8.  The facts of this case were subject to investigation before a private, non-statutory inquiry, which issued a report on 15 June 1998, setting out extensive findings of fact. As these were not contested by the parties, the Court has relied on the report in its own assessment of the facts below. 9.  Prior to his death, Christopher Edwards had shown signs of developing a serious mental illness. In 1991 a psychiatric assessment expressed the tentative diagnosis of schizophrenia. In July 1994 he stopped living at home with the applicants, his parents. At this time he stopped taking his medication. 10.  On 27 November 1994 Christopher Edwards, then 30 years old, was arrested in Colchester by the police and taken to Colchester police station. He had been approaching young women in the street and making inappropriate suggestions. His behaviour before arrest, and at the police station where he attempted to assault a policewoman, led police officers to suspect that he might be mentally ill. He was assessed at the police station by an approved social worker, who discussed the matter on the telephone with a consultant psychiatrist. They agreed that, while there was some evidence of possible developing schizophrenia, he did not need urgent medical attention and that he was fit to be detained at the police station. Any psychiatric assessment could take place as part of a pre-sentencing exercise. Christopher Edwards was held in a cell on his own. The police officer responsible did not fill in a CID2 form identifying Christopher Edwards as an exceptional risk on ground of mental illness due to the opinion expressed by the social worker. The police officer did, however, note in the confidential information form (MG6A) her belief that if Christopher Edwards was not treated or seen by the mental health team he might seriously harm a female. She was not aware that her own suspicion of his mental state was sufficient to warrant categorising Christopher Edwards as an exceptional risk. 11.  On 28 November 1994 Christopher Edwards was brought to Colchester Magistrates' Court. Immediately his handcuffs were removed, he pushed through the other prisoners and confronted a female prison officer. He was restrained, but struggled and tried to approach her again. He was placed in a cell on his own. During the morning, he continually banged on the cell door and shouted: “I want a woman.” He shouted obscenities about women. The applicants met the duty solicitor at about 9.45 a.m. and explained that their son was mentally unwell and that they wanted him to receive medical care and not to be remanded in custody. When the duty solicitor attempted to talk to Christopher Edwards in his cell, he received no assistance from his client who continued to make obscene suggestions about women. The duty solicitor discussed the problem with the Clerk to the Justices. 12.  On his way to court and in the courtroom, Christopher Edwards repeated his earlier comments about women. The prosecutor had in her possession the MG6A form and had been requested by the police to obtain his remand in custody as there was a risk that he would reoffend and there was a real question mark about his mental state. The prosecutor informed the court that he was perceived as a risk to women, although it is unclear how much detail was given. She relied on the fact that an assessment by a psychiatrist had not yet been carried out in support of her application. Consideration was given by the Bench, together with the prosecutor, duty solicitor and Justice's Clerk as to whether he could be remanded to hospital. It was concluded that there was no power to do so under section 30 of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980. No consideration was given, inter alia, to the application of civil provisions (sections 2, 3 or 4 of the Mental Health Act 1983) or to section 35 of the 1983 Act, which provided for remand to a hospital for assessment. 13.  The magistrates decided to remand Christopher Edwards in custody for three days, which was a shorter period than usual, bringing forward the date to 1 December so that instructions could be taken and legal aid forms completed. Further consideration would then be given, inter alia, to the obtaining of a psychiatric report. After the hearing, the first applicant telephoned the probation service in Colchester and expressed concern about his son's mental health. He was advised to contact Chelmsford Prison. He rang the probation officer at the prison and informed her of his son's medical history. Her telephone note indicated that she had been told that he had been prescribed stelazine, though he had been refusing to take it or accept that he was mentally ill. The probation officer visited the health care centre and spoke to the senior medical officer, Dr F. Although there was later dispute as to how much detail she passed on to the doctor, he recalled being informed that Christopher Edwards was considered to be a risk to women. However, having regard to the psychiatric social worker's comments that Christopher Edwards was fit for detention in a police station and the fact that the court had not ordered any psychiatric reports, he stated that he would not interfere with the usual admissions procedure which meant that Christopher Edwards would be screened on arrival in the usual way and his location in the prison would depend on the result of that process. Neither he nor the probation officer passed on any of this information to the reception staff. 