7.  The applicant company operates a television station, “Sigma TV”, and a radio station, “Radio Proto”, in Cyprus. 8.  As follows from the materials submitted by the parties, between 2000 and 2002, the CRTA, exercising the functions attributed to it by the Radio and Television Stations Law (Law 7(I)/1998, as amended; hereinafter “the Law”) and the Radio and Television Stations Regulations of 2000 (Regulatory Act 10/2000; hereinafter “the Regulations”), examined a number of different broadcasts (advertisements, various programmes, films, trailers and news reports) transmitted by the applicant’s television and radio stations. In some of the cases the CRTA was acting on complaints and in others ex proprio motu, pursuant to section 3(1) of the Law. The applicant was informed of the possibility of contraventions on its part and was invited by the CRTA to make written and/or oral submissions if it so wished. Hearings were held in all cases[1]. The applicant did not make written and/or oral submissions in all the cases, however. 9.  During the abovementioned period the CRTA issued twenty-seven separate decisions finding the applicant in violation of one or more provisions of the Law and/or the Regulations[2]. The CRTA imposed fines in all the cases. In certain cases separate decisions were taken as to the merits and the fine. In these cases, following notification of the decisions, the applicant was given the opportunity to make submissions as to the imposition of a fine. 10.  The applicant paid all the fines between 2001 and 2008. 11.  Furthermore, in January 1999, the CRTA called upon the applicant to pay the licence fee due for operating its television station[3]. 12.  Administrative and/or civil proceedings resulted from the above decisions. 13.  A list with details of the relevant broadcasts and the CRTA proceedings is annexed to the present judgment. 1.  Summary of the CRTA’s decisions concerning various broadcasts on “Sigma TV” and “Radio-Proto”
(a)  Advertisements for children’s toys by “Sigma TV” [CRTA cases nos. 129/2000(3); 148/2000(3); 135/2001(3) and 3/2002(3)] 14.  The CRTA found in a number of cases that the applicant had breached the provisions of the Law. In some cases the applicant admitted the violations in the submissions it made before the CRTA. 15.  In all the cases the CRTA held that “Sigma TV” had broadcast advertisements for children’s toys at times prohibited by section 34 of the Law. The CRTA also found that some of the advertisements exploited children’s inexperience and credulity by directly inciting them to purchase the products advertised, in violation of section 33(7)(a)(i) of the Law, and that some of the advertisements contained exaggerated or unfounded claims, in violation of paragraph B.1 of appendix IX of the Regulations. Moreover, the CRTA held that in some of the advertisements the products aimed at children had been promoted by offering gifts, in violation of paragraph D.10(o) of appendix IX of the Regulations. 16.  In two of its decisions (cases nos. 135/2001(1) and 3/2002(3)) the CRTA stressed that it had repeatedly indicated in the past, through its decisions, circulars and directives to stations, the significance of protecting minors from the messages they received through advertising, and had underlined the seriousness of such violations. Further, the CRTA noted that advertisements for children’s toys were not completely prohibited by the legislation but were subject to limitations (concerning broadcasting times, approach, methods of promotion, techniques employed, visual and audio material used) as children were vulnerable and credulous consumers because of their lack of experience and judgment.
(b)  Interruption of programmes for the broadcasting of advertisements [CRTA cases nos. 173/2001(3) and 19/2001(3)], promotion of sponsors during news bulletins [CRTA case no. 19/2001 (3)] and surreptitious advertising [CRTA case nos. 18/2000(3) and 113/2000(3)] 17.  In case no. 173/2001(3) the CRTA found that on 22 occasions the times at which “Sigma TV” had interrupted programmes to broadcast advertisements had not been in accordance with section 33(2)(g) of the Law. Furthermore, the CRTA found that on 325 occasions the duration of the advertising breaks within programmes had been longer than three and a half minutes, in violation of paragraph F.3 of appendix IX of the Regulations. In its decision the CRTA held that the need to regulate the frequency and duration of television breaks derived both from the right of a viewer to watch a programme unhampered, without long and frequent interruptions, and from the need to show respect for the programme, which should be broadcast in its entirety as a human creation. The applicant admitted the violations in the submissions it made before the CRTA. 18.  In case no. 19/2001(3) the CRTA found that “Sigma TV” had interrupted a news bulletin twice in order to broadcast advertisements, in violation of section 33(2)(i) of the Law. The CRTA also found that during certain news items concerning the stock exchange and the exchange rate, transmitted as part of the news programmes, the names and logos of the sponsors of the bulletins had been shown on the screen for promotion purposes, in violation of paragraph E.3 of appendix IX of the Regulations. Lastly, the CRTA held that there had been surreptitious advertising in violation of section 33(2)(d) during a sports bulletin transmitted as part of the main news programme. The applicant admitted a violation of the Law on that account. 19.  In cases nos. 18/2000(3) and 113/2000(3)[4] the CRTA found that the transmission of clear images of various products of real brands in a comedy series had been done in a provocative manner and had clearly been for advertising purposes, contrary to section 33(2)(d) of the Law. Further, the CRTA considered that the images used had not been a necessary part of the set of the series, as the applicant maintained. When imposing the fines the CRTA took into account the fact that in spite of previous decisions finding similar violations and imposing fines, the applicant had shown no willingness to comply. In spite of previous findings of violations, for example, the applicant had broadcast repeats of some episodes of the series.
(c)  News reports included in news bulletins [CRTA case nos. 75/2000(3), 98/2000(3), 152/2000(3), 9/2001(3), 43/2001(3), 44/2001(3) and 108/001(3)] 20.  In seven cases the CRTA found that the applicant had infringed a number of provisions of the Law and/or the Regulations with regard to items broadcast during news bulletins.
(i)  Case no. 75/2000(3) 21.  “Sigma TV” broadcast a report in a news bulletin concerning the arrest of a teacher for photographing naked minors. The CRTA found a violation of Regulations 21(3), 24(1)(a) and paragraph 10 of Part II of appendix VIII of the Regulations in that insufficient measures had been taken to conceal the suspect’s identity, the information given concerning the reasons for the suspect’s arrest had not been accurate and certain statements which had been made during the report ran contrary to the principle of presumption of innocence.
