5.  The first applicant was born in 1976. She is the mother of the second applicant, who was born in 1997. The applicants live in Bratislava. 6.  On 22 May 1996 the first applicant married A., a United States national, in the United States. 7.  On 8 November 1996 the first applicant left the United States for Slovakia and has remained there since. This gave cause to several judicial proceedings, all of which took place before the courts in Slovakia. 8.  While the first applicant’s marriage was dissolved and the second applicant was entrusted to her care and custody, the subject matter of the present application concerns the second applicant’s maintenance.
This matter was determined in three different sets of proceedings. 9.  First, by way of a judgment (rozsudok) that became final and binding on 16 February 2004 (“the first judgment”), ruling on appeal by the first applicant against a judgment of the Bratislava IV District Court (Okresný súd), the Bratislava Regional Court (Krajský súd) dismissed a maintenance claim against A., observing that the first applicant had failed to indicate an address for the defendant in the United States and that it had been impossible to make him available for the purposes of the proceedings.
A maintenance order made in such circumstances would not be enforceable in the United States and there was thus no point in making it.
While the District Court’s ruling was phrased as “[the court] refrains from making a ruling” on the claim, the Regional Court changed it into “[the court] dismisses the claim” observing specifically that should the first applicant be able to obtain the defendant’s address in the future there would be no obstacle to her lodging a fresh application in the same matter. 10.  Second, by way of a ruling, which became final and binding on 1 October 2004 (“the second judgment”), which was attached to the judgment in the divorce proceedings, and which concerned the period subsequent to the divorce, the District Court ordered A. to contribute to the second applicant’s maintenance by way of monthly payments. 11.  The third set of proceedings concerning the second applicant’s maintenance is the actual subject matter of the present application. It is described below. 12.  Following the dismissal of her first claim concerning the maintenance of the second applicant in the period prior to the divorce (see paragraph 9 above), in February 2004 the first applicant made a fresh claim and indicated a new address for the defendant. 13.  On 21 July 2005 the District Court inquired at the Centre for the International Legal Protection of Children and Youth (Centrum pre medzinárodnoprávnu ochranu detí a mládeže – “the Centre”) about the address of the employer of A. and any other information concerning him. In the absence of a reply, the District Court sent a reminder on 2 September 2005, to which the Centre replied on 29 September 2005, submitting that no such information was available and that, under the 1956 Convention on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance (Decree of the Minister of Foreign Affairs no. 33/1959 Coll.), the Centre had no power to investigate such matters. 14.  On 21 November 2005 the District Court sent a request to the United States authorities to question the defendant under the 1970 Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (Decree of the Minister of Foreign Affairs no. 129/1976 Coll.). In the absence of a reply, the District Court sent reminders on 9 February 2007 and 21 January 2008. 15.  On 7 April 2008 the District Court again enquired with the Centre about the address of the employer of A. and any other information concerning him. The Centre replied on 14 April 2008 submitting that no information was available except for the last address for A., which was substantially the same as that used in the previous proceedings (see paragraphs 9 and 10 above). 16.  On 19 June 2008 the District Court gave a decision, making two different rulings concerning the periods before and after the first judgment (16 February 2004) (see paragraph 9 above). 17.  As regards the period prior to 16 February 2004, the District Court observed that it was covered by the first judgment, which constituted a res judicata. The matter could accordingly not be examined again, and that part of the action was declared inadmissible. 18.  As regards the period after 16 February 2004 and until the second judgment (1 October 2004) (see paragraph 10 above), the District Court ordered A. to make monthly contributions to the second applicant’s maintenance in the same amount as under the second judgment. 19.  The first applicant challenged the judgment of 19 June 2008 in so far as the action had been declared inadmissible. She relied on the first judgment, in that the matter had not been decided upon on the merits, and it was open to her to bring the claim anew once an address had been established for the defendant. 20.  On 21 January 2009 the Regional Court dismissed the appeal. It observed that although the first applicant had submitted a new address for the defendant, it had still not been possible to make him available for the purposes of the proceedings and, to that extent, the matter was a res judicata. 21.  Eventually, after the proceedings had been concluded, on 14 December 2009 a report was obtained from the United States authorities concerning A. being questioned, pursuant to the District Court’s request of 21 November 2005 (see paragraph 14 above). 22.  On 9 April 2009 the applicants challenged the judgments of 19 June 2008 and 21 January 2009 by way of a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution (Constitutional law no. 460/1992 Coll., as amended) in the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd). They relied, inter alia, on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 5 of Protocol No. 7 (equality between spouses). They alleged a violation of their right of access to court and to a fair trial, and submitted that they had identified A.’s address and that he himself had confirmed that address in his written submission to the court in the divorce proceedings. Moreover, maintenance orders had been enforced against A. in the past via the Centre and its counterpart in the United States. 23.  On 14 May 2009 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible. It found that the applicants had failed to exhaust ordinary remedies as required under section 53(1) of the Constitutional Court Act (Law no. 38/1993 Coll., as amended) by seeking protection of their rights before the ordinary courts by way of an appeal on points of law (dovolanie) under Article 237 (f) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Law no. 99/1963 Coll., as amended - “the CCP”). 24.  As observed by the Constitutional Court, it was true that that the subject matter of the proceedings fell within the ambit of the Family Code (Law no. 36/2005 Coll., as amended) and that, pursuant to Article 238 § 4 of the CCP, appeals on points of law were specifically unavailable in matters governed by the Family Code.
However, if there were serious procedural irregularities within the meaning of Article 237 of the CCP, an appeal on points of law was available in all cases. To that end, the Constitutional Court relied on a commentary to the CCP of 2006 by Krajčo J. and others, page 618, and on its own inadmissibility decision of 17 April 2008 in a case no. I. ÚS 136/08 (see paragraphs 34 below). 25.  The applicants subsequently lodged a request with the Prosecutor General, seeking that he use his discretionary powers and challenge the contested judgments on the applicants’ behalf by way of an extraordinary appeal on points of law (mimoriadne dovolanie). 26.  In a letter of 20 July 2009 the Prosecutor General responded that no such remedy was available in the applicants’ case, as it fell within the Family Code and, under Article 243f § 2 (a) of the CCP, no extraordinary appeal on points of law could be lodged in matters governed by the Family Code (see paragraphs 35 and 36 below).