5.  The first applicant was born in 1949 and lives in Vilnius. The second applicant was born in 1955 and according to the most recently available data, also lives in Vilnius. 6.  In 1994 the Vilnius City municipality assigned a plot of land measuring 0.08 hectares to the first applicant for the construction of an individual house. At the same time similar plots were assigned to other private persons. In accordance with the provisions of the domestic law in force and because of his status as a deportee’s family member, the first applicant was entitled to acquire the plot of land. 7.  On 5 September 1995 the first applicant and the Vilnius Region Administration signed a contract by which he purchased the plot of land from the State. He paid 422 Lithuanian litai (LTL; approximately 122 euros (EUR)) and 423 “single-use investment vouchers” (investiciniai čekiai). 8.  Subsequently, the first applicant registered the plot of land in his name in the land registry. 9.  In 10 April 1997 the first applicant sold the plot for LTL 6,000 (about EUR 1,740) to the second applicant, who then registered the plot of land in his own name. 10.  On an unspecified date the second applicant brought a claim before the courts against a private person, R.A., alleging that his right to peaceful enjoyment of his possession had been breached. The second applicant claimed that he had been unable to use his land because R.A., who lived next to the plot of land, had unlawfully put a fence around it. 11.  R.A. lodged a counterclaim against both applicants, requesting the annulment of the land sale contracts of 1995 and 1997 (see paragraphs 7 and 9 above), together with the decisions of the authorities. R.A. claimed restoration in natura of her ownership rights to the disputed plot of land, as it was part of her father’s land which had been nationalised by the Soviet authorities. R.A. had requested the restoration of her property rights in 1991, and in 1999 her rights had been restored in natura, but only to a part of her father’s plot of land. 12.  The courts at two instances granted the second applicant’s claim and dismissed R.A.’s counterclaim, noting that under the Law on the Procedure and Conditions of the Restoration of the Rights of Ownership to the Existing Real Property (įstatymas “Dėl piliečių nuosavybės teisių į išlikusį nekilnojamąjį turtą atstatymo tvarkos ir sąlygų”; hereinafter “Law on Restitution I”) in 1994, R.A. had been entitled to restitution in natura of not more than 0.2 hectares of land. The local authorities had taken this circumstance into consideration when assigning the plot of land to the first applicant. The fact that under the new Law on the Restoration of the Rights of Ownership of Citizens to the Existing Real Property (Piliečių nuosavybės teisių į išlikusį nekilnojamąjį turtą atkūrimo įstatymas; hereinafter “Law on Restitution II”) in force after 1 July 1997 R.A. was entitled to restoration in natura of up to 1 hectare of land was not considered as meaning that the decisions adopted by the local authorities in 1994-95 were automatically invalid. 13.  R.A. appealed against those court decisions to the cassation court. By a final decision of 27 November 2002 the Supreme Court overturned the decisions of the lower courts. By applying the principle of priority for former owners’ rights that had been developed in the civil case P. Roževičienė v. Panevėžio miesto valdyba and others, no. 3K-3-384/1999, the Supreme Court concluded that the local authorities in 1994-95 had not been allowed to sell plots of land to third persons before ownership rights had been restored. The court also indicated that the applicants had acted in “bad faith” (nesąžiningai) when purchasing the disputed plot of land; however, the court decision did not substantiate the first applicant’s “bad faith”. As concerns the second applicant’s “bad faith”, the Supreme Court assumed that he had known about the third persons’ rights to the land. 14.  By the above-mentioned decision of the Supreme Court the contracts of 1995 and 1997, together with the decision of 1994 to assign the disputed plot, were annulled and the plot was returned to the State. The first applicant had to return LTL 6,000 to the second applicant, the amount which he had received from the latter for the plot. The State had to return LTL 422 to the first applicant; none of the “single-use investment vouchers” were returned to him, as they no longer had any pecuniary value at the time of the Supreme Court’s decision. 15.  Alleging that they had incurred a loss following the decision of the Supreme Court, the applicants applied to the National Land Service (Nacionalinė žemės tarnyba) in 2004 with requests to be assigned a new plot of land of the same size and value. Their requests were dismissed. 16.  The applicants applied to the administrative courts. They argued that they had acquired the plot of land in good faith. The applicants had been deprived of the property by a decision of the Supreme Court, and the sums that had been awarded had not adequately compensated for the damage sustained. In particular, the first applicant alleged that the court had not awarded the full value of the property, given that part of the price had been paid in “single-use investment vouchers”. To compensate for their loss, the applicants asked to be assigned a new plot of land. 17.  On 1 October 2004 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court dismissed the claim. On 19 January 2005 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld that decision. The courts noted that the provisions of the domestic law under which the first applicant had been assigned the plot of land were no longer in force. As concerned the second applicant, he was not eligible under the domestic law to be assigned a plot of land either. 18.  On 15 August 2005 the first applicant complied with the Supreme Court’s decision of 27 November 2002 and paid the second applicant LTL 6,000. 19.  The applicants subsequently applied to the civil courts with a claim for damages against the Vilnius City municipality. 20.  On 29 September 2005 the Vilnius City First District Court dismissed the applicants’ claim having reiterated that the applicants had purchased the plot of land in “bad faith”. It appears that the applicants did not appeal against that decision.