(i)   Case no. 98/2000(3) 22.  “Sigma TV” broadcast a news bulletin that included a report on the drug problem of a Cypriot family. The CRTA noted that the report included scenes which were taken possibly from a film or documentary and illustrated in detail the procedure of preparing and consuming drugs. The CRTA considered that the images shown had not been suitable for transmission during the “family zone” (see definition in paragraph 88 below) and had possibly been dangerous for minors. It found a violation of Regulations 21(6), 24(1)(a) and 24(2)(d) as the applicant had not ensured that the material shown was suitable for minors, had not prepared and aired the particular news report with accuracy and had not issued a visual and/or verbal warning for viewers. The CRTA drew attention to the fact that minors tended to imitate acts out of curiosity and an inclination to experiment. It stressed that it was its duty to take due steps to protect minors from programmes that could cause them any mental or physical harm. In its submissions before the CRTA the applicant claimed that the purpose of the images had been to accompany the news story with visual material.
(iii)  Case no. 152/2000(3) 23.  In one of its news bulletins “Sigma TV” aired a news report concerning two murders. The CRTA noted that the report contained close-ups of the dead body of the victim covered in blood and of the grieving relatives. Furthermore, no visual or verbal warning had been given to viewers. It found a violation of Regulations 24(2)(a)–(d) and of paragraph 6 of part II of appendix VIII of the Regulations.
(iv)  Case no. 9/2001(3) 24.  “Sigma TV” broadcast a report in a news bulletin about the transfer to court of three young men suspected of drug use. The CRTA considered that the news story had lacked objectivity, impartiality, accuracy and pluralism, in violation of Regulation 24(1)(a). It noted in this regard that although the allegations made over the phone by the mother of one of the accused as to the effectiveness of the relevant institutions and the attitude of the competent medical authorities towards drug addicts had been transmitted, the institutions and medical authorities concerned had not been given the opportunity to express their views. In this connection, the applicant had argued, inter alia, that the issues in question concerned society and that the report should have been evaluated on the basis of the data and information the station had had at its disposal. The applicant further admitted that it did not have a delay unit allowing live telephone conversations to be interrupted when something unsuitable was said. 25.  In addition, the CRTA found that the news report had gone beyond the scope of information as comments, conclusions and information concerning private matters of the suspects had been broadcast, without the appropriate sensitivity towards human pain or respect for the suspects’ personality, honour, reputation and private lives, in violation of Regulation 21(3) and paragraph 8(2), of part I of appendix VIII of the Regulations. The CRTA did not accept the station’s allegations that the suspects had turned towards the cameras seeking help, as certain shots showed the suspects covering up their faces and making every effort to avoid the cameras. Even if the suspects had chosen to publicise their problem, the CRTA considered that the applicant should have taken into account that they had not been fully aware of their actions and had been in despair, vulnerable and under the influence of strong substances. In addition, the CRTA noted that the disclosure of the identity of the persons involved, their media exposure as well as the extensive coverage of their private lives, could stigmatise them in a society such as that of Cyprus. In the CRTA’s view the promulgation of the drug problem could have been accomplished without revealing the suspects’ identity and without disclosing information about their private lives.
(v)  Case no. 43/2001(3) 26.  The CRTA found that during a news bulletin broadcast on “Sigma TV” the name of the victim of a car accident had been mentioned before it had been ascertained whether the victim’s parents had been informed, in violation of Regulation 24(3). The applicant submitted before the CRTA that it was standard practice to obtain confirmation by the police and this case had not been an exception.
(vi)  Case no. 44/2001(3) 27.  The CRTA held that an interview aired during a news bulletin on “Sigma TV”, with a female witness for the prosecution in pending criminal proceedings, advocating the innocence of a man under criminal charges, had lacked accuracy, objectivity, impartiality and pluralism. It was noted that although the interviewee had testified against the suspect in court, in the interview she had given information that pointed to the suspect’s innocence. The CRTA held that the manner in which the interview had been presented essentially exonerated the defendant in the proceedings. The CRTA found that the broadcasting of such information violated paragraph 10 of part II of appendix VIII of the Regulations. Further, the CRTA pointed out that during the interview the interviewee had claimed that the investigating authorities had used her to put pressure on the arrested man to give them information. However, the views of authorities involved had not been stated, in violation of Regulation 24(1)(a), and no mention had been made in the interview of any attempts by the applicant to secure them.
(vii)  Case no. 108/2001(3) 28.  In another news bulletin “Sigma TV” broadcast a news report concerning a car accident, as well as a trailer for the report. The CRTA considered that the report contained an inappropriate and unnecessary description of the circumstances of the accident. In particular the CRTA held that the applicant had not shown due respect for the personality, honour, reputation and privacy of the female driver of the car involved in the accident as it had overstepped the bounds of information and transmitted unnecessary details, comments and conclusions about the accident, in violation of Regulation 21(3). In addition, the CRTA found that remarks had been made in the news report that were an insult to the personality, the reputation and the privacy of the driver, in violation of section 26(1)(e) of the Law, and that a clear distinction had not been drawn between fact, comment and speculation, in violation of paragraph 1(2) of part II of appendix VIII of the Regulations. In respect of the above, the CRTA, noted inter alia, that it had been stated in the news report that a young lady had been found injured and half-naked in the driver’s seat wearing only underwear on the lower part of her body, that eye-witnesses had claimed that they had seen two young men, fleeing from the accident scene and heading towards the fields and that two doors of the young woman’s car, and more specifically the front passenger door and the rear door, were open. The CRTA further pointed out that the information given in the report, which included video footage of the cars involved in the accident and reference to the place and time the accident occurred, had been sufficient to enable recognition, in particular, of the identity of the female driver. In its submissions before the CRTA, the applicant claimed that there was only a slender possibility of recognising the persons involved. In reaching its decision, the CRTA also took into account the unpleasant consequences the report had had on the driver’s personal, family and social life, and that the persons involved in the case had not been public figures or public officials and the publication of information concerning their private lives had not served the public interest.