14.  A prison officer returning to Chelmsford Prison from the Magistrates' Court informed the officer in charge of reception staff that a female prison officer had been assaulted by a prisoner who was due to arrive later that day. The police officers at the Magistrates' Court custody area suspected from his behaviour that Christopher Edwards was mentally abnormal and might be a threat to women and decided to warn the prison staff. A police officer rang and spoke to the senior officer at the prison reception and told him, inter alia, that the magistrates had wanted to remand Christopher Edwards to a mental hospital and that he had assaulted a female prison officer. The senior officer was concerned at this information and contacted the Magistrates' Court to verify whether he was being remanded under a normal warrant. He also spoke to the duty governor about the allocation of Christopher Edwards and it was decided, subject to the health care screening, that he should be located on wing D-1 where no female officers worked. 15.  In the late afternoon, Christopher Edwards was taken to Chelmsford Prison. The reception staff were aware of the information passed on from the police at the Magistrates' Court and that he was a potential danger to women. He was placed in a holding area while the other prison arrivals were processed. His behaviour was noted as “strange” and “odd” and when being placed in the holding cell he was aggressive and tried to punch a prison officer. After two hours he was screened by Mr N., a member of the prison health care staff, who saw no reason to admit him to the health care centre. Mr N. knew nothing about previous discussions in the court or the concerns passed on to the prison about Christopher Edwards's mental health. He was only aware that Christopher Edwards was alleged to have assaulted a female police constable. Mr N. followed the standard questionnaire. To question 5 (Have you ever been seen by a psychiatrist?), the answer was “three years ago”. Christopher Edwards did not disclose that he had been taking stelazine. There was no evidence of active mental disturbance or bizarre behaviour during the interview, which was unlikely to have lasted more than ten minutes. No medical officer was on duty at the centre at this time, or was present in the prison. Christopher Edwards was admitted to the main prison and placed in cell D1-6. 16.  He was detained in a cell on his own during this period. 17.  Meanwhile, Richard Linford was arrested in Maldon on 26 November 1994 for assaulting his friend and her neighbour. At Maldon police station, he was seen by a police surgeon as it was suspected that he was mentally ill. The police surgeon certified that Richard Linford was not fit to be detained. Richard Linford was assessed by a psychiatric registrar who consulted on the telephone with a consultant psychiatrist, who decided that he did not need to be admitted to hospital and that he was fit to be detained. Richard Linford was transferred to Chelmsford police station, where the police surgeon also found him fit to be detained. While his conduct before and after arrest was bizarre, it was attributed by the doctors to the effects of alcohol abuse, amphetamine withdrawal and to a deliberate attempt to manipulate the criminal justice system. The registrar, who had previously treated Richard Linford, knew that he had been diagnosed at various times as suffering from schizophrenia or as having a personality disorder, but also knew him as someone who became ill when abusing alcohol and drugs. Over the weekend, Richard Linford showed further bizarre behaviour and was violent towards police officers. He was not reassessed by a doctor. No CID2 form was filled in, although police officers remained of the opinion that he was mentally ill. On 28 November 1994 Richard Linford was remanded in custody by Chelmsford Magistrates' Court. The magistrates were presented with a “sane but dangerous” description of him. Richard Linford arrived at Chelmsford Prison shortly after Christopher Edwards, where he was screened by the same member of the prison health care service who had seen Christopher Edwards and who saw no reason to admit him to the health care centre. Richard Linford did not behave in a bizarre fashion during the screening. Mr N. did not have knowledge of Richard Linford's previous convictions, which would have alerted him to his admittance to hospital in 1988. 18.  Initially, Richard Linford was placed in cell D1-11 on his own. He was then moved into cell D1-6 with Christopher Edwards. This was due to shortage of space, as all the other cells on the landing were doubly occupied. 19.  