6.  The applicants were born in 1923, 1937, 1940, 1979, 1981, 1967, 1944, 1954, 1950, 1949, 1952, 1944, 1961 1979, 1974, 1968, 1964, 1965 respectively. 7.  The applicants and/or their predecessors were owners of properties nos. 223, 224, 225, 226 and 227 Marina Street, Msida, Malta, on land measuring a total of approximately 1,600 sq. m. Before the 1990s the properties had been requisitioned and were being used as a post office and premises for a Government department. 8.  On 31 August 1990 the President of Malta declared that the properties were to be expropriated (acquired by a title of absolute purchase). 9.  Subsequently, the premises were demolished and a complex was built, consisting of a basement with garages (two of which were allocated to EneMalta as an electricity substation), shops at ground level and social residential apartments on the upper floors. 10.  On 22 May 1991 the owners were served with a copy of the President’s declaration. They were also served with a Notice to Treat dated 20 May 1991 informing them that the sum being offered in compensation for the property was 129,000 Maltese liras (MTL) (approximately 300,490 euros (EUR)). 11.  By means of a judicial letter dated 29 May 1991, the owners (except for the last two applicants) declared that they would not accept the compensation offered and that they considered MTL 380,000 (approximately EUR 885,150) to be just compensation. The last two applicants also contested the compensation offered by means of a judicial letter dated 14 June 1991, in which they stated that they considered MTL 250,000 (approximately EUR 582,350) to be just compensation. 12.  On 21 October 1993 the Commissioner of Land (“the CoL”) deposited the sum of MTL 129,000 (approximately EUR 300,490) in court by means of a schedule of deposit (in accordance with Article 22 (4) of Chapter 88 of the Laws of Malta). 13.  On 25 January 1994 the CoL instituted proceedings before the Land Arbitration Board (“the LAB”) to determine the amount of compensation due for the above-mentioned property. Two court-appointed architects, F.V. and J.M., estimated the total value of the property together with other tenements (nos. 2, 3 and 4 Qrejten Street, Msida) at MTL 205,500 (approximately EUR 478,700). 14.  By a decision of 10 October 1996 the LAB found that the compensation payable for all the properties was MTL 205,500. 15.  Tenements nos. 2, 3 and 4 Qrejten Street, Msida, were the subject of another court case in respect of which there is no indication as to whether it has been decided. 16.  On 10 January 1997 the CoL lodged an application for a retrial on the grounds that the decision of 10 October 1996 (case no. 2/94) had covered other property which was not the subject of the case and had not taken account of the sum already deposited in court. He subsequently submitted that if the application for a new trial was granted, the same two architects who had originally been appointed should be retained. 17.  In April 1997, the applicants filed an objection to the retrial. 18.  In a hearing of 4 June 2002, however, the applicants did not object to the case being retried. The LAB appointed two new architects, R.L. and J.J., to value the property afresh and adjourned the case pending decision. 19.  By means of an application dated 4 October 2002, the CoL asked the LAB to revoke its decision to appoint architects R.L. and J.J., since it had not given a separate decision authorising a retrial and there had been no reason to replace the original architects. He asked the LAB to order a retrial. 20.  On 8 April 2003 the LAB revoked the decision of 10 October 1996 and ordered that the retrial be started on the same day. In another decision of 8 April 2003 it considered the CoL’s application contesting the architects’ appointment. On the grounds that it could not have appointed architects before deciding whether to grant the request for retrial, the LAB revoked its decision of 4 June 2002. The minutes of the hearing stated that application no. 1/97 had been decided in part; however, since the LAB as constituted did not have competence to hear the case, it suspended the case sine die, pending the composition by a different Board. 21.  Subsequently, the parties requested that the proceedings be resumed, both of them citing case no. 1/97. The new chairman of the LAB did not notice the error and rescheduled case no. 1/97. The parties made submissions regarding the appointment of the architects and the case regarding the compensation due was adjourned to 20 October 2003. 22.  Afterwards, Act XVII of 2004 (“the 2004 Act”) was promulgated, inter alia, amending Article 25 (1) of Chapter 88 (see relevant domestic law) by adding a proviso to the effect that the compensation awarded should not exceed the higher amount of compensation proposed by any of the parties. The 2004 Act entered into force on 23 December 2004 and, pursuant to its section 4(2), the above provision had retrospective effect (see relevant domestic law). 23.  Following a number of adjournments, by a decision of 12 September 2005 the LAB appointed R.L. and J.J. as architects and fixed a term of two weeks for them to present a report in the light of the amended legislation. R.L. and J.J. had inspected the property two years earlier, on 4 September 2003, in connection with the proceedings concerning properties nos. 2, 3 and 4 Qrejten Street, Msida. 24.  Following a number of further adjournments, by a judgment of 27 March 2006 the LAB noted that the new architects had re-valued the properties at MTL 1,681,895 (approximately EUR 3,032,600), although they had been unable to actually visit the properties since they had been demolished. However, it further noted that in accordance with the new 2004 Act, the court could not award more than had been requested. It awarded compensation of MTL 380,000, (approximately EUR 885,160), which was the highest amount claimed by the parties, of which MTL 129,000 (approximately EUR 300,490) had already been deposited in court. 25.  The applicants appealed (by means of two almost identical appeal applications), claiming that the compensation should be in accordance with the architects’ valuation. They complained that at the time when the proceedings before the LAB had commenced, including those for retrial, the compensation due to them had not been subject to capping, but was to have been based on the market value of the property on an open market on the day of the Notice to Treat, as established by the architects and the LAB. Thus, the retroactive application of the 2004 Act had affected their right to receive fair compensation, in violation of their property rights, both because their legitimate expectation to be awarded fair compensation had been interfered with, and because the sum eventually awarded did not constitute fair compensation. Moreover, the length of the proceedings before the LAB had breached their right to a fair trial within a reasonable time, with further consequences on their property rights – on the ground of both the changes to the law and the principle of compensation within a reasonable time. 26.  