8.  The applicant was born in 1940 and is at present imprisoned in Parma. 9.  On 2 September 1999, after a fight with his two sons, the applicant killed his wife and injured one of his sons. He was arrested on 3 September. 10.  At the end of the preliminary investigation the Rome prosecution service asked for the applicant to be committed to stand trial for murder, attempted murder, ill-treatment of his family and unauthorised possession of a firearm 11.  At a hearing on 18 February 2000 before the Rome preliminary hearings judge (giudice dell'udienza preliminare – “the GUP”) the applicant asked to be tried under the summary procedure, a simplified process which entailed a reduction of sentence in the event of conviction. In the version in force at that time Article 442 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CCP”) provided that, if the crime committed by the defendant was punishable by life imprisonment, the appropriate sentence should be thirty years. (see paragraph 29 below). 12.  The GUP agreed to follow the summary procedure. Further hearings were held on 22 September and 24 November 2000. The last-mentioned hearing began at 10.19 a.m. 13.  On 24 November 2000 the GUP found the applicant guilty and noted that he was liable to a sentence of life imprisonment; however, as the applicant had elected to stand trial under the summary procedure, the judge sentenced him to a term of 30 years. 14.  On 12 January 2001 the Public Prosecutor's Office at the Rome Court of Appeal appealed on points of law against the Rome GUP's judgment of 24 November 2000. The prosecution argued that the GUP should have applied Article 7 of Legislative Decree no. 341 of 24 November 2000, which entered into force on the very day when the applicant was convicted. After being amended by parliament, Legislative Decree no. 341 was converted into Law no. 4 of 19 January 2001. 15.  The prosecution contended in particular that Article 7 of Legislative Decree no. 341 had amended Article 442 of the CCP and now provided that, in the event of trial under the summary procedure, life imprisonment was to be substituted for life imprisonment with daytime isolation if there were “cumulative offences” (concorso di reati) or a “continuous offence” (reato continuato – see paragraph 31 below). The GUP's failure to apply Legislative Decree no. 341 amounted to “a manifest error of law” (evidente errore di diritto). 16.  On 5 and 22 February 2001 the applicant appealed. His chief submission was that he should be acquitted on the ground that his conduct had not been intentional or that, at the time when the offences were committed, he was incapable of understanding the wrongful nature of his acts and of forming the intent to commit them (incapacità de intendere e volere). In the alternative, he requested a reduction of his sentence. 17.  As there were now two appeals, at two different levels of jurisdiction, the Public Prosecutor's appeal on points of law was changed to an appeal on both facts and law and the Rome Assize Court of Appeal was declared to have jurisdiction to hear the case (Article 580 of the CCP). 18.  The hearing in private before the Rome Assize Court of Appeal was held on 10 January 2002. The applicant was not present and was tried in absentia. He alleged that, as he had difficulty in walking, he had asked to be taken to the courtroom by ambulance or some other suitably adapted vehicle but that, as the prison management had refused his request, he had been deprived of the possibility of participating in the appeal proceedings. 19.  In a judgment of 10 January 2002, deposited with the registry on 23 January 2002, the Assize Court of Appeal sentenced the applicant to life imprisonment. 20.  It observed that before the entry into force of Legislative Decree no. 341 Article 442 § 2 of the CCP had been interpreted to mean that life imprisonment was to be replaced by a term of thirty years, whether or not it was to be accompanied by daytime isolation on account of an accumulation of offences with the most serious one. In following that approach, the GUP had fixed the sentence in relation to the most serious offence, without considering whether to order the applicant's daytime isolation on account of his conviction on the other charges against him. 21.  However, Legislative Decree no. 341 of 24 November 2000 had entered into force on the very day of the GUP's decision. As its provisions were classed as procedural rules, it was applicable to pending proceedings, according to the tempus regit actum principle. The Assize Court of Appeal further observed that under the terms of Article 8 of Legislative Decree no. 341 the applicant could have withdrawn his request to be tried under the summary procedure and have stood trial under the ordinary procedure. As he had not done so, the first-instance decision ought to have taken account of the change in the rules on penalties which had taken place in the meantime. 22.  On 18 February 2002 the applicant appealed on points of law. He argued in the first place that the appeal proceedings should be declared null and void because he had not been able to participate, as defendant, in the appeal hearing on 10 January 2002. In his second and third grounds of appeal the applicant asserted that the trial courts had not given sufficient reasons either for ruling that he had intended to commit murder or for their finding that he knew what he was doing and had acted intentionally when committing the offences. Lastly, he contested the finding of an aggravating circumstance (that he had acted for futile reasons) and complained of the refusal to grant him extenuating circumstances. 23.  On 31 July 2002 the applicant submitted further grounds of appeal. He contended that a fresh expert opinion should have been produced on his mental state at the time when the offences were committed and presented new arguments on the question of aggravating and extenuating circumstances. Lastly, he submitted that the penalty deemed to be applicable in his case (life imprisonment with isolation) was excessive. 24.  In a judgment deposited with its registry on 20 January 2003, the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant's appeal. 25.  On 18 July 2003 the applicant lodged an extraordinary appeal on the ground of a factual error (Article 625a of the CCP). He asserted in the first place that the domestic courts' finding that he could have been taken to the appeal hearing by an ordinary means of transport and did not need an ambulance had been the result of an erroneous reading of the documents in the file. In addition, his absence, as the defendant, from that hearing had breached Article 6 of the Convention. The applicant further alleged that the sentence of life imprisonment imposed on him following the changes made by Legislative Decree no. 341 of 2000, and thus through a retrospective criminal-law provision, had breached Article 7 of the Convention and the principles of fair trial. He submitted that his waiver of procedural safeguards as a result of electing to stand trial under the summary procedure had not been compensated for by the reduction of his sentence promised by the State at the time when he made that choice. Lastly, he maintained that life imprisonment was an inhuman and degrading punishment and as such contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. 26.  In a judgment of 14 May 2004, deposited with its registry on 28 October 2004, the Court of Cassation declared the applicant's extraordinary appeal inadmissible. It observed that he was not complaining of factual errors committed by the domestic courts but essentially attempting to challenge the Court of Cassation's assessment on points of law.