(d)  Films, series, programmes and trailers [CRTA cases nos. 88/2000(3), 117/2000(3), 141/2000(3), 1/2001(12), 13/2001(3), 125/2001(3), 133/2001(3), 143/2001(3) and 5/2002(3)]
(i)  Violent scenes [CRTA cases nos. 88/2000(3), 141/2000(3), 13/2001(3), 125/2001(3), 133/2001(3), 143/2001(3) and 5/2002(3)] 29.  The CRTA found in a number of cases that the applicant had breached the provisions of the Law and/or the Regulations by broadcasting on “Sigma TV”, within or partly within family viewing hours, certain films and series and trailers thereof which included scenes of violence unsuitable for children. The CRTA held that the scenes in question were likely to impair the physical, mental or moral development of minors, in violation of Regulation 32(3)(a). In one of the cases the CRTA found that the film in question contained scenes of humiliation and cruel treatment, in violation of regulation 32(2) (a rape scene). Furthermore, the CRTA found in these cases either that the viewers had not been informed of the true content of the programmes as the acoustic and visual warnings given did not correspond to their content, in violation of Regulation 21(5) and (b), with a rating of “15” and “18” had been shown during the family zone, in violation of Regulation 22(2) (see paragraph 90 below). The CRTA held that the applicant had not ensured that programmes transmitted during the family zone had been suitable for all ages, in violation of Regulation 21(6). 30.  The applicant admitted the violations in two of the cases. 31.  In its decisions concerning cases nos. 125/2001(3), 133/2001(3), 143/2001(3) and 5/2002(3) the CRTA noted, inter alia, that the content of all broadcasts during the family zone had to be suitable for the whole family. It stressed that the protection of minors was the primary concern of everyone, including the European Community and the Council of Europe, and that the Cypriot legislator had set limitations as to the content of programmes which could be transmitted for family viewing in order to protect children from programmes that were unsuitable for them because they contained violent or erotic scenes, or verbal material or subject matter unsuitable for minors. The CRTA pointed out that it attached great weight to the above matters and to compliance with the relevant legal provisions.
(ii)  Offensive remarks and inappropriate language [CRTA case nos. 117/2000(3) and 1/2001(12] 32.  In case no. 117/2000(3), following a complaint, the CRTA found, in respect of an episode of an entertainment series, “Prison Bars” (“Tis Filakis ta Sidera”) produced and broadcast by “Sigma TV”, (i)  that it included offensive remarks for various social groups which did not comply with the generally accepted rules of decency and good taste in language and behaviour, in violation of Regulation 21(4); (ii)  that the applicant had not ensured that the honour, the reputation and the professional and social lives of people as individuals or as members of a specific group (in particular, the residents of the towns of Paphos and Limassol, Arabs, Russian women and women in general) were respected, in violation of Regulation 21(3); and (iii)  that the programme contained offensive material for the dignity of both genders, in violation of Regulation 26(l). The CRTA noted that in the episode in question it had been stated in the context of a dialogue between characters of the series, inter alia, that “according to recent excavations in Paphos, it was probable that the town had a lot of brothels, not for the locals, of course, but for foreigners”, “during the 50’s, 60’s and part of the 70’s most of the whores were from the town of Paphos”, “in the old times, in Limassol it was all Arabs, phoenicians, houllou, ya habibi, all of them. Most of them were darker than chocolate and some of them were very snobbish”, “the town of Paphos was a whores’ town, with thousands of whores. All of them Greek (“καλαμαρούδες”), which we imported then, like we import Russian women nowadays”. The CRTA noted that following the broadcast of the episode a Paphos newspaper had criticised the series as being crudely offensive to people from Paphos and completely unacceptable. The repeated violations by the applicant in other episodes of the same series were taken into account when imposing the fine. 33.  In case no. 1/2001(12) the CRTA found that “Radio Proto” had broadcast a programme containing inappropriate language unsuitable for minors. More specifically, it noted that the presenters had used sexually explicit Greek slang. The CRTA found that the programme contained remarks that did not comply with the generally accepted rules of decency and good taste in language and behaviour, in violation of Regulation 21(4) and that the applicant had failed, in violation of Regulation 21(6), to ensure that the programme, transmitted during family listening hours, was suitable for children.
(e)  “Social documentaries” [CRTA cases nos. 10/2001(3), 11/2001(3) and 60/2001(3)]
(i)  Documentary about drug use 34.  In cases nos. 10/2001(3) and 11(2001)(3) the CRTA found that during the family zone “Sigma TV” had broadcast and shown a repeat of a “social documentary” concerning the drug problem in Cyprus, as well as a trailer for the programme, containing visual and audio material unsuitable for children under the age of fifteen, in violation of Regulation 21(6), and which could seriously impair the physical mental or moral development of minors, in violation of Regulation 32(3)(a). In particular, the programme included scenes showing, inter alia, the consumption and trading of illegal drugs and statements made by drug addicts concerning the consumption of drugs. Moreover, the CRTA held that the trailer for the documentary contained visual and audio material that might offend the sensitivity of viewers, in violation of Regulation 24(2)(d). It further found that the visual and acoustic warning that had been given did not correspond to the actual content of the trailer and documentary, in violation of Regulations 21 (5) and 22, and that information transmitted about one of the drug addicts had not shown the appropriate sensitivity towards human suffering, in violation of paragraph 8(2) of part I of appendix VIII of the Regulations. 35.  The CRTA also noted that the personal information concerning the drug addicts in the documentary had been broadcast without due respect for their personality, honour, reputation and private lives, in violation of Regulation 21(3). For example, the identity of a caller, a light drug user, had been displayed on screen, despite his wish to remain anonymous. The CRTA considered that the drug addicts who had participated in the programme did not appear to have been fully aware of their actions, and that their free consent and decision should therefore not have been taken into full account because they had been in a state of despair, vulnerable and under the influence of strong substances that had affected their judgment. In any event, the disclosure of their identity, the media exposure and the extensive coverage of their private lives was likely to have numerous negative consequences for them. The CRTA stated that it was also concerned about the personalisation of the drug problem through the disclosure of the identity of certain drug addicts, as this might lead to their becoming role models or even “heroes” for vulnerable people who would like to identify with them. According to the CRTA the documentary had also lacked objectivity and pluralism, as criticisms and negative comments had been made against the medical authorities, the police drug squad, the Minister of Health and the Director of a Psychiatric Clinic, without them having been given the opportunity to present their position on the matter, in violation of section 26(2) of the Law. 36.  The applicant argued before the CRTA that the social content of the documentary was of interest to families. It admitted that a mistake had been made with regard to the disclosure of the identity of one of the callers in question and informed the CRTA that measures had been taken to restore the name and honour of a nurse in respect of whom allegations had been made in the programme.
