6.  The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Skopje. 7.  On 26 March 1996 the applicant brought a civil action before the then Municipal Court of Gevgelija (“the first-instance court”) seeking the annulment of a gift contract (“the contract”) of 1994 on the basis of which Ms N.B. had transferred title to a plot of land and a house to Mr J.B., her son. The applicant had a right of way (нужна службеност на премин) in respect of the plot in question. He claimed that the plot in issue had been socially-owned and could not have been the subject of the disputed contract. The claim was submitted against Mr J.B. 8.  On 24 May 1996 the first-instance court accepted the applicant’s claim and declared the contract null and void. It found that the contract was contrary to section 103 of the Obligations Act (see paragraph 22 below) since the house had been demolished in 1972, that is, before the contract had been concluded. 9.  On 19 June 1997 the adjudicating bench of the Skopje Court of Appeal, presided over by judge V.K., quashed the lower court’s decision and remitted the case for reconsideration. The court stated, inter alia:
“... the transfer of the plot and house from the defendant’s mother to the defendant is not contrary either to the constitutional values or other binding regulations since the defendant, as heir, is eligible to have the land, which cannot be subject to any legal transaction, transferred to him ... the first-instance court ignored the fact that the claim had not been submitted against the other party to the contract ...” 10.  On 20 October 1998 the first-instance court stayed the proceedings on account of the applicant’s failure to appear despite the fact that he had been duly summoned. In the absence of a request that the proceedings continue, on 6 April 1999 the court declared the applicant’s claim to have been withdrawn (тужбата се смета за повлечена). On 8 July 1999 the court rejected the applicant’s appeal as belated, together with his request for reinstatement of the proceedings. On 15 December 1999 the Skopje Court of Appeal, presided over by judge V.K., accepted the applicant’s appeal and quashed the first-instance court’s decisions of 6 April and 8 July 1999 respectively. 11.  On 30 October 2000 the first-instance court accepted the applicant’s claim and declared the contract null and void. It found that the contract had been contrary to the Building Land Act, as the lex specialis under which undeveloped building land, as was the case of the plot in question, was regarded as res extra commercium. 12.  On 14 March 2001 the Skopje Court of Appeal’s bench, presided over by judge V.K., quashed that decision, arguing, inter alia:
“... a question arises as to whether the transfer of the plot and house, under the contract, from the defendant’s mother to the defendant was contrary to the constitutional values and other binding regulations given the fact that the house had already been demolished when the contract was signed. In order to answer this question correctly, one should consider section 19 of the Building Land Act under which rights specified in sections 15 (1) and 17 (1) of that Act can be transferred from the former owner to ... heirs ... Under section 15 (1) of the Building Land Act, the former owner has a right to use undeveloped land. Section 17 (1) provides for the pre-emptive right of the former owner to construct a family house on building land. Section 19 of the Building Land Act, cited above, provides for the right to transfer these rights only to the persons enumerated therein. That means that undeveloped building land can be transferred. The first-instance court established that the plot in question was undeveloped given the fact that the house had been demolished when the contract was concluded. Having regard to the relevant provisions of the Building Land Act, cited above, the transfer of the right of construction to the defendant, as heir, when the gift contract was concluded between the defendant and his mother, was allowed.” 13.  The court further accepted the defendant’s arguments that it was not possible to sue Ms N.B., who had died in 1995, and that her heirs should, therefore, take her place. On an unspecified date the applicant specified his claim, introducing Ms B.G.B., Ms N.B.’s daughter, as a co-defendant. 14.  On 12 November 2001 the first-instance court ruled, for the third time, in favour of the applicant, finding that the contract had contained false information. Furthermore, undeveloped land, like the plot in question, was not transferable under the Building Land Act. This decision was served on the parties in May 2002. 15.  The defendant appealed on 30 May 2002. 16.  On 5 February 2004 the Skopje Court of Appeal overturned the decision and dismissed the applicant’s claim. It found that the first-instance court had erred on the law, namely that it had not relied on sections 15, 17 and 19 of the Building Land Act under which the right to construct on undeveloped land could have been transferred to the defendant when the contract was concluded. Judge V.K. was not a member of the sitting bench. 17.  On 15 June 2004 the public prosecutor lodged a legality review request (барање за заштита на законитоста) seeking that the Court of Appeal’s decision of 5 February 2004 be quashed or overturned and the first-instance court’s decision confirmed. 18.  On 18 May 2005 a five-member bench of the Supreme Court, which included judge V.K., dismissed the public prosecutor’s request. Referring to the reasons given in the impugned decision of the Court of Appeal, the court stated, inter alia:
“On the basis of the established facts, the Court of Appeal found that the first-instance court had erred on the law, namely that the gift contract was not contrary to the constitutional values and binding regulations, despite the fact that the house did not exist when the contract was concluded. Under section 19 of the Building Land Act of 1991, the former owner could transfer the rights set forth in sections 15 (1) and 17 (1) of that Act only to ... heirs ..., who could no longer transfer it to other persons. Under section 15 (1) of the Building Land Act, the former owner has the right to use undeveloped land. Section 17 (1) provides for the pre-emptive right of the former owner to construct a family house on building land. Since the defendant is among the persons enumerated in section 19 of the Building Land Act, the court considers that transferring the right of construction to the defendant, as heir, when the gift contract was concluded between the defendant and his mother, was allowed.” 19.  The court therefore found that the Court of Appeal had correctly applied the substantive law, in particular sections 15 (1), 17 (1) and 19 of the Building Land Act. It held that the defendant was among the persons enumerated in section 19 of the Building Land Act and that it was allowed, accordingly, to transfer the right of construction to him, as heir. It therefore concluded that the contract was not contrary to the constitutional values and binding regulations. This decision was served on the applicant’s representative on 4 August 2005.