4.  The applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Győr. 5.  On 3 February 1995 company G. brought an action against the applicant, requesting the Győr District Court to hold, inter alia, that the termination of a lease contract was valid. 6.  On 12 October 1995 the court adopted a partial decision holding that the termination was valid and requiring the applicant to vacate the real estate in question. On appeal, on 7 November 1996 the Győr-Moson-Sopron County Regional Court reversed that partial decision and dismissed the plaintiff’s claim concerning the validity of the termination. 7.  In the resumed first-instance proceedings, on 3 July 1997 the District Court ordered the applicant to pay 1.1 million Hungarian forints (HUF) in compensation and rejected his counterclaims. On appeal, on 21 January 1998 the Regional Court upheld the decision about the payment of HUF 1.1 million but quashed the remainder of the first-instance decision. 8.  In the resumed first-instance proceedings, the District Court held several hearings, obtained the opinion of an expert, and rejected the applicant’s counterclaims on 22 May 2001. On appeal, on 28 November 2001 the Regional Court quashed that decision. 9.  In the resumed proceedings, the case was transferred to the bench of the Regional Court competent to deal with it. That court held several hearings and obtained the opinion of an expert. On 6 April 2004 the applicant was awarded HUF 2.8 million plus accrued interest. On appeal, on 6 July 2004 the Budapest Court of Appeal reduced the award. This decision was served on 29 July 2004. 10.  The applicant filed a petition for review, alleging that the final decision was unfounded and at variance with the relevant substantive law. 11.  In a preliminary examination under section 273 of the Code of Civil Procedure, on 5 November 2004 the Supreme Court refused to deal with the merits of the petition. It applied section 270 § 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as in force in the relevant period, according to which a review of the substantive unlawfulness of final decisions was only admissible if a review was considered necessary from the perspective of harmonising or developing the application of the law.