(ii)  Other documentary 37.  In case no. 60/2001(3) the CRTA found that a “social documentary” broadcast by “Sigma TV” had not been characterised by objectivity and pluralism, as opinions and allegations had been voiced against doctors and officials working in an institution that had a bone marrow bank, without a complete picture or opposing views being presented, in violation of section 26(2) of the Law. The CRTA considered that the discussion, the direction it had taken and the manner in which it had developed indicated that it had been orchestrated to favour the views of the presenter and, more broadly, the station’s views on the issues raised, to the disadvantage of participants with opposing views. 38.  By a letter dated 15 January 1999, the CRTA requested the applicant to pay the licence fee due for operating “Sigma TV” between 13 November 1998 and 31 January 1999, as required by section 24 of the Law. The fee amounted to 6,416.65 Cyprus pounds (CYP) for the period in question. The applicant paid the licence fee on 5 August 1999. 39.  The applicant brought separate recourses (appeals for judicial review) before the Supreme Court, seeking the annulment of twenty-five of the above decisions (recourses nos. 809/00, 299/01, 300/01, 301/01, 302/01, 303/01, 304/01, 348/01, 448/01, 912/01, 913/01, 914/01, 922/01, 966/01, 1097/01, 279/02, 328/02, 330/02, 331/02, 445/02, 663/02, 803/02, 815/02, 817/02 and 819/02)[5]. It further lodged a recourse challenging the licence fee requested by the CRTA for the period 13 November 1998 to 31 January 1999 (recourse no. 320/99)[6]. 40.  Although the recourses concerned different decisions of the CRTA, the applicant relied on the same main points, including the same constitutional issues. These may be summarised as follows:
(a)  The applicant alleged a breach of the rules of natural justice on the ground that in the proceedings the CRTA had acted in many capacities, namely, as prosecutor, investigator-witness and, at the same time, judge. The CRTA had then imposed fines, which were paid into its own Fund.
(b)  The applicant claimed that the applicable Law, and by extension the Regulations, were contrary to the Constitution. In this respect it alleged a breach of Articles 12, 19, 25, 26, 28 and 35 of the Constitution. The main body of its arguments, however, was based on Articles 12 and 19 of the Constitution and, in particular, on the imposition of pecuniary sanctions/fines by an administrative body and the exercise of regulatory authority under Article 19 by a public authority other than the State itself. The applicant also argued that the applicable Law interfered with its right to enter into contracts freely with producers and directors (Article 26). Further, in recourse no. 320/99 the applicant alleged a violation of Article 23 of the Constitution and complained of discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation (“CyBC”), which was not burdened with the same charges.
(c)  The applicant raised a number of points concerning the interpretation of the relevant legal provisions relating to the imposition of sanctions for the infringement of the Regulations.
(d)  Lastly, the applicant challenged the decisions of the CRTA on a number of other grounds, claiming, for example, that the procedure had not been followed in accordance with the law because there had been no proper inquiry, and insufficient reasoning had been given. 41.  In view of the fact that issues as to constitutionality, natural justice and the interpretation of the provisions of the applicable Law were raised in all the recourses and because of their significance, the Supreme Court decided that they should be heard in priority, together and by the Full Bench (that is, all thirteen judges of the Supreme Court). 42.  The hearing took place on 5 November 2003. Judgment was then reserved. 43.  On 10 February 2004 the applicant applied for the reopening of the hearing of the recourses for the purpose, firstly, of submitting further arguments concerning its claim for the annulment of the decisions in question in the light of the Court’s judgment in the case of Kyprianou v. Cyprus (no. 73797/01, 27 January 2004)[7] and, secondly, in order to request the exclusion of one of the judges from the bench on the ground that he had given a first-instance judgment, following reservation of the judgment by the Full Bench, in another recourse brought by the applicant raising similar issues[8]. 44.  On 24 February 2004 the Supreme Court dismissed the application. The court first noted that in accordance with its settled case-law it could order the reopening of a recourse or an appeal only in exceptional cases and, in particular, only where it decided that it was necessary in the interest of justice in the light of facts which came to light after judgment had been reserved. In the present case no new fact had been put forward which could justify the re-opening of the recourses. A new fact might be an event which touched on the elements which composed the dispute. The putting forward of further arguments with reference to jurisprudence subsequent to the reservation of the judgment was not such an event. With regard to the request for the exclusion of one of the judges, the Supreme Court held that in accordance with its settled case-law the solution of a legal question at first instance or on appeal did not exclude the participation of a judge in the composition of the court who had heard the same, or a similar or closely related legal question in the context of other proceedings. The Supreme Court therefore concluded, unanimously, that no reason had been shown which could justify contemplating reopening the hearing in cases before it in which its judgment had already been reserved. 45.  On the same date, the Supreme Court gave judgment dismissing, by a majority (11 to 2), twenty-four of the twenty-six recourses. The CRTA’s decisions challenged in recourses nos. 809/00 and 304/01 were annulled. 46.  First of all, with regard to the joining of the recourses, the Supreme Court noted:
“Matters which were put forward in a number of recourses against decisions of the Radio and Television Authority of Cyprus, in compliance with the Radio and Television Stations Law of 1998 (Law 7(1)/98, as amended), were examined at first instance by different judges, the result in each case being a dismissal. Appeals were filed which because of similarity we finally fixed to be heard together. In their course before the Court it was ascertained that many recourses on similar matters of constitutionality, natural justice and interpretation of provisions of the Law were pending and were ready for hearing. Whereupon, because of their significance, it was decided that the proper course was that they should be heard, in priority, by the Full Bench of the Court since in the Revisionary Appeals the participation of all judges would be impossible. Therefore the list was prepared of the 26 recourses heard together to which this judgment relates.” 47.  The Supreme Court then noted that, with the exception of recourse 320/99, which concerned the payment of a licence fee under section 24 of the Law, the disputed CRTA decision in each recourse had found the applicants[9] guilty of infringement of one or more provisions of the Law and/or the Regulations. After referring to the relevant legal provisions and Regulations, the Supreme Court proceeded to divide the issues that arose in the recourses into (a)  general matters which broke down into three groups, and (b)  specific matters. The relevant excerpt of the Supreme Court’s judgment reads as follows:
“The more general matters are classified in three groups. The first includes matters of interpretation of provisions which relate to the imposition of sanctions for the infringement of regulations. It is the case of the applicants that section 3(2)(f) of the Law, whereby power is conferred on the Authority to impose sanctions/penalties as the applicants describe them, restricts that power solely to cases where there is an infringement of the Law itself and the terms of the operating licence and not of the Regulations “... which cannot by themselves (outside the authority of the Law) define infringements and sanctions”. In this connection reference is made to section 51(2)(n) of the Law – which confers authority to issue Regulations – as well as to relevant provisions of the Regulations.
