5.  The applicant was born in Ukraine in 1987 and arrived in Slovenia in 2000 with her sister and mother, who had married a Slovenian. 6.  Between July and December 2001, at the age of 14, she was allegedly repeatedly sexually assaulted by a family friend, X, 55 years old at the time, who together with his wife often took care of her and helped her in preparations for beauty contests. 7.  In July 2002 the applicant told her mother about the alleged sexual assaults by X, but was unwilling to talk about them with anyone else. 8.  On 15 July 2002 a priest gave a statement to the Maribor police, in which he said that the applicant’s mother had told him about her concern that the applicant had been raped by X. 9.  On 16 July 2002 the applicant’s mother lodged a criminal complaint against X, in which she alleged that X had forced the applicant to engage in sexual intercourse with him on several occasions. 10.  On 17 July 2002 the applicant was questioned by Maribor police officers and described how X had forced her to engage in various sexual activities. As regards the time frame of the assaults, the applicant stated that X had first attempted to kiss her before July 2001, when she had started modelling for fashion shows. She proceeded to give an account of a number of occasions when X had sexually assaulted her. On one occasion X had lain on top of her while she was sleeping at his house and had attempted to have sexual intercourse with her, spreading her legs with one hand and putting his other hand over her mouth to prevent her from screaming, but he was interrupted by his younger son coming up the stairs. On another occasion, when they were at a swimming pool, he had groped her in the water. On yet another occasion X had allegedly taken the applicant to an abandoned workshop owned by his family and performed oral sex on her. Moreover, according to the applicant, X had forced her to perform oral sex on him at least three times, once at his home, once at his company’s garage, and the third time in his van, which he had parked in woods near the town. On that last occasion the applicant had allegedly tried to escape; however, being unfamiliar with the surroundings, she had come back to the van. The applicant stated that X had on several occasions attempted to have intercourse with her, but that she had not been certain whether he had managed to achieve penetration. She further stated that she had tried to defend herself by crying and pushing X away, but without success. 11.  The applicant was also examined by an expert in gynaecology, who found that her hymen was intact. Moreover, in the course of July and August 2002 the police questioned X, who denied any sexual relations with the applicant, and three other people. 12.  Following a series of unsuccessful attempts to obtain specific information from the police as regards the progress of the investigation, the applicant’s mother complained to the Maribor District State Prosecutor’s Office (hereinafter “the State Prosecutor’s Office”). 13.  On 27 June 2003 the State Prosecutor’s Office sent a letter to the Maribor police, urgently requesting a copy of the criminal complaint lodged against X. 14.  On 18 August 2003 the police sent a report to the State Prosecutor’s Office stating that the applicant had failed to provide a detailed account of her allegations or to indicate the locations where the alleged rapes had taken place. The police noted that the applicant had given the impression of being under severe psychological stress and in fear of her mother’s reaction. They concluded that it was impossible to confirm her allegation of rape, and equally impossible to establish the reasons for her serious emotional distress. 15.  On 28 August 2003 the State Prosecutor’s Office lodged a request for a judicial investigation in respect of X based on charges of sexual assault on a minor below the age of fifteen. The request alleged that X had forced the applicant to engage in oral sex and had had sexual intercourse with her on at least three occasions, despite her refusal and attempted resistance. 16.  On 7 January 2005 X was summoned to appear before the investigating judge of the Maribor District Court. He refused to give an oral statement. On 10 March 2005 X, represented by a lawyer, submitted a written statement in which he denied the charges. He also submitted a medical report which indicated that his left arm had been disabled since birth. 17.  On 26 May 2005 the investigating judge issued a decision to open a criminal investigation in respect of X. An appeal by X against this decision was rejected by the pre-trial panel of the Maribor District Court. 18.  