8.  The applicants are relatives of sailors who lost their lives in a shipwreck. 9.  On 14 January 1993 the vessel Jan Heweliusz sank in the Baltic Sea. It belonged to the company Polskie Linie Oceaniczne, whose registered office is in Gdynia, and was operated by the company Euroafrica, with its registered office in Szczecin. Of the 35 passengers and 29 crew members on board, 55 died in the shipwreck and 9 survived. 10.  Several commissions of inquiry were set up to establish the cause of the shipwreck.
The commission set up by the Prime Minister suspended its inquiry in March 1993 without producing a report.
The commission set up by the Ministry of Transport and Maritime Affairs submitted a report in April 1993 in which it found that the shipwreck had been due to force majeure.
The special commission set up within the National Labour Inspectorate concluded in May 1993 that the owner of the vessel and the crew were jointly responsible. 11.  The Maritime Chamber attached to the Szczecin Regional Court (Izba Morska przy Sądzie Wojewódzkim) instituted proceedings seeking to establish the cause of the shipwreck. The relatives of the crew members who had died took part in the proceedings. 12.  On 11 January 1994 the Maritime Chamber delivered its decision, attributing liability to the ship's captain, its technical team, the Polish Shipping Registry, which had inspected the vessel before the disaster, and the Polish rescue services. 13.  On 18 November 1994 the Maritime Appeals Chamber of the Gdańsk Regional Court (Odwoławcza Izba Morska przy Sądzie Wojewódzkim), sitting in Gdynia, set aside the decision of 11 January 1994 and referred the case to the Maritime Chamber for a fresh examination. 14.  The Gdańsk Maritime Chamber, sitting in Gdynia, examined the case between 20 March 1995 and 9 February 1996. On 23 February 1996 it gave a decision in which it held that the crew had been partly liable, that the vessel's operator had been at fault for failing to undertake the necessary repair work, and that the natural elements had also played a part. 15.  The operator, the ship's owner, the representative of the Ministry of Transport and Maritime Affairs and the other parties to the proceedings appealed. In a decision delivered on 26 January 1999 and served on the parties on 19 November 1999, the Gdańsk Maritime Appeals Chamber partly upheld the finding of liability with regard to the operator. It also upheld the finding that certain acts of negligence on the part of the crew, in particular the captain and the chief officer, had contributed to the disaster, as had the fact that the rescue operation had not been properly coordinated.
The relevant passages of the decision read as follows:
 
page 2
“The most likely cause of the capsize of the car and train ferry the Jan Heweliusz and of the death by drowning and hypothermia of 27 passengers and 18 crew members and the disappearance of 8 passengers and 2 crew members was:
...
 the fact that the ferry turned into the wind while unevenly ballasted (towards the port side), resulting in the shifting of the ballast towards the port side; violent gusts of wind on that side; the shifting of the vehicles' loads and the vehicles themselves to the port side; the discharge of bilge water to the outside on the port side of the ferry.”
page 4
“The Jan Heweliusz left the port of Świnoujście at 11.35 p.m. on 13 January 1993, bound for the port of Ystad, in an unseaworthy condition, as the safety requirements were not met in the following respects: 3.  the securing of the vehicles to the deck in accordance with maritime best practice.”
page 6
“Irregularities have been found in the conduct of: 1.  the operator of the Jan Heweiusz, Euroafrica Shipping Lines, a limited liability company based in Szczecin, which allowed the ferry to be operated while in an unseaworthy condition owing to the damage sustained to the door on 10 January 1993 in Ystad, following which its class had been suspended and the safety certificate had ceased to be valid, in that it
(a)  omitted to declare the ferry to the Szczecin Maritime Bureau for an interim inspection and to the Polish Shipping Registry for immediate inspection;
(b)  failed to take the agreed action to repair the rear door in the proper manner; 2.  the captain of the above-mentioned ferry, a Master Mariner ... who, on 13 January 1993, left the port of Świnoujście, bound for the port of Ystad, while the ferry was in an unseaworthy condition, in that he
(a)  omitted to declare the ferry to the Consulate in Malmö and later to the Szczecin Maritime Bureau for an interim inspection following the damage sustained to the rear door on 10 January 1993 in Ystad, the suspension of class after the accident and the cessation of validity of the ship's safety certificate;
(b)  allowed the vessel to depart without the vehicles being secured to the deck, in spite of the gale warning that had been issued; 3.  the chief officer, a Master Mariner ... who, on 13 January 1993, before the ferry left the port of Świnoujście bound for Ystad, and despite the issuing of a gale warning, did not supervise the securing of the vehicles to the deck before the ferry left port.”
page 8
“The lack of effectiveness of the rescue operation was the result of
... 4.  the inadequate training of the crew in the use of the life-saving equipment.”
page 109
“ ... In the Chamber's view, the evidence cited demonstrates that
...
(ii)  the cargo was not secured before the vessel left dock despite the gale warning issued by the meteorological office...”
pages 129-30
“... The causes of the vessel's having turned into the wind can only be established with a high degree of probability; the possibility that the persons steering the ferry failed to observe the rules cannot be discounted ...”
page 162
“... The rescue operation revealed that, in a situation of the utmost danger, some members of the crew did not know how to use the lifejackets ...”