7.  The applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Landas. 8.  In July 1964 the applicant was prosecuted for the abduction and murder of Luc Taron, an 11-year-old boy, on 26 and 27 May 1964. 9.  On 5 July 1964, while in police custody, the applicant signed a confession which he stood by for the first ten months of the investigation. Later that day he was placed in pre-trial detention. The investigating judge questioned him on several occasions about the reasons for his conduct, which was inconsistent with his confession, but the applicant refused to offer an explanation. 10.  On 21 December 1964 a panel of experts in neuropsychiatry submitted a report. The experts submitted that the applicant had not been suffering from mental illness at the time of the events and contended that the physiological and psychological abnormalities observed, coupled with the applicant’s alleged memory loss at the time of the killing, “[made] it impossible to rule out the presence of an epileptic symptom with a twilight state and dimming of consciousness”. They concluded that the applicant was “dangerous” and “liable to a criminal penalty” and that “the organic disorders observed would be amenable to palliative treatment alone and dictate[d] that his social rehabilitation [could] be envisaged only with the utmost caution”. 11.  A second report was submitted on 30 April 1965. It concluded that the applicant was “not mentally ill and should not be admitted to a psychiatric hospital. He is fit to stand trial. He must answer for his actions in court. He is a danger to public safety.” 12.  On 11 June 1965 the applicant retracted his confession but refused to expand on his muddled and limited explanations. He has protested his innocence ever since. 13.  In a judgment of 7 May 1966 the Seine-et-Oise Assize Court found the applicant guilty of abduction and subsequent murder, with mitigating circumstances. The Assize Court held that the offence should not be classified as premeditated murder (assassinat). Although the prosecution had not sought a specific penalty, the applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment, but no minimum term was set (see paragraph 34 below). After the verdict had been read out by the President of the Assize Court, the applicant protested that there had been a miscarriage of justice and gave the name of a person who, according to him, was guilty. An appeal on points of law by the civil party was dismissed on 29 November 1966. 14.  The applicant’s wife died in unexplained circumstances in January 1970, after she had written to tell him that she knew he was innocent and that she had received death threats from one of the two real culprits. 15.  On 17 June 1971 the applicant, through his lawyer, who had nevertheless entered a guilty plea on his behalf, lodged an initial application for a retrial, which was apparently not examined. 16.  On 6 September 1974 the applicant’s lawyer lodged a second application for a retrial with the Minister of Justice. The application gave rise to an investigation, the findings of which were due to be disclosed to the lawyer. However, the lawyer died before the report was submitted and the findings of the investigation were never forwarded to the applicant. Several months later, the applicant was notified orally that the application had been dismissed. 17.  On 5 July 1979, on the expiry of a “probationary period” of 15 years (see paragraph 39 below), the applicant became eligible for release. 18.  The applicant applied for release on licence on several occasions. In 1984 he received the support of the President of the Ligue des droits de l’Homme (Human Rights League). The civil party subsequently issued death threats against the applicant in the event of his release from prison. 19.  His applications for release on licence were transmitted in 1985, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1997 to the Minister of Justice, who at the time was empowered to deal with such matters, and were refused, in many cases for his own safety despite “evidence supporting them”, as Mr Toubon, the Minister of Justice from 1995 to 1997, explained in a press article published on 8 June 2000. 20.  The applicant also made several applications for a presidential pardon. Some of them did not receive a reply. The last one, submitted in 1998, was refused after an expert medical assessment had concluded that the applicant’s state of health was compatible with detention. 21.  On 18 March 1999 a lawyer belonging to the Lille Bar applied for the applicant’s release on licence. The sentence enforcement board gave a positive opinion, but consideration of the application was adjourned pending the submission of a fresh expert report. 22.  On 4 October 1999 the experts submitted their report, which read:
“... Previous expert reports
Among the documents consulted, we have considered in particular the expert reports by the following psychiatrists:
Dr Behague, Dr Cenac and Dr Dublineau, of 21 December 1964;
Dr Petit-Dutaillis, Dr Heuyer and Dr Roumajon, of 5 April 1965;
Dr Follin and Dr Roumajon, of 13 December 1984;
Dr Bornstein, of 24 November 1989;
Dr Cayet, of 13 May 1997 ...