The CoL also lodged an appeal concerning various issues: the architects’ appointment under the principle of independence and impartiality; the composition of the LAB; and the numbering of the decision, - in that it reflected the number of the request for retrial and not the retried and decided case. 27.  By a decision of 24 January 2007, the Court of Appeal, in its inferior jurisdiction, referred the following issues to the Civil Court (First Hall), in its constitutional jurisdiction: (i) whether the applicants’ property rights had been violated; and (ii) whether there had been a violation of the right to a fair hearing, as the CoL had claimed. No referral was made in respect of the applicants’ complaint regarding the length of the proceedings. 28.  The Civil Court (First Hall), in its constitutional jurisdiction, noted that the applicants had made the following claims: (i) that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 had been violated since they had not been awarded adequate compensation, the amount of compensation having been limited by a legislative interference; (ii) that legislative interference had breached their rights under Article 17 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1; and (iii) that Article 6 had been violated since the compensation proceedings had not been decided within a reasonable time. That had had consequences on their property rights in view of the subsequent legislative amendment, which had breached the principle of equality of arms. 29.  By a judgment of 27 November 2008, the Civil Court (First Hall), in its constitutional jurisdiction, declared that the 2004 Act had violated the applicants’ property rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. It declared the decision of 27 March 2006 null and void, and ordered that the case be remitted to the Court of Appeal and that compensation be established in accordance with the law as it had stood before the passing of the Act in 2004. No violation of the right to a fair trial could be upheld vis-à-vis the CoL. 30.  The CoL appealed and the applicants cross-appealed, the latter alleging that their rights had been violated under Articles 6 and 17 of the Convention. 31.  The Constitutional Court considered that the applicants’ complaints revolved around two matters: (i) the retroactive application of the 2004 Act, which had allegedly violated their legitimate expectation to compensation as established by the laws in force at the time of the taking, thus denying them part of their compensation; and (ii) the lack of adequate compensation awarded to them. 32.  By a judgment of 6 September 2010 the Constitutional Court noted that the Court of Appeal in its inferior jurisdiction had not had competence to hear the merits of the case, it being within the competence of the Court of Appeal in its superior jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it considered that the referral made by the Court of Appeal in its inferior jurisdiction was, in itself, valid. Its decision had not included the issues arising under Articles 6 and 17, which therefore could not be entered into because the courts with constitutional jurisdiction were limited to dealing with matters referred to them by the Court of Appeal. The Constitutional Court reversed the first‑instance judgment in part. It upheld the part of the judgment dismissing the CoL’s complaints and quashed the rest, therefore finding no violation of the applicants’ property rights. It considered that before the 2004 Act the LAB could have awarded compensation higher than that requested by the parties, thus rather than clarifying the law, the Act limited the compensation that could be awarded. Nevertheless, the applicants did not have a possession under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, in that they had had no legitimate expectation to receive an amount higher than MTL 380,000 (as established by their ex parte expert), which they had claimed. Firstly, when the 2004 Act came into effect, the report of the new architects had not yet been included in the case file. Secondly, before the 2004 Act the applicants had not claimed compensation higher than that awarded, and thirdly, when architects R.L. and J.J. were appointed, the applicants had been aware of the new legislation. Moreover, the applicants had received fair compensation since they had been awarded the entire sum they had asked for. Indeed, it was clear that the valuation made by the court-appointed experts was in stark contrast with the valuations made by the previous architects and the ex parte experts; it was therefore arbitrary and disproportionate, as no reasons had been given to justify the huge difference. Thus, the 2004 Act had not violated the applicants’ rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. As to the fact that twenty years had passed without compensation having been paid, the court considered that part of the monies had already been deposited and could have been withdrawn by the applicants without prejudice to further proceedings. Moreover, the applicants had eventually been awarded triple the sum which had been offered to them at the time of the expropriation and were still to receive 5% interest on the amount, thus they were not made to bear an excessive individual burden. The court ordered that the case be remitted to the Court of Appeal in its superior jurisdiction for the continuation of the proceedings. 33.  By a judgment of 25 February 2011 the Court of Appeal in its superior jurisdiction held that the decision of 27 March 2006 was null and void owing to a procedural defect, namely in so far as the impugned decision had been given within the ambit of case no. 1/97, and not the proceedings on the merits relating to compensation claim, no. 2/94. Indeed, the relevant proceedings were never rescheduled following their adjournment in 2003. This had happened because the parties themselves – both the State and the applicants –had cited the wrong number when asking for the case to be rescheduled, and the LAB chairman had made the same error. The Court of Appeal considered that it was not in a position to order the correction of the relevant case numbers. Thus, in the circumstances, no appeal could be entertained. 34.  Consequently, there has to date been no judgment establishing the amount due in compensation for the property expropriated more than twenty years ago. 35.  By a judicial letter of 25 March 2011, the applicants asked the CoL to take the relevant measures to determine the amount of compensation payable for the expropriation. No reply was received. 36.  Following the communication of the application to the respondent Government in March 2012, on 8 November 2012 the CoL asked the LAB to restore case no. 2/94 to its list of cases for the eventual determination of compensation.