5.  The applicant was born in 1978 and lives in Vinnytsya. 6.  In November 1995 criminal investigations were launched in respect of the applicant on suspicion of fraud and extortion. 7.  On 17 December 1996 a first-instance court (presumably the Leninskyy District Court of Vinnytsya – “the Leninskyy Court”) delivered a judgment on the case. In its reasoning it held that the applicant was to be acquitted of the extortion charge as not corroborated by any evidence. The court did not however mention anything about the acquittal in the operative part of the judgment. 8.  On 29 January 1997 a court of cassation (the name is not specified) upheld, in substance, the applicant’s acquittal as regards the charge of extortion. It noted that, even though the first-instance court had failed to indicate the acquittal in the operative part of the judgment, it had correctly assessed the evidence regarding that part of the accusation and had reached the well grounded conclusion about the lack of any proof of the applicant’s guilt. The court of cassation made the aforementioned finding in the reasoning of its ruling. By its operative part, it however quashed the above judgment in its entirety for some procedural shortcomings and remitted the case for additional investigation. 9.  The additional investigation resumed both the fraud and the extortion charges against the applicant and added some other episodes, such as theft coupled with burglary and causing damage to others’ property. 10.  From 17 (or 18) December 1996 to 1 June 1999 the applicant was detained in Vinnytsya SIZO-1. 11.  By a judgment of the Leninskyy Court of 8 April 1999, upheld by a ruling of the Vinnytsya Regional Court of 12 May 1999, the applicant was found guilty of: theft coupled with burglary (with a sentence of five years’ imprisonment with confiscation of property); fraud (ditto); extortion that led to particularly grave consequences (seven years’ imprisonment and confiscation of property); and causing damage to others’ property (two years’ imprisonment). As a final penalty defined by absorption of less severe punishment by more severe, the court sentenced the applicant to seven years’ imprisonment with confiscation of property. He was considered to have started serving his sentence from 18 December 1996. The applicant pleaded guilty to all the charges, except for extortion of which he considered himself to have already been acquitted. 12.  On 28 December 1999 the applicant introduced an application with the Court registered under no. 57065/00, in which he complained, in particular, of the unfairness of the criminal proceedings completed with the aforementioned ruling of 12 May 1999. 13.  On 13 June 2000 the Court, sitting as a Committee of three judges, declared application no. 57065/00 inadmissible for the applicant’s failure to comply with the six-month time-limit. 14.  On 18 December 2003 the applicant was released, having served his sentence in full. 15.  On 12 November 2004 the Supreme Court allowed the applicant’s request for review of the decisions of 8 April and 12 May 1999 under exceptional circumstances. It quashed them in the part concerning the applicant’s conviction for extortion and discontinued the proceedings in that part for lack of proof of his guilt. As a result, the total penalty was reduced from seven to five years, without confiscation of property. 16.  The Supreme Court noted, in particular, that on 17 December 1996 the applicant had been acquitted of extortion by the first-instance court which had however failed to indicate that in the operative part of the judgment. It next observed that while the cassation court had upheld that acquittal in the ruling of 29 January 1997, it had wrongly quashed the judgment in its entirety and had remitted the case for additional investigation without having specified the omission of the first-instance court nor indicated ways of its remedying. 17.  The Supreme Court further criticised the subsequent investigation and the applicant’s retrial for their failure to give due regard to the substance of the aforementioned judicial decisions. 18.  In sum, it recognised the decisions of 8 April and 12 May 1999, by which the applicant had been convicted, as unlawful and unfounded in the part pertaining to the extortion charge. 19.  In February 2005 the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Pecherskyy District Court of Kyiv against the State Treasury, seeking compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage caused to him by the allegedly unlawful actions of the prosecution and judicial authorities that had resulted in his deprivation of liberty for two years and one day (the applicant alleged that he had been arrested one day earlier than officially reported). He relied on the aforementioned ruling of the Supreme Court of 12 November 2004, which had recognised the miscarriage of justice. 20.  On 15 March 2005, following a hearing with the participation of the applicant’s father as his representative, the court rejected the claim as unsubstantiated. Relying on Section 1176 of the Civil Code and Sections 1‑3 of the Compensation Act (see paragraphs 32-33 below), it found that the applicant’s situation did not satisfy the eligibility criteria for compensation to be awarded, as his conviction had been quashed not fully, but only in the part regarding the charge of extortion, while he had been lawfully convicted of some other offences. 21.  The applicant appealed. 22.  On 19 April 2005 the Kyiv City Court of Appeal notified the parties that a hearing had been scheduled for 10 May 2005. The applicant’s representative did not attend, expecting it to be postponed because of a public holiday declared on that date. 23.  On 10 May 2005 the appellate court upheld the findings and the reasoning of the first-instance court’s judgment. 24.  The applicant appealed in cassation. He submitted that none of the legal acts, on which the lower courts had relied for rejecting him claim, required quashing of a verdict in its entirety in order to be eligible for compensation in respect of unlawful conviction and the ensuing imprisonment. The applicant assumed that the courts might have been guided by the 1996 Regulation on Application of the Compensation Act, which provided for “a complete rehabilitation” as a prerequisite for compensation in respect of unlawful conviction. He contended that it was an obsolete by-law narrowing the safeguards of the primary legislation and running contrary to the Convention, while having been adopted prior to its ratification by Ukraine on 11 September 1997. 25.  On 16 August 2007 the Donetsk Regional Court of Appeal, sitting as a cassation instance, rejected the applicant’s cassation appeal with succinct reasoning that the lower courts had acted in compliance with law and that there were no grounds for reviewing their decisions. 26.  On 13 November 2003 the Shepetivka Town Court ordered that applicant be supervised by the police for one and a half years following his release, the date of which was approaching. It referred to submissions of the prison administration criticising the applicant’s behaviour during his sentence. The court considered this an indication that the applicant was reluctant to improve and remained a danger to society. 27.  It was noted in the above ruling that it could be challenged on appeal before the Khmelnytsky Regional Court of Appeal. 28.  After his release on 18 December 2003, the applicant was placed under police supervision as ordered. 29.  At some point he unsuccessfully asked the police to lift that measure. 30.  According to the applicant, the police continued to visit his house after the expiry of the supervision order, of which he complained to the local police station on several occasions.