5.  The applicant was born in 1926 and at the material time lived in Limassol. She died on 23 December 2004. 6.  The deceased applicant was the owner (half-a-share) of a plot of land with a house on it in the village of Pelendri in the district of Limassol. The said house was the applicant's home. 7.  By letter dated 22 May 1997 the applicant's lawyer at the time informed the Minister of Communications and Works that the applicant had found out, by chance, that the works planned to take place in her village would entail the compulsory acquisition of her house and its demolition. He further noted that the authorities had been misinformed that no one had been living in the house. He emphasised that the applicant would not consent to the loss of her home and would challenge any administrative act for its compulsory acquisition. 8.  On 25 July 1997 a notice of compulsory acquisition of the applicant's property was published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Cyprus (administrative act no. 908). The compulsory acquisition was for the purpose of the construction, improvement, alignment and surfacing of a public road. The notice stated as follows:
“Notification is hereby given that the immovable property described in the Schedule set out below is essential for the following purpose of public benefit, namely for the creation and development of roads in the Republic and its compulsory acquisition is imperative for the following reasons, namely the construction, improvement, alignment and surfacing of the road.”
On the same day a requisition order was issued under the Requisition of Property Law of 1962 (as amended) and published in the Official Gazette (no. 930):
“Because the immovable property described in the Schedule set out below ... is essential for the following purposes of public benefit, namely for the creation and development of public roads in the Republic or for any of these purposes and its requisition is imperative for the following reasons, namely the construction, improvement, alignment and surfacing of the Pelendri main road”
The initial duration of the order was for one year. It was subsequently extended until 23 July 1999 by publication in the Official Gazette of 12 June 1998 and until 22 July 2000 by publication in the Official Gazette of 18 June 1999. 9.  By letter dated 29 July 1997 the applicant lodged an objection to the compulsory acquisition and requisition of her property with the Ministry of Communications and Works. 10.  The applicant's objection was dismissed and on 15 May 1998 a compulsory acquisition order issued under the Compulsory Acquisition Law 1962 (Law 15/1962 as amended) was published in the Official Gazette (no. 576). The order referred to the earlier notice of compulsory acquisition. 11.  On 14 July 1998 the applicant lodged a recourse before the Supreme Court (first instance administrative jurisdiction) seeking the annulment of the compulsory acquisition order. She claimed, inter alia, that the impugned administrative act would result in her forced displacement from her village and her ancestral roots. 12.  In a letter dated 17 February 1999 sent by the Limassol District Officer to the Director General of the Ministry of Communications and Works, the former stated that a plot of State land had been found in the applicant's village and that an exchange had been proposed to the applicant and her family on the basis of the valuations that would be carried out by the Land Registry concerning the value of the house and the plot in question. However, the applicant had demanded, despite the fact that the Land Registry's valuations had not yet been completed, that she should be granted two houses on State land of her preference and that she was not willing to withdraw her recourse before such houses or land of her preference were granted to her or, otherwise, before the costs and a period of six months were given to her for the construction of two new houses. In view of the circumstances the Limassol District Officer considered that there was no possibility of reaching a settlement. 13.  On 13 July 2000 the Supreme Court (first instance administrative jurisdiction) dismissed the recourse and upheld the lawfulness of the compulsory acquisition order. 14.  On 19 July 2000, whilst the applicant's right of appeal was still in force, the Public Works Department of the Ministry of Communication and Works demolished the applicant's house. 15.  On 7 August 2000 the applicant was offered the sum of 450 Cyprus pounds (CYP) as annual rent for the period from 25 July 1997 until 25 July 2000 as compensation for the requisition of her property. The Government submitted that no agreement had been reached between the applicant and the authorities concerning the compensation. 16.  On 23 August 2000 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court (revisional administrative jurisdiction) challenging the first instance judgment and the demolition of her house pending the expiration of her right to appeal. In her grounds of appeal she noted, inter alia, that the authorities had not taken possession of her property until 19 July 2000, namely, the day that they demolished her house and that following the expiry of the requisition order on 22 July 2000 no other requisition order had been issued. She further invoked Article 8 of the Convention. 17.  In the context of the appeal proceedings it emerged that, pending the first instance proceedings, the compulsory acquisition order (no. 930) and the preceding notification (no. 908) had been revoked by an order published in the Official Gazette of 20 August 1999 (no. 1004) on the ground, inter alia, that the acquisition of the applicant's property had not been necessary for the public benefit purposes stated in the initial notice of compulsory acquisition. In particular, the revocation order stated as follows:
“...
Whereas in accordance with the provisions of the Compulsory Acquisition Law, the compensation for the aforementioned acquisition was not paid or deposited.
Whereas the Acquiring Authority considers the immovable property which is described in the Schedule of this order which is part of the immovable property which is described in notice no. 908 as not required for the public benefit purposes which are referred to in notice no. 908.
For these reasons, the Minister of Communications and Works, exercising the powers granted to him by the Council of Ministers by section 7 of the Compulsory Acquisition Law ... with the present notification revokes notice no. 908/97 and order no. 567/98 in so far as they concern the immovable property described in the Schedule of this order”.
