8.  The first applicant, Bronisław Rosenzweig, is a German national, who was born in 1941 and lives in Berlin. The second applicant is “Bonded Warehouses Ltd”, a public company. 9.  On 18 February 1994 the Main Customs Office granted a licence to run a bonded warehouse in Słubice to the applicant company “International Bonded Warehouses Ltd.”. 10.  On 29 May 1995 the German customs office at Frankfurt/Oder stated in writing that the German customs authorities had no objections to the operation of the applicant company. 11.  On 1 June 1995 a further permit was given for exporting merchandise via the border crossing in Słubice by the Director of the local Customs Office in Słubice. 12.  The applicant submitted that it had been repeatedly suggested that the company should pay various bribes to the customs officials if it wished to continue its operation undisturbed. The Government did not respond to this submission. 13.  By a letter of 22 November 1995 the Director of the local Duty Office in Słubice stated that from 27 November 1995 on he would revoke the permit of 1 June 1995 for exporting merchandise via the Słubice border crossing. It was argued that the permit of 1 June 1995 was not in conformity with an agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany regarding the border crossings and trans-border movements of goods and persons. 14.  On 27 November 1995 the customs officers ordered that the headquarters of the applicant company be closed and affixed official seals on its door, preventing it thereby from conducting further business. On the same day the applicant company complained to the Main Customs Office, submitting that there were no legal grounds on which the permit should be revoked and that the letter of 22 November 1995 was not an administrative decision, which made it impossible to lodge a formal appeal against it. 15.  In a letter of 21 December 1995 the applicant company reiterated its complaint and stressed that the director of the Słubice Customs Office had failed, despite the company's repeated requests, to give any legal basis for the revocation of the permit. It was argued that the revocation of the permit breached economic freedom as guaranteed by the Constitution, and clearly infringed the terms of a valid licence which the company had received from the Main Customs Office in February 1994. 16.  On 9 February 1996 the applicant company lodged a complaint under Article 17 of the Supreme Administrative Court's Act about the Main Customs Office's failure to give a decision following the appeal of 27 November 1995. It was submitted that the company had a valid permit given under the provisions of customs law. However, the company's operation had been de facto rendered impossible by the letter of 22 November 1995 as it could not run the warehouse if it was not allowed to export merchandise. 17.  In reaction to this complaint, on 14 February 1996 the Main Customs Office informed the applicant company that the permit of 1 June 1995 was of a temporary character. It was to remain valid only until a bridge in nearby Świeck was to be constructed. After the construction of this bridge had been terminated, the border crossing in Słubice was to be used only for small trans-border movement of goods and persons. This was to be understood as allowing for crossing of the border by persons, but taking merchandise out of the country via this crossing did not fall within the ambit of the notion of the “small trans-border movement of goods and persons” and therefore the permit of 1 June 1995 had to be revoked under Article 21 of the Customs Law. 18.  The applicant company appealed, submitting that the revocation of the exporting permit would practically mean that the company had to stop its business operation, carried out under the valid licence of February 1994.
On 21 August 1996 the applicant company and the Director of the Legal Department of the Main Customs Office concluded a settlement to the effect that the applicant company would withdraw the appeal it had lodged with the Supreme Administrative Court against the position taken by the Office in its letter of 14 February 1996 and the President of the Office would set aside the decision of the Director of the Słubice Customs Office of 22 November 1995. 19.  On 21 December 1996 the Main Customs Office set the decision of 22 November 1995 aside and ordered that the question be re-examined by the Director of the Słubice Customs Office. 20.  By a letter of 31 January 1997 the German customs office at Frankfurt/Oder confirmed that the German customs authorities had no legal objections whatsoever against the operation of the applicant company. 21.  On 28 May 1997 the Rzepin Customs Office revoked the permit for exporting merchandise by the applicant company via Słubice, stating that the Słubice border crossing was under Polish law designed only for the so‑called “small trans-border movement of goods and persons” and that, therefore, no merchandise could be exported via this crossing. 22.  The applicant company appealed. 23.  On 20 August 1997 the Main Customs Office quashed the decision of 28 May 1997 and discontinued the proceedings, considering that the impugned decision had been in breach of applicable provisions of procedural law since it had not been given in any of the types of proceedings on the merits provided for by the Code of Administrative Procedure. 24.  The applicant company requested that the legal meaning of this decision be interpreted. It emphasised that it was important for it to have clarified whether the original permit of 1 June 1995 was still valid. This, on the plain meaning of the text of this decision, was unclear. 25.  In an interpretative decision of 23 September 1997 the Main Customs Office explained that the fact that the decision of 28 May 1997 had been set aside was to be understood in such a way as to mean that the legal situation existing before this decision had been given still obtained. 