On 17 October 2005 the applicant was examined as a witness before the Ljubljana District Court, which had been asked to carry out the witness examination because the applicant lived in the area. The examination resumed on 8 November 2005. Neither X nor his counsel was informed of this examination. The applicant testified in detail as to when, where and how the alleged offences had taken place. She first described the assault which had occurred in X’s house, while she had been sleeping there, reiterating that X had been disturbed by his son. According to the applicant’s statement, the second assault had occurred when, instead of driving the applicant home, X had parked in the woods and started to kiss her forcefully. X had then undressed the applicant, parted her legs with one hand and held her wrists with the other and again attempted to have intercourse with her, but there had been no penetration. The applicant further recounted that X had on another occasion taken her to the family’s abandoned workshop and had performed oral sex on her. She stated that she had attempted to free herself of his grip, but that X had again pinned her wrists down and also slapped her across the face. Again, vaginal intercourse had been attempted but had not actually occurred. X had ordered her not to talk to anyone about this, or he would have her and her family deported from Slovenia. The applicant added that she remembered these three occasions well and the events had occurred just as she described them, and that there had been a number of other similar incidents between July and December 2001. 19.  On 13 and 20 December 2005 X’s wife and another witness were examined by the investigating judge of the Maribor District Court. 20.  On 13 January 2006 the Koper District Court, at the request of the Maribor District Court, examined witness D., who testified that the applicant had told her of the alleged rape. 21.  On 14 April 2006 the investigating judge examined witness H., who was an employee of the company owned by X and his wife. H. testified that she had not seen X behaving improperly towards the applicant on the company’s premises. 22.  On 16 May 2006 the investigating judge appointed an expert in gynaecology, B., in order to establish the probability that the applicant had engaged in sexual intercourse in the period between July and December 2001. The latter carried out a consultation with the applicant, who refused a clinical examination. She told B., among other things, that despite the attempts made by X there had been no actual sexual penetration. During the consultation, B. confronted the applicant with an orthopaedics report stating that X could not have used his left arm in the ways described by her, to which the applicant answered that she had seen X use it to lift heavy items. B. also presented the applicant with the police report stating that she had not been able to give a detailed account of the sexual assaults and specific locations, and asked her why she had not defended herself against X, for instance by scratching or biting. The applicant replied that she had not defended herself and had been unable to do so. On 19 June 2006 the expert prepared his report, which was based on the evidence in the file, including a gynaecological report from 2002 which showed that the applicant’s hymen was intact at that time, and the conversation with the applicant. He found that there was nothing to indicate with certainty that the applicant had had sexual intercourse with X at the material time. In addition to his medical opinion, the expert commented that there were certain inconsistencies in the applicant’s account of the events in issue. It can be seen from the report that neither of the alleged inconsistencies was related to any medical issue. 23.  On 20 June 2006 the investigating judge appointed an expert in clinical psychology, R. The latter, after holding a consultation with the applicant, submitted her report on 4 July 2006, and concluded as follows:
“Since 2001 Y. has shown all the symptoms of a victim of sexual and other kinds of abuse (emotional, behavioural and physical symptoms) ...
In addition to the emotional consequences, the girl shows very typical behavioural patterns relating to the abuse experienced by her, and also some physical symptoms (disturbed sleep, nightmares, collapsing). The symptoms are indicated in the report ...
The gravity of the consequences – physical and sexual in particular – is difficult to assess at the present time. But, like the short-term ones, the long-term consequences can be predicted. Their real extent will become apparent at key stages of the girl’s life and in stressful situations ...
Because of these effects, which are most serious in her psychological sphere ... it is of very marginal importance whether during the perpetrator’s violent behaviour the child victim experienced hymen defloration or not ...
