickly and irreversibly.
Such a statement should be considered critically, since the officers of the State Police turned to the applicant with the request to provide information on her source on 19 February 2010, but the search under the urgent procedure was carried out on 11 May 2010. The materials submitted by the State authorities and the court to the Ombudsman do not contain any evidence of attempts by the journalist to continue unlawfully processing and further distributing the data, or to destroy such information.
The need to conduct the search under the urgent procedure has also not been explained in the assessment provided by the court, if the materials of the case provided sufficient basis to consider that the applicant most likely knew, supported or participated in the crime under investigation by simultaneously using the information for journalistic purposes. If the competent investigating authority had such information at the time of making the decision on conducting the search, it is not clear why the police did not apply the status of a suspect to the journalist before the search and did not search the journalist’s place of work.
It is considered established that the decision of the court is based upon assumptions, and in reaching the decision the court has not respected the status of the journalist, whose immunity and protection against disclosure of the information source are established in the law.
Consequently, it can be concluded that by approving the search warrant issued by the competent investigating authority under the urgent procedure, the supervising prosecutor and the court made no critical assessment of the need for and validity of those actions.
The Ombudsman has reservations as to whether a search at the applicant’s home under the urgent procedure was actually the most reasonable means of putting a stop to the disclosure of information at that point in the proceedings. In order to ensure compliance with the key principles of criminal proceedings established under section 12 of the [the Criminal Procedure Law], the competent investigating authority should have given more careful consideration to whether the information necessary for the investigation could have been obtained by means less harmful to the interests of the person.”
His final conclusions were as follows:
“Freedom of expression includes the right not to disclose journalistic sources. Only a court, observing the principle of proportionality, may order the disclosure of an information source to protect the essential interests of private individuals or society.
By conducting the search in [the applicant’s] home, purportedly in search, among other things, of information about the obtaining and distribution of the EDS database XML files, the competent investigating authority – in securing the evidence and disregarding the requirement to have a court order – discovered the identity of the applicant’s source.
In authorising the search warrant issued by the investigator under the urgent procedure, the supervising prosecutor and the court failed to effect a critical examination of the urgency and the necessity of such a measure and did not sufficiently evaluate the threat to freedom of expression.
Accordingly, the freedom of expression and the right not to disclose journalistic sources enshrined in the Constitution and binding international treaties have been violated.
Since the legally protected immunity of a journalist in criminal proceedings is not incorporated in [the relevant chapter of the Criminal Procedure Law] and the domestic case-law shows that the competent investigating authorities do not pay sufficient attention to it, it would be advisable to initiate a discussion on [legislative] amendments [to the relevant provision of the Criminal Procedure Law]. In all likelihood the law should specify that it is prohibited to perform investigative activities involving journalists on premises belonging to them if there are reasonable grounds to consider that this might restrict the scope of the rights guaranteed to journalists.” 31.  Several international instruments concern the protection of journalistic sources, including the Resolution on Journalistic Freedoms and Human Rights, adopted at the 4th European Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy (Prague, 7-8 December 1994) and the European Parliament’s Resolution on the Confidentiality of Journalists’ Sources (18 January 1994, Official Journal of the European Communities No. C 44/34). 32.  Recommendation No. R (2000) 7 on the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information was adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 8 March 2000 and states, in so far as relevant:
“[The Committee of Ministers] Recommends to the governments of member States: 3.  to bring them in particular to the attention of public authorities, police authorities and the judiciary as well as to make them available to journalists, the media and their professional organisations.
Appendix to Recommendation No. R (2000) 7
Principles concerning the right of journalists not to disclose their sources of information
Definitions
For the purposes of this Recommendation:
a.  the term ‘journalist’ means any natural or legal person who is regularly or professionally engaged in the collection and dissemination of information to the public via any means of mass communication;
b.  the term ‘information’ means any statement of fact, opinion or idea in the form of text, sound and/or picture;
c.  the term ‘source’ means any person who provides information to a journalist;
d.  the term ‘information identifying a source’ means, as far as this is likely to lead to the identification of a source:
i.  the name and personal data as well as voice and image of a source,
ii.  the factual circumstances of acquiring information from a source by a journalist,
iii.  the unpublished content of the information provided by a source to a journalist, and
iv.  personal data of journalists and their employers related to their professional work.
Principle 1 (Right of non-disclosure of journalists)
Domestic law and practice in member States should provide for explicit and clear protection of the right of journalists not to disclose information identifying a source in accordance with Article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter: the Convention) and the principles established herein, which are to be considered as minimum standards for the respect of this right.
