7.  On 10 May 2001 police officer T.B. and another policeman were attempting to stop a vehicle being driven by the applicant’s fifteen-year old son, Justinas Leparskis. Three other persons were in the car with the applicant’s son. As the applicant’s son did not stop, T.B. fired two warning shots. He then fired a shot towards the wheels of the car from a distance of approximately forty metres. The applicant’s son was severely injured as that shot was misfired. 8.  The applicant’s son was hospitalised in a coma. 9.  On 10 May 2001 a prosecutor instituted a criminal investigation into the incident. T.B. was suspected of exceeding official duties (Article 287 of the Criminal Code as then in force). 10.  According to the Government, on the same day an initial on-site inspection was carried out and witnesses were questioned.
On 14 May 2001 a forensic medical expert report was ordered to establish how severely J. Leparskis was injured. The report was received on 20 July 2001. On 15 May 2001 police officer T.B. was questioned and his service gun and four bullets were seized; on 16 May the bullet extracted from the head of J. Leparskis was seized from the hospital. On 21 May the authorities ordered the forensic ballistic analysis; it was concluded on 19 September 2001 and established that the bullet extracted from the head of J. Leparskis could have been fired from T.B.’s service gun. 11.  On 27 July 2001 the applicant’s son died without coming out of the coma. 12.  According to the Government, on 27 July 2001 a supplementary forensic expert report was ordered. The report was received the next day. It concluded that J. Leparskis had died from complications caused by the gunshot wound to his head. 13.  On an unspecified date criminal proceedings for exceeding official duties and manslaughter were brought against T.B. 14.  On 27 September 2001 the prosecutor recognised the applicant as a victim in the criminal case. 15.  On 14 March 2003 the Pakruojis District Court found T.B. guilty of manslaughter (Article 109 of the Criminal Code as then in force) and exceeding official duties (Article 287). In particular, it was found that T.B. had fired the three shots without any absolute necessity, in breach of the relevant provisions of the Police Activities Act and various ministerial instructions. The court observed that T.B. had used the gun in the absence of a real threat to the life of a police officer or third persons, and without having made any attempts to verify the identity and the age of the driver of the vehicle. In addition, it was observed that T.B. had not given the applicant’s son any time to react after the two warning shots and had immediately fired the third shot from a rather long distance. T.B. was thus found to be responsible for recklessly depriving the applicant’s son of his life. He was sentenced to one year and nine months’ imprisonment, fined 1,250 Lithuanian litai (LTL, approximately 361.48 euros (EUR)) and barred from employment with law enforcement authorities for a period of five years. The court also awarded the applicant pecuniary damages against the Ministry of Interior in the amount of LTL 5,216.30 (approximately EUR 1,508.47) for funeral expenses. The court did not examine the applicant’s claim for non-pecuniary damage, having ruled that she was entitled to satisfaction of that claim in separate civil proceedings. 16.  On 4 June 2003 the Šiauliai Regional Court reclassified the charge of exceeding official duties (Article 287 of the Criminal Code in force until 1 May 2003) to that of abuse of office (Article 228 § 1 of the new Criminal Code, in force since 1 May 2003), finding T.B. guilty on the latter count. The conviction for manslaughter remained unchanged. The court imposed a suspended sentence of two years’ imprisonment on T.B. The fine and the ban from employment with law enforcement authorities were also lifted. The court upheld the lower court’s conclusion that the applicant had a right to satisfaction of her claim in respect of non-pecuniary damage, but the amount of the award was to be decided in separate civil proceedings. 17.  On 20 June 2003, upon entry into force of the above judgment, T.B. was dismissed from his job in the police. 18.  The applicant appealed, claiming, inter alia, that T.B. should have been punished for murder. In this respect the applicant stated that T.B.’s acts should have been characterised by indirect intent rather than recklessness, as he had executed the criminal acts in a dangerous manner, without any effort on his part to protect the lives of other persons. She also claimed non-pecuniary damages in the amount of LTL 1,000,000. 19.  On 28 October 2003 the Supreme Court quashed the above judgment, returning the case for a fresh examination at appeal instance. The Supreme Court ruled in particular that the lower courts had failed to answer the applicant’s arguments under Article 6 of the Convention about the effectiveness of the investigation into the death in view of the allegedly mild sentence imposed on T.B. The Supreme Court noted that these complaints might also give rise to issues under Article 2 of the Convention. It was observed however that the applicant’s claim for non-pecuniary damage should be examined by civil, not criminal, courts. The Supreme Court also emphasised that the applicant’s allegations of murder had not been substantiated, T.B. having committed an offence by negligence rather than intentionally. 20.  On 12 January 2004 the Šiauliai Regional Court again found T.B. guilty of manslaughter (under Article 109 § 2 of the old Criminal Code) and abuse of office (Article 228 § 1 of the new Criminal Code). He was given a sentence of two years and six months’ imprisonment. The execution of the sentence was suspended for three years. The applicant’s claim of LTL 5,216.30 in reimbursement of pecuniary damage in relation to the funeral of her son was upheld. The court also confirmed that she had a right to an award in respect of non-pecuniary damage, but left the sum to be determined by way of a separate set of civil proceedings. The court further noted:
“The circumstances of the incident have been fully clarified and the evidence rightly assessed. The evidence shows that [T.B.] used his firearm ... with the aim of stopping the vehicle the driver of which had not complied with the lawful requirement to stop; at the moment when [T.B.] used his gun there was no danger to life or limb for him or anyone else, as the car had already driven some forty metres from the point where it had been stopped; furthermore the policemen were not precluded from chasing the offender in the police car, in order to stop him without recourse to firearms. (...) [T.B.] endangered the life of the car passengers, exceeded his official duties and consciously acted in defiance of his duty of care, set out in Article 25 of the Police Activities Act ... which defines the conditions for using firearms as an exceptional measure of coercion. (...)