 
Sexual behavioural patterns can only be assessed properly by an expert in clinical psychology ...” 24.  On 15 September 2006 the Maribor district prosecutor’s office indicted X for sexual assault of a child below the age of fifteen under Article 183 §§ 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code. An objection by X to the indictment was rejected by the pre-trial panel of the Maribor District Court on 20 October 2006. 25.  The Maribor District Court scheduled a hearing for 27 June 2007. However, the hearing was adjourned at X’s request on the basis of a document which showed that he was now on sick leave for several weeks. 26.  A hearing was then scheduled for 3 October 2007, but adjourned at X’s counsel’s request. The next hearing was to be held on 12 November 2007. However, owing to the absence of a jury member, the hearing was adjourned. Subsequently, X informed the court that he was about to go on a business trip, for which reason the next hearing was postponed until 16 January 2008. 27.  On 16 January 2008 X failed to appear before the court. On 17 January 2008 he submitted a sick-leave certificate. 28.  On 25 January 2008 X’s counsel informed the court that X had revoked his power of attorney and that he would be represented by another lawyer, M., from then on. However, the court received no new power of attorney authorising M. to act as X’s counsel. Since X was accused of a criminal offence requiring mandatory representation, on 28 January 2008 the court appointed M. as counsel for X . 29.  On 14 March 2008 the court held a hearing, from which the public was excluded on the grounds of protection of privacy and public morals. The court heard evidence from X. At the hearing the applicant’s counsel sought to have M., X’s counsel, disqualified on the ground that in 2001 the applicant and her mother had sought advice from him on the matters in issue. Furthermore, the applicant’s mother had been intimately involved with him. M. denied that he had ever seen the applicant or her mother and said that he only knew that the lawyer at whose firm he had been working at that time had represented the applicant’s mother’s estranged husband in divorce proceedings. The panel dismissed the application, ruling that no statutory grounds existed for disqualifying M. as counsel. 30.  On 14 March 2008 X submitted written pleadings, claiming that he would have been unable to use physical force on the applicant, as his left arm had been seriously disabled since birth and was 15 cm shorter than his right arm. X alleged that he had practically no use of his disabled arm. Moreover, he asserted that he and his family had been helping the applicant and her sister to integrate into their new community and learn Slovene, while their mother had been busying herself with her private activities. According to X, the charges of sexual assault were prompted by the applicant’s mother, who wished to extort money from him. 31.  On 14 April 2008 the court held a second hearing in the case. X was questioned by the State prosecutor, mostly about the use of his left arm, and in this connection conceded that, although he usually drove automatic cars, he did occasionally drive a smaller manual transmission car. However, when asked whether he had ever driven a truck, X replied that this had no bearing on the case, acknowledging nevertheless that he had a licence to drive all categories of road vehicles. Then the applicant was summoned to testify, the court granting her request for X to be absent from the hearing room. While recounting the instances of sexual abuse by X, the applicant cried repeatedly and the hearing was adjourned for a few minutes on that account. X’s counsel M. then questioned the applicant, asking her how tall she had been and how much she had weighed at the material time. The applicant became very agitated and asked M. why, having been the first to hear her story, he was asking those questions and was now acting as X’s counsel. M. commented that this was part of the tactics. The hearing was then adjourned owing to the applicant’s distress. 32.  On 9 May 2008 the court held a third hearing. The questioning of the applicant continued in the absence of X. When asked how she felt about the situation with hindsight, she cried and said that no one had helped her and that the proceedings had been dragging on for several years, during which she had had to keep reliving the trauma. 33.  On 27 August 2008 the applicant lodged a supervisory appeal under the Protection of the Right to a Hearing without Undue Delay Act of 2006 (hereinafter “the 2006 Act”) with a view to accelerating the proceedings. 34.  On 26 September 2008 the court held a fourth hearing, from which the public was excluded, at which X personally asked the applicant over a hundred questions, starting with a comment in the form of a question “Is it true that you have told and showed me that you could cry on cue and then everybody would believe you?” It does not appear from the record of the hearing that the applicant made any reply. X then asked the applicant a series of questions aimed at proving that they had seen each other mainly at gatherings of their families or when the applicant, in need of transport or other assistance, had actively sought his company. Among the questions asked by X were the following: “Is it true that I could not have abused you on the evening of the event as you stated on 14 April?”, “Is it true that if I had wished to satisfy my sexual needs, I would have called you at least once?”; “Why did you call me in September and ask me to take you out of town if I had already raped you five times before that date?”, “Why were you calling me, because I certainly never called you?”, or “Is it true that you specifically asked that we drive out of town alone, because you wished to talk to me and to celebrate your success at a beauty pageant?” The applicant insisted that she had not called X, nor had she initiated any outings with him, but that he had called her. X also asked the applicant whether she had told him that, once she had a boyfriend, she would always be on top, as she wanted to be the mistress. 