6.  On 24 February 1997 T., a six-year old boy, described to S., a psychologist, that he had experienced improper touching while in day care and referred to the applicant in this connection. The interview was recorded on videotape in the Family Advice Centre. 7.  The next day the alleged offence was reported to the police. On 13 March 1997, T. was interviewed again by S., on that occasion in the course of the pre-trial investigation which had been opened. That interview was also recorded on videotape. 8.  The applicant was questioned on 26 and 27 March 1997. He was not aware of the existence of the above recordings. 9.  On 7 April 1997 S. submitted a written opinion on the credibility of T.'s statements. 10.  In his closing argument on an unspecified date the applicant contested the alleged improper touching. He noted that the videotape, which he had become aware of following the submission by S. of the above-mentioned written opinion, and the opinion itself, were indirect evidence, which in the light of the Convention had to be treated with extreme care. He questioned whether the questions put to the boy had not been leading in nature. He also submitted that the boy would have to be heard in court, should charges be brought. He did not request an additional investigation. 11.  The applicant was charged with having indecently touched the boy when working at a day nursery which the boy attended. The alleged offence had taken place repeatedly over a period of several months beginning in the autumn of 1996. 12.  The video recording was played back in the District Court (käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten) and the court heard evidence from the applicant, T.'s mother and S., the psychologist who had interviewed the boy. H., a doctor in psychology specialising in criminology and forensic psychology, who had not interviewed the boy herself, was also heard as a witness. Several other witnesses, including the applicant's colleagues and the parents of other children in day care, gave testimony. None of the witnesses made any observations on the alleged acts. The parents gave evidence only on the perceived changes in their children's personality. The psychologist testified only about the reliability of T.'s statements. 13.  On 29 October 1997 the District Court convicted the applicant of sexual abuse and sentenced him to a suspended term of seven months' imprisonment. It reasoned:
“... 14.  The applicant, the prosecution and the complainant appealed, arguing that the lower court had based his conviction on T.'s testimony as given to his mother and also later recorded on videotape. He requested the appellate court to hold that this indirect evidence could not be used in evidence. He also repeated his view that leading questions may have been put to the boy. He stated that his right to examine witnesses had been violated as he had not had an opportunity to put questions to T. 15.  On 26 June 1998 the Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten), having held an oral hearing, upheld the conviction but increased the sentence to fourteen months' imprisonment with immediate effect. It found that the technical quality of the videotape, which had been played back in the court, was poor as regards its image and sound reproduction and that the contents of T.'s statements could not be reliably assessed merely on the basis of that recording. The recording however showed that S. had carried out the interview without any preconceived idea of its outcome. The statements of two of the applicant's colleagues showed that it would have been possible for the applicant to have acted as described in the indictment without anyone noticing. The statements of T.'s mother and other day care children's parents showed that there had been changes in their children's behaviour after they had been in contact with the applicant. The court did not mention the applicant's argument that he had not been able to put questions to T. 16.  The applicant sought leave to appeal, arguing that he had not been afforded an opportunity to put questions to T. The indirect evidence should therefore have been rejected. 17.  On 25 September 1998 the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.