page_title: Yorktown campaign
section_title: Analysis
hierarchical_section_title: Yorktown campaign / Analysis
caption_attribution_description: Charles-Eugène-Gabriel de La Croix, marquis de Castries, maréchal de France en 1783 (1727-1801)
context_page_description: The Yorktown or Virginia campaign was a series of military maneuvers and battles during the American Revolutionary War that culminated in the decisive Siege of Yorktown in October 1781. The result of the campaign was the surrender of the British Army force of General Charles Earl Cornwallis, an event that led directly to the beginning of serious peace negotiations and the eventual end of the war. The campaign was marked by disagreements, indecision, and miscommunication on the part of British leaders, and by a remarkable set of cooperative decisions, at times in violation of orders, by the French and Americans.
  The campaign involved land and naval forces of Great Britain and France, and land forces of the United States. British forces were sent to Virginia between January and April 1781 and joined with Cornwallis's army in May, which came north from an extended campaign through the southern states. These forces were first opposed weakly by Virginia militia, but General George Washington sent first Marquis de Lafayette and then Anthony Wayne with Continental Army troops to oppose the raiding and economic havoc the British were wreaking.
context_section_description: Historian John Pancake describes the later stages of the campaign as "British blundering" and that the "allied operations proceeded with clockwork precision." Naval historian Jonathan Dull has described de Grasse's 1781 naval campaign, which encompassed, in addition to Yorktown, successful contributions to the French capture of Tobago and the Spanish siege of Pensacola, as the "most perfectly executed naval campaign of the age of sail", and compared the string of French successes favorably with the British Annus Mirabilis of 1759.  He also observes that a significant number of individual decisions, at times against orders or previous agreements, contributed to the success of the campaign:
  French ministers Montmorin and Vergennes convinced the French establishment that decisive action was needed in North America in order to end the war.
  The French naval minister Castries wrote orders for de Grasse that gave the latter sufficient flexibility to assist in the campaign.
  Spanish Louisiana Governor Bernardo de Gálvez released ships and troops to cover French territories while de Grasse sailed north with most of the French military establishment in the West Indies.
  Spanish Cuban colonial official Francisco Saavedra cooperated in the decision-making that enabled de Grasse's northward expedition.
  General Rochambeau and Chevalier Luzerne both urged de Grasse to decide on the Chesapeake.
  Admiral de Barras violated his orders to operate off Newfoundland, making possible the timely delivery of the French siege train to Yorktown.
  George Washington decided against an attack on New York and instead embarked on a risky march to Virginia.
  Admiral De Grasse agreed to overstay his planned time in the Chesapeake, understanding the importance of the undertaking there.
  Of de Grasse's negotiations with the Spanish that secured the use of his fleet and his order to the economic fleet to remain in the West Indies, Royal Navy Captain Thomas White, in his 1830 analysis of the 1781 campaign, wrote that "[i]f the British government had sanctioned, or a British admiral had adopted such a measure, [...] the one would have been turned out, and the other would have been hung: no wonder they succeeded and we failed."
caption: French Marine Minister the Marquis de Castries made important strategic decisions before the campaign began.
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