id,origin_label,target_text,annotator_prediction,annotator_confidence
7228944,lose," On information and belief, Defendants received some or all of the revenues from  the sale of the products, goods and services advertised on Exhibit A, and Defendants profit and  benefit from the sale of the products, goods and services advertised on Exhibit A.    Plaintiff did not give prior express invitation or permission to Defendants to send  the fax.     On information and belief, Defendants faxed the same and other unsolicited  facsimiles with opt-out language identical or substantially similar to the opt-out language of the  fax advertisement attached hereto as Exhibit A to Plaintiff and at least 40 other recipients or sent  the same and other advertisements by fax with the required opt-out language but without first  receiving the recipients’ express invitation or permission and without having an established  business relationship as defined by the TCPA and its regulations because the opt-out language  was not compliant.     There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other class member) to avoid  receiving unauthorized faxes. Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the urgent  communications their owners desire to receive.     Defendants’ facsimile attached as Exhibit A does not display a proper opt-out  notice as required by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200.   Class Size (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon  such information and belief avers, that the number of persons and entities of the Plaintiff Class is  numerous and joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and  upon such information and belief avers, that the number of class members is at least forty.    Typicality (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (3)):  The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the  claims of all class members. The Plaintiff received the same or similar faxes as the faxes sent by  or on behalf of the Defendants advertising products, goods and services of the Defendants during  the Class Period. The Plaintiff is making the same claims and seeking the same relief for itself  and all class members based upon the same federal statute. The Defendants have acted in the  same or in a similar manner with respect to the Plaintiff and all the class members by sending  Plaintiff and each member of the class the same or similar faxes or faxes which did not contain  the proper opt-out language or were sent without prior express invitation or permission.    Need for Consistent Standards and Practical Effect of Adjudication (Fed. R. Civ.  P. 23 (b) (1)):  Class certification is appropriate because the prosecution of individual actions by  class members would: (a) create the risk of inconsistent adjudications that could establish  incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendants, and/or (b) as a practical matter,  adjudication of the Plaintiff's claims will be dispositive of the interests of class members who are  not parties.    Common Conduct (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (2)):  Class certification is also  appropriate because the Defendants have acted in the same or similar manner with respect to all  class members thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate. The Plaintiff  demands such relief as authorized by 47 U.S.C. § 227.    The JFPA makes it unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile  machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited  advertisement . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C).    Defendants’ Other Violations.  Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such  information and belief avers, that during the period preceding four years of the filing of this  Complaint and repeatedly thereafter, Defendants have sent via facsimile transmission from  telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to telephone facsimile machines of  members of the Plaintiff Class other faxes that constitute advertisements under the JFPA that  were transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express invitation or permission  (and/or that Defendants are precluded from asserting any prior express invitation or permission  or that Defendants had an established business relationship because of the failure to comply with  the Opt-Out Notice Requirements in connection with such transmissions). By virtue thereof,  Defendants violated the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Plaintiff is informed  and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that Defendants may be continuing to  send unsolicited advertisements via facsimile transmission in violation of the JFPA and the  regulations promulgated thereunder, and absent intervention by this Court, will do so in the  future.    The TCPA/JFPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf  of Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class to redress Defendants’ violations of the Act, and provides for  statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The Act also provides that injunctive relief is  appropriate. Id.    The JFPA is a strict liability statute, so the Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff  and the other class members even if their actions were only negligent.  ",lose,1
13145643,lose," a statement that the recipient is legally entitled to opt-out of receiving  future faxed advertisements – knowing that he or she has the legal right to request  an opt-out gives impetus for recipients to make such a request, if desired;    On or about August 13, 2014, Defendants transmitted by telephone facsimile  machine an unsolicited fax to Plaintiff.  A copy of the facsimile is attached hereto as Exhibit A.    Plaintiff had not invited or given permission to Defendants to send the fax.      On information and belief, Defendants faxed the same and other unsolicited  facsimiles without the required opt-out language to Plaintiff and more than 40 other recipients  without first receiving the recipients’ express permission or invitation.      There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other class member) to avoid  receiving unauthorized faxes.  Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the urgent  communications their owners desire to receive.     Defendants’ facsimiles did not display a proper opt-out notice as required by 47  C.F.R.  § 64.1200 because it does not contain: a) a toll free fax number to opt out, b) a statement  explaining that a recipient is legally entitled to opt out, c) a statement that the sender must honor  the request within 30 days and that failure to do so is unlawful, d) a statement advising recipient  how he or she may opt out all his or her fax numbers, and e) the notice is not clear and  conspicuous.    a statement that the sender must honor a recipient’s opt-out request within  30 days and the sender’s failure to do so is unlawful – thereby encouraging  recipients to opt-out, if they did not want future faxes, by advising them that their  opt-out requests will have legal “teeth”;    Class Size (F. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)):  Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon  such information and belief avers, that the number of persons and entities of the Plaintiff Class is  numerous and joinder of all members is impracticable.  Plaintiff is informed and believes, and  upon such information and belief avers, that the number of class members is over forty.    Typicality (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (3)):   The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the  claims of all class members. The Plaintiff received the same faxes as the faxes sent by or on  behalf of the Defendants advertising goods and services of the Defendants during the Class  Period. The Plaintiff is making the same claims and seeking the same relief for itself and all class  members based upon the same federal statute. The Defendants have acted the same or in a  similar manner with respect to the Plaintiff and all the class members by sending Plaintiff and  each member of the class the same faxes.      Fair and Adequate Representation (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (4)):   The Plaintiff will  fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class. It is interested in this matter,  has no conflicts and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the class.    Common Conduct (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (2)):   Class certification is also  appropriate because the Defendants have acted and refused to act in the same or similar manner  with respect to all class members thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate.  The Plaintiff demands such relief as authorized by 47 U.S.C. §227.    The JFPA makes unlawful for any person to ""use any telephone facsimile  machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited  advertisement …"" 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C).    The JFPA defines ""unsolicited advertisement"" as ""any material advertising the  commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any  person without that person's prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise."" 47  U.S.C. § 227 (a) (5).    The Fax.  Defendants sent the on or about August 13, 2014, advertisement via  facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to the  telephone lines and facsimile machines of Plaintiff and members of the Plaintiff Class.  The Fax  constituted an advertisement under the Act.  Defendants failed to comply with the Opt-Out  Requirements in connection with the Fax as previously set forth herein.  The Fax was transmitted  to persons or entities without their prior express permission or invitation and/or Defendants are  precluded from asserting any prior express permission or invitation because of the failure to  comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements.  By virtue thereof, Defendants violated the JFPA  and the regulations promulgated thereunder by sending the Fax via facsimile transmission to  Plaintiff and members of the Class.    The TCPA/JFPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf  of Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class to redress Defendants’ violations of the Act, and provides for  statutory damages.  47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The Act also provides that injunctive relief is  appropriate.  Id.    The JFPA is a strict liability statute, so the Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff  and the other class members even if their actions were only negligent.    The Defendants knew or should have known that (a) the Plaintiff and the other  class members had not given express invitation or permission for the Defendants or anybody else  to fax advertisements about the Defendants’ goods or services; (b) the Plaintiff and the other  class members did not have an established business relationship; (c) Defendants transmitted an  advertisement; (d) the Faxes did not contain the required Opt-Out Notice; and (e) Defendants’  transmission of advertisements that did not contain the required Opt-Out Notice was unlawful.  ",lose,1
8138726,win,"Caduceus is an Occupational Medicine Practice with eight locations in  Georgia.  At all relevant times, Caduceus employed, and continues to employ,  “Medical Assistants.”  Caduceus employed Chavis as a “Medical Assistant.”      Chavis regularly worked more than forty (40) hours in a workweek.   Caduceus did not pay Chavis the overtime wage differential required by the  FLSA on the occasions that he worked over forty (40) hours in a workweek.   Chavis worked primarily at Caduceus’ midtown office location, but he also  floated between offices as needed.      Throughout Chavis’ employment with Caduceus, he has not been  customarily or regularly engaged away from Caduceus’ place of business.     Chavis’ job duties did not require the exercise of discretion and independent  judgment with respect to matters of significance.   Chavis did not manage any of Caduceus’ offices.   Throughout Chavis’ employment with Caduceus, he has not customarily or  regularly directed the work of at least two or more other full-time employees or  their equivalent.  Throughout Chavis’ employment with Caduceus, he has not had the  authority to hire or fire any other employee.   Throughout Chavis’ employment with Caduceus, his primary job duty has  not been, and has not included, the performance of office or non-manual work  directly related to the management or general business operations of Caduceus or  Caduceus’s clients or customers.   Throughout Chavis’ employment with Caduceus, his primary job has not  been, and has not included, the performance of work requiring advanced technical  knowledge, defined as work which has been predominately intellectual in character  and which has included work requiring the consistent exercise of discretion and  judgment.   Based upon the duties assigned to Chavis, Caduceus has willfully failed and  refused to pay Chavis one and one half times his regular rate for hours that he has  worked in excess of forty (40) hours per work week.  On or about January 26, 2010, Caduceus terminated Chavis’ employment  after Chavis went out on medical leave on December 30, 2009.  Chavis files this Complaint as a collective action pursuant to Section 16(b)  of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of himself and on behalf of the  Collective Plaintiffs.   At all relevant times Chavis and the Collective Plaintiffs are / were1 similarly situated, have / had substantially similar job requirements and pay  provisions, and are / were subject to Caduceus’ common decisions, policies, plans,  programs, practices, procedures, protocols, routines and rules.   Chavis’ claim / cause of action against Caduceus for willfully failing and  refusing to pay him one and one half times their regular rate for hours that he  worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek in violation of the FLSA is  essentially the same as that of the Collective Plaintiffs.   The Collective Plaintiffs’ primary or exclusive duties are / were answering  the phone, taking x-rays, taking vital signs, performing agility tests, and medical  assistant duties.  The Collective Plaintiffs’ primary job is not / was not, and does not / did not  include the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters  of significance.   The Collective Plaintiffs do not / did not customarily or regularly direct the  work of at least two or more other full-time employees or their equivalent.     The Collective Plaintiffs do not / did not have the authority to hire or fire  any other employee.   The Collective Plaintiffs do not / did not provide suggestions or  recommendations as to the hiring, firing, advancement, promotion or any other  change of status of any other employee.   The Collective Plaintiffs’ primary job is not / was not, and does not / did not  include the performance of work requiring advanced technical knowledge, defined  as work which has been predominately intellectual in character and which has  included work requiring the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment.   The Collective Plaintiffs’ primary job is not / was not, and does not / did not  include, the performance of work requiring invention, imagination, originality or  talent in a recognized field or artistic or creative endeavor.   Caduceus regularly suffers or permits / regularly suffered or permitted the  Collective Plaintiffs to work in excess of forty (40) hours per work week.   Caduceus has willfully misclassified some Collective Plaintiffs as being  exempt from overtime.     There are at least approximately thirty (30) potential Collective Plaintiffs  (i.e., similarly situated current and former individuals employed by Caduceus with  the title / in the position “Medical Assistant” on or after the date that is three years  prior to the date of the filing of this Complaint).   Each of these potential Collective Plaintiffs would benefit from the issuance  of Notice of this Complaint and the opportunity to opt in / join this Complaint.     The potential Collective Plaintiffs’ names, current or last known telephone  numbers, and current or last known addresses are readily available from Caduceus.   Notice of this Complaint and the opportunity to opt in / join this Complaint  can be provided to all of the potential Collective Plaintiffs via first class mail to  each Collective Plaintiffs’ current or last known address. Chavis realleges and incorporates as if fully set forth herein the allegations  set forth in all of the above paragraphs.   Caduceus regularly suffers or permits / regularly suffered or permitted  Chavis and the Collective Plaintiffs to work in excess of forty (40) hours per work  week.  Caduceus has failed and refused to pay Chavis and the Collective Plaintiffs  one and one half times their regular rate for hours that they worked in excess of  forty (40) hours per work week.     Caduceus has misclassified some Collective Plaintiffs as being exempt from  overtime.     As a result of Caduceus’ violations of the FLSA, Chavis and the Collective  Plaintiffs have suffered damages.  Caduceus’ conduct in refusing to pay Chavis and the Collective Plaintiffs  overtime compensation was a willful violation of the FLSA within the meaning of  29 U.S.C. § 255(a), entitling Chavis and the Collective Plaintiffs to the benefit of  the three-year statute of limitations and unpaid compensation with interest to date  plus liquidated damages all pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §§ 207, 215, 216(b), and 255.   Caduceus’ failure or refusal to pay Chavis and the Collective Plaintiffs the  overtime compensation owed further entitles them to recover attorneys’ fees and  costs of this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).   ",win,1
18623509,win," Defendant Radius Agent develops software for real estate agents.    One of their software programs, Radius Assist, generates leads for real estate agents by  automatically sending out text messages.    To advertise its software and demonstrate its functionality, Defendant used its software to  automatically text thousands of cellular phones across the country.      On September 28, 2020, Plaintiff received a text on his cell phone ending number in 1146  from Defendant from the phone number (720) 549-4205.    The text message that Plaintiff received said “Hey Terry, I’m Mari with Radius Assist.  We  call and text your old and real-time leads for you,[sic] and increase your conversion rates.  May I send  you info?”    Plaintiff responded to the message and was then solicited further for Defendant’s software.    Plaintiff never consented to be contacted by Defendant and had no knowledge of Defendant  whatsoever prior to receiving the unsolicited text message.     Class Definition: Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure  23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of Plaintiff and a class defined as follows:  Monetary Relief Class.  All persons in the United States who: (1) from  November 9, 2016 to the present; (2) were sent text message(s); (3) on his or  her cellular telephone; (4) promoting the products or services of Radius Agent.   Injunctive Relief Class. All persons who did not give express written consent  prior to receiving texts advertising Defendant’s products or services on their  cellular telephone numbers.    Numerosity: The exact number of the Class members is unknown and not available to  Plaintiff, but it is apparent that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendant  sent text messages to thousands of consumers who fall into the definition of the Class. Members of the  Class can be identified through Defendant’s records.    Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Class, in  that Plaintiff and the Class members sustained damages arising out of Defendant’s uniform wrongful  conduct and unsolicited text messages.    Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the  interests of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff’s claims are made in a representative capacity on  behalf of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the interests of the  other members of the proposed Class and is subject to no unique defenses. Plaintiff has retained  competent counsel to prosecute the case on behalf of Plaintiff and the proposed Class.  Plaintiff and  Plaintiff’s counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the  Class and have the financial resources to do so.     Policies Generally Applicable to the Class: This class action is appropriate for  certification because Defendant have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class  as a whole, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards of  conduct toward the Class members and making final injunctive relief appropriate with respect to the Class  as a whole. Defendant’s practices challenged herein apply to and affect the Class members uniformly,  and Plaintiff’s challenge of those practices hinge on Defendant’s conduct with respect to the Class as a  whole, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff.    Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.    Using sophisticated software that it developed, Defendant sent automated text messages to  Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ cellular telephones without having their prior express written consent  to do so.    Defendant used an automatic telephone dialing system as proscribed by 47 U.S.C.  §227(b)(1)(A).    Defendant’s texts were made for a commercial purpose.    As a result of its unlawful conduct, Defendant repeatedly invaded Plaintiff’s and the  Class’s personal privacy, causing them to suffer damages and, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), entitling  them to recover $500 in civil fines for each violation and an injunction requiring Defendant to stop their  illegal texting campaign.    Defendant and/or its agent made the violating texts “willfully” and/or “knowingly” under  47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C).    If the court finds that Defendant willfully and/or knowingly violated this subsection, the  court may increase the civil fine from $500 to $1500 per violation under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C).   Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.    Each of Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(A)(iii) constitute separate and  cumulative violations of §17200.    Plaintiff is authorized to pursue a private right of action for injunctive relief against  Defendant under §17204.  Unlawful Violation of California Unfair Competition Law  Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §17200  (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)   Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227  (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)  ",lose,1
5317841,win,"Defendant has employed in excess of 200 non-exempt Right of Way Agents who have been  subject to the same policies (payment of day rate, no salary, non-payment of overtime despite having the primary duty of performing non-exempt work) at all times relevant to this matter (since May 2011).  Defendant has violated §207(a) of the FLSA and the PMWA by failing to pay Plaintiff, and all other similarly situated non-exempt Right of Way Agents, who have performed work in excess of forty (40) hours in workweeks since May 2011 at a rate of time-and-one-half (1½) their regular rate of pay for the overtime hours worked.  Prosecuting this case as a collective action under the FLSA and a class action under the PMWA for similarly situated non-exempt Right of Way Agents who have been unlawfully denied overtime wages will promote judicial efficiency and will best protect the interest of the class members.  There are no conflicts of interest among the class members.    Counsel for the Representative Plaintiff, Joseph H. Chivers and John R. Linkosky, are  experienced in the field of employment law (including FLSA and PMWA wage claims), and collective/class actions, and will fairly and competently represent the interests of the class members.   The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable [numerosity]. - As noted above, there are in excess of 200 class members and it would be impractical - if not impossible - to join them all individually.   The claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class [typicality]. - As noted above, the claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the other Right of Way Agents, i.e., failure to pay overtime in accordance with the FLSA/PMWA. The defenses to Plaintiff’s claims (proper classification as exempt) are typical of any defenses to the claims of the class.   The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class [adequacy].  - As noted above, counsel for the representative Plaintiffs, Joseph H. Chivers and John R. Linkosky, are experienced in the field of wage and hour law, and collective/class actions, and will fairly and competently represent the interests of the class members.   In light of the above (numerosity, commonality, impracticability of joinder of separate actions), prosecuting this case as a collective/class action for similarly situated non- exempt Right of Way Agents who have been unlawfully denied overtime wages will promote judicial efficiency and will best protect the interests of the class members.   Common issues predominate.   A collective/class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating this controversy, and would avoid duplicative and potentially inconsistent or varying adjudications that could impair or impede the ability of either party to protect its interests.  Proof of liability for Defendant’s conduct depends on the conduct of Defendant, not on the conduct of the individual class members.   Defendant has acted on grounds that apply generally to the class of non-exempt Right of Way Agents, making declaratory relief appropriate respecting the class as a whole.   There are no conflicts of interest among the class members.   Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1 through 57 of his Complaint as though the same were more fully set forth herein.  Defendant is an employer within the meaning of the FLSA and the PMWA.   Plaintiff, and all other similarly situated non-exempt Right of Way Agents, are not paid a salary.   The primary duties of Plaintiff, and all other similarly situated non-exempt Right of Way Agents, are non-exempt duties within the meaning of the FLSA and the PMWA.   These non-exempt primary duties are the result of common policies and practices applied by Defendant to Plaintiff, and all other similarly situated non-exempt Right of Way Agents.  Plaintiff, and all other similarly situated non-exempt Right of Way Agents, have worked in excess of 40 hours in workweeks since May 2011.  Plaintiff, and all other similarly situated non-exempt Right of Way Agents, have been paid no overtime pay since May 2011.   Plaintiff, and all other similarly situated non-exempt Right of Way Agents, have been subject to the same common policies and practices since May 2011.   Plaintiff, and all other similarly situated non-exempt Right of Way Agents, are entitled to be paid overtime compensation at time-and-one-half (1½) their regular rate of pay pursuant to the FLSA and the PMWA for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in workweeks since May 2011.   Defendant has violated the FLSA and the PMWA by not paying Plaintiff, and all other similarly situated non-exempt Right of Way Agents, overtime compensation at time-and- one-half their regular rate of pay in workweeks in which the non-exempt Right of Way Agents have worked more than 40 hours since May 2011.  Plaintiff, and all other similarly situated non-exempt  Right of Way Agents, are  also, under the FLSA, entitled to liquidated damages in an amount equal to the unpaid overtime.  Defendant has also failed to maintain accurate time records regarding Plaintiff, and all other similarly situated non-exempt Right of Way Agents, in accordance with 29 CFR §516.   Defendant’s failure to pay overtime at time-and-one-half (1½) the regular rate of pay, and to maintain accurate time records, is knowing and willful.  Defendant’s failure to pay overtime at time-and-one-half (1½) the regular rate of pay, and to maintain accurate time records, is a violation of the FLSA and the PMWA.   FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME (INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE/CLASS ACTION) ",lose,1
6236319,lose," TransUnion routinely reports information about tax liens on consumer reports and  continues to report tax liens for a specified number of years after they have been paid, satisfied or  released.      On or about May 5, 2016, a Massachusetts state tax lien in the amount of $500 was  entered against the property where Plaintiff lives in Worcester County, Northern District,  Massachusetts.    On or about June 28, 2016, Plaintiff caused payment in full to be sent to the proper  authority, and on July 18, 2016, the lien was released.     The “Status Date” for the lien record listed on the August 2017 report was “06/16,”  which indicates that TransUnion had made no effort to check for updated public records on  Plaintiff for over a year.     15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b)    Despite the satisfaction of the tax lien, as reflected on Massachusetts public records,  and pursuant to its usual and systemic practice, TransUnion did not remove the tax lien public  record from Plaintiff’s credit reports, nor update it to show it as satisfied, released or paid.    Massachusetts maintains online registries per county that are searchable by name  or address.  (See www.masslandrecords.com.)  These records can be searched for free.     Worcester County, Northern District maintains its online searchable records at  www.fitchburgdeeds.com, which is also accessible through the site www.masslandrecords.com,  once “North Worcester” is selected as the County to search.  These records can be searched for  free.     Both from the face of the search results and from the underlying records, it is clear  that Plaintiff’s tax lien has been paid and released.  It is also clear that this release occurred in July  2016.    The FCRA provides: “Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer  report it shall follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the  information concerning the individual about whom the report relates.”  15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b).    TransUnion is well aware that it has problems with failing to accurately report  public record information.  In fact, it has been sued multiple times for reporting out-of-date tax  lien information in particular.  See Matthews v. Trans Union, LLC, No. 17-cv-01825 (E.D. Penn.);  Dennis v. Trans Union, LLC, No. 14-cv-2865 (E.D. Penn.); Anderson v. Trans Union, LLC, No.  16-cv-558 (W.D. Va.); Clark v. Trans Union, LLC, No. 15-cv-391 (E.D. Va.).  These suits were  filed well in advance of the reporting of Plaintiff’s lien here.      TransUnion receives its public record information that it includes on its reports  from a third party.  TransUnion knows that the tax lien information it obtains from this third party  are often inaccurate, out of date, and/or stale.  Yet, TransUnion does not take any action to ensure  that the information it receives is accurate before reporting it.     These rules were supposed to be in effect as of July 1, 2017, a month prior to  TransUnion’s inaccurate reporting of Plaintiff’s lien status, and a year after the date of the release  of the lien public record.  However, the rules were clearly not in effect, because Plaintiff’s lien  was more than a year out of date, and the face of the report indicated the record had not been  updated since June of 2016.     TransUnion’s failure to accurately report Plaintiff’s tax lien occurred because it  failed to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy in the preparation of  reports.  Specifically, TransUnion does not obtain up to date information on the status of tax lien  releases, even though such information is freely available online.     Indeed, TransUnion has no systematic procedure to assure that, when tax liens are  paid, satisfied or released, the updated status is promptly obtained and reflected upon a consumer’s  credit report.     Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as alleged above.    Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a)  and 23(b)(3) on behalf of the following Class:  All consumers who: (i) had a tax lien recorded in the State of  Massachusetts; (ii) the tax lien appeared on a TransUnion consumer  report dated within two years prior to the filing of this Complaint and  continuing through the resolution of this case; (iii) the State of  Massachusetts public record indicated that the tax lien had been paid,  satisfied, or released on a date prior to the date of the TransUnion  consumer report, and (iv) the TransUnion consumer report incorrectly  identified the tax lien as not released, unpaid, or with an unpaid balance.    TransUnion likely possesses data for consumers that include name, address, date of  birth, Social Security Number, case numbers/lien identifiers, lien amounts, jurisdiction of liens,  disposition of the liens, date of file in public record, date of disposition in public record, and dates  consumers had credit inquiries where such information was reported.  TransUnion is likely able to  produce this data in standardized spreadsheet form.    Massachusetts, in turn, maintains electronic records of liens, easily accessible and  reviewable, that are searchable by name, and include record descriptions, file dates, disposition  dates, lien identifiers, and other identifying information.     The Massachusetts data can be easily compared to TransUnion’s data to ascertain  which consumers would meet the definition of the Class above.     Existence and Predominance of Common Questions of Law and Fact.  Common  questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class, and predominate over the questions  affecting only individual members.  The common legal and factual questions include, among  others:    a.  Whether TransUnion willfully violated the FCRA by reporting tax liens which,  according to Massachusetts public records, were paid; and  b.  Whether TransUnion willfully violated the FCRA by failing to follow reasonable  procedures to assure the maximum possible accuracy of the Massachusetts tax lien  information it reported.     Adequacy.  Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class.  Her interests are  aligned with, and are not antagonistic to, the interests of the members of the Class she seeks to  represent.  She has retained counsel competent and experienced in such litigation, and intends to  prosecute this action vigorously.  Plaintiff and her counsel will fairly and adequately protect the  interests of members of the Class.    Predominance and Superiority.  Questions of law and fact common to the class  members predominate over questions affecting only individual class members, and a class action  is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.   TransUnion’s conduct described in this Complaint stems from common and uniform practices,  resulting in common violations of the FCRA.  Members of the Class do not have an interest in  pursuing separate actions against TransUnion, as the amount of each class member’s individual  claim is small compared to the expense and burden of individual prosecution.  Class certification  also will obviate the need for unduly duplicative litigation that might result in inconsistent  judgments concerning TransUnion’s practices.  Moreover, management of this action as a class  action will not likely present any difficulties.  In the interests of justice and judicial efficiency, it  would be desirable to concentrate the litigation of all class members’ claims in a single forum.    Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as alleged above.    TransUnion failed to comply with 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) by failing to follow  reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the tax lien information in the  consumer reports it prepared regarding Plaintiff and the other class members.    The foregoing violations were negligent.         The foregoing violations were willful.      TransUnion’s inaccurate reporting of Plaintiff and class members’ lien information  harmed, and/or created a risk of real harm to, their concrete interests under the FCRA.    TransUnion is one of the “big three” credit reporting agencies in the United States.    TransUnion sells consumer reports (commonly called “credit reports”) about  millions of consumers annually.    TransUnion is regulated by the FCRA.  ",win,4
5407549,win,"  J.T.L. is a subscriber to and beneficiary of the Eaton Vance Management Health  Benefit Plan.     J.T.L. is an eight-year-old boy who has been diagnosed with autism by his  treating physician.  His treating physician referred J.T.L. to a Board Certified Behavior Analyst  for clinical ABA therapy to treat his autism.  J.T.L.’s treating physician has approved the  treatment plan developed by his ABA therapist.     J.T.L. receives ABA therapy from Apple Consulting in Bellevue, Washington.   J.T.L.’s therapy is overseen by a Board Certified Behavior Analyst.       J.T.L.’s ABA therapist is a covered provider under the terms of the plan.     J.T.L.’s treatment plan calls for 6 hours per week of ABA therapy provided in a  clinical setting and 20 hours per week of ABA therapy provided in a school setting.     J.T.L.’s therapist does not work for, is not affiliated with, and is not paid by  J.T.L.’s school.  J.T.L.’s therapist provides services to him both in a clinical setting and in a  school setting.     Class Definition:  The Class consists of all individuals who: (1) have been, are,  or will be beneficiaries of an ERISA-governed health plan that has been or will be delivered,  issued for delivery, or renewed by defendant BCBS-MA; (2) have been or will be diagnosed  with an autism spectrum disorder; and (3) have required at any time within six years prior to  the filing of this complaint, require, or will require ABA therapy in a school setting as part of a  treatment plan approved by their treating physician.     The definition of the Class is clear and members of the Class are easily  identifiable on the basis of objective information.  BCBS-MA maintains records of its  subscribers and coverage determinations.  Children who have been diagnosed with an autism  spectrum disorder and whose providers have sought authorization or reimbursement for ABA  therapy provided in school as part of a physician-approved treatment plan can be identified  from BCBS-MA’s records through use of diagnostic and procedure codes.     The number of children whose treatment for autism spectrum disorder calls for  ABA therapy delivered in school as part of a physician-approved treatment plan and who are  beneficiaries of an ERISA-governed health plan insured by BCBS-MA is expected to number  in the hundreds and is so large that joinder of all Class members is impracticable.     Plaintiffs re-allege each and every allegation set forth in the proceeding  paragraphs.      ERISA provides that a participant or beneficiary may bring an action to “recover  benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of the plan,  or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.”  ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B);  29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).     Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to recover benefits they have been denied on  the basis of the improper exclusion for medically-necessary ABA therapy provided in a school  setting, as described above.     Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to a declaration of present and future rights  to benefits for medically-necessary ABA therapy that is part of a treatment plan approved by a  treating physician, without regard to whether the therapy is provided in a school setting.       Plaintiffs re-allege each and every allegation set forth in the proceeding  paragraphs.     ERISA provides that a participant or beneficiary may “enjoin any act or practice  which violates any provision of [ERISA] or the terms of the plan.”  ERISA § 502(a)(3); 29  U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(A).  A participant or beneficiary may also obtain appropriate equitable  relief to redress violations of those provisions.  ERISA § 502(a)(3)(B); 29 U.S.C.  § 132(a)(3)(B).     Plaintiffs re-allege each and every allegation set forth in the proceeding  paragraphs.     BCBS-MA is a fiduciary under ERISA because it makes benefit determinations  and reviews and finally decides appeals of denied claims under the ERISA plans it insures.  29  Breach of Fiduciary Duties  ERISA § 502(a)(2); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2); ERISA § 404(A)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 1104(A)   Claim for Recovery of Benefits, Clarification of Rights under the Plan, and Clarification  of Right to Future Benefits under the Plan  ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)   Claim to Enjoin Acts and Practices in Violation of the Terms of the Plan, to Obtain Other  Equitable Relief, and to Enforce the Terms of the Plan   ERISA § 502(a)(3); 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)  ",lose,3
4322202,win,"Allegations concerning each Plaintiff are based on personal knowledge.  All other  allegations are based on investigation by Plaintiffs’ counsel.  Plaintiffs propose a class consisting of:  All residents of the United States who are members of the British  Airways Executive Club, who purchased a Reward Ticket with  frequent flier miles from November 9, 2006 to the present (the  “Proposed Class”), and who paid a purported “fuel surcharge”  when making the purchase.  B. The Class is so Numerous that Individual Joinder is Impractical.   According to its 2011 annual report, BA “is the UK’s largest international  scheduled airline and one of the world’s leading global premium airlines.”   On information and belief, there are at least hundreds of thousands of Executive  Club Members within the United States.  On information and belief, no fewer than tens of  thousands of those Members have redeemed Miles for Reward Tickets and paid the “fuel  surcharges” during the relevant time period.  C. The Answers to Questions Common to the Proposed Class will Drive the  Resolution of this Litigation, and Common Questions Predominate over  Individual Questions.  The answer to two questions will determine BA’s liability to all (or nearly all) Class Members.  -12-  1061826.5  Plaintiffs contend that the Contract does not permit BA to impose any charge that  is not an “incidental fee[] or tax[] charged by any person or relevant authority or body.” Whether or not the Contract permits such a charge is a legal question that is common to all Class  Members, the answer to which would drive resolution of the litigation.  If a judge and/or jury  were to agree with Plaintiffs, BA would be liable to all Class Members for imposition of its “fuel  surcharge.”   Plaintiffs also contend that the “fuel surcharge” is not a “fuel surcharge” at all,  because it is unrelated to the fluctuating price of worldwide oil; and that even if BA were  contractually permitted to impose its own fuel surcharge, such a charge would only be proper if  it were based on BA’s actual fuel costs.  The issue of whether the “fuel surcharges” are based on  BA’s fuel costs presents a question of fact that is common to all Class Members, the answer to  which would drive resolution of the litigation.  Should a judge and/or jury agree with Plaintiffs  on this issue, BA would be liable to all Class Members for imposition of the “fuel surcharges.”     Put more broadly, this litigation focuses entirely on whether BA’s conduct was  in breach of the Contract, as interpreted under the law of a single jurisdiction.  Should a judge  and/or jury find BA liable for breach of the Contract, it is a ministerial task to determine  damages for Plaintiffs and Class Members because, on information and belief, BA maintains  electronic records of the ”fuel surcharges” it assessed against each and every Plaintiff and Class  Member.  D. Plaintiffs’ Claims are Typical of the Claims of all Class Members.   Plaintiffs, like all Class Members, are Executive Club Members.   Plaintiffs’ relationship with BA, like the relationship between all Class Members  and BA, is governed by the terms of the Contract.   Plaintiffs, like all Class Members, redeemed Miles for Reward Tickets.  -13-  1061826.5  Plaintiffs, like all Class Members, paid a “fuel surcharge” when purchasing their  Reward Tickets.   If BA is liable to Plaintiffs for the claim enumerated in this Complaint, it also is  liable to all Class Members for that claim.    E. Plaintiffs and their Counsel Will Adequately Represent the Proposed Class.   Plaintiffs will put the interests of the Class Members on equal footing with their  own interests, and Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit out of a desire to help all Class Members, not  merely out of a desire to recover their own damages.   Plaintiffs’ counsel are highly experienced class action litigators who are well- prepared to represent the interests of the Class Members.  F. A Class Action is Superior to Individual Actions.   BA is a sophisticated party with substantial resources.   Each individual Proposed Class Member’s damages are relatively small.  On  information and belief, relatively few Proposed Class Members will have more than $2000 in  damages.   Prosecution of this litigation is likely to be expensive.  For example, Plaintiffs’  counsel anticipate that to fully analyze BA’s “fuel surcharge” and fuel cost data,  expert analysis  alone will cost at least tens of thousands of dollars.   Given the high cost of litigation, relatively low individual damages, and the fact  that an individual litigating against BA would have to hire an expert to perform an analysis  regarding BA fuel costs and “fuel surcharges” that would be similar to the analysis required to  prove the claims of an entire Class, it would not make economic sense for any (or almost any)  Class Member to pursue this litigation as an individual action. -14-  1061826.5 V. A. Proposed Class Definition.  ",win,1
7701378,win,"Between November 2, 2017 and April 1, 2018, Peterson’s sent at least 5 texts to  Plaintiff’s cellular phone number, from short code 599-25, without Plaintiff’s consent:   Peterson’s unsolicited texts were a nuisance that aggravated Plaintiff, wasted his time,  invaded his privacy, diminished the value of the cellular services he paid for, caused him to  temporarily lose the use and enjoyment of his phone, and caused wear and tear to his phone’s data,  memory, software, hardware, and battery components.    In sending the unsolicited text messages at issue, Peterson’s, or a third party acting on  its behalf, utilized an automatic telephone dialing system; hardware and/or software with the  capacity to store or produce cellular telephone number to be called, using a random or sequential  number generator.  This is evident from the circumstances surrounding the text messages,  including the ability to trigger an automated response by replying “Y,” the text messages’  commercial and generic content, that substantively identical texts were sent to multiple recipients,  and that they were sent from a short code, which is consistent with the use of an automatic  telephone dialing system to send text messages.    Accordingly, Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure  23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated and seeks  certification of the following Class:  All persons who, on or after four years prior to the filing of the initial complaint in  this action, (1) were sent a text message to their cellular telephone number by or on  behalf of Peterson’s, (2) using an automatic telephone dialing system, (3) for the  purpose of soliciting their purchase of Peterson’s products, and (4) from whom  Peterson’s (a) does not allege to have consent, or (b) alleges to have obtained  consent in the same manner it alleges to have obtained consent from Plaintiff.    Numerosity: The exact size of the Class is unknown and unavailable to Plaintiff at this  time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendant  sent unsolicited text messages to thousands of individuals who fall into the Class definition. Class  membership can be easily determined from Defendant’s records.     Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the  Class. Plaintiff is a member of the Class, and if Defendant violated the TCPA with respect to  Plaintiff, then it violated the TCPA with respect to the other members of the Class. Plaintiff and  the Class sustained the same damages as a result of Defendant’s uniform wrongful conduct.     Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact common  to the claims of Plaintiff and the Class, and those questions predominate over any questions that  may affect individual members of the Class. Common questions for the Class include, but are not  necessarily limited to the following:   a)  How Defendant gathered, compiled, or obtained the cellular telephone  numbers of Plaintiff and the Class;  b)  Whether the text messages were sent using an automatic telephone dialing  system;  c)  Whether Defendant’s text messages were sent for the purpose of  marketing Defendant’s products;  d)  Whether Defendant sent some or all of the text messages without the  consent of Plaintiff and the Class; and   e)  Whether Defendant’s conduct was willful and knowing such that Plaintiff  and the Class are entitled to treble damages.    Policies Generally Applicable to the Class: This class action is appropriate for  certification because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the  Class as a whole, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible  standards of conduct toward the members of the Class, and making final injunctive relief  appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. Defendant’s practices challenged herein apply to  and affect the members of the Class uniformly, and Plaintiff’s challenge of those practices hinges  on Defendant’s conduct with respect to the Class as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only  to Plaintiff.     Plaintiff repeats and realleges the allegations of paragraphs 1 through 22 of this  complaint and incorporates them by reference.    Defendant and/or its agents agent transmitted text messages to cellular telephone  numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class using an automatic telephone  dialing system.    These solicitation text messages were sent without the consent of Plaintiff and the other  members of the Class.    Defendant has, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), and as a result, under  47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to a minimum of $500.00 in damages  for each violation.     In the event that the Court determines that Defendant’s conduct was wilful and  knowing, it may, under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C), treble the amount of statutory damages  recoverable by Plaintiff and the Class.  Peterson’s is one of the oldest Harley Davidson dealers in the country.      As part of its marketing plan, Peterson’s sends consumers text messages promoting  Peterson’s Harley Davidson motorcycles, apparel, and other merchandise.   Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227  (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)  ",win,1
7272347,lose,"                  Violation of Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1)  (On behalf of the Nationwide Class)            11.   Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of himself  and all others similarly situated, comprising a Class and Subclass, which are defined as follows:  a.  Nationwide Class: All persons and entities in the United States who purchased or  owned, not for resale, during the four years preceding the date of the filing of this putative  class action through the present, a Pulse X2 or X26P model CEW manufactured by Taser.  b.  California Subclass: All persons and entities in the State of California who purchased  or acquired during the four years preceding the date of the filing of this putative class  action through the present, a Pulse, X2 or X26P model CEW manufactured by Taser.  c.  California Consumer Subclass:  All members of the California Subclass who  purchased or acquired for personal, family or household use during the four years  preceding the date of the filing of this putative class action through the present, a Pulse,  X2 or X26P model CEW manufactured by Taser.     Plaintiff is a member of the Nationwide Class and the California Subclass.     The preceding paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference as though the same  were set forth below at length.       The preceding paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference as though the same  were set forth below at length.    Plaintiff brings this count individually and on behalf of the members of the  Nationwide Class.     The preceding paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference as though the same  were fully set forth at length.     Plaintiff brings this count individually and on behalf of the members of the  California Consumer Subclass.    Plaintiff and members of the California Consumer Subclass are “buyers” within  the meaning of Cal. Civ. Code § 1791.      The CEWs are “consumer goods” within the meaning of Cal. Civ. Code §  1791.     The preceding paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference as though the same  were fully set forth below at length.     Plaintiff brings this count individually and on behalf of the members of the  California Subclass.     Plaintiff and members of the California Subclass are “buyers” within the meaning  of Cal. Civ. Code § 1791.      The CEWs are “consumer goods” within the meaning of Cal. Civ. Code § 1791.     Taser is a “manufacturer” of the CEWs within the meaning of Cal. Civ. Code   § 1791.      Taser impliedly warranted to Plaintiff and the California Subclass members that  the CEWs were “merchantable” within the meaning of Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1791.1(a) and 1792.     Cal. Civ. Code § 1791.1 states that: “Implied warranty of merchantability” or  “implied warranty that goods are merchantable” means that the consumer goods meet each of the  following:  (1) Pass without objection in the trade under the contract description;  (2) Are fit for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used;  (3) Are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled; and  (4) Conform to the promises of affirmations of fact made on the container or label.     The CEWs would not pass without objection because they share a common design  defect in that they are prone to firing with the safety mechanism engaged.     Because of the defect, the CEWs are not fit for their ordinary purpose.     The CEWs were not adequately labeled because the labeling failed to disclose the  defects described herein.     The preceding paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference as though the same  were fully set forth below at length.     Plaintiff brings this count individually and on behalf of the members of the California  Subclass.     Taser was aware of the CEWs defect when it marketed and sold the CEWs to  Plaintiff and the California Subclass members.    FRAUDULENT OMISSION   (On Behalf of the California Subclass)          UNJUST ENRICHMENT  (On Behalf of the California Subclass)   VIOLATION OF THE SONG-BEVERLY CONSUMER WARRANTY ACT FOR   BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY  Cal. Civ. Code § 1790, et seq.  (Brought on behalf of the California Consumer Subclass)   VIOLATION OF THE SONG-BEVERLY CONSUMER WARRANTY ACT FOR  BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY  Cal. Civ. Code § 1790, et seq.  (On behalf of the California Consumer Subclass)  ",lose,3
6642888,lose,"Defendants have been attempting to collect from plaintiff an alleged credit card debt incurred, if at all, for personal, family or household purposes and not for business purposes. The alleged original creditor was Credit One Bank, which is also part of the Sherman Financial Group.  Credit One Bank reported the debt to Experian and possibly other credit bureaus (consumer reporting agencies) as delinquent beginning in March 2016.    LVNV began reporting the debt (or Resurgent reported it for LVNV) to Experian and possibly other credit bureaus in October 2016, as a “collection account” held by a “debt buyer.”  Resurgent, on behalf of LVNV, placed the alleged debt with Frontline for collection.  On or about November 4, 2016, after the debt had already been reported by both LVNV and Credit One Bank, Frontline sent plaintiff the letter attached as Exhibit A.  LVNV and Credit One Bank have standardized credit reporting practices, in terms of the time at which a debt is reported to credit bureaus.  Exhibit A is a form letter.  Exhibit A offers a settlement and asks plaintiff to make payment arrangements.  It also states: “In order to prevent any further action, please contact us so that we may assist you in resolving this debt.  Please note that a negative credit bureau report reflecting on your credit record may be submitted to a credit reporting agency by the current account holder if you fail to fulfill the terms of your credit obligations.”  The quoted statement seeks to induce payment by telling the least sophisticated consumer that payment of the debt will avoid a negative credit bureau report.  The quoted statement is false and misleading, and omits to state material facts 5 necessary to make the statements made not misleading, in that a negative credit bureau report has already been made and will not be avoided by payment.  The quoted statement was made by Frontline as authorized agent of Resurgent  and LVNV. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1-42.  Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. §1692e, 1692e(2), 1692e(5),  and 1692e(10) by making the statements quoted above.  Section 1692e provides: § 1692e. False or misleading representations [Section 807 of P.L.]  A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.  Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation of this section: . . . (2) The false representation of-- (A) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt; . . .  (5) The threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken. . . .  (10) The use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain information concerning a consumer. . . . Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of a class and subclass, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3).    The class consists of (a) all individuals (b) to whom Frontline sent a letter in the form represented by Exhibit A (c) relating to a debt that had already been reported to a credit bureau by the current owner of the debt or an affiliate (d) which letter was sent at any time during a period beginning one year prior to the filing of this action and ending 20 days after the filing of this action.   6  The subclass consists of class members whose debts were allegedly owned by LVNV at the time the letter was sent.  On information and belief, based on the use of a form letter, the class and subclass are so numerous that joinder of all members is not practicable.  There are questions of law and fact common to the class members, which common  questions predominate over any questions relating to individual class members.  The predominant common questions are: a. Whether defendants represent that negative credit bureau reporting may be avoided by payment, when it has already occurred; b. Whether such representation violates the FDCPA.  Plaintiff’s claim is typical of the claims of the class members.  All are based on the same factual and legal theories.  Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the class members.  Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in class actions and FDCPA litigation.  A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of this matter, in that: a. Individual actions are not economically feasible. b. Members of the class are likely to be unaware of their rights; c. Congress intended class actions to be the principal enforcement mechanism under the FDCPA. 7 WHEREFORE, the Court should enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and the class members and against defendants for: i. Statutory damages; ii. Attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit; iii. Such other and further relief as the Court deems proper. s/Tiffany N. Hardy  Tiffany N. Hardy  Tiffany N. Hardy ",win,1
4276476,win," Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action under Federal Rule of  Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of all persons and/or entities that own AS&E common stock (the  “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Defendants and their affiliates, immediate families, legal  representatives, heirs, successors or assigns and any entity in which Defendants have a  controlling interest.    Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class.  Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have sustained damages as a result of Defendants’  wrongful conduct as alleged herein.    Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class, and has no  interests contrary to or in conflict with those of the Class that Plaintiff seeks to represent.    A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient  adjudication of this controversy. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty to be encountered in the  management of this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class action.   On November 5, 2015, the Board “discussed the competitive environment,  potential consolidation in the detection equipment industry and the effects that these factors may  have on the Company.” The Board also discussed strategic alternatives for the Company going  forward, including possible acquisitions or a sale of the Company. To this end, the Board  authorized the Company’s management to retain a financial advisor and to report back to the  Board on potential acquisitions or a sale. Subsequently, the Company’s management retained  Evercore as the Company’s financial advisor.    On February 4, 2016, Evercore reviewed certain strategic alternatives with the  Board and, in response to a question by the Board, recommended that the Board consider a  targeted outreach to potential partners were it to pursue a sales process.    On February 9, 2016, Sanders was contacted by Deepak Chopra (“Chopra”), the  President and CEO of OSI. Chopra informed Sanders that OSI was interested in making an offer  to acquire the Company. Shortly thereafter, on February 10, 2016, Chopra contacted Dougherty  and stated that OSI would be sending a written proposal subject to completion of a diligence  investigation. On a follow-up call on February 12, 2016, with Dougherty, Chopra expressed the  importance and potential for meaningful synergies that could inure for OSI.    The Board met on February 22, 2016, to discuss OSI’s proposal, and came to a  consensus that the proposed price range was not sufficient to commence negotiations. The Board  directed Evercore to reach out to four potential strategic bidders in the detection equipment  industry.    On February 23, 2016, Dougherty informed Chopra that, while the Company was  still considering the proposal, the current valuation range was not sufficient to engage in  diligence, but a higher range might cause the Company to entertain further discussions. Chopra  told Dougherty that OSI would be willing to increase the proposed purchase price range to  between $37.00 and $42.00 per share of Company common stock, representing a 45% to 64%  premium to the closing price of Company common stock on the day prior.    Evercore contacted the four parties—Company A, Company B, Company C, and  Company D—on February 24 and 25, 2016, to gauge their interest in a potential transaction with   Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth  herein.    As alleged herein, Defendants have failed to provide AS&E’s stockholders with  material information concerning the Proposed Transaction, including, inter alia, the potential  conflicts of interest affecting the Company’s management, the process leading to the Merger  Agreement, the financial analysis of Evercore, and the Company’s financial projections. Instead,  Defendants are soliciting stockholders’ votes via a materially misleading and incomplete Proxy  Statement.    Further, Defendants have accepted an offer to sell AS&E at a price that fails to  reflect the true value of the Company, thus depriving common stock stockholders of the  reasonable, fair and adequate value of their shares.  The Proposed Transaction consideration  being offered and accepted represents a meager premium over the closing share price as  compared to like transactions.  There is no indication the Proposed Transaction was the result of  a competitive bidding process or arms’-length negotiation where all reasonably available  synergistic acquirers were vetted.     As such, unless the Individual Defendants’ conduct is enjoined by the Court, they  will continue to breach their fiduciary duties to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, and  will further a process that inhibits the maximization of stockholder value and the disclosure of  material information.     AS&E Background   CLAIM FOR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY   AGAINST DEFENDANTS   ",lose,3
14731134,win," Defendant owns and operates a telecommunication company that specializes in selling  minutes for overseas phone calls.     Plaintiff himself was sent at least two marketing text messages without his express  written consent.    Below is a depiction of an actual text message received by Plaintiff from Defendant:    Defendant’s text messages constitute telemarketing because they encourage the future  purchase of Defendant’s products by consumers.    Plaintiff received the subject text messages within this judicial district and, therefore,  Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon information and belief,  Defendant caused other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district.    At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with his express written consent to  be contacted by text for marketing purposes.    Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the ***-***-5833 phone number.    Some, if not all of the messages originated from “305-520-7863.”     Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendant, through their direction, utilized a  combination of hardware and software systems to send the text messages at issue in this case. The  systems utilized by Defendant have the current capacity or present ability to generate or store random or  sequential numbers or to dial sequentially or randomly at the time the call is made, and to dial such  numbers, en masse, in an automated fashion without human intervention.    Defendant’s unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion  of his privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s  text messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to his daily life. See Patriotic  Veterans, Inc. v. Zoeller, No. 16-2059, 2017 WL 25482, at *2 (7th Cir. Jan. 3, 2017) (“Every call uses  some of the phone owner’s time and mental energy, both of which are precious.”). Plaintiff received the  subject text message while he was at work, causing him to stop his work activities to check his phone.   Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of  himself and all others similarly situated.    Defendant and their employees or agents, Plaintiff’s attorneys and their employees, the  Judge to whom this action is assigned and any member of the Judge’s staff and immediate family, and  claims for personal injury, wrongful death, and/or emotional distress are excluded from the Class.  Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number  in the several thousands, if not more.   The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s  claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular  telephone services is accurate, Plaintiffs and the Class members will have identical claims capable of  being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case.   Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-48 as if fully set forth herein.    It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for  emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any  automatic telephone dialing system . . .  to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone  service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).    “Automatic telephone dialing system” refers to any equipment that has the  “capacity to dial numbers without human intervention.” See, e.g., Hicks v. Client Servs., Inc., No.  07-61822, 2009 WL 2365637, at *4 (S.D. Fla. June 9, 2009) (citing FCC, In re: Rules and  Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Request of ACA  International for Clarification and Declaratory Ruling, 07–232, ¶ 12, n.23 (2007)).    Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant– used equipment having the  capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make marketing telephone calls to the  cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined above.    Defendant therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an  automatic telephone dialing system to make marketing telephone calls to the cell phones of  Plaintiff and Class Members without their prior express written consent.    All possible Defendants are directly, jointly, or vicariously liable for each such  violation of the TCPA.    As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA,  Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a  minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an  injunction against future calls.   Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-48 as if fully set forth herein.     At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that their conduct as  alleged herein violated the TCPA.    Defendant knew that they did not have prior express written consent to send these  text messages.    Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and Class Members  had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls to their cellular telephones, the  Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members  of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA.    As a result of Defendant violations, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to  an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C.  § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C).  WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, MARIO GUERRA, on behalf of herself and the other members  of the Class, prays for the following relief:  a.  A declaration that Defendant practices described herein violate the Telephone  Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227;  b.  A declaration that Defendant violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act,  47 U.S.C. § 227, were willful and knowing;  c.  An injunction prohibiting Defendant from using an automatic telephone dialing  system to call and text message telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephones without the  prior express consent of the called party;  d.  An award of actual, statutory damages, and/or trebled statutory damages; and  e.  Such further and other relief the Court deems reasonable and just.  Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)  (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)   PROPOSED CLASS   Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)  (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)  ",win,2
4524761,lose," Plaintiff Stancu was hired by Defendant Ethos in or around September of 2015.     Plaintiff Stancu was required to perform all relevant tasks in the front of the restaurant  including acting as a bartender, waiter, busser and food runner. He also cleaned and stocked  the bar and kitchen.     Plaintiff worked hard and diligently within the restaurant.    Due to his hard work, in or around May of 2016, Plaintiff was asked to work a few days a  week in Defendants’ other food establishment, Pathos Café, located on 932 1st Ave, New  York, NY 10022.    Throughout his employment, Plaintiff Stancu worked anywhere from thirty (30) to sixty (60)  hours a week.     Throughout his employment, Plaintiff Stancu worked only as tipped employee. However,  Defendants required that Plaintiff Stancu share his tips with other employees, including the  manager. He was not paid any hourly wage for hours worked, nor any overtime wage for  hours worked over forty (40).     Defendants never provided a wage statement or pay stub detailing hours worked or amount  of tips accumulated. Defendants did not have a systematic way of fairly paying their workers.  Tips were always kept in house and distributed unevenly between managers and other  employees.     Throughout his employment, Plaintiff Stancu was never paid on time or on a regular basis.     While the tips collected by Defendant Ethos would often be more than one thousand dollars  ($1,000.00) per week, Plaintiff Stancu would only be paid that much or less for the entire  week no matter how much he actually accumulated.    Despite his hard work and long shifts, Plaintiff Stancu was not properly compensated and had  his tips stolen from him on a regular basis through a tip pool which included members of  management.     Defendants often threatened to fire Plaintiff Stancu if he did not agree with their way of  payment. Mr. Chatiris was rude and malignant when Plaintiff insisted on being paid on time.  Due to the fact Plaintiff was persistent, Mr. Chatiris began to harass him making his work  unbearable. Mr. Chatiris often cursed at him in front of other employees and assigned Plaintiff  to as much heavy lifting as possible knowing he had a persistent back pain. When Plaintiff  asked for help from other workers, Mr., Chatiris refused to let anyone help him. On some  occasions Plaintiff had to call out of work due to horrible back pains and soreness.     In or around the end of May of 2016, Plaintiff Stancu demanded that he be paid in full and on  time because he needed the money. Mr. Chatiris ignored his request and told Plaintiff his pay  was not ready. When Plaintiff Stancu insisted that he be paid, Mr. Chatiris responded with “I  will give you the money now but you are fired”.     If Plaintiff Stancu had not complained about Defendants’ violations of the law then he would  not have been terminated. In fact, this was the explicit reason given for his termination.     As a result, Plaintiff Stancu has lost pay to which he is entitled under the FLSA and NYLL  and has been damaged in an amount yet to be determined.     Defendants’ violations of the FLSA and NYLL were done with knowledge of the law and  with full understanding that this policy violated the law.     Plaintiff Stancu has lost income due to the loss of his job as he has suffered a period of  unemployment.     Defendant Ethos is an employer under the FLSA and NYLL.   Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation made in the above paragraphs of  this complaint as if same were set forth herein fully at length.    Defendants willfully employed Plaintiff, Class Plaintiffs and Rule 23 Class Plaintiffs in the  afore-mentioned enterprise and failed to compensate them for all hours worked during their  employment.    Defendants failed to pay any wages for hours worked by Plaintiff, Class Plaintiffs and Rule  23 Class Plaintiffs.    Defendants failed to pay any wages for hours worked by Plaintiff, Class Plaintiffs and Rule  23 Class Plaintiffs.    Defendants also failed to provide any pay the overtime premium rate of one and a half  times their regular hourly rate as is required by the FLSA.     Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation made in the above paragraphs of  this complaint as if same were set forth herein fully at length.    Plaintiff, Class Plaintiffs and Rule 23 Class Plaintiffs were employees of Defendants within  the meaning of New York Wage Regulations (NYCRR Labor Section 138 et seq.).    Defendants failed to pay Plaintiff, Class Plaintiffs and Rule 23 Class Plaintiffs any rate of  pay for certain hours when they were required to be at work, ready to work, and actually  performing work.     Defendants’ failure to comply with the New York Labor Law minimum wage protections  caused Plaintiff, Class Plaintiffs and Rule 23 Class Plaintiffs to suffer loss of wages and  interest thereon.    Defendants’ failure to pay proper wages for each hour worked was willful.    Defendants also failed to pay overtime pay as is required by the New York Labor Law.     Defendants also stole tips which were owed to Plaintiff due to the work he performed,  which were paid to Plaintiff by clients and to which he is entitled.    Defendants also failed to pay any spread of hours pay to Plaintiff for days in which he  worked more than ten (10) hours.     On account of such violations, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for actual, statutory and  liquidated damages.   Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation made in the above paragraphs of  this complaint as if same were set forth herein fully at length.    Defendants then retaliated against Plaintiff by immediately terminating his employment.     This action violates the New York Labor Law § 215.    As a result of this violation, Plaintiff has suffered and continues to suffer loss of wages,  benefits and emotional damages for which Defendants are liable.     Plaintiff is further entitled to reinstatement, liquidated damages, injunctive relief and  attorneys’ fees and costs.    Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation made in the above paragraphs of  this complaint as if same were set forth herein fully at length.    At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff was employed by Defendants within the  meaning of New York Labor Law §§ 190 et seq., including §§ 191, 193, 195, 198 and the  applicable regulations thereunder.    At all times relevant herein, Defendants, individually and/or jointly, failed and willfully  failed to provide Plaintiff with the notice(s) required by NYLL 195(1) – Plaintiff is  therefore entitled to and seeks to recover in this action the maximum recovery for this  violation, plus attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to NYLL 198 including NYLL 198(1-b).    At all times relevant herein, Defendants failed and willfully failed to provide Plaintiff with  the statement(s) required by NYLL 195(3) – Plaintiff is therefore entitled to and seeks to  recover in this action the maximum recovery for this violation, plus attorneys’ fees and  costs pursuant to NYLL 198 including NYLL 198(1-d)  VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT   VIOLATION OF NEW YORK LABOR LAW    VIOLATION OF NEW YORK LABOR LAW (wage notice and statement)   VIOLATION OF NEW YORK LABOR LAW   ",win,4
16694791,lose," On or about January 16, 2019, Plaintiff responded to Defendant’s text messages with  the word “Stop” as shown below, “Stop” was the “opt-out” preference provided by Defendant in its text  messages:    Defendant’s text messages constitute telemarketing and advertising because they  promote Defendant’s business, goods and services.    The text messages also include a hyperlink to a landing page website  (www.govideodeal.com)  which upon information and belief, is owned and/or operated by or on behalf  of Defendant.     Plaintiff received the subject text message within this judicial district and, therefore,  Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district.      At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her express consent to be  contacted by text messages using an ATDS.      Plaintiff is the sole user of the 1992 Number.     The number used by Defendant (480-977-0116) is known as a “long code,” a standard  10-digit code that enables Defendant to send SMS text messages en masse, while deceiving recipients  into believing that the message was personalized and sent from a telephone number operated by  an individual.    Long codes work as follows: Private companies known as SMS gateway providers have  contractual arrangements with mobile carriers to transmit two-way SMS traffic. These SMS gateway  providers send and receive SMS traffic to and from the mobile phone networks' SMS centers, which  are responsible for relaying those messages to the intended mobile phone. This allows for the  transmission of a large number of SMS messages to and from a long code.    Upon information and belief, the number (480-977-0116) that transmitted the text  messages is operated by or on behalf of Defendant.      To send the text messages, Defendant used a messaging platform (the “Platform”) that  permitted Defendant to transmit thousands of automated text messages without any human  involvement.      The Platform has the capacity to store telephone numbers, which capacity was in fact  utilized by Defendant.    The Platform has the capacity to generate sequential numbers, which capacity was in  fact utilized by Defendant.    The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers in sequential order, which capacity was  in fact utilized by Defendant.      The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers from a list of numbers, which capacity  was in fact utilized by Defendant.    The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers without human intervention, which  capacity was in fact utilized by Defendant.      The Platform has the capacity to schedule the time and date for future transmission of  text messages, which occurs without any human involvement.    Additionally, the Platform has an auto-reply function that results in the transmission of  text messages to individual’s cellular telephones automatically from the system, and with no human  intervention, in response to a keyword (e.g. “STOP”) being sent by a consumer.    Defendant then created the content of the text messages, selected the telephone numbers  to transmit the messages to, and selected a date and time for transmission.     In making these selections, Defendant was simply creating a set of instructions that were  subsequently executed automatically (i.e. with no human intervention), by the Platform.      The Platform automatically executed Defendant’s instructions as follows:  (1)  The Platform retrieved each telephone number from the list of numbers  uploaded by Defendant in the sequential order the numbers were listed by  Defendant;  (2) The Platform then generated each number in the sequential order listed by  Defendant and combined each number with the content of Defendant’s  message to create “packets” consisting of one telephone number and the  message content;  (3) Each packet was then transmitted in the sequential order listed by Defendant to  an SMS aggregator, which acts an intermediary between the Platform, mobile  carriers (e.g. AT&T), and consumers.    (4) Upon receipt of each packet, the SMS aggregator transmitted each packet –  automatically and with no human intervention – to the respective mobile carrier  for the telephone number, again in the sequential order listed by  Defendant.  Each mobile carrier then sent the message to its customer’s mobile  telephone.      Further, the Platform “throttles” the transmission of the text messages depending on  feedback it receives from the mobile carrier networks.  In other words, the platform controls how  quickly messages are transmitted depending on network congestion.  The platform performs this  throttling function automatically and does not allow a human to control the function.    The following graphic summarizes the above steps and demonstrates that the dialing of  the text messages at issue was done by the Platform automatically and without any human intervention:     Defendant’s unsolicited text message caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion  of her privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion.  Defendant’s  text messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to her daily life.    Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of  herself and all others similarly situated.    Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not  know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class members number in the several  thousands, if not more.   There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate  over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class.  Among the questions of law and  fact common to the Class are:  (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff and Class members’  cellular telephones using an ATDS;  (2) Whether Defendant can meet their burden of showing that they obtained prior  express written consent to make such calls;  (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful;  (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and  (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future.    Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth  herein.     It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for  emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any  automatic telephone dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone  service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).     The TCPA defines an “automatic telephone dialing system” (hereinafter “ATDS”)  as “equipment which has the capacity – (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called,  using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.”  Id. at § 227(a)(1).    Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the  capacity to store telephone numbers, using a random or sequential generator, and to dial such  numbers and/or to dial numbers from a list automatically, without human intervention, to make  non-emergency telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the  Class.     Defendant violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic  telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff  and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express consent.     As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA,  Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a  minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an  injunction against future calls.   WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Elizabeth Boriskin, on behalf of herself and the other members  of the Class, prays for the following relief:   a.  A declaration that Defendant’s practices described herein violate the Telephone  Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227;   b.  A declaration that Defendant’s violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection  Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, were willful and knowing;  c.  An injunction prohibiting Defendant from using an automatic telephone dialing  system to call and text message telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephones without the  prior express consent of the called party;   d.  An award of actual, statutory damages, and/or trebled statutory damages; and   e.  Such further and other relief the Court deems reasonable and just.  PROPOSED CLASS   Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)  (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)  ",win,3
17335248,lose,"The amount of the debt;    Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3).    The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the  records of Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they  attempt to collect and/or have purchased debts.    Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer,  members, partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and  their respective immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this  action, and all members of their immediate families.     There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class,  which common issues predominate over any issues involving only individual  class members. The principal issue is whether the Defendants' written  communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate 15  U.S.C. §§ l692e and 1692g.    Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of  Civil Procedure is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common  to members of the Plaintiff Class predominate over any questions affecting an  individual member, and a class action is superior to other available methods for  the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.    Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained  in paragraphs numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the  same were set forth at length herein.   The name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;    Some time prior to October 25, 2019, an obligation was allegedly  incurred to Salal Credit Union by Plaintiff.    The Salal Credit Union obligation arose out of transactions in which  money, property, insurance or services which are the subject of the transactions  were primarily for personal, family or household purposes.    The alleged Salal Credit Union obligation is a “debt” as defined by 15  U.S.C. §1692a(5).    Salal Credit Union is a “creditor” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(4).    Defendant FAI was contracted by Salal Credit Union  to collect the  alleged debt.    On or about October 25, 2019, Defendant FAI sent Plaintiff an initial  collection letter (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt currently owed. See  Exhibit A.    The FDCPA further provides that ''if the consumer notifies the debt  collector in writing within the thirty day period . . . that the debt, or any portion  thereof, is disputed . . . the debt collector shall cease collection . . . until the debt  collector obtains verification of the debt . . . and a copy of such verification is  mailed to the consumer by the debt collector.'' 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b).    Although a collection letter may track the statutory language, ''the  collector nevertheless violates the Act if it conveys that information in a  confusing or contradictory fashion so as to cloud the required message with  uncertainty.'' Russell v. EQUIFAX A.R.S., 74 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 1996) (''It is  not enough for a debt collection agency to simply include the proper debt  validation notice in a mailing to a consumer-- Congress intended that such  notice be clearly conveyed.''). Put differently, a notice containing ''language that  'overshadows or contradicts' other language informing a consumer of her  rights . . . violates the Act.'' Russell, 74 F.3d at 34.    This language completely overshadows the “G-Notice” by scaring  Plaintiff into making payment immediately to avoid negative credit reporting  instead of exercising her statutory right to dispute the debt as provided by the   Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in  paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set  forth at length herein.   A statement that the consumer notifies the debt collector in  writing within thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion  thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain  verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the  consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will  be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and    Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards  the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited  to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.    Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false,  deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the  collection of any debt.    Defendant violated said section by:   a. Making a false and misleading representation in violation of  §1692e(10).    By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that  Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual  damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees.    Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained  in paragraphs above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were  set forth at length herein.    Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards  the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not  limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g.     Pursuant to 15 USC §1692g, a debt collector:  Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in  connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the  following information is contained in the initial communication or the  consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing –    The Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §1692g, by threatening negative  credit reporting, which overshadows the ''g-notice'' language and coerces the  consumer not to exert its rights under the FDCPA.     By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that  Defendant's conduct violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA, actual  damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees.  A statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within  the thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the  consumer with the name and address of the original creditor,  if different from the current creditor.   VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES  ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq.   VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15  U.S.C. §1692e et seq.  ",lose,1
16094926,lose," Defendant Exit Realty is a real estate agent or brokerage.    Defendant John Doe 1 is an authorized agent of Defendant Exit Realty.    As a way to cut corners yet also increase its advertising reach, Defendant and its  authorized agents, including John Doe 1, repeatedly called thousands of cellular and residential phones  at a time using an automatic telephone dialing system in violation of the TCPA.      When the Class members answered their cellular phones, they heard silence for several  seconds and a distinct “click” sound before being transferred to a live agent, which denotes the use of  an automatic telephone dialing system.      On or about July 3, 2019, Plaintiff received a call on his cellular phone number ending in  1146.     The Caller ID displayed that the phone number originated from 520-277-9156.    When Plaintiff answered his phone, Plaintiff said “hello” several times, but there was  silence for approximately 4 seconds. Plaintiff then heard a “click” sound. There was an additional silent  delay after the distinct “click” before a live agent answered.     Upon information and belief, the technology used to robocall Plaintiff had the capability  to store phone numbers and dial those numbers automatically.      The live agent informed Plaintiff that he was calling on behalf of Defendant Exit Realty  and advertising Defendant’s Exit Realty’s services. The live agent gave Plaintiff some information  about Defendant Exit Realty and asked if Plaintiff would be interested in more information.     In order to investigate the company calling, Plaintiff agreed to receive more information  about Defendant Exit Realty. The live agent told Plaintiff that he would be sending Plaintiff a video  regarding Defendant Exit Realty and that one of his partners would follow up.    On or about July 10, 2019, Plaintiff received a follow up telephone call from a real estate  agent with Defendant Exit Realty. Plaintiff did not answer the telephone call as Plaintiff did not  recognize the telephone number 612-702-1869. Defendant’s voicemail stated, in pertinent part, “Hi this  is for Terry. This is Cade from Upper Midwest Realty. We had one of our associates reach out and  connect with you here last week …”    Plaintiff never consented to be contacted by Defendants.    Prior to the robocall, Plaintiff had no relationship with Defendants.    Class Definition: Plaintiff Shanahan brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil  Procedure 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2), and/or 23(b)(3) on behalf of himself and a class defined as follows:  TCPA Class.  All persons in the United States who: (1) from the last 4 years to  present (2) who received at least one telephone call; (3) on his or her cellular or  residential telephone; (4) that used an automatic telephone dialing system; (5)  for the purpose of promoting Defendant’s services; (6) where Defendant did not  first obtain the person’s express written consent.    The following people are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding  over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendants, Defendants’ subsidiaries, parents,  successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendants or their parents have a controlling  interest and its current or former employees, officers and directors; (3) persons who properly execute  and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class; (4) persons whose claims in this matter have  been finally adjudicated on the merits or otherwise released; (5) Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendants’  counsel; and (6) the legal representatives, successors, and assigns of any such excluded persons.    Numerosity: The exact number of the Class members is unknown and not available to  Plaintiff, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and belief, Defendants  placed telephone calls to thousands of consumers who fall into the definition of the Class. Members of  the Class can be identified through Defendants’ records.    Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other members of the Class, in  that Plaintiff and the Class members sustained damages arising out of Defendants’ uniform wrongful  conduct and unsolicited telephone calls.    Policies Generally Applicable to the Class: This class action is appropriate for  certification because Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the  Class as a whole, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible  standards of conduct toward the Class members and making final injunctive relief appropriate with  respect to the Class as a whole. Defendants’ practices challenged herein apply to and affect the Class  members uniformly, and Plaintiff’s challenge of those practices hinge on Defendants’ conduct with  respect to the Class as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff.    Superiority: This case is also appropriate for class certification because class  proceedings are superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this  controversy as joinder of all parties is impracticable. The damages suffered by the individual members  of the Class will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense of individual  prosecution of the complex litigation necessitated by Defendant Exit Realty and Defendant John Doe  1’s actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the individual members of the Class to obtain  effective relief from Defendant Exit Realty and Defendant John Doe 1’s misconduct. Even if members  of the Class could sustain such individual litigation, it would still not be preferable to a class action,  because individual litigation would increase the delay and expense to all parties due to the complex  legal and factual controversies presented in this Complaint. By contrast, a class action presents far  fewer management difficulties and provides the benefits of single adjudication, economy of scale, and  comprehensive supervision by a single Court. Economies of time, effort and expense will be fostered,  and uniformity of decisions ensured.   The May 2013 FCC Ruling rejected a narrow view of TCPA liability, including the  assertion that a seller’s liability requires a finding of formal agency and immediate direction and control  over the third-party who placed the telemarketing call. Id. at 6587 n. 107.     Prior to conducting discovery in this litigation, due to the anonymous nature of  robocalling, Plaintiff has no way to identify the exact party who called his cellular phone whether it  was Defendant Exit Realty, Defendant John Doe 1 or some other unknown company.    However, for the purposes of TCPA liability, Plaintiff is not expected to know this  information at the pleading stage.     Even if Defendant Exit Realty alleges that it did not personally make the TCPA-violating  calls, Defendant Exit Realty is liable because it took steps to cause the calls to be made by hiring a  third party to market the services Defendant Exit Realty, or because the calls were made pursuant to  Defendant Exit Realty’s actual authority, apparent authority and/or ratification, or pursuant to joint  enterprise or acting in concert liability.     Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.    Defendants and/or its agents placed calls using an automatic telephone dialing system to  Plaintiff’s and the Class members’ cellular telephones without having their prior express written  consent to do so.    The system used by Defendants to place such automated calls had the capability to store a  list of numbers and automatically dial those numbers.      Defendant Exit Realty’s and Defendant John Doe’s calls were made for the purpose of  advertising and marketing employment opportunities and realty services with Defendant Exit Realty.    Defendants used an automatic telephone dialing system as proscribed by 47 U.S.C. §  227(b)(1)(A)(iii) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B) to generate Plaintiff’s phone number as well as the  phone numbers of the Class members.    Defendants made the violating calls “willfully” and/or “knowingly” under 47 U.S.C. §  227(b)(3)(C).    If the court finds that Defendants willfully and/or knowingly violated this subsection, the  court may increase the civil fine from $500 to $1500 per violation under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C).  Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227  Telecommunications Consumer Protection Act  (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class against all Defendants)  ",win,4
4516603,lose," On information and belief, on or about March 14, 2011, April-May, 2012, May  10, 2012, October 19, 2012, September 30, 2013 and October 8, 2013, Defendants  transmitted by telephone facsimile machine seven (7) unsolicited advertisements to Plaintiff.   Copies of the facsimiles are attached hereto as Exhibit A.    Plaintiff did not invite or give permission to Defendants to send the faxes.     On information and belief, Defendants faxed the same and other unsolicited  facsimiles without the required opt out language to Plaintiff and more than 25 other recipients  without first receiving the recipients’ express permission or invitation.     Defendants’ facsimile did not display a proper opt-out notice as required by 47   In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3), Plaintiff brings  this class action pursuant to the JFPA, on behalf of the following class of persons:  All persons in the United States who (1) on or after four years  prior to the filing of this action until the date of class  certification, (2) were sent telephone facsimile messages of  material advertising the commercial availability of any property,  goods, or services by or on behalf of Defendants, and (3) which  did not display a proper opt-out notice.  Excluded from the Class are the Defendants, their employees, agents and members of the  Judiciary. Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the class definition upon completion of class  certification discovery.    Class Size (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon  such information and belief avers, that the number of persons and entities of the Plaintiff Class is  numerous and joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and  upon such information and belief avers, that the number of class members is more than 100.    Typicality (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (3)):  The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the  claims of all class members. The Plaintiff received the same faxes as the faxes sent by or on  behalf of the Defendants advertising goods and services of the Defendants during the Class  Period. The Plaintiff is making the same claims and seeking the same relief for itself and all class  members based upon the same federal statute. The Defendants have acted in the same or in a  similar manner with respect to the Plaintiff and all the class members by sending Plaintiff and  each member of the class the same faxes.    Need for Consistent Standards and Practical Effect of Adjudication (Fed. R. Civ.  P. 23 (b) (1)):  Class certification is appropriate because the prosecution of individual actions by  class members would: (a) create the risk of inconsistent adjudications that could establish  incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendants, and/or (b) as a practical matter,  adjudication of the Plaintiff's claims will be dispositive of the interests of class members who are  not parties.    Common Conduct (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (2)):  Class certification is also  appropriate because the Defendants have acted and refused to act in the same or similar manner  with respect to all class members thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate.  The Plaintiff demands such relief as authorized by 47 U.S.C. §227.    All Paragraphs of the Complaint are incorporated herein by reference.    The JFPA makes it unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile  machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited  advertisement . . . .” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C).    The Faxes. Defendants, upon information and belief, sent on or about March 14,  2011, April-May, 2012, May 10, 2012, October 19, 2012, September 30, 2013 and October  8, 2013, advertisements via facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines,  computers, or other devices to the telephone lines and facsimile machines of Plaintiff and  members of the Plaintiff Class. The Faxes constituted an advertisement under the Act.   Defendants failed to comply with the Opt-Out Requirements in connection with the Faxes. The  Faxes were transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express permission or invitation  and/or Defendants are precluded from asserting any prior express permission or invitation  because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements.     Defendants violated the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder by  sending the Faxes via facsimile transmission to Plaintiff and members of the Class.    Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers,  that Defendants may be continuing to send unsolicited advertisements via facsimile transmission  in violation of the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder, and absent intervention by  this Court, will do so in the future.    The TCPA/JFPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf  of Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class to redress Defendants’ violations of the Act, and provides for  statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The Act also provides that injunctive relief is  appropriate. Id.    The JFPA is a strict liability statute, so the Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff  and the other class members even if their actions were only negligent.  ",win,1
13452001,win," Defendant has been sending repeated, unsolicited marketing text messages to the  Plaintiffs’ cellular telephone numbers, XXX-XXX-8117 (Huron), and XXX-XXX-2457  (Wright).   True and correct copies of some of the text messages received by Plaintiffs from  Defendant are produced below:    Defendant’s text messages to Plaintiffs advertised promotions for the sale of Jo- Ann Stores goods.      Defendant’s text messages did not include an automated mechanism through  which the Plaintiffs, or any consumer, could reply “stop” to force the texts to cease.     Plaintiffs never provided Defendant with their cell phone numbers or their prior  express consent to call their cell phone numbers with automated text messages.     The text messages sent to Plaintiffs’ cellular phones were made with an ATDS as  defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1). The ATDS has the capacity to store or produce telephone  numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator.     The telephone numbers messaged by Defendant were assigned to cellular  telephone services for which Plaintiffs incur charges for incoming messages pursuant to 47  U.S.C. § 227(b)(1).    The messages from Defendant to Plaintiffs were not placed for “emergency  purposes” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(i).    Plaintiffs have received hundreds of such text messages.  The messages are  annoying, frustrating to the Plaintiffs and are an invasion of their privacy.    Plaintiffs bring this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf  of themselves and all others similarly situated.    Plaintiffs represent, and are members of the following class:  All persons within the United States who did not provide Defendant clear  and conspicuous prior express written consent to send automated  telemarketing text messages and who received one or more automated  telemarketing text messages, from or on behalf of Defendant, to said person’s  cellular telephone, made through the use of any automatic telephone dialing  system within four years prior to the filing of the Complaint    Upon information and belief, Defendant sent automated telemarketing text  messages to cellular telephone numbers belonging to thousands of consumers throughout the  United States without their prior express written consent.  The members of the Class, therefore,  are believed to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.    The exact number and identities of the Class members are unknown at this time  and can only be ascertained through discovery.  Identification of the Class members is a matter  capable of ministerial determination from Defendant’s records.   C. Common Questions of Law and Fact     There are questions of law and fact common to the Class that predominate over  any questions affecting only individual Class members.  These questions include:  a. Whether Defendant sent non-emergency text messages to Plaintiffs and Class  members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS;  b. Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing it obtained prior express  written consent to send each message;  c. Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and/or willful;  d. Whether Defendant are liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and  e. Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future.    Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Class members, as they are all  based on the same factual and legal theories.  E. Protecting the Interests of the Class Members     Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and have  retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business  practices.  Neither Plaintiffs nor their counsel have any interests which might cause them not to  vigorously pursue this action.  F. Proceeding via Class Action is Superior and Advisable     A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this  controversy.  The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecutions of  separate claims against Defendant is small because it is not economically feasible for Class  members to bring individual actions.    Management of this class action is unlikely to present any difficulties.  Several  courts have certified classes in TCPA actions.  These cases include, but are not limited to:  Mitchem v. Ill. Collection Serv., 271 F.R.D. 617 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Sadowski v. Med1 Online, LLC,  2008 WL 2224892 (N.D. Ill., May 27, 2008); CE Design Ltd. V. Cy’s Crabhouse North, Inc.,  259 F.R.D. 135 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Lo v. Oxnard European Motors, LLC, 2012 WL 1932283 (S.D.  Cal., May 29, 2012).   Defendant sent multiple automated text messages to cellular numbers belonging  to Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class without their prior express written consent.    Each of the aforementioned messages by Defendant constitutes a violation of the   Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the above paragraphs of this Complaint and  incorporate them herein by reference.    Defendant knowingly and/or willfully sent multiple automated text messages to  cellular telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class without  their prior express consent.    As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA,  Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to an award of treble damages up to $1,500.00 for each call in  violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C).    Additionally, Plaintiffs and the Class are entitled to and seek injunctive relief  prohibiting such conduct by Defendant in the future.     Plaintiffs and the Class are also entitled to and do seek a declaration that:  a. Defendant knowingly and/or willfully violated the TCPA;  b. Defendant knowingly and/or willfully placed telemarketing text messages to  Plaintiffs and the Class;  c. Defendant knowingly and/or willfully obtained the telephone numbers of non- customers;  d. Defendant willfully placed telemarketing text messages to non-customers such as  Plaintiffs and the Class, knowing they did not have prior express written consent  to do so; and  e. It is Defendant’s practice and history to place telemarketing text messages to non- customers without their prior express consent.   A. The Class   Dated: June 16, 2016  Respectfully submitted,  PLAINTIFFS, LAURA WRIGHT AND DEBRA   Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the   Telephone Consumer Protection Act,   47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq.   Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act,   47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq.  ",lose,1
