page_title: Battle of Majar al-Kabir
section_title: Background
hierarchical_section_title: Battle of Majar al-Kabir / Background
context_page_description: The Battle of Majar al-Kabir was the result of a growing distrust between the British military and the local people of the south-eastern region of Iraq over house searches and confiscation of personal weapons that locals felt were crucial for their self-protection. Despite a signed agreement between local people and British forces stating that the British would not enter the town, the 1st Battalion Parachute Regiment started patrolling in the town of Majar al-Kabir on 24 June 2003 the day after the agreement was signed by both sides. The British thought the agreement was to stop the weapons searches that involved going into the houses of local inhabitants.
  At first, angry locals stoned the Paras whilst being encouraged by anti-British rhetoric being chanted from microphones on minarets in the town. The Paras used rubber bullets to try and bring the situation under control, followed by conflicted reports about who fired the first live shots; this led to street battles, rifle fire and the cornering of six Royal Military Policemen in the police station at Majar al-Kabir.
context_section_description: In March 2003, coalition forces started the invasion of Iraq that would become the Iraq War, lasting until 2011. Combat operations were announced by the then-President of the United States, George W. Bush, as being over on 1 May 2003. The south-eastern region of Iraq became part of the United Kingdom's Multi-National Division (South East) (MND (SE)) under the framework of Operation Telic. As part of their remit, the British forces were keen to remove all heavy weaponry from the region (anti-tank weapons, RPGs etc) and did so purposely. Whilst most of the weapons and ammunition were removed from private houses in the region, smaller weapons, such as AK-47s and handguns, were left with the families for their own protection. The local Iraqis had argued this point and demanded that they be left with some protection in what was a dangerous area post-invasion. One local man was quoted as saying "If Saddam Hussein could not take away our weapons, why should we allow the British to do so?"
  The town of Majar al-Kabir lies 250 miles (400 km) south east of Baghdad and 120 miles (190 km) north of Basra in the Maysan Province of Iraq, and at the time, had a population of 85,000. In 2003, the main British base covering the region was Camp Abu Naji, which was 4 miles (6.4 km) south of Amarah and 15 miles (24 km) north of Majar al-Kabir. Majar al-Kabir was well known as being awash with weapons as the area was predominantly Shia Muslim, whose people had been brutally treated by the government of Saddam Hussein. When the British arrived they found an area devoid of government officials as all the Ba'athists had been chased away by the local populace in retaliation for their treatment under Saddam's regime. The region was also prone to other influences such as the CIA operating in the area. This annoyed Lieutenant-Colonel Tom Beckett (commanding officer of 1 Para) who demanded that all CIA operatives clear their routines in the 1 Para area of operations through the Ops Room at Camp Abu Naji.
  Because of the flat area in and around Majar al-Kabir, VHF and HF communications were extremely limited. Even when in close proximity to each other, communication was hampered between soldiers by blackspots. 1 Para had Iridium phones, sat-phones and Personal Role Radios (PRRs).
  A memorandum of understanding (MOU) was reached between the British Forces and local people that no more house searches would take place. The British believed that this understanding would also mean that they would still patrol through the streets (showing and maintaining a presence), but the locals maintain that this was not in the agreement. It was remarked upon later that the British were not in the habit of creating "no-go zones" for themselves. On the 21 June, three days before the Battle of Majar al-Kabir, Major Kemp went into the town to meet the elders and inform them that there would be a British military presence at the police station where they would collect, but not search for, weapons. At the inquest into the men's deaths in March 2006, it was noted that there had been a mis-translation in the text of the MOU which the Iraqi population read as there being "no necessity that the coalition [troops] be there [the following day]."
  Two days before the killings, Two-Zero Alpha, an element of 8 Platoon, C Company (1 Parachute Regiment) were at the police station in Majar al-Kabir to collect weapons that were to be handed in under the amnesty agreement. With some men on guard duty, the rest were sunbathing and relaxing when a crowd of angry Iraqis arrived at the police station throwing rocks and chanting "no, no, America". In the unrest that followed, a DAF truck and the Land Rover belonging to Two-Zero Alpha were destroyed. After some warning shots were fired by the British, including one plastic bullet which deflected off the ground and hit a protester in the face, a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) was activated and they arrived in Scimitars and armed Land Rovers to push back the crowd.
caption: Occupation zones in Iraq in September 2003