8.  The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Wrocław, Poland. 9.  In 1994 two sets of criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant. The first involved a charge of theft, the second a charge of forgery. The second proceedings, which were the object of the present application, began on 14 January 1994. On that day the applicant was arrested and charged with forgery. He was released after 48 hours. As from 3 March 1994 the police unsuccessfully tried to summon him in order to take evidence from him. 10.  On 13 October 1994 the applicant was arrested by the police under a warrant of arrest, issued on 22 June 1994 along with a “wanted” notice. He was then brought before the Wrocław District Prosecutor (Prokurator Rejonowy). The applicant made his escape while the prosecutor was taking evidence from him. 11.  On 12 December 1994 the applicant was re-arrested by the police and brought before the Wrocław-Fabryczna District Prosecutor. He was charged with five counts of burglary and one count of escaping from lawful custody. On the same day the prosecutor detained him on remand for three months. 12.  On 3 January 1995 the investigation was taken over by the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor (Prokurator Wojewódzki). 13.  On 13 June 1995 the Regional Prosecutor charged the applicant with forgery, escaping from lawful custody and seven counts of burglary. 14.  The investigation involved 6 suspects, including the applicant. The prosecution obtained evidence from several witnesses, 17 reports from experts in mechanics and evidence from experts in graphology. 15.  During the investigation, at the request of the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor, the Wrocław Regional Court (Sąd Wojewódzki) on three occasions prolonged the applicant’s detention. The last of the relevant decisions was given on 30 August 1995 and extended the applicant’s detention until 10 December 1995. 16.  In all those decisions the Regional Court relied on the reasonable suspicion that the applicant had committed the offences with which he had been charged and their serious nature. It also held that his detention was necessary to ensure the proper course of the proceedings, in particular as during the investigation evidence needed to be obtained from other suspects, experts and numerous witnesses. 17.  On 8 December 1995 the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor lodged a bill of indictment with the Wrocław Regional Court. The applicant was indicted on charges of handling stolen goods, forgery of documents and escaping from lawful custody. 18.  Between December 1995 and the end of 1996 the applicant lodged numerous applications for release. In particular, he asked to be released on bail. All those applications were dismissed, both at first instance and on appeal. 19.  Neither the applicant, nor his lawyer participated in any of the sessions held by the courts in connection with his applications for release or his subsequent appeals. The sessions were held in camera. The prosecution authorities were informed of session dates and were represented either by a regional prosecutor or a prosecutor of appeal. It was recorded in the minutes of the sessions held on 19 February and 27 June 1996 before the Wrocław Regional Court and on 9 September 1996 before the Wrocław Court of Appeal that the courts made their decisions after having heard the prosecutor’s arguments. The grounds invoked by the courts are stated below. 20.  On 19 February 1996 the Wrocław Regional Court, ruling on the applicant’s application of 12 February 1996, found that:
“... in the light of evidence there is a sufficient likelihood that [the applicant] committed the offences with which is charged [. A] serious danger to society represented by these offences and need to secure the proper conduct of the criminal proceedings, in particular as [he] absconded at the investigative stage of the proceedings, give grounds for his continuing detention.” 21.  The first hearing on the merits was to be held on 22 March 1996 but it was adjourned to 23 May 1996 since one of the applicant’s co-defendants had failed to appear. On 23 May 1996 the trial was postponed to 8 August 1996 because 3 of the applicant’s co-defendants had failed to appear. 22.  On 27 June 1996, the Regional Court rejected two further applications for release, lodged by the applicant on 24 and 25 June 1996 respectively. It held the following:
“... in the light of evidence there is a sufficient likelihood that [the applicant] committed the offences with which he is charged [. A] serious danger to society created by these offences and need to secure the proper conduct of the criminal proceedings give grounds for continuing detention[;] on the other hand, having regard to the fact that [the applicant] absconded at the investigative stage of the proceedings, the possibility of varying the preventive measure cannot be taken into account.” 23.  On 8 August 1996, at the first hearing on the merits held in the applicant’s case, the Regional Court rejected his subsequent application for release. On 9 September 1996 the Wrocław Court of Appeal (Sąd Apelacyjny) dismissed the applicant’s appeal against this decision, holding that:
“In his appeal [the applicant] argues that he has already been detained for 20 months and considers that in view of the fact that the trial has begun, he should be released. He also refers to his arrears in child support obligations and to [the situation of] his mother, on whom he [previously] attended.
This court has taken account of the following:
The period spent by [the applicant] in detention is indeed very long. However, there is no error in [the lower] court’s finding that this is not in itself a particular circumstance which would be a ground for not continuing his detention, as referred to in the first sentence of Article 218 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. There is no basis on which to refute the Regional Court’s statements expressing its concern about the proper conduct of the trial without [detention] being imposed on [the applicant]. In the course of the investigation [he] was elusive for the investigating authority and he was twice searched for by a “wanted” notice (see p. 15, volume I). [The applicant’s] detention still has a basis within the meaning of Article 217 § 1 of the [Code of Criminal Procedure] and the circumstances upon which he relies do not suffice for the Court of Appeal to question the decision of the Regional Court in respect of the preventive measure imposed on [him].