The second group concerns matters of natural justice. It is argued that in the proceedings which resulted in the imposition of a fine the necessary distinction of roles did not exist, with the result that the Authority was all at once prosecutor, investigator-witness and at the same time judge. It is added that the possibility of ex proprio motu examination conferred by section 3(1)(c) of the Law intensifies the objection. Furthermore, according to the applicants, the Authority cannot be regarded as impartial because it has an economic interest since, according to section 38(1)(d) of the Law, the fine is deposited in its own Fund.
In the third group there are matters which concern the constitutionality of the Law, and by extension the Regulations which were issued in accordance with the Law. It is submitted that the following provisions of the Constitution are violated: (a) Article 19, by which the right to freedom of speech and expression in any form is safeguarded; (b) Article 12.2, in accordance with which a person cannot be tried or punished twice for the same offence – but for one exception which does not apply here; (c) Article 26, which refers to the right to enter into a contract; (d) Article 24, which refers to taxation; (e) Article 25, which refers to the right to employment, inter alia; (f) Article 28, which refers to equality, and (g) as regards Recourse No. 320/99, Article 23, which refers to property.
In the recourses, in addition to these more general matters of great importance, other, more specific matters are also raised, connected to the particularity of each case, namely (a) whether the procedure was carried out in accordance with the law, (b) whether a proper enquiry was conducted and (c) whether the decision was reasoned.” 48.  Before examining the above issues, the Supreme Court dealt with and dismissed various additional points raised by the applicant in some of the recourses, concerning, inter alia, the composition of the CRTA. 49.  In relation to the matters of natural justice, proper enquiry and reasoning, the Supreme Court considered it useful to refer to specific instances, so that the procedural course common to most of the recourses and the manner in which the CRTA dealt with the violations was indicatively outlined. It took recourse no. 913/01, the first of the three recourses, which, after agreement between counsel, formed the basis of the discussion before it. The Supreme Court noted that in that case, as in those at issue in sixteen other recourses, the CRTA had acted following a complaint, whereas in eight other cases it had acted ex proprio motu when the respective programmes had come to its notice. However, it distinguished recourse no. 320/99, which did not concern a violation, and recourse no. 304/01, in which a different procedure had been followed. 50.  It also held, in respect of recourses nos. 809/00 and 304/01, that the procedure provided for in the relevant Regulations had not been complied with by the CRTA, and had therefore been defective. It accordingly found that the CRTA decisions challenged in these two recourses lacked the necessary legal basis. 51.  The Supreme Court proceeded to look at the procedure followed by the CRTA, the proceedings before it and its decision in case no. 11/2001(3) challenged by recourse no. 913/01. 52.  It then examined the specific matters and the general matters raised by the applicant in the recourses. With regard to the specific matters, it held as follows:
“With regard to the question of proper enquiry, with the exception of the two recourses which we have mentioned – nos. 809/00 and 304/01 – we have not ascertained a vacuum. On the contrary, it seems to us that the enquiry covered everything, indeed in detail. In some of the recourses the applicants submitted, in this connection, that a legal problem arose because the investigating official who conducted the enquiry put a second report before the Authority, whereas he should have submitted only one. They invoked Reg. 42(5) which provides that “the official states his conclusion to the Authority fully reasoned ...”. However, the second document contained no material as regards the alleged violations other than that which had already been brought to the notice of the applicants. He simply unified it for the convenience of the Authority. We do not consider this reprehensible. With regard to the question of reasoning, it seems to us that in each case, including those concerning the suitability of programmes or the definition of meanings – such as toy or game, surreptitious advertising, close-ups – adequate explanation was given to the applicants both as to the finding of the official (who conducted the enquiry) and as to the conclusions of the Authority, which, in our view, were all the result of a correct interpretative approach to the relevant provisions and reasonably arrived at, coming within the recognised boundaries of the essential appraisal of the administration, and in some cases, indeed, also unavoidable.” 53.  With regard to the general matters, it held as follows:
“The first group
Section 3(2)(f) of the Law provides that the Authority has the power to:
... [provision set out]
We observe that while in the first part of the provision the legal basis of the violations for which sanctions are imposed is analysed on four legal grounds, in the part where the sanctions are set out, after the last one – which is the administrative fine – the violation is related not to the four legal grounds but only to two, namely the Law and the terms of the licence. In our opinion this is merely a drafting inadequacy which in this case does not subtract from the clear meaning of the provision which, interpreted in its entirety, leaves no doubt about the uniform range of the sanctions in all the violations.
Section 51(2)(n) to which the applicants referred confers power to issue Regulations ...
...
Counsel for the applicants suggested that in the abovementioned Section 51(2)(n) in the phrase “of (the) Law and the Regulations ...” the “and” is conjunctive, with the result that a violation of both the Law and the Regulations is required as a precondition for the imposition of a fine. We are of the contrary opinion. By the word “and” the whole is defined without the independence of the parts being affected. The “and” functions essentially as a disjunction. We note also Regulation 42(10), issued in consequence, by which it is provided that the Authority may impose “any of the sanctions which are provided by the Law” when it considers, in a procedure by virtue of Part III of the Law, that “the provisions of the Law and the Regulations” were not complied with. There again we see a reference to the Regulations as a legal basis for the imposition of sanctions.
The second group
We do not share the view that the stipulated procedure, which the Authority pursued, is in conflict with the rules of natural justice, which require (a) that the judge be impartial and (b) that the person judged be afforded the opportunity to be heard. We firstly note their embodiment in Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which was ratified by Cyprus by Law No. 39/62, and the essential reproduction of that provision in Article 30.2 of the Constitution. The relevant jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) was not invoked during the discussion of the recourses. This is explained, however, by the inherent difficulty in the evaluation of the factors on the basis of which the classification is made, since in the variform sphere of activity of the administrative organs it is sometimes difficult to decide, firstly, whether the case falls within article 6(1) of the European Convention and secondly, if it does, whether its provisions have been complied with. With regard to the first decision, bearing in mind the tendency of the ECHR to lay emphasis on rights under private law as opposed to factors of public law, which means beneficial interpretation in favour of the citizens, we are of the view that we must approach the recourses before us on the basis of the right to impartiality. This granted, we proceed to examine whether the procedure fulfilled the safeguards of impartiality. In our opinion the affirmative answer is justified. It appears to us that in all the cases, without exception, there has been a satisfactory distinction between the various stages, which consisted in the collection of the facts, their preliminary examination, the briefing of the applicants in relation to these, affording them the right to be heard, in writing or orally, and the final adjudication. The fact that according to section 38(1)(d) of the Law “... income which accrues from the imposition of administrative fines on the stations ...” is deposited with the Authority is not, in our view, inconsistent with impartiality. No private or personal financial interest is involved. The Authority, as a legal person under public law, acts impersonally to further the purposes of the Law. According to the same provision, other income also is deposited with the Authority, including fees from the grant of licences, the examination of applications, etc., as well as the State grant, which, in any event, ensures the financial sufficiency of the Authority so that it may carry out its work of particular significance in contemporary society.
