8.  The applicants were born in 1955 and 1979 respectively and live in Sofia. 9.  On 1 July 1988 the applicants were hit by a taxi driven by a Mr V.G. The first applicant’s injuries, although serious, were not life-threatening, whereas the second applicant, who was at the time nine years old, sustained life-threatening injuries. Subsequently her spleen had to be surgically removed. Apparently her health is still seriously affected by the aftermath of the accident. 10.  Criminal proceedings were brought against Mr V.G. By a judgment of the competent criminal court of 8 December 1988 he was found guilty of negligently causing serious bodily injury to the second applicant and sentenced to one year’s imprisonment, suspended. The first applicant took part in these criminal proceedings, but only as a private prosecutor on behalf of the second applicant and not as a civil claimant, which would have been possible under the applicable law. 11.  On 17 June 1991 the first applicant filed with the Sofia City Court a tort action against Mr V.G. and the taxi enterprise where the latter had been employed at the time of the accident. She was acting on her own behalf and on behalf of the second applicant who was at the time still a minor. Both applicants claimed pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages. 12.  On 12 August 1991 Mr V.G. filed third-party claims against another person involved in the accident, Ms V.B., and against the State Insurance Company. These claims were based on Mr V.G.’s assertions that Ms V.B.’s improper crossing of the street had been the cause of the accident and that the State Insurance Company was liable to indemnify the damage under his road accident insurance. 13.  The first hearing was held on 4 October 1991. Finding that the applicants had not paid the requisite fee for filing the action, the court directed them to do so or to make a request to be exempted from payment of the fee. It also instructed Mr V.G. to provide the exact names and addresses of the third-party defendants. The court suspended the proceedings pending compliance with its instructions. 14.  The proceedings resumed on 21 October 1991 after the applicants had successfully filed a request for exemption from fees and Mr V.G. had provided the names and addresses of the third-party defendants. A hearing was listed for 10 December 1991. 15.  On 10 December 1991 the case had to be adjourned until 28 February 1992 as the taxi enterprise employing Mr V.G. at the time of the accident had in the meantime been reorganised into a commercial company[1] and had not received a copy of the applicants’ complaint. The applicants were instructed by the court to produce evidence that the taxi company listed as a defendant – Taxi Express – was the successor of the taxi enterprise, and to provide an additional copy of the complaint for it. 16.  At the hearing on 28 February 1992 the court noted that there was no evidence as to identify of the successor of the taxi enterprise. It requested Taxi Express to provide information on whether it was the successor. At that hearing the State Insurance Company intervened in the initial action in support of Mr V.G. 17.  At the next hearing, held on 21 April 1992, the court ruled on the successor of the taxi enterprise. It found that the successor was not the company listed as a defendant, Taxi Express, but another company, Softaxi. Accordingly, the court excluded the first defendant from the proceedings and constituted the second as a defendant, ordering that a copy of the applicants’ complaint be served on Softaxi. The case was adjourned. 18.  At the next hearing, which took place on 12 June 1992, the court agreed to examine Mr V.G.’s third-party claims together with the original tort action and admitted certain documents in evidence. It also ordered a medical expert report to be drawn up on the injuries sustained by the applicants and a technical expert report to be prepared on the cause of the accident. Both reports were to be drafted by court-appointed experts. Finally, the court directed Mr V.G. to pay the requisite fee for his third‑party claims, instructed the applicants to provide a breakdown of the pecuniary damages claimed, and gave the parties leave to call witnesses. 19.  The next hearing was held on 27 October 1992. The court noted that the medical expert report submitted had not been dated, with the result that it was impossible to establish whether it had been brought to the attention of Softaxi, which defendant had not appeared at the hearing. The court also noted that the technical expert who had been commissioned to draw up the report on the cause of the accident was absent. Accordingly, the court adjourned the case. It gave Mr V.G. leave to call one witness. 20.  