6.  The first and second applicants were born in 1965 and 1955 respectively. The third and fourth applicants were born in 2000. They all live in Maisons-Alfort. 7.  The first and second applicants are husband and wife. They were unable to have a child of their own because the second applicant is infertile. 8.  After a number of unsuccessful attempts to conceive a child using in vitro fertilisation (IVF) with their own gametes, the first and second applicants decided to undergo IVF using the gametes of the first applicant and an egg from a donor with a view to implanting the fertilised embryos in the uterus of another woman. Accordingly, they went to California, where the process is legal, and entered into a gestational surrogacy agreement.
The applicants specified that, in accordance with Californian law, the “surrogate mother” was not remunerated but merely received expenses. They added that she and her husband were both high earners and therefore had a much higher income than the applicants and that it had been an act of solidarity on her part. 9.  On 1 March 2000 the surrogate mother was found to be carrying twins and, in a judgment of 14 July 2000, the Supreme Court of California, to which the first and second applicants and the surrogate mother and her husband had applied, ruled that the first applicant would be the “genetic father” and the second applicant the “legal mother” of any child to whom the surrogate mother gave birth within the following four months. The judgment specified the particulars that were to be entered in the birth certificate and stated that the first and second applicants should be recorded as the father and mother. 10.  Twins – the third and fourth applicants – were born on 25 October 2000 and their birth certificates were drawn up in accordance with the terms stated above. 11.  In early November 2000 the first applicant went to the French consulate in Los Angeles to have the particulars of the birth certificates entered in the French register of births, marriages and deaths and the children’s names entered on his passport so that he could return to France with them. 12.  The applicants stated that many French couples in their situation had previously succeeded in carrying out that procedure. The consulate rejected the first applicant’s request, however, on the grounds that he could not establish that the second applicant had given birth and, suspecting a surrogacy arrangement, sent the file to the Nantes public prosecutor’s office. 13.  As the US Federal Administration had issued US passports for the twins on which the first and second applicants were named as their parents, the four applicants were able to return to France in November 2000. 14.  In December 2000 a preliminary investigation was carried out at the request of the public prosecutor’s office. 15.  In May 2001 an investigation was commenced against a person or persons unknown for acting as intermediary in a surrogacy arrangement and in respect of the first and second applicants for false representation infringing the civil status of children. 16.  On 30 September 2004, in accordance with the submissions of the Créteil public prosecutor, the investigating judge gave a ruling of no case to answer on the ground that the acts had been committed on US territory, where they were not classified as an offence, and therefore did not constitute a punishable offence in France. 17.  In the meantime, on 25 November 2002, on the instructions of the public prosecutor’s office, the particulars of the birth certificates of the third and fourth applicants had been recorded in the central register of births, marriages and deaths in Nantes by the French consulate in Los Angeles. 18.  However, on 16 May 2003 the Créteil public prosecutor instituted proceedings against the first and second applicants in the Créteil tribunal de grande instance to have the entries annulled and the judgment recorded in the margin of the entries thus invalidated. He observed that an agreement whereby a woman undertook to conceive and bear a child and relinquish it at birth was null and void in accordance with the public-policy principle that the human body and civil status are inalienable. He concluded that, as the judgment of the Supreme Court of California of 14 July 2000 was contrary to the French concept of international public policy and of French public policy, it could not be executed in France and that the validity of civil-status certificates drawn up on the basis of that judgment could not be recognised in France. 1.  Judgment of the Créteil tribunal de grande instance of 13 December 2005, judgment of the Paris Court of Appeal of 25 October 2007 and judgment of the Court of Cassation of 17 December 2008 19.  By a judgment of 13 December 2005, the Créteil tribunal de grande instance declared the action inadmissible. It found that “the entries had been recorded on the sole initiative of the public prosecutor with the purpose, since avowed, of bringing proceedings to have the entries annulled”. It concluded from this that “an action by the public prosecutor on grounds of public policy which he himself ha[d] infringed could not be deemed admissible where the provisions of Article 47 of the Civil Code on which he [relied] allowed him to verify the validity of the certificates in any respect and to reject any request for registration that would render them binding in France”. 20.  