7.  The applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Dublin. He is a pastor attached to the Irish Faith Centre, a bible based Christian ministry in Dublin. 8.  In early 1995 the Irish Faith Centre submitted an advertisement to an independent, local and commercial radio station for transmission. The text of the advertisement read as follows:
“What think ye of Christ? Would you, like Peter, only say that he is the son of the living God? Have you ever exposed yourself to the historical facts about Christ? The Irish Faith Centre are presenting for Easter week an hour long video by Dr Jean Scott Phd on the evidence of the resurrection from Monday 10th - Saturday 15th April every night at 8.30 and Easter Sunday at 11.30am and also live by satellite at 7.30pm.” 9.  The radio station was prepared to broadcast the advertisement. However, in March 1995 the Independent Radio and Television Commission (“IRTC”) stopped the broadcast pursuant to Section 10(3) of the Radio and Television Act 1988 (“the 1988 Act”). This ruling did not affect the later transmission of the video by satellite. 10.  The applicant applied for leave to take judicial review proceedings. He cited the IRTC and the Attorney General as respondents and submitted that the IRTC had wrongly construed Section 10(3) and, alternatively and mainly, that if the IRTC had correctly applied section 10(3) of the 1988 Act, that provision was unconstitutional. 11.  By judgment delivered on 25 April 1997, the High Court found that the IRTC had not infringed section 10(3) of the 1988 Act. It further considered that the unspecified right to communicate guaranteed by Article 40(3)(1) of the Constitution was at issue since the advertisement had, as its principal purpose, the communication of information. However, it found that section 10(3) was a reasonable limitation on the right to communicate and that there were good reasons in the public interest for the ban. 12.  In so concluding the High Court judge stated as follows:
“I think that it would have been reasonable for [Parliament] to take the view that in Irish society religious advertising on commercial radio might be undesirable in the public interest. ... It is sufficient, in my view, if there were good reasons in the public interest for the ban. Irish people with religious beliefs tend to belong to particular churches and that being so religious advertising coming from a different church can be offensive to many people and might be open to the interpretation of proselytising. Religion has been a divisive factor in Northern Ireland and this is something which [Parliament] may well have taken into account. ... a person listening to commercial radio is for all practical purposes compelled to listen to the advertisements. That being so, it is legitimate for any [Parliament] to have regard to the type of advertisements which might be permitted. The impugned Section enjoys the presumption of constitutionality. It is not obvious to me that a restriction on religious advertising is not a reasonable restriction in the interest of the common good on this particular form of exercise of the right to communicate. 
Of course it has been suggested on behalf of the Applicant that a blanket restriction is not proportional and that even if some restriction would be reasonable it would have to be less draconian. The absolute restriction according to the argument of Counsel for the Applicant infringes the doctrine of proportionality. I cannot accept this view. On the legislation as it stands there are very few limitations on the right to advertise and in that sense proportionality has already been taken into account. But at any rate, I do not think that one could subdivide religious advertising. Once a reasonable view can be put forward that religious advertising might be undesirable in the public interest, it would be impossible in practice to devise a wording that might have the effect of permitting certain alleged categories of innocuous religious advertising. It is the fact that the advertisement is directed towards a religious end and not some particular aspect of a religious end which might be potentially offensive to the public.” 13.  The Supreme Court rejected the applicant's appeal by judgment dated 28 May 1998. The judgment began by noting that:
“One can best glean the policy of the Act of 1988 by looking at the three kinds of prohibited advertisement collectively. One might get a false impression by singling out one kind of banned advertisement and ignoring the others. All three kinds of banned advertisement relate to matters which have proved extremely divisive in Irish society in the past. [Parliament] was entitled to take the view that the citizens would resent having advertisements touching on these topics broadcast into their homes and that such advertisements, if permitted, might lead to unrest. Moreover, [Parliament] may well have thought that in relation to matters of such sensitivity, rich men should not be able to buy access to the airwaves to the detriment of their poorer rivals.” 14.  The Supreme Court considered that religion was a private and a public affair and that the impugned provision was a restriction of the applicant's right freely to communicate and of his right to freedom of expression (Articles 40(3) and 40(6)(1) of the Constitution, respectively) which rights could be limited in the interests of the common good. The court cited with approval previous case-law which considered that the balance found by parliament between the individual rights and the common good should prevail:
“... unless it was oppressive to all or some of the citizens or unless there is no reasonable proportion between the benefit which the legislation will confer on the citizens or a substantial body of them and the interference with the personal rights of the citizen.” 15.  The court went on to point out that the real question was whether the limitation imposed upon the various constitutional rights was proportionate to the purpose which parliament wished to achieve. Again quoting with approval previous case-law, it described the principle of proportionality as follows:
“In considering whether a restriction on the exercise of rights is permitted by the Constitution the courts in this country and elsewhere have found it helpful to apply the test of proportionality, a test which contains the notions of minimal restraints on the exercise of protected rights and the exigencies of the common good in a democratic society. This is a test frequently adopted by the European Court of Human Rights and by the Supreme Court of Canada in the following terms. 'The objective of the impugned provision must be of sufficient importance to warrant over-riding a constitutionally protected right. It must relate to concerns pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society. The means chosen must pass a proportionality test. They must (a) be rationally connected to the objective and not be arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations; (b) impair the right as little as possible; and (c) be such that the effects on the rights are proportional to the objective.” 16.  The Supreme Court found that section 10(3) of the 1988 Act complied with this test - the restriction was “minimalist”, the applicant had the right to advance his views in speech or writing or by holding assemblies or associating with persons of like mind as himself; he had no lesser right than any other citizen to appear on radio or television; and the only restriction placed upon his activities was that he could not advance his views by a paid advertisement on radio or television. As regards the blanket nature of the ban and the applicant's argument that it would have been possible to introduce a more selective administrative system whereby inoffensive religious advertisements would be permitted, the Supreme Court noted:
“No doubt this is true. But [parliament] may well have decided that it would be inappropriate to involve agents of the State in deciding which advertisements, in this sensitive area, would be likely to cause offence and which not.” 17.  The Supreme Court went on to conclude that:
“It therefore appears to the court that the ban on religious advertising contained in section 10(3) of the 1988 Act is rationally connected to the objective of the legislation and is not arbitrary or unfair or based on irrational considerations. It does appear to impair the various constitutional rights referred to as little as possible and it does appear that its effects on those rights are proportional to the objective of the legislation.” 18.  In any event, once the impugned provision was broadly within the competence of parliament and parliament had respected the principle of proportionality, the Supreme Court indicated that it was not for it to interfere simply because it might have made a different decision. The presumption of constitutionality of the legislation had not therefore been rebutted and the applicant's appeal could not be allowed.