Principle 2 (Right of non-disclosure of other persons)
Other persons who, by their professional relations with journalists, acquire knowledge of information identifying a source through the collection, editorial processing or dissemination of this information, should equally be protected under the principles established herein.
Principle 3 (Limits to the right of non-disclosure)
a.  The right of journalists not to disclose information identifying a source must not be subject to other restrictions than those mentioned in Article 10 § 2 of the Convention. In determining whether a legitimate interest in a disclosure falling within the scope of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention outweighs the public interest in not disclosing information identifying a source, competent authorities of member States shall pay particular regard to the importance of the right of non-disclosure and the pre‑eminence given to it in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, and may only order a disclosure if, subject to paragraph b, there exists an overriding requirement in the public interest and if circumstances are of a sufficiently vital and serious nature.
b.  The disclosure of information identifying a source should not be deemed necessary unless it can be convincingly established that:
i.  reasonable alternative measures to the disclosure do not exist or have been exhausted by the persons or public authorities that seek the disclosure, and
ii.  the legitimate interest in the disclosure clearly outweighs the public interest in the non-disclosure, bearing in mind that:
•  an overriding requirement of the need for disclosure is proved,
•  the circumstances are of a sufficiently vital and serious nature,
•  the necessity of the disclosure is identified as responding to a pressing social need, and
•  member States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing this need, but this margin goes hand in hand with the supervision by the European Court of Human Rights.
c.  The above requirements should be applied at all stages of any proceedings where the right of non-disclosure might be invoked.
Principle 4 (Alternative evidence to journalists’ sources)
In legal proceedings against a journalist on grounds of an alleged infringement of the honour or reputation of a person, authorities should consider, for the purpose of establishing the truth or otherwise of the allegation, all evidence which is available to them under national procedural law and may not require for that purpose the disclosure of information identifying a source by the journalist.
Principle 5 (Conditions concerning disclosures)
a.  The motion or request for initiating any action by competent authorities aimed at the disclosure of information identifying a source should only be introduced by persons or public authorities that have a direct legitimate interest in the disclosure.
b.  Journalists should be informed by the competent authorities of their right not to disclose information identifying a source as well as of the limits of this right before a disclosure is requested.
c.  Sanctions against journalists for not disclosing information identifying a source should only be imposed by judicial authorities during court proceedings which allow for a hearing of the journalists concerned in accordance with Article 6 of the Convention.
d.  Journalists should have the right to have the imposition of a sanction for not disclosing their information identifying a source reviewed by another judicial authority.
e.  Where journalists respond to a request or order to disclose information identifying a source, the competent authorities should consider applying measures to limit the extent of a disclosure, for example by excluding the public from the disclosure with due respect to Article 6 of the Convention, where relevant, and by themselves respecting the confidentiality of such a disclosure.
Principle 6 (Interception of communication, surveillance and judicial search and seizure)
a.  The following measures should not be applied if their purpose is to circumvent the right of journalists, under the terms of these principles, not to disclose information identifying a source:
i.  interception orders or actions concerning communication or correspondence of journalists or their employers,
ii.  surveillance orders or actions concerning journalists, their contacts or their employers, or
iii.  search or seizure orders or actions concerning the private or business premises, belongings or correspondence of journalists or their employers or personal data related to their professional work.
b.  Where information identifying a source has been properly obtained by police or judicial authorities by any of the above actions, although this might not have been the purpose of these actions, measures should be taken to prevent the subsequent use of this information as evidence before courts, unless the disclosure would be justified under Principle 3.
Principle 7 (Protection against self-incrimination)
The principles established herein shall not in any way limit national laws on the protection against self-incrimination in criminal proceedings, and journalists should, as far as such laws apply, enjoy such protection with regard to the disclosure of information identifying a source.” 33.  For the precise application of the Recommendation, the explanatory notes specified the meaning of certain terms. As regards the terms “source” and “information identifying a source” the following was set out:
“c.  Source 17.  Any person who provides information to a journalist shall be considered as his or her ‘source’. The protection of the relationship between a journalist and a source is the goal of this Recommendation, because of the ‘potentially chilling effect’ an order of source disclosure has on the exercise of freedom of the media (see, Eur. Court H.R., Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, 27 March 1996, para. 39). Journalists may receive their information from all kinds of sources. Therefore, a wide interpretation of this term is necessary. The actual provision of information to journalists can constitute an action on the side of the source, for example when a source calls or writes to a journalist or sends to him or her recorded information or pictures. Information shall also be regarded as being ‘provided’ when a source remains passive and consents to the journalist taking the information, such as the filming or recording of information with the consent of the source.