26.  The applicant company requested that this issue be re-examined, asking whether the quashing of the decision of 28 May 1997, revoking the permit of 1 June 1995, was to mean that this permit was still valid. 27.  In a decision of 14 November 1997 the Main Customs Office held that the purpose of the decision of 23 September 1997 was not to decide whether the permit of 1 June 1995 was still valid. It upheld the decision of 23 September 1997. 28.  The applicant company appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court, arguing that the decisions of the Main Customs Office lacked clarity. The Office had set aside the revocation of the permit, but did not confirm whether the original permit was valid. Therefore it was impossible to establish what was the actual legal situation of the company as far as the validity of its permits was concerned. The applicant company emphasised that it was de facto treated by the customs authorities as if the export permit of June 1995 had been effectively revoked. 29.  In a judgment of 2 April 1998 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the decisions of 23 September and 14 November 1997. The court found that the decision of 23 September lacked clarity in that it did not allow the applicant company to elucidate the fundamental uncertainty as to the legal consequence of this decision. Neither were these doubts dispelled by the decision of 14 November in which the Main Customs Office had failed to explain what was the legal situation of the applicants' permit to run their business, and in particular, whether it could still rely on the permit of 1 June 1995. 30.  By a decision of 5 June 1998 the Main Customs Office stated that the decision of 20 August 1998 was to be understood in such a way that the applicant's rights stemming from the decision of 1 June 1995 remained intact. 31.  On 20 June 1998 the Main Customs Office instituted proceedings in order to have the licence to run the warehouse of 18 February 1994 set aside, considering that the applicant company had not been conducting its business for a period longer than three months, without having informed the competent authorities thereof, as required by law. 32.  On 30 November 1998 the Main Customs Office set aside the 1994 licence to run the warehouse, having found that after 20 August 1997 the applicant company had ceased its business activities. Under the provisions of the Customs Code, the customs authorities were obliged to withdraw the licence to run the bonded warehouse if the company enjoying such licence was not exercising it for a period longer than three months. 33.  The applicant company appealed. It argued inter alia that it could not have run the warehouse after 20 August 1997, given that the Słubice Customs Office had withdrawn its permit for exporting merchandise by the applicant company via Słubice, which had made it impossible to continue its business operation. 34.  On 5 March 1999 the Main Customs Office, having re-examined the case, discontinued the appellate proceedings. The office observed that the applicant was wrong in confusing the proceedings regarding the validity of the June 1995 permit with the present proceedings, in which it was the validity of the earlier licence, granted in 1994, which was at issue. The validity of the 1994 licence had not been questioned in the previous proceedings and therefore there were no grounds on which to accept that the applicant was prevented to run its business. 35.  It further noted that the proceedings had to be discontinued since on 1 January 1998 a new Customs Code had entered into force. It provided that various customs licences issued under the old Customs Act were to remain valid for twelve months, during which companies having such licences could lodge new requests to have new licences issued. The applicant company had not submitted such request and the validity of its 1994 licence had consequently expired on 31 December 1999. Therefore the proceedings would not serve any purpose and should be discontinued. 36.  The applicant company appealed. It argued, inter alia, that when giving the contested decision, the Main Customs Office had breached the law in that it entirely failed to take into consideration all circumstances relating to the proceedings concerning the withdrawal of the permit to export. These proceedings, which had lasted from August 1997 until June 1998, had rendered it impossible for the company to continue its business operation. Therefore it was unreasonable to revoke the 1994 licence on the ground that the company had ceased its business activities. 37.  On 5 November 1999 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the decision of 5 March 1999 as not being in compliance with law. It considered that the Main Customs Office had incorrectly held that the proceedings had become devoid of purpose. At the time when they had been instituted, i.e. on 20 June 1998, the applicant company's licence was still valid. It therefore had a legal interest in clarifying its legal situation and to confirm whether it was still authorised to run its business. 38.  On 23 March 2000 the Main Customs Office, having regard to the judgment of 5 November 1999, set aside the decision of 30 November 1998, revoking the 1994 licence to run the warehouse. 39.  The applicant company did not resume its operations afterwards. The first applicant submitted that as a result of the withdrawal of the permit and the licence to run the company, described above, it was impossible for him as the principal shareholder and, likewise, for the applicant company, to resume their business operations.   It is the withdrawal of those decisions authorising the company to run its business which constitute the basis of the applicant's claims of pecuniary damage under Article 41 of the Convention. The Government did not respond to this argument.