6.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Nicosia. He is currently employed on a temporary basis at the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus. 7.  On 3 July and 9 August 2000 he made two applications for appointment in different sections of the civil service. On 10 July 2001 and 11 September 2001 both of his applications were refused by the Civil Service Commission on the ground that he had not performed his military service or been legally exempted from it. 8.  On 21 September 2001 the applicant lodged a judicial review application before the Supreme Court challenging the relevant decisions of the Civil Service Commission. He contended, inter alia, that he had refused to perform his military service with the Cypriot National Guard as he was a homosexual and that for the determination of his sexual orientation he would have been subjected to degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 and 8 of the Convention. 9.  In its interim decision of 24 February 2003 the court rejected an application for amendment of the applicant’s pleadings. It noted that whether or not the applicant was entitled to be exempted from military service was not a contested issue in the pending proceedings and, as such, could not be examined. The issue under dispute in the proceedings before the court was the lawfulness of the decision by the Civil Service Commission dismissing the applicant’s application for lack of fulfilment of the requirement of completion of military service. 10.  On 17 October 2003 the Supreme Court rejected the judicial review application and made an order for costs against the applicant. It justified the rejection by referring to the reasons set out in its previous interim decision and, in particular, that the applicant did not meet one of the basic requirements for appointment to the Civil Service. 11.  On 28 November 2003, the applicant lodged an appeal before the Supreme Court against its first-instance judgment. The grounds of appeal had been drafted by the applicant’s representative. On 30 July 2004 the applicant filed his skeleton argument which had also been prepared by his representative. The appeal was set for a hearing on 9 October 2006. 12.  Until that stage of the proceedings, the applicant was being represented by a lawyer of his choice, but due to his inability to settle outstanding legal fees he had to stop receiving legal assistance from his lawyer. 13.  On 2 August 2004 he filed an application for legal aid claiming that the proceedings concerned the protection of his human rights and thus fell within the scope of proceedings for which the grant of legal aid was envisaged by the Legal Aid Law 165 (I) of 2002. 14.  On 4 October 2004, his application for legal aid was rejected by the Supreme Court, acting in a panel of five judges, which referred to the relevant provisions of the Legal Aid Law and explained that legal aid could only be provided in criminal proceedings, civil proceedings that concern determination of a litigant’s human rights and proceedings lodged before the family courts. The proceedings introduced by the applicant, who sought judicial review under Article 146 of the Constitution of a decision refusing to appoint him in the civil service, did not constitute civil proceedings and, as such, his legal aid application had to be refused. 15.  On 3 November 2006 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The court referred to the arguments developed by the applicant’s lawyer in the proceedings. It found that the issue of unconstitutionality had not been raised by the applicant’s lawyer in accordance with the requirements set out in the relevant procedural provisions and case-law given that it had only been set out in a vague and imprecise manner in the application seeking judicial review. The court further took into account the points raised by the applicant’s lawyer in his written address to the Court. It found that the vague suggestions made concerning unconstitutionality had no legal foundation and were irrelevant to the subject-matter of the judicial review application. No other ground for annulment of the relevant decision had been raised or shown.