5.  The applicant was born in 1974. He is currently serving a prison sentence. 6.  On 9 November 2004 the Opole Regional Court convicted the applicant of manslaughter and sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment. The prosecution appealed. 7.  On 8 December 2004 J.G., the lawyer assigned to represent the applicant under the legal‑aid scheme, also submitted an appeal against the first-instance judgment, arguing that the sentence was too severe. In the same pleadings J.G. also requested the court to dispense him from his obligation to represent the applicant and to appoint another lawyer to the case. 8.  In a letter of the same date he informed the applicant that, in his view, the appeal offered no reasonable prospects of success. He also stated that under no circumstances would he represent him for the purposes of cassation proceedings. 9.  On 16 December 2004 the Wroclaw Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals. In the proceedings before the appellate court the applicant was represented by another legal‑aid lawyer, D.K. 10.  On 4 March 2005 the court allowed the applicant’s request for the grant of legal aid and assigned J.G. to represent him for the purposes of cassation proceedings. 11.  On 15 March 2005 the second-instance judgment with the written statement of reasons was served on both the applicant and his lawyer. 12.  By a letter of 16 March 2005 the lawyer requested the court to be exempted from the obligation to represent the applicant. He submitted that he had already informed the applicant that he would prepare an appeal against the first‑instance judgment on the ground that in the circumstances of the case the sentence was disproportionate. He had also informed him that, in his view, this appeal offered no reasonable prospects of success. In the light of the judgment of the Court of Appeal his opinion proved justified. He also stated that he had warned the applicant that under no circumstances would he represent him for the purposes of cassation proceedings. In his view, there were no grounds on which to accept that any grounds for a cassation appeal obtained in the case. This was so because in the appeal against the first-instance judgment he had relied only on the disproportionate nature of the sentence, which could not be argued before the Supreme Court. 13.  The Wrocław Court of Appeal informed the applicant of this refusal by a letter dated 22 March 2005. It was further stated that in these circumstances the only course of action left to the applicant was to request the Ombudsman to lodge a cassation appeal on his behalf. This letter was served on the applicant on 29 March 2005.