16964613,lose,")    Defendants allege Plaintiff owes a debt (“the alleged Debt”).      The alleged Debt is an alleged obligation of Plaintiff to pay money arising out of  a transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the  transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.    The alleged Debt does not arise from any business enterprise of Plaintiff.     The alleged Debt is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).     At an exact time known only to Defendants, the alleged Debt was assigned or  otherwise transferred to Defendants for collection.     At the time the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendants  for collection, the alleged Debt was in default.     In its efforts to collect the alleged Debt, Defendants contacted Plaintiff by email  (“the Email”) dated October 1, 2019. (A true and accurate copy is annexed hereto as “Exhibit    The Email conveyed information regarding the alleged Debt.    The Email is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2).     The Email was the initial written communication Plaintiff received from  Defendants concerning the alleged Debt.    The Email was received and read by Plaintiff.    15 U.S.C. § 1692g protects Plaintiff's concrete interests. Plaintiff has the interest  and right to receive a clear, accurate and unambiguous validation notice, which allows a  consumer to confirm that he or she owes the debt sought to be collected by the debt collector. As  set forth herein, Defendants deprived Plaintiff of this right.    15 U.S.C. § 1692e protects Plaintiff's concrete interests. Plaintiff has the interest  and right to be free from deceptive and/or misleading communications from Defendants. As set  forth herein, Defendants deprived Plaintiff of this right.      15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) provides if the consumer notifies the debt collector in  writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, or that the  consumer requests the name and address of the original creditor, the debt collector shall cease  collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until the debt collector obtain verification  of the debt or a  copy of a judgment, or the name and address of the original creditor, is mailed to  the consumer by the debt collector.    15 U.S.C. § 1692e prohibits a debt collector from using any false, deceptive, or  misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.    15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) prohibits the use of any false representation or deceptive  means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.      Plaintiff disputed the alleged Debt by email on September 30, 2019.    In response to Plaintiffs dispute, a representative for Defendants contacted  Plaintiff by email, to notify her that the dispute would be filed immediately.      Additionally Defendants’ representative informed Plaintiff that they would be  reaching out to Plaintiff once they received adequate information from LVNV Funding LLC.    Defendants again contacted Plaintiff by the Email on October 1, 2019, luring her  into an offer for flexible payment options.    The Email further stated, that it was an attempt to collect a debt.    Defendants failed to respond to Plaintiffs dispute on the alleged Debt but instead  continued collection efforts on such alleged Debt.    As a result of the foregoing Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) by failing  to cease collection efforts after receiving Plaintiff’s written dispute on the alleged Debt.    As a result of the foregoing Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e by falsely  representing that it was entitled to continue collection efforts and were not required to cease  communication after receiving such dispute from Plaintiff.    As a result of the foregoing Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) by  attempting to collect on the alleged Debt through false representation that such efforts were  legitimate.    Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all  persons similarly situated in the State of North Carolina.    Plaintiff seeks to certify a class of:  All consumers to whom Defendants sent a collection letter in  violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b), substantially and materially similar  to the Letter sent to Plaintiff, which letter was sent on or after a date  one year prior to the filing of this action to the present.    This action seeks a finding that Defendants' conduct violates the FDCPA, and  asks that the Court award damages as authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k.    The Class consists of more than thirty-five persons.    Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the Class. Common questions of law  or fact raised by this action affect all members of the Class and predominate over any individual  issues.  Common relief is therefore sought on behalf of all members of the Class. A class action is  superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy.    The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would  create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the  Class, and a risk that any adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class would, as  a practical matter, either be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class not party to  the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.   Defendants have acted in a manner applicable to the Class as a whole such that declaratory relief  is warranted.    Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the Class.  The management of the class is not extraordinarily difficult, and the factual and legal issues  raised by this action will not require extended contact with the members of the Class, because  Defendants' conduct was perpetrated on all members of the Class and will be established by  common proof.  Moreover, Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in actions brought under  consumer protection laws. ",lose,1
6176993,win,"(Plaintiff Individually and on Behalf of All  Similarly Situated Employees Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216)   (Rule 23 Claim)    Plaintiff and other similarly situated current and former employees in the asserted  class regularly worked over 40 hours per week and earned the additional $1.25 per hour shift  differential.     At all times material to this Complaint, Defendant failed to comply with the FLSA  in that Plaintiff and those similarly situated to Plaintiff performed services for Defendant for  which no provision was made by Defendant to pay Plaintiffs and similarly situated persons the  correct overtime rate of pay.    Plaintiff and asserted members of the collective are similarly situated because, inter  alia, they were all were not paid the required overtime rate but were entitled under the FLSA to  the paid overtime rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all work in excess of  40 hours per week; and had such rights undermined and neglected by Defendants’ unlawful prac- tices and policies.    Defendant encouraged, permitted, and required the Class to work without required  overtime compensation of one and one-half times the normal wages.    Defendant knows that Plaintiff and other members of the FLSA Class have been  deprived of required overtime compensation.  Nonetheless, Defendant has operated under a  scheme to deny the Plaintiff and the Class required compensation of one and one-half time regular  rate of pay for work in excess of 40 hours of the FLSA Class.    Defendant’s conduct, as alleged herein, was willful and has caused significant dam- age to Plaintiff and other members of the FLSA class.    Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of each proposed class mem- ber and have retained counsel that is experienced in class/collective actions and employment lit- igation. Plaintiff has no interest that is contrary to, or in conflict with, members of the collective.   The Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 32, as if fully set  forth herein.    At all relevant times, RCI employed and/or continued to employ Plaintiff and each  member of the proposed class of hourly employees within the meaning of the FLSA.    Defendant has a policy and practice of not paying the proper overtime rate.    Under the FLSA, Plaintiff and the Class (hereinafter referred to as “The FLSA  Class”) were entitled to be paid at the overtime rate by Defendants for each hour worked in excess  of 40 hours each work week.    The overtime rate is computed by multiplying 1.5 times an employee’s regular  hourly rate, which includes all non-discretionary compensation paid to employees, including any  shift differential.    Upon information and belief, Defendant’s practices were not based upon Defend- ant’s review of any policy or publication of the United States Department of Labor and therefore  were willful and deliberate.    The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA  within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §255(a).    Due to Defendant’s violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff alleges on behalf of the mem- bers of the proposed class that they have suffered damages and are entitled to recover damages  from Defendant.  WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff requests the following relief, individually and on behalf of  similarly situated employees:   a.)  A declaratory judgment that Defendant violated the overtime wage provisions of  the FLSA as to the Plaintiff and the Class;  b.)  A declaratory judgment that Defendant’s violations were willful;  c.)  A judgment of unpaid overtime compensation;  b.)  A judgement of an additional equal amount as liquidated damages;  c.)  Prejudgment interest; and  d.)  Reasonable attorneys’ fees, and costs and disbursements of this action, pursuant to  29 U.S.C. §216(b).   This count arises from Defendants’ violation of the overtime compensation provi- sions of the IMWL, 820 ILCS § 105/1 et seq.     Under the IMWL, Defendants were and remain obligated to compensate Plaintiff  for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in any individual work week.  Overtime compensation  must be paid at a rate of not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay, which  includes the shift differential.    Plaintiff was regularly permitted, encouraged and/or required to work in excess of  40 hours per week but was not compensated at the required one and one-half times regular hourly  rate for such overtime work.    By failing to pay overtime compensation due to Plaintiff, Defendants willfully,  knowingly and/or recklessly violated the IMWL which requires overtime compensation of one  and one-half times normal rate to be paid.    As a result of Defendants’ policy and practice of withholding overtime compensa- tion, Plaintiff has been damaged in that he has not received wages due to him pursuant to the ",lose,1
17115352,lose," During Plaintiffs’ employment as Field Service Engineers, Defendant  paid Plaintiffs and other Field Service Engineers on a salary basis and classified  them as exempt under the FLSA.      Defendant has employed, on average, six (6) or so Field Service  Engineers at any given time over the last three (3) years.  Defendant has employed  Field Service Engineers in many states across the country, including in California,  Washington, Oregon, Utah, Delaware, Colorado, Texas, Kansas, Illinois, Georgia,  and Florida.    Defendant subjects all Field Service Engineers, including Plaintiffs, to  the same employment policies and procedures.      Plaintiffs and other Field Service Engineers all reported to the same  Field Engineering Manager.    During Plaintiffs’ employment, Field Service Engineers reported to  Defendant’s Field Engineering Manager, Jireh Providencia (“Providencia”).    Field Service Engineers were expected to work before, during, and  after Defendant’s scheduled business hours (i.e., Monday through Friday 8:00 am  to 5:00pm PT).    Plaintiffs, and those similarly situated, were regularly forced to work  in excess of forty (40) hours per week without overtime compensation.  In addition  to their primary job duties noted above, Field Service Engineers were regularly  required to answer calls and follow any and all instructions from Defendant, make  or respond to customer calls, draft or respond to e-mails, prepare weekly reports,  handle and request parts (or “trunk stock”) as necessary to perform maintenance  and repair services, and travel extensively for service calls throughout the United  States, during and outside of Defendant’s scheduled business hours.    Defendant established a policy and practice of requiring Field Service  Engineers, like Plaintiffs, to work in excess of forty (40) hours per week, without  overtime compensation, in order to maintain a satisfactory level of job  performance with Defendant.    Plaintiffs and other Field Service Engineers were uniformly  misclassified by Defendant as exempt from overtime compensation.    Defendant failed to post or provide notice to its Field Service  Engineers of their federal wage and hour rights under the FLSA. 29 C.F.R. §  516.4.    Defendant has instructed Field Service Engineers to not record their  hours worked.    Defendant uses ADP for payroll processing services.    Defendant’s Field Service Engineers have access to an ADP interface  wherein they can see their payroll information.  This interface also allows Field  Service Engineers to enter information about their hours worked into the ADP  system, which Defendant can see or access.    On at least one occasion, Defendant—through Providencia— explicitly instructed Grey to not enter his hours worked into the ADP system and  to delete any hours worked information he had already put into the ADP system.   Following their conversation, by the time Grey went to check on the hours worked  information that he had previously entered into the ADP system, Providencia had  already deleted from the ADP system the hours worked information that Grey had  entered.    Plaintiffs are representative of those similarly situated Field Service  Engineers employed by Defendant who are current or former employees of  Defendant who were required to work in excess of forty (40) hours per week and  who did not receive overtime compensation.    Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of those similarly situated Field  Service Engineers, seek relief on a collective basis, challenging, among other  FLSA violations, Defendant’s uniform misclassification of Field Service Engineers  as exempt employees, Defendant’s policy and/or practice of failing to make and  maintain accurate records of their hours worked, and Defendant’s failure to pay  them for all overtime hours worked.      Plaintiffs and other Field Service Engineers have together been the  victim of these common policies or plans of Defendant that violate the FLSA.     Plaintiffs bring this case as an “opt-in” collective action under 29  U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of all those who file a Consent to Join form with the  Court.  Plaintiffs’ Consent to Join Forms are attached as Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2.    Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the above-stated paragraphs as if  set forth fully hereunder.    Plaintiffs and other Field Service Engineers of Defendant are entitled  to the rights, protections and benefits provided under the FLSA.    The FLSA requires employers to pay non-exempt employees one and  one-half times the regular rate of pay at which they are employed for all hours  worked over forty (40) hours per workweek. 29 U.S.C. § 207.    The FLSA also requires employers to make and maintain accurate  records of hours worked each workweek, and to post or provide notice of  employee rights under the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 211(c); 29 C.F.R. § 516.4.    Defendant’s actions, policies and/or practices violated the FLSA’s  requirements by failing to compensate Plaintiffs and other Field Service Engineers  for time spent on work activities as described in this Complaint.  Defendant further  violated the FLSA by failing to make and maintain accurate records of hours  worked by Field Service Engineers and to post or provide notice to Field Service  Engineers of their federal wage and hour rights under the FLSA.    Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiffs and other Field  Service Engineers were non-exempt employees entitled to overtime compensation.   Defendant had knowledge of and information on the job duties and expectations  for Field Service Engineers, their hours worked exceeding forty (40) per  workweek, and their complaint(s) of not being paid overtime compensation for  such hours.    Defendant knowingly and willfully violated the FLSA by failing to  pay overtime compensation to Plaintiffs and other Field Service Engineers, by  failing to make and maintain accurate records of their hours worked, and by failing  to post or provide notice of their federal wage and hours rights under the FLSA.    Defendant has deliberately sought to conceal these violations rather  than remedy them and has refused to fully remedy and correct the issues when  brought to Defendant’s attention for out-of-court resolution.   FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME IN VIOLATION OF THE FLSA  ",lose,1
16920519,lose," At all times relevant, Plaintiff was the sole operator, possessor, and  subscriber of the number ending in 5290.    At all times relevant, Plaintiff’s number ending in 5290 was assigned to a  cellular telephone service as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).    Plaintiff applied for and received a Mastercard issued by Celtic Bank  Corporation.    Over time, Plaintiff made personal charges on this credit card.    Plaintiff defaulted on payments.    Plaintiff’s account, once unpaid, was referred for collection.    Plaintiff started to receive phone calls from Defendant seeking to collect on  Plaintiff’s $746.71 balance.     On numerous occasions, Plaintiff answered.    Often times, Plaintiff was met by an automated, machine-operated voice  prompting Plaintiff to: “... please return this call …”    On multiple occasions, Plaintiff returned Defendant’s call only to tell them  to stop calling.    Unfortunately, these phone calls continue.    To date, dozens of phone calls have been received from number(s) leading  back to Defendant – including, (563) 217-4577 and (563)-514-4664.    Defendant’s phone calls resulted in aggravation that accompanies  persistent and unwanted phone calls, anxiety, distress, increased risk of personal injury  resulting from distraction, intrusion upon and occupation of Plaintiff’s cellular telephone  capacity, invasion of privacy, loss of concentration, nuisance, stress, and wasted time.    Accordingly, Plaintiff is forced to expend energy and/or time consulting with  attorneys to put an end to Defendant’s unlawful collection practices.   All paragraphs of this Complaint are expressly adopted and incorporated  herein as though fully set forth herein.    Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3)  individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated (the “Putative Classes”) defined  as follows:  FDCPA Class  All persons throughout the United States (1) to whom Defendant placed, or  caused to be placed, a call; (2) within the one year preceding the date of  this complaint through the date of class certification; (3) in connection with  the collection of a consumer debt; (4) after he/she requested that Defendant  cease calls to his/her telephone number.  TCPA Class  All persons throughout the United States (1) to whom Defendant placed, or  caused to be placed, a call; (2) directed to a number assigned to a cellular  telephone service; (3) using an artificial or prerecorded voice; (4) within the  four years preceding the date of this complaint through the date of class  certification; (5) after he/she requested that Defendant cease calls to his/her  telephone number.    Upon information and belief, the members of the Putative Classes are so  numerous that joinder of them is impracticable.    The exact number of the members of the Putative Classes is unknown to  Plaintiff at this time, and can be determined only through appropriate discovery.    The members of the Putative Classes are ascertainable because the  classes are defined by reference to objective criteria.    The members of the Putative Classes are identifiable in that their names,  addresses and telephone numbers can be identified in business records maintained by  Defendant.  B.  Commonality and Predominance    There are many questions of law and fact common to the claims of Plaintiff  and the Putative Classes, and those questions predominate over any questions that may  affect individual members of the Putative Classes.    C.  Typicality    This case is also appropriate for class certification as class proceedings are  superior to all other available methods for the efficient and fair adjudication of this  controversy.      The damages suffered by the individual members of the Putative Classes  will likely be relatively small, especially given the burden and expense required for  individual prosecution.    By contrast, a class action provides the benefits of single adjudication,  economies of scale and comprehensive supervision by a single court.      Economies of effort, expense, and time will be fostered and uniformity of  decisions ensured.  E.  Adequate Representation    Plaintiff will adequately and fairly represent and protect the interests of the  Putative Classes.    Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Putative Classes, and  Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff.    Plaintiff has retained competent and experienced counsel in consumer  class action litigation.   In Colorado, “to prevail on a claim for intrusion upon seclusion as a violation  of one’s privacy, a plaintiff must show that another has intentionally intruded, physically  or otherwise, upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or solitude, and that such intrusion would be  considered offensive by a reasonable person.”  Doe v. High-Tech Inst., Inc., 972 P.2d  1060, 1065 (Colo. App. 1998), cert. denied (Colo. Mar. 1, 1999).    This tort can encompass conduct such as persistent and unwanted  telephone calls.  Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 1044, 1073 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing High- Tech Inst., 972 P.2d, at 1067.    Defendant’s persistent and unwanted phone calls to Plaintiff violated  Plaintiff’s right to privacy based on an intrusion upon her seclusion.  See Dunlap v.  McCarthy, 284 Ark. 5, 678 S.W.2d 361 (1984); see generally W. Prosser & W. Keeton,  Torts 117 (5th ed. 1984) (examples of intrusion upon seclusion include eavesdropping by  wiretapping and persistent and unwanted telephone calls).    All paragraphs of this Complaint are expressly adopted and incorporated  herein as though fully set forth herein.  Violation(s) of 15 U.S.C. § 1692d    Section 1692d provides:  [a] debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence  of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the  collection of a debt.  Without limiting the general application of the foregoing,  the following conduct is a violation of this section:  (5)  Causing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in  telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent  to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number.  15 U.S.C. § 1692d(5).    Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(5) by repeatedly or continuously  calling Plaintiff after being asked to stop.  See Chiverton v. Federal Financial Group, Inc.,  399 F. Supp. 2d 96 (D. Conn. 2005) (finding that repeated calls after the consumer had  asked debt collector to stop calling amounted to harassment).    The phone calls at issue were intended to be annoying, abusive, or  harassing.        All paragraphs of this Complaint are expressly adopted and incorporated  herein as though fully set forth herein.    Defendant placed or caused to be placed dozens of non-emergency calls,  including but not limited to the aforementioned collection calls, to Plaintiff’s cellular  telephone utilizing an artificial or prerecorded voice without Plaintiff’s consent in violation  of 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A)(iii).    As plead above, Defendant used an artificial or pre-recorded voice which  automatically played once Plaintiff answered Defendant’s phone calls.    As result of Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. §227 (b)(1)(A)(iii). Plaintiff  is entitled to receive $500.00 in damages for each violation.     Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.)  (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Members of FDCPA Class)   Invasion of Privacy by Seclusion  (On behalf of Plaintiff)   Telephone Consumer Protection Act (47 U.S.C. § 227 et. seq.)  (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Members of TCPA Class)  ",win,2
4511944,win," Plaintiff is not a customer of Verde.    Plaintiff has not sought Verde’s services online or otherwise.    On or around September of 2015, Verde began calling Plaintiff’s cellular  telephone, number 413-xxx-4923.    Verde called Plaintiff from telephone number 978-253-4077.    At all times mentioned herein, Verde contacted Plaintiff using an automated  telephone dialer system (“ATDS” or “predictive dialer”) and/or by using an artificial or  prerecorded voice.    When Plaintiff answered calls from Verde, she heard a prerecorded message  instructing Plaintiff to hold for the next available operator.    Plaintiff did not provide her cellular telephone number to Verde and does not  know how they obtained it.    Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf  of himself and all others similarly situated.    Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the following class:  All persons within the United States to whom Defendant or its agent/s and/or  employee/s made telephone calls using an ATDS or prerecorded or artificial  messages and (1) such call was to a cellular telephone number and (2) such  person did not provide prior express consent to receive such a call.  The class  period encompasses the four year period preceding the filing of this  complaint.    Defendants and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff  does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in  the several thousands, if not more.  Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to  assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter.    This suit seeks only damages and injunctive relief for recovery of economic injury  on behalf of the Class, and it expressly is not intended to request any recovery for personal injury  and claims related thereto.  Plaintiff reserves the right to modify or expand the Class definitions  to seek recovery on behalf of additional persons as warranted as facts are learned in further  investigation and discovery.  B. Numerosity    The exact number and identities of the Class members are unknown at this time  and can only be ascertained through discovery.  Identification of the Class members is a matter  capable of ministerial determination from Defendant’s call records.   C. Common Questions of Law and Fact     There are questions of law and fact common to the Class that predominate over  any questions affecting only individual Class members.  These questions include:  a. Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff and Class  members’ cellular telephones using an artificial or prerecorded voice;  b. Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff and the Class  members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS;   c. Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing it obtained prior  express consent to make each call;  d. Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and/or willful;  e. Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such  damages; and  f. Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future.    The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers.  If  Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely places unauthorized automated calls to telephone  numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will  have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case.   D. Typicality     Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class and has  retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business  practices.  Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel has any interests which might cause them not to  vigorously pursue this action.  F. Proceeding Via Class Action is Superior and Advisable     A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this  controversy.  The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecutions of  separate claims against Defendant is small because it is not economically feasible for Class  members to bring individual actions.    Management of this class action is unlikely to present any difficulties.  Several  courts have certified classes in TCPA actions.  These cases include, but are not limited to:  Mitchem v. Ill. Collection Serv., 271 F.R.D. 617 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Sadowski v. Med1 Online, LLC,  2008 WL 2224892 (N.D. Ill., May 27, 2008); CE Design Ltd. V. Cy’s Crabhouse North, Inc.,  259 F.R.D. 135 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Lo v. Oxnard European Motors, LLC, 2012 WL 1932283 (S.D.  Cal., May 29, 2012).   Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and  incorporates them herein by reference.    Each of the aforementioned calls by Defendant constitutes a negligent violation of  the TCPA.    Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages  for each call in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B).    Additionally, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to and seek injunctive relief  prohibiting such conduct by Defendant in the future.    Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to and do seek a declaration that:  •  Defendant violated the TCPA;  •  Defendant used prerecorded voices and/or artificial voices; and  •  Defendant placed calls to the Plaintiff and the Class without prior express  consent.    Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and  incorporates them herein by reference.    Defendant knowingly and/or willfully placed multiple prerecorded or artificial  calls to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class without their  prior express consent.    Each of the aforementioned calls by Defendant constitutes a knowing and/or  willful violation of the TCPA.    Additionally, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to and seek injunctive relief  prohibiting such conduct by Defendant in the future.     Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to and do seek a declaration that:  •  Defendant knowingly and/or willfully violated the TCPA;  •  Defendant knowingly and/or willfully used prerecorded voices and/or  artificial voices on calls to Plaintiff and the Class;  •  Defendant knowingly and/or willfully obtained the cell phone numbers of  Plaintiff and the Class from third parties;  •  Defendant willfully placed automated calls to the Plaintiff and the Class at  the numbers received from those third parties, knowing it did not have prior  express consent to do so; and  •  It is Defendant’s practice and history to place automated telephone calls to  consumers without their prior express consent.  A. The Class   Dated: December 20, 2015  Respectfully submitted,  By     /s/ Sergei Lemberg                 Sergei Lemberg (BBO# 650671)  Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act,  47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq.   Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act,  47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq.  ",lose,1
16688988,win," Plaintiffs and those they seek to represent in this action were employed to perform  work on various jobs for Defendant as part of its contracting business.    Defendant paid Plaintiffs and those they seek to represent “straight time”—i.e.,  the same hourly wage for every hour worked, regardless of whether such hours were in excess of  40 in a workweek.    Plaintiffs and those they seek to represent regularly worked in excess of 40 hours  in a workweek.    Defendant labeled the hourly payments for hours in excess of 40 in a workweek  as “bonus” payments on the pay statements of Plaintiffs and those they seek to represent.    A pay statement of Charles Clouse from July 2017, which shows such a “bonus”  payment, is attached hereto as Exhibit A as an example of the pay practice which applied to  Plaintiffs and those they seek to represent.    The “bonus” payment of $143.00 shown on Exhibit A is actually a payment for  13 hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek made at Plaintiff Clouse’s then-current hourly  rate of $11 per hour ($11/hour x 13 hours = $143.00).    The FLSA and KWHA require employers to pay employees at one and one-half  times their regular rate of pay for all hours in excess of 40 in a workweek.    By failing to pay Plaintiffs and those they seek to represent at one and one-half  times their regular rate of pay for all hours in excess of 40 in a workweek, Defendant violated the  overtime pay requirements of the FLSA and KWHA.    Defendant labeled these straight-time hourly payments for hours over 40 in a  workweek, which it made to Plaintiffs and those they seek to represent at their regular rate of  pay, as “bonus” payments, in order to conceal its violation of the overtime pay requirements of  Case: 5:20-cv-00011-KKC   Doc #: 1   Filed: 01/10/20   Page: 3 of 9 - Page ID#: 3 4  the FLSA and KWHA.    Defendant also continued these practices despite formal and informal complaints  by Plaintiffs about not receiving time-and-a-half and despite inquiries and investigations by the  Kentucky Labor Cabinet.    Accordingly, Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiffs and those they  seek to represent were entitled to one and one-half times their regular hourly rate for hours over  40 in a workweek and therefore acted willfully in failing to compensate all work time by these  employees at the proper overtime rate.     Plaintiffs asserts their FLSA claims pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) as a collective  action on behalf of the following individuals:  All current and former hourly-paid employees of Defendant at any time since  January 10, 2017.  (the “Collective Class”).    Plaintiffs’ FLSA claims should proceed as a collective action because Plaintiffs  and other similarly situated employees were paid in the same manner as described herein, and  are, therefore, “similarly situated” as that term is defined in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) and the  associated decisional law.   Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalf and, pursuant to Rule 23 of the  Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of the following class of individuals:  All current and former hourly-paid employees of Defendant at any time since  January 10, 2015.1  (the “Rule 23 Class”).  1  The statute of limitations under the KWHA is five years. KRS 413.120(2).  Case: 5:20-cv-00011-KKC   Doc #: 1   Filed: 01/10/20   Page: 4 of 9 - Page ID#: 4 5    Plaintiffs are members of the Rule 23 Class they seek to represent.    Since January 9, 2015, Defendant has employed more than 50 individuals who it  paid in the manner described above and who therefore fall within the Rule 23 Class definition.  Thus, the Rule 23 Class is sufficiently numerous that joinder of all members is impractical,  satisfying Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).    Plaintiffs and the members of the Rule 23 Class share the same pivotal questions  of law and fact, satisfying Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). Defendant failed to pay Plaintiffs and the  members of the Rule 23 Class all overtime wages owed, pursuant to the same policies and in the  same manner. As a result, the Rule 23 Class shares several factual and legal questions, including,  for example: (1) whether they were entitled to one and one-half times their regular rate for hours  over 40 in a workweek; and (2) whether Defendant violated the KWHA by paying purported  “bonus” payments at their regular rate of pay for hours over 40 in a workweek.    Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Rule 23 Class, satisfying Fed. R.  Civ. P. 23(a)(3). Defendant’s violation of the overtime pay requirements of the KWHA was not  the result of any Plaintiff-specific circumstances. Rather, it arose from Defendant’s common pay  policies and practices, which Defendant applied generally to all of the hourly-paid employees  who worked on jobs as part of its contracting business, including Plaintiffs. Thus, in advancing  their own claims, Plaintiffs will also be advancing the claims of the Rule 23 Class.    Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Rule  23 Class, satisfying Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Plaintiffs’ interests are shared with the Rule 23  Class and Plaintiffs have no interests that conflict with those of the Rule 23 Class. Furthermore,  Plaintiffs have retained competent counsel experienced in representing classes of employees  against their employers related to their employers’ failure to pay them properly under the law.  Case: 5:20-cv-00011-KKC   Doc #: 1   Filed: 01/10/20   Page: 5 of 9 - Page ID#: 5 6    By failing to pay hourly paid employees all required overtime wages pursuant to  its common pay practices and policies, Defendant has created a scenario where questions of law  and fact common to the Rule 23 Class predominate over any questions affecting only individual  members. Thus, a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient  adjudication of this matter. Plaintiffs are entitled to pursue their claims as a class action, pursuant  to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).   All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.    Plaintiffs assert this claim on behalf of themselves and members of the Collective  Class who opt into this action by filing a consent form, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).    Plaintiffs and the Collective Class are employees entitled to the FLSA’s  protections.    Defendant is an employer covered by the FLSA.    The FLSA requires that covered employees receive overtime compensation “not  less than one and one-half times” their regular rate of pay for hours over 40 in a workweek.   All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.    Plaintiffs assert this claim on behalf of themselves and members of the Rule 23  Class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.    Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class are employees entitled to the KWHA’s  protections.    Defendant is an employer covered by the KWHA.    The KWHA requires that covered employees receive overtime compensation “not  less than one and one-half times” their regular rate of pay for hours over 40 in a workweek. KRS  337.285.    Defendant pays Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class the same hourly rate for every  hour worked including hours over 40 in a workweek and does not pay them at one and one-half  times their regular rate of pay for hours over 40 in a workweek, in violation of the KWHA.    In violating the KWHA, Defendant has acted willfully and with reckless disregard  of clearly applicable KWHA provisions, for example, by seeking to conceal its violation on the  pay statements of Plaintiffs and the Rule 23 Class members and by ignoring formal and informal  complaints from Plaintiffs and the Kentucky Labor Cabinet.  Case: 5:20-cv-00011-KKC   Doc #: 1   Filed: 01/10/20   Page: 2 of 9 - Page ID#: 2 3   VIOLATION OF THE OVERTIME REQUIREMENTS OF THE KWHA   VIOLATION OF THE OVERTIME REQUIREMENTS OF THE FLSA  ",win,4
6158776,lose,"Identify that the call was an attempt to collect a debt;    The message did not identify that the call was an attempt to collect a debt, that  any information obtained will be used for that purpose, or that the communication was from a  debt collector.    Upon information and belief, that same day DEFENDANT also left the following  message on PLAINTIFF’S work phone number:  Confidential and important message for Ashley Coleman.  Chris ____ calling from  Central Portfolio Control.  Please contact me at 1-888-351-1975.  Thank you.    This message also failed to identify that the call was an attempt to collect a debt,  that any information obtained will be used for that purpose, or that the communication was from  a debt collector.    PLAINTIFF called DEFENDANT back.  During the subsequent conversation,  DEFENDANT again failed to disclose that the call was an attempt to collect a debt and/or that  any information obtained would be used for that purpose.    DEFENDANT never sent an initial 1692g collection letter to PLAINTIFF.    PLAINTIFF is informed and believes and therefore alleges that PLAINTIFF and  the class members are entitled to statutory damages and may have also suffered actual damages  in other ways and to other extents not presently known to PLAINTIFF, and not specified herein.   PLAINTIFF reserves the right to assert additional facts and damages not referenced herein,  and/or to present evidence of the same at the time of trial.   PLAINTIFF repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference, paragraphs 1  through 16 inclusive, above.    A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of the class  members’ claims as Congress specifically envisioned class actions as a principal means of  enforcing the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C.§ 1692k.  The members of the class are generally  unsophisticated consumers, whose rights will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action.  Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the classes would also create the risk  of inconsistent or varying adjudications resulting in the establishment of inconsistent or varying  standards and would not be in the best interest of judicial economy.    Identify that any information obtained will be used for that  purpose; and/or    PLAINTIFF repeats, re-alleges and incorporates by reference, paragraphs 1  through 20 inclusive, above.    A debt collector is required to disclose in the initial communication “that the debt  collector is attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained will be used for that  purpose” and in subsequent communications “that the communication is from a debt collector”.  15 U.S.C. §1692e(11).    In December of 2014, DEFENDANT began placing calls to PLAINTIFF’s phone  number, in an attempt to collect a consumer debt from PLAINTIFF.   DEFENDANT left the  following message on PLAINTIFF’S cell phone:  Confidential and important message for Ashely Coleman.  This is  Chris ______ calling from Central Portfolio Control.  Please contact  me at 1-888-351-1975 that’s 888-351-1975.  Thank you.    The message did not identify that the call was an attempt to collect a debt, that  any information obtained will be used for that purpose, or that the communication was from a  debt collector.    That same day DEFENDANT also left the following message on PLAINTIFF’S  work phone number:  Confidential and important message for Ashley Coleman.  Chris ____ calling from  Central Portfolio Control.  Please contact me at 1-888-351-1975.  Thank you.    When PLAINTIFF called DEFENDANT back, DEFENDANT again failed to  disclose that the call was an attempt to collect a debt and/or that any information obtained would  be used for that purpose.    As a result of the FDCPA violations by DEFENDANT, PLAINTIFF is entitled  to an award of actual and statutory damages.     It has been necessary for PLAINTIFF to obtain the services of an attorney to  pursue this claim, on behalf of herself and those similarly situated, and is entitled to recover  reasonable attorneys’ fees therefor.  Identify that the communication was from a debt collector.  b. Class Number Two:  A class consisting of nationwide consumers who:  i. Within one year prior to the filing of this action;  ii. Were not provided 1692g(a) notices;  iii. Within 5 days from the initial communication with DEFENDANT.    PLAINTIFF repeats, re-alleges and incorporates by reference, paragraphs 1  through 29 inclusive, above.    Here, DEFENDANT failed to send PLAINTIFF an initial collection letter  notifying PLAINTIFF of her rights pursuant to §1692g(a).     As a result of the FDCPA violations by DEFENDANT, PLAINTIFF is entitled  to an award of actual and statutory damages.     It has been necessary for PLAINTIFF to obtain the services of an attorney to  pursue this claim, on behalf of herself and those similarly situated, and is entitled to recover  reasonable attorneys’ fees therefor.   PLAINTIFF repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference, paragraphs 1  through 8 inclusive, above.    VIOLATIONS OF THE FDCPA 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e(11)   BROUGHT BY PLAINTIFF INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF  CLASSES NUMBERS ONE    VIOLATION OF THE FDCPA 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)  BROUGHT BY PLAINTIFF INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF OF  CLASS NUMBER TWO  ",win,3
14493636,win,"The amount of the debt;    Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.  P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3).    The Class consists of:   a. all individuals with addresses in the State of Texas;  b. to whom Defendant Law Offices sent an initial collection letter attempting to  collect a consumer debt;  c. on behalf of  Defendant Westhill;  d. that included a false and misleading statements regarding consumers rights to  dispute the debt as outlined in §1692g;  e. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this  action and on or before a date twenty-one (2l) days after the filing of this action.    The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of  Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or  have purchased debts.    Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members,  partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate  families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate  families.     The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same  facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the  Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in  handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff  nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this  action.   The name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;    Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure  is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff  Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is  superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.    Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at  the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues  pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).   Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length  herein.    The MidAmerica Bank & Trust obligation arose out of transactions where Plaintiff  used MidAmerica Bank & Trust funds primarily for personal, family or household purposes.     The alleged MidAmerica Bank & Trust obligation is a ""debt"" as defined by 15  U.S.C.§ 1692a(5).    MidAmerica Bank & Trust is a ""creditor"" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4).    Defendant Westhill, a debt collector and the subsequent owner of the MidAmerica  Bank & Trust debt, contracted with Defendant Law Offices to collect the alleged debt.    Defendants collect and attempt to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been  incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United  States Postal Services, telephone and internet.  Violation – September 25, 2017 Collection Letter    On or about September 25, 2017, Defendant Law Offices sent the Plaintiff an initial  contact notice (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt owed to Defendant Westhill. See Letter  at Exhibit A.   A statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of  the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the  debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt-collector;    This letter is commonly referred to as the “G notice.”    The “G-Notice” in the September 25, 2017 letter does not meet the required  guidelines of the FDCPA and falsely state the requirements of the consumer.    Firstly, the “G-Notice” wrongfully advises the consumer that she must “notify  [Defendants] in writing that she disputes the debt or Defendants will assume the debt to be  valid.”     This language is false and misleading to the Plaintiff since a consumer may dispute  the debt with Defendants by any method in order to be a valid dispute. (See §1692g(a)(3)).    Defendants letter then improperly advises the consumer as to her rights under  §1692g as when it fails to properly state  when notification in writing is required.    Defendants wrongfully advise the consumer that “if you notify us of a dispute, we  will obtain verification of the debt and mail a copy of such verification to you.”     Defendants’ letter fails on all accounts to inform the Plaintiff of her fundamental  rights as a consumer to dispute the debt, and the methods in which different disputes and  information requested must occur.    Plaintiff incurred an informational injury as Defendants falsely stated her rights  under §1692g of the FDCPA which put her at imminent risk of losing her right to validate and  dispute the debt.    As a result of Defendants’ deceptive, misleading and unfair debt collection practices,  Plaintiff has been damaged.   Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein.    Defendants’ debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff  violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.    Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or  misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.    Defendants violated §1692e :   a. By making a false and misleading representation in violation of §1692e(10).    By reason thereof, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendants’  conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs  and attorneys’ fees.   Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein.    Defendants’ debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff  violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g.     Pursuant to 15 USC §1692g, a debt collector:  Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with  the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is  contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer  a written notice containing –    The Defendants violated 15 U.S.C. §1692g, by wrongfully advising Plaintiff of her  rights and responsibilities as set forth in this section of the FDCPA.   A statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty- day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name  and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor.     By reason thereof, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendants’  conduct violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs  and attorneys’ fees.  VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e  et seq.  ",win,4
4401433,lose," Plaintiff brings this action on his own behalf and as a class action pursuant to  Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of all holders of Dawson common  stock who are being and will be harmed by Defendants’ actions described below (the “Class”).   Excluded from the Class are Defendants herein and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other  entity related to or affiliated with any of the Defendants.    On November 12, 2013, Dawson announced impressive operating results for its  fiscal fourth quarter and 2013 year-end results.  Specifically, the Company reported that  EBITDA increased by 15%, to a record $57.2 million and income from operations increased  22% over 2012 to $20.1 million.  The Company also reported significant capital investments  including 12,000 single-channel Geospace GSX units, 1,000 three-channel GSX units, 2,500  channels of the Wireless Seismic RT System 2 recording system and 10 INOVA vibrator energy  source units to increase recording capacity and improve efficiency.    The year-end results further indicated the Company’s strong financial position,  “[t]he Company’s balance sheet remains strong with approximately $79,000,000 of working  capital, $13,000,000 of debt, $76,000,000 of cash and cash equivalents and short-term  investments, and $115,000,000 of retained earnings.  In addition, the Company has $20,000,000  available under its undrawn revolving line of credit.  The Company anticipates financing its  recent purchase of GSX equipment with a mixture of cash and debt.”    Commenting on the 2014 fiscal second-quarter financial results, Defendant  Jumper stated:  While we are pleased with our return to profitability, the declaration of our second  quarterly dividend payment and our ability to maintain our strong balance sheet,  we are disappointed to have another short term utilization issue.  We believe the  issue will clear itself during the quarter.  We continue to explore ways to right  size our operation to fit current demand and project readiness timing while  maintaining a high resolution product that continually meets client needs.  Based  on recent bid activity, we believe market conditions in the United States indicate  signs of improvement for the second half of calendar 2014.    In sum, Dawson is well positioned to generate significant earnings in the  foreseeable future.  Despite Dawson’s bright financial prospects, the Board has now agreed to  the merger with TGC which will dilute the share value of Dawson’s current shareholders,  provide no premium and subject Dawson shareholders to the downward pull on the deal value  based on the plummeting share price of TGC and the Board’s failure to require a collar.     Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation  contained above as though fully set forth herein.    The Individual Defendants have violated fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, good  faith, and candor owed to Dawson shareholders.    As demonstrated by the allegations above, the Individual Defendants failed to  exercise the care required, and breached their duties of loyalty, good faith, independence, and  candor owed to Dawson shareholders because, among other reasons, they failed to take  reasonable steps to obtain and/or ensure that Dawson shareholders receive adequate  consideration for their shares, agreed to restrictive deal protection devices that deter other suitors  from making a superior bid for the Company, and caused a materially incomplete and misleading  Definitive Proxy concerning the Proposed Transaction to be filed with the SEC.     By reason of the foregoing acts, practices, and courses of conduct, the Individual  Defendants have failed to exercise ordinary care and diligence in the exercise of their fiduciary  obligations toward Plaintiff and the other members of the Class.    As a result of the actions of Defendants, Plaintiff and the Class will suffer  irreparable injury in that they have not and will not receive their fair portion of the value of  Dawson assets and businesses, have been and will be prevented from obtaining a fair price for  their Dawson common shares, and will not be able to cast an informed vote the Proposed  Transaction.    Unless the Court enjoins Defendants, they will continue to breach their fiduciary  duties owed to Plaintiff and the members of the Class, all to the irreparable harm of the members  of the Class.    Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation  contained above as though fully set forth herein.    Dawson, TGC, and Merger Sub have acted and are acting with knowledge of, or  with reckless disregard to, the fact that the Individual Defendants are in breach of their fiduciary  duties to Dawson’s shareholders, and have participated in such breaches of fiduciary duties.    Dawson, TGC, and Merger Sub knowingly aided and abetted the Individual  Defendants’ wrongdoing alleged herein.  In so doing, Dawson, TGC, and Merger Sub rendered  substantial assistance in order to effectuate the Individual Defendants’ plan to consummate the  Proposed Transaction in breach of their fiduciary duties.   Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation  contained above as though fully set forth herein.    Defendants have issued the Definitive Proxy with the intention of soliciting  shareholder support for the Proposed Transaction.      Specifically, the Definitive Proxy violates Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 because it  omits material facts as set forth supra.  Moreover, in the exercise of reasonable care, Defendants  should have known that the Definitive Proxy is materially misleading and omits material facts  that are necessary to render it non-misleading.    The misrepresentations and omissions in the Definitive Proxy are material to  Plaintiff and the Class, who will be deprived of his entitlement to cast a fully informed vote if  such misrepresentations and omissions are not corrected prior to the vote on the Proposed  Transaction.  As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff and the Class  will be irreparably harmed.   Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation  contained above as though fully set forth herein.    The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of Dawson within the  meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as alleged herein.  By virtue of their positions as  officers and/or directors of Dawson, and participation in and/or awareness of the Company’s  operations and/or intimate knowledge of the false statements contained in the Definitive Proxy  filed with the SEC, they had the power to influence and control and did influence and control,  directly or indirectly, the decision making of the Company, including the content and  dissemination of the various statements which Plaintiff and the Class contend are false or  materially incomplete and therefore misleading.    A.  Dawson’s Recent Financial Performance   On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class Against Dawson, TGC, and Merger Sub for Aiding  and Abetting the Individual Defendants’ Breaches of Fiduciary Duty   On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class Against the Individual Defendants  for Breach of Fiduciary Duties   On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class for Violations of Sections 14(a) and of the Exchange  Act Against the Company and the Individual Defendants   On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class for Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act  Against the Individual Defendants  ",lose,4
4236109,win,"Plaintiff desires to attend the aqua classes at the Sunrise, Florida location. Plaintiff previously  explained to Defendant’s personnel at the front desk that her PCA is required in order to assist  her in getting dressed prior to and after the aqua class in the locker room.    Plaintiff is partially paralyzed in her left side and cannot get into and out of a swimsuit without  the assistance of her PCA. Plaintiff explained in detail that her PCA would be coming into the  locker room to assist with dressing, and would in no way be availing herself of the services  offered at the gym.    On or about Wednesday, July 30, 2014, the Defendant’s front desk at the Sunrise, Florida  location would not let Plaintiff’s PCA onto the premises to assist Plaintiff in changing clothes.     Plaintiff immediately brought this issue to the attention of the manager, Maurice, and  explained that her PCA would have to be allowed into and out of the locker room to assist  with changing in and out of Plaintiff’s bathing suit.    The manager of the location (Maurice) instructed Plaintiff that either the PCA would have to  buy a gym membership, or Plaintiff would be required to pay a personal trainer to assist when  inside the gym. Plaintiff replied that a personal trainer does not assist with dressing and  undressing disabled individuals in the locker room.    Plaintiff insisted that it was discriminatory to disallow the PCA from entering the premises to  assist Plaintiff with changing clothes, which Plaintiff cannot undertake on her own due to  disability. Defendant’s manager then stated “have a nice day” and walked away without any  further communication.   Accordingly, so as to continue to make use of the Sunrise, Florida, 24 HOUR FITNESS  location, and so as to be assured that her PCA will be granted entry to change Plaintiff’s  clothing within the locker room (without being stopped, impeded, or harassed), Plaintiff has  been left with no choice but to file this lawsuit seeking an injunction, and mandating that the  gym comply with its legal obligations as it relates to policies and procedures applicable to  disabled gym members such as Plaintiff.   Plaintiff brings this action on her own behalf and as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of  Civil Procedure 23, on behalf of the following class of individuals:   All members of any 24 HOUR FITNESS gym nationwide, who by  virtue of physical disability, require the assistance of a Personal  Care Attendant while on gym property (the “Class”).    The Class includes all individuals who have been forced to pay membership fees for their  PCA in order to secure entry for the PCA onto gym property.    Plaintiff has personal knowledge that there exist other 24 HOUR FITNESS members who  have been told or forced to buy memberships for their PCAs, so the PCAs can provide  disability-related assistance within the gym premises.    The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all Class members is not practical;  the exact size of the Class can be determined only through discovery.    Plaintiff can adequately protect the interest of the members of the Class and has retained  competent counsel experienced in ADA and class action litigation. Plaintiff has no interest  that is contrary to or in conflict with the interests of the members of the Class.   A class action is superior to other methods of adjudicating this controversy. The expense and  burden of individual litigation over this issue makes it virtually impossible for the Class  members to individually seek redress for all violations across the country, and it would be  highly inefficient for the Defendant, the Class, and the Court system, for all Class members  to individually seek redress for the issue raised herein.    Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over  questions solely affecting any individual Class member. Among such questions of law and  fact is whether or not Defendant has violated one or more statutory obligations by failing to  accommodate disabled gym members in need of assistance (relating to a function of daily  living) from a PCA.     Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that would be encountered in the management of this litigation  that would preclude its maintenance as a class action.   The names and addresses of disabled individuals who have been excluded from fair and equal  access is obtainable through traditional channels used to identify members of any class; notice  can be delivered to all such individuals by U.S. Mail or electronic mail using techniques and  in a form of notice similar to those customarily used in class action litigation.  The subject 24 HOUR FITNESS location in Sunrise, Florida, is a place of public  accommodation as defined by the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12181.     Plaintiff has been a long term member of the 24 HOUR FITNESS gym, and was a bona fide  visitor to the subject Sunrise, Florida location on July 30, 2014, and intends to continue  visiting the Sunrise, Florida location and making use of aqua classes into the foreseeable  future, and thus desires to use the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and/or  accommodations offered at the Sunrise, Florida gym.    In light of her disabilities, Plaintiff will be unable to fully, properly, safely, and equally access  the subject facility and/or the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and/or  accommodations therein, unless and until Defendant is required to modify its policies and  procedures so as to comply with the Americans with Disabilities Act, or if such policies and  procedures already exist, is required by injunction to enforce those policies and procedures at  the Sunrise, Florida location, and at every location used by any member of the Class.    Defendant has discriminated against Plaintiff and all others with similar disabilities by  denying full and equal access and enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,  advantages and/or accommodations at the subject gym.   Defendant will continue to discriminate against Plaintiff and all others similarly situated  requiring the assistance of a PCA in the locker room (or elsewhere), unless and until it is  compelled by this Court to remove barriers to access by either implementing appropriate  policies and procedures or enforcing policies and procedures that are not being followed by  the Sunrise, Florida location and its management.   This Court is vested with authority to grant injunctive relief sought by Plaintiff herein  including entry of an order requiring creation, implementation, and/or enforcement of  applicable policies, practices, and procedures necessary to provide full and equal access to  Plaintiff and all those similarly situated.   As a corollary to the injunctive relief sought herein, Plaintiff seeks disgorgement of profits  garnered through enjoined and unlawful misconduct. Both the Eleventh Circuit Court of  Appeal and the U.S. Supreme Court have been clear that a Court sitting in equity has at its  disposal a full range equitable remedies, including the power to disgorge funds previously  garnered through enjoined activities.    This Court’s equitable jurisdiction has been invoked through Plaintiff’s filing of a claim for  violation of the ADA (which provides for injunctive relief). As an adjunct to this Court’s  authority to award an injunction in this case, the Court is fully vested with jurisdiction to  disgorge Defendant of all funds collected as direct result of its own discriminatory and  enjoined misconduct.    Plaintiff has been a member of the 24 HOUR FITNESS gym for years, and for years has made  use of the Miramar, Florida location, with the assistance of her personal care attendant  (“PCA”), without any issue.    VIOLATION OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT  ",win,5
17436216,win," Defendant owns and operates a restaurant known as Bluefin Bar & Grill.    Defendant employs several servers, bartenders, hosts, bussers, and runners.    As a server, Plaintiff was responsible for serving food and beverages, explaining  the menu and taking orders from guests, and adhering to company standards for food and  beverages.    Plaintiff typically worked thirty (30) to forty (40) hours per week.    Defendant paid Plaintiff an hourly wage less than federal minimum wage  (approximately $5.60).    In addition, Plaintiff earned tips as a server.    Defendant paid Plaintiff according to what is commonly referred to as the “tip  credit.”    Throughout Plaintiff’s employment Defendant failed to notify Plaintiff of the  provisions of FLSA § 3(m), 29 U.S.C. § 203(m).     Throughout Plaintiff’s employment Defendant required Plaintiff to share her tips  with other workers.      Specifically, Defendant required Plaintiff to tip out other “back of house,” non- tipped employees.     Servers should not share tips with back of the house employees.     As a result, Defendants were not entitled to utilize the FLSA’s tip credit provision  to credit Plaintiff’s tips towards a portion of their minimum wage obligations.   VI.   Defendant employs other servers as part of its business operations.      Servers perform similar job duties as Plaintiff in that they explain the menu and  take orders from guests, serve beverages and keep their area clean.    Servers are paid less than minimum wage, plus tips (“the tip credit”).    Servers typically work thirty (30) to forty (40) hours per week.    Servers are required to tip out “back of house” employees in a manner similar to  Plaintiff.    Defendant’s servers are the putative class members for this potential collective  action.    Plaintiff and the class members performed the same or similar job duties as one  another in that they provided services for Defendants.    Plaintiff and the class members were required to tip back of house employees each  shift in violation of the FLSA’s requirement that minimum wages be paid “free and clear.”    Shortly after being hired, Defendant explains it policy that servers are required to  tip out dishwashers.    The tip out is mandatory and affects all servers.    Further, Plaintiff and the class members were subjected to the same pay provisions  in that they were subject to working without receiving proper compensation in the form of a free  and clear minimum wage.     Defendants’ common policy violations have caused Plaintiff and the class  members to receive less than minimum wage for all hours worked.     Thus, the class members are similar with regard to their wages for the same reasons  as Plaintiff.     Defendant knowingly, willfully, or with reckless disregard carried out its illegal  pattern or practice of failing to pay Plaintiff and the class members at a rate of at least the statutorily  prescribed minimum wage.      Defendant did not act in good faith or reliance upon any of the following in  formulating its pay practices: (a) case law, (b) the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., (c) Department  of Labor Wage & Hour Opinion Letters or (d) the Code of Federal Regulations.        During the relevant period, Defendant violated § 7(a)(1), § 15(a)(2) and § 203(m),  by employing employees in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for  commerce within the meaning of the FLSA as aforesaid, for one or more workweeks without  compensating such employees for their work at the statutorily prescribed minimum wage within a  work week during one or more weeks.      Defendant has acted willfully in failing to pay Plaintiff and the class members in  accordance with the law.   Plaintiff reincorporates and readopts all allegations contained within Paragraphs 1-27  above as though fully stated herein.       Plaintiff and the class members are entitled to be paid minimum wage for each hour  worked during their employment with Defendant.    Because of Defendant’s improper tip out policy in this regard, Plaintiff and the class  members have not been paid the minimum wage for each hour worked during one or more weeks of  employment with Defendant.     Defendant willfully failed to pay Plaintiff and the class members minimum wage for  one or more weeks of work contrary to 29 U.S.C. § 206 because it was aware of the minimum wage  law requirements but continued its violations.    As a direct and proximate result of Defendant’s deliberate underpayment of wages,  Plaintiff and the class members have been damaged in the loss of minimum wages for one or more  weeks of work with Defendant.    Plaintiff demands a trial by jury. ",win,3
6170206,lose," Monsanto is one of the world’s largest agricultural companies, and has long been  manufacturing and selling herbicides to control weeds. Monsanto’s leading herbicide is called  Roundup, whose active ingredient is called glyphosate. Monsanto first introduced Roundup  in the mid-1970s for the agricultural community, and then in the mid-1980s for residential  use. Roundup has been a dramatically successful product, and is one of the most widely-used  herbicides in the world for residential use.    Monsanto manufactures, markets, and sells Roundup in various formulations,  including Roundup Ready-to-Use (“Ready-to-Use”) formulations, which are intended simply  to be sprayed directly out of the bottle in which the product is purchased; and concentrated  versions of the Roundup, such as the Roundup Concentrates, which the purchaser must first  dilute with water before using with a tank sprayer.    Specifically, Monsanto manufactures, markets and sells Roundup Concentrate  Plus in 32-, 36.8- and 64-ounce bottles (as pictured in the introduction above), and Roundup  Super Concentrate in 35.2-, 64-, and 128-ounce bottles, as pictured below.  4  Martin v. Monsanto Company, Case No. 16-cv-2168   While reserving the right to redefine or amend the class definition prior to  seeking class certification, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, plaintiff seeks to  represent a class of all persons in the United States who, on or after October 13, 2012 (the  “Class Period”), purchased the Roundup Concentrates for personal or household use (the  “Class” or “Nationwide Class”).  17  Martin v. Monsanto Company, Case No. 16-cv-2168   Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations elsewhere in the Complaint  as if fully set forth herein.    The Roundup Concentrates are consumer products within the meaning of 15   Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations elsewhere in the Complaint  as if set forth in full herein.    The CLRA prohibits deceptive practices in connection with the conduct of a  business that provides goods, property, or services primarily for personal, family, or  household purposes.    Monsanto’s false and misleading labeling and other policies, acts, and practices  described herein were designed to, and did, induce the purchase and use of Monsanto’s  Roundup Concentrates for personal, family, or household purposes by plaintiff and other  Subclass members, and violated and continue to violate at least the following sections of the   Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations elsewhere in the Complaint  as if set forth in full herein.    Under the FAL, “[i]t is unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or association,  or any employee thereof with intent directly or indirectly to dispose of real or personal  property or to perform services” to disseminate any statement “which is untrue or misleading,  and which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be  untrue or misleading.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500.    As alleged herein, the advertisements, labeling, policies, acts, and practices of  Monsanto relating to its Roundup Concentrates misled consumers acting reasonably as to the  amount purchased and efficacy of Roundup Concentrates.    Plaintiff suffered injury in fact as a result of Monsanto’s actions as set forth  herein because plaintiffs purchased Roundup Super Concentrate in reliance on Monsanto’s  false and misleading marketing claims that the products “Make Up to” a certain volume when  the instructions on the back panel are followed and/or when a purchaser seeks to obtain “best  results” as instructed and advertised by Monsanto.  23  Martin v. Monsanto Company, Case No. 16-cv-2168  Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability,  Cal. Com. Code § 2314  (By the California Subclass)  120. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations elsewhere in the Complaint  as if set forth in full herein.  121. Monsanto, through its acts set forth herein, in the sale, marketing, and promotion  of the Roundup Concentrates, made representations to plaintiff and the Subclass that, among  other things, the products yield a certain volume by gallons of product that is effective at  killing all weeds and grass.  122. Monsanto is a merchant with respect to the goods of this kind which were sold  to plaintiff and the Subclass, and there was, in the sale to plaintiff and other consumers, an  implied warranty that those goods were merchantable.  123. However, Monsanto breached that implied warranty in that Roundup  Concentrates do not yield the volume by gallons and are not effective at killing all weeds and  grass to the extent claimed, as set forth in detail herein.  124. As an actual and proximate result of Monsanto’s conduct, plaintiff and the  Subclass did not receive goods as impliedly warranted by Monsanto to be merchantable in  that they did not conform to promises and affirmations made on the container or label of the  goods.  125. Plaintiff and the Subclass have sustained damages as a proximate result of the  foregoing breach of implied warranty in the amount of Roundup Concentrates’ purchase  price, or some portion thereof.  27  Martin v. Monsanto Company, Case No. 16-cv-2168  Breaches of Express Warranties,  Cal. Com. Code § 2313(1)  (By the Subclass)  115. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates the allegations elsewhere in the Complaint  as if set forth in full herein.   116.  Through the Roundup Concentrates’ labels, Monsanto made affirmations of fact  or promises, or description of goods, that, inter alia, the products will yield a certain number  of gallons in volume when used in an ordinary and reasonable manner, that the products will  yield a certain number of gallons in volume if the instructions for mixing on the back panel  were followed, and that the products would be effective in killing all weeds and grass. These  and other representations were part of the basis of the bargain, in that plaintiff and the  Subclass purchased the Roundup Concentrates in reasonable reliance on those statements.  Cal. Com. Code § 2313(1).  117. Monsanto breached its express warranties by selling Roundup Concentrates that  cannot yield the promised volume in gallons when used reasonably and ordinarily, cannot  yield the promised volume in gallons when mixed according to the instructions on the back  panel or by a purchaser seeking “best results” as instructed by Monsanto, and which is not  effective at killing weeds and grass when mixed to the stated volume on the labels and/or  pamphlets.  26  Martin v. Monsanto Company, Case No. 16-cv-2168  VIOLATIONS OF THE MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT,    15 U.S.C. §§ 2301 ET SEQ.  (By the Nationwide Class)   Violations of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act,  Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1750 et seq.  (By the California Subclass)   Violations of the False Advertising Law,  Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500 et seq.  (By the California Subclass)  ",lose,3
4496582,win,"At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of California.  Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, “persons” as defined by 47  Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others  similarly situated (“the Class”).  Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Class, consisting of:  a. All persons within the United States who had or have a number  assigned to a cellular telephone service, who received at least one call  using an ATDS and/or an artificial prerecorded voice from MAIN  STREET MARKETING, INC., or its agents, calling on behalf of  MAIN STREET MARKETING, INC., between the date of filing this  action and the four years preceding, where such calls were placed for  marketing purposes, to non-customers of MAIN STREET  MARKETING, INC., at the time of the calls.  MSM and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class.  Plaintiff does  not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class  members number in the thousands, if not more.  Thus, this matter should be  certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of this matter.  This suit seeks only damages and injunctive relief for recovery of economic  injury on behalf of the Class and it expressly is not intended to request any  recovery for personal injury and claims related thereto.  Plaintiff reserves the  right to expand the Class definition to seek recovery on behalf of additional  persons as warranted as facts are learned in further investigation and  discovery.  The joinder of the Class members is impractical and the disposition of their  claims in the Class action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties  and to the Court.  The Class can be identified through Defendant’s records  and/or Defendant’s agent’s records.  As a person that received numerous calls from Defendant in which Defendant  used an ATDS or an artificial or prerecorded voice, without Plaintiff’s prior  express consent, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are typical of the Class.  Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the  Class in that Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to any member of the  Class.  Plaintiff and the members of the Class have all suffered irreparable harm as a  result of the Defendant’s unlawful and wrongful conduct.  Absent a class  action, the Class will continue to face the potential for irreparable harm.  In  addition, these violations of law will be allowed to proceed without remedy  and Defendant will likely continue such illegal conduct.  The size of Class  member’s individual claims causes, few, if any, Class members to be able to  afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein.  Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and  claims involving violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.  Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby  making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief  with respect to the Class as a whole. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this  Complaint as though fully stated herein.  The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitutes numerous and  multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each  and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq.  As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq.,  Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory  damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B).  Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief  prohibiting such conduct in the future. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this  Complaint as though fully stated herein.  The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and  multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not  limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. §  227 et seq.  Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief  prohibiting such conduct in the future. As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1),  Plaintiff  seeks  for  himself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory  damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B).  Pursuant to 47  U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such  conduct in the future.  Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. As a result of Defendant’s willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §  227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member treble damages,  as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00 for each and every violation, pursuant  to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C).  Pursuant to 47  U.S.C.  §  227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such  conduct in the future.  KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.  NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.  THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.  VIOLATION OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ. ",lose,3
4571978,lose," Upon information and belief, other similarly situated employees are also uniformly paid  in a fashion similar to Plaintiff and not compensated for the expenses associated with performing  their job duties.    As a matter of economic reality, DoorDash advertises, on the ""About Us"" section of its  website, that ""through the DoorDash marketplace, people can purchase goods from local  merchants and have them delivered in less than 45 minutes—thanks to our revolutionary  logistics technology.""   Specifically, DoorDash is in the business of delivering goods to its  customers—the very task that drivers are hired to perform.  The work performed by drivers is  integral to Defendant's business in that DoorDash simply could not function without its drivers.    Defendant did not pay Plaintiff and others similarly situated one-and-one-half times their  regular rates of pay for hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week.    Defendant violated the FLSA because it did not pay Plaintiff and others similarly situated  the overtime pay they should have received for the hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a  workweek.  Plaintiff and others similarly situated did not receive minimum wage for hours  worked for DoorDash.    As a result, Plaintiff and others similarly situated did not receive compensation they were  legally entitled to receive.  The work performed by Plaintiff and others similarly situated was  with Defendant's knowledge.  Defendant approved driver's schedules, assigned work and  supervised the work.    Defendant's violations of the FLSA were committed knowingly, willfully, and/or with  reckless disregard to Plaintiff and similarly situated employees' rights.  V.   Plaintiff reasserts and incorporate by reference all of the above numbered paragraphs.    Plaintiff and others similarly situated were employees of DoorDash, Inc., as set forth  above.    As employees of DoorDash, Plaintiff and others similarly situated were legally entitled to  be paid at one-and-one-half times their regular rates of pay for hours worked in excess of forty  (40) hours per each seven (7) day workweek. As employees of DoorDash, Plaintiff and others  similarly situated were legally entitled to minimum wage.    As a result, Plaintiff and others similarly situated did not receive the compensation they  were legally entitled to receive.     Defendant's violations of the FLSA were committed knowingly, willfully, and/or with  reckless disregard to Plaintiff's and other similarly situated employees’ rights.     As a result of Defendant's willful violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff and others similarly  situated are entitled to reimbursement of unpaid overtime, an additional equal amount as  liquidated damages, and reasonable attorneys fees, costs and disbursements incurred in this  action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).  VI.   Plaintiff reasserts and incorporate by reference all of the above numbered paragraphs.    The FLSA requires employers to keep accurate records of hours worked by nonexempt  employees.  29 U.S.C. §211(c); 29 C.F.R. pt 516.    In addition to the pay violations of the FLSA described above, Defendant also failed to  keep proper time records as required by the FLSA.   Plaintiff reasserts and incorporate by reference all of the above numbered paragraphs.    Upon information and belief, many other similarly situated employees employed by  Defendant over the last three (3) years have been victimized by Defendant's violations of the   At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Defendant was, and remains, an enterprise engaged  in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA. 29  U.S.C. § 203, and is subject to the FLSA.    At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Defendant was, and remains, an enterprise engaged  in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of the FLSA. 29  U.S.C. § 203, and is subject to the FLSA.    Defendant, DoorDash, Inc. is a food delivery service that allows customers to place food  orders, through a mobile phone application or through its website, from various restaurants in the  ""DoorDash marketplace"". DoorDash, Inc. then utilizes its ""Dashers"" (i.e. delivery drivers) to  deliver those food orders to its customer's homes or businesses.      Defendant employed Plaintiff and others similarly situated at all relevant times within the  meaning of the FLSA. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g).  Defendant's annual revenues far exceeded $500,000  during the relevant time period.    In performing his duties for Defendant, Plaintiff and others similarly situated were  employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce.  Specifically, Defendant has employees utilizing interstate telephone and broadband  communications for the commercial purposes of Defendant's enterprise.  Moreover, Defendant  required that Plaintiff regularly travel through the corridors of interstate commerce as they  traveled from customer to customer to make deliveries.    Plaintiff and others similarly situated are paid a flat fee for every delivery completed plus  gratuity added by the customer.  Often drivers do not make minimum wage for every hour  worked during their shifts.  DoorDash does not compensate drivers for the expenses associated  with using their own vehicles, cell phone data, car insurance (though a requirement of  employment if you use a car to make deliveries), gas, parking, and other expenses.    ",lose,4
14883165,lose," The Class Period begins on March 27, 2015. On that date, Care.com filed on  Form 10-K with the SEC its annual report for the period ended December 27, 2014, which stated  in pertinent part:  We have invested in building a differentiated member experience for finding  and managing care. This investment includes the ongoing prioritization of  features and processes that we believe contribute to the quality of our  marketplace. Examples of these investments include the manual review of all  job and profile postings for suspicious or inappropriate content, tools for  members to review and report other members, a monitored messaging system  that allows members to communicate without sharing their personal email, the  proactive screening of certain member information against various  databases and other sources for criminal or other inappropriate activity  and the use of technology to help identify and prevent inappropriate activity  through our platform. We believe these product investments, combined with  our investments in national brand advertising and our domain name itself, have  established the Care.com brand as a leading and trusted brand for finding care.  (emphasis added).    On March 9, 2017, Care.com filed on Form 10-K with the SEC its annual report  for the period ended December 31, 2016, which stated in pertinent part:  We have invested in building a differentiated member experience for finding  and managing care. This investment includes the ongoing prioritization of  features and processes that we believe contribute to the quality of our  marketplace. Examples of these investments include the review of all job and  profile postings for suspicious or inappropriate content, tools for members to  review and report other members, a monitored messaging system that allows  members to communicate without sharing their personal email, the proactive  screening of certain member information against various databases and  other sources for criminal or other inappropriate activity, the use of  technology to help identify and prevent inappropriate activity through our  platform and a safety center that provides resources and information designed  to help families and caregivers make more informed hiring and job selection  decisions [.] We believe these product investments, combined with our  investments in national brand advertising and our domain name itself, have  established the Care.com brand as a leading and trusted brand for finding care.  (emphasis added).     On March 7, 2019, Care.com filed on Form 10-K with the SEC its annual report  for the period ended December 29, 2018, which stated in pertinent part:  We have invested in building a differentiated member experience for finding  and managing care. This investment includes the ongoing prioritization of  features and processes that we believe contribute to the quality of our  marketplace. Examples of these investments include the review of all job and  profile postings for suspicious or inappropriate content, tools for members to  review and report other members, a monitored messaging system that allows  members to communicate without sharing their personal contact information,  the proactive screening of certain member information against various  databases and other sources for criminal or other inappropriate activity,  the use of technology to help identify and prevent inappropriate activity  through our platform and a safety center that provides resources and  information designed to help families and caregivers make more informed hiring  and job selection decisions [.] We believe these product investments, combined  with our investments in national brand advertising and our domain name itself,  have established the Care.com brand as a leading and trusted brand for finding  care.  (emphasis added).    Defendant Marcelo signed certifications for the Form 10-K referenced in  paragraph 16 above. Among other things, this certification, which was made pursuant to the  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, required the signer to attest that they have reviewed the report, that  it does not contain untrue statements, that it fairly represents the financial condition of the  company, and that the company’s internal controls are effective.    The statements set out above in paragraphs 15 to 19 were materially false and  misleading, and omitted material information necessary to make the statements not misleading in  that, in fact, the Company did not effectively screen member information “against various  databases and other sources for criminal or other inappropriate activity.”     The Company and the Individual Defendants knew that such statements or  documents would be issued or disseminated to the investing public; and knowingly and  substantially participated or acquiesced in the issuance or dissemination of such statements or  documents as primary violations of the federal securities laws. As set forth elsewhere herein in  detail, Defendants, by virtue of their receipt of information reflecting the true facts regarding the  Company, their control over, and/or receipt and/or modification of the Company’s allegedly  materially misleading statements and/or their associations with the Company that made them  privy to confidential proprietary information concerning the Company, participated in the  fraudulent scheme alleged herein.    Following the release of the Friday, March 8, 2019, Wall Street Journal article,  the Company’s common stock declined, closing down almost 13%, to close at $20.48 per share  on Monday, March 11, 2019.    Then, on March 31, 2019, the Wall Street Journal reported that “hundreds of day- care centers” listed as “state licensed” on the Care.com website did not appear to be, and that  tens of thousands of unverified day-care center listings were scrubbed from the Care.com  website just before the March 8, 2019 Wall Street Journal article was published.    Following the release of the Sunday, March 31, 2019, Wall Street Journal article,  the Company’s common stock declined, closing down almost 7%, to close at $18.45 per share on  Monday, April 1, 2019.    Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal  Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of a class of all persons and entities who purchased or  otherwise acquired the Company’s common stock between March 27, 2015 and April 1, 2019,  inclusive. Excluded from the Class are Defendants, directors and officers of the Company, as  well as their families and affiliates.    The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is  impracticable. The disposition of their claims in a class action will provide substantial benefits to  the parties and the Court. More than 24 million Care.com shares trade on the New York Stock  Exchange.    Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class because Plaintiff and the Class  sustained damages from Defendants’ wrongful conduct alleged herein.    Plaintiff will adequately protect the interests of the Class and has retained counsel  who are experienced in class action securities litigation. Plaintiff has no interests that conflict  with those of the Class.    A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient  adjudication of this controversy. ",lose,4
6290416,lose," At no time was plaintiff liable for Morrison’s “seizure” or “service” fees, or for  “towing” or “storage” charges, since none of said fees had been approved by the Newton  District Court.      Morrison misrepresented the amount of the debt in violation of 15 U.S.C.  §1692e(2)(A).   The allegations of paragraphs 1 – 14 are incorporated herein as if fully set forth.    By charging plaintiff “seizure” and “service” fees, Morrison misrepresented the  compensation which she could lawfully receive, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e(2)(B).   The allegations of paragraphs 1 – 14 are incorporated herein as if fully set forth.    Morrison used a false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to  collect a debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e(10).   The allegations of paragraphs 1 – 14 are incorporated herein as if fully set forth.    The fees and charges which Morrison charged and collected from plaintiff were not  expressly permitted by any agreement creating the debt (the “debt” having been reduced  to judgment) or Massachusetts law, and Morrison therefore violated 15 U.S.C. §1692f(1).  Class Allegations    There are issues of law and fact common to the class, which issues predominate over  any questions particular to individual class members.  Common issues include whether  defendants are debt collectors under the FDCPA, whether defendants were engaged in  trade or commerce in Massachusetts, whether defendants’ conduct violated the FDCPA  as alleged, and whether defendants may be held jointly and severally liable for harm  suffered by plaintiff and class members.    Plaintiff’s claims are typical in that they arise from the same unlawful conduct as the  claims of class members.  Plaintiff and class members seek, and are entitled to, similar  relief.    A class action is manageable, and is also a superior method for resolving this  controversy since the claims all arise from a standard business practice and class  members are unlikely to file individual actions.  WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays that this Honorable Court:  (i)  certify plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23;  (ii)  appoint plaintiff as class representative and the undersigned as class  counsel;  (iii)  enjoin defendants from continuing to engage in the unlawful conduct  complained of;  (iv)  rescind all unlawful charges imposed by defendants against class  members;  (v)  award plaintiff and class members actual and statutory damages under the  FDCPA against defendants, jointly and severally;  (vi)  award costs and attorney’s fees against defendants, jointly and severally;  (vii)    award such further relief as shall be just and proper.   Excessive seizure and service fees   The allegations of paragraphs 1 – 14 are incorporated herein as if fully set forth.    If plaintiff was liable to Morrison for any “service fee” or “seizure fee” without the  necessity of court approval, the fees charged by Morrison exceeded any amounts  permitted by Massachusetts law.      As a result of said unlawful conduct, plaintiff suffered financial loss.   The allegations of paragraphs 1 – 14 and 30 are incorporated herein as if fully set  forth.    By charging and collecting from plaintiff the sum of $55.00 as a “service fee” and  the sum of $600.00 as a “seizure fee,” Morrison misrepresented the compensation which  she could lawfully receive in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e(2)(B).    As a result of said unlawful conduct, plaintiff suffered financial loss.   The allegations of paragraphs 1 – 14 and 33 are incorporated herein as if fully set  forth.    Morrison used a false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to  collect a debt in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e(10).    As a result of said unlawful conduct, plaintiff suffered financial loss.   The allegations of paragraphs 1 – 14 and 33 are incorporated herein as if fully set  forth.    The fees which Morrison attempted to collect and did collect from plaintiff were not  expressly permitted by any agreement creating the debt (the “debt” having been reduced  to judgment) or Massachusetts law, and Morrison therefore violated 15 U.S.C. §1692f(1).    Plaintiff brings counts V – VIII of this complaint on behalf of herself and classes of  persons similarly situated, as follows:  Class B  and sub-classes:  “Class B” consists of all Massachusetts residents  whose motor vehicles were seized on execution by Morrison within one year of the filing  of this action pursuant to an execution issued on a judgment on an alleged consumer debt,  and who were charged any “service” or “seizure” fee in excess of that permitted by  Massachusetts law.  Members of “Sub-class B-1” are all members of “Class B” whose  motor vehicles were seized at the request of Forsyth/Brugnoli.  Excluded from each class  and sub-class are defendants and their current and former officers, directors, employees,  and agents.  Plaintiff alleges that the practice described herein is a standard one employed  by defendants and therefore the class is sufficiently numerous such that joinder is  impracticable.    There are issues of law and fact common to the class, which issues predominate over  any questions particular to individual class members.  Common issues include whether  defendants are debt collectors under the FDCPA, whether defendants’ conduct violated  the FDCPA as alleged, and whether defendants may be held jointly and severally liable  for harm suffered by plaintiff and class members..    Plaintiff’s claims are typical in that they arise from the same unlawful conduct as the  claims of class members.  Plaintiff and class members seek, and are entitled to, similar  relief.  ",lose,3
8164812,win," Plaintiff Gellatly has visited Defendant’s facilities at 1467 S Arlington Street,  Akron, OH; 716 E Market Street, Akron, OH; 117 S Walnut Street, Ligonier, PA, including within  the last year.  Additionally, Plaintiff Nario-Redmond has visited Defendant’s facilities at 3709 W  Dublin Grandville Road, Columbus, OH; 1467 S Arlington Street, Akron, OH; 716 E Market  Street, Akron, OH; 117 S Walnut Street, Ligonier, PA, including within the last year.  Plaintiffs  experienced unnecessary difficulty and risk at Defendant’s facilities due to excessive slopes in the  purportedly accessible parking spaces and access aisles and because of various other ADA  accessibility violations as set forth in more detail below.    Despite these difficulties, Plaintiff Gellatly plans to return to Defendant’s facilities.   Plaintiff Gellatly will be attending college in Western Pennsylvania this fall and regularly travels  throughout Pennsylvania and Ohio visiting friends and family.  Furthermore, Plaintiff Gellatly  intends to return to Defendant’s facilities to ascertain whether Defendant’s facilities remain in  violation of the ADA.    As a result of Defendant’s non-compliance with the ADA, Plaintiffs’ ability to  access and safely use Defendant’s facilities has been significantly impeded.    Plaintiffs will be deterred from returning to and fully and safely accessing  Defendant’s facilities, however, so long as Defendant’s facilities remain non-compliant, and so  long as Defendant continues to employ the same policies and practices that have led, and in the  future will lead, to inaccessibility at its facilities.    Without injunctive relief, Plaintiffs will continue to be unable to fully and safely  access Defendant’s facilities in violation of her rights under the ADA.    As individuals with a mobility disability who is dependent upon a wheelchair,  Plaintiffs are directly interested in whether public accommodations, like Defendant, have  architectural barriers that impede full accessibility to those accommodations by individuals with  mobility-related disabilities.  II.  Defendant Repeatedly Denies Individuals With Disabilities Full and Equal Access to  its Facilities.    Defendant is engaged in the ownership, management and development of  properties, including shopping centers and restaurants.    As the owner and manager of its properties, Defendant employs centralized  policies, practices and procedures with regard to the design, construction, alteration, maintenance  and operation of its facilities.    On Plaintiffs’ behalf, investigators examined multiple locations owned, controlled,  and/or operated by Defendant, and found the following violations, which are illustrative of the fact  that Defendant implements policies and practices that routinely result in accessibility violations:  a) 3709 W Dublin Grandville Road, Columbus, OH  i.  The surfaces of one or more purportedly accessible parking spaces had  slopes exceeding 2.1%;  ii.  The surfaces of one or more access aisles had slopes exceeding 2.1%; and  iii.  A portion of the route to the store entrance had a cross slope exceeding    The fact that individuals with mobility-related disabilities are denied full and equal  access to numerous of Defendant’s facilities, and the fact that each of these facilities deny access  by way of inaccessible parking facilities, is evidence that the inaccessibility Plaintiffs experienced  is not isolated, but rather, caused by Defendant’s systemic disregard for the rights of individuals  with disabilities.    Defendant’s systemic access violations demonstrate that Defendant either employs  policies and practices that fail to design, construct and alter its facilities so that they are readily  accessible and usable, and/or that Defendant employs maintenance and operational policies and  practices that are unable to maintain accessibility.    As evidenced by the widespread inaccessibility of Defendant’s parking facilities,  absent a change in Defendant’s corporate policies and practices, access barriers are likely to  reoccur in Defendant’s facilities even after they have been remediated.    Plaintiffs bring this class action, pursuant to Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal  Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of themselves and the following nationwide class:  all  wheelchair users who have attempted, or will attempt, to utilize the parking facilities at all  locations within the United States for which Defendant owns and/or controls the parking facilities.    Numerosity: The class described above is so numerous that joinder of all individual  members in one action would be impracticable.  The disposition of the individual claims of the  respective class members through this class action will benefit both the parties and this Court, and  will facilitate judicial economy.    Typicality:  Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the members of the class.   The claims of Plaintiffs and members of the class are based on the same legal theories and arise  from the same unlawful conduct.    Common Questions of Fact and Law:  There is a well-defined community of  interest and common questions of fact and law affecting members of the class in that they all have  been and/or are being denied their civil rights to full and equal access to, and use and enjoyment  of, Defendant’s facilities and/or services due to Defendant’s failure to make their facilities fully  accessible and independently usable as above described.    Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because  Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class, making  appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiffs and the Class as a  whole.    I.  Plaintiffs Have Been Denied Full and Equal Access to Defendant’s Facilities.  ",lose,3
7387410,lose,"(Conversion)   (Private Nuisance)   (Trespass to Chattels)   (Violations of the TCPA)   On or about April 16, 2018 and May 1, 2018, Plaintiff received the unsolicited  fax advertisements attached as Exhibit A on its facsimile machine # 212-960-8745.   Discovery may reveal the transmission of additional faxes as well.   Defendants are responsible for sending or causing the sending of the faxes.   Defendants, as the entities whose products or services were advertised in the  faxes, derived economic benefit from the sending of the faxes.   Plaintiff had no prior relationship with defendant and had not authorized the  sending of faxes advertisements to Plaintiff.   The faxes did not contain an opt-out notice, as is required by 47 U.S.C. §227  and violates all of the opt-out requirements of 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(2)(D), 47 C.F.R.  §64.1200(a)(3)(iii), and GBL §396-aa(2).   On information and belief, the faxes attached hereto was sent as part of a mass  broadcasting of faxes.   On information and belief, defendants transmitted similar unsolicited fax  advertisements to at least 40 other persons.   There are no reasonable means for plaintiff or other recipients of defendants’  unsolicited advertising fax to avoid receiving illegal faxes.  Fax machines must be left on and  ready to receive the urgent communications authorized by their owners.  Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations  contained in paragraphs 1 through 36 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein.   By Defendants’ conduct, as described above, Defendants committed  thousands of violations of 47 U.S.C. §227(b) against Plaintiff and each class member, to wit: the  fax advertisement Defendants sent and/or caused to be sent to Plaintiff and each class member  were unsolicited and did not contain an opt-out notice meeting the requirements of 47 U.S.C.  §227(b)(2)(D) and/or 47 C.F.R. 64.1200(a)(3)(iii).    Plaintiff and each class member suffered actual damages as a result of receipt  of the unsolicited faxes, in the form of paper and ink or toner consumed as a result.  Furthermore,  plaintiff’s statutory right of privacy was invaded.   Plaintiff and each class member is entitled to statutory damages.   Defendants violated the TCPA even if their actions were only negligent.   Defendants should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the   future.  Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations  contained in paragraphs 1 through 42 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein.   As described above, upon information and belief, Defendants committed  thousands of violations of GBL §396-aa.   Accordingly, pursuant to GBL §396-aa(3), Plaintiff and each class member are  entitled to statutory damages.  Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations  contained in paragraphs 1 through 45 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein.   By sending Plaintiff and the class members unlawful faxes, Defendants  converted to their own use ink or toner and paper belonging to plaintiff and the class members.   Immediately prior to the sending of the unlawful faxes, Plaintiff and the class  members owned and had an unqualified and immediate right to the possession of the paper and  ink or toner used to print the faxes.   By sending the unlawful faxes, defendants appropriated to their own use the  paper and ink or toner used to print the faxes and used them in such manner as to make them  unusable.  Such appropriation was wrongful and without authorization.   Defendants knew or should have known that such appropriation of the paper  and ink or toner was wrongful and without authorization.   Defendants should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the  future.  Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations  contained in paragraphs 1 through 51 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein.   Defendants’ sending plaintiff and the class members unlawful faxes was an  unreasonable invasion of the property of plaintiff and the class members and constitutes a private  nuisance.   Congress determined, in enacting the TCPA, that the prohibited conduct was a  “nuisance.”  Universal Underwriters, Ins. Co. v. Lou Fusz Automotive Network, Inc., 401 F.3d  876, 882 (8th Cir. 2005).   Defendants acted either intentionally or negligently in creating the nuisance.   Plaintiff and each class member suffered damages as a result of receipt of the  unlawful faxes.   Defendants should be enjoined from continuing their nuisance.  Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations  contained in paragraphs 1 through 58 of this Complaint as though set forth at length herein.   Plaintiff and the class members were entitled to possession of the equipment  they used to receive faxes.   Defendants acted either intentionally or negligently in engaging in such  conduct.   Plaintiff and each class member suffered damages as a result of receipt of the  unlawful faxes.   Defendants should be enjoined from continuing trespasses.  Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and (b)(3), plaintiff brings this claim on behalf  of a class.   The class consists of (a) all persons and entities with fax numbers (b) who, on  or after a date four years prior to the filing of this action (28 U.S.C. §1658), or such shorter  period during which faxes were sent by or on behalf of Defendants (c) were sent faxes by or on  behalf of Defendants promoting its goods or services for sale (d) and who were not provided an  “opt out” notice as described in 47 U.S.C. §227.   The class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable.  Plaintiff alleges on  information and belief that there are more than 40 members of the class.   Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members.  All are based  on the same factual and legal theories.   Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class  members.  Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims  involving unlawful business practices.  Neither plaintiff nor defendants’ counsel have any  interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action.   A class action is superior to other alternative methods of adjudicating this  dispute.  Individual cases are not economically feasible.    WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully demands judgment in favor of Plaintiff and  the class and against the Defendants as follows:   a)  Statutory damages;  b) Attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit;  c)  An injunction against the further transmission of unsolicited fax advertising; and  d) For such other and further relief which this court deems just and proper.  Dated: Brooklyn, New York  July 6, 2018 ",win,3
