page_title: Battle of Es Sinn
section_title: Background
hierarchical_section_title: Battle of Es Sinn / Background
caption_attribution_description: First Battle of Kut
context_page_description: The Battle of Es Sinn was a World War I military engagement between Anglo-Indian and Ottoman forces.
  It took place on 28 September 1915, during the Mesopotamian Campaign. The sides fought to determine control of the lower Tigres and Euphrates rivers, in what is now Iraq. The British and Indian governments also viewed it as a test of the Ottoman forces, and whether a further advance to capture Baghdad was possible. The Anglo-Indian forces of Indian Expeditionary Force D were under the command of Major-General Charles Vere Ferres Townshend, and the Ottoman forces by Colonel Nureddin.
  The engagement took place just south of the town of Kut-al-Amarah, along the banks of the Tigris River. Following a night march, the British and Indian troops defeated the Ottoman forces, driving them from their defensive positions along the Tigris. The capture of the Es Sinn position allowed for the capture of Kut, and with it control over the lower Tigris and Euphrates rivers, by British forces the following day.
context_section_description: After consolidating their hold over the Basra Vilayet, a debate began over what to do with Indian Expeditionary Force "D". While originally only envisioned as a limited campaign to secure the oil pipeline at Abadan, the success of the British and Indian troops in late 1914 and early 1915 caused the planners in Simla and in the field to re-evaluate the mission.
  The British government in London wanted the campaign kept to an absolute minimum. Their primary concern was the defense of Basra and the Shatt al Arab. They had to hold those to ensure that oil from Abadan, needed to fuel the Royal Navy, would not be disrupted. The Viceroy and Indian government at Simla viewed the problem differently. They saw a chance to demonstrate that British Empire was still pre-eminent in the region, despite the stalemate on the Western Front and deteriorating situation in Gallipoli. The best way to ensure Indian security, as well as those of the Abadan oil supply was to advance at least as far as the Shatt al Hai, the canal connecting the Tigris and Euphrates River, and ideally by capturing Baghdad.
  From the perspective of the Indian Army officers on the ground in Basra, it was time to strike. Their intelligence reports showed that the only troops blocking their advance upriver were the battered and demoralized remnants of the two divisions I.E.F. "D" had defeated at the battles of Nasiriyeh and Qurna. Furthermore, it was unlikely that the Ottoman divisions could expect much support from local populations. Soldiers in the Ottoman Divisions were conscripts, rarely paid and generally under-supplied. The conscripts from the Anatolian provinces were looked on as occupiers, while conscripts from the Kurdish and Arab provinces were likely to be more sympathetic to Arab or Kurdish national movements that were starting, and their morale suffered correspondingly.
  While the British Government sought to keep the campaign to a minimum to conserve resources for the Western Front, control over the campaign was still vested in the Viceroy's government in Simla.  The high command of I.E.F. "D" lobbied Simla for orders that allowed it to advance further north, which were approved by Secretary of State for India in London. However, Austen Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for India, warned Simla that while its actions were approved, they would have to achieve victory with forces already in theater. They could expect no reinforcements from other theatres of the war.
caption: Situation at Kut on 28 September 1915.
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