The public prosecutor’s office appealed to the Paris Court of Appeal, which upheld the lower court’s judgment on 25 October 2007. The Court of Appeal also considered the public prosecutor’s action for annulment of the entries in the Nantes central register of births, marriages and deaths inadmissible as a matter of international public policy. It substituted its own grounds for that decision, however, finding that the contents of the entries were accurate as regards the judgment of the Supreme Court of California of 14 July 2000 and that the public prosecutor’s office was not disputing the fact that the judgment was binding on France or that, under Article 47 of the Civil Code, the certificates drawn up in California in accordance with the usual procedures in that State should be deemed valid. 21.  On 17 December 2008 the Court of Cassation (First Civil Division) quashed that judgment on the ground that the public prosecutor’s office had an interest in bringing proceedings for annulment of the entries since, as established by the Court of Appeal, the birth certificates in question could only have been drawn up following a surrogacy arrangement. It remitted the case to the Paris Court of Appeal with a differently constituted bench. 22.  By a judgment of 18 March 2010, the Paris Court of Appeal overturned the judgment remitted to it, annulled the entries pertaining to the birth certificates and ordered its judgment to be recorded in the margin of the invalidated birth certificates. 23.  Regarding the admissibility of the action brought by the public prosecutor’s office, the court found that it could not be seriously alleged that the prosecution authorities had contravened public policy or disrupted peaceful family relations by requesting that the contents of an entry that they themselves had ordered be annulled, since the purpose was to frustrate the effects of a foreign civil status which they considered contrary to French public policy or to guard against an application to have the entries recorded. 24.  The Court of Appeal ruled on the merits as follows:
“... The birth certificates were drawn up on the basis of the Supreme Court of California’s judgment of 14 July 2000 which declared [the first applicant] the genetic father and [the second applicant] the legal mother of any child to which [the surrogate mother] gave birth between 15 August and 15 December 2000. The civil-status documents are therefore indissociable from the decision underlying them and the effectiveness of that decision remains conditional on its international lawfulness.
Recognition, on national territory, of a decision delivered by a court of a State that is not bound to France by any convention is subject to three conditions: the indirect jurisdiction of the foreign court based on the connection between the court and the case; compliance of the merits and procedure with international public policy; and absence of circumvention of the law.
It has been established in the present case that following a surrogacy agreement [the surrogate mother] gave birth to twins who were conceived from the gametes of [the first applicant] and of a third party and were relinquished to [the first and second applicants].
Under Article 16-7 of the Civil Code, whose provisions deriving from Law no. 94‑653 of 29 July 1994, and not amended by Law no. 2004-800 of 6 August 2004, are a matter of public policy by virtue of Article 16-9 of the same Code, any agreement concerning reproductive or gestational surrogacy is null and void. Accordingly, the judgment of the Californian Supreme Court, which indirectly validated a surrogacy agreement, contravenes the French concept of international public policy. Consequently, without having to ascertain whether the law has been circumvented, the entries in the French central register of births, marriages and deaths of the particulars of the US birth certificates naming [the second applicant] as the mother of the children must be annulled and the present judgment recorded in the margin of the invalidated birth certificates.
[The applicants] cannot seriously claim that they have not had a fair hearing; nor do they have justifiable grounds for arguing that this measure contravenes provisions laid down in international conventions and domestic law. The concepts to which they refer, in particular the child’s best interests, cannot allow them – despite the practical difficulties engendered by the situation – to validate ex post facto a process whose illegality, established first in the case-law and subsequently by the French legislature, is currently enshrined in positive law. Furthermore, non-registration does not have the effect of depriving the two children of their US civil status or calling into question their legal parent-child relationship with [the first and second applicants] recognised under Californian law ...” 25.  The applicants appealed on points of law, submitting that the children’s best interests – within the meaning of Article 3 § 1 of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child – had been disregarded and complaining of a breach of their right to a stable legal parent-child relationship and, further, of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14. They submitted, further, that the decision of a foreign court recognising the legal parent-child relationship between a child and a couple who had lawfully contracted an agreement with a surrogate mother was not contrary to international public policy, which should not be confused with domestic public policy. 26.  At a hearing on 8 March 2011 the advocate-general recommended quashing the judgment. He expressed the view that a right lawfully acquired abroad or a foreign decision lawfully delivered by a foreign court could not be prevented from taking legal effect in France on grounds of international public policy where this would infringe a principle, a freedom or a right guaranteed by an international convention ratified by France.