Everything we have mentioned on the subject takes into account the fact that it is the procedure of an administrative organ and not a judicial one. Article 6 (1) of the European Convention refers to a procedure before a court. What is needed in cases where decisions determining civil rights and obligations are issued by administrative organs is the possibility of access to a court to challenge the administrative decision: see Albert and Le Compte v. Belgium Series A Vol. 58 (1983). Where such possibility is offered, then the extent of the jurisdiction of the Court acquires significance. In cases concerning decisions by professional disciplinary bodies the ECHR has considered full jurisdiction of the National Court indispensable in relation to both factual and legal matters. Certain decisions of state administrative organs were approached in the same manner later, whereas in other decisions which, as it was held, belonged to a domain where the need for recognition of the state authority in the determination of policy ought to prevail, it was decided that judicial review was sufficient. Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick deal with this aspect in their work “Law of the European Convention on Human Rights” (1995) page 194. We quote the following passages which have as a point of reference the judgment of the ECHR in the case of Zumtobel v. Austria, Series A Vol. 268 (1993):
“A problem with the application of Article 6 to administrative decision-making is that in some areas there are policy considerations that suggest that the final decision on the merits should rest with the executive, rather than a court, despite the impact upon an individual΄s civil rights and obligations that the decision may have. Decisions concerning the expropriation of land for a road or for public housing are obvious cases where this can be argued. Whereas the Court΄s jurisprudence concerning decisions on such matters as the disciplining of doctors, access to children and the dismissal of employees require a right of appeal to a tribunal with ΄full jurisdiction’, it is noticeable that in the Zumtobel case, concerning expropriation, the Court stated that Article 6 was complied with, regard being had, inter alia, ‘to the respect which must be accorded to decisions taken by the administrative authorities on the grounds of expediency’... The Zumtobel case was interpreted in this sense in Ikscon v. UK ...The only judicial remedy then available to the applicant in respect of the resulting interference with their property rights was recourse to the English High Court ‘on a point of law’; the High Court did not have a full right of appeal on the law and the facts. The Commission held that this limitation on the High Court΄s jurisdiction did not infringe Article 6. The applicant society had appealed to the High Court and had been able to put and have considered by the Court all of the arguments that it wished to make. Rejecting the applicant΄s, argument that the High Court had lacked the ‘full jurisdiction’ that Article 6 required, the Commission stated that it is ‘not the role of Article 6 to give access to a level of jurisdiction which can substitute its opinion for that of the administrative authorities on questions of expediency and where the courts do not refuse to examine any of the points raised’.”
We are of the view that in the case where the infringement of the regulatory provisions of the law is examined in the particularly sensitive and significant domain of radio and television, the decision in matters which by their nature may be characterised by subtle nuances and many gradations is justifiably left, as a matter of state policy, to a special independent Public Authority. We are of the view that the judicial review provided for in our system is adequate. We do not, therefore, discern a violation of the rules of natural justice which are embodied in Article 6 (1) of the European Convention and Article 30.2 of the Constitution.
The third group
With regard to Article 19 of the Constitution, the matter of constitutionality that is raised is centred on the position that the power conferred on the Republic, on the basis of paragraph 5, to require an operating licence in the field of radio and television broadcasting and cinema, comes within and is not outside everything included in paragraph 3 as regards the boundaries of the fundamental right to which paragraphs 1 and 2 refer.
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According to the applicants, since paragraph 5 is subject to paragraph 3, the obligations which are imposed by the operating licence cannot depend on the judgment of the Administrative Authority. They arise only with reference to all that paragraph 3 subtracts from the fundamental right of paragraphs 1 and 2. Where a difference appears in relation to the observance of the limits, the matter is decided by the court. They add, with reference to paragraph 5, that the power to require a licence belongs to the Republic itself and cannot be transferred to a legal person of public law, such as the Radio and Television Authority. Their basic position however has as its core paragraph 3 and more specifically the part of it which refers to “... penalties prescribed by law ...”. “Penalties”, according to the applicants, are only sanctions which are imposed by a criminal Court. And since – they continue – the sanctions under consideration for violation of the Law and the Regulations can be viewed only by reference to the said part of paragraph 3, the entrusting of their imposition to an administrative organ is not conceivable.
In relation to the meaning of “penalty”, learned counsel for the applicants referred to Article 12 of the Constitution, where reference is made to “penalty” in the context of criminal liability. He also referred to Articles 150 and 162 of the Constitution by which the power of imposing punishment for contempt is conferred on the court. The advocate contrasted the administrative fine which, according to his suggestion, “... is only the specific sum fixed by the Law, as an automatic consequence (without an administrative procedure and decision taken in accordance with any free discretionary power of the administrative organ).” He referred in this connection to the case Director of Social Security v. Georgiades (1988) 2 Α.Α.Δ. 74, which concerned delays in the payment of social security contributions. The advocate also referred to the judgment of the Full Bench in The Republic v. Demand Shipping Co. Ltd. (1994) 3 Α.Α.Δ. 460, which he characterised as another example of the automatic imposition of sanctions by law. At the same time, however, he suggested that if the decision in Demand Shipping Co. Ltd. cannot be viewed in this way, then the deviation from its reasoning is justified.
In relation to Article 12 a matter was raised from another angle as well, namely that of dual liability, disciplinary and criminal. In paragraph 2 of Article 12 it is stated that:
The position of the applicants on this is summarised in that while section 3(2) (f) of the Law, which is the basic provision from which the challenged decisions arise, provides for administrative sanctions for various violations, section 48(6) nevertheless establishes parallel criminal liability.
In the written addresses the advocate expressed criticism in relation to the said established system and raised a query with regard to how the Authority chooses one procedure or the other, and also about the consequences. This aspect, however, was not raised in the legal points of the recourses and cannot occupy us. We observe, in any case, from the standpoint of more general classification, that while the parallel criminalisation creates disharmony from which problems could arise, the characterisation of the cases as administrative is nevertheless not reversed. It is not necessary for us to go into the potential problems.