35.  Moreover, X claimed that the charges of rape were fabrications by the applicant’s mother. Hence, he asked the applicant numerous questions about her mother, including about her knowledge of Slovene, her work, and her personal relationships. Further, X confronted the applicant with the medical report which indicated that his left arm was seriously disabled. The applicant insisted that she had seen X using his left arm in his daily life, including driving cars, lifting and carrying his children and their school bags, and carrying boxes and bottles. Throughout the questioning, X disputed the accuracy and credibility of the applicant’s answers, extensively commenting on the circumstances described by her and rejecting her version of events. He continued to do so even after the presiding judge explained to him that he would have the opportunity to make his comments after the applicant’s questioning. 36.  During the cross-examination, X repeated a number of questions and was eventually warned against doing this by the presiding judge. Moreover, the presiding judge ruled out of order seven questions that she perceived had no bearing on the case in issue. 37.  On three occasions, when the applicant became agitated and started crying, the court ordered a short recess. After one of these recesses X asked the applicant whether she would feel better if they all went to dinner, just as they used to, and maybe then she would not cry so much. 38.  At one point the applicant requested the court to adjourn the hearing as the questions were too stressful for her. However, after being told by X that the next hearing could not be held until after 19 November 2008 when he would be back from a business trip, the applicant said, while crying, that he should continue with his questioning as she wanted to get it over with. Eventually, after four hours of cross-examination of the applicant, the presiding judge adjourned the hearing until 13 October 2008. 39.  X’s wife, mother-in-law and an employee of his company were examined at the next hearing, all three of them asserting that X had very little use of his left arm and certainly could not lift any burdens. 40.  On 24 November 2008 a sixth hearing was held. The questioning of the applicant by X took an hour and a half. When questioned by X’s counsel M., the applicant again asserted that she had told him the whole story a long time ago. M. denied this, stating that if he had been informed he would have advised the applicant to go to hospital and to the police. Once the applicant’s questioning was over, her mother was questioned, mostly about her private relationships. 41.  At the end of the hearing X’s counsel M. confirmed that he had encountered the applicant’s mother when he was working at a law firm with a lawyer who had represented her in certain court proceedings. He also stated that he would inform the court within three days as to whether he would request leave to withdraw from representing X in the proceedings in issue. On 25 November 2008 M. requested leave from the court to withdraw from the case, as he had been personally affected by certain statements made by the applicant’s mother. 42.  At a hearing of 15 December 2008 the court dismissed the request by X’s counsel M., finding that there were no statutory grounds disqualifying him from representing M. The gynaecologist, B., was examined as a witness. He acknowledged that in order to clarify the circumstances he had also addressed certain issues in his report that had not been part of the investigating judge’s request. Moreover, he reiterated that the applicant’s hymen had been intact at the material time. 43.  On 22 January 2009 the court held an eighth hearing in the case and examined the expert in clinical psychology, R., who again stated that sexual abuse which had happened long ago could not be proved by any material evidence, and that only the psychological consequences could be assessed. She further reiterated that the applicant displayed clear symptoms of sexual abuse. 44.  On 20 February 2009 the court appointed T., another expert in gynaecology, to give an opinion on whether the applicant could have had sexual intercourse at the material time, given the results of her medical examination (see paragraph 11 above). On 10 March 2009 the expert submitted his report, which stated that those results were not inconsistent with the applicant’s account of the events in issue. 45.  On 16 March 2009 the court held a hearing at which it appointed N., an expert in orthopaedics, to prepare an opinion as to whether, in view of his disabled left arm, X could have performed the acts described by the applicant. 46.  On 5 May 2009 N. submitted his report, in which he found that X’s left arm was severely disabled, and that for those reasons some of the events could not have happened in the way described by the applicant. 47.  On 8 June 2009 the court held a hearing at which N. was questioned. Further to questions put by the applicant’s counsel, N. explained that he had based his opinion on the documents in X’s medical file, the X-rays brought to him by X, and an examination of X. 48.  