17090762,lose,"(All Plaintiffs individually and on behalf of the FLSA collective v. All Defendants)   (All Plaintiffs individually and on behalf of the FLSA collective v. All Defendants)   (Plaintiff Muhammad on behalf of himself and similarly-situated officers v. All Defendants)   This is a collective action brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act by Plaintiffs on   behalf of themselves and all others similarly-situated for the recovery of compensation for time  spent engaging in washing-up activities after the end of their shifts within the Cook County  Department of Corrections (“CCDOC”), including washing and sanitizing their uniforms,  sanitizing their persons, sanitizing and maintaining personal protective equipment (“PPE”), and  showering.   Specifically, the activities for which minimum and overtime compensation are due to   Plaintiffs and similarly-situated officers are:  5  a. Sanitizing and washing their uniforms, gear, belts and equipment, boots and   shoes, and bags for necessary items, such as with Lysol, Clorox, or other chemicals and then  washing their uniforms after each shift;  b. Sanitizing their vehicles with Lysol, Clorox, or other chemicals either before or   after (or both) their shifts to avoid contamination within their vehicles present due to working in  Plaintiff Rashid Muhammad received an email on March 27, 2020 offering time-and-a-  half-pay for officers who volunteer to work at the MHTC while COVID-19 positive detainees  are housed there:  From: Rashid Muhammad (Sheriff) <Rashid.Muhammad@cookcoun tyi l.gov>  Sent: Friday, March 27, 2020 11:44:26 PM  To: Martha Yoksoulian (Sheriff) <Mart ha.Yoksoulian@ cookcount yil.gov>  Subject: Re: Mental Health Transiti on Center Assignments Available  Hello Supt. I am interested in volunteering for the 11-7 shift if and only if the time and a half is for pay. I'm not interested in putting myself in  potential harms way for time on the books.  Dep. R. Muhammad #17016  From: Martha Yoksoulian (Sheriff) <Mart ha.Yoksoulian@cookcountyi l.gov>  Sent: Friday, March 27, 2020 12:46 PM  To: Division 10 Supervisors <divison10supervi sors@ cookcounty.onmicrosoft.co m>; Division Ten Officers <divisi ontenofficers@cook county .onmicrosoft.  com>  Subject: Mental Health Transiti on  Center Assignments Available Hello all,  As some of you may have heard on the news, the sheriff is opening some of the barrack's at the Mental Health Transition Center for the inmates  that have tested  positive for the COVID-19 virus.  We are asking if anyone wants to volunteer working at MHTC for a while until we pass this crisis. It will be all three shifts 11-7, 7-3 and 3-11. 11-7 will  be placed in details 1 and 7. 7-3 will be placed in details 2 and 7 as well as 3-11 details 2 and 7. You will receive time and a half pay however, it has  not been decided if it will be in time or pay. As always you will have protective gear to protect to work with and you will be stationed a minimum of ten  feet away from the inmates. We need both officers and supervisors. We are looking from 3-5 officers per division. If you are intere sted , please reply  to this email.  Thank you,  Superintende nt Martha  Yoksoulian  Cook County  Sheriff's  Office Division  10  2700 S California Avenue  Chicago, II 60608  12  Office (773) 674-4429 Mobile (312) 758-5029  Email: Martha .Yoksoulian@cookcountyil.gov  The contents of this e-mail message and any attachments are intended solely for the addressee(s) named in this message. This communication is intended to be and to remain confidential and may be subject  to applicable work product privileges. If you are not the intended recipient of this message or if this message has been addressed to you in error, please alert the sender immediately by reply e-mail and then  delete this message and its attachments. Do not deliver, distribute or copy this message and/or any attachments and if you are not the intended recipient, do not disclose the contents or take any action in reliance upon the  information contained in this communication or any attachments. Thank you   As noted above, Muhammad replied to the email that he would volunteer for the MHTC   if he received pay.   The CCSO accepted Muhammad’s offer and transferred him to MHTC starting March   30, 2020, in the following memorandum:  Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference all other paragraphs of this Complaint in   this Count.   The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 206, requires that an employer compensate an employee a   minimum hourly rate for all hours suffered or permitted to work.   Defendants suffered or permitted Plaintiffs and similarly-situated officers to work at the   beginning of, and after, their shifts, in sanitizing activities, including by washing and sanitizing  their uniforms, sanitizing their persons, sanitizing and maintaining PPE, and showering.   Each Plaintiff, and all similarly-situated officers, are due to be paid wages for   approximately 20 - 30 minutes of sanitation activities at the beginning of, and the end of, each  shift worked between March 9, 2020 and through the cessation of the COVID-19 protocols at  Plaintiffs restate and incorporate by reference all other paragraphs of this Complaint in   this Count.   The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207, requires that an employer compensate an employee one-and-  one-half-times the regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) hours in a given  workweek.   Defendants suffered or permitted Plaintiffs and similarly-situated officers to work at the   beginning of, and after, their shifts, in sanitizing activities, including by washing and sanitizing  their uniforms, sanitizing their persons, sanitizing and maintaining PPE, and showering without  paying them for such activities that were performed at an overtime rate of pay where the  Plaintiffs had performed over forty (40) hours of work in the workweek.   Each Plaintiff, and all similarly-situated officers, are due to be paid wages for   approximately 30 minutes of sanitation activities at the beginning of, and the end of, each shift  worked between March 9, 2020 and through the cessation of the COVID-19 protocols at  Plaintiff Muhammad restates and incorporates by reference all other paragraphs of this   Complaint in this Count.   Plaintiff Muhammad and similarly-situated officers entered into an agreement with   Defendant Sheriff to voluntarily work at the MHTC for time-and-a-half pay (in Muhammand’s  case), or time-and-a-half pay or comp time (in others’).   Via email on March 27, 2020, Plaintiff Muhammad notified the Sheriff, through his   Superintendent, that he would work at the MHTC if he received pay for doing so.   On March 30, 2020, Defendant Sheriff transferred Plaintiff Muhammad to MHTC, where   he then worked, including by providing safety and security, and welfare, functions for COVID- 19 positive detainees at great risk of exposure to himself.   As of payday on April 17, 2020, Defendant Sheriff failed to pay Plaintiff Muhammad, or   any similarly-situated officer assigned to MHTC, the time-and-a-half pay owed under the  transfer agreement.   Plaintiff Muhammad and similarly-situated officers are entitled to recover all amounts   owed under the transfer agreement for time spent assigned at MHTC, two percent of the amount  of such underpayments for each month they remain unpaid, costs, and reasonable attorneys’ fees.  WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff Muhammad requests that this  Honorable Court enter judgment in his favor, and against Defendants, and order that Defendants  pay him and all similarly-situated officers for all underpaid overtime wages between March 30,  16  2020 and the date of cessation of his assignment at MHTC, two percent of the amount of such  underpayments for each month they remain unpaid, costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees, the  certification of a class for purposes of this IWPCA claim, and for such other relief as this Court  deems just and proper.  I.  FACTS RELATING TO ALL PLAINTIFFS AND SIMILARLY-SITUATED  OFFICERS.   PERSONNEL MEMORANDUM  DISTRIBUTION  A ",win,3
59723155,win,"Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)  and 23(b)(3).   The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of Defendants  and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have purchased  debts.   Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members, partners,  managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate families, and  legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families.    There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common issues  predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether  the Defendants’ written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A, violate  15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e & 1692g.   Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same facts and  legal theories. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff Class defined  in this complaint. Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling consumer lawsuits,  complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither Plaintiff nor her attorneys have any interests,  which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action.   Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also  appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class  predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to  other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.   Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the time  of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant to Fed.  R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).  Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein.   Some time prior to February 10, 2021, an obligation was allegedly incurred to HSBC Bank  Nevada, N.A.   The HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A. obligation arose out of a transaction in which involved the  transaction of money, property, insurance or services primarily for personal, family or household  purposes.    The alleged HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A. obligation is a ""debt"" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§  1692a(5).   HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A. is a ""creditor"" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4).   Defendant LVNV, a debt collector and subsequent owner of the HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A.  debt, contracted with Defendant TrueAccord to collect the alleged debt.   On or about February 10, 2021, Defendant TrueAccord sent Plaintiff a collection letter (the  “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt owed. A true and accurate copy of the Letter is attached as  Exhibit A.   The Letter states a balance of $731.92.   The Letter further states: “The law limits how long you can be sued on a debt.  Because of  the age of your debt, LVNV Funding LLC cannot report it to any credit reporting agency.”   The Letter is materially deceptive as it fails to disclose that the previously-lapsed statute of  limitations to file a lawsuit to collect the debt will recommence upon payment by Plaintiff.   Therefore, the Letter puts the Plaintiff at material risk of making a partial payment and  thereby unknowingly recommencing the lapsed statute of limitations.   Plaintiff sustained an informational injury in that she was deceptively misled about the true  legal nature of the alleged debt and was not advised that making payment on the debt would restart  the statute of limitations.   As a result of Defendants’ deceptive, misleading and unfair debt collection practices,  Plaintiff has been damaged.  Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs above  herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein.   Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or  misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.   Defendants violated §1692e:   a. by omitting material information creating a false and misleading representation of  the status of the debt in violation of §1692e(10); and  b. by falsely representing the character, amount or legal status of the debt in violation  of §1692e(2)(A).   By reason thereof, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendants conduct  violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs and  attorneys’ fees.  VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT  15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.  ",lose,3
17409093,win,"(Fair Labor Standards Act - Unpaid Overtime)    (NJWHL/NJWPL- Unpaid Overtime)    The claims in this Complaint arising out of the FLSA, New Jersey Wage and  Hour Law and New Jersey Wage and Payment Law are brought by Plaintiff under Rule  23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf of himself and of a class consisting  of all similarly situated non-exempt employees (i.e. cashier, cleaning worker,  maintenance worker, care service worker, marketing and accounting clerks) who work  or have worked at King Spa for the past six years (the ""Rule 23 Class"").   The employees in the Rule 23 Class are so numerous that joinder of all  members is impracticable.   The size of the Rule 23 Class is at least forty (40) individuals, although the  precise number of such employees is unknown Facts supporting the calculation of that  number are presently within the sole control of defendants.   Defendants have acted or have refused to act on grounds generally applicable  to the Rule 23 Class, thereby malting appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding  declaratory relief with respect to the Rule 23 Class as a whole.   The claims of the Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the Rule 23 Class he  seeks to represent. Plaintiff and the members of the Rule 23 Class work or have worked  for defendants within the six years prior to the filing of this action. They enjoy the same  statutory rights under the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law and New Jersey Wage and  Payment Law to be paid at the correct overtime wage for all hours worked and to keep  the gratuities they earn. Plaintiff and the members of the Rule 23 Class have sustained  similar types of damages as a result of defendants' failure to comply with the New Jersey  Wage and Hour Law and New Jersey Wage and Payment Law.   Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class have all been injured in that they have been  under-compensated due to defendants' common policies, practices, and patterns of  conduct.    Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the  members of the Rule 23 Class.    Plaintiff has retained counsel competent and experienced in wage and hour  litigation and class action litigation.   There is no conflict between Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class members.    This action is properly maintainable as a class action under Rule 23(b)(3) of the  Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.   The claims in this Complaint arising out of the FLSA are brought by the  Plaintiff on behalf of himself and all similarly situated non-exempt employees (i.e.  cashier, cleaning worker, maintenance worker, care service worker, marketing and  accounting clerks) who work or have worked at King Spa within three years of the date  of the filing of this action and who elect to opt-in to this action (the ""FLSA Collective"").    The FLSA Collective consists of approximately one hundred similarly situated  current and former non-exempt employees of King Spa, who have been victims of  defendants' common policy and practices that have violated their rights under the FLSA  by, inter alia, willfully denying them overtime pay and other monies.   As part of their regular business practices, defendants have intentionally,  willfully, repeatedly, and in bad faith harmed Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective by  engaging in a pattern, practice, and/or policy of violating the FLSA, New Jersey Wage  and Hour Law and New Jersey Wage and Payment Law. This policy and pattern or  practice include, inter alia:   a. failing to pay employees the proper overtime pay for all hours worked over  forty;  b. failing to pay non-exempt employees one hour's pay at the minimum hourly  wage rate for each day during which employees worked more than ten  hours;   c. failing to keep accurate records of hours worked by employees as required  by the FLSA and the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law and New Jersey  Wage and Payment Law.    The FLSA Collective would benefit from the issuance of a court-supervised  notice of the present lawsuit and the opportunity to join the present lawsuit. Those  similarly situated employees are known to defendants, are readily identifiable by  defendants and are locatable through defendants' records. These similarly situated  employees should be notified of and allowed to opt into this action, pursuant to 29  U.S.C. § 216(b).   Rhee worked as a cashier throughout his time employed by defendants.    Working as a cashier, Rhee fell into the category of ""non-exempt"" employee  pursuant to the FLSA.    Rhee’s starting and ending times varied depending on his shift. He regularly  worked at least 9 hours a day for 6 days a week and sometimes for 7 days a week.    Defendants failed to compensate Rhee at one and one-half times his hourly rate  for the hours he worked in excess of forty per workweek.   Plaintiff repeats and realleges all foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth  herein.    Defendants are required to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective one and one- half (1 ½ ) times the regular rate at which Plaintiff was employed for all hours worked in  excess of forty hours in a workweek pursuant to the overtime wage provisions set forth  in the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207, et seq.    Defendants have failed to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective the overtime  wages to which they are entitled under the FLSA.    Defendants have willfully violated the FLSA by knowingly and intentionally  failing to pay Plaintiff and FLSA Collective overtime wages.    Due to defendants' violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective  are entitled to recover their unpaid overtime wages, liquidated damages, reasonable  attorneys' fees and costs of the action, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.   Under the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law and supporting New Jersey State  Department of Labor Regulations, defendants were required to pay Plaintiff and the  Rule 23 Class one and one half (1 ½ ) times the regular rate of pay for all hours they  worked in excess of forty.    Defendants have failed to pay Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class the overtime  wages to which they were entitled under the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law.    Defendants have willfully violated the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law by  knowingly and intentionally failing to pay Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class overtime  wages.    Due to defendants' willful violations of the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law,  Plaintiff and the Rule 23 Class are entitled to recover their unpaid overtime wages,  reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of the action, liquidated damages and pre-judgment  and post-judgment interest.  ",lose,4
18372176,win," Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.  P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3).    The Class consists of:   a. all individuals with addresses in the State of Virginia;  b.  to whom Defendant MLR sent an initial collection letter attempting to collect a  consumer debt;  c. that falsely and misleadingly states the consumer’s right to dispute the debt;  d. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this  action and on or before a date twenty-one (2l) days after the filing of this action.    The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of  Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or  have purchased debts.    There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common  issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue  is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as  Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692g, 1692e.    The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same  facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the  Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in  handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff  nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this  action.    Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure  is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff  Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is  superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.   The name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;    Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length  herein.    Some time prior to June 5, 2020, an obligation was allegedly incurred to ALTEON -  EMA_25_Bon Secours Mary Immaculate Hospital by the Plaintiff.    The ALTEON - EMA_25_Bon Secours Mary Immaculate Hospital obligation arose  out of transactions in which money, property, insurance or services which are the subject of the  transactions were primarily for personal, family or household purposes, specifically medical  services.    The alleged ALTEON - EMA_25_Bon Secours Mary Immaculate Hospital  obligation is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(5).    ALTEON - EMA_25_Bon Secours Mary Immaculate Hospital is a “creditor” as  defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(4).    Defendant MLR, a debt collector, was contracted to collect the alleged debt which  originated with ALTEON - EMA_25_Bon Secours Mary Immaculate Hospital.    On or about June 5, 2020, Defendant MLR sent Plaintiff a collection letter (the  “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt currently owed to Defendant ALTEON - EMA_25_Bon  Secours Mary Immaculate Hospital See Exhibit A.    When a debt collector solicits payment from a consumer, it must, within five days  of an initial communication  (1) the amount of the debt;  (2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;  (3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice,  disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be  valid by the debt collector;  (4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within the thirty- day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain  verification of the debt or a copy of the judgment against the consumer and a copy of such  verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and  (5) a statement that, upon the consumer's written request within the thirty-day period, the  debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor,  if different from the current creditor. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a).  These disclosures are commonly known as the “G-Notice.”   A statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of  the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the  debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt-collector;    In addition, Defendant’s letter does not advise that that the consumer must dispute  the debt in writing to be provided with the name and address of the original creditor, if  different from the current creditor.    Defendant’s letter merely says: “If you contact this office within 30 days after  receiving this notice, this office will provide you with the name and address of the original  creditor, if different from the current creditor.”    The language “if you contact this office” does not properly convey that the dispute  must be in writing.    These false and inaccurate statements and omissions are deceptive and misleading  as Defendant fails to advise Plaintiff of the proper method for exercising her validation rights  under the FDCPA.    Plaintiff sustained an informational injury as she was not fully apprised of his rights  and responsibilities necessary to exercise her rights under the G-Notice.    Plaintiff effectively waived her rights to this statutorily available information  because she was not properly informed of the G-Notice requirements set forth in the FDCPA.    As a result of Defendant's deceptive, misleading and unfair debt collection practices,  Plaintiff has been damaged.   Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein.    Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or  misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.   A statement that the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within  thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt  collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment  against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be  mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and    Defendant violated §1692e :   a. As the Letter it is open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of  which is inaccurate.  b. By making a false and misleading representation in violation of §1692e(10).    By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's  conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs  and attorneys’ fees.   Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein.    Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff  violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g.     Pursuant to 15 USC §1692g, a debt collector:  Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with  the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is  contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer  a written notice containing –    The Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §1692g, by Falsely and inaccurately stating the  Plaintiff’s rights and responsibilities of the G-Notice as required by the FDCPA.     By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's  conduct violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs  and attorneys’ fees.  A statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty- day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name  and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor.   VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C.  §1692g et seq.   VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e  et seq.  ",win,4
6331203,lose," Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Rule 23, FRCivP, as a class action for himself  and as representative of and for, and on behalf of, all other similarly situated persons (""Class  Members""). The Class Members are defined as participants in EMSA’s Utility Fee Program from  2008 through 2013 who were detrimentally affected by Defendants’ fraud, conspiracy to defraud,  and violations of other State and Federal laws which Defendants engaged in in furtherance of their  conspiracy to defraud, as alleged herein. The Class excludes officers or employees of Defendants  and any person or entity whom Plaintiffs' counsel is prohibited from representing under the  Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct.    Plaintiff has been informed and believes, and on such information and belief allege,  that the individual loss and potential recovery of each Class Member is such that each is precluded  from individually litigating the claims asserted herein by reason of the burdens, costs and expenses  involved and that many Class Members will never have their day in court unless this action  proceeds as a class action.    This action is governed by Federal law.    There are substantial questions of law and fact common to the claims of the Class  Members against defendants.    The claims of Class Plaintiff is typical of the claims of each and all of the Class  Members and are based upon and arise out of the identical facts concerning the conduct of the  defendants.    Plaintiff is situated to, capable of, and will fairly and adequately represent the  interests of the Class Members. Because of the similarity and identity of claims of Plaintiff and  the individual Class Members, the successful assertion of Plaintiffs' claims herein will result in the  determination of law and facts adequate to prove the liability of defendants to each Class Member.    The prosecution of separate actions by the individual Class Members, even if  possible, would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications or verdicts that may establish  incompatible standards of conduct for defendants.    Defendants’ acts alleged herein are applicable to all Class Members, making the   relief sought generally applicable to all of the Class Members.    A class action is superior to other available methods, if in fact any such other  methods are available (which Plaintiffs deny), for the fair and efficient adjudication of the matters  alleged herein.   EMSA was established in 1977, and operates a Public Utility Model of ambulance  services in Tulsa and Oklahoma City.    As a public trust, EMSA does not provide the ambulance services, but contracts with a  private contractor to provide ambulance services in Tulsa and Oklahoma City.    From 1994 to 1998, EMSA’s private contractor was American Medical Response   Plaintiff has been a resident of the City of Tulsa during the relevant time period and  paid the TotalCare Fee on his monthly water bill.     Plaintiff relied on the representation from Defendants that the amount of the  TotalCare fee was an accurate representation of the cost of the program.    Plaintiff relied on Defendants to protect his interests and accurately represent the  costs of providing ambulance services.    In paying the TotalCare fee, Plaintiff did not consent to the scheme orchestrated  by Defendants.     Plaintiff did not consent to being overcharged for the TotalCare program, and does  not consent to the money received from the TotalCare program  being used as kickbacks and for  various expenses.    Plaintiff did not consent to the TotalCare fees being used, in part, to contribute to  political campaigns.   Plaintiff incorporates by reference all prior allegations set forth above.    Count I is for fraud and arises under the common law of Oklahoma.    Defendants, and each of them, intentionally misrepresented to Plaintiffs that the  charges being paid for emergency ambulance services were being paid pursuant to a legal contract,  and not an illegal kickback scheme.    Throughout the Claim Period, Defendants, and each of them, made at least one false   material misrepresentation to Plaintiffs through solicitations of Plaintiffs to pay to participate in the  EMSA TotalCare Program; which misrepresentation was made as a positive assertion which was  known by Defendants to be false when made; which misrepresentation was made with the intention  that Plaintiffs would act on it and participate in the EMSA TotalCare Program; and which Plaintiffs  relied on to their detriment in enrolling (and continuing to enroll) in the EMSA TotalCare Program;  and which caused Plaintiffs actual hard and damages.     Plaintiffs did not know, and could not have known of the illegal acts of the defendants   herein alleged until the Qui Tam Complaint had been unsealed, on January 17, 2017.     Each class member has suffered actual damages because the illegal and fraudulent   kickback scheme alleged herein directly caused the cost of the TotalCare charged to each Class  Member to be higher than it otherwise would have been.   Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all prior allegations set forth above.    Count II is for conspiracy to defraud and arises under the common law of Oklahoma.    Defendants Williamson, Torrence, EMSA, ETMC System and ETMC Services all  conspired together  to do an unlawful act, that is, violate the federal Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C.  §1320a-7b (the “AKS”)    Each class member has suffered actual damages because the illegal and fraudulent   kickback scheme alleged herein directly caused the cost of the TotalCare charged to each Class  Member to be higher than it otherwise would have been.   Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all prior allegations set forth above.    Count III is for violation of the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act, 18   U.S.C.A. Section 1962, et seq (the “RICO” statute).  RICO provides a private right of action in federal  court for individuals injured in their business or property through fraudulent conduct.    Here, Defendants Williamson, Torrence, ETMC System, ETMC Services and EMSA,  through a  conspiracy to defraud, did: actively and intentionally defraud Plaintiffs and others; through  a criminal enterprise to violate the AKS, succeed in having EMSA award an over-cost contract to  EMTC, in violation of the Federal kickback statute, and to renew that illegal contract through additional  criminal conduct which was also in violation of the criminal anti-kickback statute; and, all of which  conduct constituted a pattern of racketeering activity.      Each class member has suffered actual damages because the illegal and fraudulent  kickback scheme alleged herein directly caused the cost of the Utility Fee Program charged to each  Class Member to be higher than it otherwise would have been.   Defendant EMSA’s inadequate policies, practices and procedures oversight of its  officers and employees resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiffs’ well established Constitutional rights  under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.    Defendant EMSA’s failure to supervise its officers and employees amounts to  deliberate indifference.    Defendant EMSA made a conscious choice by failing to adequately supervise its  officers and employees which resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiffs’ well established Constitutional  rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.    Defendant EMSA’s policy, practices, customs and procedures are nonexistent or  wholly inadequate given the great power, authority and deference given to its officers and/or  employees.    Defendant EMSA knew or should have known that Defendants Williamson and/or  Torrence were likely to engage in the acts set forth above.    Defendant EMSA authorized or ratified the actions of Defendants Williamson and/or  Torrence    As a result of Defendant EMSA’s actions, policies, procedures and customs, Plaintiffs  suffered damages.   Defendant Williamson is the Chief Executive Officer of Defendant EMSA.    As Chief Executive Officer of Defendant EMSA, Defendant Williamson acted  under color of state law.     Defendant Williamson’s actions led to a violation of Plaintiffs’ well established  Constitutional rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.     Defendant Williamson’s actions are in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983.   Defendant Torrence is the Chief Financial Officer of Defendant EMSA.    As Chief Financial Officer of Defendant EMSA, Defendant Torrence acted under  color of state law.     Defendant Torrence’s actions were in violation of the policies and procedures of  Defendant EMSA.    Defendant Torrence’s actions led to a violation of Plaintiffs’ well established  Constitutional rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.     Defendant Torrence’s actions are in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983.  CONSPIRACY TO DEFRAUD   FRAUD   VIOLATION OF THE RACKETEER INFLUENCED   CORRUP ORGANIZATIONS ACT   Violation of Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Rights by Defendant EMSA  (42 U.S.C. §1983)   Violation of Plaintiffs Constitutional Rights by Defendant Williamson  (42 U.S.C. §1983)   Violation of Plaintiffs Constitutional Rights by Defendant Torrence  (42 U.S.C. §1983)  ",win,4
18694402,lose," Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.  P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3).    The Class consists of:   a. all individuals with addresses in the state of New York;  b. to whom Defendant EOS sent a collection letter;  c. On behalf of Defendant US Asset;  d. attempting to collect a consumer debt;  e. which debt was past the statute of limitation for filing suit thereon;  f. without disclosing that the statute of limitations for suing to collect the debt had  expired;   g. without disclosing that if a payment is made it could restart the statute of  limitations;   h. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this  action and on or before a date twenty-one (21) days after the filing of this action.    The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of  Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have  purchased debts.    Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officers, members,  partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate  families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families.     There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common  issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue is  whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as Exhibit A,  violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692f.    The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same  facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff  Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling  consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor his attorneys  have any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action.    This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action  pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a well- defined community interest in the litigation:  a. Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges,  that the Plaintiff Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members  would be impractical.  b. Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as  to all members of the Plaintiff Class and those questions predominance over any  questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue  is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms  attached as Exhibit A violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692e and §1692f.  c. Typicality: The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members.  The Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff Class have claims arising out of the  Defendants' common uniform course of conduct complained of herein.  d. Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the  class members insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the absent  class members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter.  Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits,  complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor his counsel have  any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class  action lawsuit.  e. Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair  and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all  members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large  number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single  forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that  individual actions would engender.    Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure  is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class  predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to  other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.    Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at  the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant  to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).   Plaintiff repeats the above paragraphs as if set forth here.    On a date better known to the original creditor, Verizon, Plaintiff incurred a debt.    The obligation arose out of a transaction allegedly incurred by Plaintiff in which  money, property, insurance or services which are the subject of the transaction were incurred solely  for personal purposes, specifically for personal cellphone service.    The alleged Verizon obligation is a ""debt"" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (5).    Verizon is a ""creditor"" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (4).    Defendant EOS collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been  incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of itself or others using the United  States Postal Services, telephone and internet.    Defendant US Asset collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have  been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of itself or others using the  United States Postal Services, telephone and internet.    Upon information and belief, Defendant EOS contracted with Defendant US Asset  to collect the alleged debt.  Violation – July 2, 2020 Collection Letter    On or about July 2, 2020, Defendant sent the Plaintiff an initial collection letter  regarding the alleged debt.  A copy of the letter is attached as Exhibit A.    The letter states a balance of $40.14 and states that the Plaintiff’s payment is past  due.    The letter fails to disclose that the statute of limitations to file a lawsuit to collect the  debt had already expired.     The statute of limitations for commencing suit on this debt is two years after default  on the account, the time of which has already passed.    This material omission misleads the consumer into potentially paying a time-barred  debt, which will restart the statute of limitations.    The letter fails to state that if a partial payment is made the statute of limitations may  restart, thus allowing for a lawsuit to occur.    The letter further fails to clearly and adequately inform the consumer of the true legal  status of the debt and potential ramifications of making a payment and restarting the statute of  limitations.    As a result of Defendant’s deceptive, misleading, and unfair debt collection practices,  Plaintiff has been damaged.   Plaintiff repeats the above paragraphs as if set forth here.    Defendants’ debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff  violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.    Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or  misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.    Defendants violated said section by:   a. omitting material information creating a false and misleading representation of  the debt in violation of §1692e (10); and  b. falsely representing the character, amount or legal status of the debt in violation  of §1692e (2)(A).    By reason thereof, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendants’  conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs  and attorneys’ fees.   Plaintiff repeats the above paragraphs as if set forth here.    Defendants’ debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff  violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f.    Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f, a debt collector may not use any unfair or  unconscionable means in connection with the collection of any debt.    Defendants violated this section by omitting material information that gave Plaintiff  a false understanding of her rights under the FDCPA.    By reason thereof, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendants’  conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs  and attorneys’ fees.  VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT   15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq.   VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT   15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.  ",win,4
16610350,win," The exact number of FLSA Collective members is unknown to plaintiffs at this  time, but there are believed to be at least 25 such persons who have been victims of defendants’  common policy and practices that have violated their rights under the FLSA by willfully denying  them overtime pay and other wages.      The identities of the FLSA Collective members are known to the defendants and  is contained in the employment records that the defendants are required to create and maintain  pursuant to the FLSA and NJWHL.    As part of their regular business practice, defendants have intentionally, willfully,  and repeatedly harmed the FLSA Collective by engaging in a pattern, practice, and/or policy of  violating the FLSA.      This policy, pattern, or practice includes, inter alia, failing to pay overtime at the  rate of one and one-half times the FLSA Collective’s regular hourly rate for hours worked in  excess of 40 in a workweek.    Defendants’ unlawful conduct has been intentional, willful, and in bad faith and  has caused significant damage to the FLSA Collective.           Defendants did not keep complete records, as required by law, of hours worked  and wages earned by the plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective.    Silva brings the Second Claim and both named plaintiffs bring the Third Claim  against defendants as a class action for unpaid minimum wage and unpaid overtime on behalf of  themselves and other employees similarly situated pursuant Rule 23(b)(2) and (b)(3) of the  Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and pursuant to N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a25. N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a25  provides in pertinent part, “An employee shall be entitled to maintain the action for and on  behalf of himself or other employees similarly situated, and such employee and employees may  designate an agent or representative to maintain such action for and on behalf of all employees  similarly situated.”     Plaintiffs are a member of a class of employees of similarly situated individuals  which includes current and former non-tipped, non-exempt restaurant employees, including  Chefs, Cooks, Salad Preparers, Food Preparers, Pizza Makers and Dishwashers employed by  defendants at Buongusto at any time, during the period permitted by N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a25.1  prior to the filing of the action through entry of judgment in this action (the “New Jersey Class”).    The identities of the New Jersey Class members are known to the defendants and  are contained in the employment records that the defendants are required to create and maintain  pursuant to the FLSA and NJWHL.    Plaintiffs are similarly situated to the New Jersey Class because plaintiffs and the  New Jersey Class performed similar work under similar terms and conditions of employment,  and sustained similar damages arising out of defendants’ policies and conduct in violation of the   At all relevant times, Ghobrial operated and managed Buongusto.    At all relevant times, Youssef operated and managed Buongusto.    At all relevant times, Habib operated and managed Buongusto.    Throughout her employment, Silva’s primary duties included slicing tomatoes,  preparing pizza dough and preparing the pizza sauce.      Throughout his employment, Salmeron’s primary duties included preparing for  and making the meatballs, pasta, chicken, salad, wraps and paninis.      At all relevant times, defendants recorded plaintiffs’ and other restaurant workers’  hours of work first by having the workers orally notifying the managers when they arrived at the  restaurant and when they were leaving the restaurant, which the managers recorded. Thereafter,  in or about 2018, a Point of Sale (POS) electronic system was installed at Buongusto, which  recorded hours of work for each restaurant worker.    At all relevant times, plaintiffs and other restaurant workers typically worked 74  hours per workweek.    Throughout their employment, plaintiffs and other restaurant workers generally  worked six days per week with the following, or close to the following schedule: Sunday through  Thursday, 10:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. and Friday through Saturday 10:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m., with  one day off per week.    Plaintiffs and other restaurant workers did not receive any uninterrupted meal or  rest breaks during the workday. Any food eaten was done so while working.    The pay period at Buongusto was from Monday to Sunday. Non-Tipped  restaurant workers were generally paid once a week on Tuesdays.    All of the restaurant workers, except for the pizza makers, were paid on a flat  salary basis, regardless of the number of hours they worked in a week. Pizza makers were paid  on an hourly basis the same hourly rate, regardless of the number of hours they worked in a work  week.    Effective January 1, 2015, the New Jersey minimum wage became $8.38, and  effective January 1, 2017, the New Jersey minimum wage became $8.44. Effective January 1,  2018, the New Jersey minimum wage became $8.60, and effective July 1, 2019, the New Jersey  minimum wage became $10.00.    Silva was initially paid $550 per week, which increased over time to $700 per  week for all hours worked, all in violation of the applicable New Jersey state minimum wage  rate.    Defendants failed to pay plaintiffs and other restaurant workers overtime pay at  one and one half (1 ½) times their hourly rate for hours worked in excess of 40 per workweek.      Defendants failed to pay plaintiffs New Jersey and federal overtime for each and  every pay period they worked at the Buongusto beginning June 2017 to September 2019.      Examples of such weekly pay periods in 2019 include pay periods ending on  March 4, May 20, June 24, August 19, and October 7, 2019.     Examples of such weekly pay periods in 2018 include pay periods ending on  March 5, May 21, June 18, August 27, and October 1, 2018.     In each of the identified pay periods above, plaintiffs worked at least 74 hours.       Defendants did not provide the plaintiffs or the other restaurant workers any  written notification of the hours they worked or wages paid in a workweek.     Defendants have violated the recordkeeping requirements of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C.  §211(c), N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a20 and N.J.A.C. 12:56-4.1 and 4.2    Defendants failed to post, in a conspicuous, unobstructed place, pursuant to  N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a21, the “New Jersey State Wage and Hour Law Abstract,” prescribed by the  NJDOL, setting forth the state minimum wage and overtime requirements in English and  Spanish.     Defendants failed to post in a conspicuous, unobstructed, place pursuant to 29  C.F.R. §516.4, a poster prescribed by the U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division,  setting forth federal minimum wage and overtime requirements in English and Spanish. ",win,4
59753915,win," Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein.    Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.  P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3).    The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of  Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or  have purchased debts.    Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members,  partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate  families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate  families.     There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common  issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal  issue is whether the Defendants’ written communications to consumers, in the forms attached  as Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e & 1692f.    Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff  violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f.    Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure  is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff  Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is  superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.    Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at  the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues  pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).   Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length  herein.    The Sprint Nextel obligation arose out of a transaction in which involved the  transaction of money, property, insurance or services primarily for personal, family or  household purposes.     The alleged Sprint Nextel  obligation is a ""debt"" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5).    Sprint Nextel  is a ""creditor"" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4).    Defendant LVNV, a debt collector and subsequent owner of the Sprint Nextel debt,  contracted with Defendant TrueAccord to collect the alleged debt.    Defendants collects and attempt to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been  incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United  States Postal Services, telephone and internet.  Violation – February 10, 2021 Collection Letter    On or about February 17, 2021, Defendant TrueAccord sent Plaintiff a collection  letter (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt owed. A true and accurate copy of the Letter is  attached as Exhibit A.    Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f, a debt collector may not use any unfair or  unconscionable means in connection with the collection of any debt.    The letter states a balance of $770.75.    The letter states:  “We are TrueAccord, a third party debt collection agency.  We  are working on behalf of LVNV Funding LLC (current creditor of your original Sprint Nextel  Corporation account) to collect on your balance of $770.75.    Upon information and belief, the statute of limitations to file a lawsuit on this debt  has long passed.     The letter fails to clearly and adequately inform the consumer as to the true legal  status of the debt and potential ramifications of making a payment with a written  acknowledgement of the debt and thereby restarting the statute of limitations.    Therefore, the letter puts the Plaintiff at material risk of making a partial payment  and thereby unknowingly recommencing the lapsed statute of limitations.    Plaintiff sustained an informational injury in that he was deceptively misled about  the true legal nature of the alleged debt and was not advised that making payment on the debt  would restart the statute of limitations.    As a result of Defendants’ deceptive, misleading and unfair debt collection  practices, Plaintiff has been damaged.   Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein.    Defendants debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff  violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.    Defendant violated this section by omitting material information that gave Plaintiff  a false understanding of the rights provided him under the FDCPA.    Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or  misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.   VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e  et seq.   VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692f  et seq.  ",win,4
8138535,lose,"Plaintiff received a series of automated calls on his cell phone seeking to sell him life insurance including at least the following: August 11, 2016, at 11.04 am from 978-213-8332 (Exhibit A); a. August 10, 2016, at 9.52 am from 517-208-0209 (Exhibit B); b. August 10, 2016 at 11.43 am from 952-777-1698 (Exhibit C); c. August 10, 2016, at 11.09 am from 303-214-0430 (Exhibit D); d. August 5, 2016 at 3.14 pm from 303-214-0430 (Exhibit D); e. August 5, 2016 at 2.46 pm from 603-263-3019 (Exhibit E); f. August 4, 2016, at 4.35 pm from 303-214-0430 (Exhibit D).  Each call began with a pause and then delivered a recorded message.  A person who calls 517-208-0209 or  603-263-3019 or 952-777-1698 or  303- 214-0430 gets a recorded message inviting the caller to press “1” in order to learn about saving money on life insurance, substantially as follows: 2 Hello.  I’m calling because I believe I can save you money on your life insurance.  If you can spare a few seconds, we offer a valuable free service.  Studies have shown that people are paying up to 40% too much for life insurance and they’re very happy to find out that they may be able to pay a lot less for the same or better coverage.  We are local representatives for a major insurer and we offer a free comparison quote just to see if we can save you money.  There is no cost or obligation.  If you would like a free quote on life insurance, please press the “1” key on your telephone now. You may also press “9” to be added to our no call list, but press “1” to hear more.  On information and belief, based on the content of the message (“I’m calling . . . ”), the identical message is played regardless of whether one answers or returns the call.  A person who presses “1” is transferred to a live person who, if the caller expresses interest, transfers the caller to an insurance representative at the Life Insurance Center, who takes down information about the proposed insured and type and amount of coverage sought.  The insurance representative provides 800-286-7842 as a callback number.  The number 800-286-7842 is issued to or used by The Life Insurance Center, LLC.  (Exhibit F)  The Life Insurance Center, LLC is held out (Exhibit F) as “division of InsureNOW Direct”.    InsureNOW Direct is a trade name used by Crump Life Insurance Services, Inc. (Exhibit G).  The relationship between Crump Life Insurance Services, Inc., and The Life Insurance Center, LLC is described in Exhibit H.  Crump Life Insurance Services, Inc., is therefore liable for the conduct of its “division,” The Life Insurance Center, LLC.  On information and belief, the calls were placed using an automated dialer and a recorded voice.    Plaintiff did not authorize the automated placement of calls to his cell phone.  Plaintiff may have received other automated calls from the same source.   Plaintiff did not furnish his cell phone number to defendant. 3  Defendants’ calls harmed plaintiff by causing the very harm Congress sought to prevent – a “nuisance and invasion of privacy.”   Defendants’ calls harmed plaintiff by intruding upon his seclusion.  Defendants’ calls harmed plaintiff by distracting him from work and causing him aggravation and annoyance.  Defendants’ calls harmed plaintiff by wasting his time.  Defendants’ calls harmed plaintiff by using data storage space and the battery on the cellular telephone.   Plaintiff and each class member is entitled to statutory damages.  Defendants violated the TCPA even if their actions were only negligent.  Defendants should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1-32.  The TCPA, 47 U.S.C. §227, provides: §  227.  Restrictions on use of telephone equipment  . . . (b) Restrictions on use of automated telephone equipment.    (1) Prohibitions. It shall be unlawful for any person within the United States, or any person outside the United States if the recipient is within the United States–       (A) to make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice–          (iii) to any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service for which the called party is charged for the call; . . .   The TCPA,  47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3), further  provides: Private right of action. 4 A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State– (A)  an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation, (B)  an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or (C)  both such actions. If the Court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount available under the subparagraph (B) of this paragraph.  Defendant violated the TCPA by placing automated calls using a recorded message to plaintiff’s cell phone.  Plaintiff incorporates paragraphs 1-32.  Defendants engaged in unfair acts and practices, in violation of ICFA §2, 815 ILCS 505/2, by making unauthorized robocalls to plaintiff’s cell phone.  Defendants’ conduct is contrary to public policy, as set forth in the TCPA.  Plaintiff suffered damages as a result of receipt of the call.   Defendants engaged in such conduct in the course of trade and commerce.  Defendants should be enjoined from committing similar violations in the future. Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of a class, consisting of (a) all persons with phone numbers in the Illinois area codes (b) who, on or after a date three years prior to the filing of this action, (c) received calls on their cell phones soliciting business for the Life Insurance Center, (d) placed using an automated dialer or a prerecorded or artificial voice.  The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impractical.  Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that there are more than 40 members of the class.  There are questions of law and fact common to the class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members.  The predominant common questions include: a. Whether defendants engaged in a pattern of using automated equipment to place calls to cellular telephones; b. The manner in which defendants compiled or obtained their list of telephone numbers; and c. Whether defendants thereby violated the ICFA.  Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions and claims involving unlawful business practices.  Neither plaintiff nor plaintiff’s counsel has any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action.   Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members.  All are based on the same factual and legal theories.  A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy.  The interest of class members in individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against defendant is small because it is not economically feasible to bring individual actions.  Management of this class action is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties that those presented in many class actions, e.g. for securities fraud. 8 WHEREFORE, plaintiff requests that the Court enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and the class and against defendants for: (1) Statutory damages; (2) An injunction against further violations; (3) Costs of suit; (4) Such other or further relief as the Court deems just and proper. s/ Daniel A. Edelman Daniel A. Edelman Daniel A. Edelman Cathleen M. Combs Julie Clark Michelle A. Alyea  7 ",lose,3
14541926,lose," (42 U.S.C. § 1983; Violation of the Help America Vote Act Against Defendants Reagan,  Maricopa County, and Fontes)   (42 U.S.C. § 1983; Violation of Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution Against  Defendants Reagan, Maricopa County, and Fontes)   (42 U.S.C. § 1983; Violation of the National Voter Registration Act Against Defendants  Reagan, Maricopa County, and Fontes)    For an order certifying a Class and Subclass pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2);     To be eligible to vote in a particular election, Arizona law requires that the  voter’s registration form be “received by the county recorder . . . prior to midnight of the  twenty-ninth day” before that election.  A.R.S. § 16-120.    Columbus Day is a state and federal holiday.  See A.R.S. § 1-301(A); 5   For compensatory and punitive damages in an amount to be determined  according to proof;    For costs of suit and attorneys’ fees as provided by law; and    For such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.   Plaintiff is a United States Citizen living in Arizona.  He brings this action  against the Defendants both as an individual and as a representative of a class of all  Arizona voters who had their ballots discarded due to the unlawful October 10, 2016  Policy, which set an unlawful voter registration deadline.    Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure  23(b)(2) to certify a class of individuals who did not have their ballots counted due to the  unlawful October 10, 2016 voter registration deadline.      Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of all Arizona voters who registered to  vote on October 11, 2016 and cast a provisional ballot in the November 8, 2016 General  Election.    The members of the Class and Subclass are so numerous that joinder of all  members is impracticable.  The Class and Subclass consist of hundreds of individuals  who registered to vote on October 11, 2016 and cast a provisional ballot in the November  8, 2016 General Election.    There are questions of law and fact common to the Class and Subclass,  including:  a.  Whether the Defendants violated the Class and Subclass members’  right to register to vote by adopting a voter registration deadline that did not  comply with the National Voter Registration Act;  b.  Whether the Defendants violated Class and Subclass members’ right  to vote by refusing to count their ballots and certifying election results that  did comply with the Help America Vote Act;  c.  Whether the Defendants violated Class and Subclass members’  federal and constitutional rights by engaging in conduct that led to the  disenfranchisement of all voters who registered on October 11, 2016.    Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class and Subclass because the  policies, practices, and conduct that violated Plaintiff’s rights are the same as those that  were applied to all members of the Class and Subclass.  Plaintiff is a member of the Class  and Subclass he seeks to represent.    Defendants have acted on grounds applicable to the Class and Subclass, in  that their policies, practices, and conduct have affected all Class and Subclass members.   Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all prior paragraphs of this  Complaint and the paragraphs in the counts below as though fully set forth herein.    The purpose of the National Voter Registration Act (“NVRA”) is to, among  other things, “establish procedures that will increase the number of eligible citizens who  register to vote in elections for Federal office.”  52 U.S.C. § 20501(b)(1).      To accomplish this, the NVRA requires that states provide for voter  registration via several methods: registration with an application for a driver’s license, 52  U.S.C. § 20504; registration by mail, 52 U.S.C. § 20505; and in-person registration at  registration sites or government offices, 52 U.S.C. § 20506.    Arizona law requires that voter registration forms be “received . . . prior to  midnight of the twenty-ninth day preceding the date of the election.”  A.R.S. § 16-120.   Twenty-nine days before the November 2016 Election was October 10, 2016, which is  the registration deadline the Defendants set.  That date, however, fell on Columbus Day.   It was thus impossible for Arizonans to register using certain NVRA-mandated methods  on that date.  For example, MVD and post offices were closed on Columbus Day.  The  same was true of October 9, 2016 because it was a Sunday.  Therefore, Arizonans were  required to register to vote via these methods, by the latest, Saturday, October 8, 2016.   This deadline was 31 days before the election and violates the NVRA.  See 52 U.S.C.  § 20507(a)(1).    Put differently, given that 29 days before the November 2016 Election fell  on Columbus Day, the first available day to require voters to register through the NVRA  methods that was “not later” than 29 days before the election was Tuesday, October 11,  2016.   Accordingly, Defendants’ insistence that voters who registered by October 11,  2016 were ineligible vote in the November 2016 Election was inconsistent with, and a  violation of, the NVRA and Arizona law.    Defendants’ violations of 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(1) directly and proximately  caused Plaintiff to suffer injuries and damages.   Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all prior paragraphs of this  Complaint and the paragraphs in the counts below as though fully set forth herein.    Under the Help America Vote Act (“HAVA”), “[i]f the appropriate State or  local election official to whom [a] [provisional] ballot or voter information is transmitted  … determines that the individual is eligible under State law to vote, the individual’s  provisional ballot shall be counted as a vote in that election in accordance with State  law.”  52 U.S.C. § 21082(a)(4).    Because all of the provisional ballots described herein were cast by voters,  who should have been eligible to vote under state law, the plain language of 52 U.S.C.  § 21082(a)(4) required that those votes should have been counted.    Defendants’ violation of 52 U.S.C. § 21082(a)(4) directly and proximately  caused Plaintiff to suffer injuries and damages.   Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all prior paragraphs of this  Complaint and the paragraphs in the counts below as though fully set forth herein.    Article I, Section 2 of the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he  House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by  the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the  Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State  Legislature.”    Article I, Section 2 secures the right of qualified voters within a state to cast  their ballots and have them counted in Congressional elections.    Because all of the provisional ballots described herein were cast by  qualified voters within the State of Arizona, Article I, Section 2 required Defendants to  count their vote.    Defendants’ violation of Article I, Section 2 directly and proximately  caused Plaintiff to suffer injuries and damages.  WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays as follows:   I.  BACKGROUND  ",win,4
29108983,win," Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.  P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3).    The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of  Defendant and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have  purchased debts.    Excluded from the Plaintiff Classes are the Defendants and all officer, members,  partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate  families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate  families.     There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Classes, which common  issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue  is whether the Defendant’s written communications to consumers, in the form attached as  Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e and 1692f.    The Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same  facts and legal theories. The Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the  Plaintiff Classes defined in this complaint. The Plaintiffs have retained counsel with experience  in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiffs  nor his attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action.    Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiffs may, at  the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues  pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).   Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length  herein.    Some time prior to November 3, 2020, an obligation was allegedly incurred to  Synchrony Bank.    The Synchrony Bank obligation arose out of a transaction in which money, property,  insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for personal, family  or household purposes, specifically a Wal-Mart credit card.    The alleged Synchrony Bank obligation is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C.  §1692a(5).    Defendant PRA, a debt collector and the subsequent owner of the alleged  Synchrony Bank, is collecting the alleged debt.    On or about November 3, 2020, Defendant PRA sent the Plaintiff a notice (the  “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt owed to Synchrony Bank. See Attached hereto as Exhibit  A.     The Letter states a balance of $ 5,069.20.    The Letter offers two options regarding the balance: Pay the full amount in either  one, six or twelve payments or choose a “savings plan” that allows the consumer to pay the  balance for a discounted amount in one, twelve or eighteen consecutive months.     Defendant’s offer is illogical. Why choose to pay the full balance when there is an  offer to pay less than the full balance?    The only answer would be that paying in full would receive some form of added  benefit.     Defendant’s letter does not make any mention of any benefit or incentive to pay the  full balance rather than the discounted amount.    Therefore, the consumer is left confused and misled which option to choose; on the  one hand the discounted amount saves him money but on the other hand, the full payment option  must have some benefit or else it would not even be a consideration.     Yet Defendant’s letter mentions no benefit whatsoever of paying the full balance,  making the letter illogical and leaving the consumer wondering if there is a “catch” or if this is  a real offer.      Defendant’s letter it is open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one  of which is inaccurate    As a result of Defendant’s deceptive, misleading and unfair debt collection practices,  Plaintiff has been damaged.   Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein.    Defendants’ debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff  violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.    Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or  misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.    Defendant violated §1692e :   a. As the Letter it is open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of  which is inaccurate.  b. By making a false and misleading representation in violation of §1692e(10).    By reason thereof, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendants’  conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs  and attorneys’ fees.   Defendants’ debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards Plaintiff  violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f.    Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f, a debt collector may not use any unfair or  unconscionable means in connection with the collection of any debt.    Defendants violated this section by omitting material information that gave Plaintiff  a false understanding of the offers in the Letter.    By reason thereof, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendants’  conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs  and attorneys’ fees.  VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT  15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq.   VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e  et seq.  ",win,3
17283150,lose,"Plaintiff brings this action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of a proposed  class defined as:   Plaintiff and all persons within the United States, within  the four years immediately preceding the filing of this  Complaint, Defendant or some person acting on  Defendant’s behalf sent a text message to their cellular  telephone advertising Defendant’s political campaign,  through the use of the same or materially similar telephone  dialing equipment as that which was used to send the texts  at issue to the Plaintiff.   (the “Class”)    Excluded from this class are Defendant and any entities in which Defendant  have a controlling interest; Defendant’s agents and employees; any Judge and  Magistrate Judge to whom this action is assigned and any member of their  staffs and immediate families; and any claims for personal injury, wrongful  death, and/or emotional distress.   The Class members for whose benefit this action is brought are so numerous  that joinder of all members is impracticable.   The Class is comprised of hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals  nationwide.    As a person that received at least one unsolicited text message without  Plaintiff’s prior express written consent, Plaintiff is asserting claims that are  typical of the Class. Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect  the interests of the Class in that Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to any  member of the Class.    Plaintiff and the members of the Class have all suffered irreparable harm as a  result of the Defendant’s unlawful and wrongful conduct. Absent a class  action, the Class will continue to face the potential for irreparable harm. In  addition, these violations of law will be allowed to proceed without remedy  and Defendant will likely continue such illegal conduct. Because of the size  of the individual Class member’s claims, few, if any, Class members could  afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein.   Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to, or in conflict with, the Class.    Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and  claims involving violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.   Defendant has acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the  Class, thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate for the  Class as a whole.    The prosecution of separate actions by individual class members would create  a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications.    A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient  adjudication of the controversy since, inter alia, the damages suffered by each  class member make individual actions uneconomical.   Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs one (1) through thirty-nine (39)  of this Complaint as though fully stated herein.   Common questions will predominate, and there will be no unusual  manageability issues.  The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendant constitute numerous and  multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not  limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227  et seq.   Defendant sent text messages to Plaintiff and Class members on their cellular  telephone numbers.    Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief prohibiting  such conduct in the future.  The text messages were sent using an “automatic telephone dialing system.”    The text messages were not sent for “emergency purposes” as defined by 47  U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(i).    As a result of Defendant’s negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1),  Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory  damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B).   Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory  damages for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B).   Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such  conduct in the future.   An award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.   Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.  Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct in the future.   An award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.  Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper. KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE  TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT,   47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.   NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER  PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227(B)(1)(A)(III)   TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.   VIOLATIONS OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.  ",lose,3
17219883,win," Upon information and belief, the individual identified in the above prerecorded  messages is Armando Tello, one of the general managers of South Houston Nissan.      The prerecorded telemarketing call was transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, and  within the time frame relevant to this action.      Defendant’s prerecorded telemarketing call constitutes telemarketing because it  encouraged the future purchase, sell, or investment in property, goods, and/or services, i.e., selling  Plaintiff one of Defendant’s vehicles.      The prerecorded telemarketing call originated from telephone a telephone number  which upon information and belief is owned and/or operated by or on behalf of Defendant.      Plaintiff received the subject prerecorded telemarketing call within this District and,  therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this District.  Upon information and  belief, Defendant caused other prerecorded telemarketing calls to be sent to individuals residing within  this judicial district.      At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her express consent to be  contacted using an ATDS.      Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 9787 Number and is financially  responsible for phone service to the 9787 Number.     Defendant’s prerecorded calls caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of her  privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion. Defendant’s  prerecorded calls also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to her daily life.     Defendant’s prerecorded calls caused Plaintiff actual harm. Specifically, Plaintiff  estimates that she spent approximately fifteen minutes investigating the unwanted prerecorded calls  including how they obtained her number and who the Defendant was.    Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of  herself and all others similarly situated.    Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a Class defined as follows:  No Consent Class: All persons within the United States who, within  the four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, were sent a  prerecorded message, from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s  behalf, to said person’s cellular telephone number, without  emergency purpose and without the recipient’s prior express  written consent.     Excluded from the Class is Defendant, its officers, directors, affiliates, legal  representatives, employees, successors, subsidiaries and assigns, as well as the judge and court staff to  whom this case is assigned.  Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the right to amend the Class definition  if discovery of further investigation reveals that the Class should be modified.    There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate  over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class.  Among the questions of law and  fact common to the Class are:  (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency prerecorded telemarketing calls to  Plaintiff’s and Class members’ cellular telephones;  (2) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express  written consent to make such calls;  (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful;  (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and  (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future.    The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers.  If  Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits prerecorded telemarketing calls to telephone  numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have  identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case.   Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth  herein.     It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for  emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any  automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice … to any telephone  number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).     Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – transmitted calls using an  artificial or prerecorded voice to the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiff and members of the  putative class.      These calls were made without regard to whether Defendant had first obtained  express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior  express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class  when its calls were made.     Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an  artificial or prerecorded voice to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of  Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express consent.     As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA,  Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a  minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an  injunction against future calls. Id.    Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate paragraphs 1-45 as if fully set forth herein.    At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as  alleged herein violated the TCPA.    Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to transmit artificial or  prerecorded voice calls and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the  PROPOSED CLASS  ",win,3
14970892,win,"(Willful and Knowing Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. – Telephone Consumer  Protection Act)  (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)     In early 2018, Nelly Garcia provided her cellular telephone number to Fashion  Nova when she purchased clothing items at its website.    On or about June 20, 2018 at approximately 6:06 p.m. Central Standard Time  (CST), Ms. Garcia received the following text message from Fashion Nova at her cellular  telephone number ending in “-5462”:    None of the above-described text messages addressed her by name.     Ms. Garcia has never provided her consent, orally or in writing, to receive text  advertisements from Fashion Nova on her cellular phone.     Class members received the same or similar unsolicited text advertisements.    Defendant did not obtain prior express written consent from Plaintiff or Class  members to send the above-described text messages to their cellular telephones.     Plaintiff and Class members suffered injuries in the form of invasion of privacy,  aggravation, and nuisance.    The text messages alleged herein were exclusively made by, or on behalf of  Defendant.     Defendant was and is aware that it was making the above-described text message  calls on a widespread basis to consumers who had not provided prior express written consent to  receive them/   Numerosity: The exact number of Class members is unknown and not available to  Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information and  belief, Defendant has sent text messages to thousands of consumers who fall into the definition of  the Class. Class members can be identified through Defendant’s records.    Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of other members of the  Class in that Plaintiff and the Class members sustained damages arising out of Defendant’s  uniform wrongful conduct and unsolicited text message calls.    Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and  protect the interests of the Class, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in complex  litigation and class actions. Plaintiff’s claims are representative of the claims of the other members  of the Class. That is, Plaintiff and the Class members sustained damages as a result of Defendant’s  conduct and received substantially the same text messages. Plaintiff also has no interests  antagonistic to those of the Class, and Defendant has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. Plaintiff and  her counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the  Class, and have the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiff nor his counsel has any interest  adverse to the Class.    Plaintiff reserves the right to revise the foregoing ""Class Allegations"" and ""Class  Definition"" based on facts learned through additional investigation and in discovery.   Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.    Defendant made unwanted, unsolicited text message advertisements to Plaintiff and  the Class members’ cellular telephones without their prior express written consent.    Defendant sent these text messages to Plaintiff and the Class' cellular telephone  numbers using equipment with the ability to store or produce cellular telephone numbers to be  called using a random or sequential number generator and to dial such numbers without human  intervention.     The equipment used by Defendant to send text messages to Plaintiff and Class’  cellular telephone numbers qualifies as an ATDS as defined by 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(2) and 47  U.S.C. § 227(a)(1).     As a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the members of the  putative Class suffered actual damages and also have had their rights to privacy adversely  impacted. Plaintiff and the Class are therefore entitled to, among other things, a minimum of $500  in statutory damages for each such violation under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B).    Because Defendant’s misconduct was willful and knowing, the Court should,  pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the  Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class.     Alternatively, because Defendant’s misconduct was negligent, the Court should,  pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), award statutory damages recoverable by Plaintiff and the other  members of the putative Class.     Additionally, as a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the other  members of the Class are entitled to an injunction under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A) and §  227(c)(5)(A) to ensure that Defendant’s violations of the TCPA do not continue into the future. ",lose,3
6788590,win,"(Fair Labor Standards Act Violations)   (Violations of Ohio Revised Code 4111.03)    Defendant Larchwood Health Group LLC d/b/a Larchwood Village Retirement  Community is an assisted living facility/nursing home.     Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a State Tested Nurses Aide (“STNA”)  between August 2017 and September 2017.    Other similarly-situated employees were employed by Defendant as activity  assistants and caregivers.    Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees were classified by Defendant as  non-exempt employees.     Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees were paid by Defendant on an  hourly basis.  (Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation)    Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees worked more than 40 hours per  week, but Defendants failed to pay them overtime compensation for the hours they worked over  40 each workweek.    Rather than paying overtime compensation, Plaintiff and other similarly-situated  employees were only paid straight time for the hours they worked over 40 each workweek.  4  (Failure to Keep Accurate Records)    Defendant failed to make, keep and preserve accurate records of the unpaid work  performed by Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees.   (Defendants Willfully Violated the FLSA)    Defendant knowingly and willfully engaged in the above-mentioned violations of  the FLSA.    Plaintiff brings Count One of this action on her own behalf pursuant to 29 U.S.C.  216(b), and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated who have been, are being, or will be  adversely affected by Defendant’s unlawful conduct.    The class which Plaintiff seeks to represent and for whom Plaintiff seeks the right  to send “opt-in” notices for purposes of the collective action, and of which Plaintiff is herself a  member, is composed of and defined as follows:   All current and former non-exempt hourly employees employed by  Larchwood Health Group LLC at any time between May 18, 2015  and the present.    The amount of overtime hours Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees  worked are reflected on their time sheets and pay stubs.    Plaintiff estimates, that on average she worked between five (5) and ten (10)  overtime hours per week.    Plaintiff is unable to state at this time the exact size of the potential class, by upon  information and belief, avers that is consists of at least 50 persons.    This action is maintainable as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C.   216(b) as to claims for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and  5  costs under the FLSA.  In addition to Plaintiff, numerous current and former employees are  similarly situated with regard to their wages and claims for unpaid wages and damages.  Plaintiff  is representative of those other employees and is acting on behalf of their interests as well as her  own in bringing this action.      These similarly-situated employees are known to Defendant and are readily  identifiable through Defendant’s payroll records.  These individuals may readily be notified of  this action, and allowed to opt in pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 216(b), for the purpose of collectively  adjudicating their claims for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees  and costs under the FLSA.   Plaintiff brings Count Two of this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and  (b)(3) on behalf of herself and all other members of the class (“the Ohio Class”) defined as:  All current and former non-exempt hourly employees employed by  Larchwood Health Group LLC at any time between May 18, 2015 and the  present.    The Ohio Class is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable.   Plaintiff is unable to state at this time the exact size of the potential Ohio Class, but upon  information and belief, avers that it consists of at least 50 persons.     There are questions of law or fact common to the Ohio Class, including but not  limited to the following:  (a)  whether Defendant failed to pay overtime compensation to  their non-exempt employees for hours worked in excess of 40 each  workweek; and  (b)  what amount of monetary relief will compensate Plaintiff  Tanisha Jackson and other members of the class for Defendant’s  violation of R.C. 4111.03 and 4111.10.  6    The claims of the named Plaintiff Tanisha Jackson are typical of the claims of  other members of the Ohio Class.  Named Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the same uniform course  of conduct by Defendant, and are based on the same legal theories, as the claims of the other  Ohio Class members.    Named Plaintiff Tanisha Jackson will fairly and adequately protect the interests of  the Ohio Class.  Her interests are not antagonistic to, but rather are in unison with, the interests  of the other Ohio Class members.  The named Plaintiff’s counsel has broad experience in  handling class action wage-and-hour litigation, and is fully qualified to prosecute the claims of  the Ohio Class in this case.    The questions of law or fact that are common to the Ohio Class predominate over  any questions affecting only individual members.  The primary questions that will determine  Defendant’s liability to the Ohio Class, listed above, are common to the class as a whole, and  predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members.    A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient  adjudication of this controversy.  Requiring Ohio Class members to pursue their claims  individually would entail a host of separate suits, with concomitant duplication of costs,  attorneys’ fees, and demands on court resources.  Many Ohio Class members’ claims are  sufficiently small that they would be reluctant to incur the substantial cost, expense, and risk of  pursuing their claims individually.  Certification of this case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 will  enable the issues to be adjudicated for all class members with the efficiencies of class litigation.      Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten  herein.   7    Defendant’s practice and policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly- situated home health aides overtime compensation at the rate of one and one-half times their  regular rate of pay for the hours they worked over 40 each workweek violated the FLSA, 29   Plaintiff in corporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten  herein.    Defendant’s practice and policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly- situated home health aides overtime compensation at the rate of one and one-half times their  regular rate of pay for the hours they worked over 40 each workweek violated the OMFWSA, ",lose,3
4248727,lose,"(INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAIMS)   (INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CLAIMS)   (INDIVIDUAL AND CLASS CLAIMS)  (DISPARATE TREATMENT AND DISPARATE IMPACT DISCRIMINATION)    Dr. Ahad is female and a citizen of Pakistan. She is a member of protected  classes, as recognized by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended (42 U.S.C. §  2000e et seq.).    Dr. Ahad was well-qualified for her work duties described herein.    Based on her accomplishments, in June 2008, Dr. Ahad started work as an  Assistant Professor for Surgery/Bariatric Surgeon for Defendants via an O-1 visa, which is  approved only for individuals with extraordinary ability or achievement. She executed  employment contracts (Exhibit A) in 2008 and 2011 that referenced obligations of SIU  Physicians & Surgeons, Inc. and SIU School of Medicine, which are both affiliated entities of   Dr. Ahad incorporates all prior paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth  herein.    Defendants have discriminated against Dr. Ahad and similarly-situated female  workers in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), as amended by  the Equal Pay Act of 1963, by subjecting them to unequal pay on the basis of sex.    Defendants have discriminated against Dr. Ahad and similarly-situated female  workers by treating them differently from and less preferably than similarly-situated male  employees who performed jobs which required equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which  were performed under similar working conditions. Defendants so discriminated by subjecting  them to lesser (discriminatory) pay and benefits in violation of the Equal Pay Act.    Defendants caused, attempted to cause, contributed to, or caused the continuation  of, the wage rate discrimination based on sex in violation of the Equal Pay Act. Further,  Defendants knew of or showed reckless disregard for the fact their conduct was in violation of  the Equal Pay Act.    Dr. Ahad and similarly-situated female workers should be awarded all legal and  equitable remedies, including underpaid wages, doubled compensatory awards for all willful  violations and reasonable attorneys’ fees under 29 U.S.C. §§ 216, et seq.   Dr. Ahad incorporates all prior paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth  herein.    This Count is brought on behalf of Dr. Ahad and all members of the class.    Defendants’ conduct above has discriminated between employees on the basis of  sex by paying wages to female employees, including Dr. Ahad and similarly-situated female  workers, at rates less than the rates at which Defendants paid wages to male employees for the  same or substantially similar work on jobs the performance of which required equal skill, effort,  and responsibility, and which were performed under similar working conditions. Defendants  thereby violated the IL Equal Pay Act at 820 ILCS 112/ et seq.      Dr. Ahad and similarly-situated female workers should be awarded the entire  amount of underpayment, interest, costs, reasonable attorneys’ fees and other statutory penalties  or relief as may be allowed by the court.   Dr. Ahad incorporates all prior paragraphs of this Complaint as if fully set forth  herein.    This Count is brought on behalf of Dr. Ahad and all members of the class.    Defendants have discriminated against Dr. Ahad and similarly-situated female  workers by treating them differently from and less preferably than similarly-situated male  employees and by subjecting them to discriminatory (lesser) pay and benefits, discriminatory  terms and conditions of employment, and other forms of discrimination, in violation of Title VII.    Defendants’ conduct has been intentional, deliberate, willful, malicious, reckless  and conducted in callous disregard of the rights of Dr. Ahad and similarly-situated female  workers, entitling them to punitive damages.    By reason of the continuous nature of Defendants’ discriminatory conduct, which  persisted throughout the employment of Dr. Ahad and similarly-situated female workers, they  are entitled to application of the continuing violations doctrine to all violations alleged herein.  Additionally, Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, specifically invokes  the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act provisions of Title VII.    As a result of Defendants’ conduct alleged in this complaint, Dr. Ahad and  similarly-situated female workers have suffered and continue to suffer harm, including but not  limited to lost wages and benefits, diminished employment opportunities, and humiliation,  embarrassment, emotional and physical distress, and mental anguish.    By reason of Defendants’ discrimination, Dr. Ahad and similarly-situated female  workers are entitled to all remedies available for violations of Title VII, including an award of  punitive damages. Reasonable attorneys’ fees should be awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).  Dr. Ahad’s Employment Background  ",win,2
4391085,lose," 24 Hour Fitness operates a chain of more than 400 fitness clubs in 18 states,  including Texas.      24 Hour Fitness has 89 locations within the State of Texas currently registered  with the Texas Secretary of State.    24 Hour Fitness has purported written contracts with its members for access to its  health/fitness clubs and for its provision of fitness and other services.     On or about October 17, 2010, Plaintiff Wendt entered into a Club Membership  Agreement with 24 Hour Fitness (the “Wendt Contract”).   A true and correct copy of the Wendt  Contract is attached hereto as Exhibit 1 and incorporated herein by reference.    Under the Wendt Contract, Plaintiff Wendt’s club of enrollment was 24 Hour  Fitness’ club number 00307, located at 7622 Campbell Road, Dallas, Texas 75248.      The Wendt Contract is 24 Hour Fitness version 24HR-V.07.10-TEX.      Pursuant to the terms of the Wendt Contract, Plaintiff Wendt paid a total amount  of $72.62 upfront for (1) $3.10 in dues for prorated days, (2) first month’s dues in the amount of  $31.99, (3) last month’s dues in the amount of $31.99 and (4) taxes in the amount of $5.54.      Plaintiff Wendt’s monthly dues under the Wendt Contract are $31.99, which he  has paid on a regular basis since the Wendt Contract was entered into.    Under the Jasso Contract, Plaintiff Jasso’s club of enrollment was 24 Hour  Fitness’ club number 00344, located at 2407 West Airport Freeway, Irving, Texas 75062.      The Jasso Contract is 24 Hour Fitness version 24HR-V.07.11-TX.    Pursuant to the terms of the Jasso Contract, Plaintiff Jasso paid a total amount of  $154.29 upfront for (1) an initiation fee in the amount $99.98, (2) first month’s dues in the  amount of $20.57, (3) last month’s dues in the amount of $21.99 and (4) taxes in the amount of  $11.75.     Plaintiff Jasso’s monthly dues under the Jasso Contract are $21.99, which he has  paid on a regular basis since the Jasso Contract was entered into.   B.   Mandatory Requirements for Health Spa Act Contracts.    Subchapter G of the Health Spa Act, entitled “CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS,”  sets forth specific language that must be included verbatim in a contract for membership in a  health club or spa.      Health Spa Act § 702.304 provides as follows:  Sec. 702.304.  CANCELLATION AND REFUND NOTICE.    (a)  Except as provided by Subsection (b), a contract must state in at  least 10-point type that is boldfaced, capitalized, underlined, or otherwise  conspicuously distinguished from surrounding written material:   This class action is filed on behalf of all persons who, within two years prior to  the filing of this action, paid dues and/or fees for services to 24 Hour Fitness (“dues and services  fees”) pursuant to contracts with 24 Hour Fitness for membership in or access to any 24 Hour  Fitness location in Texas or for the provision of services at any 24 Hour Fitness location in Texas  (the “Class”).      Pursuant to § 702.003(14) of the Health Spa Act and for purposes of this action,  “services” means the “programs, plans, guidance, or instruction” that 24 Hour Fitness provides  for its members, including “diet planning, exercise instruction and programs, and instructional  classes.”    The Class Period runs from two years before the date this action was filed until  the date of class certification.    Plaintiffs reserve the right to modify or amend the definition of the proposed  Class before the Court determines whether certification is appropriate.    The Class as defined is identifiable and unambiguous based on objective  information and criteria, including the computer and paper records regularly maintained by 24  Hour Fitness in its regular course of business.    Upon information and belief, 24 Hour Fitness has collected dues and services fees  pursuant to purported written contracts with hundreds of thousands of Texas residents during the  Class Period within the last two years.  The Class is thus so numerous as to make it impracticable  to bring all members of the Class individually before the Court.     Plaintiffs are members of the Class.  Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of, if not  identical to, the claims of the rest of the Class.  Plaintiffs entered into the Contracts with 24 Hour  Fitness which violated the Health Spa Act and are therefore void.  The other members of the  Class also entered into contracts with 24 Hour Fitness that violated the Health Spa Act in the  exact same manner and which, therefore, are also void.  Plaintiffs’ claims thus arise from the  same factual pattern and under the same legal theories as all of the other members of the Class.    A class action provides a fair and efficient method for adjudicating this  controversy.  The substantive claims of Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class are  identical and will require evidentiary proof of the same kind and application of the same law to  those facts.    A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient  adjudication of this controversy because the Class members number in the hundreds of thousands  and individual damages are relatively low compared to the cost of suit.  The expense and burden  of individual litigation would make it impracticable or impossible for Class members to  prosecute their claims individually.      Trial of Plaintiffs’ and the Class’ claims is manageable.  Damages can be  precisely calculated based upon objective data and criteria.  Absent certification of a class, the  Class members will be effectively precluded from protecting and enforcing their legal rights, and  24 Hour Fitness would be permitted to retain the illegal charges it collected from Plaintiffs and  the other Class members.   A.   Contracts Between 24 Hour Fitness and Plaintiffs    THE SECRETARY OF STATE'S INTERNET WEBSITE.""  (4)  ""IF YOU DIE OR BECOME TOTALLY AND  PERMANENTLY DISABLED AFTER THE DATE THIS CONTRACT ",win,2
59942126,win," Plaintiff received the subject text messages within this judicial district and,  therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district.    The purpose of Defendant’s text message was to promote and advertise its  restaurant.  12 .  Upon information and belief, Defendant caused similar text messages to be sent to  individuals residing within this judicial district.     Plaintiff never voluntarily disclosed his telephone number to Defendant.     Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number has consistently been registered on the  National Do Not Call Registry since 2 007.    Plaintiff solely uses his cellular telephone for personal purposes.     To send the text messages, Defendant used a text messaging platform (the  “Platform”) that permitted Defendant to transmit bulk SMS text messages.  Systems like the  Platform utilized by Defendant have the capacity to transmit thousands of messages per second  and are technologically more sophisticated in their availability to transmit messages than a  traditional smartphone.  Moreover, Defendant utilized a “short-code” to transmit the messages,  which cannot be done using a regular smartphone.      There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which  predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the  questions of law and fact common to the Class are: [1] Whether Defendant initiated telemarketing  calls to telephone numbers; [2 ] Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it had  express consent to make such calls; [3] Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful;  [4 ] Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and [5] Whether  Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future.  32 .  The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers.  If  Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned  to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical  claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case.   Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth  herein.    Defendant violated 4 7 U.S.C. § 2 2 7(c)(5) because Plaintiff and the Do Not Call  Registry Class received more than one telephone call in a 12 -month period made by or on behalf  of Defendant in violation of 4 7 C.F.R. § 64 .12 00, as described above. As a result of Defendant’s  conduct as alleged herein, Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class suffered actual damages  and, under section 4 7 U.S.C. § 2 2 7(c), are entitled, inter alia, to receive up to $500 in damages for  such violations of 4 7 C.F.R. § 64 .12 00.  52 .  To the extent Defendant’s misconduct is determined to be willful and knowing, the  Court should, pursuant to 4 7 U.S.C. § 2 2 7(c)(5), treble the amount of statutory damages  recoverable by the members of the Do Not Call Registry Class.   On or about March 2 7, 2 02 1 and April 2 , 2 02 1, Defendant sent the following text  messages to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone:   CASE NO.   WILLIAM WARNER,   individually and on behalf of all others  similarly situated,  PROPOSED CLASS  2 7.  Plaintiff brings this lawsuit as a class action on behalf of himself individually and  on behalf of all other similarly situated persons as a class action pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil  Procedure 1.2 2 0(b)(2 ) and (b)(3).  The “Class” that Plaintiff seeks to represent is comprised of  class two classes and defined as:  NO CONSENT CLASS: All persons in the United States who,  within four years prior to the filing of this action, (1) were sent  a text message by or on behalf of Defendant, (2) using the same  equipment or type of equipment utilized to text message  Plaintiff, (3) regarding Defendant’s property, goods, and/or  services.  DO NOT CALL REGISTRY CLASS: All persons in the United  States who from four years prior to the filing of this action: (1)  were sent a text message, prerecorded message or phone call by  or on behalf of Defendant; (2) more than one time within any  12-month period; (3) where the person’s telephone number had  been listed on the National Do Not Call Registry for at least  thirty days; (4) for the purpose of advertising and/or promoting  Defendant’s products and services.  2 8.  Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does  not know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class members number in the  several thousands, if not more.  VIOLATION OF 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) and 47 C.F.R. § 64.120 0   (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the No Consent Class)   Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)  (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class)  4 5.  Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the allegations of paragraphs 1-36 as if fully  set forth herein.  4 6.  The TCPA’s implementing regulation, 4 7 C.F.R. § 64 .12 00(c), provides that “[n]o  person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber  who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons who  do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.”  4 7.  4 7 C.F.R. § 64 .12 00(e), provides that § 64 .12 00(c) and (d) “are applicable to any  person or entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone  numbers.”  4 8.  4 7 C.F.R. § 64 .12 00(d) further provides that “[n]o person or entity shall initiate any  call for telemarketing purposes to a residential telephone subscriber unless such person or entity  has instituted procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not to receive telemarketing  calls made by or on behalf of that person or entity.”   4 9.  Any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12 - month  period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this  subsection may” may bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were  promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone  solicitations to which they object. 4 7 U.S.C. § 2 2 7(c).  ",lose,1
