5.  The applicant was born in 1950 and lives in Košice. He is a self‑employed entrepreneur. 6.  In his capacity as an entrepreneur, the applicant received a subsidy for the creation of a number of positions of employment deemed “socially desirable”. The subsidy was paid to him on terms specified in a contract with the District Employment Office (Okresný úrad práce). 7.  In a decision of 28 November 1996 the Košice I. District Tax Authority (Daňový úrad) found that the applicant had breached the above‑mentioned contract by failing to fill all the positions. The applicant was therefore ordered to return 430,000 Slovakia korunas (SKK) of the subsidy and to pay SKK 860,000 by way of a financial penalty. 8.  The period for appealing against the decision was fifteen days from the date of service. 9.  The written version of the decision was sent to the applicant through the postal service, to be served on him in person (do vlastných rúk).
However, after repeated attempts to do so had proved unsuccessful the decision was deposited with the local post office and a notice was left in the applicant’s mailbox to the effect that he could collect the decision there within three days.
Should the applicant not collect the decision within that period, as proved to be the case, it was to be deemed to have been served on him by force of a legal presumption on the date of expiry of the period. 10.  The question of when the decision of 28 November 1996 became final and binding (právoplatnosť) was not subject to full administrative or judicial examination. However, the authorities took the view that it had become final and binding on 23 December 1996, by operation of the presumption mentioned in the preceding paragraph. At that time the applicant had no legal representation. 11.  Under a legal-assistance contract of 1 October 1997, the applicant retained the services of a lawyer to provide him with general legal assistance, including representation in litigation. 12.  Being a member of the Slovakian Bar Association, the lawyer was under a duty conscientiously to defend her clients’ rights and diligently to apply all legal means available for the assertion of their interests and to have taken out and to maintain professional liability insurance (see paragraphs 40 and 42 below). 13.  On 26 January 1998 the applicant paid a visit to the District Tax Authority, accompanied by his lawyer. It was on this occasion that the applicant obtained the decision of 28 November 1996 (see paragraph 7 above) by collecting it from the Tax Authority in person. 14.  On 18 August 1998, through his lawyer, the applicant challenged the decision of 28 November 1996 by way of an administrative‑law action (see paragraph 47 below). 15.  Simultaneously, also through the lawyer, the applicant requested an extraordinary review of the impugned decision by the Central Tax Directorate (Ústredné daňové riaditeľstvo) outside the framework of appellate proceedings (see paragraph 51 below). In his request, the applicant argued, inter alia, that he had in fact complied with the terms on which he had been provided with the subsidy. 16.  On 30 September 1998 the Central Tax Directorate modified the decision of 28 November 1996 in that it reduced the amount of the subsidy to be repaid to SKK 180,000 and the penalty payment to SKK 360,000. In the proceedings leading up to that decision the applicant’s lawyer officially acted as his legal representative. Although it was open to her, the lawyer filed no administrative appeal against it on the applicant’s behalf. 17.  The District Tax Authority subsequently relieved the applicant of the duty to pay any more than SKK 160,000 in penalties. 18.  On 10 November 1998 the Košice Regional Court (Krajský súd) declared the applicant’s administrative-law action (see paragraph 14 above) inadmissible and discontinued the proceedings. In the proceedings leading up to that decision the applicant’s lawyer officially acted as his legal representative. 19.  The Regional Court found that the applicant had failed to fulfil the statutory admissibility requirement of exhausting ordinary remedies by lodging an administrative appeal (see paragraphs 48 and 50 below) and, as appropriate, by challenging the decision on the administrative appeal by way of a fresh administrative‑law action (see paragraph 47 below). 20.  In so far as there might have been any misgivings as to the way in which the impugned decision had been served on the applicant and, consequently, as to when the period for lodging an administrative appeal had expired, the Regional Court held:
“The court dealing with the action of 18 August 1998 cannot examine whether the defendant served the impugned decision [on the applicant] in accordance with Article 24 of the Code of Administrative Procedure. This question may be examined only by the appellate administrative agency, in the context of an [administrative] appeal against the decision of the defendant.
...
