4.  The applicants were born in 1971, 1947 and 1938 respectively and live in Štip. 5.  On 6 February 1996 the applicants brought an action against Mr G., a juvenile at that time, and Ms M. and Mr B., Mr G.’s parents (“the defendants”), claiming compensation for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage resulting from injuries that the first applicant had sustained in a fight with Mr G. In the course of the proceedings, the applicants increased their initial claim on account of injuries that were established subsequently. 6.  Five hearings were scheduled between 25 September and 9 December 1996, three of which were adjourned because of expert examinations. On the latter date the Štip Court of First Instance ruled partly in favour of the applicants, awarding them less compensation than they had sought. That judgment was quashed by the Štip Court of Appeal in a decision of 18 June 1997 following appeals by both parties. 7.  On 15 October 1997 the Štip Court of First Instance partly granted the applicants’ claims and ordered the defendants jointly to reimburse the second and third applicants for the material loss, and to cover the non-pecuniary damage sustained by the first applicant. 8.  On 25 February 1998 the Štip Court of Appeal, on appeal by the applicants, quashed the part of the lower court’s decision relating to the first applicant’s claim for loss of income. It upheld the remainder of that decision. 9.  On 25 May 1998 the applicants lodged an appeal on points of law (ревизија) with the Supreme Court. On 22 May 1999 the first applicant unsuccessfully requested that the case be given priority treatment. 10.  On 11 January 2001 the Supreme Court partly allowed the applicants’ appeal and increased the award in respect of non-pecuniary damage. The applicants were served with that decision on 23 March 2001. 11.  On 17 April 2001 the applicants requested enforcement of the above decisions before the Štip Court of First Instance (“the enforcement court”). They proposed the following means of enforcement: seizure of the defendants’ monetary funds or an inventory, valuation and sale of their movable and immovable assets. They also requested the court to prevent Mr B. from selling or encumbering a flat (“the flat”) which he allegedly possessed. The enforcement court granted those requests in a decision of 16 May 2001 (“the order”). It appears that the applicants did not pay the court fees in time and the court did not decide upon their request for an injunction in respect of the flat. 12.  An on-site examination of the flat was scheduled for 21 March 2002. However, a hearing was held in the court building instead. On that occasion, the applicants requested the court to obtain evidence about the defendants’ immovable assets. 13.  On 21 June 2002 the applicants requested the court, in the alternative, to order an inventory and public sale of a house (“the house”) allegedly owned by Mr B. Their request for enforcement as regards the flat remained unaffected. The defendants argued that the house had not been constructed and that Mr B. did not have title to the flat. 14.  On 19 September 2002 the court inspected the site and established the existence of the house. It further ordered the applicants to provide evidence that Mr B. had title to the house. 15.  On 15 November 2002 the applicants requested the continuation of the enforcement proceedings in respect of the flat and the house. The defendants contested that request, stating that they did not have title to the assets in question. Since the flat had been subjected to a charging order (a mortgage) by a bank, the applicants requested that their claim be satisfied after the bank’s loan had been returned from the proceeds of the sale. The bank requested that, should the court sell the flat, which was allegedly socially owned, the loan arrangements be settled so that the charging order would be erased from the official records. 16.  On 17 June 2003 the applicants requested the enforcement court to expedite the enforcement. 17.  At a hearing on 11 July 2003, the applicants submitted a certificate, issued by the local authorities in 1981, authorising Mr B. to construct the house. The defendants disputed that that certificate could serve as proof of possession and stated that the house had been transferred, on the basis of a gift contract, into the possession of Mr B.’s daughter (Mrs B.N.). 18.  On 1 September 2003 the applicants requested the enforcement court to prevent Mr B. from selling the house until the enforcement was concluded. 19.  On 11 and 12 November 2003 the enforcement court visited the site, but it did not proceed with the enforcement given that the flat was locked. On the latter date, the applicants requested the court to obtain information as to whether the defendants possessed a vehicle. 20.  On 26 December 2003 the court again went into the flat and drew up an inventory of movable items. 21.  In separate proceedings instituted by the first applicant, on 6 July 2004 the Štip Court of First Instance ruled that the gift contract (see paragraph 17 above) of 28 May 2001 by which Mr B. had transferred possession of the house to Mrs B.N. was devoid of any legal effect up to the amount sufficient to satisfy the first applicant’s claims (non-pecuniary damage and trial costs) as established in the substantive proceedings (see paragraphs 7-10 above). It further ordered Mrs B.N. to allow the enforcement in respect of the house that Mr B. had transferred to her on the basis of the gift contract. 22.  On 21 April 2005 the Štip Court of Appeal dismissed appeals by Mr B. and Mrs B.N. and upheld the lower court’s decision. 23.  On 6 September 2005 the enforcement court resumed the proceedings by ordering an on-site examination of the house. The on-site visit took place on 20 September 2005. The house was locked, but the court ordered the expert to value it. It also issued an injunction preventing the house from being sold. 24.  In another set of proceedings, Mrs B.N. and Mr G.N., her husband, requested the Štip Court of First Instance to recognise that they had title to the house. On 5 October 2005 the court allowed that claim and held that the claimants had gained possession of the house as a result of having constructed it with their own assets. On the same date, that decision became final given that Mr B. and Ms M. had waived their right to appeal. 25.  On 20 November 2005 the enforcement court refused a request by the defendants for postponement of the enforcement, submitted on account of the civil proceedings described in the preceding paragraph. Referring to the proceedings described in paragraph 21 above, the court held that separate proceedings concerning the same property, but on a different ground, would only delay the enforcement of the order of 16 May 2001. 26.  On 16 March 2006 the enforcement court ordered the applicants to propose an alternative means of enforcement since the order could not be enforced in respect of the house given that, according to the final decision of 5 October 2005 (see paragraph 24 above), it was no longer in the defendants’ possession. 27.  On 14 September 2006 the applicants requested the enforcement court to continue the proceedings concerning the flat. They also requested the court to order Mr B. not to dispose of the flat. 28. On 10 October 2007 the enforcement court called the applicants to propose an alternative means and assets of enforcement under threat of suspension of the proceedings. It stated that the order could not be enforced in respect of the movable assets found in the flat (see paragraph 20 above) since they had been excluded from execution; the house had no longer been in the defendants’ possession and the flat, still subjected to a charging order, could not be sold under the Law on socially-owned flats of 2004. The applicants’ objections to this decision were unsuccessful. 29.  On 15 February 2008 the enforcement court, reiterating its findings stated above, stayed (запира) the proceedings due to a lack of funds on the defendants’ part. On 20 May 2008 the Štip Court of Appeal accepted the applicants’ appeal and remitted the case for a renewed consideration. It held that the lower court’s findings about the lack of funds had not been sufficiently reasoned and substantiated. It contradicted the fact that the defendants had the title of the flat under a sales contract of 1993. It therefore instructed the enforcement court to reassess the evidence so as to establish whether the enforcement could continue in respect of the flat. 30.  In the course of the enforcement proceedings, the defendants proposed enforcement by means of a standing authority for deduction of funds from Mr G.’s monthly salary. The applicants refused that proposal given the high amount of their claim.