On 5 February 1993 the court admitted in evidence the newly submitted medical expert report and questioned the medical expert who had prepared it. The court requested the applicants to specify and itemise, in the light of the medical expert’s report, the amount of compensation for pecuniary damages sought. The technical expert, Softaxi and Mr V.G.’s witness did not appear at the hearing, although they had been duly summoned. The court adjourned the case and fined the witness but not the technical expert. 21.  At the hearing held on 30 March 1993 the court questioned Mr V.G.’s witness. It then adjourned the case as Softaxi, despite having been duly summoned, did not appear and as the technical expert arrived at the hearing too late to be questioned. 22.  At the next hearing, which took place on 28 September 1993, the applicants increased their claims for non-pecuniary damages in order to take account of inflation. Softaxi and the technical expert did not appear, although they had been duly summoned. On the motion of Mr V.G.’s lawyer the court ordered the technical expert to answer an additional question regarding the causal link between Ms V.B.’s conduct and the accident. It adjourned the case with a view to receiving the technical expert’s report. 23.  A hearing listed for 10 December 1993 was adjourned as the technical expert, although having been duly subpoenaed, did not show up. 24.  On 25 February 1994 the technical expert finally showed up and was questioned. His report was admitted in evidence. As the expert had apparently not provided an answer to the additional question put to him on 28 September 1993, the court ordered him to supplement his report. The court also authorised Mr V.G. to increase his third-party claims against Ms V.B. and the State Insurance Company. 25.  A hearing listed for 20 May 1994 was adjourned as Softaxi had not been duly summoned and did not appear. The technical expert was also absent. 26.  A hearing fixed for 7 October 1994 was adjourned because the applicants’ lawyer, having had a road accident on 25 September, was ill and could not attend. 27.  At the hearing which took place on 20 December 1994 the court again gave the applicants leave to increase their claims for non-pecuniary damages, ordering that a copy of their request be served on Softaxi, which had failed to appear at the hearing. It noted that the supplementary technical expert report, ordered on 25 February 1994, had not yet been drawn up and adjourned the case. 28.  The next hearing was held on 17 March 1995. Despite having been duly summoned, the applicants, Softaxi, Ms V.B. and the State Insurance Company failed to appear. The technical expert was also absent. The court gave Mr V.G. leave to increase his third-party claims for a second time. The court adjourned the case. It ordered that the subpoena to be served on the technical expert should expressly mention that the case had had to be adjourned many times and that the court’s request for the presentation of his supplementary report had been made a long time ago. 29.  The next hearing took place on 19 June 1995. Softaxi and the State Insurance Company, despite having been duly summoned, did not appear. The technical expert was also absent. Ms V.B.’s lawyer submitted that Mr V.G.’s third-party claims had been made after the first hearing and for that reason should not have been examined jointly with the applicants’ tort action. Mr V.G.’s lawyer objected, stating that the claim had been presented prior to the first hearing. The court ruled that it would determine the point later in private. It adjourned the case, holding that this was necessary because of the technical expert’s absence and his failure to draw up his supplementary report, which was essential for the determination of the facts of the case. It fined the expert. 30.  The next hearing was held on 5 November 1995. Softaxi did not appear and the technical expert was also absent. Ms V.B.’s, Mr V.G.’s and the State Insurance Company’s lawyers all insisted that the technical expert report was needed so as to enable the facts of the case to be established properly. The court agreed. Noting that the technical expert had repeatedly failed to show up, the court replaced him with another expert. 31.  The new expert’s report on the cause of the accident was ready on 10 January 1996. 32.  The next hearing was held on 26 January 1996. Softaxi and Ms V.B. did not appear. The newly-appointed technical expert presented his report and was questioned. The applicants increased their claims for non-pecuniary damages for a third time. Mr V.G. also increased his third-party claims. The court ordered that copies of the requests to increase the claims be served on the absent parties and adjourned the case. 33.  