Both the parties and the first instance court had not been aware of this development at the material time. 18.  In a letter dated 6 November 2000 the Land Registry Department of the Minister of the Interior informed the then Attorney-General that the compulsory acquisition order of 15 May 1998 had been revoked because the relevant plans of the Land Registry did not correspond to the actual situation on the site. Furthermore, following the demolition, the applicant had refused the authorities' offers for a friendly settlement and had not replied to the offer made for the period the property was under the requisition order, i.e. from 25 July 1997 until 25 July 2000. In this connection the Land Registry noted that the applicant had sent letters of protest on 19 and 20 July 2000 to the Director of Public Works and the Minister of Interior respectively. Finally, the Land Registry requested advice with regard to the steps to be taken. In particular, it asked whether the Ministry should send an offer for the compulsory acquisition or whether a new compulsory acquisition order should be issued instead. 19.  Subsequently, in a letter dated 1 December 2000, by the Limassol District Engineer of Public Works to the Director of Public Works of the Ministry of Communications and Works, the following, inter alia, was stated:
“...
following your instructions we proceeded with the immediate demolition of the house on 19 and 20 July 2000 after repeated telephone conversations with the owner's son ...
Before the demolition process commenced we had a telephone conversation with the complainant's son and we once again mentioned the fact that we would proceed with the demolition of the house.
After this, once the house was opened up in the presence of the police, the Limassol District Officer, the Community Chairman and the Community Secretary of Pelendri village, all objects that were in the house were listed by all the abovementioned which were subsequently taken to a safe place and we proceeded to demolish the house”. 20.  On 18 May 2001 another order of requisition (no. 454) was published in the Official Gazette. On 19 April 2002 the period of requisition was extended until 17 May 2003 and then extended again on 3 April 2003 until 16 May 2004. 21.  In the meantime, on 30 April 2002 a new notice of compulsory acquisition of the applicant's property was published in the Official Gazette (no. 443). Subsequently, on 17 May 2002 an order of compulsory acquisition (no. 499) was published. 22.  On 29 May 2002 the applicant was offered the sum of CYP 12,500 as compensation for the compulsory acquisition of her property. The Government submitted that no agreement had been reached between the applicant and the authorities concerning the compensation. 23.  On 18 February 2003 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal (see paragraph 16 above). In particular, it held that the demolition could not be considered as “damage” connected to the compulsory acquisition order that had been revoked, since, as admitted also by the applicant, the demolition had been carried out after the revocation of that order and whilst the requisition order was still in force. The court noted that, in accordance with its jurisprudence, “damage” in this context should be a direct result of the contested act and not of another cause. Accordingly, the court concluded that no issue of “damage” arose and thus no further examination of the validity of the revoked compulsory acquisition order was justified. The court also pointed out that timely notification of the revocation, which had been the Government's responsibility, would have rendered further consideration of the recourse unnecessary and further, took into account the fact that the compulsory acquisition order had been revoked on the ground that the acquisition of the applicant's property was not necessary for the public benefit purposes stated in the initial notice of compulsory acquisition. The Supreme Court granted the costs of the proceedings, both first instance and appeal, in favour of the applicant. 24.  In the meantime, on 29 September 2002, following the demolition of her house, the applicant lodged a recourse before the Supreme Court (first instance administrative jurisdiction) challenging the lawfulness of the decision and/or order to demolish her house and the act of demolition. She invoked Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in this respect. 25.  On 26 March 2002 the Supreme Court dismissed the recourse. The court held that the act of demolition had not been an executory administrative act but the implementation of the administrative act of requisition. Furthermore, the court considered that there had not been a violation of the applicant's rights under Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention. In this respect it noted that under Article 23 (3) of the Constitution limitations to property, by law, were permissible on certain grounds. In the event of a lawful limitation on property, the above Article provided for just compensation which was determined, in the case of disagreement, by the civil courts. The right therefore of the applicant to compensation for the expropriated property was safeguarded. Furthermore the court considered that, in the event the Supreme Court upheld an appeal lodged by the applicant and annulled the compulsory acquisition order, she would be able to claim compensation for any damage suffered as a result of the administrative act under Article 146 (6) of the Constitution. 26.  On 7 May 2002 the applicant lodged an appeal before the Supreme Court (revisional administrative jurisdiction) against the first instance judgment. In her appeal grounds the applicant claimed, inter alia, that the demolition of her home violated her rights under Article 8 of the Convention and that the Supreme Court, at first instance, had wrongly omitted to examine Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and to find a violation of Article 13 of the Convention. 27.  On 21 November 2006 the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the first instance judgment. In particular, it held that the demolition of the applicant's house had not been an executory administrative act. Furthermore, it considered that it was not necessary to examine the question whether the demolition came within the parameters of the requisition order since, even in the case of a negative reply, the act at issue would be that of unlawful trespass falling within the ambit of private law and not public law. A remedy for such an act could be sought only by way of action before the district court. The Supreme Court held that it did not have jurisdiction to examine the case further on the basis of Article 146 of the Constitution and it therefore did not examine the remaining grounds of appeal.