11.  The applicant was born in 1940 and is currently in compulsory residence at San Secondo Hospital – Fidenza (Parma). 12.  On 2 September 1999, after a violent family dispute, the applicant killed his wife and injured one of his sons. He was arrested the following day. 13.  At the end of the preliminary investigation the Rome prosecution service asked for the applicant to be committed to stand trial for murder, attempted murder, ill-treatment of his family and unauthorised possession of a firearm. 14.  On 24 November 2000, under the summary procedure under which the applicant had elected to stand trial, the Rome preliminary hearings judge (giudice dell’udienza preliminare) found the applicant guilty of all the charges and noted that he should be sentenced to life imprisonment. However, because the summary procedure had been used, he sentenced the applicant to thirty years’ imprisonment and a lifetime ban from public office within the meaning of Article 29 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 36 below). 15.  The judge noted that the applicant had first attempted to strangle his wife with the cable of the telephone she had used to call the police. Then, when his wife and children ran out of the flat and down the stairwell of the building, he had fired several shots at his wife at close range, and at one of his sons, who had initially been ahead of his mother but had gone back to help her. 16.  In fixing the sentence the judge took into account certain aggravating circumstances, namely the fact that the applicant’s criminal behaviour had been against his own family and had been triggered by so trifling an incident as his children having allegedly broken his mobile phone. 17.  The judge made no allowance for the fact that the applicant had no previous criminal record, an argument the applicant had relied on as a mitigating circumstance. He found that the applicant’s attitude in denying some of his actions and blaming his family, who he claimed were guilty of rebelling against his authority, showed that he felt no remorse whatsoever. 18.  Lastly, the judge noted that according to witness statements the applicant had been responsible for other episodes of violence over the past twenty years, such as insults, physical violence and threats against his wife and children, including with weapons. 19.  Both the Public Prosecutor’s Office and the applicant appealed against that judgment, and in a judgment of 10 January 2002 the Rome Assize Court of Appeal sentenced the applicant to life imprisonment, upholding the conclusions of the preliminary hearings judge as to which aggravating and mitigating circumstances should be taken into account. 20.  The applicant appealed on points of law, and in a judgment deposited with its registry on 20 January 2003 the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal. 21.  Under Article 29 of the Criminal Code, the life sentence imposed on the applicant entailed a lifetime ban from public office, which in turn led to the permanent forfeiture of his right to vote, in conformity with section 2 of Presidential Decree no. 223 of 20 March 1967 (“Decree no. 223/1967” – see paragraph 33 below). 22.  The applicant’s disenfranchisement was not mentioned in the judgments against him. 23.  In application of section 32 of Decree no. 223/1967 (see paragraph 35 below), on 2 April 2003 the electoral committee deleted the applicant’s name from the electoral roll. 24.  On 30 June 2004 the applicant lodged a complaint with the electoral committee. Referring to the Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) judgment (no. 74025/01, 30 March 2004), amongst other authorities, he alleged that depriving him of the right to vote was incompatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. 25.  The complaint was rejected, and on 16 July 2004 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Rome Court of Appeal. He contended that the fact that the removal of his name from the electoral roll, as an automatic consequence of his life sentence and lifetime ban from public office, was incompatible with his right to vote guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. 26.  By a judgment deposited with its registry on 29 November 2004 the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It pointed out that, unlike in the Hirst (no. 2) case (cited above), where every person sentenced to imprisonment was divested of the right to vote, with no assessment of the competing interests or the proportionality of the measure, in Italian law the impugned measure was applied only where the offence was punishable with a particularly heavy sentence, including life imprisonment. The court found that the automatic aspect of the application of the voting ban to any custodial sentence was lacking in the applicant’s case. 27.  The applicant appealed on points of law, alleging, inter alia, that his disenfranchisement was a consequence of the ancillary penalty banning him from public office (which was itself the result of the main penalty imposed on him). In his view the impugned ban had nothing to do with the offence committed and the courts had no power to decide to apply such a measure. 28.  In a judgment deposited with its registry on 17 January 2006 the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s appeal. First, it referred to the Hirst (no. 2) judgment of 6 October 2005 (Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) [GC], no. 74025/01, § 77, ECHR 2005‑IX), where the Grand Chamber considered that the withdrawal of voting rights in the United Kingdom “concern[ed] a wide range of offenders and sentences, from one day to life and from relatively minor offences to offences of the utmost gravity”. It then noted that in Italian law, under Article 29 of the Criminal Code, only those offenders sentenced to at least three years’ imprisonment were deprived of the right to vote. Where the offence attracted a sentence of less than five years, the disenfranchisement lasted only five years, a lifelong ban on voting being reserved for offenders sentenced to between five years and life. 29.  On 24 March 2003, the applicant lodged an application with the Court alleging, inter alia, that his life sentence had breached Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention. 30.  In a judgment of 17 September 2009 the Grand Chamber of the Court found violations of those Articles (see Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) [GC], no. 10249/03, 17 September 2009). 31.  Ruling on Article 46 of the Convention, the Grand Chamber indicated that “Having regard to the particular circumstances of the case and the urgent need to put an end to the breach of Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention, the Court therefore considers that the respondent State is responsible for ensuring that the applicant’s sentence of life imprisonment is replaced by a penalty consistent with the principles set out in the present judgment, which is a sentence not exceeding thirty years’ imprisonment.” (see Scoppola (no. 2), cited above, § 154). 32.  Consequently, by a judgment deposited with its registry on 28 April 2010, the Court of Cassation reversed its judgment of 20 January 2003 (see paragraph 20 above), set aside the judgment of the Rome Assize Court of Appeal of 10 January 2002 (see paragraph 19 above) and fixed the applicant’s sentence at thirty years’ imprisonment.