The next hearing took place on 27 September 1996. Softaxi and Ms V.B. did not appear. The applicants increased their claims for non‑pecuniary damages for a fourth time. As a result, Mr V.G. increased his third-party claims as well. The court adjourned the case, ordering that copies of the requests for leave to increase the claims be served on the absent parties. It also requested that a copy of Softaxi’s certificate of company registration be produced by the parties. 34.  The next hearing was held on 11 February 1997. The applicants’ lawyer informed the court that Softaxi had been transformed into a joint‑stock company under the name of Softaxi EAD. The court listed Softaxi EAD as a defendant in the place of Softaxi but requested the applicants to produce certified copies of its registration documents. It also instructed them to provide a detailed breakdown of their claims for pecuniary damages and adjourned the case. 35.  The hearing listed for 11 March 1997 failed to take place. Despite having been duly summoned, the second applicant and Softaxi EAD did not appear. The court adjourned the case to allow the second applicant to countersign the complaint, since she had already turned eighteen and had thus obtained the capacity to sue on her own behalf. 36.  At the hearing which took place on 11 April 1997 the second applicant countersigned the complaint. The applicants tried to increase their claims for non‑pecuniary damages for a fifth time. The court rejected their request, holding that they had not paid the requisite fee for increasing the claims. It instructed them to pay the fee or to request an exemption. The court also found that the applicants had failed to provide a detailed breakdown of their claims for pecuniary damages. It directed them to do so within seven days, warning them that non-compliance could result in the dismissal of the claims. 37.  The next hearing took place on 31 October 1997. Softaxi EAD, Ms V.B. and the State Insurance Company, despite having been duly summoned, did not appear. Finding that the applicants had not complied with its instructions to provide a detailed breakdown of their claims for pecuniary damages, the court dismissed the claims. It gave the applicants leave to increase their claims for non-pecuniary damages and acceded to Mr V.G.’s follow-up request to increase his third‑party claims. The court ordered that copies of the requests be served on the absent parties. The applicants’ request for a new medical expert report was rejected. The court issued the applicants a certificate enabling them to obtain a copy of Softaxi EAD’s registration documents. The case was adjourned. 38.  The last hearing was held on 31 March 1998. Although duly summoned, Softaxi EAD and the State Insurance Company did not appear. The court rejected the applicants’ request to be allowed once again to increase their claims for non-pecuniary damages, holding that this would further complicate the examination of the case. The court heard the parties’ closing arguments. 39.  The Sofia City Court gave judgment on 15 April 1998. It allowed in part the applicants’ claims for non‑pecuniary damages against Mr V.G. and Softaxi EAD, holding them jointly and severally liable. The court also found that Ms V.B. had contributed to the accident and ordered her to pay Mr V.G. one third of the amount he had to pay the applicants. Finally, it held that Mr V.G.’s third-party claim against the State Insurance Company was statute-barred and, in any event, ill-founded because only the owner of the insured vehicle – Mr V.G.’s employer – could make such a claim. 40.  The second applicant was notified of the Sofia City Court’s judgment on 28 June 1999 and on 5 July 1999 she appealed against it to the Sofia Court of Appeals. She demanded that her claim for non-pecuniary damages be granted in full. She requested a new expert report on her medical condition. 41.  The first applicant was notified of the Sofia City Court’s judgment on 26 July 1999 and appealed against it the same day. She demanded that her claim for non-pecuniary damages be granted in full. She requested that a new expert report be prepared on her medical condition and sought leave to be allowed to call two witnesses. 42.  On 26 November 1999 the Sofia Court of Appeals, sitting in private, declared the appeals admissible. Finding the applicants’ requests for the gathering of additional evidence well-founded, it ordered a new medical expert report to determine the applicants’ present state of health, whether their health had deteriorated since the accident and what their health prospects were. The court also gave the first applicant leave to call the requested witnesses. It listed a hearing for 3 February 2000. 43.  The first hearing took place on 3 February 2000. Despite having been duly summoned, Mr V.G. and the State Insurance Company did not appear. The medical expert appointed by the court on 26 November 1999 was also absent. The applicants’ lawyer stated that she had spoken to the expert and had found that his field of expertise was different from the one needed for the preparation of an opinion on the applicants’ injuries. The court agreed and replaced the expert. It also questioned the two witnesses called by the applicants. It adjourned the case. 44.  