page_title: Uljin–Samcheok Landings
section_title: Reasons for failure
hierarchical_section_title: Uljin–Samcheok Landings / Assessment and aftermath / Reasons for failure
caption_attribution_description: 한국어: 새마을 지도자 교육
context_page_description: The Ulchin-Samcheok landings was an unsuccessful attempt by North Korea to establish guerrilla camps in the Taebaek Mountains on October 30, 1968, in order to topple Park Chung-hee's regime and bring about the reunification of Korea. As the DMZ became increasingly harder to penetrate after the Blue House Raid, Kim Il-sung deployed 120 North Korean commandos along eight separate coastal locations between Ulchin and Samcheok in Gangwon province on an important mission to indoctrinate South Korean citizens, which ended in failure.
context_section_description: Encouraged by the popularity of the Homeland reserve Force, Park had decided to launch the "New Community Movement" (Saemaul Undong) to ensure the people's loyalty. Park sought to instill a sense of  democracy and nationalism, facilitated by elevating living standards in rural areas under the Korean traditional communalism - Hyangyak and Doorae. The first move embodied the construction of "Reconstruction Villages" by populating areas south of the DMZ with ex-soldiers and their families ready to repel northern infiltrators. Next, Park instituted a civil action program requiring ROK soldiers to build basic infrastructure and schools holding anti-communist classes in rural areas as part of the larger counter-propaganda scheme as well as strengthening ties between the military and villagers.
  Under the cover of medical assistance, in various localities soldiers were actually trained members of "Medical Enlightenment" teams, whose purpose was to instill support for Park Chung-hee and cultivate a citizenry ready to dismiss the North's Communist line. Meanwhile, under the careful inspection of General William P. Yarborough, cooperation between the United States Eighth Army (EUSA) and the Korean Augmentation to the United States Army (KATUSA) flourished. A new "Cold War Program" included "Welcome to Korea" classes facilitated by US troops' contributions to social welfare in the form of building schools, visiting orphanages, and conducting cultural exchanges at local universities. Overall, the acceptance of US soldiers by the South Korean populace preemptively dispelled the power of North Korean ideology which characterized American soldiers as violent colonizers and foreign occupiers.
  Overall, the DPRK strategy lacked discipline and proper logistics. As a result of Park's aggressive policies which rallied popular participation against the DPRK threat, the public transformed into valuable informants for the government. Under the guidance of the Korean National Intelligence Service (NIS),132 North Korean spies had already been captured by 1967. Therefore, the North Korean leadership displayed a sense of ignorance of the extent to which South Korean nationalism and citizens'  were loyal to Park. Additionally, the lack of consistent major offensives prior to the Ulchin-Samcheok landing allowed for the regrouping and unified deployment of allied resources in the form of effective counterinsurgency measures. Ultimately, the DPRK  failed to conduct a series of well-orchestrated strikes aimed at continually whither down their opponent before the major Ulchin-Samcheok offensive, which contributed to the mission's failure.
caption: Saemaul Undong
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