5.  The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Tbilisi. She worked as a technician in a State company specialising in the production of jewellery. 6.  By an administrative order of 1 August 2001, the company dismissed the applicant on account of her unauthorised absence on 26 July 2001, coupled with the fact that a disciplinary reprimand for professional negligence had been already been imposed on her on 9 July 2001. In response, the applicant sued the company for unlawful dismissal. 7.  At a hearing on 11 October 2001, which was not attended by the respondent company, the Didube-Chughureti District Court in Tbilisi found in the applicant's favour by default. 8.  In an interlocutory appeal dated 18 October 2001, the respondent company complained that the summons had not been served on its representative and requested that the default judgment of 11 October 2001 be annulled. 9.  On 22 October 2001 the Didube-Chughureti District Court, dispensing with an oral hearing, acknowledged its failure to serve the summons on the respondent company's representative, annulled the default judgment of 11 October 2001 and scheduled another hearing on the merits. 10.  On 3 December 2001 at an oral hearing the Didube-Chughureti District Court dismissed the applicant's claim. The court found it established that on 26 July 2001 she had been absent from work without leave. Taking into account the fact that she had received a previous disciplinary sanction, the court concluded that the dismissal was in compliance with Article 34 § 1 (g) of the Labour Code (“the LC”). 11.  In an appellate decision of 6 March 2002, the Tbilisi Regional Court, noting that the first instance court had fully established the circumstances of the case and correctly applied the law, upheld the judgment of 3 December 2001. The decision was based on both parties' written and oral submissions. 12.  On 4 June 2002 the applicant lodged a cassation claim. She complained that the respondent company's representative had not had an appropriate power of attorney at first instance. She further complained that the Didube-Chughureti District Court had set aide the default judgment of 11 October 2001 without holding an oral hearing. Finally, she challenged the lower courts' reading of the LC and claimed that the disciplinary reprimand of 9 July 2001 had been arbitrarily imposed on her. 13.  On 17 June 2002 the Supreme Court of Georgia decided to declare the cassation claim admissible and to dispense with an oral hearing on the merits under Article 408 § 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”). This decision was communicated on the same day to both parties; the respondent company was served with a copy of the applicant's cassation claim as well. 14.  On 24 June 2002 the applicant requested the Supreme Court to reconsider its decision regarding an oral hearing. She stated that her oral pleadings, bearing on some particularly technical issues concerning jewellery production, could better demonstrate that the earlier disciplinary reprimand of 9 June 2001 had been wrongly imposed. 15.  On 2 July 2002 the respondent company filed submissions in reply to the applicant's cassation claim. This reply, addressing only the factual circumstances of the case, was not communicated to the applicant. 16.  On 8 July 2002 the applicant maintained before the Supreme Court her request for an oral hearing. 17.  On 19 July 2002 the Supreme Court, dispensing with a hearing, dismissed the applicant's cassation claim and upheld the appellate decision of 6 March 2002. It reasoned that the applicant lacked standing to challenge the authority of the respondent company's representative, this prerogative being reserved to the company itself. In any case, the complaint was ill‑founded, as the case file disclosed a copy of a duly completed letter of authority.
As regards the first instance court decision to set aside the default judgment without holding a hearing, the Supreme Court acknowledged that it constituted a procedural breach. That breach, however, did not justify cassation, as it could not be said to have resulted in an erroneous decision within the meaning of Article 393 § 3 of the CCP. Even if an oral hearing had been held, the failure to serve the summons on the respondent company would still have been a legitimate ground for setting aside the default judgment of 11 October 2001. As to the complaint about the earlier reprimand, the Supreme Court refused to hear it since it went beyond the subject of the present dispute – the lawfulness of the dismissal on 1 August 2001 – and had never been raised by the applicant either before the first instance or the appellate courts. 18.  In the decision of 19 July 2002, the Supreme Court did not take into account any of the arguments contained in the respondent company's submissions of 2 July 2002; its reasoning solely addressed the issues raised in the applicant's cassation claim. The decision was communicated to both parties on 26 July 2002.