5.  The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Debrecen. He is a practising lawyer and member of the Békés County Bar Association. 6.  At the material time the applicant was appearing as the legal representative of a hunting association before the Battonya District Court. On 19 March 2003 he filed with the court a notice of appeal for the attention of the second-instance Békés County Regional Court, in which he also requested this court to initiate proceedings with a view to examining the first-instance judge’s competence to exercise the duties of a judge. In his appeal he wrote, inter alia:
“Of course, we do not assume any professional incompetence on the side of the sitting judge, thus the fact... that he appointed a guardian ad litem despite explicit objection...is the first proof of his bias...
Questioning whether or not the general assembly of the respondent was entitled to suspend its session, continue at a later point and call another general assembly is not a question of bias but that of clear-cut professional incompetence ...
Because the judgment reflected the personal opinion of the judge and was not based on any evidence, we cannot but call into question the professional competence of the sitting judge. His conduct was guided either by sympathy for the plaintiff or a dislike for the respondent and this was also represented in the judgment. In a State based on the rule of law where proceedings should be based on the constitutional independence of judges, such judicial bias cannot be permissible.
Based on the above, besides our request for appeal, we also request the County Regional Court to forward our motion to the authority responsible for initiating proceedings to examine the professional [in]competence of the judge.” 7.  The motion was transferred to the Békés County Regional Court, whose vice-president indicated to the Békés County Bar Association that, in his view, the applicant’s submissions should give rise to disciplinary proceedings.
On 11 April 2003 the President of the Bar Association informed the applicant about the opening of disciplinary proceedings.
On 24 April 2003 the applicant submitted his observations, contesting the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings. 8.  In the ensuing proceedings, the Szeged Bar Association Disciplinary Board dealt with the case. On 10 June 2004 it fined the applicant 300,000 Hungarian forints (HUF) (approximately 1,000 euros (EUR)) for having committed a serious disciplinary offence. On appeal, on 5 November 2004 the National Bar Association Disciplinary Board upheld this decision in essence.
The applicant sought judicial review. On 19 September 2006 the Budapest Regional Court remitted the case to the disciplinary instances, essentially on procedural grounds. 9.  In the resumed disciplinary proceedings, on 11 April 2008 the Disciplinary Board fined the applicant HUF 170,000 (EUR 570) for having committed a deliberate disciplinary offence. The Board was of the opinion that the expressions “of course, we do not assume any professional incompetence on the side of the sitting judge”, “this is not a question of bias, but that of clear-cut professional incompetence” and “we cannot but call into question the professional competence of the sitting judge” amounted to disrespecting the court’s dignity and to denying the judge the requisite respect. This was a disciplinary offence consisting of the applicant’s breaching the relevant ethical obligations. 10.  On 3 November 2008 the National Bar Association Disciplinary Board upheld this decision, endorsing the first-instance Disciplinary Board’s position that the tone and language of the impugned statement was unacceptable and prejudicial to the reputation of lawyers. 11.  On 2 June 2009 the Budapest Regional Court dismissed the applicant’s action challenging the disciplinary sanction. The court did not agree with the applicant’s contention that in expressing the impugned statements he had merely exercised his procedural rights, that is, that he had requested the exclusion of the sitting judge for bias. It also found that the statements had accused the court as an institution, and not merely the sitting judge, of circumventing the law. 12.  On 20 April 2010 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s petition for review, endorsing the Regional Court’s reasoning. It dismissed the applicant’s argument that the disciplinary measure had infringed his procedural right, exercised in his capacity as defence counsel, to lodge a motion for bias. Reiterating the Regional Court’s findings, the Supreme Court held that, contrary to what the applicant had argued, his notice – submitted following the closing of the first-instance proceedings (see paragraph 6 above) – could not possibly serve the purpose of seeking the exclusion of the sitting judge for bias. It further found that, in as much as the applicant’s request could be interpreted as initiating proceedings to have the judge’s professional competence examined, the reason for which he had been subjected to a disciplinary measure was not the very request, but its tone.