A hearing was held on 9 July 2009. The applicant requested that N. be questioned further. 49.  On 29 September 2009 the court held the twelfth and last hearing in the case. At the hearing the applicant and the State Prosecutor questioned N., who stated, inter alia, that X could only use his left arm to assist the right arm in carrying out specific tasks, and that he had practically no strength in his left arm. In the expert’s opinion, X would not have been able to spread the applicant’s legs with his left arm, and neither would he have been able to take off his trousers as alleged by her. After being asked by the prosecutor whether his assessment was based on the assumption that the applicant had used all her strength to resist X, N. stated: “I did not base my conclusion on that assumption, as I did not know whether she had resisted or whether she had willingly submitted.” After being asked whether the applicant, who was 14 years old at the time, could have resisted X, who had allegedly been lying on top of her, he said he believed so. N. also testified that although X had more than ordinary strength in his right arm, he could not have assaulted the applicant in the way she alleged. 50.  After the examination of N., the applicant, who had sought and obtained an opinion from another orthopaedist outside the court proceedings which indicated that X might still have limited use of his left arm, asked for another orthopaedics expert to be appointed, on the grounds that there was doubt about N.’s conclusions. This request was rejected by the court as unnecessary, as was the applicant’s request for the court also to call as witnesses her sister and her mother’s former husband, who had allegedly seen X rowing with both arms. A request by the prosecutor for the applicant to be examined again was also rejected. 51.  At the end of the hearing the court pronounced judgment, acquitting X of all charges. In view of this verdict, the court recommended that the applicant pursue her claim for damages, which she had submitted in the course of the proceedings, before the civil court. 52.  On 15 December 2009 the applicant lodged a new supervisory appeal under the 2006 Act. On 22 December 2009 she received a reply from the court informing her that the reasoning of the judgment had been sent to her that day. 53.  In the written grounds the court explained that the expert orthopaedics report contested X’s ability to carry out certain acts described by the applicant, for which he would have had to use both arms. As explained by the expert, X was not capable of even moving his left hand in a position which would have allowed him to take his trousers off or spread the applicant’s legs. According to the court, the fact that some of the applicant’s allegations were disproved by the expert raised some doubts as to her entire version of the events. On the basis of the principle that any reasonable doubt should benefit the accused (in dubio pro reo), the court had acquitted X. As regards the report by the expert in psychology R., which found that the applicant had suffered sexual abuse, the court noted that it could not ignore the judgment delivered in another set of proceedings concerning the applicant’s mother’s estranged husband, in which the competent court had accepted that he had engaged in sexual activity in front of the applicant and her sister and had also behaved inappropriately towards the applicant. 54.  On 30 December 2009 the State Prosecutor lodged an appeal, in which she criticised the court for not considering the fact that owing to his age, gender and body mass X was much stronger than the applicant, and was also in a position of power on account of his economic and social status. Moreover, she pointed out that X had operated manual transmission vehicles, which required him to use both his arms. The prosecutor further argued that the criminal offence in question did not require the sexual act to have been committed by force; it was sufficient that the applicant opposed it. She also stressed that the proceedings had already been pending for eight years, which had aggravated the trauma suffered by the applicant. 55.  The appeal was dismissed by the Maribor Higher Court on 26 May 2010, which found that the reasoning of the first-instance court’s judgment was clear and precise regarding the doubt that X had committed the alleged criminal acts. 56.  The applicant subsequently asked the Supreme State Prosecutor to lodge a request for the protection of legality (an extraordinary remedy). On 28 July 2010 the Supreme State Prosecutor informed the applicant that the aforementioned request could only concern points of law and not the facts, which the applicant had called into question. 57.  On 11 February 2011 the applicant and the Government reached an out-of-court settlement under the 2006 Act in the amount of 1,080 euros (EUR), covering all pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage incurred by the applicant as a result of a violation of her right to a trial without undue delay in the criminal proceedings in issue. The applicant also received EUR 129.60 in respect of the costs incurred in the proceedings. 58.  Article 183 §§ 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code regulating the criminal offence of sexual assault on a person younger than 15 years, as in force at the material time, reads as follows:
“(1) A person who engages in sexual intercourse or any other sexual act with a person of the opposite or same sex who is not yet fifteen years old, and where the maturity of the perpetrator and that of the victim are obviously disproportionate, shall be punished with imprisonment of one to eight years.