59875491,win,"The amount of the debt;    Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.  23(a) and 23(b)(3).    The Class consists of:   a.  all individuals with addresses in the State of New Jersey;  b.  to whom Defendant sent an initial collection letter;  c.  attempting to collect a consumer debt;  d.  providing multiple addresses;  e.  without identifying the correct address to which to send a dispute; and  f.  which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this action  and on or before a date twenty-one (21) days after the filing of this action.    The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of  Defendant and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or have  purchased debts.    Excluded from the Plaintiff Class is the Defendant and all officers, members, partners,  managers, directors and employees of the Defendant and its respective immediate families, and legal  counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate families.     The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same  facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff  Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling  consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor his attorneys  have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action.    Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure  is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff Class  predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to  other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.    Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at  the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues pursuant  to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).   Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth herein.   The name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;    The obligation arose out of a transaction involving a consumer debt to BMW  Financial Services in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the  transaction, were incurred solely for personal purposes, specifically a personal automobile.    The alleged BMW Financial Services obligation is a ""debt"" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§  1692a (5).    BMW Financial Services is a ""creditor"" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a (4).    Upon information and belief, BMW Financial Services contracted with the  Defendant to collect the alleged debt. Therefore, Defendant is a “debt collector” as defined by 15  U.S.C. § 1692a (6).    Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been  incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States  Postal Services, telephone and internet.  Violation – October 12, 2020 Collection Letter    On or about October 12, 2020, Defendant sent the Plaintiff an initial collection letter  regarding the alleged debt owed to BMW Financial Services.  (See “Letter” attached as Exhibit A).    The letter ostensibly provides the notices as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g regarding  disputing the debt.    However, there are three addresses listed for Defendant in two different states:   a. 9 Wills Way, Piscataway, NJ 08854  b. PO Box 1121, Charlotte, NC 28201  c. PO Box 55, 3 Skiles Ave, Piscataway, NJ 08855   A statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after  receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any  portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt- collector;    Plaintiff was therefore confused as to how to properly dispute the debt and exercise  his rights under § 1692g.    Upon information and belief, disputes sent to one or more of these addresses will not  be honored by Defendant.    Listing these incorrect addresses(es) misled Plaintiff into believing a proper dispute  cannot be sent there.    Plaintiff was therefore unable to straightforwardly dispute the debt resulting in  wasted time.    Plaintiff was therefore unable to evaluate his options of how to handle this debt.    Because of this, Plaintiff expended time, money, and effort in determining the proper  course of action.    As Plaintiff did not understand how to dispute the debt, Plaintiff paid off the balance  of the debt out of fear of further accrual of interest and fees and damage to his credit score. However,  Plaintiff wanted to dispute the debt and would have done so if the dispute process was  comprehendible.      These violations by Defendant were knowing, willful, negligent and/or intentional,  and Defendant did not maintain procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such violations.    Defendant’s collection efforts with respect to this alleged debt from Plaintiff caused  Plaintiff to suffer concrete and particularized harm, inter alia, because the FDCPA provides Plaintiff  with the legally protected right not to be misled or treated unfairly with respect to any action  regarding the collection of any consumer debt.   A statement that the consumer notifies the debt collector in  writing within thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion  thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of  the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy  of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer  by the debt collector; and    Defendant’s actions created an appreciable risk to Plaintiff of being unable to  properly respond or handle Defendant’s debt collection.    Plaintiff was confused and misled to his detriment by the statements in the dunning  letter, and relied on the contents of the letter to his detriment.    Plaintiff would have pursued a different course of action were it not for Defendant’s  statutory violations.    As a result of Defendant’s deceptive, misleading and false debt collection practices,  Plaintiff has been damaged.   Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth herein.    Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff  violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.    Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or  misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.    Defendant violated said section by deceptively and/or misleadingly providing  multiple addresses and not identifying which one should be used to dispute the debt, in violation  of § 1692e (10).    Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth herein.   A statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the  thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer  with the name and address of the original creditor, if different  from the current creditor.    In the alternative, Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed  towards the Plaintiff violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15  U.S.C. § 1692f.    Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f, a debt collector may not use any unfair or  unconscionable means in connection with the collection of any debt.    Defendant violated this section by unfairly providing multiple addresses and not  identifying which one to use for disputing a debt.    By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment in that Defendant's  conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs  and attorneys’ fees.   Plaintiff repeats the above allegations as if set forth herein.    Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff  violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g.    By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment in that Defendant's  conduct violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs  and attorneys’ fees.  VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT   15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq.   VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT   15 U.S.C. §1692g et seq.   VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT   15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.  ",win,3
4150319,lose,"(BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS   FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE)   (BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY)   (BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY)   (VIOLATION OF MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT)    Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of itself and as a class action,  pursuant to the provisions of Rules 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of  Civil Procedure on behalf of the following classes:  All persons or entities in the United States who are current or former  owners and/or lessees of a Class Vehicle (the “Nationwide Class”).  All persons or entities who purchased or leased a Class Vehicle in the  State of California (the “California Class”).  (collectively, the “Class,” unless otherwise noted).      Excluded from the Class are individuals who have personal injury  claims resulting from the defect in the MyFord Touch system.  Also excluded from  the Class are Ford and its subsidiaries and affiliates; all persons who make a timely  election to be excluded from the Class; governmental entities; and the judge to whom  this case is assigned and his/her immediate family.  Plaintiff reserves the right to  revise the Class definition based upon information learned through discovery.    Certification of Plaintiff’s claims for class-wide treatment is appropriate  because Plaintiff can prove the elements of his claims on a class-wide basis using the  same evidence as would be used to prove those elements in individual actions  alleging the same claim.    This action has been brought and may be properly maintained on behalf  of each of the Classes proposed herein under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.    Plaintiff incorporates by reference all allegations of Paragraphs 1-71 as  though fully set forth herein.    Plaintiff brings this Count on behalf of the Nationwide Class.    Plaintiff is a “consumer” within the meaning of the Magnuson-Moss  Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3).    Ford is a “supplier” and “warrantor” within the meaning of the  Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(4)-(5).    Plaintiff incorporates by reference all allegations of Paragraphs 1-71 as  though fully set forth herein.    Plaintiff brings this Count on behalf of the Nationwide Class.    Plaintiff incorporates by reference all allegations of Paragraphs 1-71 as  though fully set forth herein.    Plaintiff brings this Count on behalf of the Nationwide Class.    Plaintiff incorporates by reference all allegations of Paragraphs 1-71 as  though fully set forth herein.    Plaintiff brings this Count on behalf of the Nationwide Class.    Ford is and was at all relevant times a merchant with respect to MyFord  Touch-equipped motor vehicles.   A.  Introduction of MyFord Touch   A.  Introduction of MyFord Touch ................................................................ 5  B.  Description of MyFord Touch ................................................................. 7  C.  MyFord Touch Has Been Plagued with Serious Defects ...................... 11  D.  The TSBs and Warranty Extension ........................................................ 12  E.  Similar Experiences and Complaints by Consumers ............................. 16  F.  Fallout From the MyFord Touch Problems ........................................... 22  VI.  ACT) ................................................................................................................. 27  COUNT II:  (BREACH OF EXPRESS WARRANTY) .................................. 29  COUNT III:  (BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS    MERCHANTABILITY) .................................................................................. 31  B.  Claims Brought on Behalf of the California Class ................................ 32  NOW THEY FINALLY DO BUT DO NOT SAY WHEN A FIX WILL BE  AVAILABLE. I SHOULD HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT OPTION WAS NOT  WORKING BEFORE THEY HAD ME SIGN A LEASE FOR THE CAR. ALOT  THE MEMORY. IT HELPED, BUT IT STILL FAILED, AT TIMES. THE  SECOND TIME, HE RETURNED TO THE DEALER, THEY INSTALLED AN  UPDATED PROGRAM FROM FORD THAT WAS SUPPOSED TO CORRECT  THE MALFUNCTIONING SYSTEM. A TYPICAL PROBLEM WAS THE  SYSTEM LOCKING UP, THE SCREEN WOULD FREEZE AND THERE WAS  NO CONTROL OVER THE HEATER/AIR CONDITIONER OR RADIO  VII.  CLAIMS FOR RELIEF .................................................................................... 27  A.  Claims Brought on Behalf of the Nationwide Class .............................. 27 ",lose,3
6303460,lose,"13   20   24  PROPOSED CLASS  25  26    On January 5, 2018, Defendant transmitted a call to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone  14  number ending in 3092 (the “3092 Number”) and left the following prerecorded message on  15  Plaintiff’s phone:   16  ….your energy supply charges on your electric account.  Please call  17  me back at 609-201-1785 and have a copy of your electric statement  18  handy to review.  Your reference number is NJ7741002.     19  20    The above referenced call originated from telephone number 609-201-1785,  21  which is owned and/or operated by Defendant, and answered by a representative who announces  22  Defendant’s name upon answering.   23    The above call was transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, and within the  24  time frame relevant to this action.    25    Upon information and belief, Defendant caused other prerecorded calls to be  2  made to individuals residing within this judicial district.    3    Upon information and belief, Defendant has received one or more complaints  4  from recipients of its prerecorded calls who do not reside within Defendant’s service area, placing  5  Defendant on notice that its telemarketing activities are impacting residents of states outside of  6  Defendant’s service area.    7    At the time Defendant caused the subject prerecorded call to be made to  8  Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, Defendant knew or should have known, or was willfully ignorant, that  9  Plaintiff was a resident of Nevada.    10    At the time Defendant caused prerecorded calls to be made to the cellular  11  telephones of other individuals residing in Nevada, Defendant knew or should have known, or was  12  willfully ignorant, that these individuals were residents of Nevada.   13    Plaintiff has never had any type of relationship with Defendant.    14    Plaintiff never provided his telephone number to Defendant.  15    At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with his express written  16  consent or express consent to be contacted using a prerecorded message.    17    Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 3092 Number, and is financially  18  responsible for phone service to the 3092 Number.   19    The fact that other individuals have received the same message as Plaintiff  11  demonstrates that Defendant used prerecorded messages to harass thousands of individuals.      12    Through its telemarketing calls, Defendant violated Plaintiff’s substantive rights  13  under the TCPA.   14    Defendant’s TCPA violation caused Plaintiff a particularized and concrete injury,  15  including:   16  a. Invasion of privacy;  17  b. Inconvenience;   18  c. Unwanted occupation of his time and mental energy;   19  d. Unwanted occupation of his cellular telephone;  20  e. Nuisance;   21  f. Trespass; and  22  g.  Aggravation and annoyance.   23  6  Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)  7  (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)  8  9    Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a Class defined as follows:  1  All persons within the United States who, within the four  2  years prior to the filing of this Complaint, received a  3  telephone call through the use of an artificial or  4  prerecorded voice, from Defendant or anyone on  5  Defendant’s behalf, promoting Defendant’s services, to  6  said person’s cellular telephone number, who had not  7  expressly consented in writing to receiving such calls.   8    Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does  9  not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several  10  thousands, if not more.  11   The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If  5  Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely violates the TCPA, Plaintiff and the Class members will  6  have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case.  7  8   Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth  10  herein.   11    It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for  12  emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any automatic  13  telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice…to any telephone number assigned to  14  a…cellular telephone service….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).   15    Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – made prerecorded or  16  artificial voice calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and Class Members.  17    These calls were made without regard to whether Defendant had first obtained  18  express written consent to make such calls. In fact, Defendants did not have prior express written  19  consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and Class Members when the subject calls were made.   20    Defendant violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an artificial or  21  prerecorded voice to make marketing telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and Class  22  Members without their prior express written consent.   23  ",lose,3
7045177,win,"(VIOLATION OF THE FAIR STANDARDS ACT, FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME)  (On behalf of the Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective)   The named Plaintiffs and members of the proposed FLSA Collective and Rule 23 Class  are individuals, who were, or are employed by the Defendant, as School Bus Drivers  (""Employees""); and their job duties, as drivers, are non-exempt; and in fact, the Defendant  has paid time and one half of the Employees' regular hourly rate, for a portion of their  hours worked on a weekly basis.   The named Plaintiffs and members of the proposed FLSA Collective and Rule 23 Class  are, and were, paid at the normal rate of $14.00, per hour for their work as School Bus  Drivers; and for a portion of their hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in any work  week, they were paid in accordance with the FLSA premium rate, time and one half of their  regular hourly rate, for all hours worked in excess of the regular rate, in any particular work  week.   The named Plaintiffs and members of the proposed FLSA Collective and Rule 23 Class  worked, on average, fifty (50) hours per week; however, for each additional ten (10) hour  overtime period per week, they would only be paid three (3) hours of overtime  compensation; and for the remaining seven (7) hours of overtime worked per week, they  would be paid straight time.   Although the SCHOOL BOARD classified the Employees as non-exempt workers, the  named Plaintiffs and members of the proposed FLSA Collective and Rule 23 Class are,  and were, permitted and authorized, to work on average, fourteen (14) overtime hours,  during any two (2) week pay period; without overtime pay.   Defendant was aware, or should have been aware, that the named Plaintiffs and members  of the proposed FLSA Collective and Rule 23 Class, performed non-exempt work, during  these additional fourteen (14) overtime times hours, which were performed by the  Employees, during any two (2) week pay period.   The named Plaintiffs bring this Complaint on behalf of themselves and all similarly  situated individuals. The Proposed FLSA Collective Class is defined as follows:  All persons who worked in the position of School Bus Driver for the School Board of Palm  Beach County, Florida, at any time in the two years prior to the filing of this Complaint.   The named Plaintiffs have consented in writing, to be part of this action, pursuant to 29  U.S.C. Section 216(b); and Plaintiffs' signed consent forms are attached hereto, as  The named Plaintiffs bring this Complaint, on behalf of themselves, and all similarly  situated individuals. The proposed Rule 23 Class is defined as follows:  All persons who worked in the position of School Bus Driver for the School Board of Palm  Beach County, Florida, at any time in the two years prior to the filing of this Complaint.   The persons in the proposed Rule 23 Class are so numerous that joinder of all of the  proposed Rule 23 Class members is impracticable.   There are questions of law and fact common to the proposed Rule 23 Class that  predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the proposed Class,  including, but not limited to:  a. Whether Defendant violated the FLSA, by failing to pay the Employees  overtime compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty hours in any  individual work week;  b.  Whether the Defendant knew that the Employees were not being paid overtime  pay, for all hours worked in excess of forty hours per week, in any work week;  c.  The proper measure of damages for the representative Plaintiffs are typical of  the claims of the class;  d.  Whether the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the  interests of the class; and  e.  Whether the Defendant should be enjoined from such violations in the future.   The named Plaintiffs' claims are typical of those of the proposed Rule 23 Class; Plaintiffs,  like other members of the Rule 23 Class, worked as School Bus Drivers for the Defendant;  and furthermore, Plaintiffs, like other members of the Rule 23 Class, were not paid  overtime compensation for approximately fourteen (14) hours of overtime work, during  any applicable pay period, or for approximately seven (7) hours of overtime work in any  work week.   This action is properly maintainable as a class action under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23 (b)(l')(A)  because prosecuting separate actions by individual class members would create a risk of  inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members that would  establish incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendant.   This action is properly maintainable as a class action under Fed.R. Civ.P. 23 (b)(2) because  the Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class,  thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief, or corresponding declaratory relief with  respect to the class as a whole.   This action is properly maintainable as a class action under Fed.R. Civ.P. 23 (b)(3) because  questions of law or fact predominate over any questions affecting individual class  members, and a class action is superior to other methods in order to ensure a fair and  efficient adjudication of this controversy because, in the context of wage and hour  litigation, individual plaintiffs lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute separate  lawsuits against large employers.   Class action litigation is also superior because it will preclude the need for unduly  disruptive litigation resulting in inconsistent judgments pertaining to Defendant's policies  and practices.   The named Plaintiffs restate and re-aver the allegations of Paragraphs 1-46 of the  Complaint, as if fully set forth herein.   The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Section 207, requires employers to pay non-exempt employees one  and one-half times the regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) hours per  work week.    As described in the preceding paragraphs, Defendant permitted the named Plaintiffs and  the FLSA Collective to work more than forty hours per week; and Plaintiffs and the FLSA  Collective were not fully compensated for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours  per week, in any particular work week.   The named Plaintiffs and the FLSA Collective are not exempt from the overtime  requirements of the FLSA, see, 29 U.S.C. Section 213.   Defendant's actions, policies and practices as described herein, violate the FLSA's  overtime requirement by regularly and repeatedly failing to compensate Plaintiffs and the  FLSA Collective at the required overtime rate.    As a direct and proximate cause of the Defendant's unlawful conduct, the named Plaintiffs  and the FLSA Collective have suffered and will continue to suffer a loss of income and  other damages.   The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA within the  meaning of 29 U.S.C. Section 255 (a); Defendant knew or showed reckless disregard for  the fact that its compensation policies and practices were in violation of the FLSA.  FLORIDA,  CASE NO.  COLLECTIVE AND CLASS ",lose,3
6132898,win,"At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of California.  Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, “persons” as defined by  Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others  similarly situated (“the Class”).   Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Class, consisting of:   a. All persons within the United States who had or have a number assigned  to a cellular telephone service, who received at least one call using an  ATDS and/or an artificial prerecorded voice from CapitoHomes, LLC,  or Jipal Bhalodwala, or their agents, calling on behalf of CapitoHomes,  LLC, or Jipal Bhalodwala, between the date of filing this action and the  four years preceding, where such calls were placed for marketing  purposes, to non-customers of CapitoHomes, LLC, or Jipal Bhalodwala,  at the time of the calls.   Jipal Bhalodwala and CapitoHomes, LLC and their employees or agents are  excluded from the Class.  Plaintiff does not know the number of members in  the Class, but believes the Class members number in the thousands, if not  more.  Thus, this matter should be certified as a Class action to assist in the  expeditious litigation of this matter.   Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendants in  at least the following ways: Defendants illegally contacted Plaintiff and the  Class members via their cellular telephones thereby causing Plaintiff and the  Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular  telephone time for which Plaintiff and the Class members previously paid,  by having to retrieve or administer messages left by Defendants or their  agents, during those illegal calls, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff  and the Class members.  Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged  thereby.   The joinder of the Class members is impractical and the disposition of their  claims in the Class action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties  and to the Court.  The Class can be identified through Defendants’s records  and/or Defendants’ agent’s records.   There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and  fact involved affecting the parties to be represented.  The questions of law  and fact to the Class predominate over questions which may affect  individual Class members, including the following:  i. Whether, within the four years prior to the filing of the  Complaint, Defendants made any call(s) (other than a call made  for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent  of the called party) to the Class members using any ATDS or an  artificial or prerecorded voice to any telephone   number  assigned to a cellular telephone service;  ii. Whether Defendants called non-customers of Defendants for  marketing purposes;  iii.Whether Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged  thereby, and the extent of damages for such violation(s); and  iv.Whether Defendants should be enjoined from engaging in such  conduct in the future.   Plaintiff and the members of the Class have all suffered irreparable harm as  a result of the Defendants’s unlawful and wrongful conduct.  Absent a class  action, the Class will continue to face the potential for irreparable harm.  In  addition, these violations of law will be allowed to proceed without remedy  and Defendants will likely continue such illegal conduct.  The size of Class  member’s individual claims causes, few, if any, Class members to be able to  afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein.   Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims  and claims involving violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.   A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of  this controversy.  Class-wide damages are essential to induce Defendants to  comply with federal and California law.  The interest of Class members in  individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against  Defendants is small because the maximum statutory damages in an  individual action for violation of privacy are minimal.  Management of these  claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than those that  would be presented in numerous individual claims.   Defendants has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby  making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory  relief with respect to the Class as a whole.  The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitute numerous and  multiple negligent violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each  and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq.   As a result of Defendants's negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq.,  Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory  damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this  Complaint as though fully stated herein.   The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitute numerous and  multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not  limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. §  227 et seq.   As a result of Defendants's knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. §  227 et seq., Plaintiff and each of the Class are entitled to treble damages, as  provided by statute, up to $1,500.00, for each and every violation, pursuant  to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C).   Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief  prohibiting such conduct in the future.  As a result of Defendants' negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1),  Plaintiff  seeks  for  himself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory  damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) As a result of Defendants' willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §  227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member treble  damages, as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00 for each and every  violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE  CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.   NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER  PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.   THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.   VIOLATION  OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.  ",lose,3
6827603,lose,"(Against the Individual Defendants for Violations of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act)   (Against All Defendants for Violations of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9  Promulgated Thereunder)    Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of herself  and the other public shareholders of Orbital ATK (the “Class”).  Excluded from the Class are  Defendants herein and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated  with any Defendant.    Orbital ATK, is an aerospace and defense systems company and supplier of related  products to the United States Government, allied nations, prime contractors and other customers.  The Company's segments include Flight Systems Group, Defense Systems Group, Space Systems  Group, and Corporate. Its products include launch vehicles and related propulsion systems;  satellites and associated components and services; tactical missiles, subsystems and defense  electronics, precision weapons, armament systems, and ammunition. The Flight Systems Group  segment consists of Launch Vehicles Division, Propulsion Systems Division, and Aerospace  Structures Division. The Defense Systems Group segment consists of Armament Systems  Division, Defense Electronic Division, Missile Products Division, and Small Caliber Systems  Division. The Space Systems Group consists of Commercial Satellites Division, Government  Satellites Division, Space Components Division, and Technical Services Division.    The Merger Consideration is inadequate given Orbital ATK’s recent financial  performance and strong growth prospects.     In the year leading up to the announcement of the Proposed Merger, Orbital ATK’s  stock price increased over 50%, going from $72.48 on September 16, 2016 to $110.04 on  September 15, 2017, illustrated by the chart below:    Orbital ATK’s good news has continued since announcing the deal. On September  19, 2017, the Company announced that the U.S. Army placed an additional $123 million in orders  under production contract Option 2 for the Precision Guidance Kit (PGK) that will continue to  deliver PGK’s to the warfighter. Orbital ATK had previously signed a $69 million production  option in July 2016 under the same Option 2. Additionally, on October 24, 2017, the Company  announced they received a $24 million contract from Lockheed Martin to produce additional  composite components for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.    Finally, Citigroup valued the Company at a higher price than the Merger  Consideration. Citigroup calculated an implied equity value per share of up to $157.15,  substantially higher than the $134.50 Merger Consideration.    Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth  herein.    Section 14(a)(1) of the Exchange Act makes it “unlawful for any person, by the use  of the mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a  national securities exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the  Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection  of investors, to solicit or to permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or  authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to  section 78l of this title.”  15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)(1).    The omission of information from a proxy statement will violate Section 14(a) and  Rule 14a-9 if other SEC regulations specifically require disclosure of the omitted information.      Defendants have issued the Proxy with the intention of soliciting shareholder  support for the Proposed Merger.  Each of the Defendants reviewed and authorized the  dissemination of the Proxy, which fails to provide critical information regarding, amongst other  things: (i) financial projections for the Company; and (ii) the valuation analyses performed by  Citigroup in support of its fairness opinion.    In so doing, Defendants made untrue statements of fact and/or omitted material  facts necessary to make the statements made not misleading. Each of the Individual Defendants,  by virtue of their roles as officers and/or directors, were aware of the omitted information but failed  to disclose such information, in violation of Section 14(a). The Individual Defendants were  therefore negligent, as they had reasonable grounds to believe material facts existed that were  misstated or omitted from the Proxy, but nonetheless failed to obtain and disclose such information  to shareholders although they could have done so without extraordinary effort.     The Individual Defendants knew or were negligent in not knowing that the material  information identified above has been omitted from the Proxy, rendering the sections of the Proxy  identified above to be materially incomplete and misleading.  Indeed, the Individual Defendants  were required to review Citigroup’s analyses in connection with their receipt of the fairness  opinion, question Citigroup as to its derivation of fairness, and be particularly attentive to the  procedures followed in preparing the Proxy and review it carefully before it was disseminated, to  corroborate that there are no material misstatements or omissions.    The Individual Defendants were, at the very least, negligent in preparing and  reviewing the Proxy.  The preparation of a proxy statement by corporate insiders containing  materially false or misleading statements or omitting a material fact constitutes negligence.  The  Individual Defendants were negligent in choosing to omit material information from the Proxy or  failing to notice the material omissions in the Proxy upon reviewing it, which they were required  to do carefully as the Company’s directors.  Indeed, the Individual Defendants were intricately  involved in the process leading up to the signing of the Merger Agreement and the preparation of  the Company’s financial projections.      Orbital ATK is also deemed negligent as a result of the Individual Defendants’  negligence in preparing and reviewing the Proxy.        The misrepresentations and omissions in the Proxy are material to Plaintiff and the  Class, who will be deprived of their right to cast an informed vote if such misrepresentations and  omissions are not corrected prior to the vote on the Proposed Merger.      Plaintiff incorporates each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth  herein.    The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of Orbital ATK within the  meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as alleged herein.  By virtue of their positions as  officers and/or directors of Orbital ATK, and participation in and/or awareness of the Company’s  operations and/or intimate knowledge of the incomplete and misleading statements contained in  the Proxy filed with the SEC, they had the power to influence and control and did influence and  control, directly or indirectly, the decision making of the Company, including the content and  dissemination of the various statements that Plaintiff contends are materially incomplete and  misleading.    Each of the Individual Defendants was provided with or had unlimited access to  copies of the Proxy and other statements alleged by Plaintiff to be misleading prior to and/or  shortly after these statements were issued and had the ability to prevent the issuance of the  statements or cause the statements to be corrected.    In particular, each of the Individual Defendants had direct and supervisory  involvement in the day-to-day operations of the Company, and, therefore, is presumed to have had  the power to control or influence the particular transactions giving rise to the Exchange Act  violations alleged herein, and exercised the same.  The Proxy at issue contains the unanimous  recommendation of each of the Individual Defendants to approve the Proposed Merger.  They were  thus directly involved in preparing this document.    By virtue of the foregoing, the Individual Defendants have violated Section 20(a)  of the Exchange Act.    As set forth above, the Individual Defendants had the ability to exercise control  over and did control a person or persons who have each violated Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 by  their acts and omissions as alleged herein.  By virtue of their positions as controlling persons, these  Defendants are liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.  As a direct and proximate  result of Individual Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff and the Class will be irreparably harmed.    Plaintiff and the Class have no adequate remedy at law.  Only through the exercise  of this Court’s equitable powers can Plaintiff and the Class be fully protected from the immediate  and irreparable injury that Defendants’ actions threaten to inflict.  I.  Background and the Proposed Transaction  ",win,3
4192985,lose," Defendants manufacture, distribute, market, and sell the IGF-1 Plus line of  health supplements on a nationwide basis.     Defendants presently offer six forms of the IGF-1 Plus products: (a) Super  Max 200,000ng; (b) Maximum 100,000ng; (c) Ultra Plus 25,000ng; (d) Ultra 10,000ng;  (e) Starter Plus 5,000ng; and (f) Starter 3,000ng. The products are nearly identical in their  chemical composition: they each contain deer antler velvet (cervidae parvum comu) and  stevia extract (leaves).  The only differences are the amounts of deer antler velvet and  stevia extract, and that the Super Max and Maximum IGF-1 Plus products come in a  dropper form rather than a spray.  The advertising and marketing messages for the  products are nearly identical.  See Exhibit A.  All IGF-1 Plus products claim to have  clinically tested components, and all products claim they build lean muscle mass, speed  recovery time, promote healthy joints, and increase libido.  Id.  Plaintiff alleges that the  actual quantity of deer antler velvet in any of the products is irrelevant because it is  completely ineffectual when delivered to the human body in the droplet form.     The IGF-1 Plus products are sold throughout California and the United States  via the Nutronics website.    Since the launch of the IGF-1 Plus products, Defendants have consistently  conveyed the message to consumers throughout California and nationwide that the IGF-1  Plus products ingredients will help “build lean muscle mass and speed[] their recovery  time,” “boost your energy levels,” and “promote sexual performance and function by  raising libido.”  While the main component of the IGF-1 Plus products, IGF-1, has been  Case No.  6   Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and all others similarly  situated pursuant to Rule 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure  and seeks certification of the following Class:  All persons who purchased the IGF-1 Plus products in California.  Excluded from the Class are Defendants, their parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, officers,  and directors, those who purchased the IGF-1 Plus products for the purpose of resale, and  those who assert claims for personal injury.    Numerosity. Members of the Class are so numerous and geographically  dispersed that joinder of all Class members is impracticable.  Plaintiff is informed and  believes, and on that basis alleges, that the proposed Class contains many thousands of  members.  The precise number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff.      Existence and Predominance of Common Questions of Law and Fact.   Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate  over questions affecting only individual Class members.  The common legal and factual  questions include, but are not limited to, the following:  Case No.  14   Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in  the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein.    Plaintiff seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive and equitable relief on  behalf of the entire Class, on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class, to enjoin  and prevent Defendants from engaging in the acts described, and requiring Defendants to  provide full restitution to Plaintiff and Class members.    Unless a Class is certified, Defendants will retain monies that were taken  from Plaintiff and Class members as a result of their conduct.  Unless a Class-wide  injunction is issued, Defendants will continue to commit the violations alleged, and the  members of the Class and the general public will continue to be misled.    This cause of action is brought under the Consumers Legal Remedies Act,  California Civil Code § 1750, et seq. (the “Act”).  Plaintiff and the proposed Class are  consumers as defined by California Civil Code § 1761(d).  Defendants’ IGF-1 Plus  products are goods within the meaning of the Act.  Case No.  16   Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in  the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein.    As alleged herein, Plaintiff has suffered injury in fact and lost money or  property as a result of Defendants’ conduct because he purchased the IGF-1 Plus  products.    In the course of conducting business, Defendants committed unlawful  business practices by, inter alia, making the representations (which also constitute  advertising within the meaning of § 17200) and omissions of material facts, as set forth  more fully herein, and violating Civil Code §§ 1572, 1573, 1709, 1711, 1770, Business &  Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq., 17500, et seq., and the common law.    Plaintiff and the Class reserve the right to allege other violations of law,  which constitute other unlawful business acts or practices.  Such conduct is ongoing and  continues to this date.    Defendants’ acts, omissions, misrepresentations, practices and non- disclosures as alleged herein also constitute “unfair” business acts and practices within the  meaning of Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq., in that their conduct is  substantially injurious to consumers, offends public policy, and is immoral, unethical,  Case No.  18   Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in  the paragraphs above as if fully set forth herein.    Plaintiff, and each member of the Class, formed a contract with Defendants  at the time Plaintiff and the other members of the Class purchased the IGF-1 Plus  products.  The terms of that contract include the promises and affirmations of fact made  Case No.  19  Breach of Express Warranty   The IGF-1 Plus products   Violation of Business & Professions Code § 17200, et seq.   Violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act –Civil Code § 1750, et seq.  ",lose,3
16333700,win," Plaintiffs have retained the services of the undersigned attorneys and are obligated  to pay the undersigned a reasonable fee for their services.    Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury on all claims alleged herein.   Plaintiffs sue under Rule 23(a) and (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for  violations of the WARN Act, on behalf of themselves, and a class of employees who were laid off  by Defendants as part of a reasonably foreseeable result of shutdowns or mass layoffs (“Class”)  during the weeks of September 30, 2019, through October 14, 2019.    The persons in the Class (“Class Members”) are so numerous that joinder of all  members is impracticable as there are, upon information and belief, approximately one-hundred  or more (100) potential class members.    The claims of the representative Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the Class, as  she/they were laid off as part of the shutdown or mass layoff, and did not receive the requisite  notice.    The representative Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the  class.    The named Plaintiff retained counsel competent and experienced in complex class  action employment litigation.    A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient  adjudication of this controversy—particularly in the context of WARN Act and wage litigation –  where the individual Plaintiff and class members may lack the financial resources to vigorously  prosecute a lawsuit in federal court against corporate defendants and separate actions would create  a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual class members and the  adjudications with respect to individual class members would be dispositive of the interests of  other members.    Defendants have acted on grounds that apply generally to the class.    Plaintiff and other similarly situated employees were laid off as part of plant  shutdowns or mass layoffs of a single site of employment as defined by the WARN Act, for which  they were entitled to receive 60 days advance written notice under the WARN Act.    At all relevant times, Defendants employed three hundred (300) or more  employees, exclusive of part-time employees, or employed 100 or more employees who in the  aggregate worked at least 4,000 hours per week exclusive of hours of overtime within the United  States as defined by the WARN Act.     At all relevant times, Defendants were “employers” as that term is defined by the  WARN Act.      During the weeks of September 30, 2019, through October 14, 2019, Defendants  ordered “shutdowns” or “mass layoffs” as that term is defined by the WARN Act.      Defendants’ actions resulted in an “employment loss” as that term is defined by the  WARN Act for at least 33% of its workforce, and at least 50 of its employees, excluding (a)  employees who worked less than six of the twelve months prior to the date WARN notice was  required to be given and (b) employees who worked an average of less than 20 hours per week  during the 90-day period prior to the date WARN notice was required to be given.    Defendants’ termination of the Class Members’ employment constituted plant  shutdowns or mass layoffs at a single site of employment as defined by the WARN Act.     The Plaintiff and each of the Class Members are “aggrieved employees” of  Defendants as that term is defined by the WARN Act.    Pursuant to the WARN Act, Defendants were required to provide at least 60 days  prior written notice of the layoff, or notice as soon as practicable, to the affected employees, or  their representative, explaining why the sixty (60) days prior notice was not given.     Defendants failed to give at least sixty (60) days prior notice of the layoff in  violation of the WARN Act.    Defendants failed to pay the Plaintiff and each of the Class Members their  respective wages, salary, commissions, bonuses, accrued holiday pay and accrued vacation for 60  working days following their respective layoffs, and failed to make the pension and 401(k)  contributions, provide other employee benefits under ERISA, and pay their medical expenses for  60 calendar days from and after the dates of their respective terminations.    As a result of Defendants’ failure to pay the wages, benefits and other monies as  asserted, the Plaintiff and Class Members were damaged in an amount equal to the sum of the  members’ unpaid wages, accrued holiday pay, accrued vacation pay, accrued sick leave pay and  benefits which would have been paid for a period of sixty (60) calendar days after the date of the  their terminations.    All administrative notice requirements and prerequisites have been satisfied.   Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in paragraphs 1  through 33 as if fully stated herein.    Plaintiffs were employed by Defendants.      During the weeks of October 7 and October 14, 2019, Defendants, without warning,  and despite having knowledge of their intention to conduct mass lay-offs, engaged in a mass lay  off without properly notifying Plaintiffs.    No prior written notice was provided to the Plaintiffs as required by the WARN act.   VIOLATIONS OF THE WARN ACT AGAINST DEFENDANT  ",win,4
4520480,lose,"Plaintiff brings claims, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter  “FRCP”) Rule 23, individually and on behalf of the following New York consumer class  (the “Class”):   All New York consumers who were sent collection letters and/or notice from  3  Defendant attempting to collect an obligation owed to or allegedly owed to  Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., that contain at least one of the alleged  violations arising from Defendant's violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692 et seq..    The Class period begins one year to the filing of this Action.   Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  numbered “1” through “12” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set  forth at length herein.   The Class satisfies all the requirements of Rule 23 of the FRCP for maintaining a class  action:   Upon information and belief, the Class is so numerous that joinder of all  members is impracticable because there are hundreds and/or thousands of  persons who have received debt collection letters and/or notices from the  Defendant that violate specific provisions of the FDCPA. Plaintiff is  complaining of a standard form letter and/or notice that is sent to hundreds of  persons (See Exhibit A, except that the undersigned attorney has, in  accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2 partially redacted the financial account  numbers in an effort to protect Plaintiff’s privacy);   There are questions of law and fact which are common to the Class and which  predominate over questions affecting any individual Class member.  These  common questions of law and fact include, without limitation:  a.  Whether Defendant violated various provisions of the FDCPA;  b.  Whether Plaintiff and the Class have been injured by Defendant’s  conduct;  c.  Whether Plaintiff and the Class have sustained damages and are  entitled to restitution as a result of Defendant’s wrongdoing and if  so, what is the proper measure and appropriate statutory formula to  4  be applied in determining such damages and restitution; and  d.  Whether Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to declaratory and/or  injunctive relief.   Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class, which all arise from the same  operative facts and are based on the same legal theories.   Plaintiff has no interest adverse or antagonistic to the interest of the other  members of the Class.   Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the Class and has  retained experienced and competent attorneys to represent the Class.   A Class Action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient  adjudication of the claims herein asserted. Plaintiff anticipates that no unusual  difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action.   A Class Action will permit large numbers of similarly situated persons to  prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously and without  the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would  engender.  Class treatment will also permit the adjudication of relatively small  claims by many Class members who could not otherwise afford to seek legal  redress for the wrongs complained of herein.  Absent a Class Action, class  members will continue to suffer losses of statutory protected rights as well as  monetary damages. If Defendant’s conduct is allowed proceed to without  remedy they will continue to reap and retain the proceeds of their ill-gotten  gains.  5   Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class,  thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding  declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole.  Some time prior to June 24, 2014, an obligation was allegedly incurred to Capital One  Bank (USA), N.A. (“Capital”)   The Capital obligation arose out of a transaction in which money, property, insurance or  services, which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for personal, family or  household purposes.   The alleged Capital obligation is a ""debt"" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5).   Capital is a ""creditor"" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4).   Defendant contends that the Capital debt is past due.   Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been incurred  for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United States  Postal Services, telephone and internet.   Capital directly or through an intermediary contracted Defendant to collect the Capital  debt.   On or about June 24, 2014, the Defendant caused to be delivered to the Plaintiff a  collection letter in an attempt to collect the alleged Capital debt. See Exhibit A.   The June 24, 2014 letter was sent or caused to be sent by persons employed by Defendant  6  as a “debt collector” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(6).   The June 24, 2014 letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(2).   The June 24, 2014 letter was sent in an envelope that contained a glassine window.   Visible through the glassine window in the return address the Plaintiff’s account number  was shown.    The account number constitutes personal identifying information.   The account number is not meaningless – it is a piece of information capable of  identifying [the consumer] as a debtor, and its disclosure has the potential to cause harm  to a consumer that the FDCPA was enacted to address. Douglass v. Convergent  Outsourcing, 765 F. 3d 299 (Third Cir. 2014).   Defendant’s actions as described herein are part of a pattern and practice used to collect  consumer debts.   Defendant could have taken the steps necessary to bring its actions within compliance  with the FDCPA, but neglected to do so and failed to adequately review its actions to  ensure compliance with the law.   On information and belief, Defendant sent a written communication, in the form annexed  hereto as Exhibit A to at least 50 natural persons in the State of New York within one  year of the date of this Complaint.  Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  numbered “1” through “30” herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set  forth at length herein.  7   Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff  violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. §  1692f.   Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f(8), a debt collector is prohibited from using any language  or symbol, other than the debt collector’s address, on any envelope when communicating  with the consumer by use of mails.   The Defendant violated said section by putting the Plaintiff’s account number visible on  the June 24, 2014 letter.   By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's conduct  violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs  and attorneys’ fees.  VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT  15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq.  ",lose,3
16160529,win," Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.  P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3).    The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of  Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or  have purchased debts.    Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members,  partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate  families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate  families.     There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common  issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue  is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as  Exhibits A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e and 1692f.    The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same  facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the  Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in  handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff  nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this  action.    Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at  the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues  pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).   Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length  herein.    Some time prior to May 3, 2019, an obligation was allegedly incurred by Plaintiff.    The alleged obligation arose out of a transaction involving a debt allegedly incurred  by Plaintiff with Augusta, Realtors in which the subject of the transaction was primarily for  personal, family or household purposes.    The alleged obligation is a ""debt"" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5).    The owner of the alleged obligation is a ""creditor"" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4).    The owner of the obligation contracted with the Defendant Hunter to collect the  alleged debt.    On or about May 3, 2019, Defendant sent the Plaintiff a collection letter (the  “Letter”) seeking to collect an alleged debt.  See Collection Letter – Attached hereto as  Exhibit A.    The letter warned:   “Your account is now in final review.  This account meets the guidelines for legal action set  by the creditor, but they have not yet referred your account to an attorney or made a decision  to file a lawsuit. …  If we cannot resolve this matter, the creditor may refer your account to  an attorney to review their ability to recover your unpaid balance through litigation.  If an  action is commenced and a judgment is sought, you will be given notice and the opportunity  to raise a legal defense. Accordingly, demand is hereby made for full payment of your past  due amount to avoid the possibility of additional costs if the creditor chooses to proceed with  legal action.”    The threat that Plaintiff’s account is in “final review” and “meets the guidelines for  legal action” is harassing and only serves to scare Plaintiff into making immediate payment.    Further, the implication is that litigation is imminent, due to the account “meeting  the guidelines for legal action,” yet the Defendant is not an attorney and cannot make the  decision if and when a lawsuit may occur.    In addition, neither the Defendant nor the creditor are attorneys, yet the letter goes  into detail regarding the legal process discussing what the attorney will be reviewing in  litigation, legal defenses and possibilities of additional costs through litigation, all in furtherance  of harassing and  intimidating the Plaintiff into making an immediate payment due to fear of  litigation and higher costs and fees.    These threats only serve to coerce Plaintiff into paying immediately to avoid the  threat of legal action.      As a result of Defendant’s deceptive misleading and false debt collection practices,  Plaintiff has been damaged.   Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein.    Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff  violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.    Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or  misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.    Defendant violated said section   a.  by making a false and misleading representation in violation of §1692e(10);  b.  by falsely representing the character, amount of legal status of the debt in  violation of §1692e(2)(A);   c.  my making the threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is  not intended to be taken in violation of §1692e(5).    By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's  conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs  and attorneys’ fees.   Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff  violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f.    Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f, a debt collector may not use any unfair or  unconscionable means in connection with the collection of any debt.    Defendant violated this section by falsely threatening and harassing Plaintiff with the  letter containing false threats.    By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's  conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs  and attorneys’ fees.  VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C.  §1692f et seq.   VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e  et seq.  ",win,4
4567276,win," Market Volume Increases ......................................................................... 26    Relationship Between Secondary Market Trading and Primary Market  Issuing ....................................................................................................... 29    Regulatory Changes .................................................................................. 29    A Perfect Storm for Collusion .................................................................. 31    Dealers Collude to Increase Spreads ......................................................... 35  C.  News Reports of Regulatory Investigations into the SSA Market ....................... 36  D.  Defendants Terminate or Suspend SSA Traders as the Government Investigations  Are Revealed ......................................................................................................... 38  VI.   Class Definition.  Pursuant to Rules 23(a) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil  Procedure, Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of itself and on behalf of the following “Class”:  All persons who, between January 1, 2010 and April 27, 2014  (inclusive) purchased or sold a U.S. dollar-denominated SSA bond  in the secondary SSA bond market directly to or from a Defendant,  where such persons were either domiciled in the United States or  its territories or, if domiciled outside the United States or its  territories, purchased or sold (as set forth above) one or more  USD-denominated SSA bond in the United States or its territories.    Exclusions from the Class.  Excluded from the Class are Defendants and their co- conspirators.  For the Bank Defendants and their co-conspirators, this includes their subsidiaries  and affiliates, as well as the directors, members, partners, managers, officers, employees, and  agents of both the Bank Defendants and their subsidiaries and affiliates.  For the Trader  Defendants, this includes any entity in which they have a controlling interest, their legal  representatives, heirs, assigns or any other person acting on their behalf.  Also excluded from the  Class are any judicial officer presiding over this action and the members of his/her immediate  family and judicial staff, and any juror assigned to this action.    Ascertainability. Using, among other things, Defendants’ records, the Class  members are readily ascertainable.    Typicality.  Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of Class members.   Defendants’ wrongful common course of conduct in violation of the law directly and  proximately caused the damages and injuries of Plaintiff and each member of the Class. There  are no defenses that are unique to Plaintiff.    Adequacy.  Plaintiff will protect the interests of the Class. Plaintiff’s interests are  aligned with, and not antagonistic to, the Class members.  Plaintiff has retained counsel  competent and experienced in the prosecution of class actions and antitrust litigation to represent  itself and the other Class members.    Commonality. There are one or more questions of law or fact common to the  Class, including, but not limited to:  a.  whether Defendants and their co-conspirators engaged in an agreement,  combination, or conspiracy to fix, raise, elevate, maintain, or stabilize  USD-denominated SSA bond bid/ask spreads in interstate commerce in  the United States;  b.  the identity of the participants of the conspiracy or manipulative scheme;  c.  the duration of the conspiracy scheme alleged herein and the acts  performed by Defendants and their co-conspirators in furtherance thereof;  d.  whether the alleged conspiracy violated Sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman  Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1 and 3;  e.  whether the conduct of Defendants and their co-conspirators, as alleged in  this Complaint, caused injury to Plaintiff and Class members; and  f.  the appropriate measures of damages for the Class.    Predominance.  Questions of law or fact common to Class members predominate  over questions affecting only individual Class members.    The Class is defined herein based on currently available information and Plaintiff  hereby reserves the right to amend the definition of members of the Class, including, without  limitation, the Class Period.  V.   The SSA bond market is a large global market.  According to Bloomberg  estimates, the SSA bond market is valued from $9 trillion to $15 trillion.  The SSA bond market  experienced significant growth in the past decade, having tripled from 2005 to 2012.  In 2015,  new issues in SSA bonds reached $843.35 billion.8    Governmental or quasi-governmental, supranationals, sub-sovereigns, and  agencies issue SSA bonds to raise capital for a variety of public (i.e., social, infrastructure,  policy, economic development) purposes worldwide.  8   See Abhinav Ramnarayan and Helene Durand., DoJ investigates bond traders over  market-rigging,  A.  The SSA Bond Market   V.  SUBSTANTIVE FACT ALLEGATIONS ....................................................................... 22  A.  The SSA Bond Market .......................................................................................... 22  B.  Changes Affecting the SSA Bond Market ............................................................ 26  ",lose,3
17149083,lose," As of May 31, 2019, more than 190,000 people had a South Carolina driver’s  license under indefinite suspension for failure to pay traffic fines and fees pursuant to Section  56-25-20.     South Carolina suffers from one of the highest poverty rates in the nation.   According to 2017 U.S. Census estimates, South Carolina has the eleventh highest population of  people living in poverty in the United States, with 16.6% of South Carolinians earning less than  the Federal Poverty Guideline for their household.10    Even South Carolinians with incomes above the federal poverty level may  experience significant day-to-day financial hardship.  For example, people are generally eligible  for free legal assistance from South Carolina Legal Services, a federally-funded “legal aid”  organization, if their household income is at or below 125% of the relevant Federal Poverty  Guideline and may be eligible if their income is at or below 200% of the relevant Federal  Poverty Guideline.11  Similarly, food assistance is provided to people whose household income  is at or below 130% of the relevant Federal Poverty Guideline.12    South Carolina’s indefinite suspension of driver’s licenses for nonpayment of  traffic fines and fees under Section 56-25-20 disproportionately harms Black people.  Analysis of  DMV data, which is described below, reveals that Black people are around 3.4 times more likely  than non-Latinx white people to have their South Carolina driver’s license indefinitely suspended  for failure to pay traffic tickets pursuant to Section 56-25-20.    According to 2017 U.S. Census estimates, non-Latinx Black people make up 27%  and non-Latinx white people make up 64% of the South Carolina population.15  But DMV data  shows that, as of May 31, 2019, Black people made up 48% and white people made up only 35%  of all people with driver’s licenses indefinitely suspended for failure to pay traffic tickets under  Section 56-25-20.  These racial disparities are linked to the longstanding racial gaps in poverty  and unemployment discussed above.    The suspension of a driver’s license for nonpayment of traffic fines and fees has  devastating consequences on the ability of people to pursue a livelihood, to meet basic needs for  themselves and their families, and to meaningfully participate in civic life.  Eighty-six percent of  Americans describe a car as a “necessity of life.”16      In a 2013 survey of 2,459 South Carolina residents concerning transportation  options, 92% of respondents reported using a personal vehicle for travel.17     The South Carolina Department of Transportation (“SC DOT”) estimated in a  2014 report that only 44% of statewide public transit demands were met in fiscal year 2011.18     In the same 2014 report, the SC DOT recognized that an increase in low-income  households presented a need for public transit.  The report concluded that South Carolina lacked  sufficient public transportation options to serve second- and third-shift workers, lacked  “coordinated/scheduled services and coverage” in rural areas, and had “[l]imited scheduled  public transit routes outside urban areas.”19  In parts of South Carolina, major employers have  openly acknowledged that the lack of public transportation hinders the ability of employees to  get to work.20    Research from across the country also underscores the critical link between a  person’s ability to maintain a valid driver’s license and employment and financial stability.  The  American Association of Motor Vehicles Administrators (“AAMVA”) has recognized that  “[p]eople who are able to legally drive are more likely to have stable employment.”29  In  response to a Rutgers University survey of suspended New Jersey driver’s license holders, 42%  of respondents reported losing jobs after their driver’s licenses were suspended.30  Forty-five  percent of the respondents who lost their jobs following driver’s license suspensions reported  that they were unable to find new jobs.31  Of those who were able to find employment, 88%  reported a decrease in income.32    The AAMVA has recognized that “[s]uspending a person’s driving privilege  makes it less likely that fines will be paid if the person is unable to get to work and to pursue  other daily activities such as attending school, going to medical appointments, and so on.  This is  compounded for individuals who live in areas where other transportation options are not readily  available.”35     The indefinite suspension of driver’s licenses for nonpayment of traffic fines and  fees confronts indigent people with an impossible decision: lose their jobs, face barriers to  finding employment, and fail to care for themselves and their families, or drive illegally and risk  further legal consequences for driving on a suspended license (“DUS”), including fines, fees, jail  time, and extension of probation or parole.      Faced with such difficult choices, most people whose licenses are suspended  continue to drive.  A 2003 report by the National Cooperative Highway Research Program  estimated that as many as 75% of people with suspended and revoked licenses continue to drive  while under suspension.37  Similarly, a study commissioned by the AAMVA Suspended and  Revoked Working Group, which analyzed 114,626 driver records from eight geographically and  demographically diverse states, concluded that people with suspended licenses continue to drive  despite the seriousness of the consequences for driving on a suspended license.38    In South Carolina, the steep penalties associated with driving on a suspended  license push people who live with such suspensions deeper into cycles of poverty, debt, and  entanglement with the criminal legal system.      Under South Carolina law, a person who is convicted of DUS three or more times  in three years is designated a “habitual offender.”43  And a person who is convicted of driving on  a suspended license while designated a habitual offender may be charged with a felony and face  up to five years of incarceration.44    The DMV indefinitely suspends driver’s licenses for failure to pay traffic tickets  in an exercise of its discretion under South Carolina Code Section 56-25-20.45    %.24     Section 56-25-20 vests the DMV with the sole authority and discretion to suspend  the driver’s licenses of South Carolina residents and driver’s license holders for noncompliance  with traffic citations and littering summonses.      Section 56-25-20 does not require the DMV to suspend driver’s licenses.  Rather,  the statute permits the agency to indefinitely suspend a driver’s license if it is notified, within  twelve months of the issuance of a traffic citation or littering summons, that a South Carolina  resident or driver’s license holder has failed to comply with the citation or summons (“NRVC  procedures”).     As described in detail below, the DMV has a policy and practice of exercising its  Section 56-25-20 authority to indefinitely suspend driver’s licenses after a report of failure to pay  a traffic citation without ensuring the license holder is able to pay.  The DMV does this in  response to reports of nonpayment, whether the reports are issued by South Carolina courts or by  a court or motor vehicle department in another NRVC-participating state.    Section 56-25-20 permits the DMV to impose indefinite license suspensions for  failure to comply with a littering summons, but data disclosed by the DMV reveals that the  agency does not exercise this authority in practice.  As of November 2018, there was no one with  a driver’s license suspended indefinitely by the DMV under Section 56-25-20 for failure to  comply with a littering summons.     NRVC procedures are not used when a defendant in a traffic case pays fines and  fees at, or before, their court date.    A. A driver’s license is necessary for economic self-sufficiency, to care for one’s self  and family, and to meaningfully participate in society.  ",lose,5
7044919,win," This Action is properly maintained as a class action. The Class is initially defined  as:   All New Jersey consumers who were sent letters and/or notices from AUDIT  SYSTEMS concerning a debt owed to PERSONAL SUPPORT MEDICAL  SUPPLIERS, which included the alleged conduct and practices described  herein.   The class definition may be subsequently modified or refined.     The Class period begins one year to the filing of this Action.     Plaintiff is at all times to this lawsuit, a ""consumer"" as that term is defined by 15  U.S.C. § 1692a(3).    At some time prior to May 10, 2017, Plaintiff allegedly incurred a financial  obligation to PERSONAL SUPPORT MEDICAL SUPPLIERS.    The PERSONAL SUPPORT MEDICAL SUPPLIERS obligation arose out of a  transaction, in which money, property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the  transaction, are primarily for personal, family or household purposes.    The PERSONAL SUPPORT MEDICAL SUPPLIERS obligation did not arise out  of a transaction that was for non-personal use.    The PERSONAL SUPPORT MEDICAL SUPPLIERS obligation is a ""debt"" as  defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).    PERSONAL SUPPORT MEDICAL SUPPLIERS is a ""creditor"" as defined by 15  U.S.C. § 1692a(4).    On or before May 10, 2017, the PERSONAL SUPPORT MEDICAL SUPPLIERS  obligation was sent to AUDIT SYSTEMS for the purpose of collection.    At the time the PERSONAL SUPPORT MEDICAL SUPPLIERS obligation was  sent to AUDIT SYSTEMS the PERSONAL SUPPORT MEDICAL SUPPLIERS obligation was  past due.    At the time the PERSONAL SUPPORT MEDICAL SUPPLIERS obligation was  sent to AUDIT SYSTEMS the PERSONAL SUPPORT MEDICAL SUPPLIERS obligation was  in default pursuant to the terms of the agreement creating the obligation and/or by operation of  law.    Defendants caused to be delivered to Plaintiff a letter dated May 10, 2017, which  was addressed to Plaintiff.  A copy of said letter is annexed hereto as Exhibit A, which is fully  incorporated herein by reference.    The May 10, 2017 letter was sent to Plaintiff in connection with the collection of  the PERSONAL SUPPORT MEDICAL SUPPLIERS obligation.     The May 10, 2017 letter is a “communication” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §  1692a(2).    The May 10, 2017 letter is the initial written communication sent from Defendant  to the Plaintiff.    The May 10, 2017 letter contained the Defendant’s contact information at the top  of the letter:   Collection letters and/or notices, such as those sent by Defendants, are to be  evaluated by the objective standard of the hypothetical “least sophisticated consumer.”    The May 10, 2017 letter fails to properly inform the least sophisticated consumer  that to effectively dispute the alleged debt, such dispute must be in writing.    The least sophisticated consumer upon reading the May 10, 2017 letter would be  confused as to what he or she must do to effectively dispute the alleged debt.     The least sophisticated consumer wishing to dispute the alleged debt would be  confused as to what steps he or she should take to notify Defendants of his or her dispute.    The least sophisticated consumer upon reading the instructions in the May 10,  2017 letter would be misled into believing that if he or she wished to effectively dispute the  alleged debt or any portion thereof, he or she may: (1) notify AUDIT SYSTEMS by calling the  toll free telephone number provided of (800) 741-1969, between during the business hours  Monday through Thursday 8:00 am - 9:00 pm  EST, or on Friday between 8:00am - 7:00pm  EST; or (2) write to AUDIT SYSTEMS at the address listed on the letter.    AUDIT SYSTEMS' instructions in the May 10, 2017 letter would cause least  sophisticated consumer to be unsure as to what he or she must do to effectively dispute the  alleged debt.    A dispute of a debt, to be effective, in the Third Circuit, must be in writing.  Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 112 (3d Cir. 1991). Caprio v. Healthcare Revenue  Recovery Group, 709 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. March 1, 2013).      AUDIT SYSTEMS violated 15 U.S.C. §1692e(10) by falsely representing and  misleading Plaintiff into believing that if he wished to dispute the alleged debt or any portion  thereof, that he may (1) notify AUDIT SYSTEMS by calling the toll free telephone number  provided of (800) 741-1969, between during the business hours Monday through Thursday 8:00  am - 9:00 pm  EST, or on Friday between 8:00am - 7:00pm EST; or (2) write to AUDIT  SYSTEMS at the address listed on the letter.     The May 10, 2017 letter is misleading because the instructions can be read to  have two or more meaning, which one is inaccurate.     The May 10, 2017 letter can be read to mean that the least sophisticated consumer  may dispute the alleged debt by calling AUDIT SYSTEMS at the toll free telephone number  provided of (800) 741-1969, between during the business hours Monday through Thursday 8:00  am - 9:00 pm  EST, or on Friday between 8:00am - 7:00pm EST.    Congress enacted the FDCPA in part to eliminate abusive debt collection  practices by debt collectors.    Plaintiff and others similarly situated have a right to free from abusive debt  collection practices by debt collectors.    Plaintiff and others similarly situated have a right to receive proper notices  mandated by the FDCPA.    Plaintiff and others similarly situated were sent letters, which would have affected  their decision-making with regard to the debt.    Plaintiff has suffered damages and other harm as a direct result of AUDIT  SYSTEMS actions, conduct, omissions and violations of the FDCPA described herein.  WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendants as follows:  (a)  Declaring that this action is properly maintainable as a Class Action and  certifying Plaintiff as Class representative and the attorney(s), Joseph K. Jones, Esq., as Class  Counsel;  (b)  Awarding Plaintiff and the Class statutory damages;  (c)  Awarding Plaintiff and the Class actual damages;  (d)  Awarding pre-judgment interest;  (e)  Awarding post-judgment interest.  (f)  Awarding Plaintiff costs of this Action, including reasonable attorneys'  fees and expenses; and  (g)  Awarding Plaintiff and the Class such other and further relief as the Court  may deem just and proper.  Dated: November 15, 2017  s/ Joseph K. Jones   Joseph K. Jones, Esq.   FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT, 15 U.S.C. §   1692 et seq.  VIOLATIONS   ",lose,2
7643082,win," Defendants are engaged in the petroleum industry. Particularly, they are a  petroleum and fracking proppant distributor.    Defendants are headquartered in Sandy, Utah, but operate at numerous fracking  sites throughout the United States, including within the state of Texas and within this Judicial  District.    Defendants also maintain satellite offices near their fracking sites.    QCMs operate out of the satellite offices, but report to both their satellite office and  Defendants’ headquarters.    The satellite offices report directly to Defendants’ headquarters.     QCMs are required to contact Defendants’ headquarters for trucking dispatch.  Furthermore, QCMs constantly communicate employment-related issues with Defendants’  headquarters via email and text message.     Defendants employed Plaintiff Hunter and those similarly situated as quality  control managers.    Despite the title, QCMs are not administrative employees.    QCMs are blue collar workers who performed repetitive operations outdoors with  their hands.    Moreover, QCMs were prohibited from exercising their discretion and independent  judgment on significant matters.    For example, QCMs were not permitted to discipline employees, even for safety  violations such as being intoxicated while driving a truck.    QCM’s were also not permitted to cure contaminated sand containers. Instead, they  were only permitted to report these and other types of incidents to their field operations manager.  Furthermore, QCMs did not have the power to hire or fire employees.    Defendants did not require an advanced degree or specialized academic training for  employment as a quality control manager.  A. Facts Pertaining to Defendants’ Pay Scheme    QCMs work twelve (12) hour shifts.     QCMs are required to work twenty-two (22) days straight per month and have the  remaining eight/nine (8/9) days off.     QCMs worked one (1) shift per workday.    If a QCM does not request the eight/nine (8/9) days off in advance, that QCM is  required to work those days.    QCMs are paid semi-monthly.    Defendants issue QCMs their paychecks from their headquarters in Sandy, Utah.    Defendants state to QCMs that they are paid on a “salary” basis. However, it is a  far more complex pay scheme.    If a QCM does not work twenty-two (22) days straight per month, they are only  paid their pro-rata rate calculated based upon the amount of days worked, effectively paying QCMs  on a shift rate basis. For example, if a QCM only works twenty (20) straight days in a month he is  paid a recalculated rate based upon the twenty (20) shifts worked.    Additionally, QCMs are paid at a rate of approximately $230.00 per day when they  work in excess of the twenty-two (22) days straight, effectively paying QCMs on a shift rate basis.    This additional pay of $230.00 per day worked in excess of twenty-two (22) is paid  to QCMs as a “bonus.”    Accordingly, despite Defendants’ contention, QCMs are not compensated on a  salary basis.    QCMs are not compensated on a fee basis.    Defendants pay scheme is a corporate policy.    Upon information and belief, Defendants’ pay scheme policy was conceived at their  corporate headquarters.    Defendants’ pay scheme is implemented throughout its various fracking sites.  B. Facts Pertaining to Defendants’ FLSA Violations    Defendants do not maintain a formal system of recording the QCMs time.     QCMs work approximately three (3) weeks straight every month.    QCMs are required to work twelve (12) hour shifts.    On average, QCMs work approximately eighty-four (84) hours per workweek.    QCMs are not paid the statutorily required rate of one-and-one-half (1½) times their  hourly rate for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek.    Defendants titled QCMs’ pay basis as salary to knowingly skirt the overtime  provisions of the FLSA.    Defendants titled QCMs as managers and their pay basis as salary, despite the fact  that their duties do not qualify them as exempt, to knowingly skirt the statutory provisions of the   Plaintiff Hunter seeks to bring this suit as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C.  § 216(b) on his own behalf as well as those in the following collective:   All quality control managers employed by Defendants during the  past three (3) years through the final date of disposition of this  action, who are or were required to work in excess of forty (40)  hours per workweek without compensation at the statutorily  required rate of one-and-one-half (1½) times their hourly rate for all  hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek.    At all relevant times, Plaintiff Hunter was similarly situated to all such individuals  in the FLSA Overtime Collective1 because, while employed by Defendants, Plaintiff Hunter and  all FLSA Plaintiffs performed similar tasks, were subject to the same laws and regulations, were  paid in the same or substantially similar manner, were paid the same or similar rate, were required  to work in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek and were subject to Defendants’ policies and  practices of willfully failing to pay them at the statutorily required rate of one-and-one-half (1½)  times their hourly rate for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek.   A. FLSA OVERTIME COLLECTIVE    I.  General Facts    Violation of The Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., Made by Plaintiff  Hunter on Behalf of All FLSA Plaintiffs  (Failure to Pay Overtime)  108.  Plaintiff Hunter and the FLSA Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference all  allegations in all preceding paragraphs.  109.  Throughout the period covered by the applicable statute of limitations, Plaintiff  Hunter and other FLSA Plaintiffs were required to work and did in fact work in excess of forty  (40) hours per workweek.  110.  Defendants knowingly failed to pay Plaintiff Hunter and the FLSA Plaintiffs the  statutorily required rate of one-and-one-half (1½) times their hourly rate for all hours worked in  excess of forty (40) per workweek.  111.  Defendants’ conduct was willful and lasted for the duration of the relevant time  periods.  112.  Defendants’ conduct was in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act. ",win,3
17238085,win," Plaintiff worked as a Utilization Review Employee for Defendant  within the last three years.     Utilization Review Employees’ job duties were routine and rote and did  not include the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to  matters of significance. Utilization Review Employees’ duties and responsibilities  did not involve the management of the enterprise or any particular department, and  Plaintiff did not direct the work of other employees. Nor were any Utilization  Review Employees involved in setting the management policies or general business  operations of Defendant or its patients.      The minimum clinical certification required to perform the Utilization  Review Work performed by Plaintiff is Licensed Practical Nurse (“LPN”) or  Licensed Vocational Nurse (“LVN”) credentials. In fact, URAC Health Plan  Accreditation Guidelines explicitly provide that an “LPN/LVN meets the URAC  definition of health professional and this licensure category may conduct initial  clinical review.”3   29 U.S.C. § 216(b) COLLECTIVE ACTION  VIOLATION OF FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.  FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME WAGES    Although Plaintiff and other Utilization Review Employees were  licensed nurses, they were not certified nurse midwives, nurse anesthetists, or nurse  practitioners. Defendant employed Utilization Review Employees, including  Plaintiff, who held LPN licensure, but no other clinical licensure such as a Registered  Nurse license.    During Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant, Defendant required  Plaintiff and other Utilization Review Employees to perform their job duties in  accordance with its corporate policies, procedures, guidelines, and guidelines  embedded in Defendant’s computer software.    The policies, procedures and guidelines followed by Plaintiff and other  Utilization Review Employees in performing Utilization Review Work were  designed to comply with the accreditation guidelines for a national accreditation  organization, the NCQA.4    During Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant, Plaintiff’s and other  Utilization Review Employees’ job duties did not involve creating or drafting  corporate policies, procedures or guidelines pertaining to Utilization Review Work.   In fact, during Plaintiff’s employment with Defendant, Plaintiff’s job duties did not  involve creating or drafting any corporate policies, procedures or guidelines of any  kind for Defendant or its employees.     Defendant misclassified Plaintiff and other Utilization Review  Employees as exempt employees for the purposes of the FLSA. Defendant paid  Plaintiff and other Utilization Review Employees a salary, at the same amount of  compensation each week, regardless of the number of hours they worked each week  during their employment. When Plaintiff worked over 40 hours in individual  workweeks, Defendant did not pay Plaintiff overtime at one-and-one-half times the  “regular rate” at which she was employed.    As non-exempt employees, Defendant’s Utilization Review Employees  were entitled to full compensation for all overtime hours worked. Under the FLSA,  employees are entitled to “not less than one and one-half times the regular rate” at  which they are employed for work in excess of 40 hours in a workweek. 29 U.S.C.  § 207(a)(1). The “regular rate” shall be deemed to include bonuses, commissions,  nondiscretionary incentive compensation and other remuneration paid to the  employee. 29 U.S.C. § 207(e).    When Plaintiff and Utilization Review Employees worked over 40  hours in one or more individual workweeks, Defendant did not pay them overtime  at one-and-one-half times the “regular rate” at which they were employed.  C.  Defendant Benefited from the Uncompensated Overtime Work  and Suffered and Permitted it to Happen    At all relevant times, Defendant directed and directly benefited from  the Utilization Review Work performed by Plaintiff and the Utilization Review  Employees.    At all relevant times, Defendant controlled the work schedules, duties,  protocols, applications, assignments and employment conditions of Plaintiff and the  Utilization Review Employees.    At all relevant times, Defendant was able to track the amount of time  Plaintiff and the Utilization Review Employees spent in connection with the  performance of their Utilization Review Work. However, Defendant failed to do so  and failed to properly compensate Plaintiff and the Utilization Review Employees  for the overtime work they performed.    Defendant expressly trained, instructed and permitted Plaintiff and the  Utilization Review Employees to perform more than 40 hours of Utilization Review  Work during numerous individual workweeks.    Because Plaintiff and the Utilization Review Employees typically  worked more than 40 hours in a workweek, Defendant’s policies and practices  deprived Plaintiff and the Utilization Review Employees of overtime wages for the  Utilization Review Work they performed    Defendant knew or should have known that the Utilization Review  Work performed by Plaintiff and the Utilization Review Employees did not qualify  for the FLSA’s administrative, executive or professional exemption. Indeed, given  the routine and rote nature of the Utilization Review Work, the lack of discretion  and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance, and the strict  guidelines the Utilization Review Employees were required to adhere to, there is no  conceivable way for Defendant to establish that its classification scheme was  enacted in good faith.    Despite knowing Plaintiff and the Utilization Review Employees  performed more than 40 hours of Utilization Review Work in numerous individual  workweeks, Defendant failed to make any effort to stop or disallow the overtime  work and instead suffered and permitted it to happen.    Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) of the FLSA  on her own behalf and on behalf of:  All similarly situated current and former Utilization Review  Employees who work or have worked for Defendant in the last  three years and who were paid a salary and classified as exempt  from overtime.   (hereinafter referred to as the “FLSA Collective”). Plaintiff reserves the right to  amend this definition if necessary.    Defendant is liable under the FLSA for, inter alia, failing to properly  compensate Plaintiff and other similarly situated Utilization Review Employees.      Excluded from the FLSA Collective are Defendant’s executive,  administrative and professional employees, including computer professionals and  outside salespersons.    Consistent with Defendant’s policy and pattern or practice, Plaintiff and  the FLSA Collective were not paid premium overtime compensation when they  worked beyond 40 hours in a workweek.    As part of its regular business practices, Defendant intentionally,  willfully and repeatedly engaged in a pattern, practice and/or policy of violating the  FLSA with respect to Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective. This policy and pattern or  practice includes, but is not limited to:  a.  Willfully misclassifying Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective as  exempt employees under the FLSA;  b.  Willfully failing to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective  premium overtime wages for hours worked in excess of 40 hours  per workweek; and  c.  Willfully failing to record all of the time that Plaintiff and the  FLSA Collective worked for the benefit of Defendant.    Defendant is aware or should have been aware that Plaintiff and the  FLSA Collective were non-exempt employees and that federal law required it to pay  Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective overtime premiums for hours worked in excess of  40 per workweek.    Defendant’s unlawful conduct has been widespread, repeated and  consistent.    The employment relationships between Defendant and every proposed  FLSA Collective member are the same. The key issue – whether the Utilization  Review Work performed by Utilization Review Employees qualifies for the  professional, executive or administrative exemption – is identical among the  proposed FLSA Collective members.    Many similarly situated current and former Utilization Review  Employees have been underpaid in violation of the FLSA and would benefit from  the issuance of a court-supervised notice of this lawsuit and the opportunity to join  it.     Court-supervised notice of this lawsuit should be sent to the FLSA  Collective pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).    Those similarly situated employees are known to Defendant, are readily  identifiable, and can be located through Defendant’s personnel and payroll records.    Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates all previous paragraphs herein.    At all times relevant to this action, Defendant was engaged in interstate  commerce, or in the production of goods for commerce, as defined by the FLSA.    At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective  were “employees” of Defendant within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) of the  A.  Defendant Misclassified Its Utilization Review Employees  ",lose,2
17105550,lose,"All prior paragraphs are hereby incorporation by reference as though each were fully set forth  herein.   Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal  Rules of Civil Procedure on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated.   Plaintiff’s class consists of all individuals in Pennsylvania who are residents of Long Term Care  Facilities (LTCFs) who are disabled within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act, for the reasons  as aforesaid.   The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.     Upon information and belief, based on the number of LTCF residents and the number of LTCFs  in Pennsylvania, and the highly infectious nature of SARS-COV-2, that every LTCF resident is at  incipient risk for infection with SARS-COV-2, and subsequent community transmission to others.  These residents are also at immediate risk for exploitation via unauthorized biomedical research.   The laws and regulations which address the nature of this action and that form the basis of this  complaint are common to all members of the class. The relief sought will apply to all of them.   The claims of the Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the entire class. Defendant’s violation of  the laws as alleged herein has deprived Plaintiff and members of the class to be deprived of the  safety and wellbeing afforded to the rest of the public by the PA DOH. Therefore, all class  members will suffer the same or similar injuries for the purposes of the injunctive and declaratory  relief sought.   The named plaintiff is capable of fairly and adequately representing the class and protecting  interests. Counsel for the Plaintiff are attorneys with substantial class action litigation experience  as well as substantial experience in litigating on behalf of plaintiffs with disabilities. Counsel are  aware of no conflicts among members of the proposed plaintiff class.   The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would create a risk of  inconsistent and varying adjudications that would establish incompatible standards of conduct for  the defendant.   The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would also create a risk of  adjudications with respect to individual members which would, as a practical matter, substantially  impair the ability of other members to protect their interests.   Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, making  appropriate injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.  All prior paragraphs are hereby incorporated by reference as though each were fully set forth at  length herein.   As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant’s actions and inactions, the Plaintiffs and their  class members have been harmed or are in danger of incipient harm as aforesaid.  All prior paragraphs are hereby incorporated by reference as though each were fully set forth at  length herein.   As a result of Defendant’s policy and practice of segregating Plaintiffs and their class members,  and as a result of denying appropriate safeguards to the residents of LTCFs, Defendant has failed  to care for its most fragile citizens and discriminated against them because of their disability.  Defendant has excluded them from appropriate oversight, protection, care, safety, wellbeing, and  all other protections afforded to the public, and those not confined to a LTCF.    As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant’s actions and inactions, the Plaintiffs and their  class members have been harmed or are in danger of incipient harm as aforesaid.  All prior paragraphs are hereby incorporated by reference as though each were fully set forth at  length herein.   As a result of Defendant’s policy and practice of segregating Plaintiffs and their class members,  and as a result of denying appropriate safeguards to the residents of LTCFs, Defendant has failed  to care for its most fragile citizens and discriminated against them because of their disability.  Defendant has excluded them from appropriate oversight, protection, care, safety, wellbeing, and  all other protections afforded to the public, and those not confined to a LTCF.    All prior paragraphs are hereby incorporated by reference as though each were fully set forth at  length herein.   As a result of Defendant’s policy and practice of segregating Plaintiffs and their class members,  and as a result of denying appropriate safeguards to the residents of LTCFs, Defendant has failed  to care for its most fragile citizens and discriminated against them because of their disability.  Defendant has excluded them from appropriate oversight, protection, care, safety, wellbeing, and  all other protections afforded to the public, and those not confined to a LTCF. Defendants are  obligated to conduct appropriate inspections and enforcement under the SSA which responsibility  they have abrogated to the detriment of the Plaintiffs and class members.   As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant’s actions and inactions, the Plaintiffs and their  class members have been harmed or are in danger of incipient harm as aforesaid.  All prior paragraphs are hereby incorporated by reference as though each were fully set forth at  length herein.    As a result of Defendant’s policy and practice of segregating Plaintiffs and their class members,  and as a result of denying appropriate safeguards to the residents of LTCFs, Defendant has failed  to care for its most fragile citizens and discriminated against them because of their disability.  Defendant has excluded them from appropriate oversight, protection, care, safety, wellbeing, and  all other protections afforded to the public, and those not confined to a LTCF. Defendants are  obligated to conduct appropriate inspections and enforcement under the SSA which responsibility  they have abrogated to the detriment of the Plaintiffs and class members.   All prior paragraphs are hereby incorporated by reference as though each were fully set forth at  length herein.   As a result of Defendant’s policy and practice of segregating Plaintiffs and their class members,  and as a result of denying appropriate safeguards to the residents of LTCFs, Defendant has failed  to care for its most fragile citizens and discriminated against them because of their disability.  Defendant has excluded them from appropriate oversight, protection, care, safety, wellbeing, and  all other protections afforded to the public, and those not confined to a LTCF. Defendant is  required under the DPCL to take all action required to prevent, identify, examine, diagnose ad  cause to be treated every potential communicable disease within the Commonwealth.    As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant’s actions and inactions, the Plaintiffs and their  class members have been harmed or are in danger of incipient harm as aforesaid.  All prior paragraphs are hereby incorporated by reference as though each were fully set forth at  length herein.   The common law has recognized the standards of the Nuremburg Code and the Declaration of  Helsinki as a source of the right of every human subject to be treated with dignity in the conduct  of a clinical trial.   The Plaintiff and the class members were not afforded these basic rights and suffered as a result.   As a direct and proximate result of the Defendant’s actions and inactions, the Plaintiffs and their  class members have been harmed or are in danger of incipient harm as aforesaid.  Violation of the Pennsylvania Disease Prevention and Control Law   Violation of 29 U.S.C. 794 – Rehabilitation Act   Violation of the Federal Nursing Home Reform Amendments (1983 Action)   Violations of the Nuremburg Code and Declaration of Helsinki   Violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act   Violation of the Social Security Act   Violation of the Affordable Care Act  ",lose,1
4356432,lose," Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of itself and all others similarly  situated under rules 23(a) and 23(b)(1)-(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.    Numerosity: The Classes are so numerous that joinder of all individual  members in one action would be impracticable.  The disposition of the individual claims  of the respective class members through this class action will benefit the parties and this  Court.  Upon information and belief there are, at a minimum, thousands of class members  of Classes A, B and C.  Upon information and belief, the Classes’ sizes and the identities  of the individual members thereof are ascertainable through Defendant’s records,  including Defendant’s fax and marketing records.    Typicality:  Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of  Class A because the claims of Plaintiff and members of Class A are based on the same  legal theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct.  Among other things, Plaintiff  and members of Class A were sent or caused to be sent by Defendant at least one fax  advertisement advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods,  or services which did not contain an opt-out notice.    Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of Class B  because the claims of Plaintiff and members of Class B are based on the same legal  theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct.  Among other things, Plaintiff and the  members of Class B were sent or caused to be sent by Defendant, without Plaintiff’s or  the Class B members’ express permission or invitation, at least one fax advertisement  advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services  which did not contain an opt-out notice.     Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of Class C  because the claims of Plaintiff and members of Class C are based on the same legal  theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct.  Among other things, Plaintiff and  members of Class C were sent or caused to be sent by Defendant, without Plaintiff’s or  the Class C members’ express permission or invitation, at least one fax advertisement  advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services  which did not contain an opt-out notice.     The questions of fact and law common to Plaintiff and Class A  predominate over questions that may affect individual members, and include:  (a)  Whether Defendant’s sending and/or causing to be sent to Plaintiff and  the members of Class A, by facsimile, computer or other device, fax  advertisements advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property,  goods or services which did not contain opt-out notices violated 47 U.S.C. §  227(b) and the regulations thereunder;  (b)  Whether Defendant’s sending and/or causing to be sent such fax  advertisements was knowing or willful;  (c)  Whether Plaintiff and the members of Class A are entitled to statutory  damages, triple damages and costs for Defendant’s conduct;   (d) Whether Plaintiff and members of Class A are entitled to multiple  statutory damages per fax advertisement Defendant sent or caused to be sent to  them because each fax advertisement contains multiple violations of the TCPA  and the regulations promulgated thereunder;  and   (e)  Whether Plaintiff and members of Class A are entitled to a permanent  injunction enjoining Defendant from continuing to engage in its unlawful  conduct.    Adequacy of Representation:  Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the  Classes because its interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the  Classes.  Plaintiff will fairly, adequately and vigorously represent and protect the interests  of the members of the Classes and has no interests antagonistic to the members of the  Classes.  Plaintiff has retained counsel who is competent and experienced in litigation in  the federal courts, class action litigation, and TCPA cases.    Superiority:  A class action is superior to other available means for the fair  and efficient adjudication of the Classes’ claims.  While the aggregate damages that may  be awarded to the members of the Classes are likely to be substantial, the damages  suffered by individual members of the Classes are relatively small.  The expense and  burden of individual litigation makes it economically infeasible and procedurally  impracticable for each member of the Classes to individually seek redress for the wrongs  done to them.  The likelihood of the individual Class members’ prosecuting separate  claims is remote.  Plaintiff is unaware of any other litigation concerning this controversy  already commenced against Defendant by any member of the Classes.    Injunctive Relief:  Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to  the members of Classes A and B, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with  respect to Classes A and B.    Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in  paragraphs 1-34.    By the conduct described above, Defendant committed more than five  thousand (5,000) violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) against Plaintiff and the members of  Class A, to wit: the fax advertisements Defendant sent and/or caused to be sent to  Plaintiff and the members of Class A were either (a) unsolicited and did not contain   notices satisfying the requirements of the TCPA and regulations thereunder, or (b)  solicited and did not contain notices satisfying the requirements of the TCPA and  regulations thereunder.    Plaintiff and the members of Class A are entitled to statutory damages  under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) in an amount greater than two million, five hundred thousand  dollars ($2,500,000).    Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in  paragraphs 1-34.    By the conduct described above, Defendant committed more than five  thousand (5,000) violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) against Plaintiff and the members of  Class B, to wit:  the fax advertisements Defendant sent and/or caused to be sent to  Plaintiff and the members of Class B were unsolicited and did not contain notices  satisfying the requirements of the TCPA and regulations thereunder.    Plaintiff and the members of Class B are entitled to statutory damages  under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) in an amount greater than two million, five hundred thousand  dollars ($2,500,000).    If it is found that Defendant willfully and/or knowingly sent and/or caused  to be sent unsolicited fax advertisements that did not contain notices satisfying the  requirements of the TCPA and regulations thereunder to Plaintiff and the members of  Class B, Plaintiff requests that the Court increase the damage award against Defendant to  three times the amount available under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), as authorized by 47  U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).   Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in  paragraphs 1-34.    Defendant committed thousands of violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b).    Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in  paragraphs 1-34.    By the conduct described above, Defendant committed numerous  violations of GBL § 396-aa against Plaintiff and the members of Class C, to wit: the fax  advertisements Defendant sent and/or caused to be sent to Plaintiff and the members of  Class C were unsolicited and/or did not contain notices satisfying the requirements of  GBL § 396-aa.    Pursuant to GBL § 396-aa, Plaintiff and the members of Class C are  entitled to statutory damages in an amount to be determined at trial. ",lose,1
6166177,lose," In approximately early 2017, Plaintiff began receiving telephone calls on her  cellular telephone number ending in 9464.    These calls came from Defendants’ telephone number 1-800-228-7676.    Defendants, as part of their “Dream Sweepstakes” promotion, place prerecorded  telephone calls to individuals.     These calls also used an automatic telephone dialing system, as evidenced by a brief  and unnatural pause prior to the prerecorded message beginning to play.    These telephone calls contain several advertisements for various products and  services, making the calls telemarketing.    The calls Plaintiff answered contained such prerecorded messages and  advertisements.    Because the calls constitute telemarketing, Defendants were required to obtain prior  express written consent from the persons to whom they made calls.    “Prior express written consent” is specifically defined by statute as:   [A]n agreement, in writing, bearing the signature of the person called that clearly  authorizes the seller to deliver or cause to be delivered to the person called  advertisements or telemarketing messages using an automatic telephone dialing  system or an artificial or prerecorded voice, and the telephone number to which the  signatory authorizes such advertisements or telemarketing messages to be  delivered.     Indeed, a review of the “Dream Sweepstakes” website shows that Defendants’ did  not obtain such consent.    On the main page, there are links to “Home”, “How To Play”, and “Support”.    On the “Home” page, it states “Subscribe now by calling 1_800_228_7676.    There are no written disclosures authorizing Defendants to deliver or cause to be  delivered advertisements or telemarketing messages using an artificial or prerecorded voice.    On the “How to Play” page there are instructions on how to subscribe (but none on  how to opt out). There are no written disclosures authorizing Defendants to deliver or cause to be  delivered advertisements or telemarketing messages using an artificial or prerecorded voice.    On the Support Page, there is a contact form. There are no written disclosures  authorizing Defendants to deliver or cause to be delivered advertisements or telemarketing  messages using an artificial or prerecorded voice.    On the Support Page, however, there is a link to “Official Rules.” This is the only  link to the Official Rules on the site.     The Official Rules page discloses that “by clicking the SUBSCRIBE button, I  hereby consent to receive … pre-recorded telemarketing calls from or on behalf of Intelemedia  Premier Leads, LLC at the telephone number provided above[.]”     There is no “subscribe” button to click, nor is the telephone number provided  anywhere on the site.    In the “How to Enter” section, it states that “[b]y confirming your subscription over  the phone or online at www.dreamsweepstakes.net, you are providing your express written consent  to receive weekly phone numbers to the phone you use to subscribe with[.]”    Notwithstanding the facts that burying consent language in the “Official Rules”  found only on the support page and that simply stating that a telephone call is written consent  cannot override the statutory definition of “written consent”, the language itself is deficient, as it  does not disclose the possibility or pre-recorded telemarketing calls.    Nevertheless, the language quoted above indicates Defendants’ awareness of its  obligations under the TCPA, and its intentional disregard of those obligations.    Plaintiff brings this action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of a proposed class  defined as:  Plaintiff and all persons within the United States to whose telephone  number Defendants placed a prerecorded telemarketing call or to  whose cellular telephone number Defendants placed a call using an  automatic telephone dialing system.  (“Class”)    Excluded from this class are Defendants and any entities in which Defendants have  a controlling interest; Defendants’ agents and employees; any Judge and Magistrate Judge to  whom this action is assigned and any member of their staffs and immediate families, and any  claims for personal injury, wrongful death, and/or emotional distress.    The Class members for whose benefit this action is brought are so numerous that  joinder of all members is impracticable.     The exact number and identities of the persons who fit within the class are  ascertainable in that Defendants maintains written and electronically stored data showing:  a.  The time period(s) during which Defendants placed their calls;  b.  The telephone numbers to which Defendants placed their calls;  c.  The content of the calls;  d.  The equipment and methods for making the calls;    The Class is comprised of hundreds, if not thousands, of individuals nationwide.    Plaintiff is a member of the Class in that Defendants made prerecorded  telemarketing calls made using an automatic telephone dialing system to her cellular telephone.    The claims of Plaintiff are typical of the Class members in that they arise from  Defendants’ uniform conduct and are based on the same legal theories of all Class members.     Plaintiff and all putative Class members have also necessarily suffered actual  damages in addition to statutory damages, as the calls used Class members’ cellular telephone  plans, caused a nuisance to Class members, and invaded Class members’ privacy.    Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to, or in conflict with, the Class.    Plaintiff will thoroughly and adequately protect the interests of the Class, having  retained qualified and competent legal counsel to represent himself and the Class.    Defendants have acted and refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the  Class, thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate for the Class as a whole.    The prosecution of separate actions by individual class members would create a  risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications.    Common questions will predominate, and there will be no unusual manageability  issues.    Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.    Defendants placed prerecorded and autodialed telemarketing telephone calls to  the telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class.    These calls were made in the absence of prior express written consent from  Plaintiff and Class members.    Defendants have therefore violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b).    As a result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the members of the  putative Class are each entitled to, inter alia, a minimum of $500 in damages for each such  violation under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B).    Should the Court determine that Defendants’ conduct was willful and/or knowing,  Plaintiff and each member of the Class are entitled to treble damages in the amount of $1,500 per  call, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).  Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227  (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)  ",lose,3