Observations
We have studied the committal order by the Indictment Division and a number of expert reports. In their report dated 13 December 1984 Dr Roumajon and Dr Follin observed in Lucien Léger a mental distortion of reality bordering on the process of paranoia. They noted his pride, his taste for publicity and his need for a sense of self-worth. They referred to the substantial administrative file on Lucien Léger, whose time in custodial establishments had been highly eventful. The two experts emphasised that Lucien Léger was very keen to publish his version of events. This, they concluded, was likely to cause a quite considerable scandal. His release risked causing a significant disturbance to public order, and they believed that it could give rise to fears of a publicity stunt.
Dr Boissenin, who had been unable to examine Lucien Léger as the latter had refused, expressed the view in his report of 18 May 1985 based on the file that the prospect of release was risky.
On 13 May 1997 Dr Denis Cayet noted in his report that Lucien Léger’s intellectual faculties had remained intact. He observed that, despite a fairly warm appearance, there were still paranoid character traits centred on distrust, a suspicious and quibbling temperament, a general impression of persecution, difficulty in being self-critical, an underlying inflexibility and an inflated opinion of himself, accompanied by a latent sense of manipulation and provocation. Dr Denis Cayet concluded from this that Lucien Léger had scarcely changed since the assessment by Dr Follin and Dr Roumajon, finding him to be just as combative, prone to look for hidden meaning, and seemingly determined to assert in future, by any possible means, what he considered to be his justification and the expression of the truth.
In Dr Cayet’s opinion, the question of release was very difficult to assess, in view of the disturbance to public order and the media attention that were likely to ensue.
During our examinations, Lucien Léger developed good relations with us. The general impression that emerged seems more balanced than that observed by the previous experts.
One expression struck us in particular: ‘I have continued to develop a structure while in prison.’ That does indeed seem to be the case, but it is impossible to assess whether, as things stand, Lucien Léger would be able to maintain this relative stabilisation on being released, if such a decision were taken.
Lucien Léger appeared to us to be well informed about the current situation. He demonstrated great skill in pleading his own case, without, moreover, displaying excessive passion or exerting pressure on his interlocutors, so much so that questions may be raised as to the intensity of his current desire to be released. In any event, after thirty-five years of imprisonment, such ambivalence is not surprising. The idea of coming out of a system that is organised, restrictive and frustrating yet reassuring by its very monotony, with particular features such as a certain degree of respect on the part of most of the supervising staff, will undoubtedly cause him to wonder, quite naturally, about life as a free man, a life to which he is no longer accustomed: management of time and space, access to treatment, professional responsibility, social skills ...
The version of events he submitted to the three experts is consistent with what he has written and with the version he gave to the previous succession of experts. It is not for us to pass judgment on its credibility. Is it a mythomaniac fabrication? What portion of truth is there in his current version of events? Is it quite simply a defence mechanism? Is it basically a defensive structure verging on the delusional? All these aspects, indeed, may well be interlinked.
In any event, a certain progression can be seen from these various documents. In simplified form, it may be broken down into three phases:
At first, Lucien Léger appeared to have a highly disordered personality, being prone to mythomaniac fabrication and a somewhat naive boastfulness.
Next came the phase of multiple complaints and a defensive organisation bordering on paranoia.
Currently there seems to be evidence of a relative softening of his character armour, although it is impossible to judge the impact of ‘protection afforded by prison’ and his reaction on experiencing the ‘void of release’.
Our overall impression is therefore more qualified.
To sum up, [the applicant] was imprisoned at the age of 27. At the time he appeared to have a disordered personality ... Thirty-five years later, most of his life has been spent in prison. ... Admittedly, a few paranoid personality traits may still be observed, but they are relatively well suppressed. Such traits essentially seem to be a form of character defence against accusations, a psychological survival response in order to ... ‘avoid losing a grip on reality’. He does not show any signs of systematic misjudgment, general over-simplification, deep suspicion, or a sense of current persecution ... at least, as soon as discussion moves away from the case in question. ...