(2) A person who commits the above act against a person who is not yet ten years old, or against a vulnerable person who is not yet fifteen years old, or by using force or threat to life or limb, shall be punished with imprisonment of three years or more ...” 59.  Section 148 of the Criminal Procedure Act, as in force at the material time, provides that the police, having concluded the preliminary investigation of an alleged criminal offence, will draw up a criminal complaint based on the information collected and send it to the State Prosecutor’s Office. However, even if the information gathered does not appear to provide any grounds for such a criminal complaint to be made, the police must submit a report on their actions to the State Prosecutor. 60.  As regards the protection of under-age victims of criminal offences of a sexual nature during judicial investigations, the Criminal Procedure Act includes a number of provisions aimed at protecting under-age victims of or witnesses to criminal proceedings. In proceedings regarding criminal offences against sexual integrity, minors must, from the initiation of the criminal proceedings onwards, have counsel to protect their rights. Under-age victims who have no lawyer are assigned one by the trial court. Moreover, the defendant cannot be present during the examination of witnesses below the age of 15 years who claim to be victims of criminal offences against sexual integrity. In this regard, section 240 of the Act provides that minors, especially those who have been affected by the criminal offence, should be examined with consideration for their age, to avoid any harmful effects on their mental state. 61.  In order to ensure the smooth running of a judicial investigation, the parties and the victim may, under section 191 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1994, complain to the president of the court charged with the investigation about any delays or other irregularities. Upon the examination of the complaint, the president is required to inform the complainant of any steps taken in this regard. 62.  As to the time frame for scheduling a criminal trial, section 286(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that the presiding judge shall schedule a first hearing within two months of receipt of an indictment. If he fails to do so, he must inform the president of the court accordingly, and the latter is required to take the necessary steps to schedule a hearing. 63.  As regards the conduct of the hearing, section 295 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that the public may be excluded from the hearing if so required, for example for the protection of the personal or family life of the defendant or the victim. In accordance with section 299 of the Act, the presiding judge conducts the hearing, grants the parties the right to address the court, and questions the defendant, witnesses and experts. Moreover, it is the presiding judge’s duty to ensure that the case is presented fully and clearly, that the truth is established, and that any obstacles protracting the proceedings are eliminated. 64.  The defendant may be temporarily removed from the courtroom if a witness refuses to testify in his presence. The witness’s statement is then read to him and he is entitled to put questions to him or her. Nonetheless, pursuant to section 334(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act the presiding judge will prohibit any questions that have already been asked, that bear no relation to the case, or that in themselves suggest how they should be answered. 65.  Article 148 of the Code of Obligations regulating the liability of legal persons for damage inflicted by one of their subsidiary bodies, which also applies to the determination of the State’s liability for damages, provides that a legal person is liable for damage inflicted on a third party by one of its subsidiary bodies in the exercise of its functions or in connection therewith. In order for a claimant to be awarded compensation for damage inflicted by the State, he or she is required to prove all four elements of the State’s liability, that is, unlawfulness of the State’s action, existence of damage, causal link, and negligence or fault on the part of the State. 66.  By virtue of Article 179 of the Code of Obligations, which constitutes the statutory basis for awarding compensation for non-pecuniary damage, such compensation may be awarded in the event of the infringement of a person’s personality rights, as well as for physical distress, mental distress suffered due to the reduction of life activities, disfigurement, defamation, death of a close relative, or fear, provided that the circumstances of the case, and in particular the level and duration of the distress and fear caused thereby, justify an award. 67.  According to the decision of the Supreme Court no. II Ips 305/2009, an award of compensation for non-pecuniary damage is strictly limited to the categories of damage specified in the Code of Obligations, adhering to the principle of numerus clausus. The Supreme Court thus decided that non-pecuniary damage resulting from excessive length of proceedings could not be classified among the categories of damage recognised by the Code of Obligations, as the right to trial within a reasonable time could not be interpreted as a personality right. 