6.  The applicants were born in 1976 and 1986 respectively and live in Budapest. 7.  When introducing the application, the applicants were staff members of Eötvös Károly Közpolitikai Intézet, a non-governmental, “watchdog” organisation voicing criticism of the Government. The subsequent employer of one of the applicants was subjected to financial control measures by the Government in 2014, which according to the applicants verged on vexation. 8.  Act no. CXLVII of 2010 defines combating terrorism as one of the tasks of the police. Within the force, a specific Anti-Terrorism Task Force (“TEK”) was established as of 1 January 2011. Its competence is defined in section 7/E of Act no. XXXIV of 1994 on the Police, as amended by Act no. CCVII of 2011 (the “Police Act”). 9.  Under this legislation, TEK’s prerogatives in the field of secret intelligence gathering include secret house search and surveillance with recording, opening of letters and parcels, as well as checking and recording the contents of electronic or computerised communications, all this without the consent of the persons concerned. 10.  The authorisation process for these activities is dependent on the actual competence exercised by TEK, namely whether it is within the framework of secret surveillance linked to the investigation of certain specific crimes enumerated in the law (section 7/E (2)) or to secret surveillance within the framework of intelligence gathering for national security (section 7/E (3)). 11.  Whereas the scenario under section 7/E (2) is as such subject to judicial authorisation, the one under section 7/E (3) is authorised by the Minister in charge of justice, (i) in order to prevent terrorist acts or in the interests of Hungary’s national security or (ii) in order to rescue Hungarian citizens from capture abroad in war zones or in the context of terrorist acts. 12.  “Section 7/E (3) surveillance” takes place under the rules of the National Security Act under the condition that the necessary intelligence cannot be obtained in any other way. Otherwise, the law does not contain any particular rules on the circumstances in which this measure can be ordered, as opposed to “section 7/E (2) surveillance”, which is conditional on the suspicion of certain serious crimes. The time-frame of “section 7/E (3) surveillance” is 90 days, which can be prolonged for another 90-day period by the Minister; however, the latter has no right to know about the results of the ongoing surveillance when called on to decide on its prolongation. Once the surveillance is terminated, the law imposes no specific obligation on the authorities to destroy any irrelevant intelligence obtained. 13.  The applicants filed a constitutional complaint on 15 June 2012, arguing in essence that the sweeping prerogatives under section 7/E (3) infringed their constitutional right to privacy. They emphasised that the legislation on secret surveillance measures for national security purposes provided fewer safeguards for the protection of the right to privacy than the provision on secret surveillance linked to the investigation of particular crimes. They pointed out that (i) “section 7/E (2) surveillance” was always linked to a particular crime and could only be ordered for the purposes of identifying or locating suspects, whereas “section 7/E (3) surveillance” was not linked to any particular crime; (ii) “section 7/E (2) surveillance” was always ordered by the court, whereas “section 7/E (3) surveillance” was authorised by the government minister in charge of justice; (iii) the decision on ordering “section 7/E (2) surveillance” was subject to detailed reasoning, whereas no reasoning was included in the minister’s decision on ordering “section 7/E (3) surveillance”; and (iv) under the legislation relating to “section 7/E (2) surveillance”, all collected but irrelevant information had to be destroyed within eight days, unlike in the case of “section 7/E (3) surveillance”. 14.  On 18 November 2013 the Constitutional Court dismissed the majority of the applicants’ complaints. In one aspect the Constitutional Court agreed with the applicants, namely, it held that the decision of the minister ordering secret intelligence gathering had to be supported by reasons. However, the Constitutional Court held in essence that the scope of national security-related tasks was much broader that the scope of the tasks related to the investigation of particular crimes. For the purpose of national security, the events of real life were examined not for their criminal law relevance; therefore they might not necessarily be linked to a particular crime. Furthermore, in the context of national security, the external control of any surveillance authorised by the minister was exercised by Parliament’s National Security Committee (which had the right to call the minister to give account both in general terms and in concrete cases) and by the Ombudsman, and that this scheme was sufficient to guarantee respect for the constitutional right to privacy of those concerned. Finally, the Constitutional Court was of the opinion that the National Security Act, which applies to “section 7/E (3) surveillance”, contained general provisions on ex officio deletion of any data unnecessary for achieving the aim underlying the gathering of intelligence. 15.  This decision was published in the Official Gazette on 22 November 2013.