4.  The applicant was born in 1932 and lives in Stockholm. He is a lawyer. 5.  On 17 March 1997 he sued the Swedish State for damages before the District Court (tingsrätten) of Stockholm, claiming negligence in the administration of his bankruptcy. The applicant requested that the court render a declaratory judgment (fastställelsetalan), establishing that the State was liable for damage allegedly caused by negligence during the Enforcement Service’s administration of his bankruptcy in 1987/88. 6.  The District Court, in June 1997, ordered the applicant to specify his claims and to elaborate further the grounds for these claims. Upon a request by the applicant, the court granted him an extension of the time-limit for submitting the supplementary material. On 20 August 1997, the court received the applicant’s submissions, which included 57 annexes. 7.  On 29 October 1997 the District Court, without having issued a summons, rejected the applicant’s claim as being clearly unfounded. 8.  The applicant appealed to the Svea Court of Appeal (hovrätten) and demanded that the case be remitted to the lower court for proper examination. The Court of Appeal, in June 1998, requested the applicant to supplement his appeal and to specify his claims. After having been granted an extension of the time-limit, the applicant complied with the request. 9.  In a judgment of 17 December 1998, the Court of Appeal set aside the lower court’s judgment as far as the applicant’s claim relating to damage allegedly caused by the Enforcement Service’s administration of his bankruptcy was concerned and remitted the case to the District Court for proper examination. However, the Court of Appeal also decided not to allow the applicant to plead that the State was responsible for damage caused by an alleged breach of contract by the Enforcement Service. 10.  The applicant appealed against the judgment to the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen), seeking leave to invoke the alleged breach of contract. On 23 April 1999, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal. 11.  The proceedings were then re-initiated before the District Court, which, in June 1999, issued a summons to the State, represented by the National Tax Board (Riksskatteverket). The State disputed the claims and the applicant was given the opportunity to comment on the State’s submissions. After having been granted two extensions of the time-limit due to ill-health, the applicant had his third such request for an extension rejected. The court called the parties to a preparatory meeting to be held on 18 January 2000. As the meeting could not be finalised in one day, it was resumed on 21 February 2000. The parties were subsequently requested to submit the evidence invoked. The applicant asked for, and was granted, another three extensions of the time-limit during the spring and summer before submitting all the requested material. During the autumn of 2000 both parties submitted comments relating to, inter alia, the oral evidence invoked and the schedule for the oral hearing. Due to the applicant’s health problems, the main hearing was eventually scheduled for 23 and 24 January 2001. During the hearing, four witnesses were heard and extensive written evidence was produced. 12.  On 21 February 2001 the District Court rejected the applicant’s claim for damage as it did not find that the Enforcement Service’s administration of the bankruptcy had been negligent. 13.  The applicant appealed against the judgment to the Court of Appeal, requesting that the case be remitted to the lower court or, in the alternative, that his claims be upheld. He further asked to be heard under oath (sanningsförsäkran) before the Court of Appeal and for the four witnesses to be heard again. The State submitted its reply to the applicant’s submissions on 6 August 2001. 14.  On 30 December 2003 the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s request to have the case remitted to the District Court. It further refused to allow the applicant to invoke certain new evidence, and to be heard under oath, since he had not shown that he had a valid excuse for having failed to produce the evidence previously before the lower court. At the same time, the court informed the parties that it was considering adjudicating the case without holding an oral hearing. Thus, the parties were given the opportunity to state their view on this matter and to conclude their submissions. The State consented to the case being decided upon without a main hearing, whereas the applicant opposed it. 15.  In a judgment of 10 June 2004, the Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s judgment in full, noting that the parties had essentially invoked and developed the circumstances on which their claims were based in the same manner as before the District Court and that they had invoked written evidence. The Court of Appeal found no reason to depart from the evaluation of the case made by the lower court. As concerned its decision not to hold an oral hearing the court stated that, according to the relevant rules in the Code of Judicial Procedure, an appeal could always be adjudicated without a main hearing if it was clear that such a hearing was unnecessary. The court then considered that it was clear that a main hearing was unnecessary in the case before it in view of the investigation of the matter at hand. The fact that the applicant opposed the determination of the case without a hearing was immaterial as the issues of law raised in the case had been elucidated at the District Court in a way that made it obvious that a main hearing would not add anything of value to the case. Hence, the court found that there was no impediment to the case being adjudicated without a main hearing. 16.  On 20 July 2004 the applicant’s appeal reached the Supreme Court and he asked for, and was granted, an extension of the time-limit to supplement his appeal. In August 2004 he submitted his supplementary pleadings and, on 14 September 2004, the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.