By contrast, there is no indication that [T.B.] breached Article 25 § 4 of the Police Activities Act, as he had fired his shots at the tyres of the car which had already moved away from the people. Nor is there any evidence that [T.B.] knew about the presence of the minors in the car, that he aimed at causing the death of the car driver or was indifferent to the fact that he might cause it.
[T.B.] had been familiar with all the normative acts regarding his duties, inter alia those determining the use of [firearms]; he had undergone shooting training. However, [T.B.] irresponsibly overestimated his skills and acted unlawfully, aiming at the tyres of the car which was swiftly moving away. Such actions were correctly classified as manslaughter.” 21.  The court found no procedural irregularities in the investigation or trial. As to the alleged bias on the part of the judges, it noted that the applicant had not requested the withdrawal of a particular judge. To the extent that the applicant complained of the excessive length of the proceedings, the Šiauliai Regional Court considered that she had not indicated any substantial periods of inaction by the courts, and that her complaint about the alleged delay in the pre-trial investigation could not be a ground for quashing the lower court decisions, as this could only further prolong the proceedings. It was concluded that these, as well as other complaints of the applicant under Articles 2 and 6 of the Convention, were better suited for examination by way of civil proceedings for non-pecuniary damages. 22.  On 13 February 2004 the applicant submitted a cassation appeal against this judgment. By reference to Articles 2 and 6 of the Convention, the applicant reiterated that the proceedings had lasted too long, that the courts had not been impartial, that they had wrongly established the evidence, that T.B. should have been found guilty of murder, that his punishment had been totally inadequate, and that her claim for non-pecuniary damage should have been allowed by the criminal courts. 23.  On 1 June 2004 the Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s cassation appeal. The court ruled that the proceedings had been fair and impartial in compliance with the requirements of Article 6 of the Convention in that the applicant had been provided with all procedural guarantees. Her claims for non-pecuniary damages were duly left to be decided by way of civil proceedings as the criminal procedure rules applicable at the material time provided only for assessment of the pecuniary damage (Article 65 of the old Code of Criminal Procedure). The Supreme Court opined that the length of the proceedings at the appellate instance was justified by the legal and factual complexity of the case. Finally, regarding the severity of the punishment imposed on T.B. the court stated:
“The general grounds for imposition of punishment provided for in Article 54 of the Criminal Code require a court to impose a punishment within the limits provided for in the sanction of an article of the criminal law which enshrines liability for the criminal act; it also requires it to take into consideration the extent to which the activity was dangerous, as well as its motivation and objectives, the form of guilt, the personality of the accused, and the circumstances relieving or aggravating the liability. The [lower] court was following the provisions enshrined in the said norm and did not make a mistake; the court, upon taking into consideration the circumstances positively characterising the personality of the convicted person, reasonably imposed a punishment near the medium of the punishment provided for in the sanction for negligent deprivation of life (...). By suspending the sentence of imprisonment for the negligent crime committed by the convicted person the court was following the rules provided for in Article 75 of the Criminal Code. The punishment imposed is relevant to its purpose (...) and does not contradict the principle of justice. Therefore, there is no ground to conclude that in the present criminal case while imposing punishment on the convicted person criminal law was not applied properly.”