68.  Under section 1 of the 2006 Act, any party to court proceedings – including a victim of a criminal offence – is guaranteed the right to have his or her rights decided upon by the court without undue delay. 69.  The Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power adopted by the United Nations General Assembly resolution 40/34 of 29 November 1985 provides that victims of crime should be treated with compassion and respect for their dignity (Annex, Article 4). Moreover, the responsiveness of judicial and administrative processes to the needs of victims should be facilitated by, inter alia, taking measures to minimise inconvenience to victims, protecting their privacy when necessary, and ensuring that they and their families and witnesses on their behalf are protected from intimidation and retaliation (Annex, Article 6 (d)). 70.  Victims of criminal offences further enjoy protection under the legislation of the European Union. In 2001, a Council Framework Decision on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings (2001/220/JHA) was adopted with a view to introducing minimum standards on the rights and protection of victims of crime. Article 2 of the Framework Decision requires the Member States to ensure that victims have a real and appropriate role in its criminal legal system and that they are treated with due respect for the dignity of the individual during proceedings. Moreover, Article 3 provides that victims must be afforded the possibility to be heard during proceedings and to supply evidence; however, appropriate measures must be taken to ensure that they are questioned by the authorities only in so far as necessary for the purpose of criminal proceedings. Article 8 requires the Member States to provide a number of measures aimed at protecting the victims’ safety and privacy in the criminal proceedings. Among others, measures must be taken to ensure that contact between victims and offenders within courts premises may be avoided, unless such is required in the interests of the criminal proceedings. Also, the Member States must ensure that, where there is a need to protect victims – particularly those most vulnerable – from the effects of giving evidence in open court, they may be entitled to testify in a manner which enables this objective to be achieved, by any appropriate means compatible with its basic legal principles. 71.  Moreover, the EU Member States’ ambition to reinforce the rights of the victims of crime led to the adoption, on 25 October 2012, of the Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council (2012/29/EU) establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime, and replacing Council Framework Decision 2001/220/JHA. The relevant part of the Directive, which is to be implemented into the national laws of the EU Member States by 16 November 2015, provides as follows:
Recital 19
“A person should be considered to be a victim regardless of whether an offender is identified, apprehended, prosecuted or convicted and regardless of the familial relationship between them ...”
Article 20 – Right to protection of victims during criminal investigations
“Without prejudice to the rights of the defence and in accordance with rules of judicial discretion, Member States shall ensure that during criminal investigations:
(a)  interviews of victims are conducted without unjustified delay after the complaint with regard to a criminal offence has been made to the competent authority;
(b)  the number of interviews of victims is kept to a minimum and interviews are carried out only where strictly necessary for the purposes of the criminal investigation;
...
(d)  medical examinations are kept to a minimum and are carried out only where strictly necessary for the purposes of the criminal proceedings.”
Article 22 – Individual assessment of victims to identify specific protection needs
“1.  Member States shall ensure that victims receive a timely and individual assessment, in accordance with national procedures, to identify specific protection needs and to determine whether and to what extent they would benefit from special measures in the course of criminal proceedings, as provided for under Articles 23 and 24, due to their particular vulnerability to secondary and repeat victimisation, to intimidation and to retaliation. 2.  The individual assessment shall, in particular, take into account:
(a)  the personal characteristics of the victim;
(b)  the type or nature of the crime; and
(c)  the circumstances of the crime. 3.  In the context of the individual assessment, particular attention shall be paid to victims who have suffered considerable harm due to the severity of the crime; victims who have suffered a crime committed with a bias or discriminatory motive which could, in particular, be related to their personal characteristics; victims whose relationship to and dependence on the offender make them particularly vulnerable. In this regard, victims of terrorism, organised crime, human trafficking, gender-based violence, violence in a close relationship, sexual violence, exploitation or hate crime, and victims with disabilities shall be duly considered.
