6.  The applicants were born in 1946, 1950, 1971, 1973 and 1980 respectively and live in Smolyan. The first and second applicants are spouses and the other applicants are their children. During the relevant period they all shared the same household. 7.  In the period between 25 July 1997 and 22 August 2001 the first applicant was the head of the Smolyan district police department. 8.  On 7 January 1998 an inspection commission from the Inspectorate of the Ministry of the Interior (“the Commission”), acting in accordance with an order of the Minister of the Interior (“the Minister”), inspected the police department and informed the first applicant that his office and home had been subjected to covert surveillance by his inferiors. The next day the covert surveillance was terminated and the surveillance equipment removed. Three officers of the same department, Mr S.B., chief of the Criminal Police Division, Mr I.I., chief of the Group for Operative and Technical Information, and Mr G., chief of the Anti-Terrorist Division, were dismissed in connection with the incident. 9.  In a report of 6 February 1998 the Commission established that on 4 December 1997 Mr S.B. had informed the Minister that he suspected the first applicant of links with criminal groups. On the following day Mr S.B. and Mr I.I. had requested a warrant for covert surveillance of the first applicant’s home and office. The chairman of the Plovdiv Military Court had issued the warrant on the same day and authorised two operations: surveillance of the applicants’ home in the period between 5 December 1997 and 4 February 1998, and of the first applicant’s office in the period between 6 December 1997 and 5 January 1998. The surveillance had started on 8 December 1997 without the requisite written authorisation of the Minister. The Commission did not draw any conclusion as to the lawfulness of the surveillance as such but limited the scope of its inspection to the conduct of the involved police officers. According to its report, Mr S.B. and Mr I.I. had committed serious breaches of the disciplinary rules in order to discredit the first applicant. It was further noted that some of the information gathered during the surveillance constituted a state secret which Mr S.B. had not been authorised to know. In the Commission’s opinion, the case revealed insufficient control by the Ministry of the Interior. 10.  On 2 April 1998 the head of the Inspectorate reported the case to the military prosecuting authorities, in whom the power to investigate criminal offences committed by police officers was vested at the relevant time. There is no information as to whether the latter took any action. 11.  On an unspecified date the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the dismissal of Mr S.B. and Mr I.I. in proceedings classified as confidential. 12.  On 11 September 2001 the first applicant requested the Chief Public Prosecutor to open an investigation into the incident. On 27 November 2001 criminal proceedings were opened. The military investigator questioned the suspects and a number of witnesses. 13.  In his explanations, Mr S.B. claimed that the Minister had given his consent for covert surveillance of the first applicant during a meeting between them on 4 December 1997. 14.  The Minister stated that Mr S.B. and Mr I.I. had not informed him that they had requested surveillance measures against the first applicant. They had sent him several envelopes containing information but he had forwarded them to another officer without opening them. It was only later that he had learned about the surveillance of the first applicant. 15.  According to witness statements, following the inspection members of the Commission had put the material obtained from the surveillance in a cardboard box and taken it away. The head of the Operative and Technical Information Service at the Ministry of the Interior stated that the material had not been received in that department and that he was not aware of its whereabouts. 16.  On 25 March 2002 Mr S.B. and Mr I.I. were charged with an offence under Article 387 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 37 below). 17.  On 13 January 2003 the first applicant lodged a civil claim for damages in the context of the criminal proceedings. 18.  On 4 September 2003 a prosecutor from the Plovdiv district military prosecutor’s office terminated the proceedings and discontinued the first applicant’s civil claim. He noted that the Minister had not approved the requests for secret surveillance in respect of the first applicant. However, during the inspection of 8 January 1998 the surveillance had been discontinued and the intelligence thus obtained had been delivered to the Chief Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior and had later been destroyed. The prosecutor therefore found that the first applicant had not suffered any damage, as the intelligence gathered had been destroyed. He further found that Mr S.B. and Mr I.I. had acted in accordance with section 17 of the SSMA, which only required the Minister to be informed about secret surveillance in urgent cases. 19.  