4538138,win," Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, the subscriber of the cellular  telephone number (715) 245-0640 (the ""0640 Number""). The 0640 Number is, and at all times  mentioned herein was, assigned to a cellular telephone service as specified in 47 U.S.C. §  227 (b )(1 )(A)(iii).    Between in or about early March 2016 and the date of the filing of this Class Action  Complaint, Defendant transmitted or caused to be transmitted, by itself or through an intermediary  or intermediaries, approximately fifty (50) SMS text message advertisements to the 0640 Number  without Plaintiffs express consent, written or otherwise.    The source of each of the unsolicited SMS text messages sent by Defendant to the  0640 Number was ""65017"", which is an SMS short code leased by Defendant or Defendant's  agent(s) or affiliate(s), and is used for operating Defendant's text message marketing program.    The 0640 Number continues to receive Defendant's unsolicited SMS text message  advertisements on a daily basis.    Specifically, Defendant utilized an ""automated telephone dialing system"" because the  SMS messages to the 0640 Number were sent from ""65017"", which is a short code telephone  number used to message consumers en masse, and because the hardware and software used by  Defendant to send such messages have the capacity to store, produce, and dial random or sequential  numbers, and/ or receive and store lists of telephone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse, in  an automated fashion and without human intervention. Defendant's automated dialing equipment  includes features substantially similar to a predictive dialer, inasmuch as it is capable of making  numerous calls and/ or texts simultaneously (all without human intervention).    The complained of SMS messages to the 0640 Number constituted calls not made  for emergency purposes as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(i).    The complained of SMS messages to the 0640 Number constituted telephone  solicitations as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(4).    The complained of SMS messages to the 0640 Number constituted advertisements  as defined by 47 C.F.R. 64.1200(£)(1).    Plaintiff never provided ""prior express written consent"" or any other form of  consent allowing Defendant and/ or any affiliate, subsidiary, or agent of Defendant to transmit SMS  messages to the 0640 Number by means of an ""automatic telephone dialing system,"" within the  meaning of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A). At no time did Plaintiff ever provide Defendant with the 0640  Number.   Defendant, its employees and agents are excluded &om the Class.    Plaintiff reserves the right to modify the definition of the Class (or add one or more  subclasses) after further discovery.    Plaintiff and all Class members have been impacted and harmed by the acts of  Defendant and/ or their affiliates or subsidiaries.    This Class Action Complaint seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages.    This action may properly be brought and maintained as a class action pursuant to  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b). This class action satisfies the numerosity, typicality, adequacy,  commonality, predominance and superiority requirements.    Upon application by Plaintiffs counsel for certification of the Class, the Court may  also be requested to utilize and certify subclasses in the interests of manageability, justice and/ or  judicial economy.    Numerosity. The number of persons within the Class is substantial, believed to  amount to tens of thousands of persons dispersed throughout the United States. It is, therefore,  impractical to join each member of the Class as a named Plaintiff. Further, the size and relatively  modest value of the claims of the individual members of the Class renders joinder impractical.  Accordingly, utilization of the class action mechanism is the most economically feasible means of  determining and adjudicating the merits of this litigation.    Adequacy. As Class representative, the Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to,  or which conflict with, the interests of the absent members of the Class and is able to fairly and  adequately represent and protect the interests of such a Class. Plaintiff has raised viable statutory  claims of the type reasonably expected to be raised by members of the Class, and will vigorously  pursue those claims. If necessary, Plaintiff may seek leave to amend this Class Action Complaint to  add additional Class representatives or assert additional claims.    Competency of qass Counsel. Plaintiff has retained and is represented by  experienced, qualified and competent counsel committed to prosecuting this action. These counsel  are experienced in handling complex class action claims.    Superiority. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and  efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual litigation of the claims of all Class  members is impracticable. Even if every member of the Class could afford to pursue individual  litigation, the Court system could not. It would be unduly burdensome to the courts in which  individual litigation of numerous cases would proceed. Individualized litigation would also present  the potential for varying, inconsistent or contradictory judgments, and would magnify the delay and  expense to all parties and to the court system resulting from multiple trials of the same factual issues.  By contrast, the maintenance of this action as a class action, with respect to some or all of the issues  presented herein, presents few management difficulties, conserves the resources of the parties and of  the court system and protects the rights of each member of the Class. Plaintiff anticipates no  difficulty in the management of this action as a class action. Class wide relief is essential to compel  compliance with the · TCP A. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the  prosecution of separate claims is small because the statutory damages in an individual action for  violation of the TCP A are small. Management of these claims is likely to present significantly fewer  difficulties than are presented in many class claims because the text messages at issue are all  automated and the Class members, by definition, did not provide the prior express written consent  required under the statute to authorize such text messages to their cellular telephones. The Class  members can be readily located and notified of this class action through Defendant's records and, if  necessary, the records of cellular telephone providers.    Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Class Action  Complaint as if fully stated herein.    The foregoing acts and onuss1ons constitute negligent violations of the TCPA,  including but not limited to each of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227.    As a result of the alleged negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, Plaintiff and all  Class members are entitled to, and do seek, injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct violating the  TCP A in the future.    Plaintiff and all Class members are also entitled to, and do seek, an award of $500.00  in statutory damages for each and every SMS message transmitted in violation of the TCP A  pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).    Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Class Action  Complaint as if fully stated herein.    The foregoing acts and omissions constitute knowing and/ or willful violations of the  TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227.    As a result of alleged knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227, Plaintiff  and all Class members are entitled to, and do seek, injunctive relief prohibiting such conduct  violating the TCP A in the future.    Plaintiff and all Class members are also entitled to, and do seek, treble damages of up  to $1,500.00 for each and every SMS message transmitted in violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47  u.s.c. § 227(b)(3).    Plaintiff and Class members also seek an award of attorneys' fees and costs.  KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATION OF THE  TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT  (47 u.s.c. § 227)   NEGLIGENT VIOLATION OF THE TELEPHONE  CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT  (47 u.s.c. § 227)  ",win,3
4584882,win," The Q50 is a luxury sedan that debuted in the United States in  August 2013.  Since then, it has become Infiniti’s best-selling vehicle in the  United States.  More than 40,000 Q50s have been sold in the United States since  its introduction.    This action is brought as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.  23(a) and (b)(3), on behalf of a Class defined as follows:  All persons and entities that purchased or leased a 2014  Infiniti Q50 for end use and not for resale.  Excluded from the Class are: (i) Defendant and its officers and directors,  agents, affiliates, subsidiaries, authorized distributors and dealers, (ii) all Class  Members that timely and validly request exclusion from the Class, and (iii) the  Judge presiding over this action.    Plaintiffs also seek certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and  (b)(3) of the following proposed state classes (“State Classes”):  All persons and entities that purchased or leased a 2014  Infiniti Q50 for end us and not for resale in the State of California.  All persons and entities that purchased or leased a 2014  Infiniti Q50 for end use and not for resale in the State of Nevada.  Excluded from the State Classes are: (i) Defendant and its officers and  directors, agents, affiliates, subsidiaries, authorized distributors and dealers, (ii)  all State Class Members that timely and validly request exclusion from the State  Class, and (iii) the Judge presiding over this action.    Certification of Plaintiffs’ claims for classwide treatment is  appropriate because Plaintiffs can prove the elements of their claims on a  classwide basis using the same evidence as would be used to prove those  elements in individual actions alleging the same claims.    Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the preceding  paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.    Each Plaintiff is a “consumer” within the meaning of the Magnuson  Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3).    Defendant is a “supplier” and “warrantor” within the meaning of the  Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(4)-(5).    The Q50 is a “consumer product” within the meaning of the  Magnuson Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1).    15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1) provides a cause of action for any consumer  that is damaged by the failure of a warrantor to comply with a written warranty.    Defendant’s representations as described herein, such as on  Defendant’s website and brochures, that Plaintiffs and the other Class members  would be able to access the Advertised App/Functions through Q50s’  InTouch  are written warranties within the meaning of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act,   Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the preceding  paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.    Plaintiffs and the other Class members individually formed  contracts with Defendant for the purchase of a Q50 equipped with an InTouch  system.    The contract included terms regarding delivery of an InTouch  system capable of running the Advertised Apps/Functions on a certain date.   Plaintiffs and the other Class members bargained for this term in the sales  contract.    Defendant breached each of these contracts when it failed to deliver  an InTouch system capable of running the Advertised Apps/functions on that  certain date.  Although Defendant eventually delivered portions of the  Advertised Apps/Functions, the delivery was nearly a year overdue and did not  meet specifications.  Plaintiffs and the other Class members have been without  the Advertised Apps/Functions from the time they took delivery to about late- September 2014 at the earliest.  Certain features, including but not limited to  certain music apps and e-mail capabilities are still unavailable or substandard.    Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the preceding  paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.    Defendant’s conduct, as described herein, in misrepresenting Q50s’  technological features and emphasizing Q50s’ InTouch system as capable of  performing certain tasks it was unable to perform, while omitting the fact that  InTouch could not access the Advertised Apps/Functions, violates the California  Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, et seq.   Specifically, Defendant violated the CLRA through advertisements, promotional  material, packaging materials, such as vehicle inserts, and statements by  salespersons when it portrayed the InTouch system as capable of interfacing with  several popular mobile phone apps, by engaging in the following practices  proscribed by California Civil Code § 1770(a) in transactions that were intended  to result in, and did result in, the sale of the product:  a.  representing that the Q50 has characteristics, uses and  benefits which it does not have;  b.  representing that the Q50 is of a particular standard, quality,  or grade, when it is not;  c.  advertising the Q50 with intent not to sell it as advertised; and  d.  representing that the Q50 has been supplied in accordance  with previous representations when it has not.    Plaintiffs reallege and incorporate by reference the preceding  paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.   Breach of Express Warranty  (National Class or, in the Alternative, the California Class)   Breach of Contract under California Law  (National Class or, in the Alternative, the California Class)   The Q50 and the InTouch System   Violation of the California Consumers Legal Remedies Act  (National Class or, in the Alternative, the California Class)   Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law  (National Class or, in the Alternative, the California Class)   Violation of Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act  (National Class or, in the Alternative, Each State Class)  ",win,3
8385853,win,"In accordance with F.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3), plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to the JFPA, on behalf of the following class of persons: All persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, (2) were sent telephone facsimile messages of material advertising the commercial availability of any property, goods, or services by or on behalf of defendant, (3) from whom defendant did not obtain prior express permission or invitation to send those faxes, and (4) did not display a proper opt-out notice. Excluded from the Class are the defendant, their employees, agents and members of the Judiciary.  Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the class definition upon completion of class certification discovery.  Class Size (F.R.Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of persons and entities of the Plaintiff Class is numerous and joinder of all members is impracticable.  Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon such information and belief avers, that the number of class members is at least forty.  a statement that the sender must honor a recipient’s opt-out request within 30 days and the sender’s failure to do so is unlawful - thereby encouraging recipients to opt-out, if they did not want future faxes, by advising them that their opt-out requests will have legal “teeth”;  Fair and Adequate Representation (F.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4)): The plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class.  It is interested in this matter, has no conflicts and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the class.  Need for Consistent Standards and Practical Effect of Adjudication (F.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(1)): Class certification is appropriate because the prosecution of individual actions by class members would: (a) create the risk of inconsistent adjudications that could establish incompatible standards of conduct fo the defendant and/or (b) as a practical matter, adjudication of the plaintiff’s claims will be dispositive of the interests of class members who are not parties.  Common Conduct (F.R.Civ.P.23(b)(2)): Class certification is also appropriate because the defendant has acted and refused to act in the same or similar manner with respect to all class members thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate.  The plaintiff demands such relief as authorized by 47 U.S.C. § 227.  The JFPA makes unlawful for any person to “use any telephone facsimile machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited advertisement...” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C).   26. The JFPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods or services which is transmitted to any person without that person’s prior express invitation or permission in writing or otherwise.” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(5).  Opt-Out Notice Requirements.  The JFPA strengthened the prohibitions against the sending of unsolicited advertisements by requiring, in §(b)(1)(C)(iii) of the Act, that senders of faxed advertisements place a clear and conspicuous notice on the first page of the transmission that contains the following among other things (hereinafter collectively the “Opt-Out Notice Requirements”):  The fax defendant sent on February 5, 2015 a facsimile transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to the telephone facsimile machines of plaintiff and members of the plaintiff class.  The fax constituted an advertisement under the Act.  Defendant failed to comply with the Opt-Out Requirements in connection with the Fax.  The Fax was transmitted to persons or entities without their prior express permission or invitation and/or Defendant are precluded from asserting any prior express permission or invitation because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements.  By virtue thereof, defendant violated the JFPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder by sending the Fax via facsimile transmission to plaintiff and members of the class.  a statement advising the recipient that he or she may opt-out with respect to all of his or her facsimile telephone numbers and not just the ones that receive a faxed advertisements from the sender - thereby instructing a recipient on how to make a valid opt-out request for all of his or her fax machines; The requirement of (1) above is incorporated from §(b)(D)(ii) of the Act.  The requirement of (2) above is incorporated from §(b(D)(ii) of the Act and rules and regulations of the Federal Communications Commission (the “FCC”) in ¶31 of its 2006 Report and Order (In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, Junk Prevention Act ov 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 3787, 2006 WL 901720, which rules and regulations took effect on August 1, 2006).  The requirements of (3) above are contained in §(b)(2)(E) of the Act and incorporated into the Opt-Out Notice requirements via §(b)(2)(D)(ii).  Compliance with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements is neither difficult no costly.  The Opt-Out Notice Requirements are important consumer protections bestowed by Congress upon the owners of fax machines giving them the right and means to stop unwanted faxed advertisements.  The TCPA/JFPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf of plaintiff and the plaintiff class to redress defendant’s violations of the Act and provides for statutory damages.  47 U.S.C. §227(b)(3).  The Act also provides that the injunctive relief is appropriate.  Id.  The JFPA is a strict liability statute, so the defendant are liable to plaintiff and the other class members even if their actions were only negligent.  The defendant knew or should have known that (a) the plaintiff and the other class members had not given express invitation or permission for the defendant or anybody else to fax advertisements about the defendant’s goods or services; (b) defendant transmitted an advertisements; and (c) the faxes did not contain the required Opt-Out Notice. ",lose,2
14757956,lose," On or about February 15, 2019, Defendant caused the following automated text message  to be transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 1175 (“1175 Number”):    Long codes work as follows: Private companies known as SMS gateway providers have  contractual arrangements with mobile carriers to transmit two-way SMS traffic. These SMS gateway  providers send and receive SMS traffic to and from the mobile phone networks' SMS centers, which  are responsible for relaying those messages to the intended mobile phone. This allows for the  transmission of a large number of SMS messages to and from a long code.    The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant’s text message, demonstrates that  Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages.      To send the text messages, Defendant used a messaging platform (the “Platform”) that  permitted Defendant to transmit thousands of automated text messages without any human  involvement.      The Platform has the capacity to store telephone numbers, which capacity was in fact  utilized by Defendant.    The Platform has the capacity to generate sequential numbers, which capacity was in  fact utilized by Defendant.    The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers in sequential order, which capacity was  in fact utilized by Defendant.      The Platform has the capacity to dial numbers from a list of numbers, which capacity  was in fact utilized by Defendant.    The Platform has the capacity to schedule the time and date for future transmission of  text messages, which occurs without any human involvement.    Additionally, the Platform has an auto-reply function that results in the transmission of  text messages to individual’s cellular telephones automatically from the system, and with no human  intervention, in response to a keyword (e.g. “STOP”) being sent by a consumer, which function was  also utilized by Defendant on February 17, 2019. As shown below:    The above execution these instructions occurred seamlessly, with no human  intervention, and almost instantaneously.  Indeed, the Platform is capable of transmitting thousands of  text messages following the above steps in minutes, if not less.      Further, the Platform “throttles” the transmission of the text messages depending on  feedback it receives from the mobile carrier networks.  In other words, the platform controls how  quickly messages are transmitted depending on network congestion.  The platform performs this  throttling function automatically and does not allow a human to control the function.    The following graphic summarizes the above steps and demonstrates that the dialing of  the text messages at issue was done by the Platform automatically and without any human intervention:     Defendant’s unsolicited text message caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion  of her privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion.  Defendant’s  text message also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to his daily life.   Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of  herself and all others similarly situated.    Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of the below defined Class:  All persons within the United States who, within the four  years prior to the filing of this Complaint, were sent a text  message using the same type of equipment used to text  message Plaintiff, from Defendant or anyone on  Defendant’s behalf, to said person’s cellular telephone  number.      Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not  know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class members number in the several  thousands, if not more.   The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s  claim that Defendants routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular  telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of  being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case.   Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth  herein.     It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for  emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any  automatic telephone dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone  service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).     The TCPA defines an “automatic telephone dialing system” (hereinafter “ATDS”)  as “equipment which has the capacity – (A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called,  using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.”  Id. at § 227(a)(1).    These calls were made without regard to whether Defendant had first obtained  express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior  express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class  when its calls were made.     Defendant violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an automatic  telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff  and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express consent.    Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)  (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)  ",lose,2
4370453,win,"ERIC is the owner of commercial property located at 4600 Lancaster Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19131 (“Subject Property” or “Property”), as well as other commercial properties in Philadelphia and Pennsylvania (“ERIC Properties”).  On or around January 25, 2012, Seneca issued Policy No. SSP1501079, an all-risk commercial property policy (“Policy”), to ERIC. A true and correct copy of the Policy is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit “A.”  The ERIC Properties, including the Subject Property, are each separately enumerated on the declarations page of the Policy.  The Subject Property’s “Limit of Insurance” is listed at $212,180.  The Policy provides for replacement cost coverage, but allows ERIC to, at its option, recover on an actual cash value (when abbreviated, “ACV”) basis.  Most pertinently to this litigation, the Policy includes a coinsurance term providing that, if the insured fails to purchase high enough limits, it must act as a co-insurer in the event of a loss. See Exhibit A, page 46.  It is well understood and accepted in the insurance industry that there will be many instances in which an insured will “do better” by recovering on an actual cash value basis than a replacement cost basis, because, where the recovery is on an actual cash value basis, the coinsurance penalty similarly calculated on actual cash value is limited or nonexistent. II.  On August 23, 2012, a motor vehicle crashed into the Property, causing it to sustain substantial damage.  ERIC notified Seneca of the loss in a timely and proper fashion, and the claim was assigned Claim No. 12HHN260 (“Claim”).  In its handling of the Claim, Seneca has breached the terms and conditions of the Policy and acted in bad faith.  Seneca determined that the replacement cost value of the Property at the time of the loss was $395,486, ERIC was required to carry limits of $356,261, and ERIC would therefore only be able to recover 59.56% of the damages it sustained.  This would only be correct if ERIC was making a claim for replacement cost value.  Other insurance companies interpret coinsurance provisions in this manner; that is, when a claim is made on actual cash value basis, the required amount of coverage to avoid a coinsurance penalty is similarly calculated on an actual cash value basis.  One reason for this, among others, is that an insured pays extra for replacement cost coverage, so presumably it is receiving more coverage not less than if the insured purchased only an actual cash value policy.  Moreover, courts have uniformly held that when an insured elects coverage under an actual cash value basis, the replacement coverage provisions are irrelevant.  On December 10, 2012, Seneca issued a letter to ERIC’s public adjuster improperly rejecting ERIC’s Claim (“December 10 Letter”). A true and correct copy of the December 10 Letter is attached to this Complaint as Exhibit “B.”  According to Seneca, “Although the policy permits the insured to submit its claim on an actual cash value basis, that option does not alter the method by which the ‘value of the covered property’ is determined for purposes of calculating coinsurance.” See Exhibit B, page 5.  This is simply untrue.  Seneca then reiterated that the replacement cost value of the Property at the time of the loss was $395,486, ERIC was required to carry limits of $356,261, and ERIC would therefore only be able to recover 59.56% of the damages it sustained. See Exhibit B, pages 5-6.  Seneca’s interpretation of its Policy is arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, contrary to the plain language of the Policy and the reasonable expectations of its insured, and in bad faith; if such an interpretation were to stand, Seneca would in effect have been charging a higher premium to its insureds for less coverage.  On information and belief, Seneca has interpreted its policies in this manner with regard to hundreds, if not thousands, of insureds throughout the country who elected to make a claim on an ACV basis. This action is being brought as a class action under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), 23(b)(l), 23(b)(2), and 23(b)(3), on behalf of a class (“Class”) consisting of the following: All Seneca policyholders and insureds that, following a property loss, have elected to recover on an actual cash value basis, and have been assessed a coinsurance penalty based upon the replacement cost of the property.  The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(1).  The exact size of the Class and the members thereof are ascertainable through Seneca’s business records.  Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over any questions effecting solely individual members of the Class. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2).  The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the Class, as the Plaintiff and all other members of the Class were damaged in the same way. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(3).  The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Class, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class action litigation. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4).  The Plaintiff and its counsel are committed to vigorously pursuing this matter, and have the financial resources to do so.  The Plaintiff has no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with those of the Class.  A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3).  Since the damage suffered by individual class members may be relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it virtually impossible for the Class members individually to seek redress for the unlawful conduct alleged.  Moreover, as set forth above, common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and predominate over any questions that solely effect individual members of the Class. See id. These common questions include the question of whether Seneca’s method of calculating a coinsurance penalty is wrongful.  The Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this litigation that would preclude its maintenance as a class action. The Policy is a valid and enforceable contract between ERIC, on the one hand, and Seneca, on the other hand.  The members of the Class also possess (and/or possessed) valid and enforceable contracts with Seneca.  ERIC has complied with all of the applicable terms and conditions of the Policy.  The members of the Class also complied with all of the applicable terms and conditions of their contracts with Seneca.  Seneca has breached the Policy (and the policies it issued to members of the Class) by, among other things, using the irrelevant replacement cost of a property, rather than the applicable actual cash value, to calculate whether enough insurance had been purchased.  The aforesaid breach has directly and proximately caused ERIC and the members of the Class to sustain damages. The Plaintiff repeats each of the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.  Seneca has no actual basis for declining full coverage to ERIC and the members of the Class.  Seneca has acted in bad faith by knowingly taking actions that lacked a reasonable basis, and frivolously and unfoundedly refusing to pay policy proceeds due and owing to policyholders, including ERIC and the members of the Class.  Seneca’s actions run contrary to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8371 and other applicable statutes and common law governing first-party bad faith.  This is a class action brought on behalf of the Plaintiff and all Seneca policyholders and insureds that, following a property loss, have elected to recover on an actual cash value basis, and have been assessed a “coinsurance penalty” based upon the property’s replacement cost.  I. ",win,4
6516758,win," Plaintiff sent Defendant written communication dated August 7, 2012, and  demanded that Defendant cease and desist from any and all further communications with  Plaintiff.  (See August 7, 2012 Correspondence, attached as Exhibit A).    Defendant received Plaintiff’s cease and desist correspondence on August 14,  2012 at 8:32 A.M.  (See USPS Delivery Confirmation, attached as Exhibit B).    During the September 17, 2012 telephone call, Plaintiff answered and listened to a  pre-recorded message until Plaintiff was transferred to a live person.    During the September 17, 2012 telephone call, Plaintiff spoke with Defendant and  again demanded that Defendant cease and desist from placing any and all further calls to  Plaintiff.    During the September 17, 2012 conversation, Defendant advised Plaintiff that it  would remove her name from its calling list.    Despite Plaintiff’s repeated cease and desist demands, Defendant placed calls to  Plaintiff on September 18, 2012 at 8:54 A.M., September 18, 2012 at 12:25 P.M, October 2,  2012 at 3:04 P.M., October 9, 2012 at 12:10 P.M., October 10, 2012 at 9:56 A.M., October 10,  2012 at 10:42 A.M., October 11, 2012 at 6:36 P.M. and October 15, 2012 at 5:41 P.M.    Upon information and good-faith belief, Defendant placed the telephone calls  identified above to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number using an automatic telephone dialing  system and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice.    Defendant did not place any telephone calls to Plaintiff for emergency purposes.    Defendant did not have Plaintiff’s prior express consent to make any telephone  calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number—any consent, if it existed, having been expressly  revoked via the August 7, 2012 letter and again during the September 17, 2012 conversation.    Upon information and good-faith belief, Defendant placed the telephone calls  identified above to Plaintiff voluntarily.    Upon information and good-faith belief, Defendant placed the telephone calls  identified above to Plaintiff under its own free will.    Upon information and good-faith belief, Defendant had knowledge that it was  using an automatic telephone dialing system and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice to make  and/or place each of the telephone calls identified above.    Upon information and good-faith belief, Defendant intended to use an automatic  telephone dialing system and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice to make and/or place each of  the telephone calls identified above.   The proposed Class specifically excludes the United States of America, the State  of Texas, counsel for the parties, the presiding United States District Court Judge, the Judges of  the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and the Justices of the United States  Supreme Court, any entity in which Defendant has or had a controlling interest, all officers and  agents of Defendant, and all persons related to within the third degree of consanguinity or  affection to any of the foregoing individuals.    The Class is averred to be so numerous that joinder of all members is  impracticable.      The exact number of members of the Class is unknown to Plaintiff at this time  and can be ascertained only through appropriate discovery.      Upon information and good-faith belief, the proposed Class is ascertainable in  that the names and addresses of all members of the Class can be identified in business records  maintained by Defendant.      Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class she seeks  to represent.    Plaintiff and all members of the Class’s claims originate from the same conduct,  practice, and procedure on the part of Defendant, and Plaintiff possesses the same interests and  has suffered the same injuries as each Class member.  Like all proposed members of the Class,  Plaintiff received telephone calls from Defendant using an automatic telephone dialing system,  and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice, in violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227.  Thus, if brought and  prosecuted individually, the claims of each of the members of the Class would require proof of  the same material and substantive facts.    Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the  Class and has no interests that are contrary to or in conflict with the members of the Class.    Plaintiff is willing and prepared to serve this Court and the proposed Class.    Plaintiff has retained the services of counsel who are experienced and competent  in consumer protection claims, as well as complex class action litigation, will adequately  prosecute this action, and will assert, protect, and otherwise represent Plaintiff and all absent  Class members.    The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the proposed Class  would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members  of the Class, which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the parties opposing  the Class.  Such incompatible standards of conduct and varying adjudications, on what would  necessarily be the same essential facts, proof, and legal theories, would also create and allow the  existence of inconsistent and incompatible rights within the Class.    Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) in that Defendant  has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the proposed Class, making final  declaratory or injunctive relief appropriate.    Class certification is appropriate under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) in that the  questions of law and fact that are common to members of the proposed Class predominate over  any questions affecting only individual members.    There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as a class action.    Absent a class action, Defendant’s violations of the law will be allowed to  proceed without a full, fair, judicially supervised remedy.    Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation above.    Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) by utilizing an automatic  telephone dialing system and/or an artificial or prerecorded voice to make and/or place telephone  calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number.    Defendant willingly or knowingly violated 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) as  Defendant was advised that it did not have consent to call Plaintiff’s cellular telephone on two  separate occasions, yet repeatedly used an automatic telephone dialing system and/or an artificial  or prerecorded voice to make and/or place telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone  number anyway.   VIOLATION OF 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(a)(iii)  ",win,4
18507112,win," On or about August 14, 2020, Defendant caused a call with a prerecorded message to  be transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number ending in 9590 (the “9590 Number”).    Because Plaintiff did not answer her telephone after it rang, a voicemail containing  a prerecorded message was left on Plaintiff’s phone.    The following is a transcript of the voicemail that was left in Plaintiff’s voicemail  box:  Hey, it’s me. I’m really sorry that I’m calling again, but I forgot to  tell that you that I’m going to the new recreational dispensary  tomorrow called Doja. They’re in Portage and they are giving out  like a free 50-inch TV and like free tacos for an entire year from  Taco Bob’s and I really want to get out there. I don’t want to miss  it. So you should meet up with me tomorrow like a little before  eleven because they are going to be really busy. I think they are on  like 4203 East Centre Avenue. If you can’t make it just give me a  holler, but otherwise I just wanted to let you know why I’m going  to be a little late tomorrow. Alright, talk soon. Bye.     The prerecorded call at issue, which was left as a voicemail, was transmitted to  Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, and within the time frame relevant to this action.    Defendant’s prerecorded calls constitute telemarketing because they encourage the  future purchase or investment in property, goods, and/or services, i.e., selling cannabis products.    The prerecorded calls Plaintiff received originated from telephone number 269- 459-6462, a telephone number owned and/or operated by or on behalf of Defendant.    Plaintiff received the subject call with a prerecorded voice within this judicial  district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon  information and belief, Defendant caused other prerecorded messages to be sent to individuals  residing within this judicial district.    At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with her express consent to be  contacted with a prerecorded call.    Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 9590 Number and is financially  responsible for phone service to the 9590 Number.    Defendant’s unsolicited prerecorded call caused Plaintiff actual harm, including  invasion of her privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion.  See Patriotic Veterans, Inc. v. Zoeller, No. 16- 2059, 2017 WL 25482, at *2 (7th Cir. Jan. 3, 2017)  (“Every call uses some of the phone owner's time and mental energy, both of which are precious.”).    Defendant’s unsolicited voice messages caused Plaintiff actual harm.  Specifically,  Plaintiff estimates that she has wasted fifteen minutes reviewing all of Defendant’s unwanted  messages.  Each time, Plaintiff had to stop what she was doing to either retrieve her phone and/or  look down at the phone to review the message.     Defendant’s voice messages also can slow cell phone performance by taking up space  on the recipient phone’s memory. See https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0350-text-message- spam#text (finding that spam text messages can slow cell phone performance by taking up phone  memory space).   Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of  herself and all others similarly situated.    Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a Class defined as follows:  No Consent Class: All persons within the United States who, within the  four years prior to the filing of this Complaint, were sent a call using an  artificial or prerecorded voice, from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s  behalf, to said person’s cellular telephone number, without emergency  purpose and without the recipient’s prior express written consent.    Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not  know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several  thousands, if not more.   There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate  over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class.  Among the questions of law and  fact common to the Class are:  (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency prerecorded telemarketing calls to  Plaintiff’s and Class members’ cellular telephones;  (2) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express  written consent to make such calls;  (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful;  (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and  (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future.    The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s  claim that Defendant routinely transmits prerecorded messages to telephone numbers assigned to  cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims  capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case.   Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth  herein.     It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for  emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any  automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice … to any telephone  number assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).     Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – transmitted calls using an  artificial or prerecorded voice to the cellular telephone numbers of Plaintiff and members of the  putative class.      These calls were made without regard to whether Defendant had first obtained  express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior  express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class  when its calls were made.     Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an  artificial or prerecorded voice to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of  Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express consent.     Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and  knew or should have known that it was using an artificial or prerecorded voice. The violations  were therefore willful or knowing.     Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and the other  members of the putative Class had not given prior express consent to receive its prerecorded calls  to their cellular telephones the Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to  Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA.    Plaintiff re-allege and incorporates paragraphs 1-50 as if fully set forth herein.    At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as  alleged herein violated the TCPA.    Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to transmit artificial or  prerecorded voice calls, and knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the  Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)  (On Behalf of Plaintiffs and the Class)   PROPOSED CLASS   Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)  (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)  ",win,3
16330858,win," Defendant’s text messages were transmitted to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone, and within  the time frame relevant to this action.      Defendant’s text messages constitute telemarketing because they encouraged the future  purchase or investment in property, goods, or services, i.e., selling Plaintiff group fitness classes.         The information contained in the text message advertises Defendant’s “Special  Memorial Day sales” and “Special Labor Day Sale”, which Defendant sends to promote its business.    Plaintiff received the subject texts within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s  violation of the TCPA occurred within this district.  Upon information and belief, Defendant caused  other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district.      Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 2385 Number, and is financially  responsible for phone service to the 2385 Number.     The impersonal and generic nature of Defendant’s text messages demonstrates that  Defendant utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages.  See Jenkins v. LL Atlanta, LLC, No. 1:14- cv-2791-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30051, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2016) (“These assertions,  combined with the generic, impersonal nature of the text message advertisements and the use of a short  code, support an inference that the text messages were sent using an ATDS.”) (citing Legg v. Voice  Media Grp., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to infer  text messages were sent using ATDS; use of a short code and volume of mass messaging alleged would  be impractical without use of an ATDS); Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D.  Cal. 2010) (finding it ""plausible"" that defendants used an ATDS where messages were advertisements  written in an impersonal manner and sent from short code); Hickey v. Voxernet LLC, 887 F. Supp. 2d  1125, 1130; Robbins v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 13-CV-132-IEG NLS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72725, 2013  WL 2252646, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2013) (observing that mass messaging would be impracticable  without use of an ATDS)).      The text messages originated from telephone number 727-888-6781, a number which  upon information and belief is owned and operated by Defendant.    The number used by Defendant (727-888-6781) is known as a “long code,” a standard  10-digit phone number that enabled Defendant to send SMS text messages en masse, while deceiving  recipients into believing that the message was personalized and sent from a telephone number operated  by an individual.      Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendant utilized a combination of hardware  and software systems to send the text messages at issue in this case.  The systems utilized by Defendant  have the capacity to store telephone numbers using a random or sequential generator, and to dial such  numbers without human intervention.      Defendant’s unsolicited text messages caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion  of his privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion.  Defendant’s  text messages also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to his daily life.     Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of  himself and all others similarly situated.    Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a Class defined as follows:  All persons within the United States who, within the four  years prior to the filing of this Complaint, were sent a text  message, from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s  behalf, to said person’s cellular telephone number,  advertising Defendant’s services, without the recipients’  prior express written consent.      Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not  know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class members number in the several  thousands, if not more.   There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which predominate  over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class.  Among the questions of law and  fact common to the Class are:  (1) Whether Defendant made non-emergency calls to Plaintiff’s and Class  members’ cellular telephones using an ATDS;  (2) Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior  express written consent to make such calls;  (3) Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful;  (4) Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and  (5) Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future.    The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s  claim that Defendant routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular  telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of  being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case.   Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth  herein.     Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used equipment having the  capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make non-emergency telephone calls to  the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined below.     These calls were made without regard to whether or not Defendant had first  obtained express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not  have prior express consent to call the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative  Class when its calls were made.     Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an  automatic telephone dialing system to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of  Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express written consent.    Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls, and  knew or should have known that it was using equipment that at constituted an automatic telephone  dialing system. The violations were therefore willful or knowing.     Plaintiff re-allege and incorporate paragraphs 1-46 as if fully set forth herein.    At all times relevant, Defendant knew or should have known that its conduct as  alleged herein violated the TCPA.    Defendant knew that it did not have prior express consent to make these calls and  knew or should have known that its conduct was a violation of the TCPA.    Because Defendant knew or should have known that Plaintiff and Class Members  had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls, the Court should treble the  amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class  pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA.   Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)  (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)   PROPOSED CLASS   Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)  (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)  ",win,4
6084483,win," Ms. Meadows files this case as an “opt-in” collective action, as is specifically  allowed by the collective action provisions of the FLSA (See, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)).    For purposes of this action, the “relevant period” or “class period” is the period of  time commencing on the date that is three years prior to the filing of this action, and continuing  thereafter until time of trial.    Ms. Meadows, for instance, routinely worked 42 to 44 hours a week during each  workweek of her employment with KPMG.  She was termed a “Seasonal, Professional Level”  employee, but KPMG never intended her employment to be seasonal, sporadic or part-time.    Other similarly situated employees have, and are, being denied their lawful  overtime wages by having to work hours off-the-clock and by being required to certify that they  have worked exactly 40 hours each and every week of their employment. Thus, Plaintiff’s  experience is typical of the experience of members of the Plaintiff Class as it pertains to unpaid  overtime wages and unpaid employment benefits.    The job titles or specific job requirements of the numerous members of the Plaintiff  Class do not prevent collective treatment because each non-exempt employee, regardless of job  title, job requirements, or rate of pay, who was / is denied overtime compensation for hours worked  in excess of 40 in one or more workweek is similarly situated to Plaintiff, resulting solely from  Defendant’s deliberate denial of overtime wages by way of a systematic and consistently applied  company policy in violation of the FLSA.    Further, although the quantum of damages may vary among the individual members  of the Plaintiff Class, there is no detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts.    Thus, the unpaid overtime class Ms. Meadows seeks to represent is comprised of  all current and former employees that KPMG LLP employed as hourly or non-exempt workers     1) who were categorized as “Seasonal, Professional Level” employees; 2) who were based in,  and/or worked in the United States during any workweek falling within the class period; 3) who  worked off-the-clock hours during any workweek falling within the class period; and 4) who were  not paid their overtime wages during any workweek falling within the class period.    Each individual who opts into this litigation will be added as a party, evidenced by  the timely filing of his or her written consent to join this collective action.  V.   During the relevant period, Defendant has been subject to the requirements of the  FLSA.    On October 29, 2013, KPMG offered Ms. Meadows employment (See Offer Letter  attached hereto as Exhibit – A).  Among other things, the Offer Letter stated that Ms. Meadows  would be compensated at a rate of $80.00 per hour; that she was a non-exempt employee for  purposes of federal wage-hour law; and that KPMG would deduct and withhold income, social  security and Medicare taxes from her compensation (and presumably, she would receive an IRS  Form W-2 on an annual basis, which she did). Id.    The Offer Letter further stated that “As an employee who will work less than 1,000  hours a year, you will not be eligible for firm provided benefits (unless required by applicable  law). In the event that you work 1,000 hours or more during a calendar year with approval from  your manager, your status may be changed, and you may then become eligible for firm provided  benefits.” Id.    Further, KPMG claimed to employ Ms. Meadows as a “Seasonal, Professional  Level” employee based out of Houston, Texas. However, as noted above, there was nothing  seasonal, sporadic or part-time about Ms. Meadows’ employment.    Ms. Meadows worked for KPMG from November 11, 2013, until September 30,  2016. During this time, she was termed a “Contract Recruiting Manager” (November 11, 2013 –  March 15, 2016), and as “Research Manager” (March 16, 2016 – September 30, 2016).    On average, Ms. Meadows worked between 42 and 44 hours a week, but KPMG  required her to report only 40 of those hours on her timesheet each week.  She was repeatedly,  purposefully and willfully required to underreport her weekly hours worked in violation of the  FLSA, despite knowing full well that her job duties could not be completed within 40 hours a  week.    When Ms. Meadows asked to be paid her overtime wages, KPMG’s management  refused to address the matter.    Admittedly, no FLSA exemption applied to Ms. Meadows’ employment, and  Plaintiff now sues for her unpaid wages.    Thus, as victims of a common and uniformly applied policy that violated the FLSA,  Plaintiff and all other similarly situated non-exempt employees of the Defendant may properly be  joined as a class under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).    Plaintiff and all other similarly situated employees now sue KPMG, as a class, for  their unpaid overtime wages owed to them under the FLSA.  VI. ",lose,3
59874136,win," Plaintiff had an account with AT&T Mobility.     Thereafter, AT&T Mobility claimed Plaintiff incurred a debt of $82.42 (“the  alleged Debt”).     Defendant alleges Plaintiff owes a debt (“the alleged Debt”).    The alleged Debt is an alleged obligation of Plaintiff to pay money arising out of a  transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the  transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.    The alleged Debt does not arise from any business enterprise of Plaintiff.    The alleged Debt is a “debt” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).    At an exact time known only to Defendant, the alleged Debt was assigned or  otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection.     At the time the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for  collection, the alleged Debt was in default.    In its efforts to collect the alleged Debt, Defendant decided to contact Plaintiff by  written correspondence.    Rather than preparing and mailing such written correspondence to Plaintiff on its  own, Defendant decided to utilize a third-party vendor to perform such activities on its behalf.    As part of its utilization of the third-party vendor, Defendant conveyed information  regarding the alleged Debt to the third-party vendor.  4    The information conveyed by Defendant to the third-party vendor included  Plaintiff’s status as a debtor, the precise amount of the alleged Debt, the entity to which Plaintiff  allegedly owed the debt, among other things.     Defendant’s conveyance of the information regarding the alleged Debt to the third- party vendor is a “communication” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2).    The third-party vendor then populated some or all this information into a prewritten  template, printed, and mailed the letter to Plaintiff at Defendant’s direction.    That letter, dated June 10, 2020, was received and read by Plaintiff.  (A true and  accurate copy of that collection letter (the “Letter”) is annexed hereto as “Exhibit 1.”)    The Letter, which conveyed information about the alleged Debt, is a  “communication” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2).    The Letter was the initial written communication Plaintiff received from Defendant  concerning the alleged Debt.   Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein.      15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) provides that, subject to several exceptions not applicable  here, “a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt,” with  anyone other than the consumer “without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the  debt collector.”    The third-party vendor does not fall within any of the exceptions provided for in 15  U.S.C. § 1692c(b).    Plaintiff never consented to Defendant’s communication with the third-party  vendor concerning the alleged Debt.  5    Plaintiff never consented to Defendant’s communication with the third-party  vendor concerning Plaintiff’s personal and/or confidential information.    Plaintiff never consented to Defendant’s communication with anyone concerning  the alleged Debt or concerning Plaintiff’s personal and/or confidential information.    Upon information and belief, Defendant has utilized a third-party vendor for these  purposes thousands of times.    Defendant utilizes a third-party vendor in this regard for the sole purpose of  maximizing its profits.    Defendant utilizes a third-party vendor without regard to the propriety and privacy  of the information which it discloses to such third-party.    Defendant utilizes a third-party vendor with reckless disregard for the harm to  Plaintiff and other consumers that could result from Defendant’s unauthorized disclosure of such  private and sensitive information.    Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) when it disclosed information about  Plaintiff’s alleged Debt to the third-party vendor.    15 U.S.C. § 1692f provides that a debt collector may not use unfair or  unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.      The unauthorized disclosure of a consumer’s private and sensitive information is  both unfair and unconscionable.    Defendant disclosed Plaintiff’s private and sensitive information to the third-party  vendor.      Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) when it disclosed information about  Plaintiff’s alleged Debt to the third-party vendor.  6    For the foregoing reasons, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(b) and 1692f  and is liable to Plaintiff therefor.   Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all  consumers similarly situated in the State of New York.    Plaintiff seeks to certify a class of:  i. All consumers where Defendant sent information concerning the  consumer’s debt to a third-party vendor without obtaining the prior  consent of the consumer, which disclosure was made on or after a date  one year prior to the filing of this action to the present.    This action seeks a finding that Defendant’s conduct violates the FDCPA and asks  that the Court award damages as authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k.    The Class consists of more than thirty-five persons.    Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class.  Common questions of law  or fact raised by this action affect all members of the Class and predominate over any individual  issues.  Common relief is therefore sought on behalf of all members of the Class.  A class action is  superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy.    The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would  create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the  Class, and a risk that any adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class would, as  a practical matter, either be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class not party to  the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.  Defendant  has acted in a manner applicable to the Class as a whole such that declaratory relief is warranted.    Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the Class.  The management of the class is not extraordinarily difficult, and the factual and legal issues raised  7  by this action will not require extended contact with the members of the Class, because Defendant’s  conduct was perpetrated on all members of the Class and will be established by common proof.   Moreover, Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in actions brought under consumer protection  laws.  Violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) and § 1692f  ",win,3
39239088,lose," Supercuts has over 2,700 salons across the U.S. that provide haircut services to  consumers that are either corporate-owned or owned by a franchisee.3     As part of its business practice, Supercuts places solicitation text messages to  consumers in order to solicit them to purchase haircutting services from Supercuts locations  across the country.    For example, in Plaintiff Shipman’s case, Defendant sent multiple unsolicited text  messages to his number registered on the national do not call registry.    Consumers have posted complaints online about unsolicited text messages they  received from Supercuts including:  • “Spam text from Supercuts”4  • “Received a text asking to reply Y to sign up for rewards at Supercuts….Delete”5    In response to these text messages, Plaintiff Shipman files this lawsuit seeking  monetary and injunctive relief requiring the Defendant to cease from violating the Telephone  Consumer Protection Act, as well as an award of statutory damages to the members of the Class  and costs.   Plaintiff Shipman registered his phone number on the DNC on August 27, 2011.    Plaintiff Shipman’s phone number is not associated with a business and is used  for personal use only.    At the beginning of November 2020, Plaintiff Shipman received an unsolicited  text message from Supercuts using shortcode 71441 stating, “Supercuts Supercuts Pick 2! Get  your coupon at: https://mcpn.us/x?i=904894&c=13f27 OR to redeem by text reply: 81703.”    On December 14, 2020 at 9:03 AM, Plaintiff Shipman received a fourth  unsolicited text message from Supercuts, again from shortcode 71441:    None of the text messages that Plaintiff received provide instructions on how to  opt-out of receiving additional text messages.    When the links in any of the first 3 text messages that Plaintiff received are  visited, they showed 2 coupons that Plaintiff could redeem until the end of November 2020.     The December 14th text message shows that the coupon can be redeemed until  the end of December 2020 and is valid at participating locations without indicating any specific  location.    Plaintiff has never provided Defendant with consent to send him unsolicited text  messages or calls to his cell phone.    The unauthorized solicitation text messages that Plaintiff received from  Supercuts, as alleged herein, have harmed Plaintiff Shipman in the form of annoyance, nuisance,  and invasion of privacy, and disturbed the use and enjoyment of his phone, in addition to the  wear and tear on the phone’s hardware (including the phone’s battery) and the consumption of  memory on the phone.     Plaintiff Shipman brings this action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure  23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) and seek certification of the following Class:  Do Not Call Registry Class: All persons in the United States who from four years prior  to the filing of this action through class certification (1) Defendant (or an agent acting on  behalf of the Defendant) texted more than one time, (2) within any 12-month period, (3)  where the person’s telephone number had been listed on the National Do Not Call  Registry for at least thirty days, (4) for substantially the same reason Defendant texted  Plaintiff, and (5) for whom Defendant claims (a) they obtained prior express written  consent in the same manner as Defendant claim they supposedly obtained prior express  written consent to text Plaintiff, or (b) they did not obtain prior express written consent.    The following individuals are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or  Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, their  subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which either Defendant or its  parents have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors;  (3) Plaintiff’s attorneys; (4) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion  from the Class; (5) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such excluded persons;  and (6) persons whose claims against Defendant have been fully and finally adjudicated and/or  released. Plaintiff Shipman anticipates the need to amend the Class definitions following  appropriate discovery.    Numerosity: On information and belief, there are hundreds, if not thousands of  members of the Class such that joinder of all members is impracticable.     Adequate Representation: Plaintiff Shipman will fairly and adequately represent  and protect the interests of the Class, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in  class actions. Plaintiff Shipman has no interests antagonistic to those of the Class, and Defendant  has no defenses unique to Plaintiff. Plaintiff Shipman and his counsel are committed to  vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the members of the Class, and have the financial  resources to do so. Neither Plaintiff Shipman nor his counsel have any interest adverse to the  Class.    Appropriateness: This class action is also appropriate for certification because  Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class and as a  whole, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible standards  of conduct toward the members of the Class and making final class-wide injunctive relief  appropriate. Defendant’s business practices apply to and affect the members of the Class  uniformly, and Plaintiff’s challenge of those practices hinges on Defendant’s conduct with  respect to the Class as wholes, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff Shipman.  Additionally, the damages suffered by individual members of the Class will likely be small  relative to the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex litigation  necessitated by Defendant’s actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the members of  the Class to obtain effective relief from Defendant’s misconduct on an individual basis. A class  action provides the benefits of single adjudication, economies of scale, and comprehensive  supervision by a single court.   Plaintiff Shipman repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 41 of this Complaint  and incorporates them by reference.    The TCPA’s implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides that “[n]o  person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber  who has registered his or his telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons  who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.”    Any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month  period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this  subsection may” may bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were  promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone  solicitations to which they object.  47 U.S.C. § 227(c).    Defendant violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) by initiating, or causing to be initiated,  telephone solicitations to telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry  Class members who registered their respective telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call  Registry, a listing of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is  maintained by the federal government.    Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) because Plaintiff and the Do Not Call  Registry Class received more than one text message in a 12-month period made by or on behalf  of the Defendant in violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, as described above.     As a result of Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein, Plaintiff and the Do Not Call  Registry Class suffered actual damages and, under section 47 U.S.C. § 227(c), are entitled, inter  alia, to receive up to $500 in damages for such violations of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200.  ",win,4
4500752,win," On or about December 24, 2015, Defendant sent a written communication to  Plaintiff in connection with the collection of the Debt.  A true and correct copy of the relevant  page of the December 24, 2015 communication is attached hereto as Exhibit A.    The December 24, 2015 communication was the first communication Plaintiff  received from Defendant concerning the Debt.    Plaintiff did not receive any additional communications from Defendant within  five days of the December 24, 2015 communication.    The December 24, 2015 communication to Plaintiff stated, “Your Sam’s Club  MasterCard Account, which was issued by and owed to Synchrony Bank, has been referred to us  by our client for collection.”  See Ex. A.    Further, Defendant’s December 24, 2015 communications also violated 15 U.S.C.  § 1692g(a)(5) by failing to inform Plaintiff that Defendant need only provide him the name and  address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor, if he notified Defendant of  such request, in writing.     Defendant’s misstatement of the rights afforded by the FDCPA would cause the  least-sophisticated consumer to understand, incorrectly, that validation of the debt, or a request  for the name and address of the original creditor, could be obtained through an oral request, or by  means other than in writing.  Such a misunderstanding could lead the least-sophisticated  consumer to waive or otherwise not properly vindicate her rights under the FDCPA.     Indeed, failing to dispute the debt in writing, or failing to request the name and  address of the original creditor, in writing, would cause a consumer to waive the important  protections afforded by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b)—namely, that a debt collector cease contacting the  consumer until the debt collector provides the consumer with verification of the alleged debt  and/or the original creditor’s name and address, as requested.    Plaintiff bring this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil  Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a class consisting of:  (a) All persons with a Florida address, (b) to whom GC Services Limited  Partnership mailed an initial debt collection communication that stated: (1) “if  you do dispute all or any portion of this debt within 30 days of receiving this  letter, we will obtain verification of the debt from our client and send it to  you,” and/or (2) “if within 30 days of receiving this letter you request the  name and address of the original creditor, we will provide it to you in the  event it differs from our client,” (c) in the one year preceding the date of this  complaint, (d) in connection with the collection of a consumer debt.   Excluded from the class is Defendant, its officers and directors, members of their immediate  families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors, or assigns, and any entity in which  Defendant has or had controlling interests.    The proposed class satisfies Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1) because, upon information  and belief, it is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.  The exact number of  class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through  appropriate discovery.  The proposed class is ascertainable in that, upon information and belief,  the names and addresses of all members of the proposed class can be identified in business  records maintained by Defendant.      The proposed class satisfies Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) and (3) because Plaintiff’s  claims are typical of the claims of the members of the class.  To be sure, the claims of Plaintiff  and all of the members of the class originate from the same conduct, practice and procedure on  the part of Defendant, and Plaintiff possesses the same interests and has suffered the same  injuries as each member of the proposed class.    A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient  adjudication of this controversy, since joinder of all members is impracticable.      Furthermore, as the damages suffered by individual members of the class may be  relatively small, the expense and burden of individual litigation make it impracticable for the  members of the class to individually redress the wrongs done to them.  There will be no  difficulty in the management of this action as a class action.    Issues of law and fact common to the members of the class predominate over any  questions that may affect only individual members, in that Defendant has acted on grounds  generally applicable to the class.  Among the issues of law and fact common to the class are:  a. Defendant’s violations of the FDCPA as alleged herein;  b. Defendant’s failure to properly provide in its initial debt collection letter the  disclosures required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g;  c. Whether Defendant is a debt collector as defined by the FDCPA;  d. the existence of Defendant’s identical conduct particular to the matters at issue;  e. the availability of statutory penalties; and  f. the availability of attorneys’ fees and costs.   Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs  1 through 36.    Defendant’s December 24, 2015 communication did not contain the proper  disclosures required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4), and Defendant did not provide such disclosures  within five days thereafter.    Specifically, the December 24, 2015 communication violated 15 U.S.C. §  1692g(a)(4) by failing to inform Plaintiff that Defendant need only mail verification of the Debt  to him, and a copy of any judgment, if he notified Defendant that he disputed the Debt, or any  portion thereof, in writing.    As a result, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4).   Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs  1 through 36.    Defendant’s December 24, 2015 communication did not contain the proper  disclosures required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5), and Defendant did not provide such disclosures  within five days thereafter.    Specifically, the December 24, 2015 communication violated 15 U.S.C. §  1692g(a)(5) by failing to inform Plaintiff that Defendant need only provide him the name and  address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor, if he notified Defendant of  his request for that information in writing.    As a result, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5).   Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges each and every allegation contained in paragraphs  1 through 36.    The FDCPA at 15 U.S.C. § 1692e provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] debt  collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection  with the collection of any debt.”    Defendant’s December 24, 2015 communication did not contain the proper  disclosures required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4) and 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5), and Defendant did  not provide such disclosures within five days thereafter.   PRACTICES ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 1692e   PRACTICES ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(4)   PRACTICES ACT, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(5)  ",lose,2
15724899,win," Plaintiffs bring this action individually, and on behalf of the following  Pennsylvania state-wide class of similarly situated individualc;, pursuant to Rule 23 of the  Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:  All ind1v1duals who were employed by Defendants at ""Han Dynasty of  University City Inc."" at 371 I Vlarket Street, Philadelphia PA 19104  and ""\:ew Han Dynasty lnc ··at 70 Buckwalter Rd, L1rner1ck PA 19468,  Since \1ay I, 2016 (the ""Clas<,'')     There are questions of law and fact common to the Class. including, without  limitation:  a. whether Defendants, based on its uniform and company-wide policies and practices,  have failed to pay wages and overtime to Plaintiff~ and the Class pursuant to the P'\t1WA,  b. whether Plamt1ffs and the Class are entitled to overtime compensation for services  rendered in excess of 40 hours per week under the P'\t1W A,  c. whether Defendants acted knowingly, willfully or recklessly in v10lat111g the P'\t1W A,  d whether Plaintiffs and the Class have "">uffered and are entitled to damage"">. and. 1f so,  111 what amount,  e. Whether liquidated, punitive damages, or special damages are warranted under the  PMWA, and  f Whether Plamtiffs and the Clac-,s are entitled to declaratory or 1111unct1ve relief under the   Plaintiff Pan was employed as a cook at ""\Jew Han Dynasty Inc "" located at 70  Buckwalter Rd, Limerick PA 19468 from \'larch 2. 2016 until \'lay 2. 2018. He was primarily  responsible for frying food for the Defendants' re!'itaurant patrons    Throughout that time and, upon information belief. both before that time  (throughout the Class Period) and continuing unti I present, the Defendants have likewise employed  other individuals, like the Plaintiff (the Collective Action \'!embers/the Class) in positions that  required little skill and no capital providing chef. server, deli..,ery and other general restaurant  services.    From March 2, 2016 until May 2, 2018. Plaintiff Pan worked at ""'\ew Han Dynasty  Inc."" He w,as paid $4,500 per month from '.\'larch 2, 2016 to December 31, 2017 and was paid  $4,700 per month from January I, 2018 to 'v1ay 2. 2018 by cash only     Throughout that time and, upon information belie( both before that time  (throughout the Class Period) and continuing until present, the Defendants have likewise employed  other individuals, like the Plaintiffs (the Collective Action \!!embers/the Class) in positions that  required little skill and no capital providing chef, server, delivery and other general restaurant  services.    During the employment of Plaintiff by Defendants, Plaintiff Zhang was paid $2,700  per month by a combination of cash and check from December, 2015 to October, 2016. From  October, 2016 to October, 2017, Plaintiff Zhang was paid $2,800 per month by a combination of  cash and check. From October, 2017 to ~ovember, 2017, he was paid $2,850 per month by a  combinati<)n of cash and check. From '.\:ovember, 2017 to \!larch. 2018, Plaintiff Zhang was paid  $2,950 pel' month by a combination of cash and check. rrom \!larch, 2018 to present, Plaintiff  Zhang was paid $3,000 by a combination of cash and check.    Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference, all preceding paragraphs     Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs and similarly situated employees for actual  damages, liquidated damages and equitable relief. pursuant to 29 lJ S.C. § 2 I 6(b), as \\<ell as  reasonable' attorneys' fees. costs and expenses.   Plaintiffs re-allege and incorporate by reference. all preceding paragraphs.    ·y he PMW A requires that covered employees he compensated for every hour  worked in a workweek. See 43 P.S. § 333.104(a).    The P\tlWA requires that employees receive overtime compensation ""not less than  one and one-half times"" the employee's regular rate of pay for all hours worked over 40 in a  workweek. See 43 P.S. § 333.104(c).    Plaintiffs and the Class are covered employees entitled to the P\tlW A's protections.    Plaintiffs and other members of the Class are not exempt from receiving P\tf WA  overtime b¢nefits.    Defendants are employers required to comply with the P\tl WA's mandates.    Defendants violated the PMWA by failing to pay Plaintiffs and other members of  the Class proper compensation for all hours worked and for time spent working in excess of 40  hours during the workweek.   FAIRLABORSTA~DARDSACT  29 C.S.C. § 201 et seq.  (UNPAID WAGES/OVERTL\1E)   PENNSYLVANIA '.\11~1'.\HJ'.\1 WAGE ACT  43 P.S. §§ 333.10 I et seq.  (lJNPAID WAGES!OVERTI'.\1.E)  ",lose,3
59250880,lose," Ms. Haynes-Glenn also seeks to represent a subclass defined as all Class members  who reside in New York who possess Laundry Cards that are maintained by Defendant (the  “New York Subclass”).    Members of the Class and New York Subclass are so numerous that their  individual joinder herein is impracticable.  On information and belief, members of the Class and  New York Subclass number in the millions.  The precise number of Class members and their  identities are unknown to Plaintiff at this time but may be determined through discovery.  Class  members may be notified of the pendency of this action by mail and/or publication through the  distribution records of Defendant and third-party retailers and vendors.    Common questions of law and fact exist as to all Class members and predominate  over questions affecting only individual Class members.  Common legal and factual questions  include, but are not limited to whether Defendant’s Laundry Card refund policy is false and  misleading.     The claims of the named Plaintiff are typical of the claims of the Class in that the  named Plaintiff was exposed to Defendant’s false and misleading marketing and promotional  materials and representations, possess Laundry Cards, and suffered a loss as a result of  Defendant’s possible prepayment amount and refund policies.    Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class and Subclass because her  interests do not conflict with the interests of the Class members she seeks to represent, she has  retained competent counsel experienced in prosecuting class actions, and she intends to  prosecute this action vigorously.  The interests of Class members will be fairly and adequately  protected by Plaintiff and her counsel.    Plaintiff incorporates by reference and re-alleges each and every allegation set  forth above as though fully set forth herein.    Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of members of the New York  Subclass against Defendant.      By the acts and conduct alleged herein, Defendant committed unfair or deceptive  acts and practices by making false representations in the marketing of Defendant’s Laundry  Card.       The foregoing deceptive acts and practices were directed at consumers.    Plaintiff and members of the New York Subclass were injured as a result because  (a) spent money to fill up their Laundry Card, and (b) were charged a hidden fee in the form of a  balance that was economically impractical to access.    On behalf of herself and other members of the New York Subclass, Plaintiff seeks  to enjoin the unlawful acts and practices described herein, to recover their actual damages or fifty  dollars, whichever is greater, three times actual damages, and reasonable attorneys’ fees.   Plaintiff incorporates by reference and re-alleges each and every allegation set  forth above as though fully set forth herein.    Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of members of the Class and  New York Subclass against Defendant.    Plaintiff and Class members conferred benefits on Defendant by paying money to  Defendant in the form of adding prepayments to their Laundry Cards.    Defendant has knowledge of such benefits.     Defendant has been unjustly enriched in retaining the revenues derived from  Plaintiff’s and Class members’ Laundry Card balance remainders.  Retention of those moneys  under these circumstances is unjust and inequitable because Defendant did not disclose that their  prepayment, refund policies, and Laundry Card reader replacements were structured in way that  maximized the balance remainders and then made these balances economically unfeasible to  access by requiring a processing and handling fee.    Plaintiff incorporates by reference and re-allege each and every allegation set  forth above as though fully set forth herein.    Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of members of the Class and  New York Subclass against Defendant.     As discussed above, Defendant misrepresented that its prepayment, refund  policies, and Laundry Card reader replacements were for reasons other than a hidden policy to  generate profits at the expense of Plaintiff and members of the Class and New York Subclass.     The false and misleading representations and omissions were made with  knowledge of their falsehood.     The false and misleading representations and omissions were made by Defendant,  upon which Plaintiff and members of the Class and New York Subclass reasonably and  justifiably relied, and were intended to induce and actually induced Plaintiff and members of the  Class and New York Subclass to add money to their Laundry Cards.     The fraudulent actions of defendant caused damage to Plaintiff and members of  the Class and New York Subclass, who are entitled to damages and other legal and equitable  relief as a result.  Deceptive Acts Or Practices, New York Gen. Bus. Law § 349   Fraud   Unjust Enrichment  ",lose,1
8028958,lose,"(Against the Individual Defendants for Violations of Section 20(a) of the  Exchange Act)   (Against All Defendants for Violations of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 14a-9  and 17 C.F.R. § 244.100 Promulgated Thereunder)    Plaintiff brings this class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf of himself  and the other public shareholders of Beneficial (the “Class”).  Excluded from the Class are  Defendants herein and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated  with any Defendant.    WSFS is a savings and loan holding company headquartered in Wilmington,  Delaware and the parent to WSFS Bank, one of the ten oldest bank and trust companies in the  United States continuously operating under the same name.  WSFS Bank is also the largest locally- managed bank and trust company headquartered in the Delaware Valley.    On August 8, 2018, Beneficial and WSFS issued a joint press release announcing  the Proposed Transaction.  The press release stated, in relevant part:  WSFS Financial Corporation Announces Combination with  Beneficial Bancorp, Inc.,  Creating the Largest, Premier, Locally-Headquartered  Community Bank   for the Greater Delaware Valley  Concurrently executing a technology transformation to secure a  competitive advantage and meet fast-changing Customer needs.  WILMINGTON, Del. and PHILADELPHIA, Pa. — WSFS  Financial Corporation (NASDAQ: WSFS) and Beneficial Bancorp,  Inc. (NASDAQ: BNCL), jointly announced today the signing of a  definitive agreement whereby WSFS Financial Corporation   Plaintiff incorporate each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth  herein.    Rule 14a-9, promulgated by the SEC pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Exchange  Act, provides that proxy communications shall not contain “any statement which, at the time and  in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any  material fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements  therein not false or misleading.”  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9.    The omission of information from a proxy will violate Section 14(a) and Rule 14a- 9 if other SEC regulations specifically require disclosure of the omitted information.      Defendants have issued the Proxy with the intention of soliciting the Company’s  common shareholders’ support for the Proposed Transaction.  Each of the Defendants reviewed  and authorized the dissemination of the Proxy, which fails to provide critical information  regarding, amongst other things: (i) financial projections for Beneficial; and (ii) the valuation  analyses performed by Beneficial’s financial advisor, Sandler, in support of their fairness opinion.    In so doing, Defendants made untrue statements of fact and/or omitted material  facts necessary to make the statements made not misleading.  Each of the Individual Defendants,  by virtue of their roles as officers and/or directors, were aware of the omitted information but  failed to disclose such information, in violation of Section 14(a).  The Individual Defendants were  therefore negligent, as they had reasonable grounds to believe material facts existed that were  misstated or omitted from the Proxy, but nonetheless failed to obtain and disclose such information  to the Company’s shareholders although they could have done so without extraordinary effort.     The Individual Defendants were, at the very least, negligent in preparing and  reviewing the Proxy.  The preparation of a proxy statement by corporate insiders containing  materially false or misleading statements or omitting a material fact constitutes negligence.  The  Individual Defendants were negligent in choosing to omit material information from the Proxy or  failing to notice the material omissions in the Proxy upon reviewing it, which they were required  to do carefully as the Company’s directors.  Indeed, the Individual Defendants were intricately  involved in the process leading up to the signing of the Merger Agreement.    Beneficial is also deemed negligent as a result of the Individual Defendants’  negligence in preparing and reviewing the Proxy.    Plaintiff incorporate each and every allegation set forth above as if fully set forth  herein.    The Individual Defendants acted as controlling persons of Beneficial within the  meaning of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act as alleged herein.  By virtue of their positions as  officers and/or directors of Beneficial, and participation in and/or awareness of the Company’s  operations and/or intimate knowledge of the incomplete and misleading statements contained in  the Proxy filed with the SEC, they had the power to influence and control and did influence and  control, directly or indirectly, the decision making of the Company, including the content and  dissemination of the various statements that Plaintiff contends are materially incomplete and  misleading.    Each of the Individual Defendants was provided with or had unlimited access to  copies of the Proxy and other statements alleged by Plaintiff to be misleading prior to and/or  shortly after these statements were issued and had the ability to prevent the issuance of the  statements or cause the statements to be corrected.    In addition, as the Proxy sets forth at length, and as described herein, the Individual  Defendants were involved in negotiating, reviewing, and approving the Merger Agreement.  The  Proxy purports to describe the various issues and information that the Individual Defendants  reviewed and considered.  The Individual Defendants participated in drafting and/or gave their  input on the content of those descriptions.    By virtue of the foregoing, the Individual Defendants have violated Section 20(a)  of the Exchange Act.    As set forth above, the Individual Defendants had the ability to exercise control  over and did control a person or persons who have each violated Section 14(a) and Rule 14a-9 by  their acts and omissions as alleged herein.  By virtue of their positions as controlling persons, these  Defendants are liable pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.  As a direct and proximate  result of Individual Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff will be irreparably harmed.    Plaintiff and the Class have no adequate remedy at law.  Only through the exercise  of this Court’s equitable powers can Plaintiff and the Class be fully protected from the immediate  and irreparable injury that Defendants’ actions threaten to inflict.  I.  Company Background and the Proposed Transaction  ",lose,4
6827115,win,"(FMLA – Unlawful Disclosure of Medical Information)  As to Plaintiff Melissa Wolfe  357.  Plaintiff Melissa Wolfe realleges and incorporates by reference each allegation in the  foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.   358.  At all times relevant, Plaintiff Melissa Wolfe was “eligible” under the definition of  the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and was entitled to take unpaid leave.   359.  Plaintiff gave notice to Defendant that she intended to take leave for a serious  medical condition.   360.  Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff by, inter alia, failing to treat her medical  information as a confidential record and by disclosing such information to persons with no  lawful privilege to receive such information in violation of 29 C.F.R. § 825.500(g).   361.  Defendant’s actions were intentional and in reckless disregard of the health and well  being of the Plaintiff.  As a result of these acts, the Plaintiff Melissa Wolfe has suffered  grievous, extensive and continuing damages, including, but not limited to, lost wages and  benefits, liquidated damages, attorney’s fees and the costs of this action.  (FMLA – Willfulness)  As to Plaintiff Melissa Wolfe  362.  Plaintiff Melissa Wolfe realleges and incorporates by reference each allegation in the  foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.   363.  Defendant’s acts complained of herein with regard to the FMLA were willful.   The persons in the New York Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is  impracticable.  Although, the precise number of such persons is unknown, and facts upon  which the calculation of that number are presently within the sole control of Defendant,  there are approximately more than 40 members of the New York Class.    The New York Class Representative fairly and adequately protects the interests of  the New York Class and has no interests antagonistic to the class.  The Plaintiffs are  represented by attorneys who are experienced and competent in both class litigation and  employment litigation.    A class is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication  of the controversy, particularly in the context of wage-and-hour litigation where individual  plaintiffs lack the financial resources to vigorously prosecute a lawsuit in federal court  against a corporate defendant.  The damages sustained by individual class members are  small, compared to the expense and burden of individual prosecution of this litigation.  Class  action treatment will obviate unduly duplicative litigation and the possibility of inconsistent  judgments.    Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the New  York Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory  relief with respect to the class was a whole.    Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those of the class.  Plaintiffs and the New York Class  members were subjected to Defendant’s policies, practices, programs, procedures, protocols  and plans alleged herein concerning the failure to pay wages at the applicable minimum  wage rate and/or the failure to pay overtime at the applicable rate, the failure to provide  accurate wage notices and statements, the failure to keep adequate records, and the failure to  compensate or reimburse Plaintiffs’ for purchases of music and athletic uniforms made for  Defendant’s benefit.  The job duties of Plaintiffs are typical of those of the class members.    The New York Class Representative intends to send notice to all members of the  New York Class to the extent required by Rule 23.    Plaintiffs and the members of the FLSA Collective and New York Class (collectively  “Class Members”) are victims of Defendant’s common policy and plan that violated their  rights under the FLSA and NYLL by denying them wages at the applicable minimum wage  and/or overtime rates.  At all times relevant, Defendant’s unlawful policy and pattern or  practice was willful.     Upon information and belief, Defendant failed to pay each Class Member, including  Plaintiffs any wages for all hours worked during a training period that Defendant required of  each instructor, including Plaintiffs, pursuant to Defendant’s policy and/or practice.     Upon information and belief, pursuant to Defendant’s policy and/or practice, after  the training period, Plaintiffs and each Class Member were/are paid on piece-rate basis, per  class they taught. Generally, classes lasted 45-60 minutes. Defendant also required Plaintiffs  and each Class Member to arrive half-hour before class and stay after class to provide  feedback to customers.     Upon information and belief, following the training period, Plaintiffs and each Class  Member were/are required not only to teach classes, but also perform a variety of other  tasks, such as, but not limited to opening/unlocking the studio, setting up the computer  systems, answering phones, checking in clients at the front desk, preparing for classes,  developing routines, compiling playlists, communicating with customers, attending  meetings, and engaging in marketing on behalf of the company, amounting to an  approximately 15 to 28 hours per week of work in addition to teaching classes, and  Defendant was/is aware of this fact.      Upon information and belief, Plaintiffs and each Class Member was/is required to  incur business expenses for items necessary to perform their job, including during the  training period, and afterward, which included, but is not limited to making purchases of  music and athletic uniforms. Plaintiffs and each Class Member were never compensated or  reimbursed for these expenses.    As a result of Defendant’s piece-rate compensation scheme, Plaintiffs and each Class  Member that was paid under the piece-rate compensation scheme were not paid at the  applicable overtime rate for hours worked over 40 per week.     As part of its regular business practice, Defendant intentionally, willfully, and  repeatedly engaged in a pattern, practice, and/or policy that violated the FLSA and  NYLL.  Defendant’s policy and pattern or practice includes but is not limited to:   a.  Willfully failing to keep accurate payroll records of its instructors, including  Plaintiffs and Class Members, as required by the FLSA and NYLL;  b.  Willfully failing to pay its instructors, including Plaintiffs and Class  Members, wages at the applicable minimum wage rate;  c.  Willfully failing to pay its instructors, including Plaintiffs and Class  Members, wages at the applicable overtime rate;  c.  Willfully failing to provide its instructors, including Plaintiffs and Class  Members, accurate wage notices and statements pursuant to N.Y. Lab. Law §§  195(1) and (3); and   d.  Willfully failing to compensate or reimburse its instructors, including  Plaintiffs and Class Members, for purchases of music and athletic uniforms for the  benefit of Defendant, pursuant to N.Y. Lab. Law § 193.    Defendant is or should have been aware that the FLSA and NYLL required  Defendant to pay Plaintiffs and the Class Members at the applicable minimum wage and/or  overtime rates.     Defendant’s failure to pay Plaintiffs and the Class Members wages at the applicable  minimum wage and/or overtime rates, was willful, intentional, and in bad faith.      Defendant failed to provide Plaintiffs and members of the Wage Notice Class with  accurate and proper wage notice pursuant to N.Y. Lab. Law § 195(1).    Defendant failed to compensate or reimburse Plaintiffs and members of the Wage  Deduction Class for purchases of music and athletic uniforms Defendant required they make  for the benefit of Defendant, pursuant to N.Y. Lab. Law § 195(3).    Defendant’s unlawful conduct has been widespread, repeated, and consistent.    At all times relevant, Mr. Montalvo was an employee of Defendant, working under  Defendant’s direct supervision, and was classified as non-exempt from the FLSA and the   At all times relevant, Ms. Wolfe was an employee of Defendant, working under  Defendant’s direct supervision, and was classified as non-exempt from the FLSA and the  ACTION COMPLAINT   JURY TRIAL DEMANDED  Plaintiff Melissa Wolfe (herein “Ms. Wolfe”) and Plaintiff Bryant Montalvo (herein  “Mr. Montalvo”), on behalf of themselves, and a class of all others similarly situated, by and  through their attorneys, Liszka & Gray, LLC, as and for the Complaint in this action against  Defendant Flywheel Sports, Inc. (herein “Defendant”), hereby alleges upon personal  knowledge as to some, and information and belief as to the rest, as follows: ",win,3
6230346,lose," Lyft is a $7.5 billion dollar transportation services company that develops, markets and  operates the Lyft App.       In order to maximize its efforts to market to potential drivers, upon information and  belief, Lyft contracted with Jobcase to market its services to potential drivers like Plaintiff.     Under the terms of this contract, Lyft encourages and incentivizes Jobcase to market  Lyft’s services to drivers by providing Jobcase with a unique URL that tracks the number of potential  drivers that access Lyft’s website via advertisements disseminated by Jobcase, and compensating  Jobcase based on this number.            As a result, on or about August 10, 2017 at 11:26 a.m., Jobcase, using an automated  text-messaging platform, caused a text message to be transmitted, on Lyft’s behalf, to Plaintiff’s cellular  telephone number ending in 4187 (“4187 Number”):    The website promoted in the text message is owned and operated by Lyft     Defendants’ text message constitutes telemarketing because it encouraged the future  purchase of Lyft’s services by potential drivers.        At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendants with her express written consent to  be contacted by text using an ATDS.      Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 7883 Number.     The impersonal and generic nature of Defendants’ text messages demonstrates that  Defendants utilized an ATDS in transmitting the messages.  See Jenkins v. LL Atlanta, LLC, No. 1:14- cv-2791-WSD, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30051, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2016) (“These assertions,  combined with the generic, impersonal nature of the text message advertisements and the use of a short  code, support an inference that the text messages were sent using an ATDS.”) (citing Legg v. Voice  Media Grp., Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 1370, 1354 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (plaintiff alleged facts sufficient to infer  text messages were sent using ATDS; use of a short code and volume of mass messaging alleged would  be impractical without use of an ATDS); Kramer v. Autobytel, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D.  Cal. 2010) (finding it “plausible” that defendants used an ATDS where messages were advertisements  written in an impersonal manner and sent from short code); Robbins v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 13-CV-132- IEG NLS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72725, 2013 WL 2252646, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 22, 2013) (observing  that mass messaging would be impracticable without use of an ATDS)).      Specifically, upon information and belief, Defendants utilized a combination of  hardware and software systems to send the text messages at issue in this case.  The systems utilized by  Defendant have the current capacity or present ability to generate or store random or sequential numbers  or to dial sequentially or randomly at the time the call is made, and to dial such numbers, en masse, in  an automated fashion without human intervention.    As outlined above, upon information and belief, Jobcase was acting as an agent of,  or as part of a joint venture with Lyft, for each other’s mutual benefit, within the course and scope  of their agreement and with each other’s full knowledge and consent.     Plaintiff is informed and believes that each of Jobcase’s acts and/or omissions  complained of herein were known, consented to, and/or ratified by Lyft.    Further, Lyft knowingly received and retained the monetary benefit from drivers it  contracted with as a result of Jobcase’s unlawful calling and telemarketing practices on Lyft’s  behalf.    Upon information and belief, at all times relevant, Lyft had the ability and right to  control Jobcase’s conduct as it pertained to marketing Lyft’s services and/or use of Lyft’s trade-name.     Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of  herself and all others similarly situated.    Defendants and their employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does  not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several  thousands, if not more.   The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s  claim that Defendants routinely transmits text messages to telephone numbers assigned to cellular  telephone services is accurate, Plaintiffs and the Class members will have identical claims capable of  being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case.   Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-58 as if fully set forth herein.     It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for  emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any  automatic telephone dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular telephone  service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).     “Automatic telephone dialing system” refers to any equipment that has the  “capacity to dial numbers without human intervention.”  See, e.g., Hicks v. Client Servs., Inc., No.  07-61822, 2009 WL 2365637, at *4 (S.D. Fla. June 9, 2009) (citing FCC, In re: Rules and  Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991: Request of ACA  International for Clarification and Declaratory Ruling, 07–232, ¶ 12, n.23 (2007)).     Defendants – or third parties directed by Defendants – used equipment having the  capacity to dial numbers without human intervention to make marketing telephone calls to the  cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the Class defined above.     Defendants therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using an  automatic telephone dialing system to make marketing telephone calls to the cell phones of  Plaintiff and Class Members without their prior express written consent.     All Defendants are directly, jointly, or vicariously liable for each such violation of  the TCPA.    As a result of Defendants’ conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA,  Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a  minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an  injunction against future calls.    Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates paragraphs 1-58 as if fully set forth herein.     At all times relevant, Defendants’ knew or should have known that their conduct as  alleged herein violated the TCPA.      Defendants knew that they did not have prior express written consent to send these  text messages.      Because Defendants knew or should have known that Plaintiff and Class Members  had not given prior express consent to receive its autodialed calls to their cellular telephones, the  Court should treble the amount of statutory damages available to Plaintiff and the other members  of the putative Class pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA.    As a result of Defendants’ violations, Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled  to an award of $1,500.00 in statutory damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C.  § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C).  WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Mary Fente, on behalf of herself and the other members of the  Class, prays for the following relief:   a.       A declaration that Defendants’ practices described herein violate the Telephone  Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227;   b.  A declaration that Defendants’ violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection  Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, were willful and knowing;  c.  An injunction prohibiting Defendants from using an automatic telephone dialing  system to call and text message telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephones without the  prior express consent of the called party;   d.  An award of actual, statutory damages, and/or trebled statutory damages; and   e.  Such further and other relief the Court deems reasonable and just.  Knowing and/or Willful Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)  (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)   PROPOSED CLASS   Violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)  (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)  ",win,3