He noted in particular that in Wagner and J.M.W.L. v. Luxembourg (no. 76240/01, 28 June 2007) the Court had taken account, in its examination of the case under Article 8 of the Convention, of an “effective family life” and “de facto family ties” between a single mother and the child she had adopted in Peru, without attaching any importance to the fact that the former had gone abroad in search of a legal system which would allow her to obtain what the law of her country of origin refused her. In the advocate-general’s opinion, if the same rationale were applied in the present case, even where domestic law had been circumvented, a legal relationship lawfully created abroad could not be prevented from producing the relevant legal effects where it concerned an effective family set-up and allowed it to function and evolve in normal conditions from the standpoint of Article 8 of the Convention. He also observed that the third and fourth applicants had been living in France for ten years and “[were being] brought up there by genetic and intended parents in a de facto family unit in which [they were receiving] affection, care, education, and the material welfare necessary to their development” and that this effective and affective family unit – fully lawful in the eyes of the law of the country in which it had originated – [was] “legally clandestine”, “the children having no civil status recognised in France and no parent-child relationship regarded as valid under French law”. As to whether that state of affairs infringed their “right to a normal family life”, the advocate-general replied as follows:
“... At this stage two answers are possible: either – somewhat theoretically and largely paradoxically – the refusal to register the birth particulars is inconsequential and does not substantially affect the family’s daily life, which means that registration is a mere formality and it is therefore difficult to see any major obstacle in the circumstances to recording the details of certificates with such minimal legal effect that it is inconceivable that they are capable in themselves of shaking the foundations of our fundamental principles and seriously contravening public policy (since they do not intrinsically contain any mention of the nature of the birth).
Alternatively, the refusal to register the birth details permanently and substantially disrupts the family’s life, which is legally split into two in France – the French couple on one side and the foreign children on the other – and the question then arises whether our international public policy – even based upon proximity – can frustrate the right to family life within the meaning of Article 8 [of the Convention] or whether, on the contrary, public policy of that kind, whose effects have to be analysed in practical terms as do those of the foreign rights or decisions that it seeks to exclude, should not be overridden by the obligation to comply with a provision of the Convention.
If the second alternative is retained on the grounds that international conventions must take precedence over public policy based on a standard provided for in a legislative provision, this will not necessarily result in the automatic collapse of the barriers erected by the domestic public-policy provision in such circumstances. As long as the European Court has not given a clear ruling on the question of the lawfulness of surrogacy and allows the States to legislate as they deem fit in this area, it can be considered contrary to public policy to validate, on grounds of respect for family life, situations created illegally within the countries which prohibit them.
However, where it is merely a question of giving effect on the national territory to situations lawfully established abroad – be this at the cost of deliberately disregarding the strictures of a mandatory law – there is nothing to preclude international public policy – even based upon proximity – from being overridden in order to allow families to lead a life in conformity with the legal conditions in which they were created and the de facto conditions in which they now live. Furthermore, the best interests of the child, envisaged not only under the New York Convention but also under the case-law of the Court of Human Rights which has established this criterion as a component of respect for family life, also militate in favour of this interpretation. At least this is the lesson that I think we can draw from the judgment in Wagner [and J.M.W.L.] ...” 27.  However, on 6 April 2011 the Court of Cassation (First Civil Division) gave judgment dismissing the appeal on the following grounds:
“ ... the refusal to register the particulars of a birth certificate drawn up in execution of a foreign court decision, based on the incompatibility of that decision with French international public policy, is justified where that decision contains provisions which conflict with essential principles of French law. According to the current position under domestic law, it is contrary to the principle of inalienability of civil status – a fundamental principle of French law – to give effect, in terms of the legal parent-child relationship, to a surrogacy agreement, which, while it may be lawful in another country, is null and void on public-policy grounds under Articles 16-7 and 16-9 of the Civil Code.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal correctly held that, in giving effect to an agreement of this nature, the “American” judgment of 14 July 2000 conflicted with the French concept of international public policy, with the result that registration of the details of the birth certificates in question, which had been drawn up in application of that judgment, should be annulled. This does not deprive the children of the legal parent-child relationship recognised under Californian law and does not prevent them from living with Mr and Mrs Mennesson in France; nor does it infringe the children’s right to respect for their private and family life within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention ..., or the principle that their best interests are paramount as laid down in Article 3 § 1 of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child ...” 28.  On 16 April 2013 the first applicant lodged an application with the Charenton-le-Pont District Court for a certificate of French nationality for the third and fourth applicants. The senior registrar sent him acknowledgement-of-receipt forms dated 31 October 2013 and 13 March 2014, indicating that the request “was still being processed in [his] department pending a reply to the request for authentication sent to the consulate of Los Angeles, California”.
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