page_title: Jacobite Army (1745)
section_title: Formation and leadership
hierarchical_section_title: Jacobite Army (1745) / Formation and leadership
caption_attribution_description: English: A private and corporal of a Highland Regiment, circa 1744. The private is wearing a belted plaid in the Government tartan. Note how the plaid is being used to protect the musket lock from rain and wind.
context_page_description: The Jacobite Army, sometimes referred to as the "Highland Army", was the military force assembled by Charles Edward Stuart and his Jacobite supporters during the 1745 Rising that attempted to restore the House of Stuart to the British throne.
  Starting with less than 1,000 men at Glenfinnan in August 1745, the Jacobite army won a significant victory at Prestonpans in September. A force of about 5,500 then invaded England in November and reached as far south as Derby before successfully retreating into Scotland. Reaching a peak strength of between 9,000 to 14,000, they won another victory in January 1746 at Falkirk, before defeat at Culloden in April. While a large number of Jacobites remained in arms, lack of external and domestic support combined with overwhelming government numbers meant they dispersed, ending the rebellion.
  Once characterised as a largely Gaelic-speaking force recruited from the Scottish Highlands using traditional weapons and tactics, modern historians have demonstrated this was only partially accurate.
context_section_description: Charles left France on 15 July aboard Du Teillay, supplies and 70 volunteers from the Irish Brigade transported by Elizabeth, an elderly 64-gun warship. Four days out, they were intercepted by HMS Lion which engaged Elizabeth; after a four hour battle, both were forced to return to port, while  Du Teillay continued to Eriskay. This meant Charles arrived with few weapons, accompanied only by the "Seven Men of Moidart," among them the elderly Marquess of Tullibardine and John O'Sullivan, an Irish-born officer in the French army.
  Many of those contacted on arrival told Charles to return to France but Lochiel's commitment persuaded enough for the Rebellion to be launched at Glenfinnan on 19 August. O'Sullivan estimated initial numbers as around 1,000, with 700 Camerons plus several hundred men from Lochaber led by Keppoch. 
  Though physically fit, they lacked discipline and were poorly armed, accentuating the loss of Elizabeth with its weapons and the regulars intended to provide the core of the Jacobite army. Although Charles was in nominal command, his inexperience meant O'Sullivan acted as adjutant-general and quartermaster-general, handling personnel, training and logistics. 
  O'Sullivan created an army organised along conventional European lines and his use of the then-novel divisional structure is viewed as a major factor in the Jacobites' speed of movement. Further recruits came in as they marched on Edinburgh; by the time of Prestonpans on 21 September, numbers had increased to around 2,500. 
  One of these recruits was Tullibardine's younger brother, Lord George Murray, who took part in the failed Risings of 1715 and 1719. Despite this, his acceptance of a pardon in 1725 and swearing an Oath of Allegiance to George II in 1739 made some suspicious, including Charles' chief Scottish advisor, Murray of Broughton. Although primarily driven by Broughton's political ambitions, others recorded Murray's genuine military talents were undermined by a quick temper, arrogance and inability to take advice. 
  Co-operation with O'Sullivan was essential but failed to develop, Murray arguing Highland customs better suited the bulk of their recruits and it was unrealistic to expect them to execute weapons drill or carry out written orders. Others considered these views outdated, including Sir John MacDonald, an Irish exile who acted as Inspector-General of Cavalry. There was some truth in both positions; plenty of Scots served in European armies but the military aspects of clan society had been in decline for decades and most Highland levies were illiterate agricultural workers.
  Even for regular troops, training was a concern as infantry drill became increasingly complex; before and after 1746, peacetime inspections consistently noted an alarmingly high number of British regiments as 'Not fit for service.' This had many causes, one of the most significant being lack of live firing practice and the Jacobites were short of both weapons and ammunition. The exiles also failed to appreciate the Highland obligation to provide military service assumed short periods of warfare, not continuous service for six months or a year. After Prestonpans and Falkirk, the clan chiefs could not prevent large numbers of their levies returning home; when Charles wanted to attack Cumberland in early February 1746, he was told the army was in no state to fight a battle.
  Charles considered his 'Lieutenant-Generals' subordinates, whose duty was to comply with his orders; Murray disagreed and matters were not helped by a furious row between the two prior to Prestonpans. Lord Elcho later wrote the Scots were concerned from the beginning by Charles' autocratic style and fears he was overly influenced by his Irish advisors. 
  At their insistence, Charles established a "Council of War" to agree military strategy but deeply resented what he viewed as an imposition by subjects on their divinely appointed monarch. Consisting of 15-20 senior leaders, it was dominated by the Highlanders who provided most of the manpower and decisions reflected their priorities. The civilian e
caption: Members of a Highland regiment, circa 1744; the Jacobite army would have worn something very similar, particularly the belted plaid.[11]
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