6249109,lose," The Class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.  Although the  precise number of Class members is known only to Defendants, Plaintiff upon  information and belief asserts that the Class numbers in the hundreds, if not  thousands.    There are questions of law and fact common to the Class that predominate over any  questions affecting only individual Class members.  The questions include, but are  not limited to:  a. Whether, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(A) and 12 C.F.R. § 205.16,  Defendants were ATM operators at all relevant times during the Class  period that imposed a fee on consumers for providing host transfer services  to those consumers;   b. Whether, at all relevant times during the class period, Defendants failed to  comply with the notice requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3) and 12  C.F.R. § 205.16(c); and  c. The appropriate measure of damages sustained by Plaintiff and other  members of the Class.    Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class, which all arise from the same  operative facts and are based on the same legal theories, including:  a. Plaintiff and all putative Class members used an ATM operated by  Defendants;  b. Defendants failed to provide notices compliant with 15 U.S.C. §  1693b(d)(3) and 12 C.F.R. § 205.16(c) to Plaintiff and all putative Class  members; and  c. Defendants illegally imposed a fee on Plaintiff and all putative Class  members for their respective use of the ATM.    This action should be maintained as a class action because the prosecution of  separate actions by individual members of the Class would create a risk of  inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members which  would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the parties opposing the Class,  as well as a risk of adjudications with respect to individual members which would as  a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of other members not parties to the  adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.     Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Class,  thereby making appropriate final injunction relief or corresponding declaratory relief  with respect to the Class as a whole.     A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this  controversy. The interest of Class members in individually controlling the  prosecution of separate claims against the Defendants are small.  Management of the  Class claims is likely to present significantly fewer difficulties than those presented  in many individual claims. The identities of the Class members may be obtained  from Defendants’ records.    Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though fully stated  herein.    Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(D)(i) and 12 C.F.R. § 205.16(a), Defendants  were ATM operators at all times relevant to this action.    Defendants were the operators of the ATM (Terminal #LK823326) located at  Fairmont Battery Wharf, Three Battery Wharf, Boston, Massachusetts, at all times  relevant to this action.    Defendants failed to comply with the notice requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)  and 12 C.F.R. § 205.16(c) when providing ATM services to Plaintiff and all putative  Class members.    Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(C) and 12 C.F.R. § 205.16(e), Defendants,  therefore, illegally imposed a fee on Plaintiff and all putative Class members for their  respective use of the ATM.   The Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 et seq. (“EFTA”), and its  implementing Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. § 205.1 et seq., require an automated teller  machine operator to provide notice to consumers that the operator will impose a fee  on consumers for conducting a transaction at an ATM and the amount of such a fee.    Specifically, 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3) and 12 C.F.R. § 205.16(c) require that an  ATM operator disclose (a) on the ATM (via placard/sticker) that a fee will be  imposed and (b) on the ATM screen that a fee will be imposed and the amount of  such a fee.   VIOLATION OF ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER ACT & REGULATION E  U.S.C. §1693 et seq. & 12 C.F.R. §205.1 et seq.    ",lose,1
17253164,lose," Upon the opening of the account, Plaintiff was registered for Online Banking by  providing his cellphone number as instructed by SunTrust.    Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff began receiving text messages from SunTrust on his  cellular phone.      The Plaintiff’s cellular phone number is identified as 757-###-6812.      Based upon information and belief, the Defendant sent the text messages using an  automatic dialing system as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1).     On or about December 2, 2019, the Plaintiff texted “STOP” from his cell phone to  “shortcode” 786411 as instructed by the SunTrust Online Services Agreement that governed his  banking relationship with SunTrust.       Plaintiff thereafter continued to receive text messages from the Defendant.    On December 13, 2019, Plaintiff sent a letter to Truist requesting that it stop  sending text messages to his cell phone.     This letter was received by the Defendant.    The Plaintiff thereafter continued to receive text messages from the Defendant.     On or about December 17, 2019, the Plaintiff sent a second letter to Truist via its  registered agent in Raleigh, North Carolina, requesting that it stop sending text messages to his  cell phone.    This letter was received by the Defendant.    The Plaintiff thereafter continued to receive text messages from the Defendant.    The Plaintiff continued to receive text messages from the Defendant.    On or about March 26, 2020, the Plaintiff sent a fourth letter by registered mail  addressed to Truist Bank via its registered agent in Glen Allen, Virginia requesting that it stop  sending text messages to his cell phone.    The Plaintiff continued to receive text messages from the Defendant.    Despite the Defendant receiving multiple notifications from the Plaintiff that he did  not want to receive text messages from Truist, the Defendant continued to send text messages to  the Plaintiff’s cellular phone.     The Defendant failed to comply with the requirements of the TCPA and associated  governing F.C.C. Rules and Regulations by continuing to transmit unwanted text messages via an  ATDS to the Plaintiff after he had revoked his consent, causing the Plaintiff to sustain damages to  include, but not limited to: intrusion on the Plaintiff’s privacy, occupation of the capacity of the  Plaintiff’s cell phone, loss of the Plaintiff’s time, additional cellular charges, and accompanying  emotional distress.    The Defendant is aware of its obligations under the TCPA.    Despite knowing these legal obligations, the Defendant acted consciously in  breaching its known duties and violated the Plaintiff’s rights by failing to cease sending text  messages to Plaintiff’s cell phone using an ATDS after the Plaintiff revoked his consent.      The Defendant’s conduct was not a mere mistake or accident.  Instead, it was the  intended result of its standard operating procedures, and the Defendant’s violations were  willfully and knowingly committed.     The Plaintiff restates each of the allegations in paragraphs 1 through 33 as if set  forth at length herein.    Pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Plaintiff brings this  action for himself and on behalf of a class defined as follows:  All natural persons residing in the United States (a) who opened a Truist checking  account, (b) within the four-year period preceding the filing of this action and  during its pendency, (c) to whom Truist thereafter sent text messages using an  ATDS, (d) after such date as the class member revoked his or her consent. Excluded  from the class definition are any employees, officers, or directors of Truist, any  attorney appearing in this case, and any judge assigned to hear this action.     The Plaintiff also bring this action on behalf of a portion of the Class described as  the following subclass:  The Short Code Subclass  All natural persons residing in the United States (a) who opened a SunTrust/Truist  checking account, (b) within the four-year period preceding the filing of this action  and during its pendency, and (c) to whom Truist thereafter sent text messages using  an ATDS, (d) after such date as the class member revoked his or her consent by  sending the word “STOP” or any sentence, word, phrase or string of letters  containing the word “STOP” to short code 786411. Excluded from the class  definition are any employees, officers, or directors of Truist, any attorney appearing  in this case, and any judge assigned to hear this action.     The Plaintiff’s claim is typical of those of the class members.  All are based on the  same facts and legal theories.  Truist’s failure to stop sending text messages using an ATDS after  a person revokes consent is typical of its regular business practices and policies.      The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.  The  Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class actions.  Neither the Plaintiff nor his  counsel has any interests that might cause them to not vigorously pursue this action. The Plaintiff  is aware of his responsibilities to the putative class and has accepted such responsibilities.    Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure  is proper.  Prosecuting separate actions would create a risk of adjudications that would be  dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the individual adjudications or would  substantially impair their ability to protect their interests.      Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure  is appropriate in that the Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby  making appropriate declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.    Truist violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) by using an ATDS to send text  messages to the Plaintiff and purported class members’ phones lines after they revoked their  consent.     The Defendant’s conduct was not a mere mistake or accident. Instead, it was the  intended result of their standard operating procedures    As a result of Truist’s conduct and actions, the Plaintiff and purported class  members suffered actual damages.     As a result of Truist’s conduct and actions, the Plaintiff and purported class  members are entitled to statutory damages.    Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) were willfully and  knowingly committed, rendering the Defendant liable for actual or statutory damages, and treble  damages under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).  Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii)  ",win,4
6345771,lose," At all times relevant herein, Defendant operated a willful scheme to deprive their  ANCs and others similarly situated of overtime compensation.      Plaintiff and the similarly situated individuals worked or work as ANCs or other  job positions performing similar duties for Defendant.  As ANCs, their primary job duty was  non-exempt work consisting of applying pre-determined criteria and guidelines to medical  authorization request appeals for health insurance coverage and payment purposes.     Plaintiff and the similarly situated individuals were paid a salary with no overtime  pay.      Defendant suffered and permitted Plaintiff and the similarly situated individuals  to work more than forty (40) hours per week without overtime pay.     Defendant also employed licensed practical nurses (“LPNs”) or licensed  vocational nurses (“LVNs”) who had the same principle job duties as ANCs.  Unlike the ANCs,  however, LPNs or LVNs, were paid hourly and eligible for overtime wages.      Defendant has been aware, or should have been aware, that Plaintiff and the  similarly situated individuals performed non-exempt work that required payment of overtime  compensation.  For instance, Defendant set productivity goals for Plaintiff and other similarly  situated individuals.  Plaintiff and the similarly situated individuals were required to work long  hours, including overtime hours, to complete all of their job responsibilities and to meet and/or  exceed their goals.    Defendant did not make, keep, or preserve accurate records of the hours worked  by Plaintiff and the similarly situated individuals.    Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all similarly situated individuals, restates and  incorporates by reference the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.      Plaintiff files this action on behalf of herself and all similarly situated individuals.   The proposed collective class for the FLSA claims is defined as follows:   All persons who worked as Appeals Nurse Consultants (or other job positions  performing similar duties) for Defendant at any time from three years prior to the  filing of this Complaint through the entry of judgment (the “FLSA Collective”).    Plaintiff has consented in writing to be a part of this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C.  § 216(b).  Plaintiff’s signed consent form is attached as Exhibit A.   As this case proceeds, it is  likely that other individuals will file consent forms and join as “opt-in” Plaintiffs.    During the applicable statutory period, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective  routinely worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek without receiving overtime  compensation for their overtime hours worked.  Plaintiff estimates that she typically worked on  average between fifty and sixty hours per week.    Defendant willfully engaged in a pattern of violating the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201  et seq., as described in this Complaint in ways including, but not limited to, failing to pay its  employees overtime compensation.  Defendant knew that it was subject to the FLSA; it knew  that its ANCs worked more than forty-hours per week; and it knew that they were not receiving  overtime premiums for this work.    Defendant is liable under the FLSA for failing to properly compensate Plaintiff  and the similarly situated individuals.  Accordingly, notice should be sent to the FLSA  Collective.  There are numerous similarly situated current and former employees of Defendant  who have suffered from the Defendant’s practice of denying overtime pay, and who would  benefit from the issuance of court-supervised notice of this lawsuit and the opportunity to join.   Those similarly situated employees are known to Defendant, and are readily identifiable through  Defendant’s records.    Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and all members of the FLSA Collective, restates  and incorporates by reference the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.      The FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207, requires employers to pay employees one and one- half (1.5) times the regular rate of pay for all hours worked over forty (40) hours per workweek.      Defendant suffered and permitted Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective to routinely  work more than forty (40) hours per week without overtime compensation.      Defendant’s actions, policies, and practices described above violate the FLSA’s  overtime requirement by regularly and repeatedly failing to compensate Plaintiff and the FLSA  Collective overtime compensation.    Defendant knew, or showed reckless disregard for the fact, that it failed to pay  these individuals overtime compensation in violation of the FLSA.      By failing to accurately record, report, and/or preserve records of hours worked  by Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective, Defendant has failed to make, keep, and preserve records  with respect to each of its employees sufficient to determine their wages, hours, and other  conditions and practice of employment, in violation of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.   FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME  (on behalf of Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective)  ",win,3
17425100,lose,"Plaintiff repeats and realleges the foregoing paragraphs as if fully restated herein.   15 U.S.C. § 1692e provides, generally, that a debt collector may not use any false,  deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.   An overstatement of the amount of a debt is a false representation made in  connection with the collection of any debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.   An overstatement of the amount of a debt is a deceptive representation made in  connection with the collection of any debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.   An overstatement of the amount of a debt is a misleading representation made in  connection with the collection of any debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.   15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) prohibits the false representation of the character, amount,  or legal status of any debt.   An overstatement of the amount of a debt is a false representation of the character  of the debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A).   An overstatement of the amount of a debt is a false representation of the amount of  the debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A).   An overstatement of the amount of a debt is a false representation of the legal status  of the debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A).   15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) prohibits the use of any false representation or deceptive  means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.   An overstatement of the amount of a debt is a false representation made in an  attempt to collect the debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10).   An overstatement of the amount of a debt is a deceptive means used in an attempt  to collect the debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10).   Defendant’s overstatement of the amount owed by Plaintiff – specifically, that  Plaintiff owed an inflated amount of money to the creditor is a false representation made by  Defendant in connection with Defendant’s collection of the alleged Debt, in violation of 15  U.S.C. § 1692e.  69 Defendant’s overstatement of the amount owed by Plaintiff – specifically, thatPlaintiff  owed an inflated amount of money to the creditor is a deceptive representation made by  Defendant in connection with Defendant’s collection of the alleged Debt, in violation of 15  U.S.C. § 1692e.   Defendant’s overstatement of the amount owed by Plaintiff – specifically, that  Plaintiff owed an inflated amount to the creditor is a misleading representation made by  Defendant in connection with Defendant’s collection of the alleged Debt, in violation of 15  U.S.C. § 1692e.   Defendant’s overstatement of the amount owed by Plaintiff specifically, that  Plaintiff owed money to the creditor when Plaintiff did not owe any money to the creditor is a  false representation of the character of the alleged Debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A).   Defendant’s overstatement of the amount owed by Plaintiff specifically, that Plaintiff  owed money to the creditor when Plaintiff did not owe any money to the creditor is a false  representation of the amount of the alleged Debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A).   Defendant’s overstatement of the amount owed by Plaintiff specifically, that  Plaintiff owed money to the creditor when Plaintiff did not owe any money to the creditor is a  false representation of the legal status of the alleged Debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §  1692e(2)(A).   Defendant’s overstatement of the amount owed by Plaintiff specifically, that Plaintiff  owed money to the creditor when Plaintiff did not owe any money to the creditor is a false  representation made in an attempt to collect the alleged Debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C.  §1692e(10).   Defendant’s overstatement of the amount owed by Plaintiff specifically, that Plaintiff  owed money to the creditor when Plaintiff did not owe any money to the creditor is a deceptive  means used in an attempt to collect the alleged Debt, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §1692e(10).   For the foregoing reasons, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A)  and 1692e(10) and is liable to Plaintiff therefor.  Violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A) and 1692e(10)  ",lose,1
14525049,lose," Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the  preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.    Plaintiffs have a right against wealth-based detention. In the pretrial detention  context, courts have regularly found that setting arbitrary monetary release conditions that  exceed an individual’s ability to pay violates the equal protection clause. The Fourteenth  Amendment’s Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses prohibit jailing a person because of her  inability to make a monetary payment. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983).  Because  Plaintiffs are detained based solely on their inability to pay, heightened scrutiny is implicated.    ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147, 161 (5th Cir. 2018) ( “[T]he Supreme Court has found  that heightened scrutiny is required when criminal laws detain poor defendants because of their  indigence.”); Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 397-99 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 241- 42 (1970).     Defendants violate Plaintiffs’ substantive rights by enforcing against them a  system of wealth-based detention that keeps them in jail solely because they cannot afford to  make a monetary payment.   23    Defendants do not inquire into an individual’s ability to afford monetary release  conditions or consider less restrictive alternatives before recommending or setting unaffordable  monetary bail.    Defendants’ actions fail any form of scrutiny, as empirical research indicates no  correlation between monetary release conditions and an individual’s likelihood to appear in  court.     Here, Defendants’ policies and practice result in poor arrestees being detained  when similarly situated wealthy arrestees are not, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The  Commissioner of Corrections and Sheriff enforce these unconstitutional detention orders. Thus  Defendants deny individuals their equal protection and due process rights.   Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the  preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.    Defendants, acting under color of law, deny pretrial detainees their  constitutionally protected right to liberty without any compelling state interest.     It is well settled that freedom from imprisonment “lies at the heart of the liberty  that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 679, 690 (2001); Foucha v.  Louisiana, 504 U.S. 117, 80 (1992) (“Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core  of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action.”). Pretrial  detention infringes upon this right and may only be applied if it is “narrowly focuse[d]” to serve  “compelling” interests.  United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987).  24    The state’s interest at the pretrial bond stage is limited to ensuring the accused  will appear for trial and protecting the public from danger associated specifically with that  individual’s release. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 452-54 (2013).     Here, the City’s Bond Commissioner and individual judges fail to consider a  particular detainee’s likelihood to appear or whether that individual poses any danger to the  community, and make no findings regarding the necessity of detention, before setting de facto  detention orders through imposition of unaffordable monetary conditions of release. The  Commissioner of Corrections and Sheriff enforce these unconstitutional detention orders. Thus  Defendants deny pretrial detainees their fundamental right to liberty in the absence of any  compelling government interest and in violation of their substantive due process rights.   Plaintiffs incorporate by reference each and every allegation contained in the  preceding paragraphs as if set forth fully herein.    Defendants provide absolutely no process before detaining individuals for weeks  on unaffordable monetary release conditions. No hearing occurs, much less a hearing with  sufficient process. Since no hearing occurs, no determination is made that any government  interests require detention, in violation of Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights.    Before an individual may be detained pretrial, procedural due process requires an  individual be given the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful  25  manner” before being deprived of liberty. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (citing  Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)).    Defendants’ total lack of procedures—including no notice that a hearing will  occur, no notice that the issue at the hearing will be whether the individual arrested is a flight  risk or poses a danger to the community, no hearing with the opportunity to present evidence and  cross-examine witnesses, and no hearing with counsel present—flagrantly violates the  Fourteenth Amendment.    Individuals who qualify for public defenders remain incarcerated an average of 4- 5 weeks before they are given any hearing to challenge or modify their release conditions.  Individuals who do not qualify for the public defender, but cannot afford to hire a private  attorney, fair even worse—often being denied an opportunity to address their release conditions  or discuss their financial status even longer. Conversely, wealthier individuals can obtain almost  immediate release or obtain counsel to immediately challenge release conditions.   Defendants Violate Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Rights to Equal Protection and Due  Process through a Policy or Practice that Jails Individuals Based on their Poverty under 42  U.S.C. § 1983  By Named Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and  all others similarly situated, against all Defendants   Defendants Violate Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process Right to  Liberty under 42 U.S.C. § 1983   By Named Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and  all others similarly situated, against all Defendants    Defendants Violate Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Right to Procedural Due Process 42  U.S.C. § 1983  By Named Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and  all others similarly situated, against all Defendants  ",lose,5
7634110,win," Tim Ables Trucking Company, LLC was established in 1988 and provides, among  other things, frac sand and cement transportation services to the oil and gas industry throughout the  State of Texas and New Mexico.2    To provide its services, Tim Ables employed (and continues to employ) numerous  hourly paid workers—including Plaintiff and the individuals that make up the putative class. While  exact job titles may differ, these employees were subjected to the same or similar illegal pay practices  for similar work in the oilfield.    Plaintiff Stickell worked for Tim Ables as a Sand Coordinator from approximately May  2017 until August 2018.     As a Sand Coordinator, Plaintiff Stickell was tasked with ensuring the required frac  sand was unloaded from the delivery trucks and then loaded into the blender for use as a proppant.    Specifically, Plaintiff assisted in getting trucks into position, inspected the sand that  had been delivered, and hooked up hoses to the trucks that delivered the sand.    Sand is a critical part of the hydraulic fracturing process.    Once sand is unloaded into the blender, it is then used in the well. As such, Sand  Coordinators are an integral part of the hydraulic fracturing crew.    Tim Ables paid Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members a straight hourly wage for all  hours worked.     Specifically, Plaintiff Stickell was paid $40.00 per hour worked but did not receive  overtime compensation at the required rate of time and one-half for all hours worked over forty (40)  each week.  2 https://www.timablestrucking.com.    Original Collective Action Complaint  Page 5    Although it is well-known that blue-collar oilfield workers like Plaintiff and the  Putative Class Members are not exempt from overtime, Tim Ables did not pay Plaintiff and the  Putative Class Members the additional overtime premium required by the FLSA for hours worked in  excess of forty (40) in a workweek.    Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ primary job duties included performing daily  checklists, assisting with the preparation of equipment, and performing other oilfield related functions  on various job sites.    Upon information and belief, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members would conduct  their day-to-day activities within mandatory and designed parameters and in accordance with pre- determined operational plans created by Tim Ables and/or its clients.    Upon further information and belief, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ daily  and weekly activities were routine and largely governed by standardized plans, procedures, and  checklists created by Tim Ables and/or its clients.     Virtually every job function was pre-determined by Tim Ables and/or its clients,  including the tools to use at a job site, the schedule of work, and related work duties.     Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were prohibited from varying their job duties  outside of the predetermined parameters.     Moreover, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ job functions were primarily  routine and manual labor in nature, requiring little to no official training, much less a college education  or other advanced degree.    Indeed, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are blue-collar workers. They rely on  their hands, physical skills, and energy to perform manual and routine labor in the oilfield.     Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ duties did not (and currently do not) include  managerial responsibilities or the exercise of independent discretion or judgment.  Original Collective Action Complaint  Page 6    Tim Ables determined the hours Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members worked.      Tim Ables set Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ pay and controlled the  number of hours they worked.    Tim Ables set all employment-related policies applicable to Plaintiff and the Putative  Class Members.     Tim Ables maintained control over pricing and marketing.     Tim Ables also chose equipment and product suppliers.    Tim Ables owned or controlled the equipment and supplies that Plaintiff and the  Putative Class Members used to perform their work.    Tim Ables had the power to hire and fire Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members.     Tim Ables made all personnel and payroll decisions with respect to Plaintiff and the  Putative Class Members, including but not limited to, the decision to pay Plaintiff and the Putative  Class Members an hourly wage with no overtime pay.      Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members did not employ their own workers.    Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members worked exclusively for Tim Ables on a  permanent full-time basis.     Tim Ables, instead of Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members, paid operating  expenses like rent, payroll, marketing, insurance, and bills.     Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members relied on Tim Ables for their work. Plaintiff  and the Putative Class Members did not market any business or services of their own. Instead, Plaintiff  and the Putative Class Members worked the hours assigned by Tim Ables, performed duties assigned  by Tim Ables, worked on projects assigned by Tim Ables, and worked for the benefit of Tim Ables  and its customers.  Original Collective Action Complaint  Page 7    Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members did not earn a profit based on any business  investment of their own. Rather, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ only earning opportunity  was based on the number of hours they were allowed to work, which was controlled by Tim Ables  and/or its customers.    Tim Ables improperly classified Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members as  independent contractors. The classification was improper because Plaintiff and the Putative Class  Members were not in business for themselves. Instead, they were economically dependent upon Tim  Ables for their work.    Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ duties did not (and currently do not) include  managerial responsibilities or the exercise of independent discretion or judgment.    The FLSA mandates that overtime be paid at one and one-half times an employee’s  regular rate of pay.     Tim Ables denied Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members overtime pay as a result of  a widely applicable, illegal pay practice. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members regularly worked in  excess of forty (40) hours per week but never received overtime compensation.    Tim Ables applied this pay practice despite clear and controlling law that states that  the manual labor/technical, routine duties which were performed by Plaintiff and the Putative Class  Members consisted of non-exempt work.    Accordingly, Tim Ables’ pay policies and practices blatantly violated (and continue to  violate) the FLSA.  V.   All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.    Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this collective claim is made on behalf of all those who  are (or were) similarly situated to Plaintiff.    Other similarly situated employees have been victimized by Tim Ables’ patterns,  practices, and policies, which are in willful violation of the FLSA.    The FLSA Collective Members are defined in Paragraph 57.    Tim Ables’ failure to pay any overtime compensation results from generally applicable  policies and practices and does not depend on the personal circumstances of the individual FLSA  Collective Members.  Original Collective Action Complaint  Page 11    Thus, Plaintiff’s experiences are typical of the experiences of the FLSA Collective  Members.    The specific job titles or precise job requirements of the various FLSA Collective  Members does not prevent collective treatment.    All of the FLSA Collective Members—regardless of their specific job titles, precise job  requirements, rates of pay, or job locations—are entitled to be properly compensated for all hours  worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek.    Although the issues of damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction  from the common nucleus of liability facts. Indeed, the FLSA Collective Members are blue-collar  oilfield workers entitled to overtime after forty (40) hours in a week.    Tim Ables employed a substantial number of similarly situated workers since August  9, 2015. Upon information and belief, these workers are geographically dispersed, residing and  working in locations across the United States. Because these workers do not have fixed work locations,  they may work in different states across the country in the course of a given year.    Absent a collective action, many members of the proposed FLSA collective likely will  not obtain redress of their injuries and Tim Ables will retain the proceeds of its rampant violations.    Moreover, individual litigation would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system.  Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the claims  of the individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency.    Accordingly, the FLSA collective of similarly situated plaintiffs should be certified as  defined as in Paragraph 57 and notice should be promptly sent.  VI. ",lose,1
16729910,win," Defendant Princess sent multiple unsolicited text messages to consumer phone  numbers, regardless of whether they were registered on the DNC.   Plaintiff Received Unsolicited Autodialed Text Messages to Her Cell  Phone Despite Being on the DNC List     Plaintiff Wammack’s cell phone number was registered on the DNC on April 5,  2013.     Her cell phone number is not associated with a business and is for personal use.    The text message shown above directs the recipient to call Sam Nguyen at 919- 589-1759. When 919-589-1759 is called, it is directed to Sam Nguyen, a Princess employee.     On July 26, 2019 at 5:49 PM, Wammack received a second autodialed text  message from Defendant, this time from phone number 919-446-5486:     Plaintiff has never had a relationship with Princess and has never provided  Princess with express written consent to contact her.    The unauthorized text messages sent by Princess, as alleged herein, have harmed  Plaintiff in the form of annoyance, nuisance, and invasion of privacy, and disturbed Wammack’s  use and enjoyment of her cellular phone, in addition to the wear and tear on the phone’s  hardware (including the phone’s battery) and the consumption of memory on the phone.     Seeking redress for these injuries, Wammack, on behalf of herself and two  Classes of similarly situated individuals, brings suit under the Telephone Consumer Protection  Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq., which prohibits unsolicited autodialed text messages to cellular  telephones, including solicitation text messages to a phone number protected by the DNC.   The following individuals are excluded from the Classes: (1) any Judge or  Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, its  subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendant or its parents  have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors; (3)  Plaintiff’s attorneys; (4) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion  from the Classes; (5) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such excluded  persons; and (6) persons whose claims against Defendant have been fully and finally adjudicated  and/or released.     Plaintiff anticipates the need to amend the Class definition following appropriate  discovery regarding the type of equipment used, the purpose of the text messages, and other  appropriate discovery.     Numerosity: On information and belief, there are hundreds, if not thousands of  members of the Classes such that joinder of all members is impracticable.    Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and  protect the interests of the Classes and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class  actions. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Classes, and Defendant has no  defenses unique to Plaintiff. Plaintiff and her counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting  this action on behalf of the members of the Classes, and they have the financial resources to do  so. Neither Plaintiff nor her counsel has any interest adverse to the Classes.    Appropriateness: This class action is also appropriate for certification because  Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the Classes as  respective wholes, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure  compatible standards of conduct toward the members of the Classes and making final class-wide  injunctive relief appropriate. Defendant’s business practices apply to and affect the members of  the Classes uniformly, and Plaintiff’s challenge of those practices hinges on Defendant’s conduct  with respect to the Classes, not on facts or law applicable only to Plaintiff.     Additionally, the damages suffered by individual members of the Classes will  likely be small relative to the burden and expense of individual prosecution of the complex  litigation necessitated by Defendant’s actions. Thus, it would be virtually impossible for the  members of the Classes to obtain effective relief from Defendant’s misconduct on an individual  basis. A class action provides the benefits of single adjudication, economies of scale, and  comprehensive supervision by a single court.    Defendant and/or its agents sent unwanted solicitation text messages to cellular  telephone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent  Class using an autodialer.     These solicitation text messages were sent en masse without the consent of the  Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class to receive such solicitation  text messages.     The equipment used to send the text messages had the present capacity to transmit  text messages en masse and did not function similar to a simple cellphone.     The text messages were sent without human intervention.     Defendant’s conduct was wilful or knowing. Defendant knew or should’ve known  that its text messages violated the TCPA.    Defendant has, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). As a result of  Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class are  each entitled to between $500 and $1,500 for each and every text message.   Plaintiff repeats and realleges the paragraphs 1 through 38 of this Complaint and  incorporates them by reference.    47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e), provides that § 64.1200(c) is “applicable to any person or  entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone numbers.”3    Any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month  period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this  subsection may” may bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were  promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone  solicitations to which they object. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c).    Defendant violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) by initiating, or causing to be initiated,  repeated telephone solicitations to telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the Do Not Call  Registry Class members who registered their respective telephone numbers on the National Do  Not Call Registry, a listing of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is  maintained by the federal government.     Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5) because Plaintiff and the Do Not Call  Registry Class received more than one phone call/text message in a 12-month period by or on  behalf of Defendant in violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, as described above. As a result of  Defendant’s conduct as alleged herein, Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class suffered  actual damages and are entitled to $500 per violation.    Defendant’s conduct was wilful or knowing. Defendant knew or should’ve known  that its text messages violated the TCPA.  Class Treatment Is Appropriate for Plaintiff’s TCPA Claims    Princess Sends Unsolicited Text Messages Using an Autodialer    Telephone Consumer Protection Act  (Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227)  (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class)   Telephone Consumer Protection Act  (Violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227)  (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Autodial No Consent Class)  ",lose,1
6945879,lose,"  Defendant Brake Check is a chain automotive repair shop for brake service, oil changes  and alignment.     0  In order to perform their job duties, Plaintiff and the Class Members follow procedures  that are outlined in Defendant’s manuals and guidelines and/or learned during training.  It  is Plaintiff’s understanding that Defendant expects its Store Managers to follow the  procedures and policies provided to complete their work.     3  As Service Managers, Plaintiff and Class Members regularly work/worked more than  forty (40) hours per workweek.  Neither he nor any of the other Class Members had  authority to (nor did they): manage an enterprise, hire or fire other employees, set the pay  rates of other employees, create policies or procedures to govern Defendant’s employees,  handle employee grievances, determine the type of equipment or materials that Defendant  could use in its operations, enter into contracts on behalf of Defendant or otherwise have  operational control over Defendant’s business operations and practices.  Moreover,  Plaintiff and the Class Members did not perform office or non-manual work directly  related to the management or general business operations of Defendant or its customers,  nor did they exercise discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of  significance in the conduct of Defendant’s business.   7  Plaintiff and the Class Members worked/work over forty hours per work week and  Defendant fails/failed to pay Plaintiff and the Class Members overtime compensation.  Plaintiff and the Class Members were paid the same amount no matter how many hours  they worked for Defendant.   8  Throughout Plaintiff’s tenure working for Defendant, Service Managers who are subject  to the same pay policy/plan described herein, work/worked overtime hours, and were/are  not compensated in accordance with the FLSA by Defendant.  Over the past three (3)  years there have been other Service Managers who were subject to the same policy and  plan as described herein.  Plaintiff is aware of other individuals who worked for  Defendant within the past three years and were not compensated in accordance with the  FLSA for hours worked in excess of forty-hours per work week.     1  Plaintiff and the Class Members routinely receive instructions as to what jobs are to be  completed and how by their supervisor. Plaintiff and the Class Members are not allowed  to make unilateral decisions about the tasks assigned or the manner in which such tasks  are completed without the approval of their supervisor.   5  Plaintiff and the Class Members were at all times “non-exempt” employees and eligible  to receive overtime pay pursuant to Section 207 of the FLSA.   4  Plaintiff and the Class Members are subject to a single policy and pay plan that they are  paid the same amount no matter how many hours they work.  Defendant had a  plan/policy in place which applied to Plaintiff and the Class Members that they were  misclassified as exempt and thus were not compensated for any hours worked over 40  hours per week.        Plaintiff works as a Service Manager for Defendant Brake Check.  He began working for  Brake Check on May 2016 and is still currently employed.  He is wrongfully classified by  Defendant as exempt from overtime compensation however, he is expected to work and  does in fact work over forty (40) hours per work week.  He reports to and is supervised  by the Store Director, Derrick Carter.  Other individuals who work/worked with Plaintiff,  perform the same or similar job duties and are paid similarly.      Plaintiff and the Class Members input their actual time worked when they clocked in and  out on Defendant’s computer system.  However, on Plaintiff’s pay stub Defendant  changes/changed the hours worked to twelve (12) hours for the entire two-week pay  period at a rate of $100.00 to equal $1,200.00 paid for each two-week pay period, no  matter how many hours were actually worked.  Plaintiff works six (6) days a week.   Plaintiff and the Class Members are not paid for all hours actually worked and do not  receive overtime compensation.     Defendant dictates what hours Plaintiff works, provides the tools for him to do his job,  tells him what work he is required to complete and the specifications on how the work is  to be completed.  On most weeks during his employment over the last three (3) years  Plaintiff worked and continues to work over forty (40) hours per week.  The overtime  hours Plaintiff works are necessary to meet the demands of the job.  On average, Plaintiff  and the Class Members work approximately 30-35 hours per week of overtime.      Defendant controlled all the conditions of Plaintiff’s employment.  Defendant determines  Plaintiff’s pay rate, the schedule he works, and the policies and procedures Plaintiff and  the other Class Members are/were required to follow.     As a Service Manager, Plaintiff’s primary duties include but are not limited to, brake  repairs, alignments, answering phones, ordering parts at the direction of the Store  Director, and completing paperwork related to material ordered from vendors.  Over fifty  percent (50%) of Plaintiff and the Class Members time was spent working on and  repairing cars and trucks, the same functions performed by the technicians.  These same  job duties are also performed by all of Defendant’s Service Managers at every location.       Plaintiff and the Class Member do not; (1) interview or select other employees; (2) set or  adjust the rates of pay and hours of work of other employees; (3) appraise other  employees' productivity and efficiency for the purpose of recommending promotions or  other changes in their status; (4) handle employee complaints and grievances and/or  discipline employees; (5) determine the techniques, policies or procedures to be used or  followed by Defendant’s employees; and/or (6) determine the types of materials,  supplies, machinery, or tools to be used or merchandise to be bought, stocked, and sold.      Plaintiff incorporates the allegations in the preceding paragraph as if fully set forth  herein.     Plaintiff brings this suit as a collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b) on behalf of  himself and all other persons employed by Defendant as Service Managers within three  (3) years from the filing of this suit who, like Plaintiff, (1) have not been compensated for  all hours worked and/or (2) have not been compensated at one and a half times their  regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a single work  week.     Defendant’s Service Managers all perform the same/similar essential job functions and  duties, notwithstanding the fact that one employee might have more tenure or experience  than another employee in the same or similar position.  Plaintiff and the Class Members  were also paid in the same manner by Defendant.  Therefore, the Class Members are  similarly situated to Plaintiff.       The damages for each individual can easily be calculated using the same methodology  and formula although the exact amount of the damages may vary.     Defendant possesses the names and addresses of Class Members in its records.  The Class  Members should be allowed to receive notice about this lawsuit and given an opportunity  to join.  Like Plaintiff, these similarly situated workers are entitled to recover their unpaid  wages, overtime wages, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and other damages.  Therefore, notice is appropriately sent to the following class:  All Service Managers that worked for Defendant at any of its  locations any time during the three years preceding the filing of this  lawsuit to the present that worked over forty (40) hours in any  workweek.     Defendant misclassified Plaintiff and the Class Members as exempt from receiving  overtime compensation, failed to pay them wages for all hours worked and failed to pay  them overtime wages required by the FLSA for all hours worked over forty (40) hours  per work week.     Plaintiff and the Class Members are entitled to wages for all hours worked, overtime  wages for all hours worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek, an amount equal to all  of their unpaid wages as liquidated damages, as well as their reasonable and necessary  attorneys’ fees and costs of this action.  29 U.S.C. §216(b).   ",win,3
6174616,win,"(Against All Defendants For Violations of  Section 10(b) And Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder)   (Violations of Section 20(a) of the  Exchange Act Against The Individual Defendants)    Education Management Corporation is a publicly traded, for-profit education  company. The company offers academic programs to students through campus-based and online  instruction to earn undergraduate and graduate degrees, including doctoral degrees, and  specialized non-degree diplomas in a range of disciplines.     The company operates 110 locations across 32 states of the United States and  Canada. Education Management Corporation was founded in 1962, is headquartered in  Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and its shares trades on the NASDAQ under the ticker symbol   The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is  impracticable.  Throughout the Class Period, EDMC securities were actively traded on the  NASDAQ.  While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and  can be ascertained only through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes that there are hundreds  or thousands of members in the proposed Class.  Record owners and other members of the Class  may be identified from records maintained by EDMC or its transfer agent and may be notified of  the pendency of this action by mail, using the form of notice similar to that customarily used in  securities class actions.    Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class as all  members of the Class are similarly affected by defendants’ wrongful conduct in violation of  federal law that is complained of herein.    Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the  Class and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation.   Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to or in conflict with those of the Class.    A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient  adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable.  Furthermore, as  the damages suffered by individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and  burden of individual litigation make it impossible for members of the Class to individually  redress the wrongs done to them.  There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as  a class action.    Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to a  presumption of reliance upon the integrity of the market.     Alternatively, Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to the  presumption of reliance established by the Supreme Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens of the State  of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 92 S. Ct. 2430 (1972), as Defendants omitted material  information in their Class Period statements in violation of a duty to disclose such information,  as detailed above.   Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if  fully set forth herein.    This Count is asserted against defendants and is based upon Section 10(b) of the  Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the SEC.    Pursuant to the above plan, scheme, conspiracy and course of conduct, each of the  defendants participated directly or indirectly in the preparation and/or issuance of the quarterly  and annual reports, SEC filings, press releases and other statements and documents described  above, including statements made to securities analysts and the media that were designed to  influence the market for EDMC securities.  Such reports, filings, releases and statements were  materially false and misleading in that they failed to disclose material adverse information and  misrepresented the truth about EDMC’s finances and business prospects.      By virtue of their positions at EDMC, defendants had actual knowledge of the  materially false and misleading statements and material omissions alleged herein and intended  thereby to deceive Plaintiff and the other members of the Class, or, in the alternative, defendants  acted with reckless disregard for the truth in that they failed or refused to ascertain and disclose  such facts as would reveal the materially false and misleading nature of the statements made,  although such facts were readily available to defendants.  Said acts and omissions of defendants  were committed willfully or with reckless disregard for the truth.  In addition, each defendant  knew or recklessly disregarded that material facts were being misrepresented or omitted as  described above.    Information showing that defendants acted knowingly or with reckless disregard  for the truth is peculiarly within defendants’ knowledge and control.  As the senior managers  and/or directors of EDMC, the Individual Defendants had knowledge of the details of EDMC’s  internal affairs.    The Individual Defendants are liable both directly and indirectly for the wrongs  complained of herein.  Because of their positions of control and authority, the Individual  Defendants were able to and did, directly or indirectly, control the content of the statements of  EDMC.  As officers and/or directors of a publicly-held company, the Individual Defendants had  a duty to disseminate timely, accurate, and truthful information with respect to EDMC’s  businesses, operations, future financial condition and future prospects.  As a result of the  dissemination of the aforementioned false and misleading reports, releases and public statements,  the market price of EDMC securities was artificially inflated throughout the Class Period.  In  ignorance of the adverse facts concerning EDMC’s business and financial condition which were  concealed by defendants, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class purchased or otherwise  acquired EDMC securities at artificially inflated prices and relied upon the price of the securities,  the integrity of the market for the securities and/or upon statements disseminated by defendants,  and were damaged thereby.    By reason of the conduct alleged herein, defendants knowingly or recklessly,  directly or indirectly, have violated Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5  promulgated thereunder.    As a direct and proximate result of defendants’ wrongful conduct, Plaintiff and  the other members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their respective purchases,  acquisitions and sales of the Company’s securities during the Class Period, upon the disclosure  that the Company had been disseminating misrepresented financial statements to the investing  public.   Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the  foregoing paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.   Background  ",lose,1
15683492,win," (Breach of Express Warranty)    (Breach of Implied Warranties)    (Fraudulent Concealment)    (Product Liability – Design Defect)    (Violation of Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.SC. § 2301, et seq.)   (California Unfair Competition Law – Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.)   (Negligence)   (Violation of Consumer Legal Remedies Act – Civil Code § 1750, et seq.)    The Mini Cooper is a distinctive vehicle that has been a popular  automotive icon since the 1960s.  Defendant acquired Mini Cooper in 2002 and  marketed it as a new class of high-end vehicles that were affordable.  In 2007,  Defendant released its second generation of Mini vehicles, featuring a four-stroke  engine (the “Prince engine”).  The Defective Vehicles were manufactured with the  Prince engine.    Unlike most engines made for the consumer market, the Prince engine  uses a metal timing chain rather than a “belt” made of composite materials.  When the  Prince engine was first introduced in 2004, Defendant touted the timing chain’s  durability compared to a timing belt, and indicated that the timing chain would remain  maintenance-free throughout the full running life of the engine.  One of the features of  the Prince engine Defendant has promoted is that the timing chain and tensioner are  located inside the engine block.  However, actual road use has shown a significant  drawback to this design: if the chain fails, damage to the engine can be catastrophic.    Plaintiffs seek relief in their individual capacity and seek to represent a  class consisting of all others who are similarly situated.  Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.  23(a) and (b)(2) and/or (b)(3), Plaintiffs seek certification of a class initially defined as  follows:  All persons who formerly or currently own or lease the following Mini  Cooper vehicles in California: 2007 through 2010 Hardtop (R56), 2008  through 2010 Clubman (R55), and 2009 through 2010 Convertible (R57).     Excluded from the Class are Defendant and its subsidiaries and affiliates,  Defendant’s executives, board members, legal counsel, the judges and all other court  personnel to whom this case is assigned, their immediate families, and those who  purchased the Product for the purpose of resale.    Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend or modify the Class definition with  greater specificity or division into subclasses after they have had an opportunity to  conduct discovery.    Numerosity.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).  The Class is so numerous that  joinder of all members is unfeasible and not practicable.  While the precise number of  Class members has not been determined at this time, Plaintiffs are informed and  believes that many thousands of consumers have purchased the Products.    Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and re-allege the preceding paragraphs.    Plaintiffs bring this claim individually and on behalf of the Class.    Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and re-allege the preceding paragraphs.      Defendant engaged in unlawful, unfair, and/or fraudulent conduct under  California Business & Professional Code § 17200, et seq.    Defendant’s conduct is unlawful in that it violates the Consumers Legal  Remedies Act, California Civil Code § 1750, et seq. (as set forth in the first cause of  action), and the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability and  Documentation Act (the “TREAD Act”), 49 U.S.C. § 30101, et seq. (by failing to  timely inform the NHTSA of the Defect and allowing the Defective Vehicles to be sold  with the Defect).    Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and re-allege the preceding paragraphs.      Plaintiffs bring this claim individually and on behalf of the Class.    Defendant had a duty to its customers as a manufacturer of motor vehicles  to design, manufacture, market, and provide vehicles that, in their ordinary operation,  are reasonably safe for their intended uses.  Defendant had a duty to adequately test its  vehicles’ safety before selling millions to consumers worldwide.    Defendant had a duty to test vehicles for timing chain tensioner problems  once Defendant was on notice that its vehicles had a propensity to have timing chain  tensioner issues leading to catastrophic engine failure, which can cause bodily injury,  death, and property damage.  Moreover, Defendant had a duty to provide true and  accurate information to the public to prevent undue risks arising from the foreseeable  use of its products.    At all times relevant, Defendant sold, marketed, advertised, distributed,  and otherwise placed Defective Vehicles into the stream of commerce in an unlawful,  unfair, fraudulent, and/or deceptive manner that was likely to deceive the public.    Defendant was negligent, and breached the above duties owed to Plaintiffs  and Class members.    As direct and proximate causes of Defendant’s breaches, Plaintiffs and the  Class have been damaged including, but not limited to, the cost of repairs required due  to timing chain tensioner problems, the financial loss of owning the Defective Vehicles  that are unsafe, and being subjected to potential risk of injury.   Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and re-allege the preceding paragraphs.    Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and re-allege the preceding paragraphs.    Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and re-allege the preceding paragraphs.    Plaintiffs and Class members are “consumers” within the meaning of the   Plaintiffs incorporate by reference and re-allege the preceding paragraphs.    Plaintiffs bring this claim individually and on behalf of the Class.    Plaintiffs, and each member of the Class, formed a contract with Defendant  at the time Plaintiffs and the other members of the Class purchased the Defective  Vehicles.  The terms of that contract include the promises and affirmations to provide  vehicles free of “defects in materials or workmanship.”  This express warranty became  part of the basis of the bargain and is part of a standardized contract between Plaintiffs  and the members of the Class on the one hand, and Defendant on the other.    All conditions precedent to Defendant’s liability under this contract have  been performed by Plaintiffs and the Class.    Plaintiffs purchased an extended, 100,000-mile warranty, which was still in  effect at the time the Defect manifested (at approximately 91,000 miles).    Defendant breached the terms of this contract, including the express  warranty, with Plaintiffs and the Class by not providing a vehicle that could provide the  benefits described above (being free from defects).    As a result of Defendant’s breach of its express warranty, Plaintiffs and the  Class have been damaged in the amount of the repair costs associated with the Defect,  as well as their vehicles’ diminished value as a result of the Defect.  SYSTEMATICALLY FAIL AND CAN CAUSE CATASTROPHIC ENGINE  FAILURE  ",lose,2
15922179,lose," By virtue of operating a mobile phone network, AT&T knows its customers’ real- time locations because it has to collect that information to provide service to its customers’  cellular phones.    Cellular phone networks work by routing phone calls, text messages, and data for  email messages, Internet browsing, mobile applications, and other operations from a network of  fixed towers containing antennas to an individual customer’s cell phone.     A.  AT&T Has Access to Its Customers’ Real-Time Location Data by Virtue of  Operating a Mobile Cellular Phone Network.    A.  AT&T Has Access to Its Customers’ Real-Time Location Data by Virtue of Operating a  Mobile Cellular Phone Network  .........................................................................................9  B.  Public Reports Reveal AT&T’s Sale of Access to Its Customers’ Real-Time Location  Data, and the Rampant Abuses Flowing from Such Sale ..................................................10  C.  Defendants Developed and Profit from a Robust Market for Customers’ Real-Time  Location Data .....................................................................................................................21  D.  Defendants Sell Access to Location Data Intended for Enhanced 911- Purposes .............27  E.  AT&T Allowed Unauthorized Third Parties to Access Customers’ Location Data ..........32  F.  Defendants’ Sale of Access to Customers’ Location Data Is Outrageous and Harmful ...36  G.  The Sale of Location Data Violates Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Is Highly  Offensive ............................................................................................................................39  H.  AT&T’s Misrepresentations and Omissions Concerning the Sale of Customer Location  Data ....................................................................................................................................55  I.  Fraudulent Concealment and Tolling ................................................................................62  J.  Named Plaintiff Allegations ..............................................................................................62 ",lose,3
14726408,win," Defendant specializes in flowback and well testing for oil and natural gas energy  producers throughout the United States, including Pennsylvania and Ohio. To complete their business  objectives, Defendant employed independent contractors.      Many of the individuals who worked for Defendant, were paid on a day-rate basis,  misclassified as independent contractors, and make up the proposed Putative Class. While the exact  job titles and job duties may differ, the Putative Class Members are and were subjected to the same or  similar illegal pay practices for similar work.  These so-called independent contractors were paid a flat  sum for each day worked, regardless of the number of hours that they worked that day (or in that  workweek) without any overtime pay for hours that they worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a  workweek.    As a Flowback Operator, Plaintiff spent his time operating and monitoring flowback  equipment as the fluid used to hydraulically fracture a shale formation was recovered from the well at  the surface.    The work Plaintiff performed was an essential and integral part of Defendant’s core  business.    While he was classified as an independent contractor, Defendant exercised control  over all aspects of his job.      Defendant did not require any substantial investment by Plaintiff or the Putative Class  Members for them to perform the work that was required.      Defendant determined Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members opportunity for  profit and loss.  Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were not required to possess any unique or  specialized skillset (other than that maintained by all other employees in their respective position) to  perform their job duties.      Defendant and its clients controlled all the significant or meaningful aspects of the job  duties performed by Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members.    Defendant and its clients determined the hours and locations Plaintiff and the Putative  Class Members worked, tools used, and rates of pay received.    Even though Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members often worked away from  Defendant’s offices without the presence of a direct supervisor employed by Defendant, Defendant  still controlled all aspects of Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members job activities by enforcing  mandatory compliance with Defendant and its client’s policies and procedures.    More often than not, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members utilized equipment  provided by Defendant and/or its clients to perform their job duties.  Plaintiff and the Putative Class  Members did not provide the equipment he worked with on a daily basis.      Defendant and/or its clients made the large capital investments in buildings, machines,  equipment, tools, and supplied in the business in which Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members  worked.    Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members did not incur operating expenses like rent,  payroll, marketing, and insurance.    Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were economically dependent on Defendant  during their employment.    Defendant set Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members rates of pay, their work  schedules, and prohibited them from working other jobs for other companies while they were working  on jobs for Defendant.    Defendant directly determined Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members opportunity  for profit and loss.  Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members earning opportunities were based on the  number of days Defendant scheduled them to work.    Moreover, the job functions of Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were  primarily manual labor/technical in nature, requiring little to no official training, much less a college  education or other advanced degree.     Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members did not have any supervisory or management  duties.    Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members perform the same or similar job duties and  are subjected to the same or similar policies and procedures which dictate the day-to-day activities  performed by each person.    Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members also worked similar hours and were denied  overtime as a result of the same illegal pay practice.     Defendant’s policy of failing to pay their independent contractors, including Plaintiff  and the Putative Class Members, overtime violates the FLSA, the Ohio Wage Acts and PMWA because  these workers are, for all purposes, employees performing non-exempt job duties.    Because Plaintiff (and Defendant’s other independent contractors) were misclassified  as independent contractors by Defendant, they should receive overtime for all hours that they worked  in excess of 40 hours in each workweek.  VI.   Plaintiff incorporates all previous paragraphs and alleges that the illegal pay practices  Defendant imposed on Plaintiff were likewise imposed on the Putative Class Members.    Numerous other individuals who worked with Plaintiff indicated they were improperly  classified as independent contractors, paid in the same manner, performed similar work, and were not  properly compensated for all hours worked as required by state and federal wage laws.    Based on his experiences and tenure with Defendant, Plaintiff is aware that  Defendant’s illegal practices were imposed on the Putative Class Members.    The Putative Class Members were all improperly classified as independent contractors  and not afforded the overtime compensation when they worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week.    Defendant’s failure to pay wages and overtime compensation at the rates required by  state and/or federal law result from generally applicable, systematic policies, and practices which are  not dependent on the personal circumstances of the Putative Class Members.    Plaintiff’s experiences are therefore typical of the experiences of the Putative Class  Members.    The specific job titles or precise job locations of the Putative Class Members do not  prevent class or collective treatment.      Plaintiff has no interest contrary to, or in conflict with, the Putative Class Members.  Like each Putative Class Member, Plaintiff has an interest in obtaining the unpaid overtime wages  owed to them under state and/or federal law.    A class and collective action, such as the instant one, is superior to other available  means for fair and efficient adjudication of the lawsuit.     Absent this action, many Putative Class Members likely will not obtain redress of their  injuries and Defendant will reap the unjust benefits of violating the FLSA and applicable state labor  laws.    Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity  among the claims of individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency.    The questions of law and fact common to the Putative Class Members predominate  over any questions affecting solely the individual members. Among the common questions of law and  fact are:  a.  Whether Defendant employed the Putative Class Members within the meaning  of the applicable state and federal statutes, including the FLSA, the Ohio Wage  Acts and PMWA;  b.  Whether the Putative Class Members were improperly misclassified as  independent contractors;  c.  Whether Defendant’s decision to classify the Putative Class Members as  independent contractors was made in good faith;   d.  Whether Defendant’s decision to not pay time and a half for overtime to the  Putative Class Members was made in good faith;   e.  Whether Defendant’s violation of the FLSA, the Ohio Wage Acts and PMWA  was willful; and   f.  Whether Defendant’s illegal pay practices were applied uniformly across the  nation to all Putative Class Members.    Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Putative Class Members. Plaintiff and  the Putative Class Members sustained damages arising out of Defendant’s illegal and uniform  employment policy.     Although the issue of damages may be somewhat individual in character, there is no  detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. Therefore, this issue does not preclude  collective and class action treatment.  X. ",win,5
6121552,win,"- en  Ol  u..  s:  I- <(  13  UJ  ()  <(  UJ   0  L()  ('"")  17   The San Diego City Council did not design or intend for Municipal Code  18  19  §54.0110 (""Illegal Encroachment"" or ""MC §54.011 O"") to be used against people  20  living on the street. It is an obscure ordinance intended to address trash cans and  21  dumpsters left on the sidewalks too long after trash pickup. The City's  22  23  Environmental Services Department recommended MC §54.01 lO's adoption, and  24  an October 18, 2007 Authorizing Ordinance reveals that it was intended to address  25  ""unauthorized solid waste or recycling dumpsters and bins discovered in the public  26  27  right-of-way or on public property."" No community participation took place before  28  MC §54.0llO's enactment, and there was no public discussion or written record  - 19 - Plaintiffs bring this action on their own behalves and on behalf of all other  - _J  cc  0  cc  I- CJ  14  UJ  en  UJ  I  I  - UJ  en  0  15  cc  <( z  persons similarly situated. The Class of people that Plaintiffs represent consists of  0  <(  s:  en  16  all those persons in the City of San Diego who are homeless and ( 1) have nowhere  0  L()  C')  17  to place themselves or their belongings other than in public; (2) who fear being  18  19  ticketed for violation of MC §54.0110 (""encroachment"") if they set anything down;  20  (3) who have been issued one or more citations for ""encroachment;"" (4) who have  21  become the subject of""stay away"" orders resulting from an ""encroachment"" citation;  22  23  and/or (5) have been arrested or jailed for violating MC §54.0110.  24   The members of the Class are so numerous that individual joinder of all  25  members is impracticable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(l). The Class is comprised of  26  27  thousands of individuals who are homeless in the City of San Diego, and who are  28  potentially committing a crime every time they place their belongings on public  - 4 - Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations in paragraphs 1-43 above.   42 U.S.C. §1983 provides that, ""[e]very person who, under color of any  statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the  District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United  States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,  privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the  party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for  d  ""  re ress ....   efendants' actions violate Plaintiffs' civil and constitutional rights,  including, but not limited to, Plaintiffs' rights under the Fourth, Eighth and  Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article 1, §7, Article  1, § 15; and Article 1, § 1 7 of the California Constitution.  - 26 - Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations in paragraphs 1-43 above.   Forces beyond Plaintiffs' control, such as unemployment, poverty, medical  conditions, and the failure of the Defendant to provide alternatives, including but not  limited to those which may be mandated by law, have compelled Plaintiffs and  others to live and place their belongings in public.   Because of Plaintiffs' status as homeless and unsheltered, Plaintiffs must  carry their belongings-including items necessary for their health, safety, and  security-with them in their daily lives. Plaintiffs must set themselves and their  belongings down on public property because they do not have access to private  shelter or storage. Placing belongings on public property constitutes an involuntary  and unavoidable manifestation of the Plaintiffs' status as homeless. Plaintiffs may  not avoid committing acts that violate MC §54.0110, which criminalizes placing any  object on public property, at any time for any length of time, even a moment, ever. 14  14 In a Statement of Interest of the United States in Bell v. City of Boise 834  F.Supp.2d  1103,  filed  August  6,  2015  (available  at:  htfps:l/wwwjustice.gov/crt/fi,_le/761211rdownloa~ the U.S. Department of Justice  clarified its recommended framework for analyztng Eighth Amendment claims  relating to criminalization of homelessness:  ""If sufficient shelter space is unavailable because a) there are  inadequate beds for the entire population, orb) there are restrictions on those  - 27 - Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations in paragraphs 1-43 above.  b~ds tqat disqualify certau~ groups_ of homeless in.dividuals (e.g., _because of  disability access or exceeding maxunum stay requirements), then 1t would be  impossiole for some .homeless tndividuals to comply with these ordiµances.  As set forth below, m those circumstances enforcement of the ordinances  am.aunts to the criminalization of homelessness, in violation of the Eighth  Amendment.""  - 28 - Cruel and Unusual Punishment in Violation of the  United States and California Constitutions   Violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983   Violation of Due Process Under the  United States and California Constitutions  ",lose,2
59756995,win," Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.  P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3).    The Class consists of:   a. all individuals with addresses in the State of New York;  b.  to whom Defendant Convergent sent a collection letter attempting to collect a  consumer debt;  c. containing deceptively worded settlement offers;   d. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this  action and on or before a date twenty-one (2l) days after the filing of this action.    The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of  Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or  have purchased debts.    Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members,  partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate  families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate  families.     There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common  issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue  is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as  Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e.    The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same  facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the  Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in  handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff  nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this  action.    This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action  pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a  well-defined community interest in the litigation:  a. Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges,  that the Plaintiff Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members  would be impractical.  b. Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as  to all members of the Plaintiff Class and those questions predominance over any  questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue  is whether the Defendants’ written communications to consumers, in the forms  attached as Exhibit A violate 15 USC §l692e.  c. Typicality: The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members.  The Plaintiffs and all members of the Plaintiff Class have claims arising out of  the Defendants' common uniform course of conduct complained of herein.  d. Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the  class members insofar as Plaintiff have no interests that are adverse to the absent  class members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter.  Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits,  complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor her counsel have  any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class  action lawsuit.  e. Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair  and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all  members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large  number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single  forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that  individual actions would engender.    Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure  is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff  Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is  superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.    Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at  the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues  pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).   Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length  herein.    Some time prior to February 4, 2021, an obligation was allegedly incurred to T- Mobile, USA by the Plaintiff.    The T-Mobile, USA obligation arose out of transactions in which money, property,  insurance or services which are the subject of the transactions were primarily for personal,  family or household purposes, specifically telecommunication services.    The alleged T-Mobile, USA obligation is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C.  §1692a(5).    T-Mobile, USA is a “creditor” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(4).    Defendant Convergent, a debt collector, was contracted by T-Mobile, USA to collect  the alleged debt which originated with T-Mobile, USA    Defendants collect and attempt to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been  incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United  States Postal Services, telephone and internet.  Violation I – February 4, 2021 Collection Letter    On or about February 4, 2021, Defendant Convergent sent Plaintiff a collection letter  (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt currently owed to Defendant T-Mobile, USA See  Exhibit A.    The collection letter states: “We have been authorized to accept payment of 35% of  the total balance, which is $1,347.12, in exchange for which T-Mobile, USA will recall your  account and cease all collection activity. If you are interested in taking advantage of this offer,  call our office within 14 days of the date of this letter.  Please note that this is not an offer to  accept 35% of your debt as payment in full, but an offer for T-Mobile, USA to remove your  account from further collection efforts.  We are not obligated to renew this offer.”    The letter is deceptive because it implies that in exchange of 35% of the balance the  consumer will achieve some form of settlement, when in actuality it is unclear what form of  settlement the letter is offering.    The letter states that T-Mobile, USA will recall the account and cease all collection  activity but does not clarify what will occur with the rest of the balance and whether the rest of  the balance would be collected by another collection company in the future.    Nor does the letter clearly state that the account will be reinstated upon payment of  35% of the balance.    The letter deceives and misleads the consumer by implying that paying 35% would  achieve results akin to a settlement offer, when in reality the Defendant’s offer contains no  significant benefits and is unclear to what the benefits of the settlement would actually be.    As a result of Defendant’s deceptive, misleading and false debt collection practices,  Plaintiff has been damaged.   Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein.    Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff  violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.    Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or  misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.    Defendant violated said section by:   a. Making a false and misleading representation in violation of but not limited to  §1692e (10).  b. by failing to delineate to which listed amount the “adjustment” may be applied.    By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's  conduct violated Section 1692e, et seq. of the FDCPA and is entitled to actual damages, statutory  damages, costs and attorneys’ fees.  VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT   15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.  ",win,4
15692982,win," Estee Lauder is liable under the FLSA for, inter alia, failing to properly  compensate Plaintiff and other Representatives.    There are many similarly-situated current and former Representatives who have  been underpaid in violation of the FLSA and who would benefit from the issuance of a court- supervised notice of this lawsuit and the opportunity to join it.  Thus, notice should be sent to  the Collective Action Members pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).    The similarly situated employees are known to Estee Lauder, are readily  identifiable and can be located through Estee Lauder’s records.   Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, Plaintiff seeks to prosecute her NYLL claims as a  class action on behalf of all persons who are or were formerly employed by Estee Lauder in  New York State as Representatives (collectively, the “NY Class Action Members”) at any time  from six years from the date of filing this Complaint until entry of judgment in this case (the  “Class Action Period”).    The persons in the NY Class are so numerous that their joinder is impracticable.    A class action in superior to other methods of adjudicating the NYLL claims set  forth in this case.   Estee Lauder employed Plaintiff, the FLSA Collective, and the New York Rule 23  Class as Representatives.    Consistent with Estee Lauder’s policy, pattern and practice, Plaintiff, the FLSA  Collective, and the New York Class regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek  without being paid premium overtime wages, in violation of the FLSA and/or the NYLL.      Plaintiff worked 41.5 to 58 hours per week for which she was not paid proper  wages or overtime premium wages.  For example, during the weeks of June 29, 2015 and  November 21, 2016, Plaintiff worked 58 hours and 48 hours, respectively, for which she was  not paid overtime compensation.     Furthermore, Defendants instructed Plaintiff to work, and Plaintiff routinely  worked outside, her scheduled shift (e.g., to prepare and setup the store before opening and after  closing) without compensation.    Estee Lauder assigned the work Representatives performed and is aware of the  work that they have performed.    During the Collective Action Period, upon information and belief, Estee Lauder  failed to post or keep posted a notice explaining the minimum wage and overtime wage  requirements, as required by the FLSA.  This failure to post or keep posted a notice explaining  the minimum wage and overtime wages was willful and in reckless disregard of the Plaintiff’s  and other similarly situated Representatives’’ rights under the FLSA.    Due to the foregoing, Estee Lauder’s failure to pay overtime wages for work  performed by the Collective and the New York Rule 23 Class in excess of 40 hours per  workweek was willful and reckless, and has been widespread, repeated and consistent.   Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference allegations in paragraphs 1-37.    Estee Lauder has engaged in a widespread pattern, policy, and practice of  violating the FLSA, as detailed in this Class Action Complaint.    At all times relevant, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective were engaged in  commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§  206(a) and 207(a).    Estee Lauder is an employer engaged in commerce and/or the production of goods  for commerce within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a).    At all times relevant, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective have been employees  within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(e) and 207(a).    Estee Lauder has failed to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective the overtime  wages to which they are entitled under the FLSA.    Estee Lauder’s violations of the FLSA, as described in this Complaint, have been  willful and intentional within the meaning of the FLSA.87    Estee Lauder has not made a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA with  respect to its compensation of Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective.    Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in paragraphs 1-   Because Estee Lauder’s violations of the FLSA have been willful, a three-year  statute of limitations applies, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255.    Estee Lauder has engaged in a widespread pattern, policy, and practice of  violating the NYLL, as detailed in this Complaint.    At all times relevant, Plaintiff and the members of the New York Rule 23 Class  have been employees and Estee Lauder has been an employer within the meaning of the NYLL.    As a result of Estee Lauder’s violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff and the FLSA  Collective have suffered damages by being denied overtime wages in accordance with the FLSA.    The overtime wage provisions of Article 19 of the NYLL and its supporting  regulations apply to Estee Lauder and protect Plaintiff and the members of the New York Rule  23 Class.    As a result of the unlawful acts of Estee Lauder, Plaintiff and the FLSA  Collective have been deprived of overtime compensation and other wages in amounts to be  determined at trial, and are entitled to recovery of such amounts, liquidated damages,  prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees, costs, and other compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §  216(b).   Estee Lauder has failed to pay Plaintiff and the members of the New York Rule  23 Class the overtime wages to which they are entitled under the NYLL.    By Estee Lauder’s knowing and intentional failure to pay Plaintiff and the  members of the New York Rule 23 Class overtime wages for hours worked in excess of 40 hours  per week, it has willfully violated the NYLL 19, §§ 650 et seq., and the supporting New York  State Department of Labor Regulations, including but not limited to the regulations in 12  N.Y.C.R.R. Part 142.    Due to Estee Lauder’s violations of the NYLL, Plaintiff and the members of the  New York Rule 23 Class are entitled to recover from Estee Lauder their unpaid overtime wages,  reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.   Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all allegations in paragraphs 1-   The provisions of NYLL Article 6 §§ 190 et seq. of the NYLL and its supporting  regulations apply to Estee Lauder and protect Plaintiff and the members of the New York Rule  23 Class.    At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff and the members of the New York  Rule 23 Class have been employees and Estee Lauder has been an employer within the meaning  of the NYLL §§ 190, 651(5).    Estee Lauder has engaged in a pattern, practice, and policy of failing to  compensate the Plaintiff and the members of the New York Rule 23 Class at their agreed regular  rates of pay for all hours either worked or required to be compensated by the terms of Estee  Lauder’s employment agreements with Plaintiff and the Class members.    Estee Lauder’s failure to pay Plaintiff and the members of the New York Rule 23  Class their wages at their agreed hourly regular and overtime pay rates for all hours worked or  required to be compensated by law violates the NYLL Article 6, §§ 190 et seq.    Due to Estee Lauder’s violations of the NYLL, Plaintiff and the members of the  New York Rule 23 Class are entitled to recover from Estee Lauder their unpaid overtime wages,  reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs of the action, and pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.  Fair Labor Standard Act – Unpaid Overtime Wages  On Behalf of Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective   NYLL – Unpaid Overtime Wages  On Behalf of Plaintiff and the New York Rule 23 Class   New York Labor Law Article 6 – Unpaid Regular Wages  (Brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of the New York  Rule 23 Class)  ",win,3
6623841,lose,"Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate and incorporate the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered oo1"" through""z3"" herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein.  Upon information and belief, Defendants, on behalf of a third-party, began efforts to collect an alleged consumer debt from the Plaintiffs.  Upon information and belief, and better known to the Defendants, the Defendants began their collection efforts and campaign of communications with the Plaintiffs by calling their cell phones and leaving automated messages.  The calls would come in from numbers 407-732-2415,847-426-9203 and 2t0-520-64A0.  In response to these calls the Plaintiffcalled the Defendant Chase on May 25,20178nd was connected with a female representative  The Plaintiffgave the representative the last four digits of her credit card and verified her account. The Plaintiffthen asked for some infonnation on her account and informed the representative that she did not want to receive uriy *o.. calls from the Defendant.  After receiving the information she requested from the representative the call was then concluded.  In October of 2077 the PlaintiffJakob Padwa started receiving calls from the Defendant Chase as well to his cell phone number of 347-977'6613. The calls would come from the same mentioned numbers from Chase as the calls made to Miriam Padwa and he too would be left automated messages on his cell phone.  In response to the phone calls the Plaintiffcalled the Defendants on October 2, 2017 ardwas connected \rrith a male representative. The Plaintiffgave the representative the last four digits of his social security number to access his account.  The Plaintiffinformed the representative that he had two cards and the representative stated that he had located both accounts.  The Plaintiffstated that he would like the phone calls to stop and informed the 'representative that he would see what he could do about bringlng the account current.  The representative questioned when that would be and the Plaintiffsaid he would call back the next day. The Plaintiffthen resra*ted that he did not want to receive any more calls and the conversation was concluded.  ,$ince the conclusion of the call and the requests for the phone calls to cease, the Defendants continued to contact the Plaintifts. To date the Plaintiffs have received at least 200 calls to their cell phones.  Following the phone call;dated January ll,'2018 Plaintiff Miriam Padwa received a collection letter from Defendant Nationwide Credit lnc informing her that she owed $9,266.27, originally to Chase Bank USA NA.  The letter stated ""Nationwide Credit lnc previously sent you a letter more than thirty (30) days ago, advising you that your past due account was placed with us for collection.  It then $4,262.48. This ofler or before 1124/2018. stated is valid ""We are offering you an opportunity to settle this amount for . for a one-time payment of the settlement amount and is due on  However, towards the bottom of the letter it then states oolf we sefile this debt with you for less than the full outstanding balance. Chase may offer you less than favorable terms in the future for some Chase products or services or may deny you applications. ""  A copy of the Defendant's collection letter is attached hereto as exhibit'.A"".  Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate and incorporate the allegations contained in t- 'ii paragraphs numbered ""1"" through ""45"" herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein.   15 USC fi1692 e-preface states that a debt collEctor may not use false, deceptive or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.   Defendants violated 15 USC $1692 e-preface when they sent out a collection letter dated January 11, 2018 and deceptively stated that if the Plaintiffchose to take the settlement offer and pay her debt for less than the flrll amount owed then she would possibly be in poor standing with the original creditor and have less favorable dealings with them in the future. Either Chase has a policy or providing less favorable terms for those who pay less than the full balance or they have a policy of providing the same favorable terms as those who are not in debt to them. Either way it is a misleading statement.  The threat of receiving less favorable terms is unfair, deceptive and misleading, as it is ambiguous and confusing, and forces the consumer to fear not paying the full amount to receive, as implied, urfavorable temrs. However, the letter again confuses and misleads the consumer to believe if she pays she will definitely receive favorable terms. Nowhere in the letter is it spelled out that paying the full balance will result in favorable terms.   As a result of Defendant's violations of the FDCPA, the Plaintiffhas been damaged and is entitled to damages in accordance with the FDCPA sECO""np cAUSE-gr ACTIO, N (Wolations of the TCPA)  Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs numbered ""l"" through ""53"" herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein.  It is thus clear from the plain language of the TCPA, and its considerable body of resultant case law that the TCPA is violated when a cellular telephone is called with an automatic dialer without consent, even if no charges are alleged or incurred.   With the autodialed calls to Plaintiffs' telephones commencing on or about May 2017 and continuing at atate of approximately (200) times thereafter, the Defendants violated various provisions of the TCPA, including but not limited to 47 USC $227(b)(AXiii).  The Defendants, having been informed that Piaintiffs requested that no further calls be received, willfully violated the TCPA at least (200) tiles.  Pursuant to the TCPA Omnibus Declaratory Ruling and Order, July 2015, paragraphs 138 and 139, communications from banking institutions which are exempt ""...are all intended to address exigent circumstances in which a quick, timely communication with a consumer could prevent considerable consumer harms from occurring or, in the case of the remediation calls, could help quickly mitigate the extent of harm that will occur."" Pursuant to Paragraph 139, (3) and (7) ""In light of these considerations, we adopt the following conditions for each exempted call (voice call or text message) made by a financial institution: 3) voice calls and text messages are strictly limited to purposes discussed in paras. 129-137 above and must not include any telemarketing, cross-marketing, solicitation, debt collection, or advertising content; 7) a financial institution must honor opt-out requests immediately.""   Defendants violated various provisions of the TCPA, including but not limited to 47 USC $227(bXAXiii). *  DEMANp ron TBI4I{ BY JU.RY  Plaintiffs hereby respectfully request a trial by jury for all clarms and issues in its Complaint to which it is or may be entitled to a jury tial. PRAYER rqR REL{Sr WHEREFORE, Plaintitrs demands judgment &omthe Defendaots as follows: A.  For actual damages provided and pursuant to 15 USC $16ek (a) (l); B.  For statutory damages provided aild pursuant to 15 USC $16e2(2XA); C.  For statutory darnages provided and pursuant to 15 usc$16e2k(2xB); D.  For attorneys' fees and costs provided and pursuant to I5USC$1692(a)(3); E.  A declaration that the Defendants' practices violated the",win,4
4325010,lose,"An order certifying that Count I may be maintained as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the  Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and appointing Plaintiff and the undersigned counsel to  represent the Plaintiff Class as previously set forth and defined above;   On or about August 11 2005, the Plaintiff allegedly incurred a debt (the “Debt” or “Mortgage  Loan”).   The Debt arose out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance or services  which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family or household purposes,  namely fees emanating from a personal mortgage loan on the Plaintiff’s personal residence.   The Mortgage Loan is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(5).   According to a foreclosure complaint filed against Plaintiff earlier this year, Green Tree  (which is now Ditech) was assigned plaintiff’s mortgage on June 10, 2013.   According to the foreclosure complaint, Plaintiff has been in default on his mortgage since  2009.   An award of statutory damages for Aaron Cohen and the Plaintiff Class pursuant to 15 U.S.C.  §1692k;    Shortly after the foreclosure complaint was filed, Plaintiff received in the mail a foreclosure  complaint providing him with the alleged amount of the debt ($545,425.53), the alleged name of  the creditor to whom the debt was owed (Green Tree Servicing LLC), dispute rights and rights  relating to obtaining information.   The name of the creditor to whom the debt was owed at the time of the foreclosure complaint  was not Green Tree Servicing, LLC.   The name of the creditor to whom the debt was owed at the time of the foreclosure complaint  was Fannie Mae according to a letter in response to a qualified written request by Plaintiff.   Shortly after the foreclosure complaint was filed Plaintiff received a certificate of merit as  well as a request for judicial intervention.   The certificate of merit, the foreclosure complaint and the request for judicial intervention are  “communications” as defined by the FDCPA.    The foreclosure complaint is a formal pleading in a civil action.   The request for judicial intervention and the certificate of merit are not formal pleadings in a  civil action.   The identification of the “creditor to whom the debt is owed” was readily available to  Rosicki and Ditech at the time of Rosicki’s communications with Plaintiff.  Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this Complaint as though  fully stated herein.   In their collection efforts, Ditech and Rosicki violated 15 U.S.C. §§1692, 1692e, and  §1692g(a)(2).   Attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs of suit pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692k; and   Section 15 U.S.C. §1692e provides:  1692e False or misleading representations  A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in  connection with the collection of any debt.   Rosicki and Ditech violated §1692e of the FDCPA because they falsely stated that Green  Tree Loan Servicing, LLC was the creditor to whom the Plaintiff’s debt and the debts of the  putative class members was owed when, in fact, Green Tree Servicing, LLC was not the creditor  to whom the Plaintiff’s debt and the debts of the putative class members was owed. As such the  Defendants used a false, deceptive or misleading representation or means in the collection of a  debt in violation of the FDCPA. See Bourff v. Rubin Lublin, LLC, 674 F.3d 1238 (11th Cir.  2012).   Section 15 USC §1692g provides:  (a) Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection with the  collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following information is contained in the  initial communication or the consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice  containing --  (2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;   Rosicki and Ditech violated §1692g(a)(2) of the FDCPA because Rosicki did not state the  name the creditor to whom the Plaintiff’s debt and the debts of the putative class members was  owed. The current “creditor to whom the debt is owed” is not Green Tree Servicing, LLC as  stated in the foreclosure complaint.    Despite Rosicki making an “initial communication” with plaintiff, neither Rosicki nor Green  Tree informed Plaintiff of the correct name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed.    Rosicki and Ditech are liable to the Plaintiff pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692k because of the  FDCPA violations.  Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of a class, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure  Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3).   The class consists of all natural persons with a New York address who were sent or hand  delivered a foreclosure complaint and another communication relating to a mortgage incurred to  purchase a residential owner occupied house where Rosicki names Green Tree the creditor when  it is not the creditor on or after a date one year prior to the filing of this complaint.   Upon information and belief the identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from  the records of Rosicki and Ditech.   Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges, that the  Plaintiff Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members would be impractical.  On information and belief, there are at least 40 members of the class.   Such other and further relief as the Court deems proper.   Dated: Decatur, Georgia               November 25, 2015                                                   The Law Offices of Shimshon Wexler, PC  By: /s Shimshon Wexler                                                                   Shimshon Wexler                                                                    Attorney for Plaintiff                                                                   315 W Ponce de Leon Ave Suite 250                                                                   Decatur, Georgia 30030                                                                   Tel: (212)760-2400                                                                   Fax: (917)512-6132                                                                   swexleresq@gmail.com        Admitted to practice law in New York and Georgia  Plaintiff requests a trial by jury on all issues so triable.   By: /s Shimshon Wexler                                                                                 Shimshon Wexler    Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as to all  members of the Plaintiff Class and those questions predominate over any questions or issues  involving only individual class members. The principal issue is whether Defendants satisfied  their “g” notice obligations and whether the communication is false, deceptive or misleading.   Typicality: The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members. Plaintiff  and all members of the Plaintiff Class have claims arising out of the Defendant’s common  uniform course of conduct complained of herein.   Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class members  insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the absent class members. The Plaintiff is  committed to vigorously litigating this matter. Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in  handling consumer litigation. Neither the Plaintiff nor his counsel has any interests which might  cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit.   Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair and efficient  adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all members would be  impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to  prosecute their common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication  of effort and expense that individual actions would engender.   A class action is superior for the fair and efficient adjudication of this matter, in that:  a. Individual actions are not economically feasible;  b. Members of the class are likely to be unaware of their rights;  c. Congress intended class actions to be the principal enforcement mechanism under the FDCPA.  WHEREFORE, the Court should enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff and the class and against  Defendants for:   VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT  15 U.S.C. §1692, et seq.  ",lose,4
15780637,lose,"12  13  14  15  16  '7  18  '9  20  21 11   CHARLES E. WARD; FELICIA VIDRJO and )  PAUL BRADLEY, individ11y. and on behalf of )  all others similarly situated,  )  )  Plaintiffs,  )  V.  UNITED AIRLINES, INC., and Does 1 through )  25, inclusive,  )  )  Defendants.  ..  )  CaseNo.:   Pilots employed by Defendants are required to report for duty at the airport, in  60 minutes before their first flight in the duty period for domestic flights, 90 minutes before their  all flight in the duty period for international flights, and 30 minutes before each additional flight that  in the same duty period. The duty period begins when a pilot is required to report for duty and  --to  11 11  perform during the 60, 90, and 30-minute pre-flight reporting time periods. Defendants only compensal  12 the pilots for actual flight time, that is, the time beginning when all cabin and cargo doors on the airci  13 are closed and the parking brakes are released, and ending when the aircraft arrives at a passeni  14 unloading point and the first cabin or cargo door is opened. The duties performed by the pilots dun  15 the unpaid 60, 90, and 30-minute pre-flight reporting time periods include, but are not limited  160 obtaining the flight plan, loading the flight, plan onto the aircraft's computer, calculating the corr  17 amount of fuel needed f6i the flight plan, recalculating the flight plan and fuel requirements as needed  18  adjust for bad weather, checking all switches in the cockpit to ensure 'they are physically set in  correct position for the pushback sequence, input all' non-safety related repair/maintenance if  20  received from the flight attendant's cabin inspection, and conducting a physical inspection'of  21  exterior of the aircraft ('e.g. one of the,  pilots 'inspects' the tires, tire pressure, engines, lights, ft  22  . .  2311 aileron, flight service controls, pitot static system intakes, and checks for hydraulic leaks and oil leaks)  2411 The pilots receive no compensation for performing these important pre-flight duties.  14  1511  UNFAIR BUSINESS PRACTICES  16   15  WAITING TIME PENALTIES   20  UNPAID MINIMUM WAGE  21  22  11    Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference Paragraphs I through 24 above as though fully  4  set forth herein.    Plaintiffs rendered services to Defendants benefiting Defendants, to wit, pre-flight work  711 performed in California and on-call ""reserve status"" work performed in California, but were not  compensated by Defendants for sUch work. Injustice has resulted to Plaintiffs and the Class Members  III providing the bnefith of this work to Defendants without compersation,and Defendants have thereby  lOj been unjustly enriched Accordingly, Plaintiffs seek recovery for themselves and the other Class  Members for the reasonable value of the services they provided to Defendants without compensation.  1211   Plaintiffs and the other Class Members seek restitution from Defendants of all unpaid waged for pre-  13  flight work performed in California and all unpaid wages for on-call ""reserve status"" work performed in  14  California, and seek restitution of these unpaid wages as measured by the applicable regular hourly rates  15  16 11  listed on their wage statements multiplied by the number of unpaid hours of pre-flight work and on-call  17H reserve status work perfontied by each Class Member in California during the applicable statutory  isll period;  plus interest.  19   Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference Paragraphs I through 26 above as though fully  set forth herein.  23  24  25   Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference Paragraphs I through 28 above as though fully  17 set forth herein.  18    Labor Code 201(a) statesthat if an employer discharges an employee, all wages  20 and unpaid at the time of discharge ae due and payable immediately. Likewise pursuant to Labor Co  21 § 202(a), if an employee resigns,. the employer must pay all wages earned and unpaid not later than  22 hours after resignation: If an employer fails to comply with its obligations under Labor Code §201(  23 and 202(a), then pursuant to Labor Code § 203, the employer must pay statutory penalties to the affect(   Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference Patagraphs I through 32 above as though filly  17 setforthherein.  'U    California Business & Professions Code § 17200, et seq., prohibits acts of unfair  'It  competition, which includes any 'unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice..."" The Class  20  21  Members, including Plaintiffs, have suffered and continue to suffer injuries in fact, due to the unfair and  22 unlawhil business practices of Defendants as alleged herein above. Defendants' conduct alleged above  2311 violated California's Labor Code and FWC Wage Order No. 9-2001.  -.  A.  Unpaid Pre-Flight Duties   Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference Paragraphs 1 through 16 above as though full:  set focth herein.  Class Definitions. Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all  similarly situated as a class action pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure §382. The Classes that  seek to represent are defined as follows:  (1)  All persons who werd employed by UNITED AIRLINES, INC. as pilots at any  time from four years before the filing of the Complaint up through the time of the  judgment in this action, who performed any unpaid pre-flight work in California.  QUANTUM MERUIT/QUASI-CONTRACT  3   STREETODRESS 400 McAllister  MAiLING cooREss-  400 lvlcAlisster, Room 103  CITYANQ1IPCOOE. San bi'ancisco, CA 94102  BRAICH NAME: Civic Center courthouse ",win,1