The case has now reached the stage of the opening of the trial and the subsequent hearings (the dates of which have already been fixed) will soon be held. Accordingly, it is likely that the case will in a short time be terminated which – still more – justifies [an opinion] that the contested decision of the Regional Court should be upheld. ...” 24.  On 27 September 1996 the court held the second hearing. Subsequently, it listed hearings for 20 November 1996 (cancelled as two of the applicant’s co-defendants failed to appear), 28 January 1997 (cancelled as the case-file had been sent to the Supreme Court) and 18 March 1997 (cancelled as one of the co-defendants failed to appear). 25.  Meanwhile, on 31 December 1996 the Regional Court had made an application under Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy), asking it to prolong the applicant’s detention until 24 June 1997. The application was posted to the Supreme Court on 10 January 1997. 26.  On 24 January 1997 a panel of three judges, sitting in camera as the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court, after obtaining oral comments from the State Prosecutor (Prokurator Krajowy), who represented the prosecution, granted the application and prolonged the applicant’s detention “from 24 January 1997 to 24 June 1997”. The Supreme Court’s decision contained exhaustive reasons, the relevant part of which may be summarised as follows:
The Supreme Court, noting that the application was filed on 31 December 1996 but posted as late as 10 January 1997, first considered what was the proper date of “lodging” such an application for the purposes of Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The Supreme Court next observed that, depending on the answer to this question, it would have to determine the legal consequences of a potential failure on the part of the Wrocław Regional Court to respect the rule laid down in section 10 (a) § 2 of the Interim Law of 1 December 1995, which stated that in cases where no application for a further prolongation of detention on remand had been “lodged”, detention had to be lifted no later than on 1 January 1997.
The Supreme Court considered that it should also deal with the question whether it was competent to rule on the application if it had been “lodged” after the deadline referred to in section 10 (a) of the Interim Law of 1 December 1995, i.e. after 1 January 1997.
Referring to the first question, the Supreme Court held that the proper date of “lodging” an application under Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure had to be deemed to be either the date of posting the application or the date of submitting it to the registry of the Supreme Court since to hold otherwise would mean leaving a detainee without any guarantee that the Supreme Court was properly supervising his detention. Moreover, if the requesting court was not bound by any time-limits for submitting its request, detention, the most severe among the preventive measures, might continue for an unspecified and unlimited time outside the Supreme Court’s supervision. In consequence, an application under Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, a mere “proposal” to continue detention, would, for all practical purposes, transform into a basis for continuing detention. Clearly, it was not the intention of the legislator.
The Supreme Court therefore concluded that since in the applicant’s case no application for a further prolongation of his detention had been lodged before 1 January 1997, the order for his detention should have been quashed at latest on that day. Accordingly, his detention from that date to the date on which the Supreme Court was giving the present decision lacked any legal basis and was, consequently, unlawful. The court noted that such an “unlawful” detention might justify granting compensation for unlawful deprivation of liberty if this period were not deducted from the future sentence.
The Supreme Court went on to find that it was, nevertheless, competent to deal with the application. A lower court’s obligation to release a detainee in case of its failure properly to lodge an application under Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was one thing but its right to make such an application at any time was another. In the Supreme Court’s opinion, the application in question should be deemed a “fresh request” and be examined as such.
