9.  The applicant was born in 1961 and lives in Vilnius. 10.  On 1 November 1997 the applicant was recruited by the embassy of the Republic of Poland in Vilnius (“the embassy” or “the Polish embassy”), to the post of secretary and switchboard operator (korespondentė-telefonistė). 11.  The contract of employment provided in Article 1 that the applicant’s responsibilities and tasks were limited by the scope of her (secretarial and switchboard-related) duties. If the applicant agreed, she could be assigned other tasks not covered by this agreement. In such circumstances, a new contract would have to be signed. According to Article 6 of the contract, the applicant had to comply with Lithuanian laws, was liable for any damage she might cause to her employer and could be subjected to disciplinary action for failing to fulfil her professional obligations or to observe safety regulations at work. In return for extra work, the applicant could receive remuneration, bonuses, discretionary benefits or compensatory leave. Article 8 provided that any disputes arising under the contract were to be settled in accordance with the laws of Lithuania: the Constitution, the Employment Contracts Act, the Labour Remuneration Act, the Leave Act and the Employees’ Social Security Act. Lastly, the contract could be terminated in accordance with sections 26, 27, 29 and 30 of the Employment Contracts Act (enacted on 28 November 1991 with a number of subsequent amendments). 12.  The applicant’s duties – as set out in a schedule to her employment contract – included the following:
“1.  Operating the switchboard of the embassy and Consulate-General and recording international telephone conversations. 13.  In 1999 the applicant lodged a complaint before the Equal Opportunities Ombudsman, alleging sexual harassment by one of her male colleagues, a member of the diplomatic staff of the embassy. Following an inquiry, the Ombudsman reported that the applicant was indeed a victim of sexual harassment. The applicant alleged that she had fallen ill because of the tension she was experiencing at work. 14.  The applicant was on sick leave from 1 September to 29 October 1999. On 29 October 1999 she went to work but was not authorised to enter the embassy building. On 22 November 1999 the applicant was again refused entry when she arrived for work. The same thing occurred again on 23 November 1999. 15.  On 26 November 1999 the applicant wrote a letter to the ambassador, informing her about the incidents. On 2 December 1999 the applicant was notified that she had been dismissed on the ground of her failure to come to work from 22 to 29 November 1999. 16.  The applicant brought a civil claim, requesting compensation for unlawful dismissal. She did not claim reinstatement. The Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs issued a note verbale claiming immunity from the jurisdiction of the Lithuanian courts. On 2 August 2000 the Vilnius Regional Court discontinued the proceedings for lack of jurisdiction. On 14 September 2000 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision. The final decision was taken by the Supreme Court on 25 June 2001. 17.  The Supreme Court established, inter alia, that the 1993 agreement on legal assistance between Lithuania and Poland had not resolved the question of State immunity, that Lithuania had no laws on the question, and that the domestic case-law in this area was only just being developed. The Supreme Court therefore considered it appropriate to decide the case in the light of the general principles of international law, in particular the 1972 European Convention on State Immunity. 18.  The Supreme Court observed that Article 479 of the Lithuanian Code of Civil Procedure, as then in force, established the principle of absolute State immunity, but that that provision had become inapplicable in practice. It noted that the prevailing international practice was to adopt a restrictive interpretation of State immunity, granting such immunity only for acts of sovereign authority (acta jure imperii), as opposed to acts of a commercial or private-law nature (acta jure gestionis). The Supreme Court further held, in particular, as follows:
“... in the Supreme Court’s view, it is possible to apply the principle of restrictive immunity to the Republic of Poland. Having regard to the fact that Lithuania recognises that foreign nationals may bring actions in respect of private-law disputes, it must be accepted that, in order to defend their rights, individuals or entities from the Republic of Lithuania are entitled to take proceedings against foreign States.
It is thus necessary to establish in the present case whether the relationship between the claimant and the Republic of Poland was one of a public-law nature (acta jure imperii) or a private-law nature (acta jure gestionis). Besides that, other criteria are applicable and should allow [the court] to determine whether the State concerned enjoys immunity ... in employment disputes. These criteria include, in particular, the nature of the workplace, the status of the employee, the territorial connection between the country of employment and the country of the court, and the nature of the claim.
Regard being had to the plea of immunity by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland ... it is possible to conclude that there was a public-service relationship governed by public law (acta jure imperii) between the claimant and the embassy of the Republic of Poland, and that the Republic of Poland may lay claim to immunity from the jurisdiction of foreign courts. This conclusion is supported by other criteria. With regard to the nature of the workplace, it should be noted that the main function of the embassy ... is directly related to the exercise of sovereignty of the Republic of Poland. With respect to the status of [the] employee ... while the parties had entered into a contract of employment, the very fact that the employee was a switchboard operator implies that the parties developed a relationship akin to that which characterises a public-service function ... The court was unable to obtain any information allowing it to establish the scope of the claimant’s actual duties. Thus, merely from the title of her position, it can be concluded that the duties entrusted to her facilitated, to a certain degree, the exercise by the Republic of Poland of its sovereign functions. ... It must also be established whether the country of employment is the country of the court, since a court in the country of employment is best placed to resolve a dispute that has arisen in that country. In this respect, it is to be recognised that the exercise of the sovereign powers of the forum State is severely restricted with regard to an embassy, even though it is not a foreign territory as such (section 11(2) of the Status of Diplomatic Missions of Foreign States Act). As to the nature of the claim ... it should be noted that a claim for recognition of unlawful dismissal and for compensation cannot be regarded as violating the sovereignty of [another] State, since such a claim pertains solely to the economic aspect of the impugned legal relationship[;] there is no claim for reinstatement ... However, by reason of this criterion alone, it cannot be unconditionally asserted that the Republic of Poland cannot invoke State immunity in this case. ... [The claimant] has submitted no [other] evidence to confirm the inability for the Republic of Poland to enjoy State immunity (Article 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure).
Against the background of the above criteria, [in view of] the aspiration of Lithuania and Poland to maintain good bilateral relations ... and respect the principle of sovereign equality between States ..., the chamber concludes that the courts [below] properly decided that they had no jurisdiction to entertain this case.
...
The Supreme Court notes that both the Regional Court of Vilnius and the Court of Appeal based the decision to apply jurisdictional immunity to the Republic of Poland merely on the fact that the latter had refused to appear in the proceedings. Those courts did not examine the question of the application of restrictive jurisdictional immunity in the light of the criteria developed by the Supreme Court. However, this breach of procedural rules does not constitute, in the Supreme Court’s view, a ground for quashing the decisions of the courts below. ...
The application of jurisdictional immunity by the courts of the Republic of Lithuania does not prevent the claimant from taking proceedings before the Polish courts.”