Each cell had a green emergency light situated on the wall outside the cell next to the door which came on when the call button was depressed inside the cell. Additionally, once the button was pressed, a buzzer sounded on the landing and a red light lit up on a control panel in the office on the landing concerned, indicating the cell. The red light remained on and the buzzer continued to sound even if the prisoner ceased to press the button. At 9 p.m., either Christopher Edwards or Richard Linford pressed the call button. A prison officer saw the green light outside the cell and was told that they wished one of the cell lights, operated from the exterior, to be switched off. He agreed to do so. He saw that the two men appeared to be “getting on all right”. He noticed that while the green light had gone on the buzzer which should have been sounding continuously had not done so. He did not report the apparent defect. 20.  Shortly before 1 a.m. on 29 November 1994, a prison officer heard a buzzer sound. He saw no red light on the D-landing control panel and saw a prison officer go to check the other landings. Some time later, he heard continuous banging on a cell door on his landing. On going to investigate he saw the green light on outside cell D1-6. Looking through the spy hole, he saw Richard Linford holding a bloodstained plastic fork and noticed blood on the floor and on Linford's feet. There was a delay of five minutes while officers donned protective clothing. They entered the cell to find that Christopher Edwards had been stamped and kicked to death. Richard Linford was making continual reference to being possessed by evil spirits and devils. D-landing had previously been patrolled at 12.43 a.m., which indicated that up to seventeen minutes could have elapsed since the pressing of the cell's call button. 21.  At the time of the attack, Richard Linford was acutely mentally ill. He was transferred later on 29 November 1994 to Rampton Special Hospital. 22.  On 21 April 1995 Richard Linford pleaded guilty at Chelmsford Crown Court to the manslaughter of Christopher Edwards by reason of diminished responsibility. The trial was therefore brief. The judge imposed a hospital order under section 37 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (“the 1983 Act”), together with a restriction order under section 41. Richard Linford is currently still at Rampton Special Hospital, diagnosed as suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. 23.  A coroner's inquest had been opened but adjourned pending the criminal proceedings against Richard Linford. After Richard Linford's conviction, the coroner closed the inquest, as there was no obligation to continue in those circumstances. 24.  On 16 October 1995 the applicants were advised by the Assistant Chief Constable that it was considered that there was insufficient evidence to establish the offence of manslaughter by gross negligence on the part of anyone involved in the case but that the matter would be probably reviewed at the conclusion of the inquiry which had been commenced by the statutory agencies concerned in the case. 25.  In July 1995 a private, non-statutory inquiry was commissioned by three State agencies with statutory responsibilities towards Christopher Edwards – the Prison Service, Essex County Council and North Essex Health Authority. Its terms of reference were:
“To investigate the death of Mr Edwards in Chelmsford Prison, including factors in his and Mr Linford's detention which are relevant to that, and in particular: the extent to which their reception, detention, management and care corresponded to statutory obligations, Prison Service Standing Orders and Health Care Standards and local operational policies. 1.  To examine the adequacy, both in fact and of relevant procedures, of collaboration and communication between the agencies (HM Prison Service, the Essex Police, the courts, MidEssex Community and Mental Health NHS Trust and its predecessor, and Essex County Council Social Services Department) involved in the care, custody and control of Mr Edwards and Mr Linford, or in the provision of services to them. 2.  To examine the circumstances surrounding the arrest, detention and custody of Mr Linford and Mr Edwards by Essex Police, including whether all relevant information was effectively and efficiently passed between Essex Police, the prison service, the courts, and any other relevant agencies ...; 3.  To examine all the relevant circumstances surrounding the treatment and care of Mr Edwards and Mr Linford, by the health service and social services, and in particular: the extent to which Mr Edwards and Mr Linford's care corresponded to relevant statutory obligations, relevant guidance from the Department of Health ... and local operational policies. 4.  To prepare a report and make recommendations to North Essex Health Authority, Essex County Council Social Services Department and HM Prison Service, and other such agencies as are identified as appropriate ...” 26.  In February 1996 the applicants were advised by their solicitors that they had a claim for funeral costs and a potential claim for compensation and any pain and suffering between Christopher Edwards's injury and death, but that taking into account legal costs it would not be economic to bring such a claim. 