4.  The applicant was born in 1951 in Moutoullas, Cyprus and lives in Nicosia. 5.  On 12 March 1996 the police received complaints to the effect that the applicant had been involved in fraudulent behaviour in February 1994. The police then commenced their investigation and on an unspecified date they obtained a written statement from the applicant. On 23 September 1996 the results of the investigation were submitted to the Attorney-General to decide whether to prosecute the applicant. On 3 November 1996 he decided not to proceed with prosecution. Following the receipt of further complaints against the applicant’s conduct, the investigation file was sent for a second time to the Attorney-General. On 15 May 1998 the Attorney-General issued new instructions to the police to commence a new cycle of investigations. On 16 June 1998 the applicant and his wife were charged with several counts of forgery and obtaining funds through misrepresentation. On 18 September 1998 criminal proceedings were brought against them before the District Court of Nicosia. 6.  On 14 October 1998 the applicant and his wife pleaded not guilty, and the case was set for hearing on 20 November 1998. On that date the case was adjourned, on the applicant’s request, for 13 January 1999. On the basis of the applicant’s request it was further adjourned for 19 February 1999 and then for 8 March 1999. The case was adjourned on two subsequent occasions. On 19 March 1999 the applicant changed his lawyer and requested an adjournment so that his new lawyer could prepare his case. The hearing was set for 25 May 1999. A further adjournment was requested by the applicant for the same reasons and the case was set for 30 June 1999. The hearing was then adjourned twice due to the change of judge and on the request by the prosecution. A further adjournment request was made by the applicant on 11 November 1999 and the case was set for hearing on 23 November 1999. On that date the applicant’s new lawyer had to withdraw from the proceedings and the applicant requested a further adjournment to appoint a new lawyer. 7.  The case was thus set for directions on 29 November 1999. On that date a new lawyer appeared on behalf of the applicant who requested an adjournment of the case so that he could prepare the applicant’s defence. The case was adjourned for 6 December 1999 when the applicant requested an adjournment. On 14 December 1999 the applicant appeared without a lawyer and requested an adjournment until 17 December 1999 so that he could find another lawyer. On 17 December 1999 the applicant’s new lawyer requested another adjournment so that he could file a request for the applicant’s discharge due to the unreasonable delay in the proceedings. On 23 December 1999 the court heard the parties’ addresses in this respect. On 21 January 2000 the court issued an interim decision by which it rejected the applicant’s request for discharge. 8.  The hearing of the case eventually commenced on 28 February 2000 but was subsequently adjourned on several occasions. On 29 November 2000 the applicant argued that his written statement should not be admitted in trial and the issue was examined in a trial within trial. The court issued its interim decision in this respect on 4 April 2001 when the main trial was resumed. Following a number of adjournments the hearing was completed on 9 July 2002. Judgment was delivered on 6 November 2002, finding the applicant guilty of certain of the charges brought against him and on 11 November 2002 he was sentenced to fifteen months’ imprisonment. The court accepted that there had been unjustified delay in the proceedings but noted that it was not of such an exceptional nature as to require the applicant’s discharge. The length of the proceedings was taken as a mitigating factor in the imposition of the sentence. In this regard it was noted that given the seriousness of the offences committed by the applicant a sentence of imprisonment was required. From a maximum sentence of three years’ imprisonment a sentence of fifteen months’ imprisonment was imposed. Counsel for the applicant accepted in his plea for mitigation that the delay was not such as to require the applicant’s discharge. 9.  On an unspecified date the applicant lodged an appeal against his conviction and sentence, and contended, inter alia, that there had been a violation of his right to determination of the criminal charges brought against him within a reasonable time. 10.  The Supreme Court delivered its judgment on 1 June 2004, by which it dismissed the applicant’s appeal. The court held in its majority judgment that there had been no violation of his right to a fair trial within reasonable time. The period to be taken into account had started on 16 June 1998 when the applicant was charged and finished when his criminal liability had been determined, on 6 November 2002. It had thus lasted for four years and five months. Having established that the case was of a complex nature, the Supreme Court noted that a significant part of the delay was to be attributed to the applicant, who had only managed to find a representative after a period of fourteen months had elapsed, and had requested at least eleven adjournments of the hearing of the case; there had been no period of inactivity. 11.  A dissenting judge found that the applicant’s right to a fair trial within reasonable time had been violated and noted that, in his view, the applicant should have been discharged.