The hearing listed for 23 March 2000 could not take place because the State Insurance Company had not been duly summoned. 45.  The next hearing was held on 18 May 2000. The court questioned the medical expert and admitted his report in evidence. Softaxi EAD’s lawyer presented a document purporting to prove that the taxi enterprise where Mr V.G. had been employed at the time of the accident had been split into two commercial companies following its reorganisation in 1991, and that Softaxi was only one of the two companies. The court adjourned the case to allow Softaxi EAD to produce the court decision on the reorganisation of its predecessor. 46.  The last hearing was held on 20 September 2000. The court admitted in evidence documents presented by Softaxi EAD on the strength of which it tried to prove that it was not the successor of the taxi enterprise where Mr V.G. had been employed at the time of the accident. The court heard the parties’ closing arguments. The parties presented written observations. In its observations Softaxi EAD argued that the applicants’ increased claims for non-pecuniary damages were time-barred because the increases had been made at various times during the proceedings but more than five years (the relevant limitation period) after the accident. 47.  The Sofia Court of Appeals gave judgment on 29 September 2000. It held that Softaxi EAD was indeed the successor of Mr V.G.’s employer at the time of the accident. It also held that the applicants’ increased claims for non-pecuniary damages were not time‑barred. It found that the pain and suffering sustained by the first and especially by the second applicant warranted a higher amount of compensation for non-pecuniary damages and, accordingly, awarded them such, but not the full amount claimed by the applicants. Finally, the court ordered Ms V.B. to pay Mr V.G. one third of the increased amount of compensation he had to pay the applicants. 48.  The applicants, Ms V.B. and Softaxi EAD lodged appeals on points of law with the Supreme Court of Cassation. 49.  The Supreme Court of Cassation held a hearing on 4 December 2001, at which it heard oral argument. 50.  The Supreme Court of Cassation gave judgment on 2 January 2002. It found that the applicants’ appeals were out of time. It proceeded to examine Softaxi EAD’s and Ms V.B.’s appeals on the merits. It dismissed Ms V.B.’s appeal but held, pursuant to Softaxi EAD’s appeal, that the Sofia Court of Appeals had erred in holding that the applicants’ increased claims for non-pecuniary damages had not been time‑barred. In fact, any increase in a claim was tantamount to the bringing of a new claim representing the difference between the original claim and the increased one. Accordingly, it remitted the case to a different panel of the Sofia Court of Appeals with instructions to analyse the dates of the increases in the applicants’ claims for non-pecuniary damages and to determine which had been made in good time and which had not. 51.  The Sofia Court of Appeals listed a hearing for 7 June 2002. At the hearing the court heard the parties’ arguments and reserved judgment. 52.  The Sofia Court of Appeals gave judgment on 17 October 2002. It held that the limitation period for claiming damages for the accident of 1 July 1988 had been five years and had expired on 1 July 1993, whereas all increases of the applicants’ claims for non‑pecuniary damages had been made after the latter date. Therefore, only the original claims could be allowed. Accordingly, the court upheld the Sofia City Court’s judgment of 15 April 1998. 53.  The applicants did not lodge an appeal on points of law with the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Sofia Court of Appeals’ judgment became final on an unspecified date in December 2002 or January 2003. 54.  On 24 January 2003 the Sofia Court of Appeals issued to the applicants writs of execution against Mr V.G. and Softaxi EAD. The two were ordered to pay jointly and severally 400 new Bulgarian levs (“BGN”) plus interest from 1 July 1988 until settlement to the first applicant and BGN 2,500 plus interest from 1 July 1988 until settlement to the second applicant, plus costs and expenses for the proceedings. 55.  On 21 April 2003 the applicants entered into an agreement with Softaxi whereby the company agreed to pay BGN 2,817.60 and BGN 17,608.80, which represented the sum of the award of damages and the interest from 1 July 1988 until 15 April 2005, to the first and the second applicant respectively. Thereafter Softaxi started paying the amounts due in monthly instalments of BGN 117 to the first applicant and BGN 734 to the second applicant.