7.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Milan. 8.  A.C., the applicant’s father, was the owner of a flat in Milan, which he had let to V.S. 9.  In a registered letter of 9 November 1990, the applicant’s father informed the tenant that he intended to terminate the lease on expiry of the term on 31 December 1991 and asked him to vacate the premises by that date. 10.  The tenant told the applicant’s father that he would not leave the premises. 11.  In a writ served on the tenant on 22 January 1991, the applicant’s father reiterated his intention to terminate the lease and summoned the tenant to appear before the Milan Magistrate. 12.  By a decision of 21 March 1991, which was made enforceable on 26 March 1991, the Milan Magistrate upheld the validity of the notice to quit and ordered that the premises be vacated by 31 December 1992. 13.  On 11 January 1993, the applicant’s father served notice on the tenant requiring him to vacate the premises. 14.  On 25 February 1993, he informed the tenant that the order for possession would be enforced by a bailiff on 19 March 1993. 15.  Between 19 March 1993 and 18 April 2000, the bailiff made nineteen attempts to recover possession. Each attempt proved unsuccessful, as the applicant’s father and then the applicant were not entitled to police assistance in enforcing the order for possession. 16.  In the meanwhile, on 24 August 1993, the applicant’s father died and the applicant inherited the flat. 17.  On 14 February 2000, she became party to the proceedings. 18.  On 15 June 2000, the applicant recovered possession of the flat. 19.  Pursuant to the Pinto Law, on 3 April 2002 the applicant applied to the Brescia Court of Appeal. By decision of 12 June 2002, the Court of Appeal rejected the applicant’s claim. As far as the conduct of the relevant authorities were concerned, the Court of Appeal underlined that the behaviour of the Prefect was in conformity with the criteria fixed by the national law and that after the Law no. 431/98 the expulsion was suspended by other laws. So the delays derived from factum principis and were therefore irrelevant for the purpose of the Pinto Law. 20.  The applicant did not appeal to the Court of Cassation.