12.  The applicant was born in 1923 and lives in Catanzaro. 13.  On 21 May 1986 Mr P. brought proceedings against the applicant in the Chiaravalle Centrale Magistrate’s Court for recognition of the existence of a right of way. 14.  Preparation of the case for trial began on 28 May 1986 and on that date the Magistrate’s Court appointed an expert. Of the seven hearings listed between 8 October 1986 and 2 December 1987 three were devoted to organising expert evidence, two to an inspection of the premises by the pretore, two were adjourned by the court of its own motion and one was adjourned because the lawyers were on strike. On 27 July 1988 the Magistrate’s Court set the case down for hearing of oral submissions on 1 March 1989. On that date the hearing was adjourned to 5 July 1989 at the parties’ request. Of the fifteen hearings listed between 2 May 1991 and 4 June 1997 six were adjourned at the parties’ request, two at the request of the defendant, five by the court of its own motion – one of which was because the registry had not notified the applicant of the date of the hearing – one because the applicant had changed lawyer and another one to allow the registry to check that the stamps had duly been affixed to a number of documents in the case file. Judgment was reserved on 22 October 1997. 15.  In an order of 26 November 1997, which was not made at a hearing, the court declared the case reopened and requested the parties to file documents with the registry. On 4 March 1998 the court reserved judgment. 16. In an order of 9 April 1998 the court declared the case reopened, noted that the parties had not yet filed the documents requested and adjourned the case to 7 October 1998. On that date judgment was reserved. 17.  In a judgment of the same date, the text of which was deposited with the registry on 16 August 1999, the Magistrate’s Court granted Mr P.’s application. 18.  On 27 October 2000 the applicant appealed to the Catanzaro Court of Appeal. According to information provided by the applicant on 6 June 2005, the first hearing, which was to be held on 22 January 2001, was not held until 10 December 2001 following two adjournments of the court’s own motion and an adjournment of a hearing because the registry had not notified the parties of the hearing date. The parties made their submissions two hearings later, on 27 May 2002, and the hearing of final submissions was set down for 9 December 2003. That hearing was adjourned to 6 July 2004 following the transfer of the judge directing the preparations for trial, then to 18 January 2005. On that date judgment was reserved. 19.  In a judgment of 21 February 2005, the text of which was deposited with the registry on 18 March 2005, the Court of Appeal set aside the first-instance court’s judgment and allowed the applicant’s appeal. According to information provided by the applicant on 14 October 2005, as the judgment had not been served the time allowed for appealing to the Court of Cassation was still running. 20.  On an unspecified date in April 2002 the applicant lodged an application with the Salerno Court of Appeal under Law no. 89 of 24 March 2001, known as the “Pinto Act”, complaining of the length of the above-described proceedings. He requested the court to rule that there had been a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and to order the Italian State to pay compensation for the distress and other non-pecuniary damage sustained. The applicant claimed 13,000 euros (EUR) in compensation for distress and other non-pecuniary damage, and sought reimbursement of the costs and expenses but did not quantify them. 21.  In a decision of 1 October 2002, the text of which was deposited with the registry on 13 December 2002, the Court of Appeal found that the length of the proceedings had been excessive. It held as follows:
“ ... [the proceedings], given the manner in which they were conducted, cannot be deemed particularly complex. That said, it should be pointed out that the proceedings gave rise to many hearings, some of which were mere adjournments, and as such unnecessary. With regard to the conduct of the parties, the adjournments they requested or at least agreed to must be attributed to them. They must therefore be deemed responsible for the adjournments requested by one party and which the other parties did not oppose or which were accepted and therefore allowed by the court. ... The fact that the court allowed the parties to exercise ... [through those adjournments] their right to a defence cannot be blamed a posteriori on the public organisation of the service.
The remaining period does have to be attributed to the conduct of the judicial authorities, however, both regarding the intervals relating to the adjournments of the court’s own motion and the adjournments for reasons relating to investigation measures which took longer than a reasonable time to carry out.
Indeed, when the situation is analysed in accordance with Law no. 89/01 [Pinto], the time that elapsed between the beginning of the proceedings and the end is a central factor: in this sense, the fact that the length of the proceedings, which is not attributable to the parties’ conduct, is otherwise determined – in the sphere of the organisation of the court service and, in general, the services managed by the authorities involved in giving a decision or contributing to the disposal of the proceedings – by personal or structural factors, such as the shortage of staff when compared with the demands of the workload, does not change the conclusion that this time must be attributed to the State, which has not assigned the resources necessary to dispose of a trial speedily.
Accordingly, on the basis of that analysis the delays attributable to the parties can be quantified at three years and two months at first instance. The proceedings are still pending on appeal but the case has already been referred to the appropriate Chamber for the hearing of final submissions on 25 February 2003 and, given that the first hearing was held on 22 January 2001, the period can be regarded as falling within the reasonable time-span of two years.
On that basis, the delays attributable to the organisation of the courts, less the delays attributable to the parties, amount to twelve years and ten months.
Moreover, taking the main thrust of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights as a basis, a reasonable time for the average timescale for the conduct of a case at first instance can prima facie properly be fixed at three years. For proceedings dealt with also on appeal the reasonable length can be fixed at about five years for proceedings whose subject-matter is nothing out of the ordinary.
In the instant case, therefore, the surplus time must be deemed to be approximately seven years and ten months.
The reasonable time must accordingly be deemed to have been exceeded in so far as the case was not particularly complex and the delays attributable to the parties have already been taken into account.
For the rest, the claim for compensation of 13,000 euros appears totally disproportionate and unsupported by evidence. Accordingly, the award must be significantly less.
Consequently, having taken into consideration the parties’ interest in having the proceedings disposed of, as their conduct has shown, the lack of complexity of the case, in the absence of evidence supplied by the parties, and the limited impact of the non-pecuniary damage, the court considers it equitable to award Mr Musci 3,500 euros in damages.”
The Court of Appeal awarded the applicant EUR 3,500 on an equitable basis in compensation for non-pecuniary damage. In respect of costs and expenses, the Court of Appeal noted that the applicant had not given particulars of the claim. Having regard to the quantity and quality of the work done by the lawyer, it awarded him only half the sum he had considered due EUR 516.46 (that is, EUR 258.23) plus tax. That decision became final by 28 January 2004 at the latest. The applicant obtained payment of the amounts due from the authorities on 19 November 2004. 22.  In a letter of 20 October 2003 the applicant informed the Court of the outcome of the domestic proceedings and asked it to resume its examination of his application. 23. In a letter of 18 November 2003 the applicant informed the Court that he did not intend to appeal to the Court of Cassation because an appeal to that court could only be on points of law.