On 19 September 2003 the applicant appealed to the Plovdiv Military Court. He indicated several allegedly unclear points, among which: the reason why the case had been considered urgent; whether Mr S.B. and Mr I.I. were competent to request the application of secret surveillance and the reasons for considering that no surveillance had taken place between 5 and 8 January 1998. 20.  By a decision of 30 September 2003 the Military Court quashed the appealed order for lack of sufficient reasoning and remitted the case for further investigation. It noted that the public prosecutor had not explained why he deemed that there had been a situation of urgency justifying the application of section 17 of the SSMA, nor why the two accused had failed to inform the Minister immediately, as the SSMA required. It went on to hold that the possible surveillance of the first applicant for several days after the expiration of the permission had also not been investigated. 21.  The investigator questioned the two accused. They stated that they had sent the requests to the Minister for approval on 18 or 19 December 1997, together with some of the material gathered. 22.  By an order of 18 August 2004 a prosecutor from the Plovdiv district military prosecutor’s office again terminated the proceedings. He found that the Minister had given oral permission for surveillance of the first applicant on 4 December 1997. The two accused had sent him the first envelope containing intelligence on 10 December 1997. The requests for covert surveillance had been sent on 19 December 1997 together with the second portion of intelligence. The last envelope had been sent on 26 December 1997. He found that while the Minister had not approved the secret surveillance in writing, he had in any event given oral permission and the two accused had acted pursuant to section 17 of the SSMA. The prosecutor noted that the Minister denied having given any oral permission for secret surveillance. However, he assumed that the Minister must have known about it, as the first results from it had been sent to him in December 1997. The prosecutor further found that in the period between 5 and 8 January 1998 secret surveillance was indeed still deployed, as time had been necessary for their dismantling, but no intelligence had been gathered during this period. He also held that although the Minister had not been informed immediately, this was a trivial breach of the procedure which did not amount to a criminal offence as no damage had been inflicted on the first applicant. 23.  On 23 August 2004 the first applicant appealed further, reiterating his arguments and emphasising the Commission’s finding that on 8 January 1998 his office was still under secret surveillance. 24.  In a final decision of 8 September 2004 the Plovdiv Military Court dismissed the appeal and terminated the proceedings. It relied on the prosecutor’s findings, and held that the accused officers had acted in accordance with the law and that the first applicant had not suffered any damage from their actions. Mr S.B. and Mr. I.I. had been dismissed on disciplinary grounds, but the Supreme Administrative Court had quashed the dismissal and ordered their reinstatement, thus finding that their actions had been lawful. The court also held that the case had been urgent as it had concerned the head of the Smolyan District Police Department and that no secret surveillance had taken place outside the permitted time-limit. 25.  According to the information made available to the Court, no investigation was ever opened against the first applicant in connection with any criminal activity or unlawful conduct. 26.  On an unspecified date in 2001 the first applicant initiated private criminal proceedings against Mr S.B. and Mr I.I. for insult and libel, and joined a civil claim for damages, in relation to allegedly insulting statements made by them on a local radio station and in a newspaper in August 2001 relating to his personality and his work as head of the Smolyan District Police Department. 27.  In a judgment of 9 February 2004 the Smolyan District Court acquitted the defendants of the charges of insult and found them guilty of libel, sentencing them to a fine. It also awarded damages to the first applicant. 28.  On 24 June 2004 the Smolyan Regional Court quashed this judgment for breaches of procedure and remitted the case for fresh examination. 29.  In a court hearing on 11 October 2004 the Smolyan District Court terminated the proceedings, as the statutory limitation period for the offences had expired. The court did not rule on the civil claim, as it found that after the remittal the first applicant should have been designated a civil claimant again. This had not been possible however as no hearing on the merits had taken place after the remittal. 30.  On an unspecified date in 2006 the first applicant brought a civil action against Mr S.B. and Mr I.I. for insult and libel. In a judgment of 6 November 2008 the Plovdiv Regional Court partly allowed the action. On appeal on 18 May 2009 the Plovdiv Appeal Court quashed that judgment, holding that the first applicant had not proved that he had sustained any non-pecuniary damage in connection with the defendants’ statements. On 17 February 2010 the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the Plovdiv Appeal Court, with similar reasoning.