We consider that, subject to the scope of the exercise of the power conferred by paragraph 5 of Article 19 for the regulation of radio and television broadcasting, the said power comes within the boundaries of paragraph 3 and cannot exceed them.” 54.  The Supreme Court then referred, in connection with the third group of issues raised, to Article 10 of the Convention in the context of the regulation of radio and television broadcasting, with particular emphasis on the Court’s judgments in the cases of Informationsverein Lentia and Others v. Austria, 24 November 1993, § 42, Series A no. 276, and Vgt Verein gegen Tierfabriken v. Switzerland, no. 24699/94, ECHR 2001‑VI. It further referred to relevant European Community legislation and case-law, namely the 8th recital of the preamble of Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 on the coordination of certain provisions laid down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States concerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities – specifically advertising, sponsors and telemarketing and the judgment of the European Court of Justice in RTL Television GmbH v. Niedersächsische Landesmedienanstalt für privaten Rundfunk, Case C-245/01, 23 October 2003. 55.  It went on to hold as follows:
“... we do not share the opinion of the applicants that the supervisory prevalence of paragraph 3 of Article 19 over paragraph 5 excludes administrative sanctions for infringements of provisions in consequence of arrangements made on the basis of paragraph 5. By the Radio and Television Stations Law of 1998 and the Regulations issued in accordance with it, the domain to which paragraph 5 refers is regulated in a manner which in our opinion is not in conflict with paragraph 3. Because even if it is identified with the criminal meaning of Article 12 or the quasi-criminal meaning of Articles 150 and 162, the sanctions which are provided for by the Law and Regulations in question are related not to the possibility of penalties provided for in paragraph 3 but to non-compliance with the provisions of the Law and the Regulations, which constitute the basis for the issue of the broadcasting licence. And these provisions are in harmony with what paragraph 3 permits as terms and restrictions of the right to freedom of speech and expression in any form, with reference inter alia to the protection of the rights of others as well, as it was said also in RTL Television GmbH (supra).
As to the meaning of administrative sanctions, the case of Demand Shipping Co. Ltd. (supra), like the cases before us, shows clearly the latitude with which it is viewed. It is not confined to the financial charge which is automatically imposed by the Law for non-fulfilment of the stipulated obligation. In Demand Shipping Co. Ltd. (supra) as in the cases before us, a decision was issued by the competent Authority whereby a violation was found in relation to which the fine was imposed: an “administrative penalty” as the full bench described it there. We see no reason for divergence from that approach.
Nor do we share the view of the applicants that the regulatory powers conferred on the Republic by paragraph 5 of Article 19 cannot be exercised on behalf of the State by a public Authority established by Law. On the contrary, we are of the opinion that the role of the State is expressed more effectively and more objectively through such an Authority than through a government service. The same was done in Greece in 1989 with the establishment of the National Council of Radio and Television before Article 15.2 of the Greek Constitution was amended in 2001.
With reference to Article 26 of the Constitution, the position of the applicants, as their learned counsel explained in the written submissions, is basically as follows:
“Law 7(1)/98 is an unconstitutional intervention there where the applicants carry out their work, in the course of which they are entitled to deal freely (Article 26 of the Constitution) with producers and directors who provide information, familiarisation, entertainment through television to any television viewer who may watch their programme – free of charge –, with the obligation of course NOT to violate any of the “benefits” which Article 19(3) of the Constitution listed specifically, which alone could restrict the right to freedom of information.
It is, we believe, obvious that this position does not extend beyond what has been put forward in relation to Article 19, and in particular as regards the relationship between paragraphs 3 and 5. This we have already decided. The same is also valid for Article 25 (Employment), which has been included in the formulation of certain arguments. Article 26 (Equality) was argued in particular in recourse No. 320/99 in connection on the one hand with the said Articles 25 and 26 and on the other hand with Articles 23 (Property) and 24 (Taxation). However the same discussion has been included to some extent in other recourses also.” 56.  Finally, with regard to recourse no. 320/99, the Supreme Court examined the applicant’s arguments concerning differential treatment vis-à-vis the CyBC. The Supreme Court held as follows:
“The applicants complain that the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation, which is a State institution, is not burdened with the same charges and furthermore that it is supported financially. They present the charges as an unacceptable deprivation of property, as the imposition of tax and as an interference with their work and the contracts they enter into. We do not discern any unconstitutionality in the imposition of charges. Obviously this is not taxation. Next, objection to the co-existence of a public television station and private ones may not in principle be put forward since the right which is safeguarded by Article 19 may be promoted more fully and more effectively by this co-existence. In Antenna T.V. Ltd and another v. 1.The Electricity Authority of Cyprus and 2. Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation, A.E. 28th November 2002, the Full Bench, by the judgment of Kallis J., said the following in this connection:
“We therefore hold that the existence and operation in our country of public radio and television, which does not aim at profit, constitutes a form of indirect state control which also aims at guaranteeing the objectivity of private radio and television. Such a guarantee serves the public interest. Therefore the existence and operation of the CyBC., which is a public utility, serves the public interest. And as stated in the preamble of Law 14/79, the operation of the CyBC. fulfils an essential social function in the contemporary state. Consequently we hold that the need to secure income which will ensure its viability continues to exist even after the enactment of Law 120/90.”
