5.  On 19 September 1974 the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Cyprus approved the introduction of a scheme of aid for displaced persons and war victims. Under the scheme, displaced persons were entitled to refugee cards. The holders of such cards were (and still are) eligible for a range of benefits including housing assistance. For the purposes of the scheme the term “displaced” was determined as being any person whose permanent home was in the areas occupied by the Turkish armed forces, in an inaccessible area, or in an area which had been evacuated to meet the needs of the National Guard. 6.  To implement the scheme, the Director of the Care and Rehabilitation of Displaced Persons Service (“SCRDP”) issued a circular on 10 September 1975. The circular provided that non-displaced women whose husbands were displaced could be registered on the refugee card of their husbands. It also provided that children whose fathers were displaced could be registered on the refugee card of their fathers (see paragraph 20 below). No provision was made for the children of displaced women to be registered on the refugee cards of their mothers. 7.  Although the term “displaced” was extended by the Council of Ministers on 19 April 1995 (see paragraphs 23 and 24 below), at the time of the facts giving rise to the present application it had not been extended to allow children whose mothers were displaced but whose fathers were not, to qualify for refugee cards. 8.  The applicant’s mother has been a refugee since 1974. Her mother is the holder of a refugee card. 9.  In September 2002, the applicant married and began looking for a house for her family in Kokkynotrimithia. She wished to obtain housing assistance and so, on 27 February 2003, applied to the Civil Registry and Migration Department of the Ministry of the Interior for a refugee card with occupied Skylloura, the place from which her mother was displaced, as her place of displacement. 10.  By letter dated 6 March 2003 the request was rejected on the basis that the applicant was not a displaced person because, while her mother was a displaced person, her father was not. 11.  The applicant filed a recourse before the Supreme Court challenging the above decision. She claimed, inter alia, that the decision was in violation of the principle of equality safeguarded by Article 28 of the Constitution and in breach of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. She claimed that it also breached Article 13 of the Convention. 12.  A single judge of the Supreme Court dismissed the recourse on 12 May 2004, finding that, on the basis of the relevant case-law, the extension of the applicable criteria so as to cover the children of displaced women was not possible. The question of extending the term “displaced” to cover the children whose mothers were displaced but whose fathers were not had been repeatedly discussed before the House of Representatives’ Committee for Refugees. A proposal to change the law to that effect had been placed before the Committee but was never approved. Furthermore, because of the consequences which would ensue from such an extension of the term “displaced”, the Minister of the Interior had referred the question to the Council of Ministers for its consideration and, on 19 April 1995, the Council of Ministers had decided not to extend the term in this manner (see the relevant domestic law and practice set out at paragraphs 23 and 24 below). 13.  On 23 June 2004 the applicant filed an appeal before the Supreme Court. 14.  By judgment of 3 March 2006 a five-judge panel of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the findings of the first instance court. 15.  The Supreme Court held as follows:
“[In the present appeal] an attempt was made to demonstrate that we must depart from the above [first instance] decision, since the Supreme Court can, in the present case, proceed to the so-called “extended interpretation” and, by invoking the principle of equality, widen the application of the criterion to the children of displaced mothers as well.
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The proposed extension of the plan was placed before the Council of Ministers in Proposal no. 1852/92, which was submitted by the Ministry of the Interior to amend the criteria for providing assistance to displaced persons. However the decision taken refers only to amendments which do not concern the present case. Despite the fact that, on 19 April 1995, by decision no. 42.465 of the Council of Ministers, further amendments were made by which the term ‘displaced’ was extended and now includes other categories of those entitled, the point which concerns us in this case remains unchanged.
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In accordance with the case-law (Dias United Publishing Co Ltd v. The Republic, [1996] 3 A.A.D. 550), the non-existence of a legislative provision cannot be remedied by judicial decision because, in such a case, the constitutional control which the Supreme Court exercises would be turned into a means of reshaping or supplementing the legislation.
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We have given this matter very serious consideration in view also of the position that, in the case of an arrangement favouring one sex only, the extended application of the provision also finds support in European Community Law ...
However this may be, we cannot depart from the prevailing case-law. Dias United Publishing Co Ltd v. The Republic, cited above, fixed the framework of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has, in accordance with Article 146(4) of the Constitution, the power to uphold in full or in part the decision appealed against or to declare the act or omission invalid. It does not have jurisdiction to legislate by extending legislative arrangements which did not meet with the approval of parliament. This would conflict with the principle of the separation of powers. We note that the House of Representatives cannot of its own accord enact legislation which would incur expenditure. If the House of Representatives, the constitutionally appointed legislative organ, does not have such a right, the Supreme Court has even less of a right.
In agreement with the principles set out above, we conclude that the Supreme Court does not have the competence to proceed to an extended application of a legislative arrangement.” 16.  The same issue of the non-extension of refugee cards to the children of displaced women was also considered by the Supreme Court in Anna Giagkozi v. the Republic (case no. 291/2001). That challenge was rejected at first instance on 30 April 2002 ((2002) 4 A.A.D. 405), the court finding that, while it was difficult to understand why there should not be uniform treatment between the children of displaced men and displaced women, on the basis of Dias United, cited above, it was unable to grant the relief sought. This was because Ms Giagkozi was, in effect, asking the court to extend the relevant legal framework so that the benefits provided to children of displaced fathers would be provided to children of displaced mothers. An appeal against that judgment was dismissed on 3 March 2006 by the same bench which dismissed the present applicant’s appeal (the appeal judgment in Giagkozi is reported at (2006) 3 Α.Α.D. 85).