5.  The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Liptovský Mikuláš. 6.  The applicant is an enforcement officer. In the context of enforcement proceedings, he seized movable property of a company with a view to having it sold. Subsequently bankruptcy (insolvency) proceedings were brought against the debtor. The administrator in bankruptcy asked the applicant to transfer the property to him in accordance with the required legal procedure in such cases. The applicant stored some of the items at the premises of one of the creditors. The representatives of the latter decided to retain the property until the debtor discharged the debt. They later revoked that decision. 7.  On 21 October 2003 the Liptovský Mikuláš District Court, on an application by the administrator, ordered the applicant to transfer the property to the administrator within fifteen days. It further ordered the applicant to pay his costs amounting to EUR 1,130. 8.  On 14 April 2005 the Žilina Regional Court quashed the judgment. It held that the first-instance court had not duly examined whether the applicant had standing in the case as a defendant, given that the property in question was being retained by a third party. 9.  A hearing was scheduled for 21 March 2006, but on 14 March 2006 the applicant asked the District Court for an adjournment “on account of his incapacity for work”. 10.  On 21 March 2006 the District Court, after taking further evidence, again ordered the applicant to transfer the property to the administrator, with reference to sections 14 and 18 of the Bankruptcy Act 1991. He was further ordered to reimburse the administrator’s costs amounting to EUR 1,964. The District Court held that, under the relevant law, the property had been at the applicant’s disposal. The creditor company where the applicant had stored the property had no obligation towards the bankruptcy administration. In those circumstances, the applicant’s argument, that the creditor had availed itself of its right to retain the property, could not be upheld. 11.  The judgment indicated that the applicant had not submitted any documentary evidence to prove that he had been unable to attend the hearing. The District Court had therefore proceeded with the case in his absence. 12.  The applicant appealed. He indicated, among other things, that he had been bedridden and unable to submit relevant documentary evidence of his sick leave for the period 16 February to 2 May 2006. He enclosed a medical certificate drawn up on 17 February 2006 confirming his inability to work until 2 May 2006 because of an accident. 13.  On 6 September 2007 the Žilina Regional Court upheld the first‑instance judgment. The decision on the claim in issue became final on 10 December 2007. 14.  The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. Relying on Article 237(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure, he argued that the first-instance court had not accepted his excuse and had proceeded with the case in his absence. He further argued, among other things, that he had no standing in the case as a defendant, and that the lower courts had applied the law incorrectly and had decided arbitrarily. In particular, the applicant maintained that he could not have been ordered to transfer the movable property to the administrator as it was not in his possession. The decision against the applicant was therefore unenforceable. 15.  In addition, the applicant argued that the administrator also lacked standing to bring the claim, as the law did not entitle him to realise property which one of the creditors had exercised its right to secure a debt by retaining. Since, in the course of the proceedings, the company which had been storing the property had indicated that it no longer wished to exercise that right, the courts should have discontinued the proceedings, as nothing had prevented the administrator from recovering the property. 16.  The Supreme Court rejected the appeal on points of law on 7 April 2009. It noted that on 14 March 2006 the applicant had sent a written excuse and a request for the District Court hearing on 21 March 2006 to be adjourned. However, he had not submitted any documentary evidence to that court in support of his argument that ill-health had prevented him from attending the hearing. In those circumstances, the District Court had been entitled to proceed with the case, and it had not prevented the applicant from asserting his rights in the proceedings within the meaning of Article 237(f) of the Code of Civil Procedure.
With reference to its case-law, the Supreme Court further held that the alleged lack of standing of both the applicant and the administrator was not a relevant reason for an appeal on points of law within the meaning of Article 237(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure. That provision extended exclusively to situations where a person lacked legal capacity. That was not the situation in the applicant’s case.
As a result, the applicant’s appeal on points of law was declared inadmissible, and the Supreme Court could not deal with his arguments as to the alleged errors of fact and law by courts at a lower level of jurisdiction. 17.  On 12 June 2009 the applicant submitted a constitutional complaint. He alleged a breach of Article 6 of the Convention in the proceedings leading to the above decisions being taken by the three levels of ordinary court. In particular, the applicant alleged that (i) the first‑instance and appellate courts had committed errors of fact and law when determining the merits and had decided in an arbitrary manner, (ii) he had had no standing in the case as a defendant, and (iii) the District Court had proceeded with the case in his absence. As to the last-mentioned complaint, he submitted that he had been immobilised because of a broken leg and had therefore been unable to attend the hearing or to enclose a medical certificate in support of his request for its adjournment. 18.  The Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint on 17 September 2009. It held that the complaint had been lodged outside the statutory time‑limit of two months in so far as it concerned the first-instance and appellate courts’ decisions, which had become final on 10 December 2007. As the Supreme Court had declared the applicant’s appeal on points of law inadmissible, and since the Constitutional Court found no reason to disagree with that conclusion, the applicant’s use of that remedy could not affect the running of the above time-limit in respect of the judgments of the District Court and the Regional Court. 19.  The Constitutional Court further carried out a detailed examination of the reasons for the Supreme Court’s decision, and concluded that it was neither arbitrary nor otherwise contrary to the applicant’s right to a fair hearing.