d.  Information identifying a source 18.  In order to protect the identity of a source adequately, it is necessary to protect all kinds of information which are likely to lead to the identification of a source. The potential to identify a source therefore determines the type of protected information and the range of such protection. As far as its disclosure may lead to an identification of a source, the following information shall be protected by this Recommendation:
i.  the name of a source and his or her address, telephone and telefax number, employer’s name and other personal data as well as the voice of the source and pictures showing a source;
ii.  ’the factual circumstances of acquiring this information’, for example the time and place of a meeting with a source, the means of correspondence used or the particularities agreed between a source and a journalist;
iii.  ’the unpublished content of the information provided by a source to a journalist’, for example other facts, data, sounds or pictures which may indicate a source’s identity and which have not yet been published by the journalist;
iv.  ’personal data of journalists and their employers related to their professional work’, i.e. personal data produced by the work of journalists, which could be found, for example, in address lists, lists of telephone calls, registrations of computer-based communications, travel arrangements or bank statements. 19.  This list is not necessarily exhaustive. Paragraph c has to be read and interpreted in a manner which allows an adequate protection of a source in a given case. The decisive factor is whether any additional information is likely to lead to the identification of a source.” 34.  Section 22 of the Law on Press and Other Mass Media (likums “Par presi un citiem masu informācijas līdzekļiem”) lays down the principle of non-disclosure in Latvian law. The mass media have a right not to disclose sources of information (paragraph 1). An order to disclose a source of information may be made only by a court, after considering proportionality, for the protection of the essential interests of private individuals or society (paragraph 2). 35.  Section 154 of the Criminal Procedure Law (Kriminālprocesa likums) sets forth the circumstances when a journalist or an editor is under obligation to disclose a source of information. Such an order may be made only by a court (paragraph 1). The investigating judge, upon an application by an investigator or a public prosecutor, hears the parties and examines the material in the case file (paragraph 2) and assesses the proportionality of the measure (paragraph 3). The decision is amenable to judicial review by a higher-court judge, under a written procedure, whose decision is final (paragraph 4). 36.  Section 180 of the Criminal Procedure Law lays down the procedure for issuing a search warrant. Under the ordinary procedure, the investigating judge or court authorises the search upon an application by the competent investigating authority (procesa virzītājs), having examined the case file (paragraph 1). Under the urgent procedure, when a delay could allow the relevant documents or objects to be destroyed, hidden or damaged or the person to abscond, the search warrant may be issued by the competent investigating authority. Authorisation by a public prosecutor is necessary for a search warrant issued by the investigator (paragraph 3). A search warrant issued under the urgent procedure has to be submitted on the following day to the investigating judge, who then examines the lawfulness of and the grounds for the search; if an investigative action is unlawful, the investigating judge declares such evidence inadmissible in the criminal proceedings and decides on further action in relation to the evidence (paragraph 5). 37.  Section 337 of the Criminal Procedure Law lays down the procedure for submission of complaints. A complaint shall be addressed to and lodged with the authority that is competent to decide on it; it can also be submitted to an official whose action or decision is contested (paragraph 1). A complaint about an action or decision by an investigating judge shall be forwarded for examination to the President of the court (paragraph 2, part 4). When examining a complaint, the President of the court has to decide on merits; his/her decision is final (paragraph 4). 38.  Section 12 of the Criminal Procedure Law provides as follows:
Section 12 - Human rights guarantees
“1.  Criminal proceedings shall be performed in compliance with internationally recognised human rights, without imposing unjustified criminal procedural obligations or disproportionate interferences with a person’s private life. 2.  Human rights shall be restricted only for public safety reasons and only in accordance with the procedure specified by this Law, regard being had to the nature and danger of the criminal offence. 3.  The application of security measures depriving people of their liberty, and the infringement of the inviolability of private premises, or of the confidentiality of correspondence and means of communication, shall be allowed only with the consent of an investigating judge or court. 4.  Officials involved in the conduct of criminal proceedings shall protect the confidentiality of private life and of commercial activities. The relevant information shall be obtained and used only if such information is necessary to establish the truth. 5.  An individual shall have the right to request the exclusion from the criminal case of information concerning ... his or her private life ... if such information is not necessary for the fair resolution of the criminal proceedings.” 39.  On 13 May 2010 the Latvian Parliament (Saeima) adopted legislative amendments to the effect that all public institutions were to make available on the internet information about the salaries paid to their officials. These amendments took effect on 15 June 2010.