The Supreme Court then dealt with the application and found that further prolongation of the applicant’s detention was necessary. It relied on the likelihood that the applicant had committed the offences with which he had been charged and the risk of his absconding or going into hiding which, in its view, was justified by the fact that the applicant had already absconded after having been arrested and had been searched for by a “wanted” notice. Lastly, the Supreme Court stressed the complexity of the case. 27.  On 16 May 1997 the court held a hearing and heard evidence from witnesses. On 18 June 1997 the Regional Court held the next hearing. On the same day it made the second application under Article 222 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the Supreme Court, asking it to prolong the applicant’s detention until 24 December 1997. On 8 August 1997 the Supreme Court granted the application. It held a session in camera. Before taking its decision, it heard arguments of the State Prosecutor. The decision read, in so far as relevant:
“... the principal charge laid against [the applicant] concerns the offence of handling stolen goods of a high value. A severe penalty, that is, a sentence of up to 10 years’ imprisonment may be imposed for the commission of this offence ... The charges against the applicant have a degree of likelihood, as required by Article 209 of [the Code of Criminal Procedure], in particular in view of the testimonies given by the co-defendants Ł[...], L[...] and B[...] as well as [evidence] which has so far been heard from witnesses. Given that [the applicant], after having been arrested, had on one occasion fled and was then searched for by a “wanted” notice, there is a risk of his absconding or going into hiding. ... Accordingly, his detention has its basis under Article 217 § 1(1) and § 2. In the present case there is a need to take various evidence, in particular from witnesses. The process of obtaining evidence is lengthy and, as it emerges from the case-file, it has been extended because of [the obstacles] which the [trial] court, despite its efforts, could not overcome. Consequently, there are grounds for further prolongation of detention, as defined in Article 222 § 4 of the [Code of Criminal Procedure]. ...” 28.  On 10 September 1997 the applicant applied to the Regional Court for his release. He relied on Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, submitting that his detention had clearly exceeded a “reasonable time”. On 11 September 1997 a panel of three judges, sitting in camera as the Wrocław Regional Court rejected the application. A.G., a regional prosecutor from the Wrocław Regional Prosecutor’s Office took part in the session and the court heard her arguments. The relevant decision comprises a four-line reasoning, which reads as follows:
“Since the grounds for continuing detention, mentioned in the decision of the Supreme Court of 8 August 1997 file no. V K0 42/97, are still valid and as there are no circumstances militating in favour of not continuing the preventive measure imposed, it has been held [as in the operative part of the decision].” 29.  On 18 September 1997 the court cancelled a hearing since one of the co-defendants had failed to appear. Further hearings were held on 30 September and 11 and 22 December 1997. 30.  On 22 December 1997 the applicant was released. 31.  A hearing listed for 17 March 1998 was cancelled due to the absence of one of the applicant’s co-defendants. On 11 September 1998 the trial came to an end. On 14 September 1998 the Regional Court delivered judgment. The applicant was convicted as charged and sentenced to 3 years’ and 2 months’ imprisonment. The period spent by him in pre-trial detention was deducted from the sentence to be served. 32.  On 24 September 1998 the applicant lodged a notice of appeal with the Regional Court. On 16 October 1998 the applicant’s counsel informed the court that the applicant did not intend to contest the judgment and withdrew his notice of appeal. In consequence, the judgment became final on 10 November 1998. 33.  On 2 December 1998 the applicant asked the Regional Court to grant him retrospective leave to appeal out of time. He maintained that his counsel had withdrawn the notice of appeal without his consent. On 25 February 1999 the court refused his application. The applicant later lodged two further appeals but, eventually, he withdrew his application for leave to appeal out of time on 2 September 1999. 34.  In his original submissions, the applicant maintained that for 17 months following the submission of the bill of indictment to the Regional Court (which took place on 8 December 1995) he had not, in principle, been allowed to maintain personal contact with his family. He asserted that particular restrictions had been placed on his personal contact with his mother. 35.  As it transpires from a letter from the Director of Legal Department of the Central Board of Prisons dated 10 October 2000 and copies of visit permissions given to the applicant’s brother and mother, from 4 February 1995 to 6 December 1995 the applicant’s mother was allowed to visit him in prison on 9 occasions (4 February; 15 March; 23 June; 28 July; 17 August; 13 September; 20 October; 22 November and 6 December 1995. The applicant’s brother was allowed to visit him in prison on 19 July and 27 December 1995. 36.  On 18 December 1995 the applicant’s mother asked the Regional Court to allow her to visit him in prison; in the same letter she stated that she would take advantage of her right to refuse to testify in the applicant’s case. On 20 December 1995 the court rejected her request and held that, on account of the fact that she had been called as a witness by the prosecution, no such permission could be granted as long as evidence from her had not been heard or, alternatively, as long as she refused to give evidence on the ground that she was not qualified to testify as a close relative. The court further stated that the applicant’s mother could refuse to testify only during a hearing in the case 37.  On 21 December 1995 the applicant asked the court to allow his mother to visit him in prison. The court refused on 10 January 1996. On 23 May 1996 the court allowed the applicant’s brother to visit him in prison. On 4 June 1996 the applicant again asked the court to allow his mother to visit him in prison. He also asked for permission to contact his family by phone. The court allowed him to make two phone calls but refused to give a visit permission to his mother since she had not yet given evidence before it. 38.  On 12 July 1996 the applicant asked the court to allow him to speak on the phone to his brother and son. In August, the court allowed him to make a phone call to the son but not to the brother. Overall, in 1996 the applicant was allowed to make three phone calls; two in June and one in August 39.  The applicant submits that the court permission to make phone calls was delivered too late to the prison authorities and, as a result, he could not make use of it. 40.  The applicant’s mother was allowed to resume visits on 16 May 1997 and then, up to 21 November 1997, she visited him 9 times (16 and 25 May; 8 and 15 June; 29 August; 12 September; 3 and 24 October and 21 November 1997). The applicant’s brother was allowed to visit him on 21 and 26 May 1996 and on 4 November 1997.