As further evidence against the presence of genuine paranoia, it is noticeable that he has maintained a certain sense of humour, a responsiveness to his surroundings and a degree of nuance.”
The report concluded:
“This assessment therefore focuses entirely on aspects of his personality from a strictly psychiatric and forensic standpoint. And from that standpoint, there do not currently seem to be any formal obstacles to his release.”
The report also stated that the previous experts had already found that there did not appear to be a risk of a further offence involving a child and that only the risk of a surge of paranoia and protest had held them back.
“That eventuality cannot be totally ruled out, although a number of clinical factors suggest that there has been a relaxation of his reactive faculties. In the event of his release on licence, which is not precluded by the findings of the clinical examination, it is ultimately the continuity, consistency and solidity of the reference points with which he is provided that should prevent a reaction of psychological destabilisation after such a lengthy period of incarceration. It would be helpful for him, at least initially, to receive support through psychological counselling.”
The experts reported that the applicant was envisaging receiving such counselling “to reassure everyone and myself, and in case I get depressed”. 23.  On 7 February 2000 the judge responsible for the execution of sentences gave the following opinion:
“Mr Léger is supported by the Bernhard family, who have regularly come to see him in the visiting room for about twenty years. Mr and Mrs Bernhard have offered to provide [the applicant] with accommodation. They have already welcomed other people in difficulty into their family. In addition, Mr Bernhard runs a company called ‘Le pain de nos ancêtres’. He will employ the prisoner to carry out administrative duties. [The applicant] will not be able to submit any other plans in view of his age (63) and his isolated family situation (as a widower with no children). The assessment recently conducted by a panel of psychiatric experts concludes that his personality has mellowed and that he has maintained his intellectual faculties and his grasp of reality. There does not appear to be any risk of his committing a further criminal offence involving a child. The findings of the clinical examination do not stand in the way of his release on licence. The solidity of the reference points with which he has been provided should prevent a reaction of psychological destabilisation after such a lengthy period of incarceration. It would be helpful for him initially to receive support through psychological counselling, according to the experts.
I am forwarding the file on [the applicant] because I consider that after almost 35 years in prison it is appropriate to review of his situation and thus assess the purpose of his sentence. Releasing him on licence would enable him to undergo compulsory medical and psychological treatment and to regain his liberty within a clearly defined framework, unlike an individual pardon.”
Following the reform of the post-sentencing system, including the procedure for granting release on licence to long-term prisoners, pursuant to the Law of 15 June 2000, the Minister of Justice refused the application for the applicant’s release and referred his case to the newly established courts. 24.  On 16 January 2001 the applicant availed himself of this new judicial procedure. In his application he again stated that friends of his would provide him with accommodation in an outbuilding at their home and with employment in their bakery on his release. 25.  On 5 February 2001 the sentence enforcement board issued a unanimous opinion in favour of his release on licence. The applicant’s resettlement and probation officer also expressed an opinion strongly in favour of the application. 26.  At the hearing in the Douai Regional Parole Court the advocate-general submitted that the applicant’s application should be refused in view of his “lack of reform” in relation to the acts that had led to his conviction. 27.  In a decision of 6 July 2001 the Regional Parole Court, observing that the applicant denied having committed the offence of which he had been convicted, refused his application on the following grounds:
“The extremely serious offence which [the applicant] denies having committed was punished by a sentence of life imprisonment.
The psychiatric experts who examined [the applicant] (in 1965, 1984, 1989 and most recently 1999) could not rule out his potential dangerousness and the risk of his reoffending, the only means of averting such risks being through psychotherapeutic counselling or support, which by its very nature requires acceptance by the subject.