...”
Article 23 – Right to protection of victims with specific protection needs during criminal proceedings
“1.  Without prejudice to the rights of the defence and in accordance with rules of judicial discretion, Member States shall ensure that victims with specific protection needs who benefit from special measures identified as a result of an individual assessment provided for in Article 22(1), may benefit from the measures provided for in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article. A special measure envisaged following the individual assessment shall not be made available if operational or practical constraints make this impossible, or where there is a an urgent need to interview the victim and failure to do so could harm the victim or another person or could prejudice the course of the proceedings. 2.  The following measures shall be available during criminal investigations to victims with specific protection needs identified in accordance with Article 22(1):
...
(b)  interviews with the victim being carried out by or through professionals trained for that purpose;
... 3.  The following measures shall be available for victims with specific protection needs identified in accordance with Article 22(1) during court proceedings:
(a)  measures to avoid visual contact between victims and offenders including during the giving of evidence, by appropriate means including the use of communication technology;
(b)  measures to ensure that the victim may be heard in the courtroom without being present, in particular through the use of appropriate communication technology;
(c)  measures to avoid unnecessary questioning concerning the victim’s private life not related to the criminal offence; and
(d)  measures allowing a hearing to take place without the presence of the public.” 72.  On 5 May 2011 the Council of Europe adopted the Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, which entered into force on 1 August 2014. The Convention was signed by Slovenia on 8 September 2011, but has not yet been ratified. The relevant part of the Convention provides as follows:
Article 49 – General obligations
“1.  Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that investigations and judicial proceedings in relation to all forms of violence covered by the scope of this Convention are carried out without undue delay while taking into consideration the rights of the victim during all stages of the criminal proceedings. 2.  Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures, in conformity with the fundamental principles of human rights and having regard to the gendered understanding of violence, to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of offences established in accordance with this Convention.”
Article 54 – Investigations and evidence
“Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to ensure that, in any civil or criminal proceedings, evidence relating to the sexual history and conduct of the victim shall be permitted only when it is relevant and necessary.”
Article 56 – Measures of protection
“1.  Parties shall take the necessary legislative or other measures to protect the rights and interests of victims, including their special needs as witnesses, at all stages of investigations and judicial proceedings, in particular by:
(a)  providing for their protection, as well as that of their families and witnesses, from intimidation, retaliation and repeat victimisation;
(b)  ensuring that victims are informed, at least in cases where the victims and the family might be in danger, when the perpetrator escapes or is released temporarily or definitively;
(c)  informing them, under the conditions provided for by internal law, of their rights and the services at their disposal and the follow‐up given to their complaint, the charges, the general progress of the investigation or proceedings, and their role therein, as well as the outcome of their case;
(d)  enabling victims, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of internal law, to be heard, to supply evidence and have their views, needs and concerns presented, directly or through an intermediary, and considered;
(e)  providing victims with appropriate support services so that their rights and interests are duly presented and taken into account;
(f)  ensuring that measures may be adopted to protect the privacy and the image of the victim;
(g)  ensuring that contact between victims and perpetrators within court and law enforcement agency premises is avoided where possible;
(h)  providing victims with independent and competent interpreters when victims are parties to proceedings or when they are supplying evidence;
(i)  enabling victims to testify, according to the rules provided by their internal law, in the courtroom without being present or at least without the presence of the alleged perpetrator, notably through the use of appropriate communication technologies, where available. 2.  A child victim and child witness of violence against women and domestic violence shall be afforded, where appropriate, special protection measures taking into account the best interests of the child.”