27.  In April 1996, the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board awarded the applicants 4,550 pounds sterling (GBP) for funeral expenses but decided that there should be no dependency or bereavement award. 28.  The inquiry opened in May 1996. It was chaired by Mr Kieran Coonan QC, Recorder of the Crown Court, the other members of the panel consisting of Professor Bluglass (Emeritus Professor of Forensic Psychiatry at the University of Birmingham), Mr Gordon Halliday (former Director of Social Services, Devon County Council and member of the Mental Health Commission), Mr Michael Jenkins (former Governor of Oxford Prison and Long Lartin Prison and HM Deputy Chief Inspector of Prisons 1987-92) and Mr Owen Kelly (Commissioner of the City of London Police 1985-93). They were assisted by a firm of solicitors appointed by the commissioning agencies to provide secretarial and administrative support and to arrange for the attendance of witnesses. Two solicitors from this firm were appointed as advocates to the inquiry. 29.  The inquiry received evidence on fifty-six days over a period of ten months. It sat in private. It had no powers of compulsion of witnesses or production of documents. Two prison officers refused to give evidence. The inquiry report later noted that one of these had potentially significant evidence and his refusal was said to be “all the more regrettable since he had passed by Christopher Edwards's cell shortly before he met his death”. The inquiry panel conducted visits to the police stations, Magistrates' Court building and prison concerned. Professor Bluglass, a member of the panel, interviewed Richard Linford in hospital. About 150 witnesses attended the inquiry to give evidence, while a considerable number of others submitted written evidence. 30.  In November 1997 the applicants issued a summons in the County Court for negligence against the Chief Constable of Essex and Essex County Council. They did not, however, serve it due to legal advice from their solicitors. 31.  Draft extracts of the inquiry's preliminary findings were circulated to those subjected to criticism to allow them the opportunity to comment. A number of witnesses were recalled to give evidence on 27 April 1998. 32.  The inquiry report was published on 15 June 1998. It concluded that ideally Christopher Edwards and Richard Linford should not have been in prison and in practice they should not have been sharing the same cell. It found “a systemic collapse of the protective mechanisms that ought to have operated to protect this vulnerable prisoner”. It identified a series of shortcomings, including poor record-keeping, inadequate communication and limited inter-agency cooperation, and a number of missed opportunities to prevent the death of Christopher Edwards. 33.  The findings included the following:
(a)  Ideally, if suitable beds had been available, Christopher Edwards should have been admitted to hospital for assessment under section 2 of the Mental Health Act 1983.
(b)  It was a serious omission, and breach of Code C of the Code of Practice under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (“PACE”), that no doctor had been asked by the custody officer to see Christopher Edwards.
(c)  It was a serious failure by Essex Police that a CID2 form was not completed describing Christopher Edwards as a prisoner reasonably suspected of being an exceptional risk on the grounds of mental disturbance, though it was noted that even if he had been so described by the police this would not have been enough, by itself, to ensure that he was admitted to the health care centre at Chelmsford Prison.
(d)  At the Magistrates' Court hearing on 28 November 1994 no consideration was given to section 35 of the 1983 Act which provided for a remand to hospital for assessment. 
(e)  No attempt was made by the court to notify the prison authorities, in particular the senior medical officer, that Christopher Edwards was suspected of suffering from a mental illness. 
(f)  Information provided to the prison by the applicants about Christopher Edwards's psychiatric background was not recorded or passed on to the person carrying out the screening.
(g)  When Christopher Edwards arrived at Chelmsford Prison there was no medical officer on duty, in breach of the Prison Service Health Care Standards.
(h)  The prison health care worker, Mr N., who assessed Christopher Edwards was inadequately trained in the recognition of mental disorder and had been given insufficient guidance. The screening was rushed and superficial and did not take place in adequate conditions of privacy.
(i)  Mr N. had not been provided with any information about the concerns as to Christopher Edwards's mental condition by the police or the court. If he had received a CID2 form identifying mental disturbance or the court had expressed some concern, this might have prompted sufficient residual doubts to cause him to err on the side of caution and have him admitted to the health centre for the first night.