[The applicant’s] position in relation to the offence committed and to the assessment which psychiatrists may make of a person’s mental state rules out any counselling of that kind and precludes a finding that he is making ‘serious efforts to readjust to society’ ... in spite of a coherent resettlement plan in terms of accommodation and employment.” 28.  Contending that that decision had required a confession as a new condition for release, the applicant appealed to the National Parole Court. His lawyer observed that the applicant was assured of work and accommodation on his release and that the most recent psychiatric report submitted by a panel of experts on 4 October 1999 had concluded that nothing stood in the way of his release on licence as there no longer appeared to be any risk of his reoffending. Relying on Article 3 of the Convention, the applicant’s lawyer argued that making his client’s release conditional on a confession was tantamount to a slow death sentence. 29.  On 12 November 2001 the applicant’s friends attested that their offer of accommodation and employment, which they had repeatedly made over a period of seventeen years, was still valid although their bakery was currently being sold to a private company founded by their children (a separate business registered at their home address). 30.  In a judgment of 23 November 2001 the National Parole Court upheld the decision of 6 July 2001 in the following terms:
“... the offers of employment and accommodation referred to by the offender in support of his application as evidence of a social resettlement plan are closely interlinked and are currently in doubt as a result of the bankruptcy order against the person who made the offers. Furthermore, the paranoid tendencies still noted by the most recent expert would require psychological counselling, which the prisoner does not envisage undergoing.” 31.  Following a proposal to commute the applicant’s sentence, a fresh psychiatric report on him was completed in May 2004. It concluded:
“... In our view there has been no particularly perceptible change in the offender’s mental state since the psychiatric assessments carried out in 1999. The character and personality traits observed do not make it possible to conclude with absolute certainty that he will not pose a significant danger in the community, in the psychiatric sense of the term.
The forecast cannot be anything but reserved ... as to his ability to readjust. Prospects of change are barely perceptible, seeing that he is increasingly occupied with disparaging the experts’ methods rather than providing evidence to address the question of his plans for the future.” 32.  On 25 January 2005 the applicant lodged a further application for release on licence with the Arras Post-sentencing Court (tribunal de l’application des peines). The prison authorities recommended applying a probationary semi-custodial regime. The public prosecutor was opposed to the applicant’s release on licence, contending that such a measure would entail a dual risk for society, that of reoffending and that of psychological decompensation. 33.  In a judgment of 1 July 2005, which was upheld on 31 August 2005 by the Post-sentencing Division of the Douai Court of Appeal, the applicant was released on licence with effect from 3 October 2005 until 2 October 2015, on which date the monitoring and supervision arrangements would expire. In addition to the standard requirements which the applicant was to observe (place of residence, contact with the judge responsible for execution of sentences and Prison Service social workers, permission for travel), particular obligations were imposed on him: to submit to medical examinations, treatment or care, including in a hospital environment, and to refrain from contacting the victim’s mother, from distributing any publication or audiovisual work produced or co-produced by himself relating, in whole or in part, to the offence committed, and from making any public comment on the offence. The courts held that the applicant now satisfied the conditions laid down in Article 729 of the CCP and based their decision on three considerations. Firstly, he had a coherent plan in terms of both accommodation (long-standing friends who had already assisted a number of people in difficulty) and voluntary work for the Red Cross, such arrangements being stable and long-term. Furthermore, with regard to his attitude towards the victims, the courts pointed out that the applicant had not made the slightest gesture to them and took refuge behind his alleged innocence, but added: “It nevertheless appears that Mr Léger’s conduct does not, after 41 years of imprisonment, represent an obstacle to his release on licence as it might have done in the past.” Lastly, with regard to the prevention of further offences, they noted that the risk of his reoffending was limited (“a zero risk of reoffending is so rare”) and that the recent expert reports were generally in favour of his release on licence. The first-instance court concluded as follows:
“There is no evidence to suggest that a more positive development may be expected in Mr Léger’s case, and there is cause to fear that even if his personality may have ‘mellowed’ according to the experts’ findings in 1999, it will not truly change. Accordingly, refusing his application for release on licence would amount to his virtually permanent exclusion from society, which does not seem justified in view of his resettlement plan and the limited nature of the risk of his reoffending.”