4.  The applicant was born in 1927 and lives in Simferopil. 5.  On 22 May 1992 the applicant was employed by a private company (“the Company”). No written documents concerning conditions of the employment were produced at the material time. 6.  On 1 July 1992 a contract was signed between the applicant, Mr I., the sole owner of the Company, and Mr G., referred to in the contract as the Company director. Pursuant this contract the applicant was entitled to 30% of the Company’s profits, which could be invested into the Company. The contract referred to the applicant as a co-founder of the Company. Subsequently the Company was re-organized, three individuals - the aforementioned Mr G. and Mr I., and a certain Mrs G. having been registered as its co-founders. 7.  In January 1997 the applicant resigned. According to a contract, signed on 1 August 1997 by him and Mr G., the Company was to pay the applicant the equivalent of 7,930 dollars (USD) in monthly instalments over a four-year period as the share of profit owed pursuant to the contract of July 1992. 8.  In 1998 the applicant instituted civil proceedings in the Kyivskiy District Court of Simferopil (the “District Court;” Київський районний суд м. Сімферополя) complaining that in December 1997 the Company had discontinued the monthly payments under the contract of August 1997. According to the applicant, the proceedings at issue were instituted on 14 March 1998. According to the Government, they were instituted on 28 April 1998. According to the text of the District Court judgment of 18 May 2000, which is the only case-file document referring to the date of the institution of the proceedings, they were instituted on 21 April 1998. 9.  Between August 1998 and September 1999 the court scheduled ten hearings, two of them being adjourned on account of the absence of the applicant’s representative, one on account of the parties’ absence, and one on account of court business. 10.  On 16 September 1999 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s claims, having found that the contracts of July 1992 and August 1997 were null and void. In particular, the court observed that labour legislation at the material time distinguished between ordinary open-ended employment agreements (трудовий договір), which could be concluded orally, and special written employment contracts (контракт), which, to be valid, had to comply with a number of formalities prescribed by law. The court held that the applicant had been hired on the basis of an oral employment agreement, since the contract of July 1992 lacked a number of essential clauses and had not been executed in accordance with necessary formalities. Furthermore, the contract falsely referred to the applicant as the Company co-founder and to Mr G. as the Company director. The court further found that the annulment of the contract of July 1992 entailed the annulment of the contract of August 1997, which referred to it, and that, furthermore, Mr G. needed the consent of the other co-founders to execute it. 11.  On 6 December 1999 the Supreme Court of the Crimea (the “Court of the Crimea;” Верховний суд Автономної Республіки Крим)[1] quashed the judgment of 16 September 1999 on the applicant’s appeal in cassation and referred the case to another District Court judge. In its reasoning, the court stated that the District Court had failed to carry out a comprehensive investigation into the facts and to ensure their proper assessment. In particular, it had failed to clarify the nature of the relationship between the parties and to determine which law was applicable. 12.  In March 2000 the applicant amended his claims, seeking default interest and other additional payments under the contracts of July 1992 and August 1997. He also claimed non-pecuniary damage on account of the delay in payment, as, being an indigent pensioner of an advanced age, he suffered from hearing loss and a number of other ailments and lacked funds for purchasing a hearing aid and other medical necessities. 13.  Between April and May 2000 the District Court scheduled three hearings. 14.  On 18 May 2000 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s claims, referring to essentially the same grounds, as in its earlier judgment. In particular, it found that the applicant’s employment had been pursuant an oral agreement, the contract of July 1992 lacked essential clauses and falsely referred to the applicant as a co-founder of the Company. Moreover, Mr G. had signed the contract ultra vires. The court further found that the annulment of the contract of July 1992 entailed the annulment of the contract of August 1997. 15.  On 14 June 2000 the Court of the Crimea quashed the judgment of 18 May 2000 on the applicant’s appeal in cassation and referred the case to another District Court judge. By way of reasoning, the Court of the Crimea stated that the District Court had failed to comply with its earlier instructions and urged the new judge to follow these instructions more thoroughly. 16.  On 4 August 2000 the judge, who rendered the judgment of 18 May 2000, petitioned the President of the Court of the Crimea to lodge a protest against the decision of 14 June 2000, insisting that her judgment had been properly reasoned. On 8 September 2000 her request was rejected. 17.  Between November 2000 and November 2001 the District Court scheduled ten hearings, four of them being adjourned on account of court business, two on account of the defendant’s absences and one to allow for the friendly settlement negotiations. 18.  On 5 November 2001 the District Court dismissed the applicant’s claims referring to essentially the same grounds, as in the previous judgments. In addition to the reasons for invalidating the contract of August 1997 mentioned in the judgment of 18 May 2000, the court held, similarly to what it had held in the judgment of 16 September 1999, that this contract could not be executed by a sole co-founder. 19.  On 16 January 2002 the Court of the Crimea upheld the judgment of 5 November 2001 on appeal. 20.  On 27 December 2002 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s request for leave to appeal in cassation.