4609649,win," Sito is a company specializing in mobile location-based advertising  and mobile messaging. Sito provides a platform serving businesses, advertisers and  brands, and allowing them to create real-time targeted content based on  location, interests, behaviors and loyalty.     Via the platform, Sito delivers display advertisements and videos on  behalf of its customers. The platform also allows customers to build and control  both messaging and customer incentive programs.     Sito rebranded itself in September 2014, in an effort to emphasize the  mobile location-based advertising and mobile messaging. Sito then focused on  maximizing its messaging and media placement businesses on mobile devices.    The Class Period begins on February 9, 2016, when Sito issued a  press release also attached as exhibit 99.1 to the Form 8-K filed with the SEC  announcing the Company’s financial and operating results for the first fiscal  quarter ended December 31, 2015 (“1Q2016 Press Release”). For the quarter, the  Company reported a total revenue of $7.2 million, compared to a total revenue of  $3.8 million in the previous year’s comparable quarter. The 1Q2016 Press Release  stated in pertinent part:  JERSEY CITY, N.J., February 9, 2016 (GLOBE NEWSWIRE) --  SITO Mobile Ltd. (NASDAQ:SITO), a leading mobile engagement  platform, today announced results for its fiscal first quarter ended  December 31, 2015.  First Quarter 2016 Business Highlights   TOTAL REVENUE: Total revenue was $7.2 million, an  increase of 87% year-over-year and 60% sequentially.   MEDIA PLACEMENT REVENUE: Media Placement  revenue (SITO Mobile’s programmatic advertising revenue)  was $5.3 million, more than triple year-over-year and an  increase of 77% sequentially over Q4 2015.   WIRELESS APPLICATIONS REVENUE: Wireless  Applications Revenue (SITO Mobile’s SMS Revenue) was  $1.6 million, an increase of 20% sequentially.   ADJUSTED EBITDA: SITO produced approximately  $677,000  in  Adjusted   As alleged herein, Defendants acted with scienter in that they knew  that the public documents and statements issued or disseminated in the name of the  Company were materially false and misleading; knew that such statements or  documents would be issued or disseminated to the investing public; and knowingly  and substantially participated or acquiesced in the issuance or dissemination of  such statements or documents as primary violations of the federal securities laws.  As set forth elsewhere herein in detail, Defendants, by virtue of their receipt of  information reflecting the true facts regarding Sito, their control over, and/or  receipt and/or modification of Sito’s allegedly materially misleading statements  and/or their associations with the Company which made them privy to confidential  proprietary information concerning Sito, participated in the fraudulent scheme  alleged herein.   Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the  Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on behalf of all persons who purchased or  otherwise acquired Sito common stock during the Class Period (the “Class”).  Excluded from the Class are Defendants and their families, the officers and  directors of the Company, at all relevant times, members of their immediate  families and their legal representatives, heirs, successors, or assigns, and any entity  in which Defendants have or had a controlling interest.    Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class  as all members of the Class are similarly affected by the defendants’ respective  wrongful conduct in violation of the federal laws complained of herein.     Plaintiff has and will continue to fairly and adequately protect the  interests of the members of the Class and have retained counsel competent and  experienced in class and securities litigation. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic  to or in conflict with those of the Class.    Plaintiff’s claims are typical of those of the Class because Plaintiff  and the Class sustained damages from Defendants’ wrongful conduct in a  substantially identical manner.    Plaintiff will adequately protect the interests of the Class and has  retained counsel who are experienced in class action securities litigation. Plaintiff  has no interests which conflict with those of the Class.    A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and  efficient adjudication of this controversy.   Plaintiff incorporates by reference each and every preceding  paragraph as though fully set forth herein.     This Count is asserted by Plaintiff on behalf of themselves and the  Class against all the Defendants and is based upon Section 10(b) of the Exchange  Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. C 240.10b-5, promulgated  thereunder.    Defendants, by the use of means and instrumentalities of interstate  commerce: (i) employed devices, schemes, and artifices to defraud; (ii) made  untrue statements of material fact and/or omitted to state material facts necessary  to make the statements made not misleading; and (iii) engaged in acts, practices,  and a course of business that operated as a fraud and deceit upon the purchasers  and acquirers of the Company’s common stock in an effort to maintain artificially  high market prices for Sito’s common stock in violation of Section 10(b) of the  Exchange Act and Rule 10-5.    Defendants engaged in the fraudulent activity described above  knowingly and intentionally or in such a reckless manner as to constitute willful  deceit and fraud upon Plaintiff and the Class. Defendants knowingly or recklessly  caused their reports and statements to contain misstatements and omissions of  material fact as alleged herein.     As a result of Defendants’ fraudulent activity, the market price of Sito  common stock was artificially inflated during the Class Period.    In ignorance of the true financial condition of Sito, Plaintiff and other  members of the Class, relying on the integrity of the market and/or on the  statements and reports of Sito containing the misleading information, purchased or  otherwise acquired Sito’s common stock at artificially inflated prices during the  Class Period.    Throughout the Class Period, Defendants were aware of material non- public information concerning Sito fraudulent conduct (including the false and  misleading statements described herein). Throughout the Class Period, Defendants  willfully and knowingly concealed this adverse information, and Plaintiff’s and the  Class’s losses were the foreseeable consequence of Defendants’ concealment of  this information.    As a direct and proximate cause of the Defendants’ wrongful conduct,  Plaintiff and other members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their  respective purchases and sales of Sito common stock during the Class Period.   Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every  allegation above as though fully set forth herein.    The Individual Defendants also were able to, and did, directly or  indirectly, control the conduct of Sito’s business, the information contained in its  filings with the SEC, and its public statements. Moreover, the Individual  Defendants made or directed the making of affirmative statements to securities  analysts and the investing public at large, and participated in meetings and  discussions concerning such statements. Because of their positions and access to  material non-public information available to them but not the public, the Individual  Defendants knew that the adverse facts specified herein had not been disclosed to  and were being concealed from the public and that the positive representations that  were being made were false and misleading. As a result, the Individual Defendants  are responsible for the accuracy of Sito’s corporate releases detailed herein and is  therefore responsible and liable for the misrepresentations contained herein.     As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct of Sito and  the Individual Defendants, Plaintiff and members of the Class suffered damages in  connection with their respective purchases and sales of the Company’s securities  during the Class Period.  I.  Company Background   Violation of Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act  (Against the Individual Defendants)   Violation of Section 10(b) of   the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5  (Against All Defendants)  ",lose,3
6121168,win,"(Class Action Alleging Violations of the PWMA)  A.  PMWA COVERAGE  120.  All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.  121.  The PMWA Class is defined as:  (Class Action Alleging Violations of the Ohio Acts)  A.  OHIO ACTS COVERAGE   (Collective Action Alleging FLSA Violations)  A.  FLSA COVERAGE    Advanced Oilfield claims to be “a nationally recognized and growth-oriented energy  services company providing critical completion and production related services to Oil & Gas  companies throughout the United States.”3    Specifically, Advanced Oilfield provides construction, maintenance, trucking and  roustabout services nationwide.4    Advanced Oilfield currently has locations and operations in Pennsylvania, West  Virginia, Ohio, North Dakota and Colorado.5    To provide their services, Advanced Oilfield employed numerous workers— including the individuals that make up the putative or potential class. While exact job titles may  differ, these employees were subjected to the same or similar illegal pay practices for similar work in  the oilfield.    Plaintiff Brotherton worked for Advanced Oilfield as a Rig Welder from  approximately November 2014 through September 2015 and again from June 2016 until March  2017.    Plaintiff Brotherton was based out of Advanced Oilfield’s Claysville, Pennsylvania  location, while working in both Pennsylvania and Ohio.    Although it is well-known that blue-collar oilfield workers like Plaintiff and the  Putative Class Members are not exempt from overtime, Advanced Oilfield did not pay Plaintiff and  the Putative Class Members the additional overtime premium required by the FLSA for hours  worked in excess of forty (40) in a workweek.    Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ primary job duties included performing  daily checklists, assisting with the preparation of equipment, and performing other oilfield related  functions on various job sites, including for example in the State of Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas and  throughout the United States.    Upon information and belief, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members would  conduct their day-to-day activities within mandatory and designed parameters and in accordance  with pre-determined operational plans created by Advanced Oilfield and/or its clients.    Upon further information and belief, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ daily  and weekly activities were routine and largely governed by standardized plans, procedures, and  checklists created by Advanced Oilfield and/or its clients.     Virtually every job function was pre-determined by Advanced Oilfield and/or its  clients, including the tools to use at a job site, the schedule of work, and related work duties.  Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members were prohibited from varying their job duties outside of  the predetermined parameters.     Moreover, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ job functions were primarily  routine and manual labor in nature, requiring little to no official training, much less a college  education or other advanced degree.    Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ duties did not (and currently do not)  include managerial responsibilities or the exercise of independent discretion or judgment.    Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members did not (and currently do not) have the  authority to hire or fire other employees, and they were not (and currently are not) responsible for  making hiring or firing recommendations.    Moreover, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members did not (and currently do not)  supervise two or more employees.    Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ duties did not (and currently do not)  concern work directly related to the management or general business operations of Advanced  Oilfield or its customers.    Advanced Oilfield determined the hours Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members  worked.     Advanced Oilfield set Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ pay and controlled  the number of hours they worked.    Advanced Oilfield set all employment-related policies applicable to Plaintiff and the  Putative Class Members.     Advanced Oilfield maintained control over pricing and marketing. Defendants also  chose equipment and product suppliers.    Advanced Oilfield owned or controlled the equipment and supplies that Plaintiff and  the Putative Class Members used to perform their work.    Advanced Oilfield made all personnel and payroll decisions with respect to Plaintiff  and the Putative Class Members, including but not limited to, the decision to pay Plaintiff and the  Putative Class Members an hourly wage with no overtime pay.     Advanced Oilfield reimbursed Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members for expenses  and bought or provided tools and equipment that Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members used.     Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members did not employ their own workers.    Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members worked continuously for Advanced Oilfield  on a permanent full-time basis.     Advanced Oilfield, instead of Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members, made the  large capital investments in vehicles, buildings, equipment, tools, and supplies. Moreover, Advanced  Oilfield paid operating expenses like rent, payroll, marketing, insurance, and bills.     Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members relied on Advanced Oilfield for their work.  Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members did not market any business or services of their own.  Instead, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members worked the hours assigned by Advanced Oilfield,  performed duties assigned by Advanced Oilfield, worked on projects assigned by Advanced Oilfield,  and worked for the benefit of Advanced Oilfield and its customers.    Advanced Oilfield paid Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members on a weekly basis.  Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members did not earn a profit based on any business investment of  their own. Rather, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ only earning opportunity was based on  the number of hours they were allowed to work, which was controlled by Advanced Oilfield and/or  its customers.    Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ duties did not (and currently do not)  include managerial responsibilities or the exercise of independent discretion or judgment.    The FLSA, the Ohio Acts and the PMWA mandate that overtime be paid at one and  one-half times an employee’s regular rate of pay.     Under the Ohio Acts overtime shall be paid in the manner and methods provided in  and subject to the exemptions of section 7 and section 13 of the FLSA. O.R.C. § 4111.03(A).    Under the PMWA regular rate shall include all remuneration for employment paid to  or on behalf of the employee, with exceptions that are inapplicable here. 34 Pa. Code § 231.43.    Advanced Oilfield denied Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members overtime pay as a  result of a widely applicable, illegal pay practice. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members regularly  worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week but never received overtime compensation.    Advanced Oilfield applied this pay practice despite clear and controlling law that  states that the manual labor/technical, routine duties which were performed by Plaintiff and the  Putative Class Members consisted of non-exempt work.    Accordingly, Advanced Oilfield’s pay policies and practices blatantly violated (and  continue to violate) the FLSA, the Ohio Acts and the PMWA.  V.   All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.    All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.    Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this collective claim is made on behalf of all those  who are (or were) similarly situated to Plaintiff.    Other similarly situated employees have been victimized by Advanced Oilfield’s  patterns, practices, and policies, which are in willful violation of the FLSA.    The FLSA Collective Members are defined in Paragraph 60.    Thus, Plaintiff’s experiences are typical of the experiences of the FLSA Collective  Members.    The specific job titles or precise job requirements of the various FLSA Collective  Members does not prevent collective treatment.    All of the FLSA Collective Members—regardless of their specific job titles, precise  job requirements, rates of pay, or job locations—are entitled to be properly compensated for all  hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek.    Although the issues of damages may be individual in character, there is no detraction  from the common nucleus of liability facts. Indeed, the FLSA Collective Members are blue-collar  oilfield workers entitled to overtime after forty (40) hours in a week.    Advanced Oilfield employed a substantial number of similarly situated workers since  June 21, 2014. Upon information and belief, these workers are geographically dispersed, residing and  working in locations across the United States. Because these workers do not have fixed work  locations, they may work in different states across the country in the course of a given year.    Absent a collective action, many members of the proposed FLSA collective likely  will not obtain redress of their injuries and Advanced Oilfield will retain the proceeds of its rampant  violations.    Moreover, individual litigation would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system.  Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the  claims of the individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency.    All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.    The Ohio Acts Class is defined as: ",win,3
6162776,win," This action is brought as a class action. Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of herself  and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal  Rules of Civil Procedure.    The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of MRS  BPO, L.L.C. and those business and governmental entities on whose behalf it attempts to  collect debts.    Excluded from the Plaintiff's Class is the Defendant and all officers, members, partners,  managers, directors, and employees of MRS BPO, L.L.C., and all of their respective  immediate families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action and all members of  their immediate families.    There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff's Class, which common  issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members.  The  principal issues are whether Defendant's communications with the Plaintiff, such as the  above stated claims, violate provisions of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.    The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same  facts and legal theories.  -6-    The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Plaintiff's Class defined  in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in handling  consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff nor  her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this  action.    This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action pursuant  to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a  well-defined community interest in the litigation:  (a)  Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges,  that the Plaintiff's Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all  members would be impractical.  (b)  Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist  as to all members of the Plaintiff's Class and those questions predominate  over any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The  principal issues are whether the Defendant's communications with the  Plaintiff, such as the above stated claims, violate provisions of the Fair Debt  Collection Practices Act.  (c)  Typicality: The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the class  members.  Plaintiff and all members of the Plaintiff's Class defined in this  complaint have claims arising out of the Defendant's common uniform  course of conduct complained of herein.  (d)  Adequacy:  The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of  the class members insofar as Plaintiff has no interests that are adverse to the  -7-  absent class members.  The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating  this matter.  Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling  consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions.  Neither the  Plaintiff nor her counsel have any interests, which might cause them not to  vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit.  (e)  Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the  fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual  joinder of all members would be impracticable.  Class action treatment  will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their  common claims in a single forum efficiently and without unnecessary  duplication of effort and expense that individual actions would engender.  Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(l)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil  Procedure is appropriate because adjudications with respect to individual  members create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications which could  establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant who, on  information and belief, collects debts throughout the United States of  America.    Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is   also appropriate in that a determination that the above stated claims, violate provisions of  the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and is tantamount to declaratory relief and any  monetary relief under the FDCPA would be merely incidental to that determination.    Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is  also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the  -8-  Plaintiff's Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a  class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of  the controversy.    Further, Defendant has acted, or failed to act, on grounds generally applicable to the Rule  (b)(l)(A) and (b)(2) Class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief with respect  to the Class as a whole.    Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at the  time of class certification motion, seek to certify one or more classes only as to particular  issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).   Plaintiff repeats, reiterates, and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  numbered one (1) through forty six (46) herein with the same force and effect is if the  same were set forth at length herein.    This cause of action is brought on behalf of Plaintiff and the members of a class.    The class involves all individuals whom Defendant's records reflect resided in the State  of New York and who were sent a collection letter in substantially the same form letter as  the letter sent to the Plaintiff on or about May 31, 2017; and (a) the collection letter was  sent to a consumer seeking payment of a personal debt; and (b) the collection letter was  not returned by the postal service as undelivered; and (c) the Plaintiff asserts that the  letter contained violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(A), 1692e(5), 1692(f), and  1692f(1) for attempting to collect prohibited collection fees.  -9-  Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act    The Defendant's actions as set forth above in the within complaint violates the Fair Debt  Collection Practices Act.    Because the Defendant violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, the Plaintiff and  the members of the class are entitled to damages in accordance with the Fair Debt  Collection Practices Act.  WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, respectfully requests preliminary and permanent injunctive relief, and that this  Court enter judgment in Plaintiff's favor and against the Defendant and award damages as follows:  (a)  Statutory damages provided under the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(k);  (b)  Attorney fees, litigation expenses and costs incurred in bringing this action; and  (c)  Any other relief that this Court deems appropriate and just under the  circumstances.  Dated: Brooklyn, New York              October 2, 2017      /s/ Maxim Maximov_____  Maxim Maximov, Esq.  Attorneys for the Plaintiff  Maxim Maximov, LLP  1701 Avenue P  Brooklyn, New York 11229  Office: (718) 395-3459  Facsimile: (718) 408-9570  E-mail: m@maximovlaw.com  Plaintiff requests trial by jury on all issues so triable.       /s/ Maxim Maximov_____   Maxim Maximov, Esq.   Violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act brought by Plaintiff on behalf of  herself and the members of a class, as against the Defendant.  ",lose,4
6989214,win,"(Fair Labor Standards Act Violations)   (Violations of Ohio Revised Code 4111.03)    Defendant is a home health care business.  4    Plaintiff Carmel Solis was employed by Defendant between 2012 and January 15,  2018.    At all times relevant herein, Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a home  health aide.    Other similarly-situated employees were employed by Defendant as home health  aides.    Plaintiff and other similarly-situated home health aides were employed by  Defendant as non-exempt employees under the FLSA.     Plaintiff and other similarly-situated home health aides were paid an hourly wage.  (Failure to Pay Overtime Compensation)    Plaintiff and other similarly-situated home health aides worked more than 40  hours per week, but Defendant failed to pay them overtime compensation for the hours they  worked over 40 each workweek.    Rather than paying overtime compensation, Plaintiff and other similarly-situated  home health aides were only paid straight time for the hours they worked over 40 each  workweek.   (Failure to Keep Accurate Records)    Defendant failed to make, keep and preserve accurate records of the unpaid work  performed by Plaintiff and other similarly-situated home health aides.  (Defendant Willfully Violated the FLSA)    Defendant knowingly and willfully engaged in the above-mentioned violations of  the FLSA.   5   Plaintiff brings Count One of this action on her own behalf pursuant to 29 U.S.C.  216(b), and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated who have been, are being, or will be  adversely affected by Defendant’s unlawful conduct.    The class which Plaintiff seeks to represent and for whom Plaintiff seeks the right  to send “opt-in” notices for purposes of the collective action, and of which Plaintiff is herself a  member, is composed of and defined as follows:   All current and former home health aides employed by Emerald  Medical Staffing LLC at any time between February 15, 2015 and  the present.    The amount of overtime hours Plaintiff and other similarly situated home health  aides worked are reflected on their time sheets and pay stubs.    Plaintiff estimates, that on average she worked between ten (10) and fifty(50)  overtime hours per week.     Plaintiff is unable to state at this time the exact size of the potential class, by upon  information and belief, avers that is consists of at least 50 persons.    This action is maintainable as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C.   216(b) as to claims for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees and  costs under the FLSA.  In addition to Plaintiff, numerous current and former employees are  similarly situated with regard to their wages and claims for unpaid wages and damages.  Plaintiff  is representative of those other employees and is acting on behalf of their interests as well as her  own in bringing this action.     These similarly-situated employees are known to Defendant and are readily  identifiable through Defendant’s payroll records.  These individuals may readily be notified of  6  this action, and allowed to opt in pursuant to 29 U.S.C. 216(b), for the purpose of collectively  adjudicating their claims for unpaid overtime compensation, liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees  and costs under the FLSA.   Plaintiff brings Count Two of this action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and  (b)(3) on behalf of herself and all other members of the class (“the Ohio Class”) defined as:  All current and former home health aides employed by Emerald  Medical Staffing LLC at any time between February 15, 2015 and  the present.    The Ohio Class is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable.   Plaintiff is unable to state at this time the exact size of the potential Ohio Class, but upon  information and belief, avers that it consists of at least 50 persons.     There are questions of law or fact common to the Ohio Class, including but not  limited to the following:  (a)  whether Defendant failed to pay overtime compensation to  its home health aides for hours worked in excess of 40 each  workweek; and  (b)  what amount of monetary relief will compensate Plaintiff  Carmel Solis and other members of the class for Defendant’s  violation of R.C. 4111.03 and 4111.10.    The claims of the named Plaintiff Carmel Solis are typical of the claims of other  members of the Ohio Class.  Named Plaintiff’s claims arise out of the same uniform course of  conduct by Defendant, and are based on the same legal theories, as the claims of the other Ohio  Class members.    Named Plaintiff Carmel Solis will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the  Ohio Class.  Her interests are not antagonistic to, but rather are in unison with, the interests of  7  the other Ohio Class members.  The named Plaintiff’s counsel has broad experience in handling  class action wage-and-hour litigation, and is fully qualified to prosecute the claims of the Ohio  Class in this case.    The questions of law or fact that are common to the Ohio Class predominate over  any questions affecting only individual members.  The primary questions that will determine  Defendant’s liability to the Ohio Class, listed above, are common to the class as a whole, and  predominate over any questions affecting only individual class members.    A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient  adjudication of this controversy.  Requiring Ohio Class members to pursue their claims  individually would entail a host of separate suits, with concomitant duplication of costs,  attorneys’ fees, and demands on court resources.  Many Ohio Class members’ claims are  sufficiently small that they would be reluctant to incur the substantial cost, expense, and risk of  pursuing their claims individually.  Certification of this case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 will  enable the issues to be adjudicated for all class members with the efficiencies of class litigation.      Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten  herein.     Defendant’s practice and policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly- situated home health aides overtime compensation at the rate of one and one-half times their  regular rate of pay for the hours they worked over 40 each workweek violated the FLSA, 29   Plaintiff in corporates by reference the foregoing allegations as if fully rewritten  herein.    Defendant’s practice and policy of not paying Plaintiff and other similarly- situated home health aides overtime compensation at the rate of one and one-half times their  regular rate of pay for the hours they worked over 40 each workweek violated the OMFWSA, ",win,2
7708368,win," As hourly nonexempt manufacturing employees of Defendant, Plaintiff and  others similarly situated, have the primary duties of performing manual manufacturing  tasks in the production of Gates’ products.  This primary duty established the Plaintiff and  others similarly situated as being entitled to overtime pay under the FLSA and KWPA  (i.e., nonexempt employees under the FLSA and the KWPA).    On a weekly basis throughout their employment with Defendant, the  Plaintiff and others similarly situated routinely worked in excess of forty hours per  workweek without receiving proper overtime compensation for all overtime hours worked  as required under the FLSA and the KWPA.  Defendant has a policy and practice requiring  all hourly nonexempt manufacturing employees to arrive at their work station between  early before each shift (usually 10-15 minutes, but longer on other occasions) to perform  work related activities such as, but not limited to: meeting and transitioning with prior  shift on any issues regarding production, supply, maintenance, and other pre-shift  activities.  Defendant also has a policy and practice requiring hourly nonexempt  manufacturing employees to remain after their shift if necessary to perform work to assist  in the transition to the next shift.  Defendant does not permit the Plaintiff and other  similarly situated employees to report this pre-shift or post-shift time as work performed,  and in turn, they are denied overtime compensation resulting from this policy and  practice.      Regarding the allegations asserted in ¶ 15, the Plaintiff observed the other  hourly nonexempt manufacturing employees in her respective work areas throughout her  employment as being subject to the same policy of requiring pre-shift and post-shift “off  the clock” work and thereby denying these persons overtime pay.      Defendant has a policy or practice of counseling, disciplined or terminating  hourly nonexempt manufacturing employees for a failure to be present at their work  stations for the pre-shift and post-shift work described in ¶ 15.       The FLSA and KWPA requires covered employers such as Defendant to  compensate all nonexempt employees at a rate of not less than one and one-half times the  regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek.  The  Defendant’s policy and practice as alleged herein violates the FLSA and the KWPA in that  Defendant knowingly allows, permits and/or requires Plaintiff, and others similarly  situated, to perform work “off the clock” which in turn denies overtime pay in violation of  the FLSA and KWPA.    Defendant’s conduct was willful and in bad faith.  Defendant was aware, or  should have been aware, that Plaintiff and others similarly situated performed work that  required payment of the correct overtime compensation for all hours actually worked, and  that its policy and practice of requiring pre-shift and post-shift “off the clock” work denied  them of such compensation required under the FLSA and KWPA.     Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, re-alleges and  incorporates by reference the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.    The FLSA requires each covered employer, such as Defendant, to  compensate all non-exempt employees at a rate of not less than one and one-half the  regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of forty hours in a work week.      Plaintiff files this action on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated  pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §216(b).  The proposed collective class for the FLSA  claims is defined as follows:  All persons who worked as hourly nonexempt employees in the  manufacturing process for Defendant (including “Team Leads”) at all its  manufacturing locations within three years prior to the filing of this  Complaint (hereafter the “FLSA Collective”).    This Complaint may be brought and maintained as an “opt-in” collective  action pursuant to the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §216(b), for all claims asserted by the Plaintiff  because the claims of the Plaintiff are similar to the FLSA Collective.    During the applicable statutory period, Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective  routinely worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek without receiving overtime  compensation at the proper overtime rate of pay for their overtime hours worked in  violation of the FLSA.    Defendant is liable under the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., for failing to  properly compensate Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective for overtime pay owed.     Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective are victims of Defendant’s widespread,  repeated, systematic and consistent illegal policies that have resulted in violations of their  rights under the FLSA, and that have caused significant damage to Plaintiff and the FLSA  Collective.     The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the FLSA  within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) as Defendant knew, or showed reckless disregard  for, the fact that its compensation practices were in violation of these laws.    As the direct and proximate result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct,  Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective have suffered, and will continue to suffer, a loss of  income and other damages.  Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective under § 216(b) of the FLSA  are entitled to liquidated damages and attorney’s fees and costs incurred in connection  with enforcing this claim.        The Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective have suffered from Defendant’s  common policies and would benefit from the issuance of a Court-supervised notice of this  lawsuit and the opportunity to join.  Those similarly situated employees are known to  Defendant and are readily identifiable through Defendant’s records.   Plaintiff, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, re-alleges and  incorporates by reference the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.    Plaintiff brings her overtime wage claim pursuant to the KWPA, Kan. Stat.  § 44-313 et seq. as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, on behalf  of the following class:  All persons who worked as hourly nonexempt employees in the  manufacturing process for Defendant (including “Team Leads”) at its Iola,  Kansas plant within three years prior to the filing of this Complaint  (hereafter the “Kansas Overtime Class”).    Defendant violated the KWPA by failing to compensate Plaintiff and the  Kansas Overtime Class overtime wages due at each pay period for all overtime hours  worked as required under the FLSA.    Class action treatment of Plaintiff’s KWPA claim is appropriate because, as  alleged in paragraphs 38-43, infra, all of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s class action  requisites are satisfied.     The Kansas Overtime Class includes over fifty individuals and, as such, is so  numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable.    Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the interests of the Kansas  Overtime Class, and she has retained competent and experienced counsel who will  effectively represent the interests of the Kansas Overtime Class.    Questions of law and fact are common to the class.  The Plaintiff and the  Kansas Overtime Class have been subjected to the common business practices described  in paragraph 39, supra, and the success of their claims depends on the resolution of  common questions of law and fact.  Common questions of fact include whether the  Plaintiff and the Kansas Overtime Class worked in excess of forty hours per work week,  whether they were paid overtime as required, and whether Defendant had actual or  constructive knowledge that Plaintiff and others similarly situated worked more overtime  hours than reported.  Common questions of law include, inter alia, whether Defendant’s  conduct as alleged herein violated the KWPA for failing to pay all wages due on each and  every pay period as required under the FLSA.    Class certification is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure  23(b)(1) because the prosecution of separate actions by individual Kansas Overtime Class  members would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications which would  establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant and/or because adjudications  with respect to individual class members would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of  the interests of non-party Kansas Overtime Class members.    The foregoing conduct, as alleged, constitutes a willful violation of the  KWPA as Defendant knew, or showed reckless disregard for, the fact that its  compensation practices were in violation of these laws.  In turn, under KWPA, Kan. Stat.  § 44-315(b), Plaintiff and the Kansas Overtime Class are also entitled to liquidated  damages set forth in this statute.  FLSA COLLECTIVE ACTION   RULE 23 CLASS UNDER KWPA FOR OVERTIME OWED  ",win,3
14588500,win,"Plaintiff brings claims for relief as a collective action pursuant to FLSA Section  16(b), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of all non-exempt persons employed by Defendants on or  after the date that is six years before the filing of the Complaint in this case as defined herein  (“FLSA Collective Plaintiffs”).   At all relevant times, Plaintiff and the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs are and have  been similarly situated, have had substantially similar job requirements and pay provisions, and  are and have been subjected to Defendants’ decisions, policies, plans, programs, practices,  procedures, protocols, routines, and rules, all culminating in a willful failure and refusal to pay  4  them minimum wage and overtime premium at the rate of one and one half times the regular rate  for work in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek.  The claims of Plaintiff stated herein are  essentially the same as those of the other FLSA Collective Plaintiffs.     The claims for relief are properly brought under and maintained as an opt-in  collective action pursuant to §16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. 216(b). The FLSA Collective  Plaintiffs are readily ascertainable. For purposes of notice and other purposes related to this  action, their names and addresses are readily available from the Defendants. Notice can be  provided to the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs via first class mail to the last address known to  Defendants.  In or about April 2015, Plaintiff JIMENEZ was hired by Defendants and/or their  predecessors, as applicable, to work as a sales representative for Defendants’ jewelry shop  located at 1204 Broadway, New York, New York, 10001.     Plaintiff JIMENEZ worked for Defendants until on or about November 5, 2018.   During his employment, Plaintiff JIMENEZ worked over forty (40) hours per week.   Specifically, Plaintiff worked the following schedule:  a) From the beginning of his employment until on or about December 31, 2017,  Plaintiff worked from 8:30 a.m. until 6:30 p.m. for six (6) days a week, for total  of sixty (60) hours each week.    b) From on or about January 1, 2018 until November 5, 2018, Plaintiff worked from  9 a.m. until 6:30 p.m. for four (4) days a week, and from 11:00 a.m. until 6:30  p.m. for one (1) day a week, for a total of forty-five and half (45.5) hours each  week.   5   Plaintiff JIMENEZ received his compensation on a fixed salary basis at the following  rates:  a) From the beginning of his employment until on or about December 31, 2015,  Plaintiff was paid daily rate of $95;   b) From on or about January 1, 2016 until on or about December 31, 2016, Plaintiff  was paid daily rate of $100; and   c) From on or about January 1, 2017 until November 5, 2018, Plaintiff was paid  daily rate of $115.    There was never any agreement that Plaintiff’s fixed salary was intended to cover his  overtime compensation.    During her employment by Defendants, Plaintiff regularly worked shifts exceeding  ten (10) hours in duration. However, she never received any spread-of-hours premium for  working such shifts, as required under the New York Labor Law.   During his employment, Plaintiff received his compensation entirely in cash and was  never provided with a pay stub from Defendants.     Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not  paying Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs the FLSA overtime rate (of time and one-half) or  the New York State overtime rate (of time and one-half).   Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not  paying the New York State minimum wage to the Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs.   Defendants unlawfully failed to pay Plaintiff and other non-exempt employees  spread-of-hours premium for working shifts exceeding ten (10) hours in duration, as required  under the New York Labor Law.  6   Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not  paying full wages to Plaintiff.   Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not  providing a proper wage notice to Plaintiff and other non-exempt employees at the beginning of  employment and anytime thereafter, in violation of the New York Labor Law.   Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not  providing a proper wage statement to Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Plaintiffs, in violation of  the New York Labor Law.    Plaintiff retained Lee Litigation Group, PLLC to represent him and other employees  similarly situated in this litigation and have agreed to pay the firm a reasonable fee for its  services.  Plaintiff realleges and reaver Paragraphs 1 through 28 of this Complaint as if fully set  forth herein.   At all relevant times, upon information and belief, Defendants were and continue to  be employers engaged in interstate commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce  within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207 (a).  Further, Plaintiff is covered  individuals within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207 (a).   At all relevant times, Defendants employed Plaintiff within the meaning of the FLSA.   Upon information and belief, at all relevant times, Corporate Defendant LX 1204  JEWELRY INC had gross revenues in excess of $500,000.  7   At all relevant times, Defendants had a policy and practice of refusing to pay  overtime compensation at the statutory rate of time and one-half to Plaintiff and FLSA Collective  Plaintiffs for their hours worked in excess of forty hours per workweek.   At all relevant times, the Defendants had a policy and practice of refusing to pay the  statutory minimum wage to Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs for their hours worked.   Records, if any, concerning the number of hours worked by Plaintiff and FLSA  Collective Plaintiffs and the actual compensation paid to Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs  are in the possession and custody of the Defendants. Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs  intend to obtain these records by appropriate discovery proceedings to be taken promptly in this  case and, if necessary, will then seek leave of Court to amend this Complaint to set forth the  precise amount due.   Defendants knew of and/or showed a willful disregard for the provisions of the FLSA  as evidenced by their failure to compensate Plaintiff and FLSA Collective Plaintiffs at the  statutory rate of time and one-half for their hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week  when Defendants knew or should have known such was due.   Defendants failed to properly disclose or apprise Plaintiff of his rights under the  Plaintiff realleges and reaver Paragraphs 1 through 39 of this Complaint as if fully set  forth herein.   At all relevant times, Plaintiff was employed by the Defendants within the meaning of  the New York Labor Law, §§2 and 651.    Defendants willfully violated Plaintiff’s rights by failing to pay Plaintiff overtime  compensation at rates not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for each hour  worked in excess of forty hours in a workweek.   Defendants willfully violated Plaintiff’s rights by failing to pay Plaintiff minimum  wages in the lawful amount for hours worked.   Defendants willfully violated Plaintiff’s rights by failing to pay “spread-of-hours”  premium to Plaintiff for each workday that exceeded ten (10) or more hours.    Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not  providing a proper wage statement to Plaintiff and other non-exempt employees, in violation of  the New York Labor Law.   Defendants knowingly and willfully operated their business with a policy of not  providing a proper wage notice to Plaintiff and other non-exempt employees at the beginning of  employment and annually thereafter, in violation of the New York Labor Law.   Defendants willfully violated Plaintiff’s rights by paying him on a salary basis,  because Plaintiff is a non-exempt employee who must be paid on an hourly basis under the New  York Labor Law.  9   Due to the Defendants’ New York Labor Law violations, Plaintiff is entitled to  recover from Defendants his unpaid overtime, unpaid minimum wages, unpaid spread-of-hours,  statutory penalties, damages for unreasonably delayed payments, reasonable attorneys’ fees, and  costs and disbursements of the action.    VIOLATION OF THE NEW YORK LABOR LAW    VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT  ",win,3
4398927,lose," Defendants Bombay Pizza Company, LLC d/b/a Bombay Pizza Co.;  Bombay Pizza Company Telfair, LLC and Sovijai, Inc. (collectively referred to as  “Bombay Pizza Co.”) own and operate restaurants located in the territorial jurisdiction of  this Court.    Defendants Viral Patel and Sonali Patel are officers and/or directors and/or  managing members of Bombay Pizza Co.  As such, they have operational control of  Bombay Pizza Co. and/or effectively dominate its administration or otherwise act, or  have the power to act, on behalf of Bombay Pizza Co. vis-à-vis its employees.  This is  includes, but is not limited to, developing and implementing pay practices, hiring and  firing employees, undertaking managerial responsibilities, and otherwise exercising  control of the work situation.    In connection with their business operations, Defendants collectively  employ numerous waiters, waitresses, bartenders, busboys, food runners, cooks, kitchen  help, dishwashers, etc.     From approximately November 2009 through November 2011, Lopez was  employed by Defendants as a cook.    Cooks, including Lopez, are responsible for preparing food.    Defendants do not pay cooks, including Lopez, overtime wages for hours  worked in excess of forty (40) per each seven (7) day workweek at a rate of time and one- half as required by the FLSA.    Instead, cooks, including Lopez, are paid at their regular rate for all  overtime hours worked.     On information and belief, these same illegal pay practices were applied to  all employees of Defendants who were compensated in the same or similar manner to that  of Plaintiff.   Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the facts set forth in  the above-sections of this Complaint.    On information and belief, Plaintiff was a nonexempt employee under the  guidelines of the FLSA.    As a nonexempt employee, Plaintiff was legally entitled to be paid at the  minimum wage for all hours worked and at one and one-half times his “regular rate” for  all hours worked in excess of forty (40) during each seven (7) day workweek.  29 U.S.C.  §§ 206(a), 207(a).    Instead, Defendants paid Plaintiff at his straight time rate for all hours  worked over forty (40) each workweek in violation of the FLSA.    As a result, Plaintiff was regularly “shorted” on his paycheck by not being  paid at a rate of time and one-half for hours worked in excess of forty (40) per workweek.    In the event that Defendants classified Plaintiff as exempt from the  overtime requirements of the FLSA, Plaintiff was misclassified, as no proper exemption  enumerated within the guidelines of the FLSA excused Defendants from appropriately  paying Plaintiff full overtime wages for hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per  each seven (7) day workweek, as is specifically required by the FLSA.    Rather, Defendants knowingly, willfully, and with reckless disregard,  carried out his illegal pattern and practice of failing to pay Plaintiff proper overtime  wages.   B.  Defendants Failed to Keep Accurate Records of Time Worked.    The FLSA requires employers to keep accurate records of hours worked by  nonexempt employees.  29 U.S.C. § 211(c).      In addition to the pay violations of the FLSA identified above, Defendants  also failed to keep proper time records as required by the FLSA.  C.  Defendants’ Illegal Actions Were and Are Willful Violations of the FLSA.    The illegal pattern or practice on the part of Defendants with respect to  compensation and failure to maintain accurate time records are direct violations of the   Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the facts set forth in  the above-sections of this Complaint.    On information and belief, other employees have been victimized by  Defendants’ patterns, practices and policies identified above in violation of the FLSA.      These employees are similarly situated to Plaintiff because, during the  relevant time period, they held similar positions, were compensated in a similar manner,  and were denied overtime wages at a rate of time and one-half for hours worked in excess  of forty (40) each workweek.    Defendants’ patterns or practices of failing to pay overtime compensation  are generally applicable policies or practices and do not depend on the personal  circumstances of the Members of the Class.    Since, on information and belief, Plaintiff’s experiences are typical of the  experiences of the Members of the Class, collective action treatment is appropriate.     Plaintiff has retained counsel well versed in FLSA collective action  litigation who is prepared to litigate this matter vigorously on behalf of Plaintiff and any  other Members of the Class.     Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all of the facts set forth in  the above-sections of this Complaint.    Defendants’ practice of failing to pay their nonexempt employees overtime  compensation at one and one-half times their regular rates for all hours worked in excess  of forty (40) each workweek is in direct violation of the FLSA.  29 U.S.C. § 207(a).      Defendants violated the FLSA as well as the Texas Labor Code by failing  to pay Plaintiff his full and proper compensation.  29 U.S.C. § 216(b); TEX. LAB. CODE  §§ 61.011-61.020.    Plaintiff is entitled to liquidated damages in an amount equal to his unpaid  regular and overtime wages as a result of Defendants’ failure to comply with the  requirements of the FLSA.  29 U.S.C. § 216(b).  A.  Defendants Failed to Properly Compensate Plaintiff at the Rate of Time and  One-Half for All Overtime Hours Worked.  ",win,2
4606413,lose," At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of Florida. Plaintiff is, and  at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153 (39).     The text message received by Plaintiff originated from telephone number 267-613- 9146, which is owned and/or controlled by Defendant.  Further, this is a “spoofed” number in that  it is not active and states that it is disconnected if a call is attempted to the number.      The text message received by Plaintiff is identical to the generic messages received  by thousands of other individuals as outlined above.  This fact establishes that Defendant used an  ATDS in transmitting the above text message to Plaintiff.      The link (http://app.ever.pics/Uldk/He9qv6ygwx) provided in the text message  received by Plaintiff is a link to Defendant’s website (www.ever.com), where Plaintiff was  encouraged to download the Ever App.  Therefore, Defendant’s text message constitutes  telemarketing because it encouraged the future purchase or investment in property, goods, or  services – i.e. Defendant’s mobile application.      Plaintiff received the subject text within this judicial district and, therefore,  Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district.  Upon information and belief,  Defendant caused other text messages to be sent to individuals residing within this judicial district.    Plaintiff has never used Defendant’s application or services, has never downloaded  the Ever App on her mobile device, and has never had any type of relationship with Defendant.     Plaintiff has never provided Defendant her telephone number, or provided any type  of consent to receive automated text messages from Defendant.     Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 5368 Number, and is financially  responsible for phone service to the 5368 Number.     Defendant’s text message also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused a disruption to  her life as a result of Defendant’s deceptive statement suggesting that photographs of Plaintiff were  being displayed on Defendant’s platform without her permission (“…just recommended you check  out your photos on Ever.”).     Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf  of herself and all others similarly situated.     Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the following classes:   All persons residing within the United States who received  telephone calls and/or text messages from Defendant to their  cellular telephone within the four years prior to the filing of the  Complaint in this action, for the purpose of selling or attempting  to sell Defendant’s goods and/or services using an automatic  telephone dialing system, and who did not provide prior express  consent for such call(s).  Numerosity    Upon information and belief, based on the widespread Internet complaints about  Defendant’s telemarketing text messages, the members of the class are believed to number in the  thousands or millions such that joinder of all members is impracticable.    There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Class which  predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. Among the  questions of law and fact common to the Class are:  a. Whether Defendant sent non-emergency text messages to Plaintiff’s and Class  members’ cellular telephones using an autodialer and/or prerecorded message;  b. Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing that it obtained prior express  consent to make such calls;  c. Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing and willful;  d. Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages; and  e. Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future.     The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers.   Defendant routinely places automated calls to telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone  thus, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently  adjudicated and administered in this case.  Typicality    Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members, as they are all  based on the same factual and legal theories.  Protecting the Interests of the Class Members    A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient  adjudication of this lawsuit, because individual litigation of the claims of all members of the  Classes are economically unfeasible and procedurally impracticable.  While the aggregate  damages sustained by the Classes are in the millions of dollars, the individual damages incurred  by each member of the Class resulting from Defendant’s wrongful conduct are too small to warrant  the expense of individual lawsuits. The likelihood of individual Class members prosecuting their  own separate claims is remote, and, even if every member of the Class could afford individual  litigation, the court system would be unduly burdened by individual litigation of such cases.    The prosecution of separate actions by members of the Class would create a risk   of establishing inconsistent rulings and/or incompatible standards of conduct for Defendant.  For  example, one court might enjoin Defendant from performing the challenged acts, whereas another  may not.  Additionally, individual actions may be dispositive of the interests of the Class, although  certain class members are not parties to such actions.    Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the preceding paragraphs as if fully set forth  herein.    Defendant violated the TCPA by sending unsolicited text messages to Plaintiff and  the Class members on their cellular phones without first obtaining their prior express consent and  using equipment which constitutes an automatic telephone dialing system for the express purpose  of marketing Defendant’s goods and/or services.    As a result of the aforementioned violations of the TCPA, Plaintiff and the Class  are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory damages for each call in negligent violation of the  TCPA, or up to $1,500 in statutory damages for each call in willful violation of the TCPA, pursuant  to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B).   VIOLATION OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)  ",win,1
17085873,win," Defendants  refused  to  pay  Plaintiff  and  those  similarly  situated  overtime  wages   for  hours  worked  beyond  forty  each  workweek  and  beyond  twelve  each  workday.       Rather,   Defendant   only   paid   overtime   wages   when   an  employee   exceeded   80   hours   in   a   two-­week   period,   rather   than   when   an   employee   exceeded   40   hours   in   a   given  workweek,  or  twelve  hours  in  a  given  workday,  as  is  required  by  law.  This  practice   resulted  in  Defendants  failing  to  pay  employees  their  earned  overtime  wages.     For   example,   during   the   pay   period   running   from   February   23,   2020   through   March  7,  2020,  Plaintiff  worked  a  total  of  59.25  hours  and  was  not  paid  overtime  wages   per  Defendants’  practice.  Plaintiff  worked  10  hours  during  the  first  workweek  of  the  pay   period   (February   23   through   February   20,   2020)   and   worked   49.25   hours   during   the   second  workweek  of  the  pay  period  (March  1  through  March  7,  2020).  Defendants  failed   to  pay  Plaintiff  overtime  premiums  for  the  hours  worked  beyond  40  during  the  second   workweek  of  the  pay  period.     Similarly,   during   the   period   from   March   9   through   March   13,   2020,   Plaintiff   worked  47.5  hours  and  was  not  paid  at  a  time-­and-­one-­half  rate  for  the  hours  he  worked   beyond  40.     Employing   this   overtime   avoidance   scheme,   Defendants   willfully   violate   their   employees’  right  to  be  paid  overtime  wages  for  overtime  hours  worked.     At   all   times   relevant   to   this   action,   Defendants   employed   persons,   including   Plaintiff,  within  the  State  of  Colorado.       At   all   times   relevant   to   this   action,   Plaintiff   and   Defendants’   other   employees   performed   woodworking   labor   for   the   benefit   of   Defendants   wherein   Defendants   commanded  when,  where,  and  how  much  labor  Plaintiff  and  others  were  to  perform.     Defendant  Ark  Woodworks,  Inc.  sold  and  offered  for  sale  a  service  (woodworking   services)   to   the   consuming   public,   and   generated   50%   or   more   of   its   annual   dollar   volume  of  business  from  such  sales.     Plaintiff   and   Defendants’   other   employees  handled   woodworking   materials   and   equipment,  such  as  wood,  glue,  hardware,  hand  tools  and  power  tools,  which  moved  in   interstate  commerce  each  year  relevant  to  this  action.     Defendants  enjoyed  more  than  $500,000.00  in  gross  receipts  each  year  relevant   to  this  action.     Plaintiff  asserts  his  First  Claim,  brought  under  the  MWO,  as  a  Fed.  R.  Civ.  P.  23   class   action,   on   his   own   behalf   and   on   behalf   of   a   class   for   which   Plaintiff   seeks   certification.       Pending   any   modifications   necessitated   by   discovery,   Plaintiff   preliminarily   defines  this  “Rule  23  Class”  as  follows:   All  Ark  Woodworks  hourly  employees  who  worked  on  or  after  April   21,  2014.           This  action  is  properly  brought  as  a  class  action  for  the  following  reasons.     Defendants  failed  to  pay  all  their  hourly  employees  overtime  wages  for  overtime   hours  worked.     The   class   is   so   numerous   that   joinder   of   all   the   potential   class   members   is   impracticable.   Plaintiff   does   not   know   the   exact   size   of   the   Class   because   that   information  is  within  the  control  of  Defendants.  However,  Plaintiff  believes  and  alleges   that  the  number  of  Class  Members  is  in  the  50-­75  persons  range.  Membership  in  the   class  is  readily  ascertainable  from  Defendants’  employment  records.         Numerous   questions   of   law   and   fact   regarding   the   liability   of   Defendants   are   common   to   the   Class   and   predominate   over   any   individual   issues   that   may   exist.   Common  questions  of  law  and  of  fact  include:  Whether  Defendants  failed  to  pay  all  their   employees  overtime  wages  for  overtime  hours  worked.     A   class   action   is   superior   to   other   available   methods   for   the   fair   and   efficient   adjudication  of  this  controversy  because  numerous  identical  lawsuits  alleging  identical   causes  of  action  would  not  serve  the  interests  of  judicial  economy.         The  representative  Plaintiff  will  fairly  and  adequately  protect  the  interests  of  the   Members  of  the  Class.  Because  all  Class  Members  were  subject  to  the  same  violations   of  law  perpetrated  by  Defendants,  the  interests  of  absent  Class  Members  are  coincident   with,  and  not  antagonistic  to,  those  of  Plaintiff.  The  representative  Plaintiff  will  litigate   the  Class’s  claims  fully.       The  representative  Plaintiff  is  represented  by  counsel  experienced  in  wage  and   hour  class  action  litigation.     The  prosecution  of  separate  actions  by  individual  Class  Members  would  create  a   risk  of  inconsistent  or  varying  adjudications  with  respect  to  individual  Class  Members   which  would  establish  incompatible  standards  of  conduct  for  Defendants.       Plaintiff  is  unaware  of  any  members  of  the  putative  class  who  are  interested  in   presenting  their  claims  in  a  separate  action.         Plaintiff  is  aware  of  no  pending  litigation  commenced  by  members  of  the  Class   concerning  the  instant  controversy.     It  is  desirable  to  concentrate  this  litigation  in  this  forum  because  all  claims  arose   in  Colorado.     This  class  action  will  not  be  difficult  to  manage  due  to  the  uniformity  of  claims   among  the  Class  Members  and  the  susceptibility  of  wage  and  hour  cases  to  both  class   litigation   and   the   use   of   representative   testimony   and   representative   documentary   evidence.     The   contours   of   the   class   will   be   easily   defined   by   reference   to   the   payroll   documents  that  Defendants  were  legally  required  to  create  and  maintain.  7  CCR  1103-­1   at  12;;  29  C.F.R.  §  516.2.  Notice  will  be  easily  distributed  because  all  members  of  the   putative  class  are  or  were  employed  by  Defendants  and  Defendants  were  required  to   create  and  maintain  records  containing  the  mailing  addresses  of  each  class  member.     §  216(b)  COLLECTIVE  ACTION  ALLEGATIONS     The   relevant   time   period   dates   back   three   years   from   the   date   on   which   this   Complaint  was  filed  and  continues  forward  through  the  date  of  judgment  because  the   FLSA  provides  a  three-­year  statute  of  limitations  for  claims  of  willful  violations  brought   under  the  Act.  29  U.S.C.  §  255(a).     All   potential   collective   action   Members   are   similarly   situated   because   they   worked  for  Defendants  as  hourly  employees  and  were  subject  to  Defendants’  common   policy  of  avoiding  overtime  wage  payments.    Plaintiff  repeats  and  realleges  each  of  the  above  allegations  as  if  fully  set  forth   herein.     Plaintiff  asserts  this  count  on  his  own  behalf  and  on  behalf  of  all  other  similarly   situated  employees.  Fed.R.Civ.P.  23.     Defendant   Ark   Woodworks,   Inc.   was   Plaintiff’s   and   others’   “employer”   as   that   term  is  defined  by  the  MWO  because  it  employed  Plaintiff  and  others  in  Colorado.    7    Plaintiff  repeats  and  realleges  each  of  the  allegations  above  as  if  fully  set  forth   herein.         Plaintiff  asserts  this  count  on  his  own  behalf  and  on  behalf  of  all  others  similarly   situated.    29  U.S.C.  §  216(b).         Plaintiff  and  others  were  “employees”  as  that  term  is  defined  by  the  FLSA.    29   U.S.C.  §  203(e).         Defendants   “employed”   the   Plaintiff   and   others   as   that   term   is   defined   by   the   FLSA.    29  U.S.C.  §  203(g).     Defendants  were  Plaintiff’s  and  others’  “employers”  as  that  term  is  defined  by  the   FLSA.    29  U.S.C.  §  203(d).     Defendants’  violations  of  the  FLSA  were  willful.  29  U.S.C.  §  255(a).     Plaintiff  and  others  have  suffered  lost  wages  and  lost  use  of  those  wages  in  an   amount  to  be  determined  at  trial.     Plaintiff  and  others  are  entitled  to  recover  unpaid  overtime  premiums,  liquidated   damages,  attorney  fees  and  costs.    29  U.S.C.  §  216(b).       WHEREFORE:  As  to  his  FIRST  CLAIM  brought  pursuant  to  the  MWO,  Plaintiff   respectfully  requests  an  Order  from  the  Court  that:   a.   This  action  be  certified  as  a  class  action  pursuant  to  Fed.  R.  Civ.P.  23;;   b.   Plaintiff  be  certified  as  the  class  representative  of  the  Rule  23  Class;;   c.   Undersigned  counsel  be  appointed  Rule  23  class  counsel;;   d.   Prompt  notice  of  this  litigation  be  sent  to  all  potential  Rule  23  class   members;;   e.   Plaintiff  and  the  Rule  23  Class  be  awarded  the  wages  they  are  due,   together  with  attorney  fees  and  costs  of  suit.  Colo.  Rev.  Stat.  §  8-­6-­118;;  7   Violation  of  the  CMWA  (Colo.  Rev.  Stat.  §§  8-­6-­101,  et  seq.)  as  implemented  by  the   MWO  (7  CCR  1103-­1)    Violation  of  the  FLSA  (29  U.S.C.  §  201  et  seq.)   ",lose,2
6131449,win," Prior to sending the form letter, Defendant knew: Plaintiff’s home address  and phone number; and upon information and belief, the home address and phone  number of the class members.   Plaintiff brings this action individually, and pursuant to F.Civ.R.P. 23(a),  (b)(2), and (b)(3).  The class under the first claim for relief is defined as:  all Ohio  consumers who have or will receive from Defendant at any time on or after October 10,  2014 the form letter.  The class under the second claim for relief is defined as:  all Ohio  consumers who have or will receive from Defendant at any time on or after October 10,  2013 the form letter.    The members of the class are so numerous that joinder of all parties is  impracticable.  At this time, the precise number cannot be determined.  Upon  information and belief, there appears to be hundreds in the class.    There are questions of law or fact common to the class, including whether  the form letter violates the FDCPA.    Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members in that she alleges the  same claims asserted on behalf of the class as a whole.    Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class in that  she has a personal desire to vindicate the rights of the class and she has retained  competent counsel to represent the class.    Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to  the class, thereby making appropriate final equitable relief for the class as a whole.  4    Unless Defendant is enjoined and restrained from continuing the foregoing  illegal practices, Plaintiff and the putative class will suffer substantial and irreparable  injury for which they have no adequate remedy at law.    Prosecution of separate actions by individual class members creates risk  of individual adjudications that would, as a practical matter, be dispositive of the  interests of the other members not parties to the adjudication, or would substantially  impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.    Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class would  create risk of varying individual adjudications, which would establish incompatible  standards of conduct for defendants who are expected to oppose the class.    Questions of law and fact common to the class members predominate  over any questions affecting only individual members, and a class action is superior to  other methods available for the efficient adjudication of the controversy; the relief sought  by all members of the class will be effective and appropriate for the entire class; all  members of the class have a right to damages or other relief which may be readily  computed in each case or otherwise readily determined.    Many of the persons with whom Defendant has dealt, or who were  affected by its activities, may not be aware of their rights, or are not in a financial  position to assert such rights readily.  Because relegation of their claims to individual  actions would result in an unreasonable multiplicity of suits and a corresponding burden  on this and other courts, a class action is far superior to all other methods for a fair and  efficient adjudication of this controversy.  5   Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all of the allegations  contained in the above paragraphs.    At all times relevant herein, Defendant had Plaintiff’s home address and  phone number.    On or about February 3, 2015, Defendant’s authorized agent, Denise M.  Hayes (“Ms. Hayes”), who at all times relevant herein was acting in the scope of her  authority for Defendant, contacted Plaintiff’s sister.  Ms. Hayes stated it was a personal  matter and left her phone number with extension.     On or about February 11, 2015, Ms. Hayes contacted Plaintiff’s employer  (J.P. Morgan Chase).  Ms. Hayes did not identify herself, or state that se was confirming  or correcting location information concerning Plaintiff.  She stated it was personal.  The  email that Plaintiff received from her employer is attached hereto as Exhibit B.       On or about February 11, 2015, Ms. Hayes contacted Plaintiff by phone on  this date, and stated that she could make substantial payments ($6,000 to $12,000),  which Plaintiff could not make.  Ms. Hayes told her to take out a credit card, ask family  for money or take out a personal loan.  Plaintiff’s offer of $200 per month was  unacceptable, and she asked for more time to try and come up with the money.  Ms.  Hayes gave her through the end of February to do so.      On or about February 25, 2015, Defendant’s authorized agent, Tom  Johnson, who at all times relevant herein was acting in the scope of his authority for  Defendant, called Plaintiff, and left a nasty message that she needed to contact him  before Friday.  He stated, inter alia, that the payment of $200 per month was not  acceptable and that their lawyers would garnish her wages, and that she needed to  6  contact her HR department because there are some employers (reading off a list) that  often fire their employees if they had wage garnishments other than child support.      Upon information and belief, Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff with a  notice of her rights as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692g.    On or about March 11, 2015, Plaintiff sent Defendant a request for  validation of the debt, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit C, and incorporated  herein by reference.   Defendant has failed to respond to the request for validation.    As a result of Defendant’s actions and inactions, Plaintiff suffered  headaches, embarrassment, anxiety, fear, mental anguish/emotional distress, loss of  sleep, humiliation, worry, outrage, and/or anger.   Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all of the allegations  contained in the above paragraphs.    Defendants routinely sent out the form letter to consumers in an effort to  collect consumer debts in the state of Ohio.      The form letter violated Plaintiff’s and the classes’ rights under the FDCPA  in several ways, including, but not limited to:  a.       Implying that nonpayment of the debt will result in  the seizure, garnishment, attachment of exempt  property in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(4).  .  b.  Threatening and/or implying to take action it does  not actually intent to take or that it cannot legally  take in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5).  c.  Threatening to conduct ASSET DEVELOPMENT  of her/his PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT when it  knew where he/she worked in violation of 15  U.S.C. § 1692b.  7  c.      Threatening to contact relatives and neighbors to  locate consumers, when it knew her/his home  address and phone number in violation of 15  U.S.C. § 1692b.  d.  Threatening and/or implying to contact relatives  and neighbors is a false representation of the  actions that Defendant could legally take in  violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(5).    As a result of Defendant’s actions and inactions, Plaintiff and the class are  entitled to relief as provided for by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k.   Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference all of the allegations  contained in the above paragraphs.       At all times relevant herein, Defendant was a supplier under the OCSPA.    The debt arose out of a consumer transaction with a supplier as defined in   Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by references all of the allegations  contained in the above paragraphs.    Defendant’s actions and inactions constitute a violation of common law  invasion of privacy.  See, Housh v. Pleth, 165 Ohio St. 35 (1956).    Defendant’s actions and inactions were intentional, wanton, and/or in  reckless disregard for Plaintiff’s rights.  8    As a result of Defendant’s actions and inactions, Plaintiff is entitled to  actual and punitive damages based upon common law invasion of privacy.   On or about January 23, 2015, Defendant sent Plaintiff the form letter,  which forms the basis of the class claims against Defendant.    The form letter, in an attempt to collect a consumer debt, states:  “Please  call me to discuss repayment options to avoid [“ASSET DEVELOPMENT”] of your:   Under O.R.C § 2329.66, pension accounts, 401k, and deferred  compensation plans are exempt from garnishment and attachment.  Thus, the letter  objectively frustrates a consumer’s ability to intelligently choose his/her response.    The form letter further states that the ASSET DEVELOPMENT search:  “will include contact of your relatives and neighbors to locate you” and that “[t]hese  assets will be used to determine whether to recommend to the creditor legal remedies  to force collection of your debt.”  3   EQUITY, AUTOMBILE EQUITY, PENSION ACCOUNTS, 401K AND  DEFERRED COMPENSATON PLANS, WHOLE LIFE PLANS AND  ANNUITIES.  ",win,3
17132723,lose," To complete its business objectives, Ascent hires personnel, such as Rhiel, to  perform services on its oil and gas ventures.    Ascent does not hire these workers on a project-by-project basis.    Rather, Ascent hires and treats these workers just like regular, even if sometimes  short-term, employees.    Many of these individuals worked for Ascent on a day rate basis (without overtime  pay).     These workers make up the proposed collective of Day Rate Workers.       While exact job titles and job duties may differ, these employees are subjected to  the same or similar illegal pay practices for similar work.    For example, Rhiel worked for Ascent as an Operator from approximately May  2018 until March 2019.    From May 2018 until October 2018, Rhiel was paid a flat rate for each day worked  regardless of the total hours worked in a day or week with no overtime compensation (“day rate  pay plan”) and was classified as an independent contractor.    In October 2018, Ascent reclassified Rhiel as an employee and started paying him  on an hourly basis.    Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers worked for Ascent under its day rate pay scheme.    Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers did not receive a salary as required to be exempt  under the FLSA or the Ohio Wage Acts.    If Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers did not work, they did not get paid.    This is despite the fact Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers often worked more than  12 hours a day, for 7 days a week, for weeks at a time.    Although he typically worked 2 days a week, for more than 12 hours a day, Rhiel  did not receive any overtime pay.    Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers received the day rate regardless of the number of  hours they worked in a week, even when they worked more than 40 hours.    Rhiel’s work schedule is typical of the Day Rate Workers.     Ascent knows Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers work for more than 12 hours a day,  for 7 days a week.    Ascent’s records reflect the fact that Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers regularly work  far in excess of 40 hours in certain workweeks.     Ascent does not pay Rhiel or the Day Rate Workers overtime for hours worked in  excess of 40 in any of those weeks.    Instead, Ascent pays Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers on a day rate basis.    Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers are not employed on a salary basis.     Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers do not, and have never, received guaranteed  weekly compensation from Ascent irrespective of the day worked (i.e., the only compensation  they receive is the day rate they are assigned for all hours worked in a single day or week).    Ascent knew Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers worked more than 40 hours in a  week.    Ascent controls Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers’ work.    Ascent requires Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers to follow Ascent’s policies and  procedures.    Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers’ work must adhere to the quality standards put in  place by Ascent.    Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers are not required to possess any unique or  specialized skillset (other than that maintained by all other workers in their respective positions)  to perform their job duties.    As an Operator, Rhiel’s primary responsibilities included going to wellsites and  conducting preventative maintenance in accordance with Ascent’s policies and procedures.    Without the job performed by Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers, Ascent would not  be able to complete its business objectives.    Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers relied on Ascent for work and compensation.     Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers worked in accordance with the schedule set by  Ascent.     Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers cannot subcontract out the work they are assigned  by Ascent.     Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers must follow Ascent’s policies and procedures.     Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers did not substantially invest in the tools required  to complete the overall job to which they were assigned.     Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers did not possess any specialized or unique skill set.     Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers did not market their services while employed by  Ascent.     Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers worked exclusively for Ascent during the relevant  period.     Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers did not incur operating expenses like rent, payroll,  marketing, and/or insurance.     Ascent set Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers’ work schedule, which prohibited them  from working other jobs for other companies while working on jobs for Ascent.    At all relevant times, Ascent maintained control, oversight, and direction of Rhiel  and the Day Rate Workers, including, but not limited to, hiring, firing, disciplining, timekeeping,  payroll, and other employment practices.     Ascent knew Rhiel, and other Day Rate Workers, worked more than 40 hours in a  week.    Ascent knew, or showed reckless disregard for whether, the Day Rate Workers were  not exempt from the FLSA or the Ohio Wages Acts’ overtime provisions.    Nonetheless, Ascent failed to pay Rhiel and the Day Rate Workers overtime.      Ascent’s failure to pay overtime compensation to these employees was neither  reasonable, nor was the decision not to pay these employees overtime made in good faith.    Ascent willfully violated the FLSA and the Ohio Wages Acts.    Rhiel brings his claim under the Ohio Wages Acts as a Rule 23 class action.    The conduct alleged violates the Ohio Wages Acts.    At all relevant times, Ascent was subject to the requirements of the Ohio Wages  Acts.    The Ohio Wage Acts requires employers like Ascent to pay employees at 1.5 times  their regular rate of pay for hours worked in excess of 40 in any week.    Rhiel and the Ohio Day Rate Workers are entitled to overtime under the Ohio  Wage Acts.    Ascent has and has had a policy and practice (its day rate pay plan) that failed to  pay Rhiel and the Ohio Day Rate Workers overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 in a  workweek.    Rhiel and the Ohio Day Rate Workers seek unpaid overtime in amount equal to 1.5  times their regular rates of pay for work performed in excess of 40 in a workweek, prejudgment  interest, all available penalty wages, and such other legal and equitable relief as the Court deems  just and proper.    Rhiel and the Ohio Day Rate Workers also seek recovery of attorneys’ fees, costs,  and expenses of this action, to be paid by Ascent, as provided by the Ohio Wage Acts.   Rhiel brings this claim as a class and collective action under the FLSA and Ohio  Wage Acts.    The Day Rate Workers were victimized by Ascent’s day rate pay plan which is in  willful violation of the FLSA and Ohio Wage Acts.    Other Day Rate Workers worked with Rhiel and indicated they were paid in the  same manner (a day rate with no overtime) and performed similar work.    OHIO WAGE ACT VIOLATIONS  ",win,1
8347031,lose," The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is  impracticable.  While the exact number of Class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time and  can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes that there are at least  thousands of members in the proposed Class.  Record owners and other members of the Class may  be identified from records maintained by Loma Negra or its transfer agent and may be notified of  the pendency of this action by mail, using the form of notice similar to that customarily used in  securities class actions.    Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class, as all  members of the Class are similarly affected by Defendants’ wrongful conduct in violation of  federal law that is complained of herein.    Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class  and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation.    Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the Class and  predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the Class.  Among the  questions of law and fact common to the Class are:  (a)  whether Defendants violated the Securities Act;  (b)  whether the Registration Statement contained false or misleading  statements of material fact and omitted material information required to be stated therein; and  (c)  to what extent the members of the Class have sustained damages and the  proper measure of damages.    Plaintiff incorporates all the foregoing by reference.    This Cause of Action is brought pursuant to § 11 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §  77k, on behalf of the Class, against all Defendants.    The Registration Statement contained untrue statements of material facts, omitted  to state other facts necessary to make the statements made not misleading, and omitted to state  material facts required to be stated therein.    Defendants are strictly liable to Plaintiff and the Class for the misstatements and  omissions.    None of the Defendants named herein made a reasonable investigation or possessed  reasonable grounds for the belief that the statements contained in the Registration Statement were  true and without omissions of any material facts and were not misleading.    By reason of the conduct herein alleged, each Defendant violated or controlled a  person who violated § 11 of the Securities Act.    Plaintiff acquired Loma Negra ADS pursuant to the Registration Statement.    Plaintiff and the Class have sustained damages.  The value of Loma Negra ADS  has declined substantially subsequent to and due to Defendants’ violations.    Plaintiff incorporates all the foregoing by reference.    By means of the defective Prospectus, Defendants promoted, solicited, and sold  Loma Negra shares to Plaintiff and other members of the Class.    The prospectus for the IPO contained untrue statements of material fact, and  concealed and failed to disclose material facts, as detailed above.  Defendants owed Plaintiff and  the other members of the Class who purchased Loma Negra shares pursuant to the prospectus the  duty to make a reasonable and diligent investigation of the statements contained in the Prospectus  to ensure that such statements were true and that there was no omission to state a material fact  required to be stated in order to make the statements contained therein not misleading.  Defendants,  in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the misstatements and omissions  contained in the prospectus as set forth above.    Plaintiff did not know, nor in the exercise of reasonable diligence could Plaintiff  have known, of the untruths and omissions contained in the prospectus at the time Plaintiff  acquired Loma Negra shares.    Plaintiff incorporates all the foregoing by reference.    This Cause of Action is brought pursuant to § 15 of the Securities Act against all  Defendants.    The Individual Defendants were controlling persons of Loma Negra by virtue of  their positions as directors or senior officers of Loma Negra.  The Individual Defendants each had  a series of direct and indirect business and personal relationships with other directors and officers  and major shareholders of Loma Negra.  The Selling Shareholder controlled the Company.  The  Company controlled the Individual Defendants and all of Loma Negra’s employees.    Loma Negra, the Selling Shareholder, and the Individual Defendants were culpable  participants in the violations of §§ 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act alleged in the First and  Second Causes of Action above, based on their having signed or authorized the signing of the  Registration Statement and having otherwise participated in the process which allowed the IPO to  be successfully completed.  For Violation of § 11 of the Securities Act  Against All Defendants    For Violation of § 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act  Against All Defendants   For Violation of § 15 of the Securities Act  Against All Defendants   ",lose,4
18690698,win," Yet in violation of this rule, Defendant fails to obtain any express written consent  prior to sending autodialed text messages to consumers, such as Plaintiff.    In placing the calls that form the basis of this Complaint, Defendant utilized an  automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS” or “autodialer”) in violation of the TCPA.  Specifically, the hardware and software used by Defendant has the capacity to generate and store  random numbers, and/or receive and store lists of telephone numbers, and to dial such numbers,  en masse, in an automated fashion without human intervention. Defendant’s automated dialing  equipment also is, or includes features substantially similar to, a predictive dialer, meaning that it  is capable of making numerous phone calls simultaneously and automatically connecting  answered calls to then available callers and disconnecting the rest (all without human  intervention).    An IMC Sales Representative is expected to initiate between 55-65 dials per hour:  6    Upon information and belief, including complaints about IMC’s telemarketing  calls and Plaintiff’s experience, IMC contact center agents place calls to consumers using an  autodialer.    IMC also sends unsolicited, autodialed text messages to consumers like the ones  Plaintiff received.    There are a number of online complaints about Defendant’s calls to consumers  who never gave consent to be called, including consumers that requested Defendant stop calling  only to receive more calls:  •  7  • “I have asked over and over to stop calling…”8  • “Iconic mortgage, these people will not stop.calling and switch numbers after you block  them, all times of the night and day and weekends, never had any dealings with them but  they seem adamant on calling”9  • “Robocall. Non-stop calls. Always a pause when I answer. Definite robocaller.”10  • “Unwanted Call”11   On February 27, 2019 Plaintiff registered her phone number on the DNC.    Plaintiff uses her cell phone for personal use only. It is not used for business  purposes.    On December 9, 2019, Plaintiff received an unsolicited call from IMC using  phone number 540-215-1008 to her cell phone. This call was not answered.    Plaintiff called 540-215-1008 on December 9, 2019 at 2:25 PM and spoke to a  live agent, specifically asking for the calls to stop.    Despite her clear opt-out request, Plaintiff received an unsolicited, autodialed call  to her cell phone from Defendant using phone number 540-215-1008 on December 13, 2019 at   The following individuals are excluded from the Classes: (1) any Judge or  Magistrate presiding over this action and members of their families; (2) Defendant, its  subsidiaries, parents, successors, predecessors, and any entity in which Defendant or its parents  have a controlling interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors; (3)  Plaintiff’s attorneys; (4) persons who properly execute and file a timely request for exclusion  from the Classes; (5) the legal representatives, successors or assigns of any such excluded  persons; and (6) persons whose claims against Defendant have been fully and finally adjudicated  and/or released. Plaintiff anticipates the need to amend the Class definitions following  appropriate discovery.    Numerosity: On information and belief, there are hundreds, if not thousands of  members of the Classes such that joinder of all members is impracticable.    Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and  protect the interests of the Classes, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class  actions. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to those of the Classes, and Defendant has no  defenses unique to Plaintiff. Plaintiff and her counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting  this action on behalf of the members of the Classes, and have the financial resources to do so.  Neither Plaintiff nor her counsel has any interest adverse to the Classes.    Plaintiff repeats and realleges paragraphs 1 through 61 of this Complaint and  incorporates them by reference herein.    Defendant and/or its agents made unwanted solicitation telephone calls/text  messages to phone numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No  Consent Class using an autodialer.     These solicitation calls/texts were made/sent en masse without the consent of the  Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class to receive such solicitation  calls.    Defendant has, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). As a result of  Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed No Consent Class are  each entitled to a minimum of $500 in damages, and up to $1,500 in damages, for each violation.   Plaintiff repeats and realleges the paragraphs 1 through 61 of this Complaint and  incorporates them by reference herein.    The TCPA’s implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides that “[n]o  person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber  who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons  who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.”    47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(e), provides that § 64.1200(c) is “applicable to any person or  entity making telephone solicitations or telemarketing calls to wireless telephone numbers.”14    Any “person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-month  period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations prescribed under this  subsection may” may bring a private action based on a violation of said regulations, which were  promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone  solicitations to which they object.  47 U.S.C. § 227(c).    Defendant violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) by initiating, or causing to be initiated,  phone solicitations to telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the Do Not Call Registry Class  members who registered their respective phone numbers on the DNC, a listing of persons who do  not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.     Defendant has, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). As a result of  Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Do Not Call Registry Class are each  entitled to up to $1,500 in damages for each violation.   Plaintiff repeats and realleges the paragraphs 1 through 61 of this Complaint and  incorporates them by reference herein.    Defendant made marketing calls to Plaintiff and members of the Internal DNC  Class without implementing internal procedures for maintaining a list of persons who request not  to be called by the entity and/or by implementing procedures that do not meet the minimum  requirements to allow Defendant to initiate telemarketing calls. 47 C.F.R. 64.1200(d)(1)-(6).    The TCPA provides that any “person who has received more than one telephone  call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the regulations  prescribed under this subsection may” bring a private action based on a violation of said  regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid  receiving telephone solicitations to which they object. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5).    Defendant has, therefore, violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5). As a result of  Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of the Internal Do Not Call Class are each  entitled to up to $1,500 per violation.  Class Treatment Is Appropriate for Plaintiff’s TCPA Claims Arising From IMC’s Calls    IMC Repeatedly Called and Texted Plaintiff Without Consent,   Despite Plaintiff Having Registered Her Phone Number on the DNC   IMC Markets its Products and Services by Making Autodialed Calls to Consumers  Without Consent, Regardless of Whether Their Numbers are Registered on the DNC   Telephone Consumer Protection Act  (Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227)  (On Behalf of Plaintiff Correll and the Autodialed No Consent Class)  ",lose,4
17380666,win," Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.  P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3).    The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of  Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or  have purchased debts.    Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members,  partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate  families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate  families.     There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common  issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue  is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as  Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e, 1692f.    The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same  facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the  Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in  handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff  nor his attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action.    Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure  is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff  Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is  superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.    Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at  the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues  pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).   Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length  herein.    Some time prior to January 3, 2020, an obligation was allegedly incurred to Citibank,  N.A. by the Plaintiff.    The Citibank, N.A. obligation arose out of transactions in which money, property,  insurance or services which are the subject of the transactions were primarily for personal,  family or household purposes, specifically a Citi Mastercard account.    The alleged Citibank, N.A. obligation is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(5).    Citibank, N.A. is a “creditor” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(4).    Defendant UCB, a debt collector, was contracted by Citibank, N.A. to collect the  alleged debt which originated with Citibank, N.A.    On or about January 3, 2020, Defendant UCB sent Plaintiff a collection letter (the  “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt currently owed to Defendant Citibank, N.A. See Exhibit A.    The collection letter provides the following description for the amount owed.  1) Account Balance: $12,197.02  2) Minimum Payment Due: $1882.02    The collection letter states: “Because of interest and/or other charges that may vary  from day to day, the amount due on the day you pay may be greater.  Hence, if you pay the  amount shown above, an adjustment may be necessary after your payment is received.”    The Defendant’s Letter fails to explain whether the potential “adjustment” is  applicable to a payment of the “Minimum Payment Due,” or the “Account Balance.”     Plaintiff is without any guidance on where the purported amount written for each  category is sufficient or whether the adjustment will be applied to both the “Minimum Payment  Due,” and the “Account Balance,” or neither.    Additionally, Defendant’s letter does not explain the term “other charges” and  Plaintiff has no way of determining what the “other charges” may be.    Plaintiff has no basis to determine what “other charges” could affect his balance day  to day besides interest and late fees.    If Defendant is aware of “other charges” that would lead to an increase in the balance,  Defendant should clarify and explain them in the letter.    Plaintiff is unable to evaluate how much is owed, and what charges may actually be  included in an overall balance upon the time of payment.    This statement from the Defendant is also a threat to collect an amount that is not  provided in the contract or by law.      As a result of Defendant’s deceptive, misleading and false debt collection practices,  Plaintiff has been damaged.   Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein.    Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff  violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.    Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or  misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.    Defendant violated said section by:   a. Making a false and misleading representation in violation of but not limited to  §1692e (10).  b. by failing to delineate to which listed amount the “adjustment” may be applied.    Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein.    Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff  violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f.    Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f, a debt collector may not use any unfair or  unconscionable means in connection with the collection of any debt.    Defendant violated this section by   a. unfairly stating that the balance may increase due to “other charges”, when no  other charges are allowed by contract or law;    By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's  conduct violated Section 1692f, et seq. of the FDCPA and is entitled to actual damages, statutory  damages, costs and attorneys’ fees.  VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT   15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.   VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT   15 U.S.C. §1692f et seq.  ",win,3
6769191,win," Plaintiff and those similarly situated worked for a base salary in addition to  commissions based on their sales numbers.     Plaintiff Paul White was paid $50,000.00 per year plus commissions.     Plaintiff and those similarly situated worked over forty (40) hours routinely  and with Defendant’s knowledge and behest throughout their employment with  Defendant.     During the hiring process, Defendant, through its managers, represented to  Plaintiff and those similarly situated that the job was a forty (40) hour per week  position.     Plaintiff and the class of similarly situated employees routinely worked over  forty (40) hours each week with Defendant’s knowledge and behest throughout  their employment with Defendant.     Shortly after his employment began, Plaintiff’s superiors began to pressure,  urge and encourage him and all other inside sales representatives to work beyond  the scheduled 40 hours, including coming in early, staying late and working  through lunches in order to meet goals and quotas and maximize sales.     Defendant, through its managers, encouraged and pressured Plaintiff and  those similarly situated to work as many hours as necessary to meet sales  production numbers.     There was no time tracking methods used by the Defendant to track time  worked by Plaintiff and those similarly situated in the office.     In February 2017, Defendant told its employees that some were entitled to  pay for hours over forty (40), but not others.  Those employees that were paid were  only paid for those hours at an $8 – $9 overtime rate, and Defendant did not pay  overtime on the employee commissions.     During one short period of time, Defendant did instruct employees against  working overtime and even represented that they would pay overtime wages, but  very quickly is was “business as usual”, the majority of sales reps working  overtime hours without being paid and continually warned about hitting numbers  and goals no matter how many hours it took.     Plaintiff, like all other inside sales representatives, was not entirely  concerned over recording or documenting his hours since Defendant made it clear  that they would not and do not pay overtime wages.     Defendant’s managers readily observed Plaintiff and those similarly situated  working overtime within the offices of Defendant.     Plaintiff and all similarly situated inside sales representatives, accessed  electronic and computer systems, telephone, and e-mails, which would, if  produced, help reflect the true hours that they worked.     However, Defendants did not accurately record the hours of these non- exempt employees.     It is unclear whether the Defendant misclassified Plaintiff and all similarly  situated inside sales representatives as Exempt employees, a clearly unlawful and  erroneous position and action, or whether they simply just willfully refused to pay  overtime wages for non-exempt employees and did not throughout the period of  the 3 years preceding the filing of this Complaint properly and accurately record  and track the hours inside sales representatives worked in violation of the FSLA.     Plaintiff and all similarly situated inside sales representatives did not  negotiate or ever agree that their salaries were intended to pay them for all hours,  and had they known that they were non-exempt employees under the FLSA when  hired and entitled to a premium for overtime hours, they never would have agreed  to the compensation plan provide and would have complained and objected to not  being paid overtime wages for all hours worked over 40 in a work week.    Upon information and belief, the class size during the relevant class period is  upwards of 3000 employees nationwide.      Plaintiff, and all other similarly situated inside sales representatives, handle  either inbound or outbound calls to sell telecommunications to businesses.     Inside sales representatives do not supervise two (2) or more full time  employees, and thus cannot meet the Executive Exemption.     The primary job duties of inside sales representatives do not involve the  exercise of independent discretion and judgment in matters of significance, they  are in the production aspect of Defendant’s business, selling its products and  following scripts.  Thus they cannot meet the Administrative Exemption.     Plaintiff and all similarly situated inside sales representatives are micro  managed and highly scrutinized on a daily and weekly basis with very little room if  at all in deviating from strict regulated manners in which to perform their job  duties and responsibilities.    Inside sales representatives do not have decision making authority.     Plaintiff and all inside sales representatives work in a very high pressured,  boiler room type environment.     Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference all above paragraphs as if  fully set forth herein.     The FLSA requires employers to pay employees wages at a rate no less than  one-and-a-half times their regular hourly rate of pay for all hours worked in excess  of forty (40) hours in individual work weeks. 19 U.S.C. § 207.     Defendant is an “employer” of Plaintiff and those similarly situated within  the meaning of the FLSA.     Defendant is an “enterprise” as defined by the FLSA and engaged in  interstate commerce.     Plaintiff and those similarly situated are not exempt employees under the  FLSA or other Federal rules and regulations.     Defendant has willfully violated the FLSA and is liable for wages for a three  (3) year period of time preceding the filing of this complaint.  Defendant has  known for the past three years that the inside sales representatives were non- exempt employees, and continued refuse to compensate Plaintiff and the class of  similarly situated for overtime hours worked.     Defendant did not make a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA and  owes Plaintiff and those similarly situated liquidated damages and an equal sum of  all wages owed.     Defendant also has failed to pay overtime at the proper rate of one and one  half time the employees’ regular rate of pay including the value of all commissions  and bonuses earned.     Defendant has also violated the record keeping provision of the FLSA, 29  CFR 516.2, which mandates that an Employer record and track the hours of non- exempt employees.     Defendant employs inside sales representatives, upwards of one thousand or  more, working in multiple offices selling telecommunications to businesses  throughout the United States.     Defendant provides telecommunications services, including telephone  services, managed solutions, data products, and network integration, to businesses  throughout the United States.    VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT  ",win,3