Public and private radio and television differ in their nature and mission. This justifies different arrangements for each case concerning the viability and the adequacy of their operation and also the financial needs of the independent Authority which the Law established to safeguard the right referred to in Article 19 of the Constitution.” 57.  In conclusion, the Supreme Court held that recourses nos. 809/00 and 304/01 were successful and annulled the corresponding CRTA decisions on the basis of Article 146 (4)(b) of the Constitution. The remaining recourses were however dismissed and the respective CRTA decisions were upheld on the basis of Article 146 (4)(a) of the Constitution. 58.  Two judges delivered dissenting opinions in which they focused on the applicant’s arguments concerning the impartiality of the CRTA in view of the different capacities in which it acted in the proceedings. The judges expressed the view that in the circumstances the disputed procedure violated Article 30 of the Constitution and Article 6 of the Convention and consequently should be annulled. In their opinion, the cumulative result of the convergence of so many different competences by the CRTA and especially the fact that the imposed fine was collected by the authority itself, might reasonably create doubts about its independence and impartiality. They noted that the whole climate was aggravated as the CRTA’s decision was liable to nullification procedure without the right to dispute the substance. The recourse under Article 146 of the Constitution had only a nullifying character and the Supreme Court could not go into the essence of the case. For example, it could not examine the amount of the fine in terms of proportionality. The dissenting judges stressed, however, that the above conclusions had no bearing on the constitutionality of administrative fines. 59.  Following the judgment, the applicant was reimbursed the sums it had paid in fines on the basis of the decisions in cases nos. 18/2000(3) and 113/2000(3) which were annulled by the Supreme Court[10]. 60.  On 20 May 2002 the CRTA brought civil proceedings against the applicant before the Nicosia District Court seeking payment of the fines it imposed by three of its abovementioned twenty-seven decisions, namely the decisions in CRTA cases nos. 18/2000(3), 75/2000(3) and 88/2000(3) (civil actions nos. 5197/2002, 5187/2002 and 5188/2002). 61.  The applicant’s recourse concerning case no. 18/2000(3) was still pending before the Supreme Court at the time (recourse no. 809/2000) whilst its recourse against the decision in case no. 75/2000 (recourse no. 1622/00) had been dismissed by the Supreme Court on 16 July 2001 as the applicant had failed to file written observations. The applicant did not bring a recourse against the decision taken in case no. 88/2000(3). 62.  The applicant appeared and filed its defence in the actions on 27 May 2002. In its submissions the applicant raised pre-trial objections alleging that the claims, and consequently the actions, were based on an unconstitutional law. According to the applicant the legal provisions for the imposition of the administrative fines in question were unconstitutional. Further, the applicant claimed that the CRTA had imposed penalties and not administrative fines and that the imposition of such penalties infringed the rules of natural justice and Article 12 of the Constitution as the plaintiffs had acted as prosecutors, witnesses and judges. 63.  On 1 August 2002 the CRTA filed three separate applications for summary judgments. 64.  On 21 October 2002 the applicant filed objections to these applications. It pleaded, amongst other things, that it had a good defence as (a) the dispensation of justice was complete only when the arguments of all the parties had been heard in toto; (b) the claims of the plaintiff were based on an unconstitutional law; (c) the legal provisions for the imposition of monetary penalties and the claims for the specific monetary penalties were based on an unconstitutional law; and (d) it was a penalty which was imposed on the appellants and not an administrative fine, in violation of the Constitution, which granted the power of imposing penalties only to the courts (Articles 12 and 19(3) of the Constitution). The applicant’s objections were accompanied by affidavits from one of its directors stating, inter alia, that the matter of the constitutionality of the relevant law was pending before the Supreme Court. 65.  The hearing of the applications for summary judgments took place on 29 January 2003. 66.  On 21 August 2003 the District Court gave judgment in favour of the CRTA[11]. 67.  The District Court, having set out the principles governing summary proceedings and having referred to the relevant Cypriot and English jurisprudence, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff[12] had satisfied all three conditions set by Order 18 r. 1 of the civil procedure rules. Consequently, the burden of proof shifted to the defendant to put before the court such facts as would show that it was right and just to allow it to put forward its defence. It therefore proceeded to examine the main points raised by the applicant. 68.  The District Court analysed the remit of the CRTA under section 3(2) of the Law by which it had been established and made reference to the relevant Regulations. Referring to the relevant case-law, the court emphasised that the decisions of the CRTA by which administrative fines had been imposed on the applicant were executory administrative acts which produced legal results until their annulment by the Supreme Court. Consequently, the fact that a recourse was pending before the Supreme Court did not constitute a good defence for an action for the collection of a pecuniary fine imposed by an administrative decision. The court also made reference to a number of first-instance judgments of the Supreme Court in recourses brought by the applicant against certain decisions of the CRTA in which the applicant’s allegations as to a breach of the rules of natural justice and the unconstitutionality of the Law had been rejected. In conclusion, the District Court decided, on the basis of the material relied upon by the applicant, that an arguable defence had not been made out.
(b)  Appeal proceedings before the Supreme Court 69.  On 2 September 2003 the applicant lodged appeals before the Supreme Court against the first-instance judgments (civil appeals nos. 11803, 11804 and 11805[13]). 70.  The applicant claimed, inter alia, that it had been deprived of the right to a fair trial in violation of Articles 30 and 35 of the Constitution given, firstly, that the first-instance judgments had been given on the basis of Order 18 r. 1 (a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which circumvented its constitutional right to have recourse to a court and to present its defence in full, and secondly, that the first-instance court had wrongly decided that the applicant did not have a good defence despite the fact that matters concerning the constitutionality of Law 7(1)/98 were pending before the Supreme Court. 71.  On 18 March 2005 the Supreme Court gave judgment dismissing the appeals. It concluded as follows:
“(a) The procedure for the issuance of a summary judgment which is provided for by Order 18 of the Rules of Civil Procedure secures the right to a fair trial and provides sufficient guarantee to the parties for the presentation of their case within a settled framework. In this connection, we observe that, according to the jurisprudence, only in cases where the defendant fails to show that he has an arguable defence is summary judgment given against him.
(b) The decisions of the respondents[14] were for the imposition of administrative fines on the appellants by virtue of Law 7(1)/98 and constitute executory administrative acts, the legality of which may only be disputed according to Article 146 of the Constitution by recourse before the Supreme Court. Until an administrative act is annulled it remains in force and produces legal results. In this case the administrative acts were not annulled.
(c) The monetary claims of the appellants, in the aforementioned actions, were based completely on the aforementioned administrative acts. The appellants did not succeed in showing in sufficient detail, as they should have (since the respondents had satisfied the conditions of Order18), that they had an arguable defence.
(d) With reference to the constitutionality of Law 7(1)/98 we observe that every law is presumed to be constitutional until the opposite is proved. This law has not been judged unconstitutional.
We consider the decisions of the Court of First Instance to be correct and the grounds of appeal unfounded. The respondents satisfied the conditions of Order 18 of the Rules of Civil Procedure while the appellants failed to show that they had a good defence against the claims or to put before the Court such facts which would show that it was right and just to allow them to put forward their defence. Correctly, also, the Court of First Instance did not take into consideration the defence statements already filed by the appellants since in applications for summary judgment the facts which are taken into consideration are those which are set out, in the correct procedural form, in the application and the objection and the affidavits which accompany them. The filing of a defence by a defendant cannot deprive the plaintiff of his right to submit an application for summary judgment, in the appropriate case, as was this one.”