(j)  The cell's call system was defective; it had been pressed up to seventeen minutes before the alarm was raised by Richard Linford banging on the door and the warning buzzer had not sounded, or if it did it only sounded briefly. If it had functioned, a prompt response might have saved Christopher Edwards's life. The system could be disabled simply by wedging a matchstick behind the re-set button on the control panel and it could not be ruled out that it might have been tampered with by a prison officer or prisoner who wanted a “quiet night”. The fact that it could so easily be disabled rendered the system inadequate and unsafe. It was also noted that according to good practice, where the cell's call system was defective, either the occupants should be moved to another cell or effective visual monitoring should be provided, as a cell could not be certified fit for occupation without a method of communication in working condition.
(k)  Richard Linford had a history of violent outbursts and assaults, including a previous assault on a cell-mate in prison. He had been admitted to mental hospital in 1988, and subsequently had been diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia. Despite psychotic episodes and further assessments, he was not admitted to hospital after September 1994, as he was not considered to be suffering from acute mental illness. A case conference was held on 24 October 1994, where one of Richard Linford's general practitioners and a police officer expressed the view that he was capable of serious violence or murder. However, no formal risk assessment was carried out. The consultant psychiatrist did not accept that the risk to public safety was serious and it was decided to make one last attempt to induce Richard Linford to take depot medication before detaining him under section 3 of the 1983 Act. On 7 November 1994, it was reported to the consultant that Richard Linford was refusing depot medication. 
(l)  After Richard Linford's arrest on 26 November, no attempt was made to locate his medical notes before being assessed. The psychiatric registrar was unaware of the case conference or the outline plan to detain him.
(m)  No CID2 form was filled in by the police for Richard Linford despite his attacks on two officers, as the officer concerned did not know that such a form existed.
(n)  The police, prosecution and magistrates were aware that Richard Linford was described as dangerous but no formal warning was given to the prison authorities.
(o)  At Chelmsford Prison, Richard Linford was screened by Mr N., who knew nothing about him except that he had been “difficult” in the police station; although the provision of a CID2 form would not have been conclusive, information about his previous convictions (and admittance to hospital) might have prompted a closer appraisal and he might have had sufficient doubts to have him admitted to the health care centre despite the absence of really bizarre symptoms. 34.  Following the publication of the report, the applicants sought advice as to whether there were any civil remedies available to them in the light of the findings of the inquiry. At a conference on 2 October 1998, they were advised by counsel that there were still no available civil remedies. The inquiry had made no relevant findings in relation to whether any time elapsed between their son being injured and his death, which would have determined whether they had any action in respect of pain and suffering experienced by their son before he died. 35.  By letter of 25 November 1998, the Crown Prosecution Service maintained their previous decision that there was insufficient evidence to proceed with criminal charges. The applicants' counsel advised on 10 December 1998 that, notwithstanding the numerous shortcomings, there was insufficient material to found a criminal charge of gross negligence against any individual or agency. 36.  By letter dated 15 December 2000, the Police Complaints Authority (PCA) provided the applicants with a report on their complaints about police conduct in dealing with Christopher Edwards and on the subsequent investigation into his death. The report upheld fifteen of the complaints and made a number of recommendations to Essex Police in relation to practice and procedure. It found, inter alia, a breach of the Code of Practice under PACE in that the police failed to summon a doctor to the police station when Christopher Edwards's behaviour led them to believe that he might be suffering from a mental illness and that, as regarded the failure of the officers to fill in a CID2 form identifying Christopher Edwards and Richard Linford as exceptional risks on grounds of mental disturbance, the officers concerned had been insufficiently informed as to the existence and purposes of the form. It also upheld complaints about the police investigation after the death, including a failure by the police investigators to test the cell buzzer properly to establish its effectiveness, the loss of the list of prisoners held on the relevant landing on the night of the incident and a failure to interview relevant persons in the prison, for example, Mr N., the health care worker, the prison doctor and the prison probation officer concerning the allegation of criminal negligence raised by the applicants.