Should the [applicant] have been of the opinion that the decision by the defendant was not served on him through the postal service in accordance with Article 24 of the Code of Administrative Procedure, it was open to him to challenge that decision by means of an [administrative] appeal within the period for appealing, namely fifteen days from the collection of that decision in person from the defendant on 26 January 1998. The question whether the decision by the defendant was served on the applicant in accordance with Article 24 of the Code of Administrative Procedure and, as the case may be, whether the [applicant] lodged his [administrative] appeal against the decision by the defendant within the statutory time-limit would have to be resolved by the administrative agency dealing with the appellate proceedings. Upon receipt of the decision of the appellate administrative agency on his appeal, it was open to the [applicant] to proceed as indicated above.” 21.  On 12 July 2000 the applicant lodged a civil action against the lawyer with the Košice I District Court (Okresný súd). He alleged that the lawyer had breached her duty of care by failing to use all remedies, in particular administrative appeals against the decisions of 28 November 1996 and 30 September 1998, followed – as the case may be - by administrative‑law actions. 22.  The applicant argued, inter alia, that, in a judgment of 20 February 1997 in an unrelated but similar case the Supreme Court (Najvyšší súd) had found for the plaintiff and had quashed the impugned decisions of the tax authorities. 23.  The applicant sought an order for payment of SKK 540,000 in damages. This sum represented the total amount that he had to pay back to the tax authorities. In the course of the proceedings the applicant reduced his claim by SKK 200,000. 24.  On 16 April 2004 the District Court dismissed the action and ordered the applicant to pay the defendant’s costs. 25.  Referring to the Regional Court’s decision of 10 November 1998 (see paragraph 18 above), the District Court observed that the applicant’s lawyer had not lodged an administrative appeal against the decision of 28 November 1996 (see paragraph 7 above) and that, consequently, the Regional Court had no jurisdiction to deal with the applicant’s administrative-law action. 26.  The District Court also noted that the applicant’s lawyer could have challenged the decision of 30 September 1998 by means of an administrative appeal, but had not done so. 27.  The District Court concluded that the lawyer had indeed breached her professional duties in that she had failed to use all available legal means for the protection of the applicant’s interests. 28.  However, no causal link could be established between that breach and the applicant’s loss since it was unknown how the case would have proceeded on the merits had all the ordinary remedies been applied.
An administrative appeal against the decision of 28 November 1996 fell to be determined by the Central Tax Directorate. An administrative-law action against the decision of 30 September 1998 fell to be determined by the Supreme Court sitting as an administrative tribunal. Relying on Article 135 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the District Court concluded that the ordinary courts had no jurisdiction to take the place of these bodies and to pre-empt the outcome of the proceedings before them. 29.  On 28 June 2005 the Regional Court upheld the judgment following the hearing of an appeal by the applicant. The Regional Court observed that the ordinary courts held no power of review as regards the substantive aspect of administrative decisions. It held that, similarly, the ordinary courts could not be a substitute for administrative agencies and tribunals by determining matters of substance within the latter’s jurisdiction. 30.  The Regional Court denied leave to appeal on points of law on the grounds that no issue of particular legal significance was involved and that the matter was the subject of well-established case-law, although this was not referred to in any detail. 31.  On 21 April 2006 the applicant lodged a complaint under Article 127 of the Constitution (see paragraph 37 below) with the Constitutional Court (Ústavný súd). He argued that the dismissal of his action for damages had violated his rights of access to a court under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and to judicial or other legal protection under Article 46 § 1 of the Constitution (see paragraph 36 below). 32.  On 4 May 2006 the Constitutional Court declared the complaint inadmissible. The decision was served on the applicant on 22 September 2006. 33.  The Constitutional Court was of the view that the outcome of the applicant’s action for damages hinged on a point of law that fell under the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts and had already been decided there. The ordinary courts, in particular the Regional Court, had supported the decision with exhaustive, relevant and sufficient reasoning. There was no appearance of any constitutionally relevant arbitrariness or irregularity and the applicant’s complaint was accordingly manifestly ill-founded. 34.  The applicant requested the Prosecutor General to exercise his discretionary powers to challenge the judgment of 28 June 2005 on the applicant’s behalf by way of an extraordinary appeal on points of law on similar grounds to those raised in the applicant’s constitutional complaint. 35.  In a letter of 2 October 2006 the public prosecution service informed the applicant that it fully endorsed the ordinary court’s reasoning and consequently, his request was dismissed.