15765595,win,"The amount of the debt;    Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.  P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3).    The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of  Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or  have purchased debts.    Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members,  partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate  families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate  families.     There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common  issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members.    The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same  facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the  Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in  handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff  nor his attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action.    Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at  the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues  pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).  The name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;    Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length  herein.    Some time prior to April 5, 2019, an obligation was allegedly incurred to Discover  Bank (hereinafter, “Discover”).    The Discover obligation arose out of transactions in which money, property,  insurance or services were the subject of the transactions, specifically extending a revolving  line of credit on a personal credit card.    The alleged Discover obligation is a ""debt"" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5).    Discover is a ""creditor"" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4).    Defendant Van Ru, a debt collector, was contracted by Discover to collect the alleged  debt.    Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been  incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United  States Postal Services, telephone and internet    On or about April 5, 2019 Defendant sent Plaintiff an initial contact notice (the  “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt owed.     Shortly after receiving the Letter, Plaintiff’s husband under instruction from the  Plaintiff and as per the Letter stated, placed a telephone call to Defendant attempting to dispute  the Discover account.   A statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after  receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any  portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt- collector;    When asked by the Defendant the reason for the call, Plaintiff advised it was to  dispute the Discover account referenced in the Letter.      Immediately thereafter Defendant requested a reason for the dispute, to which  Plaintiff’s husband stated the he was just disputing the debt as per the instructions in the Letter.    Plaintiff then sought to affirm Defendant’s disclosure regarding the dispute process,  specifically that the dispute must be in writing or the account would not be disputed.  Defendant  advised that he was correct, that the dispute must be in writing.     To demand both a dispute to be in writing and/or contain a specific reason is  completely contradictory to both the specific consumer rights stated in the initial collection letter  as well as relevant case law in this Jurisdiction.    Furthermore, it is a clear attempt to circumvent the verification process and pause  collection efforts for any period of time.    As a result of Defendant’s deceptive, misleading and false debt collection practices,  Plaintiff has been damaged.   Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein.    Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff  violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.    Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or  misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.    By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant’s  conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs  and attorneys’ fees.   Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein.    Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff  violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g.     Pursuant to 15 USC §1692g, a debt collector:  Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in connection  with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the following  information is contained in the initial communication or the consumer has paid  the debt, send the consumer a written notice containing –    The Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §1692g, by stating that they would only accept  disputes in writing.     By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's  conduct violated Section 1692g et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs  and attorneys’ fees.  A statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the  thirty-day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer  with the name and address of the original creditor, if different  from the current creditor.   VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e  et seq.   VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692g  et seq.  ",lose,2
6381426,lose," This matter is properly maintainable as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.  23(a) in that:  (a) The Putative Class, which potentially includes in excess of sixty persons, is  so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;  (b) There are substantial questions of law and fact common to the Putative Class;  (c) The claims of the representative parties are typical of the claims of the  Putative Class; and  (d) The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the  Putative Class.    The case is properly maintainable as a class action pursuant to Fed. R Civ. P.  23(b)(3), in that questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions  affecting only individual class members, and a class action is superior to other methods for fairly  and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.    The relief sought in this action will effectively provide relief to all of the class  members.    There are no unusual difficulties foreseen in the management of this class action.   Once Defendant had granted an application in the exercise of its discretion, its  Streets Department was required to erect a sign at the location of the exclusive electric vehicle  parking space, designating it as such.    After the adoption of Section 12-1131, and in reliance thereon, Plaintiffs and the  members of the Putative Class each took a series of steps in order to apply for approval of a  reserved electric vehicle parking space.    Plaintiffs and members of the Putative Class each applied to the Philadelphia  Parking Authority (""PP A"") for approval of a designated electric vehicle parking space, paid all  fees associated with such applications, and submitted all materials in support of their respective  applications as required by the PPA and Section 12-1131, including but not limited to proof that  an electric vehicle had been purchased or leased and registered with the Pennsylvania Department  of Transportation to a resident of each of their respective homes.    By installing the curbside electrical vehicle chargers, solely at their own cost and  expense, Plaintiffs and the Putative Class made substantial improvements upon public property.    In response to the respective applications of the Plaintiffs and the Putative Class,  the PPA granted its approval for the exclusively reserved, designated electric vehicle parking  spaces, and Plaintiffs and the members of the Putative Class thus obtained such a parking space  at their place of residence, all in conformity with Section 12-1131.    On or about April 6, 2017, the City, through City Council, and without due process  to the Plaintiffs or members of the Putative Class, passed Bill No. 170093-A, which amended  Section 12-1131 by imposing a ""moratorium on new electric vehicle parking spaces, under certain  terms and conditions."" The amendment further changed Section 12-1131 ( c ), providing that instead  of the Streets Department posting signs at the existing approved electric parking spaces that  prohibited all parking in such spaces by non-electric vehicles, the signs to be posted at the spaces  now only reserved those spaces for the use of electric vehicles during the hours from 6:00 p.m. to  6:00 a.m. Pursuant to the amendment, City Council further provided that the signs were to  specifically indicate that non-electric vehicles were permitted to park in the previously  exclusively-reserved spaces for two hours at a time during the hours from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.    The City thus amended Section 12-1131, depriving each Plaintiff and member of  the Putative Class of the exclusively-reserved electric vehicle parking spaces which they had  previously obtained upon application and compliance \vith the City's ordinance, and upon  expending substantial funds in furtherance of such applications. Instead, under the revised version  of Section 12-1131, for twelve hours of every day, non-electric vehicles are now permitted to  occupy the parking spaces that were previously exclusively designated for electric vehicles, thus  depriving Plaintiffs and the Putative Class of access to their electrical vehicle chargers.   Plaintiffs hereby incorporate the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.    Each Plaintiff and member of the Putative Class applied for a reserved electric  vehicle parking space according to the process and standards established and required by the City,  as articulated in Section 12-1131, before it was subsequently amended.    In so doing, each Plaintiff and Putati,,e Class member expended substantial sums  of money so as to comply with the requirements of Section 12-1131, and made substantial  improvements upon public property.    Pursuant to Section 12-1131, the City approved the application of each Plaintiff and  Putative Class member and designated a reserved electric vehicle parking space in close proximity  to their respective homes.    By unilaterally amending Section 12-1131 so as to allow non-electric vehicles to  park in the parking spaces that previously were reserved exclusively for electric vehicles,  Defendant has unlawfully deprived each Plaintiff and the Putative Class members of his or her  protectable property interest without due process.    Defendant's amendment to Section 12-1131 reflects its policy, practice, procedure  and/or custom, and exhibits deliberate indifference to the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs and the  Putative Class.    Defendant's actions violated Plaintiffs' and the Putative Class's constitutional due  process rights and have caused them injury.   Plaintiffs hereby incorporate the above paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.    Defendant's actions have operated to treat Plaintiffs and the Putative Class  differently than other similarly situated persons.    There is no permissible basis for Defendant's arbitrary and capricious  discrimination toward and against Plaintiffs and the Putative Class.    Defendant's actions violated the constitutional equal protection rights of Plaintiffs  and the Putative Class, and caused injury to each of them.   Plaintiffs and the Putative Class have made substantial improvements upon public  property.    Defendant appreciated or had knowledge of the benefit conferred upon it by  Plaintiffs and the Putative Class.    By stripping Plaintiffs and the Putative Class of their exclusively reserved electric  vehicle parking spaces after they had expended substantial funds installing the electrical charging  stations servicing those spaces, Defendant has caused Plaintiffs and the Putative Class to lose the  benefit and value of their respective investments in the charging stations, and the improvements  they have made upon public property.    At the same time, Defendant unjustly has gained the value of and been enriched by  these improvements.    Plaintiffs and the Putative Class have been injured by Defendant's actions in this  regard.  ",lose,2
4264900,win," Plaintiff Christopher Coleman files this case as an opt in collective action,  as is specifically allowed by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).    The class that Plaintiff Christopher Coleman seeks to represent may be  described as follows:  All current and former employees of Defendant who 1) worked as a Police  Dispatcher during the class period, and 2) claims that he or she either (a)  failed to receive all of his or her overtime pay, in violation of 29 U.S.C.  201 et seq. and seeks payment for such lawfully earned overtime pay, or  (b) failed to receive all of his or her compensation for work performed, but  not recorded or paid (“off-the clock”), in violation of 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.    Plaintiff, Christopher Coleman, seeks to represent only those members of  the above-described group who, after appropriate notice of their ability to opt in to this  action, have provided consent in writing to be represented by counsel for Plaintiff  Christopher Coleman as required by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).    Those persons who choose to opt in, referred to as the “Plaintiff’s class”,  will be listed on subsequent pleadings and copies of their written consents to sue will be  filed with the Court.    At all times relevant to this action, Defendant has been subject to the  requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq.     For purposes of this action, the relevant period is defined as such period  commencing on the date that is three years prior to the filing of this action, and  continuing thereafter.    Defendant employed Plaintiff Christopher Coleman from March 2014  until February 2016 as a Police Dispatcher for the City of Cairo, Illinois.    As a Police Dispatcher, Coleman responded to emergency and non- emergency calls for assistance and information and provided dispatch and  communication support services for police, fire, emergency, and related services.    Only one Police Dispatcher works at the dispatch desk per shift.    Police Dispatchers work one of three shifts: 2 P.M. to 10 P.M.; 10 P.M. to  6 A.M.; or 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.    Defendant posted monthly schedules as to when each dispatcher is  scheduled to work. The shifts were indicated by a “1” “2” or “3” on the schedule.     Defendant requires Police Dispatchers to be at the dispatch desk between  fifteen and twenty minutes before each shift. Defendant requires Police Dispatchers to  stay at the dispatch desk until the end of their shift. This means that Defendant requires  Police Dispatchers to work 8 hours and 15 minutes per shift.    Defendant did not provide time sheets or a time clock for Police  Dispatchers to record the time they worked.     Defendant paid Police Dispatchers for 8 hours of time for each shift  worked, regardless of the actual time spent working.    During Plaintiff’s employment, while working for the Defendant, Plaintiff  was required to work overtime hours in excess of 40 hours worked during many seven- day workweeks.    Plaintiff often worked in excess of 40 hours per week during his  employment with the Defendant.    Defendant required Plaintiff and all others similarly situated to perform  work which routinely required them to work overtime hours as defined by 29 U.S.C. §  201 et seq., for which they failed to receive overtime compensation as required by the  Act.  VI.   Each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs is re- alleged as if fully written herein.    Plaintiff Christopher Coleman and all others similarly situated are  considered non-exempt employees under the statutory provisions of the Fair Labor  Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, et seq., as well as by the administrative regulations used to  interpret the Act.    Defendant has failed to make good faith efforts to comply with the FLSA,  and have willfully and deliberately sought to evade the requirements of the federal  statute.    Defendant  has  failed  to  maintain  a  complete,  accurate,  and  contemporaneous record of the number of hours worked per workweek by Plaintiff and  by all other similarly situated employees, as required by law.    The Defendant’s conduct was willful within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §  255(a).    No lawful exemption excused the Defendant from compensating Plaintiff  and all others similarly situated for hours worked, but not recorded or paid in a  workweek.    Defendant knowingly, willfully, or with reckless disregard carried out an  illegal pattern and practice of deceptive and fraudulent accounting practices regarding  compensation due to Plaintiff and to all others similarly situated for hours worked, but  not recorded or paid.    Plaintiff and all others similarly situated seek an amount of back-pay equal  to the unpaid compensation for hours worked, but not recorded or paid, from the date  they commenced employment for the Defendant until the date of trial.    Each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs is re- alleged as if fully written herein.    Plaintiff Christopher Coleman and all others similarly situated are  considered non-exempt employees under the statutory provisions of the Fair Labor  Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201, et seq., as well as by the administrative regulations used to  interpret the Act.    Plaintiff Christopher Coleman and all others similarly situated are entitled  to receive overtime pay for all hours they have worked in excess of 40 during each seven- day workweek.    Defendant failed to compensate Plaintiff and all others similarly situated,  their entitled pay (including overtime pay) for those hours they worked in excess of 40  per week.    Defendant has violated 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. by failing to compensate  the Plaintiff and all other similarly situated employees overtime pay for all hours worked  in excess of 40 hours per week.    Defendant has failed to make good faith efforts to comply with the FLSA,  and have willfully and deliberately sought to evade the requirements of the federal  statute.    The Defendant’s conduct was willful within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §  255(a).    No lawful exemption excused the Defendant from compensating Plaintiff  and all others similarly situated, overtime pay for hours worked over forty per week.    Defendant knowingly, willfully, or with reckless disregard carried out an  illegal pattern and practice of deceptive and fraudulent accounting practices regarding  overtime compensation due to Plaintiff and to all others similarly situated.    Plaintiff and all others similarly situated seek an amount of back-pay equal  to the unpaid overtime compensation from the date they commenced employment for the  Defendant until the date of trial.    Plaintiff and all others similarly situated further seek an additional equal  amount as liquidated damages, as well as reasonable attorney’s fees and costs as provided  by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), along with post-judgment interest at the highest rate allowed by  law.   Each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraph is re- alleged as if fully written herein.    Other employees have been victimized by this pattern, practice, and policy  of the Defendant that is in violation of the FLSA.    Thus, from personal knowledge, Plaintiff is aware that the illegal practices  and policies of Defendant has been imposed on other workers.    Accordingly, each Defendant’s pattern and practice of failing to pay the  overtime pay (at time and one-half) of employees as required by the FLSA results from  the Defendant’s general application of policies and practices, and does not depend on the  personal circumstances of the Plaintiff’s class.    Plaintiff Christopher Coleman’s experience is typical of the experience of  the Plaintiff’s class as it pertains to compensation.    The specific job titles or job requirements of the various members of the  class do not prevent collective treatment.    All employees, regardless of their job requirements or rates of pay, who  are denied overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 per week, are  similarly situated.    Although the issue of damages may be individual in character, there is no  detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts.    All current and former police dispatchers, who at any time during the three  years prior to the date of filing of this action to the date of judgment who were denied  overtime pay by Defendant for hours worked in excess of forty (40) in any given  workweek are properly included as members of the class.   Collective Action Allegations   Failure to compensate for “off-the-clock” work   Unpaid overtime compensation under the FLSA  ",lose,1
59176160,lose," In and around September 2020, via the telephone number 301-368-****, Marketpro  or a person acting at its direction or control sent the following generic text message to mobile  telephone subscribers:  Hi. I am with MarketPro Homebuyers, I am a local buyer in DC,  VA, MD. I’d like to speak with you about buying [property address]  for cash if you might be interested in selling? Reply STOP for opt- out.  The sender’s telephone number is associated with the area code for Rockville, Maryland, where  Marketpro maintains its headquarters. The next three digits of the sender’s telephone number, 368,  are associated with at least three other telephone numbers that are or have been used by Marketpro.    The generic reference to “DC, VA, MD” indicates that the text message was  indiscriminately sent to property owners, or suspected property owners, in Virginia and other  states.    In multiple statements by Marketpro to the Better Business Bureau, Marketpro  reported that it maintains a database of prospective sellers and targets them for solicitations. To  the extent Marketpro inserts property addresses into text messages, these addresses appear to have  been exported or populated using a database or similar automated application.    Marketpro’s text messages have several elements indicating the use of an automatic  telephone dialing system.  a.  The text messages are generic, and with the exception of the address of real  property, they have no personalized information about the recipient.  b.  The generic reference to “DC, VA, MD” indicates that the text message was  indiscriminately sent to property owners, or suspected property owners, in  multiple states and the District of Columbia.  c.  The procedure for “STOP” indicates an automated text messaging system  that processes replies without human involvement.    Several persons have complained to the Better Business Bureau about Marketpro  spamming them with unwelcome and unsolicited telephone calls. Others have posted complaints  on the Yelp website about Marketpro sending unwelcome, harassing text messages.    Through the Do Not Call Registry maintained by the FCC, consumers may register  their telephone numbers and express their unwillingness to receive unsolicited text messages.    Plaintiff Kevin Cavey subscribes to a wireless cellular telephone service and his  telephone number is ***-***-9273. Plaintiff registered this number with the Do Not Call Registry  in July 2003.    Plaintiff had no prior relationship with Marketpro. He has never given Marketpro  permission or consent to send him text messages for any reason.    By sending unwanted text message solicitations to Plaintiff and others, Marketpro  intrudes on their privacy and interferes with the regular use and enjoyment of their telephones.    Each Class is so numerous that joinder of individual plaintiffs is not practical. The  actual number of members in each Class is not precisely known, but each class is likely to number  in the hundreds or thousands. Marketpro is likely to have or control information making it feasible  to determine how many members are in each Class.    Plaintiff’s claims are typical of all Class members. When Marketpro engaged in  wrongdoing against Class members, that common course of misconduct resulted in substantially  similar harms to both Plaintiff and Class members.  a.  Like all members of the National and Virginia Robodialing Classes,  Plaintiff received texts from Marketpro, through an automated texting  application, and Plaintiff had not provided prior express consent to the texts.  b.  Like all members of the Virginia Do Not Call Registry Class, Plaintiff is a  natural person residing in Virginia, and a person with telephone assigned a  Virginia area code, who had a registered number on the Do Not Call  Registry and received one or more text-message solicitations from  Marketpro.   c.  Like all members of the Virginia Unidentified Sender Class, Plaintiff is a  natural person residing in Virginia, and a person with telephone assigned a  Virginia area code,  who received one or more text-message solicitations  from Marketpro, where the sender did not identify themselves by first and  last name.    Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Classes. Plaintiff  retained experienced counsel with the necessary expertise and resources to prosecute class action  litigation. Plaintiff and his counsel do not anticipate circumstances where Plaintiff’s interests  would be adverse to those of Class members.    Marketpro has acted on grounds that generally apply to the Classes such that final  injunctive relief is appropriate. Such grounds include injunctive relief to prevent Marketpro from  texting persons whose numbers are registered on the Do Not Call Registry and to forbid Marketpro  from sending text messages without its solicitors identifying themselves by first and last name.   Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in the prior paragraphs of this  Complaint.    The TCPA states that it is unlawful “to make any call (other than a call made for  emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any  automatic telephone dialing system … to any telephone number assigned to a … cellular  telephone.” 47 U.S.C. § 277(b)(1)(A)(iii).    Text messages constitute telephone calls for purposes of the TCPA. See, e.g.,  Federal Communications Commission, Public Notice, Text Message Senders Must Comply with  the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, DA 16-1299 (Nov. 18, 2016); see also Satterfield v.  Simon & Schuster, Inc., 569 F.3d 946, 954 (9th Cir. 2009).    As indicated by the generic content of text messages, the insertion of data through  databases or other automated systems, and the presence of automated opt-out features (by texting  “STOP” in reply), Marketpro used an automatic telephone dialing system to text Plaintiff and Class  members. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1); In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Telephone  Consumer Protection Act, 23 F.C.C.R. 559, 566 (2008).    Marketpro violated the TCPA by using an automatic telephone dialing system to  send texts to Plaintiff and other Class members without their prior written consent.    A person aggrieved by violations of the TCPA may bring action against the violator  for $500 in statutory damages. If the violations of the TCPA are willful or knowing, the damages  may be trebled. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C).    Because Marketpro ignored repeated complaints about unsolicited and harassing  text messages, Marketpro’s violations of the TCPA were willful.    Plaintiff and the Classes demand judgment against Marketpro for statutory  damages, treble damages, attorney fees and costs, and any other relief provided by law.   Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in the prior paragraphs of this  Complaint.    The VTPPA states, “No telephone solicitor shall initiate, or cause to be initiated, a  telephone call to a telephone number on the National Do Not Call Registry ….” Va. Stat. Ann.   Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in the prior paragraphs of this  Complaint.    Marketpro or telephone solicitors acting for its benefit made a call to Plaintiff and  other Class members by sending text messages to their wireless cellular telephones.    The text messages were sent for the purpose of offering or advertising Marketpro’s  services, and because the text messages were made for Marketpro’s benefit as the seller of such  services, they constituted telephone solicitation calls under the VTPPA.    When Marketpro or telephone solicitors acting for its benefit sent text messages to  Plaintiff and other Class members, the texts failed to identify the senders by their first and last  names.    Marketpro, as a telephone solicitor itself or jointly and severally through telephone  solicitors acting for its benefit, is liable for telephone solicitation calls that violate the VTPPA.    Because Marketpro ignored repeated complaints about unsolicited and harassing  text messages, Marketpro’s violations of the VTPPA were willful and each violation qualifies for  special damages up to $5,000.    Plaintiff and the Class demand judgment against Marketpro for statutory damages,  special damages, attorney fees and costs, and any other relief provided by law.  Violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act  Calls Using Automatic Telephone Dialing Systems  (Individually and on Behalf of the National and Virginia Robodialing Classes)   Violation of the Virginia Telephone Privacy Protection Act  Calls to Members of the Do Not Call Registry  (Individually and on Behalf of the Virginia Do Not Call Registry Class)   Violation of the Virginia Telephone Privacy Protection Act  Failure of Telephone Solicitors to Identify  (Individually and on behalf of the Virginia Unidentified Sender Class)  ",win,4
15007399,lose," EY is an accounting and consulting firm offering services to clients throughout  the world.    Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a non-exempt AML at all times relevant  hereto.    Plaintiff worked in this capacity from approximately September 2016 through  August 2017.    Plaintiff and those similarly situated to him, routinely worked in excess of forty  (40) hours per week as part of their regular job duties.    Despite working more than forty (40) hours per week, Defendant failed to pay  Plaintiff and those similarly situated to him, overtime compensation at a rate of time and a half  their regular rate of pay for hours worked over forty in a workweek.    Defendant has employed and is employing hundreds of other individuals as  AMLs who performed and continue to perform the same or similar job duties under the same pay  provision as Plaintiff and the class members companywide.    Defendant has violated Title 29 U.S.C. §207 and the NYLL from September 2016  and continuing to date, in that:  a.  Plaintiff worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week for the period of  employment with Defendant;  b.  No payments or provisions for payment, have been made by Defendant to  properly compensate Plaintiff at the statutory rate of one and one-half times hiss  regular rate for those hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per work week as  provided by the FLSA and the NYLL; and  c.  Defendant has failed to maintain proper time records as mandated by the FLSA  and the NYLL.    Plaintiff and the class members were all AMLs and performed the same or  similar job duties as one another in that they performed AML duties for Defendant and its clients  as part of its anti-money laundering advisory service function.     Defendant’s failure to compensate employees for hours worked in excess of 40  hours in a work week as required by the FLSA results from a policy or practice of failure to  assure that AMLs are/were paid for overtime hours worked based on their uniform pay policy,  applicable to all putative class members herein.    This policy or practice was applicable to Plaintiff and the class members.   Application of this policy or practice does/did not depend on the personal circumstances of  Plaintiff or those joining this lawsuit.  Rather, the same policy or practice which resulted in the  non-payment of overtime to Plaintiff applies to all class members.  Accordingly, the class  members are properly defined as:   All AMLs who worked for Defendant within the last three (3) years who  were not compensated at time-and-one-half for all hours worked in excess of  40 hours in one or more work weeks    Defendant knowingly, willfully, or with reckless disregard carried out its illegal  pattern or practice of failing to pay overtime compensation with respect to Plaintiff and the class  members.    Defendant did not act in good faith nor rely upon any of the following in  formulating its pay practices: (a) case law, (b) the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., (c)  Department of Labor Wage & Hour Opinion Letters or (d) the Code of Federal Regulations.    Defendant has acted willfully in failing to pay Plaintiff and the class members in  accordance with the law.    Defendant has failed to maintain accurate records of Plaintiff’s and the class  members’ work hours in accordance with the law.   Plaintiff sues on his own behalf and on behalf of a class of persons under Rules  23(a), (b)(2) and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.     Plaintiff brings his New York Labor Law claim on behalf of all persons who were  employed by Defendants at any time since February 2013, to the entry of judgment in this case  (the “Class Period”), who were non-exempt employees within the meaning of the New York  Labor Law and have not been paid for hours actually worked as well as overtime wages as  required in violation of the New York Labor Law (the “Class”).    The persons in the Class identified above are so numerous that joinder of all  members is impracticable.  Although the precise number of such persons is unknown, and the  facts on which the calculation of that number are presently within the sole control of the  Defendant, upon information and belief, there are thirty-five (35) or more members of the Class  during the Class Period.    The Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the  class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with  respect to the class as a whole.    This policy or practice was applicable to Plaintiff and the class members.   Application of this policy or practice does/did not depend on the personal circumstances of  Plaintiff or those joining this lawsuit.  Rather, the same policy or practice which resulted in the  non-payment of overtime to Plaintiff applies to all class members.  Accordingly, the class  members are properly defined as:   All AMLs who worked for Defendant within the last six (6) years who were  not compensated at time-and-one-half for all hours worked in excess of 40  hours in one or more work weeks.    Plaintiff is committed to pursuing this action and has retained competent counsel  experienced in employment law and class action litigation.    Plaintiff has the same interests in this matter as all other members of the class and  Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the Class.    Plaintiff realleges and reavers paragraphs 1 through 42 of the Complaint as if  fully set forth herein.    From at least September 2016 and continuing until August 2017, Plaintiff worked  in excess of the forty (40) hours per week for which Plaintiff was not compensated at the  statutory rate of one and one-half times Plaintiff’s regular rate of pay.    Plaintiff was, and is entitled to be paid at the statutory rate of one and one-half  times Plaintiff’s regular rate of pay for those hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours.    At all times material hereto, Defendant failed, and continues to fail, to maintain  proper time records as mandated by the FLSA.    Defendant has failed to properly disclose or apprise Plaintiff of Plaintiff’s rights  under the FLSA.    Due to the intentional, willful, and unlawful acts of Defendant, Plaintiff suffered  and continues to suffer damages and lost compensation for time worked over forty (40) hours per  week, plus liquidated damages.    Plaintiff is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to  29 U.S.C. §216(b).   Plaintiff realleges and reavers paragraphs 1 through 51 of the Complaint as if  fully set forth herein.    Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and the Class Members overtime wages to which  they are entitled under the NYLL and the supporting New York State Department of Labor  Regulations.    Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff and the Class Members one-and-one-half times  their regular rate of pay for all work in excess of forty hours per workweek.    Through their knowing or intentional failure to pay Plaintiff and the Class  Members overtime wages for hours worked in excess of forty hours per workweek, Defendant  has willfully violated the NYLL, Article 19, §§ 650 et seq., and the supporting New York State  Department of Labor Regulations.    Plaintiff realleges and reavers paragraphs 1 through 51 of the Complaint as if  fully set forth herein.    Defendant failed to supply Plaintiff and the Class Members with accurate  statements of wages as required under the NYLL, Article 6, § 195(3).    Specifically, Defendant failed to provide an accurate number of hours worked by  Plaintiff and the Class Members because Defendant failed to list the time Plaintiff and the Class  worked, their regular rate of pay, and/or their overtime rate of pay.    Through their knowing or intentional failure to provide Plaintiff and the Class  Members with the accurate wage statements required under the NYLL, Defendant has willfully  violated NYLL, Article 6, §§ 190 et seq., and the supporting New York State Department of  Labor Regulations.    Due to Defendant’s willful violations of NYLL, Article 6, § 195(3), Plaintiff and  the Class Members are entitled to statutory penalties, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and  injunctive relief and declaratory relief, as provided for by NYLL, Article 6, §198(1-d).  VIOLATION OF NEW YORK LABOR LAW  FAILURE TO PROVIDE ACCURATE WAGE STATEMENTS   VIOLATION OF 29 U.S.C. §207 OVERTIME COMPENSATION   VIOLATION OF NEW YORK LABOR LAW - UNPAID OVERTIME  ",win,2
6248631,lose," On or about August 7, 2012, Plaintiff withdrew funds from the ATM inside Brother’s  Deli, located at 41 Market Street, Lynn, Massachusetts (the “Brother’s ATM”).    At the time Plaintiff used the Brother’s ATM, it was owned and operated by Defendant.    At the time Plaintiff used the Brother’s ATM, a fee notice was inconspicuously posted  near the bottom of the machine, below the currency dispensing slot.  A true and correct copy of a  photograph of the Brother’s ATM is attached hereto as Exhibit A.    As shown in Exhibit A, the “Fee Notice” is placed in an inconspicuous location, at or  below knee level and out of eyesight of any person accessing the Brother’s ATM.    At the time Plaintiff used the Brother’s ATM, he was charged a service fee in the  amount of $2.75.  A true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s receipt from the Brother’s ATM is attached  hereto as Exhibit B.   Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of  Civil Procedure on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated.    The Class of consumers that Plaintiff seeks to protect is defined as:  All persons who within the one year period preceding the initiation of this  action were charged a transaction fee for use of the Brother’s ATM.  B.  Numerosity    Upon information and belief, since the date of Plaintiff’s transaction at the Brother’s  ATM, Defendant has not posted a conspicuous notice disclosing the amount of the service fee on the  outside of the Brother’s ATM.     The members of the Class are therefore believed to be so numerous that joinder of all  members is impractical.     Although the exact numbers and identities of class members are unknown at this time  and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff is informed and believes that there  are thousands of individuals throughout Massachusetts who have claims identical to Plaintiff’s.   Therefore, bringing the action as a class will fairly ensure the adequate representation of all who may  sue.  C.  Common Questions of Law and Fact    Plaintiff identifies the following questions of fact and law common to the Class which  predominate any questions affecting only individual Class members:  a) Whether Defendant was, at all relevant times during the class period, an ATM  operator who imposed a fee on consumers for providing host transfer services;   b) Whether the Brother’s ATM provided disclosure in a prominent and  conspicuous location that the ATM transaction was subject to the imposition of  a specified fee; and  c) Whether Defendant imposed fees on consumers without notice.     Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members since each of the  claims arises from the use of an ATM owned and operated by Defendant in their regular course of  business.  E.  Protecting the Interests of the Class Members     Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the Class members, all of whom are  victims of Defendant’s unlawful and wrongful conduct.     All of the Class members’ claims arise from substantially the same course of conduct  and specific activities complained of herein and require application of identical legal principles.     Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in bringing class actions and consumer class  claims and who stands ready, willing and able to represent the Class and advance the costs of this  litigation.  F.  Proceeding via Class Action is Superior and Advisable     A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient  adjudication of this controversy.     Absent a class action, most members of the Class would find the cost of litigating their  claims to be prohibitive, and therefore would have no effective remedy at law.    The class treatment of common questions of law and fact is also superior to multiple  individual actions or piecemeal litigation in that it conserves the resources of the court and the litigants  and promotes consistency and efficiency of adjudication.     The amount of money at issue is such that proceeding by way of a class action is the  only economical and sensible manner in which to vindicate Plaintiff and the other members of the  Class.   Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and incorporates  them herein by reference.    15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(A) provides that any ATM operator who imposes a fee on any  consumer for providing host transfer services must provide a notice stating:  (i)  The fact that a fee is imposed by such operator for providing  the service; and  (ii)  The amount of any such fee.    The notice required by 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(A) must “be posted in a prominent and  conspicuous location on or at the automated teller machine at which the electronic fund transfer is  initiated by the consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(B)(i).     In addition, 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(d)(3)(c) provides:  No fee may be imposed by any automated teller machine operator in  connection with any electronic fund transfer initiated by a consumer for  which a notice is required under subparagraph (A), unless:  (i)  The consumer receives such notice in accordance with  subparagraph (B); and  (ii)  The consumer elects to continue in the manner necessary to effect the  transaction after receiving such notice.    12 C.F.R. 205.16(c) further provides:  An automated teller machine operator must comply with the  following:  (1) Post the notice required by paragraph (b)(1) of this section in a  prominent and conspicuous location on or at the automated teller  machine    In addition, 12 C.F.R. 205.16(e) states:  An automated teller machine operator may impose a fee on a  consumer for initiating an electronic fund transfer of a balance  inquiry only if:  (1) The consumer is provided the notices required under paragraph  (c) of this section; and  (2) The consumer elects to continue the transaction or inquiry after  receiving such notices.    Defendant is an automated teller machine operator who provided host transfer services  at all times relevant to this action.    Defendant failed to comply with the EFTA in connection with providing such services  to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class as the notice on the Brother’s ATM was in neither a  prominent nor conspicuous location.    Plaintiff and the other members of the Class have suffered damages as a result of  Defendant’s violations of the EFTA in that they were charged a fee that was not properly disclosed.    Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1693m, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff and the other members  of the Class for the amount of actual damages incurred, as well as for statutory damages, reasonable  attorney’s fees and the costs of this action.  A.  The Class   Violation of the EFTA, 15 U.S.C. § 1693, et seq.,  (On Behalf of All Class Members)  ",win,3
5849049,win," Cory is in the business of providing the delivery of appliances, furniture, and other  merchandise to its customers.  Cory provides delivery services throughout the United States, and  in Illinois specifically, for companies such as Bob’s Discount Furniture, Ethan Allen, Rooms to  Go, Crate & Barrel, Carson Pirie Scott, and Wayfair.com.  In order to carry out this central  function, Cory purports to contract with individuals, such as Plaintiffs, to drive a delivery truck  and to deliver merchandise to customers’ homes.    Cory provides delivery services in Illinois from various warehouses at which  Cory’s employees oversee and manage Defendant’s deliveries.     Plaintiffs and other delivery drivers performed delivery services for Cory. In  order to receive such work, Cory required its delivery drivers to sign an agreement drafted by  Cory, which stated that they were independent contractors.    Plaintiffs worked full-time for Cory, often working six to seven days per week and  12 to 16 hours per day making deliveries for Cory.  Though Plaintiffs and other class members  routinely worked more than 40 hours per week for Cory, they did not receive an overtime premium  for those hours worked over forty in a workweek.    Plaintiffs, as well as the other class plaintiffs, performed work which is in the  usual course of business of Cory – i.e., they performed delivery services and Cory is engaged in  the business of providing delivery services to its customers.    Cory deducted certain expenses directly from Plaintiffs’ and the other class  plaintiffs’ checks, including deductions for insurance, any related insurance claims, truck rentals,  and uniforms.    Cory required Plaintiffs and other class members to provide a safety deposit to  Cory at the outset of their work relationship.  Cory did not return the safety deposit to Plaintiffs  upon their contracts terminating.    When Cory determined that a delivery had been made in a manner it deemed to  be unsatisfactory (e.g., damaged goods, damage to customer property), Cory would deduct the  costs of such damage from Plaintiffs’ and the proposed class members’ pay checks.  Plaintiffs and  the proposed class could not appeal such deductions.    Cory did not get Plaintiffs’ and other class members’ freely given express written  consent at the time it made deductions from their pay.    The deductions taken by Cory per paycheck were not for a uniform amount, but  rather varied with each paycheck.     Cory compelled Plaintiffs and other class members to incur certain other expenses  that would normally be borne by an employer, such as for workers’ compensation or similar  insurance coverage.   The Illinois Class and the Nationwide Class are together referred to as the “Class.”   Plaintiffs reserve the right to redefine the Class prior to class certification, or thereafter, as  necessary.    The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members of the  Class is impracticable.  Plaintiffs believe that the Class numbers exceed forty (40) members.    Common issues of law and fact predominate the claims of the entire Class.  Specifically, all claims are predicated on a finding that Cory misclassified its drivers as  independent contractors when they were in fact employees. In short, the claims of the named  Plaintiffs are identical to the claims of the class members.    The named Plaintiffs are adequate representative of the class because all potential  plaintiffs were subject to Cory’s uniform practices and policies. Further, Plaintiffs and the Class  have suffered the same type of economic damages as a result of Cory’s practices and policies.    Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class.  Plaintiffs’ counsel is competent and experienced in litigating large wage and hour class and  collective actions.    Plaintiffs incorporate Paragraphs 1- 31 herein.    At all relevant times, Plaintiffs and the Illinois Class were “employees” of Cory  as defined by the IWPCA.    At all relevant times, Cory was an employer of Plaintiffs and the Illinois Class as  defined by the IWPCA.    The IWPCA, 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 115/9, prohibits employers from making  deductions from employees’ wages.    Cory violated the IWPCA, 820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 115/9, by making unlawful  deductions from Plaintiffs and the Illinois Class’ wages.    Plaintiffs, individually and on behalf of the Illinois Class, seek all reimbursement  for all unlawful deductions taken by Cory from Plaintiffs’ and the Illinois Class’ wages.  Count II  New Jersey Wage Payment Law (N.J. Stat. §§ 34:11-4.2, 24:11-4.4)  (Class Action on behalf of the Nationwide Class)  (In the alternative to Count I)    Plaintiffs incorporate Paragraphs 1- 31 herein.    As employees of Cory, Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Class are  entitled to the protections of the New Jersey Wage Payment Law (“NJWPL”).    The NJWPL requires that Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Class receive  all wages owed.  See N.J. Stat. § 34:11-4.2.    As set forth herein, Cory has misclassified Plaintiffs and members of the  Nationwide Class as independent contractors when they are actually employees under the NJWPL,  who are entitled to the protection and benefits of these laws.    Cory violated the NJWPL by failing to pay Plaintiffs and members of the  Nationwide Class all their wages due, and subjecting them to wage deductions and withholdings  that are not specifically permitted by the NJWPL, including deductions for workers’  compensation, equipment rental, insurances, and other business costs of Cory.    Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Class are entitled to damages in an  amount to be proved at trial.  Count III  New Jersey Wage and Hour Law (N.J. Stat. §§ 34:11-56a(4))  (Class Action on behalf of the Nationwide Class)    Plaintiffs incorporate Paragraphs 1- 31 herein.    Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Class are employees entitled to the  protections of the New Jersey Wage and Hour Law (“NJWHL”).    Cory is an employee covered by the NJWHL.    The NJWHL provides that employees who work over 40 hours in a workweek  shall receive “1 ½ times such employee’s regular hourly wage for each hour of working time in  excess of 40 hours in any week.”  N.J. Stat. § 34.11-56a4.    Plaintiffs and members of the Nationwide Class routinely worked in excess of 40  hours per week without any overtime compensation.    Cory fails to accurately track all hours that Plaintiffs and members of the  Nationwide Class work.    Plaintiffs incorporate Paragraphs 1-31 herein.    As a result of Cory’s mischaracterizing of Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Class as  “independent contractors,”  Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Class were forced to pay substantial  sums of money for work-related expenses, including but not limited to costs associated with the  purchase of worker’s compensation or similar insurance.      Further, by mischaracterizing Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Class as “independent  contractors” Cory evades its own employment-related obligations, such as providing workers’  compensation coverageby illegally shifting these costs to Plaintiffs and the Nationwide Class.    By misclassifying their employees as “independent contractors,” and by requiring  those employees to pay its expenses, Cory has been unjustly enriched.  Prayer for Relief  WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request that the Court enter the following relief:  A.  Certification of this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.  P. 23(b)(3);  B.  Restitution for all deductions taken from Plaintiffs and the Class’  pay and all other appropriate compensatory relief;  C.  Prejudgment interest on the unpaid wages in accordance with, 815  Ill. Comp. Stat. 205/2;  D.  Statutory damages pursuant to the formula set forth in the IWPCA,  820 Ill. Comp. Stat. 115/14(a);  E.  Reasonable Attorney’s fees, costs, and interest;  F.  Any other relief to which Plaintiff and the Class members may be  entitled. ",win,4
4275122,win,"(Against All Defendants For Violations of   Section 10(b) And Rule 10b-5 Promulgated Thereunder)   (Violations of Section 20(a) of the  Exchange Act Against The Individual Defendants)   Aveo is a biopharmaceutical company focused on discovering, developing, and  commercializing cancer therapeutics.  The Company’s lead product candidate is an oral inhibitor  of the vascular endothelial growth factor (“VEGF”) receptors.  One of the Company’s principal  products is Tivopath or tivozanib, marketed by the Company for the treatment of advanced  kidney cancer.  Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil  Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) on behalf of a Class, consisting of all those who purchased or  otherwise acquired Aveo securities during the Class Period (the “Class”); and were damaged  thereby.  Excluded from the Class are defendants herein, the officers and directors of the  Company, at all relevant times, members of their immediate families and their legal  representatives, heirs, successors or assigns and any entity in which defendants have or had a  controlling interest.   Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class as all  members of the Class are similarly affected by defendants’ wrongful conduct in violation of  federal law that is complained of herein.   Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the members of the Class  and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and securities litigation.  Plaintiff  has no interests antagonistic to or in conflict with those of the Class.   A class action is superior to all other available methods for the fair and efficient  adjudication of this controversy since joinder of all members is impracticable.  Furthermore, as  the damages suffered by individual Class members may be relatively small, the expense and  burden of individual litigation make it impossible for members of the Class to individually  redress the wrongs done to them.  There will be no difficulty in the management of this action as  a class action.   Plaintiff will rely, in part, upon the presumption of reliance established by the  fraud-on-the-market doctrine in that:  • defendants made public misrepresentations or failed to disclose material facts during  the Class Period;  • the omissions and misrepresentations were material;  • Aveo securities are traded in efficient markets;  • the Company’s shares were liquid and traded with moderate to heavy volume during  the Class Period;  • the Company traded on the NASDAQ, and was covered by multiple analysts;  • the misrepresentations and omissions alleged would tend to induce a reasonable  investor to misjudge the value of the Company’s securities; and  • Plaintiff and members of the Class purchased and/or sold Aveo securities between the  time the defendants failed to disclose or misrepresented material facts and the time  the true facts were disclosed, without knowledge of the omitted or misrepresented  facts.   Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if fully  set forth herein.   This Count is asserted against defendants and is based upon Section 10(b) of the  Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder by the SEC.   Pursuant to the above plan, scheme, conspiracy and course of conduct, each of the  defendants participated directly or indirectly in the preparation and/or issuance of the quarterly  and annual reports, SEC filings, press releases and other statements and documents described  above, including statements made to securities analysts and the media that were designed to  influence the market for Aveo securities and options.  Such reports, filings, releases and  statements were materially false and misleading in that they failed to disclose material adverse  information and misrepresented the truth about Aveo’s finances and business prospects.   Information showing that defendants acted knowingly or with reckless disregard for  the truth is peculiarly within defendants’ knowledge and control.  As the senior managers and/or  directors of Aveo, the Individual Defendants had knowledge of the details of Aveo’s internal  affairs.   The Individual Defendants are liable both directly and indirectly for the wrongs  complained of herein.  Because of their positions of control and authority, the Individual  Defendants were able to and did, directly or indirectly, control the content of the statements of  Aveo.  As officers and/or directors of a publicly-held company, the Individual Defendants had a  duty to disseminate timely, accurate, and truthful information with respect to Aveo’s businesses,  operations, future financial condition and future prospects.  As a result of the dissemination of  the aforementioned false and misleading reports, releases and public statements, the market price  of Aveo securities was artificially inflated throughout the Class Period.  In ignorance of the  adverse facts concerning Aveo’s business and financial condition which were concealed by  defendants, Plaintiff and the other members of the Class purchased Aveo securities at artificially  inflated prices and relied upon the price of the securities, the integrity of the market for the  securities and/or upon statements disseminated by defendants, and were damaged thereby.   By reason of the conduct alleged herein, defendants knowingly or recklessly,  directly or indirectly, have violated Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5  promulgated thereunder.   As a direct and proximate result of defendants’ wrongful conduct, Plaintiff and the  other members of the Class suffered damages in connection with their respective purchases and  sales of the Company’s securities during the Class Period, upon the disclosure that the Company  had disseminated false financial statements to the investing public related to its prospects for  FDA approval.    Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained in the foregoing  paragraphs as if fully set forth herein.   As officers and/or directors of a publicly owned company, the Individual  Defendants had a duty to disseminate accurate and truthful information with respect to Aveo’s  financial condition and results of operations, and to correct promptly any public statements  issued by Aveo which had become materially false or misleading.   Because of their positions of control and authority as senior officers, the Individual  Defendants were able to, and did, control the contents of the various reports, press releases and  public filings which Aveo disseminated in the marketplace during the Class Period concerning  Aveo’s financial prospects.  Throughout the Class Period, the Individual Defendants exercised  their power and authority to cause Aveo to engage in the wrongful acts complained of herein.  The Individual Defendants therefore, were “controlling persons” of Aveo within the meaning of  Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.  In this capacity, they participated in the unlawful conduct  alleged which artificially inflated the market price of Aveo securities.     Each of the Individual Defendants, therefore, acted as a controlling person of Aveo.   By reason of their senior management positions and/or being directors of Aveo, each of the  Individual Defendants had the power to direct the actions of, and exercised the same to cause,  Aveo to engage in the unlawful acts and conduct complained of herein.  Each of the Individual  Defendants exercised control over the general operations of Aveo and possessed the power to  control the specific activities which comprise the primary violations about which Plaintiff and  the other members of the Class complain.   BACKGROUND  ",lose,3
6827835,lose," Defendant manufactures, labels, markets, promotes, advertises, and sells  Barlean’s Greens Products.      Defendant markets and labels the Products with the Representations  described herein.  The following images depict the Products and the uniform, material  Representations made on the Products:    B.  Defendant’s Failure to Include the Proposition 65 Warning Is A   Material Misrepresentation and Omission    Absent from the label of the Products is any disclosure that the Products  contain lead and a “clear and reasonable warning” pursuant to California’s Proposition  65, that the Products exceed the .5 mcg/day allowable limit for lead.    Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained  in the preceding paragraphs of this complaint, as though fully set forth herein.    Defendant’s conduct constitutes an unfair business act and practice  pursuant to California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. (the “UCL”).   The UCL provides, in pertinent part: “Unfair competition shall mean and include  unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practices and unfair, deceptive, untrue or  misleading advertising . . . .”     Plaintiff brings this claim seeking equitable and injunctive relief to stop  Defendant’s misconduct, as complained of herein, and to seek restitution of the  amounts Defendant acquired through the unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent business  practices described herein.     Defendant’s knowing conduct, as alleged herein, constitutes an “unfair”  and/or “fraudulent” business practice, as set forth in California Business & Professions  Code §§ 17200-17208.      Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained  in the preceding paragraphs of this complaint, as though fully set forth herein.    California Business & Professions Code § 17500 prohibits “unfair,  deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising . . . .”    Defendant violated § 17500 when it represented, through its false and  misleading Representations and omissions, that Defendant’s Products possessed  characteristics and value that they did not actually have.  Among other things,  Defendant made Structure/Function Representations and omissions, which do not  comply with the DSHEA requirements, as described herein.  In addition, Defendant  failed to include the required Proposition 65 warning and to disclose that the Products  exceeded the allowable lead limits.     Defendant’s deceptive practices were specifically designed to induce  reasonable consumers like Plaintiff to purchase the Products.  Defendant’s uniform,  material misrepresentations and omissions regarding the Products were likely to  deceive, and Defendant knew or should have known that its uniform  misrepresentations and omissions were untrue and/or misleading.  Plaintiff purchased  the Products in reliance on the Representations made by Defendant, as alleged herein.     Plaintiff and members of the California Subclass have been directly and  proximately injured by Defendant’s conduct in ways including, but not limited to, the  monies paid to Defendant for the Products, interest lost on those monies, and  consumers’ unwitting support of a business enterprise that promotes deception and  undue greed to the detriment of consumers, such as Plaintiff and Subclass members.     The above acts of Defendant were and are likely to deceive reasonable  consumers in violation of § 17500.     Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained  in the preceding paragraphs of this complaint, as though fully set forth herein.    Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to California’s Consumer Legal  Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, et seq.    The CLRA provides that “unfair methods of competition and unfair or  deceptive acts or practices undertaken by any person in a transaction intended to result  or which results in the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer are  unlawful.”      The Products are “goods,” as defined by the CLRA in California Civil  Code §1761(a).    Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporate by reference the allegations contained  in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint, as though fully set forth herein.    By advertising and selling the Products at issue, Defendant made promises  and affirmations of fact on the Products’ packaging, and through its marketing and  advertising, as described herein.  This labeling and advertising constitutes express  warranties and became part of the basis of the bargain between Plaintiff and members  of the Class, and Defendant.   A.  Defendant Manufactures, Labels and Advertises the Products    Breach of Express Warranty  (for the Nationwide Class and California Subclass)   Consumer Legal Remedies Act  (Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, et seq.)  (for the California Subclass)   Deceptive Advertising Practices  (California Business & Professions Code §§ 17500, et seq.)  (for the California Subclass)   QUASI-CONTRACT  (for the Nationwide Class and California Subclass)  104. Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the allegations of the preceding paragraphs  as if fully set forth herein.  105. By purchasing the Products, Plaintiff and members of the Class conferred  a benefit on Defendant in the form of the purchase price of the Products.  106. Defendant had knowledge of such benefits.  107. Defendant appreciated the benefit because, were consumers not to  purchase the Products, Defendant would not generate revenue from the sales of the  Products.  108. Defendant’s acceptance and retention of the benefit is inequitable and  unjust because the benefit was obtained by Defendant’s fraudulent and misleading  representations and omissions.  109. Equity cannot in good conscience permit Defendant to be economically  enriched for such actions at the expense of Plaintiff and members of the Class, and  therefore restitution and/or disgorgement of such economic enrichment is required  Unfair and Unlawful Business Acts and Practices  (Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq.)  (for the California Subclass)  ",lose,2
18686970,win," On or about November 16, 2020, Defendant made a call to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone  number ending in 7799 (the “7799 Number”) using a prerecorded voice.    When Plaintiff listened to the voicemail, he was easily able to determine that it was  a prerecorded message. See Rahn v. Bank of Am., No. 1:15-CV-4485-ODE-JSA, 2016 U.S. Dist.  LEXIS 186171, at *10-11 (N.D. Ga. June 23, 2016) (“When one receives a call, it is a clear-cut  fact, easily discernible to any lay person, whether or not the recipient is speaking to a live human  being, or is instead being subjected to a prerecorded message.”).    Defendant’s prerecorded call constitutes telemarketing because it encourages the  future purchase or investment in property, goods, and/or services.    The prerecorded call Plaintiff received originated from (417-366-9171) a telephone  number owned and/or operated by Defendant.    Plaintiff received the subject call with a prerecorded voice within this judicial  district and, therefore, Defendant’s violation of the TCPA occurred within this district. Upon  information and belief, Defendant caused other prerecorded messages to be sent to individuals  residing within this judicial district.    At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with his express consent to be  contacted with a prerecorded call.    Plaintiff is the subscriber and/or sole user of the 7799 Number.    Defendant’s unsolicited prerecorded call caused Plaintiff actual harm, including  invasion of his privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion.  Defendant’s prerecorded call also inconvenienced Plaintiff.     Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of  himself and all others similarly situated.    Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of a Class defined as follows:  All persons within the United States who, within the four years prior to the  filing of this Complaint, received a prerecorded voice call on their  telephone from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s behalf, promoting  and/or advertising Defendant’s goods and/or services    Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not  know the number of members in the Class, but believes the Class members number in the several  thousands, if not more.   The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s  claim that Defendant routinely transmit prerecorded messages to telephone numbers assigned to  telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of  being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case.   Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth  herein.     Defendant transmitted calls using an artificial or prerecorded voice to the telephone  numbers of Plaintiff and members of the putative class without their prior express written consent.     These calls were made without regard to whether Defendant had first obtained  express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior  express written consent to call the telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative  Class when its calls were made.     Defendant has, therefore, violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) and § 227(b)(1)(B) of the  TCPA by using an artificial or prerecorded voice to make non-emergency telephone calls to the  telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express  consent.     Defendant knew that it did not have prior express written consent to make these  calls, and knew or should have known that it was using an artificial or prerecorded voice. The  violations were therefore willful or knowing.     As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA,  Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a  minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an  injunction against future calls. Id.     Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the allegations of paragraphs 1-43 as if fully  set forth herein.    It is a violation of the TCPA regulations promulgated by the FCC to “initiate any  telephone call…using an…artificial or prerecorded voice…To any telephone number assigned to a  paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common  carrier service, or any service for which the called party is charged for the call.”  47 C.F.R. §    Defendant transmitted calls using an artificial or prerecorded voice to the telephone  numbers of Plaintiff and members of the putative class without their prior express written consent.     These calls were made without regard to whether Defendant had first obtained  express permission from the called party to make such calls. In fact, Defendant did not have prior  express written consent to call the telephones of Plaintiff and the other members of the putative  Class when its calls were made.     Defendant has, therefore, violated § 64.1200(a)(1)(iii) and § 64.1200(a)(3) by using  an artificial or prerecorded voice to make non-emergency telephone calls to the telephones of  Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class without their prior express consent.     Defendant knew that it did not have prior express written consent to make these  calls, and knew or should have known that it was using an artificial or prerecorded voice. The  violations were therefore willful or knowing.     As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA,  Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a  minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an  injunction against future calls. Id.    200(a)(1)(iii).    PROPOSED CLASS   Violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)  (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)   Violations of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200  (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)  ",win,2
6170293,lose," Plaintiff pays for and maintains a cellular telephone number ending in 3436.    Beginning in January 2013, Defendants began placing calls to Plaintiff's cellular  telephone number, sometimes multiple times per day.    During at least some of these calls, Defendants left a voice message for Plaintiff  using artificial or prerecorded voice.    Other than Defendants' calls, Plaintiff has had no contact with Defendants.      Plaintiff never solicited Defendants' calls and never otherwise gave Defendants  express permission to call.    Plaintiff has tried repeatedly to make Defendants stop these incessant calls.    On four separate occasions in 2013 - February 28, March 1, March 4, and March  5 - Plaintiff called Defendants to request that the calls stop.    On each occasion, Defendants assured Plaintiff that her number would no longer  be called.    Defendants have called Plaintiff at least thirty-six (36) times since she last  requested that Defendants cease calling her.    Defendants' calls for Plaintiff were placed from Defendants' automatic telephone  dialing system, as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1), from the phone number that is registered to  Defendants.       Specifically, Defendants' dialing system has the capacity to store, dial, and  generate phone numbers such as Plaintiff's.     Defendants' calls were made to Plaintiff's cellular phone and she was charged for  those phone calls.    Plaintiff never provided express consent for Defendants to place calls to her  cellular phone with Defendants' automatic telephone dialing system or to call her using an using  an artificial or prerecorded voice.     Defendants' conduct has caused Plaintiff to incur actual damages including but  not limited to cellular phone charges, anxiety, sleeplessness, and worry and she was forced to  tend to unwanted calls.   Plaintiff incorporates all previous paragraphs of this Complaint.    It is a violation of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii), to call a person's  cellular telephone using an automatic telephone dialing system.      Defendants called plaintiff and others on their cellular telephones using an  automatic telephone dialing system.    Defendants called plaintiff and others on their cellular telephones using an using  an artificial or prerecorded voice.    Plaintiff and the class are entitled to have their rights, status and legal relations  under the TCPA relating to defendant's calling of cell phones using an automatic dialing system.    The Defendants’ calls were negligent, or alternatively, as evidenced by  Defendants’ refusal to comply with Plaintiff’s requests to cease calling, they were willful.  47  U.S.C. §312(f)(1).   Class Allegations    Plaintiff brings Count I on behalf of a class, which consists of:  All persons nationwide who AHB, Homeland or some person on their behalf called on  their cell phone using a device that has the capacity to dial numbers without human  intervention, where the recipient of the call did not give either defendant the phone  number for purposes such calls, where any call was made on or after a date four years  before the filing of this complaint.     The class is sufficiently numerous to make joinder impracticable. The only use for  automatic dialing equipment is to make a high volume of telephone calls in a short period of  time.     Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the class and  predominate over any questions solely affecting any individual member of the class, including  plaintiff. Such questions common to the Class include, but are not limited to:   a.  Whether defendants used an automatic telephone dialing system as that  term us defined in the TCPA and applicable FCC regulations and orders; and  b.  Damages, including whether the violation was willful.     Class action treatment is superior to the alternatives for the fair and efficient  adjudication of the controversy alleged herein. Such treatment will permit a large number of  similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously,  efficiently, and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions  would entail.     No difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action  that would preclude its maintenance as a class action, and no superior alternative exists for the  fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy.      Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby  making relief appropriate with respect to the class as a whole.  Prosecution of separate actions by  individual members of the class, should they realize their rights have been violated, would likely  create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the  class that would establish incompatible standards of conduct.     The identity of the class is likely readily identifiable from defendant's records.    Plaintiff incorporates all previous paragraphs of this complaint.    It is a violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d) to have insufficient procedures in place  to ensure requests that calls cease are honored.    It is a violation of the TCPA, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d)(3) to call a residential or  cellular telephone for telemarketing purposes, if the consumer has requested that calls cease.     A private right of action attaches when more than two such calls are made within  a twelve month period. 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5).    Defendants called Plaintiff and others more than once within a 12 month period  on her residential and cellular telephone for telemarketing purposes, without having sufficient  procedures in place to avoid calling persons who previously requested that calls cease. 47 C.F.R.  § 64.1200(d).     Alternatively, Defendants had no procedures at all.     Plaintiff brings Count II on behalf of a class, which consists of:  All persons nationwide who AHB, Homeland or some person on their behalf called on  their residential or cell phone for the purpose of selling goods or services, where  defendants had in place the same or similar company specific do not call policy, practice  or procedure (or lack thereof) as when plaintiff was called, where the phone number was  called more than twice in a 12 month period.   Plaintiff alleges a subclass of persons who were called more than twice after they  had requested that calls cease.     The class is sufficiently numerous to make joinder impracticable. The only use for  automatic dialing equipment is to make a high volume of telephone calls in a short period of  time.     Common questions of law and fact exist as to all members of the class and  predominate over any questions solely affecting any individual member of the class, including  plaintiff. Such questions common to the Class include, but are not limited to:   c.  Whether Defendants’ company specific do not call policies, practices and  procedures complied with the TCPA, including 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d); and  d.  Damages, including whether the violation was willful.     Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.  Plaintiff has  no interests that might conflict with the interests of the class. Plaintiff is interested in pursuing  his claims vigorously, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and complex  litigation.      No difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this class action  that would preclude its maintenance as a class action, and no superior alternative exists for the  fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy.      Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby  making relief appropriate with respect to the class as a whole.  Prosecution of separate actions by  individual members of the class, should they realize their rights have been violated, would likely  create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the  class that would establish incompatible standards of conduct.     The identity of the class is likely readily identifiable from Defendant's records.  ",lose,3
16506813,win,"action for all unpaid overtime pay, 100% liquidated damages, and attorneys fees and costs arising out of the Plaintiffs' claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act; Finds that NPS is liable to the Plaintiff and all members of the proposed Rule 23  Upon information and belief Guzman, who was classified and paid by NPS as an hourly employee, would frequently during the past two years receive shift differential pay equal to 15 minutes of straight time pay for each workday, in which she worked in whole or in part on a shift different than her primary shift.  At all of its facilities in Wisconsin, NPS made attendance bonus pay available to each of its hourly employees.  The attendance bonus pay, which was promised to induce the employees to improve their attendance, became mandatory when the employees met the required defined standards to qualify for the bonuses. 1 3 . During at least a portion of the time period that she worked for NPS within the last two years, Guzman received attendance bonus pay from NPS.  Like all machine operators employed by NPS at any of its facilities, at all times during the last two years Guzman was eligible for receiving bonus payments for exceeding the defined hourly standard for her classification and machine. The production bonuses, which were promised by NPS to induce its machine  operators to improve the speed of their work, became mandatory when the machine operators exceeded the defined standard for their classifications and machines. During the past two years, and while working as a machine operator, Guzman  Based on online job advertisements posted by NPS, at NPS' Green Bay Facilities its hourly employees also frequently worked overtime by working, for example, four 12 hour shifts during some workweeks. During workweeks that Guzman received shift differential pay, or earned a  production bonus, or formed a portion ofthe time period for which Guzman received an attendance bonus for her good attendance during the time period, Guzman still received overtime pay equal to no more than 1 .5 times her base hourly wage rate.  2 1 . Plaintiff brings her First Claim for Relief, pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, on her own behalf and on behalf of all other similarly situated NPS hourly employees whose shift differential pay and/or attendance bonuses were not included by NPS when computing their regular rate for overtime pay.  classes for all unpaid straight time and overtime wages that they are owed under Wisconsin law, plus 50% increased damages on all unpaid wages, plus their attorneys fees and costs arising out of the Plaintiffs' claims under Wisconsin law; Grants to the Plaintiff such other and further relief as the Court deems just and  NPS thus applied to Guzman, just like it applied to each of its hourly employees at its Green Bay and Cudahy facilities, its uniform policy of excluding shift differential pay, production bonuses, and attendance bonuses when computing their regular rate for overtime pay. maintained as an ""opt-in"" collective action pursuant to Section 16(b) of FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §2 16(b), for prospective members of the FLSA Class that are similarly situated to Plaintiff and have claims similar to her first claim for relief.  The claims of the Named Plaintiffs are representative of the claims of members of the FLSA Class in that all members of the class were hourly paid employees of NPS who received shift differential pay, attendance bonuses, and/or production bonuses, and were subject to NPS' uniform policy of computing overtime pay as time and a half the employees' base rate of pay, so that shift differential pay, attendance bonuses, and production bonuses were excluded from the computation of the regular rate used to compute their overtime pay. Plaintiff seeks to represent a class of all employees of NPS who fall within any of the following two subclasses pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: All hourly paid employees of NPS who, during the time period on or after November 22, 2017 received some shift differential pay or attendance bonus pay from NPS, and could have been scheduled to work more than 40 hours per week; All hourly paid machine operators of NPS who, during the time period on or after November 22, 201 7 received some production bonus pay from NPS and could have been scheduled to work more than 40 hours per week. The persons in the class identified above are so numerous that joinder of all  There are questions of law and fact common to the Wisconsin Unpaid Wage Class (Rule 23 Class) that predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the class, including, but not limited to: (a). Whether the Plaintiffs' shift differentials were paid for the perceived inconvenience of working on a different shift, rather than because they performed different kinds of work on different shifts; (b). Whether the attendance and production bonuses were announced in advance to encourage NPS employees to improve their work performance; Whether fact and/or payment of the attendance and production bonuses were guaranteed once the employees met the program eligibility requirements that were announced to the employees long before the payment of the bonuses; (c)- (d). How the employees' overtime pay should be computed after incorporating the attendance, production, and shift differential pay into their regular rates; (e). The employees' eligibility for liquidated damages, attorneys' fees and costs for the underpayments of overtime pay that they have experienced.  Plaintiffs claims are typical of those of the Rule 23 class in that she just like members of both of the proposed subclasses received attendance, production, and shift differential pay from NPS, but always had her overtime pay computed as time and a half her base wage rate, so that the attendance, production, and shift differential pay were never included in computing her overtime pay.  Named Plaintiffwill fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Rule 23 class; and have retained counsel experienced in complex wage and hour litigation. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient  paragraphs 1- 30 of the Complaint.  NPS cannot utilize the exemption method outlined in §207(g)(2) of the FLSA to compute the Plaintiffs overtime pay when the Plaintiffs received different pay rates for performing the same work on different shifts, rather than for performing different kinds of work on different shifts.  Shift differential pay paid to the Plaintiff for the inconvenience of working on a less desirable shift constitutes remuneration for employment that must be included in the computation of the Plaintiffs regular rate under §207(e) of the FLSA.  Plaintiff therefore is entitled to receive overtime pay computed using her regular rate, with shift differential pay included in computing her regular rate. Production bonuses and attendance bonuses received by the Plaintiff must be  Alternatively, the production bonuses and attendance bonuses must be included in the regular rate when they were announced to employees by NPS in order to induce the employees to improve their work performance and attendance. NPS therefore violated the FLSA by failing to use the regular rate, computed  including the shift differential pay, production bonuses, and pro-rata portion of attendance bonuses the Plaintiff earned during each workweek, to compute the Plaintiffs overtime pay for each week.  NPS either knew or should have known that its method of computing the Plaintiffs overtime pay violated the FLSA, so that Plaintiff is entitled to recover, in addition to all overtime wages owed to her, an equal amount as liquidated damages; plus the application of a three years statute of limitations.  Plaintiff is entitled to recover from NPS her reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in bringing this count of the Complaint. Count II. Claim for Straight Time and Overtime Pay Under Wisconsin Law. Plaintiff re-allege, and incorporate by reference, the allegations contained in  paragraphs 1- 39 of the Complaint. Because Wisconsin law uses the same concept of the ""regular rate"" as the FLSA,  Plaintiffs shift differential pay, production bonuses, and attendance bonuses must be included in the regular rate under Wisconsin law for the same reasons why they must be included in the regular rate under the FLSA.  NPS therefore violated Wis. Stat. §109.03(1) and (5) by failing to pay to the Plaintiff, within 3 1 days of when the overtime wages were earned, all overtime pay required to be paid to her pursuant to DWD §274.03.  Pursuant to Wis. Stat. §109.03(5), Plaintiff is entitled to maintain a lawsuit against Froedtert for all straight time and overtime wages that they are entitled to but did not receive pursuant to Wis. Stat. §109.03 and DWD Chapter 274. In such a lawsuit they are also entitled to receive the 50% increased damages authorized by Wis. Stat. § 1 09. 1 1 (2)(a) on all straight time and overtime wages that remain unpaid at the time of the filing of this lawsuit, along with their reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of prosecuting their claims as authorized by Wis. Stat. §109.03(6). WHEREFORE, the Plaintiffs respectfully request the Court to enter an order that: Finds that NPS is liable to the plaintiff and all members of the proposed collective  At all of its facilities in Wisconsin, NPS made shift differential pay available to ",win,4
16719324,lose," Matador is an independent energy company engaged in the exploration, development,  production and acquisition of oil and natural gas resources in the United States.     Its operations “are focused primarily on the oil and liquids-rich portion of the  Wolfcamp and Bone Spring plays in the Delaware Basin in Southeast New Mexico and West Texas”  and “in the Eagle Ford shale play in South Texas and the Haynesville shale and Cotton Valley plays  in Northwest Louisiana and East Texas.”1    To complete its business objectives, Matador hires personnel to perform the necessary  work.     Over the past three years, Matador employed dozens of individuals – including Martin  – as Rig Hands, Directional Drillers, Mud Engineers, Mud Loggers, and Drilling Superintendents (or  similar positions) in several states.      While exact job titles and job duties may differ, these oilfield workers are subjected to  the same illegal pay practice for similar work.     Specifically, Matador paid these workers a flat sum for each day worked, regardless of  the number of hours that they worked that day (or in that workweek) and failed to pay them overtime  for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek.    For example, Matador employed Martin as a Drilling Superintendent from  approximately June 2016 through February 2018.     As a Drilling Superintendent, Martin’s primary job duties included observing drilling  operations on the rig and ensuring that the team followed safety protocol.     Martin worked well in excess of 40 hours each week while employed by Matador.    The work Martin performed was an essential part of Matador’s core business.    During Martin’s employment with Matador while he was classified as an independent  contractor, Matador exercised control over all aspects of his job.     Matador did not require any substantial investment by Martin for him to perform the  work required of him.    Matador determined Martin’s opportunity for profit and loss.     Indeed, Matador controlled all the significant or meaningful aspects of the job duties  performed by Martin.    Matador controlled the hours and locations Martin worked, the tools he used, and the  rate of pay he received.    Matador controlled all aspects of Martin’s job activities by enforcing mandatory  compliance with Matador’s policies and procedures.    He worked on Matador’s well sites and utilized equipment and software provided by  Matador to perform his job duties on Matador’s behalf.    Martin did not provide the equipment he used on a day-to-day basis.     Matador made the large capital investments in buildings, machines, drilling equipment,  personnel, tools, and supplied in the business in which Martin worked.    Martin did not incur operating expenses like rent, payroll, and marketing.    Martin was economically dependent on Matador during his employment.    Matador directly determined Martin’s opportunity for profit and loss.     Very little skill, training, or initiative was required of Martin to perform his job duties.    Martin performed routine duties that were largely dictated by Matador.    Martin was not employed by Matador on a project-by-project basis.    In fact, while Martin was classified as an independent contractor, he was regularly on  call for Matador and was expected to drop everything and work whenever needed.    The daily and weekly activities of the Day Rate Workers were routine and largely  governed by standardized plans, procedures, and checklists created by Matador.     Virtually every job function was pre-determined by Matador, including the tools to use  at a job site, the data to compile, the schedule of work, and related work duties.     The Day Rate Workers were prohibited from varying their job duties outside of the  pre-determined parameters.     Moreover, the job functions of the Day Rate Workers were primarily manual  labor/technical in nature, requiring little to no official training, much less a college education or other  advanced degree.    For the purposes of an FLSA overtime claim, the Day Rate Workers performed  substantially similar job duties related to servicing oil and gas operations in the field.    The Day Rate Workers also worked similar hours and were denied overtime as a result  of the same illegal pay practice.     The Day Rate Workers all worked in excess of 40 hours each week and were often  scheduled for daily 12-hour shifts for weeks at a time.     Instead of paying them overtime, Matador paid the Day Rate Workers a day-rate.    Matador’s policy of failing to pay its independent contractors, including Martin,  overtime violates the FLSA because these workers are, for FLSA purposes, non-exempt employees.    It is undisputed that the contractors are maintaining and working with oilfield  machinery, performing manual labor, and working long hours out in the field.    These Day Rate Workers carry out the hands-on, day-to-day production work of  Matador.    Because Martin and the other Day Rate Workers were misclassified as an independent  contractors, Matador owes them overtime for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a workweek.     Despite knowing the FLSA and NMMWA’s requirements, Matador failed to pay  Martin and the Day Rate Workers overtime for hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a single  workweek.   Numerous individuals were victimized by this pattern, practice, and policy which is in  willful violation of the FLSA and the NMMWA.    Dozens of other individuals who worked with Martin indicated they were improperly  classified as contractors, paid in the same manner, performed similar work, and were not properly  compensated for all hours worked as required by state and federal wage laws.     Matador employed dozens of Day Rate Workers across New Mexico, Texas, and  Louisiana. As a result, joinder of their individual claims is impracticable, and a class and collective  action serves the interests of judicial economy.    Based on his experiences and tenure with Matador, Martin is aware that Matador’s  illegal practices were imposed on other Day Rate Workers.      Matador used day rate contractors across the United States.     The Day Rate Workers (including the subset that makes up the NMMWA Class) were  all improperly classified as contractors and not afforded overtime compensation when they worked in  excess of forty 40 hours per week.    Matador is an “employer” of Martin and the Day Rate Workers.     Matador’s failure to pay wages and overtime compensation at the rates required by  state and/or federal law result from generally applicable, systematic policies, and practices which are  not dependent on the personal circumstances of the Day Rate Workers.      Martin’s experiences are therefore typical of the experiences of the Day Rate Workers.     The specific job titles or precise job locations of the Day Rate Workers do not prevent  class or collective treatment.     Martin has no interests contrary to, or in conflict with, the members of the class.     A class and collective action, such as the instant one, is superior to other available  means for fair and efficient adjudication of the lawsuit.     Absent this action, many members of the class likely will not obtain redress of their  injuries and Matador will reap the unjust benefits of violating the FLSA and the NMMWA.  ",win,4
6087753,lose," The Local Union represents the Southwest Airlines Flight Attendants. Local 556  of the Air Transport Division of the TWU was chartered as a Local on October 13, 1981, in the  city of Dallas.    Plaintiff Jackson began the process of obtaining signatures on recall petitions in  August of 2015. The effort was made in response to actual violations of the Constitution and By- Laws committed by certain Executive Board members. At all times the recall effort was  conducted in accordance with the union Constitution and By-Laws.    On December 15, 2016, valid recall petitions signed by 7,592 TWU members in  good standing were presented to the Local for verification as required by the By-Laws. The  recall petitions alleged violations of the Local By-Laws Objectives Article II (b) and the TWU  International Constitution Article XIX Section 5. The petitions met or exceeded the form  requirements described in the By-Laws.    The recall petitions sought the recall of Local 556 President Audrey Stone, 1st  Vice President Todd Gage, 2nd Vice President Brett Nevarez, Recording Secretary Cuyler  Thompson, Financial Secretary/Treasurer John Parrott, Board Member at Large Sam Wilkins,  Board Member at Large Crystal Reven, DEBM1 Andrea Garnett, DEBM Stacey Vavakas,  DEBM David Jackson, DEBM Pamila Forte, DEBM Rachel Brownfield, DEBM Jimmy West,  and DEBM Matt Hettich.    An appeal was filed with TWU International on January 17, 2017 at the request of  union leadership. As of the date of filing, TWU International has refused to verify the recall  petitions and comply with the Constitution and By-Laws.    Multiple attempts were made, both by plaintiff Jackson and her counsel, to confer  with legal counsel for International to assist and cooperate in the recall petition validation.  Attempts to communicate and assist were ignored completely.    In continuing to ignore the recall petitions of more than 50% of the eligible  membership, both Local and International are depriving the members of rights as conferred in  the Act and the governing documents of International and Local.  IV.   Each of the foregoing paragraphs are incorporated and re-alleged.    “The Labor–Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 was the product  of congressional concern with widespread abuses of power by union leadership.” Finnegan v.  Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 435 (1982). Although the LMRDA as originally enacted focused on  disclosure requirements and regulating union elections, over time various amendments have  shifted the focus toward “protection for members of unions paralleling certain rights guaranteed  by the Federal Constitution[.]” Id. To state a claim under § 412, plaintiffs must show (1) that  they are members of a labor organization and (2) that the organization infringed a right secured  by § 411, 412, 413, 414, or 415. See Martinez v. Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps., 980 F.2d 1039,  1041–42 (5th Cir. 1993).    In repeatedly ignoring the valid recall petitions of plaintiffs, both Local and  International have denied plaintiffs the equal rights provided for in the Act.    Specifically, the Act recognizes that a member’s exercise of their equal rights are  “subject to reasonable rules and regulations in such organization’s constitution and bylaws.”  Here, plaintiffs are attempting to participate and engage in the rights described in the Act in  conformity with the by-laws and constitution, but are improperly being blocked from doing so.    In repeatedly ignoring the valid recall petitions of plaintiffs, the defendants have  in effect deprived the plaintiffs of their freedom of speech and assembly, barring plaintiffs from  having a voice in the conduct of the union’s business.    Thus, the defendants violated§ 411(a)(1) and (2) and deprived Plaintiffs and other  Local 556 members in good standing of their right to participate in the deliberations and voting  upon the business and elections of the union.    Local 556 has adopted By-Laws that provide for the proper procedures and  methods for the recall of an Officer of the Local.    Said By-Laws apply to Local 556 members in good standing.    The By-Laws are a contract between the Local 556 and its members.    Local 556 Executive Board violated the By-Laws when it rejected Plaintiffs’  recall petitions and refused to verify signatures as required by the Constitution and By-Laws.     As of the date of filing, Local and TWU International have refused to verify the  recall petitions and comply with the Constitution and By-Laws.   In their recall petitions, Plaintiffs allege violations of the Constitutions and By- Laws that severely and materially affect the members of the union on a daily basis. A recall  election is a method by which the members can remove from power those who negatively impact  their rights, do not work in their best interests, and violate the governing documents and  principles of the union.    “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary equitable remedy that may be  granted only if the plaintiff establishes four elements: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on  the merits; (2) a substantial threat that the movant will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction  is denied; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs any damage that the injunction might cause  the defendant; and (4) that the injunction will not disserve the public interest.” Hoover v.  Morales, 164 F.3d 221, 224 (5th Cir. 1998).    Unless Defendants are restrained, Plaintiffs will be irreparably injured, and suffer  loss and damage by Defendants' wrongful conduct described above. Specifically, the conduct  complained of in the recall petitions will continue, and the plaintiffs will continue to be harmed.    Unless this Court issues a preliminary injunction, the Board will continue to block  a democratically held election for new Executive Board members.     Further, unless Defendant is immediately enjoined, Plaintiffs will have no  adequate remedy at law.    An injunction would not disserve the public interest. On the contrary, an  injunction blocking the defendants’ attempts to violate the rights conferred to plaintiffs under the  Act would serve the public interest and fulfill the purpose of the Act as envisioned by Congress.    Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction enjoining defendants from any and all  such conduct that serves to block or prevent the recall election as provided in Article X of the  By-Laws.    Preliminary injunction is also sought pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 412.   Plaintiffs seek a declaration from the Court concerning the rights and legal  relations as authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 2201.    Plaintiffs seek a declaration that they have complied with the requirements of the  Constitution and By-Laws of the Local and International and are thus entitled to a recall election.    Plaintiffs seek class certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil  Procedure.    The putative class members are defined as: all Local 556 members in good  standing who affixed their signature, employee number, and the date to a recall petition as set  forth in Article X of the By-Laws of the Local.    Numerosity: The class consists of approximately 8,000 members (additional recall  petitions are received daily). The class is therefore so numerous that joinder of all members is  impractical.    Commonality: There are questions of law and fact that are common to the class.  Because each class member affixed their signature to the same recall petition, the violations  alleged herein apply to each class member equally.    Typicality: The claims of the representative Jeanna Jackson are typical of the  class members as each have sought recall of Officers of the Local pursuant to Article X of the  By-Laws.    Adequacy of Representation: As a member in good standing of the Local, plaintiff  Jackson’s claims are so identical to those putative class members that her claim and efforts to  enforce the provisions of the By-Laws show prima facie evidence of adequacy of representation.  Plaintiff Jackson was the party initiating the recall effort on behalf of the putative class.    The Transport Workers Union of America is affiliated with the AFL-CIO and the  World Wide International Transport Workers Federation.    All TWU Members belong to Locals formed on the basis of interest and  geographic location. The Members elect their own Local Officers who handle most of their  issues and business. The International coordinates the activities of the Divisions and the Locals  and assists in negotiations, organizing drives and legislative campaigns. It provides professional  legal, education, research and public relations services to the Locals and Divisions.  ",win,2
4322363,win,"  .  Violations  New Yot~k Labor Law  Nonpayrnent of Straight \Vages  190 et .\·eq. and (J50 et !>;eq. and ""'12 NYCRR I  C~unille Forest and the New York Class)    Due to Defendants' violations of the NYLL,  are entitled to recover from  attorneys'  and costs of the action, and  Plaintiffs do not seek liquidated  In embers of the  York Class but reserves their right to do so.   The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference as if the same were fully  set forth herein.  8  all  216(b ), specifically, on  state  years  were: (a) not  (b) were not  -L., 'L'"" ~ and (c) were  not compensated tor time worked over forty hours per week at  overtime rates (the '·FLSA Collective  controlling interest in the Company or JCP.  excluded are  and entities who submit  timely and otherwise proper requests for exclusion fro1n the  Collective  Plaintiti is unable to state the exact nmnber of the  without discovery of  Defendants' books and records but estimates the  hundred if not thousands  individuals.    and  during required tneal periods and to perfonn work on-the-clock and/or off-the-clock for vvhich  they were not fully compensated. Defendants also failed to pay Plaintiff and n1en1bers of the  FLSA Collective Class time and one half their regular rate of pay tor hours worked beyond forty  hours in a workweek.    Defendants' unlawful conduct has been \videspread, repeated and consistent.    Defendants' conduct was willful and in bad faith and has caused significant  damages to Plaintiff and the FLSA Collective Class.  9  the  tn  are known to Defendants and are  identifiable   Excluded from the New York Class are Defendants, their legal representatives,  officers, directors, assigns, and successors, or any individual who has or had a controlling  interest in the Company or JCP. Also excluded are persons and entities who submit timely and  otherwise proper requests for exclusion from the New York Class.    As of January 28, 2012, JCP operated 43 stores in New York State. In addition,  Defendants employed hundreds of hourly-wage employees at its New York based department  10  numerous  were not rv•~""""""""""'""~'<Cl1'£::.r1  and during meal  to comply with the NYLL. The Plaintiffs and other New York  that they have  uncompensated or under-compensated  comn1on uv''""'·.d,\.1.:>. practices, and patterns of conduct.  H4U,l\,LLL<J and  Defendants'  have been  to Defendants'  Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the  York  PlaintitTs have retained counsel competent and experienced in cmnplex class action and  and hour litigation. There is no cont1ict between the Plaintiffs and the New York  Con11non  law and fact  as to the  that  are not  lin1ited to, the following:  (a)  vVhether Defendants failed and/or refused to pay Plaintiffs and the New  York Class for off-the-clock tin1e spent working in violation of New York  Law;  (b)  Whether Defendants failed and/or refused to pay PlaintitTs and the New  York Class for all of the compensable time that they worked for  Defendants while clocked-in;  (c)  Whether Defendants failed to keep true and accurate time records for all  11  (f)  (g)  (h)  Whether  to  compensated;  Whether  willfully or with  The nature and extent of  InJUrieS.  adjudication of the controversy  to  York Labor  §  the  the posting and notice  practice  York  Plaintitis and New York Class  Defendants~ benefit which was not  tailing to pay  was instituted  tC't""t:>Cr'l!r'rl of the law; and  and the tneasure of datnages for  treattnent will pern1it a large nmnber of  sitnilarly situated persons to prosecute their cmnn1on clain1s in a single forum siinultaneously,  efficiently and 'Without the duplication of eflort and expense that numerous individual actions  would entail.  Individual class members' damages are inadequate to justify the costs of  prosecuting their claims in any manner other than a class action. No difficulties are likely to be  encountered in the management of this class action that would preclude its maintenance as a  class action, and no superior alternative exists for the fair and efficient adjudication of this  controversy. Members of the New York Class are readily identifiable from Defendants' own  12  L  their nr't'r..-..•~,,~,,  course  that will result  ..,, ... T .... ""''""""' ~·-U11--~....,"""""" to Plaintitls and the New  intend to send notice to all 1ne1nbers of the New York Class to the  extent   The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference as if the satne were fully  set forth herein.    Pursuant to New York Labor Law §§ 190, 191, 193, 198 and 652, Defendants  have willfully failed to pay the straight wages due as set forth in the preceding paragraphs of this  Complaint to Plaintiffs and the New York Class in violation of New York Labor Law §§ 190,  191,193,198 and652 and 12 N.Y.C.R.R. 142-2.1 and 142-2.2.    Defendants were not and are not permitted by state or federal law, or by order of a  court of competent jurisdiction, to withhold or divert any portion of the Plaintiffs' and the New  15  concern  to  not  court  worked at  established rate.  New York Class, seek the amount  of at least the tninimum  Labor Law., and such other  not  but reserves their right to do so.   The overtime wage provisions of Article 19 of the NYLL and its supporting  regulations 12 N.Y.C.R.R. 142-2.1 and 142-2.2 apply to Defendants and protect Plaintiffs and  16  to  '""""'1""\rt""r'r•""V\""'1'~r of  Regulations.   New York Labor Law- Unpaid Overtime  (On Behalf of the New York Class)  The preceding paragraphs are incorporated by reference as if the same were fully  set forth herein.   VIOLATION OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT  (On Behalf of Plaintiff, Afza AnJum and the FLSA Collective Class)  same were fully  set forth herein.  At all relevant  Defendants  and  to be, ""employers''  commerce, within the  §  At all relevant  continue to etnploy, employees, including Plaintiff and  of the  of  are incorporated by reference as if the same were fully  set forth  bring  Anjum,  Terrana, Veronica Monahan and Camille Forest  own behalf and as a class action pursuant to Article 9 of New York  on behalf of a Class consisting of:  years  not  'fJ'-'""k'""'""'""'"". f(x all work perton11ed while clocked-in; (b) were not  all work perfonned while off-the-clock; and (c)  were not c01npensated for titne worked over torty hours per week  at overtitne rates (the ··New York Class'').  ",win,2
4543835,win," Halliburton is an oil and natural gas company operating worldwide and throughout  the United States and employs oilfield personnel to carry out its work.    For example, Plaintiff worked exclusively for Halliburton from approximately April  2015 to March 2015 and October 2015 until February 2016 as an oilfield contractor/solids control  operator. Throughout his employment with Halliburton, he was classified as an independent  contractor and paid on a day-rate basis.      As an oilfield contractor/ solids control operator, his primary job duties included  maintaining and operating solids control equipment and rigging up and rigging down oilfield  equipment.  Halliburton typically scheduled Plaintiff to work 12 hour shifts, for as many as 7 days a  week.  Plaintiff worked well in excess of 40 hours each week while employed by Halliburton.    The work Plaintiff performed was an essential party of Halliburton’s core business.    During Plaintiff’s employment with Halliburton while he was classified as an  independent contractor, Halliburton and/or the company it contracted with exercised control over  all aspects of his job. Halliburton did not require any substantial investment by Plaintiff in order for  him to perform the work required of him. Halliburton determined Plaintiff’s opportunity for profit  and loss.  Plaintiff was not required to possess any unique or specialized skillset (other than that  maintained by all other individuals working in his same job position) to perform his job duties.   Plaintiff worked exclusively for Halliburton, while working for Halliburton.     Indeed, Halliburton and/or the company it contracted with controlled all of the  significant or meaningful aspects of the job duties performed by Plaintiff.    Halliburton ordered the hours and locations Plaintiff worked, tools used, and rates of  pay received.    No real investment was required of Plaintiff to perform his job.  More often than  not, Plaintiff utilized equipment provided by Halliburton and/or its client to perform his job duties.   Plaintiff did not provide the equipment he worked with on a daily basis.  Halliburton and/or its  clients made the large capital investments in buildings, machines, equipment, tools, and supplied in  the business in which Plaintiff worked.    Plaintiff did not incur operating expenses like rent, payroll, marketing, and insurance.    Plaintiff was economically dependent on Halliburton during his employment.    Halliburton set Plaintiff’s rates of pay, his work schedule, and prohibited him from  working other jobs for other companies while he was working on jobs for Halliburton.    Halliburton directly determined Plaintiff’s opportunity for profit and loss.  Plaintiff’s  earning opportunity was based on the number of days Halliburton scheduled him to work.    Very little skill, training, or initiative was required of Plaintiff to perform his job  duties.    Plaintiff performed routine manual and technical labor duties that were largely  dictated by Halliburton and/or its clients.    Plaintiff was not employed by Halliburton on a project-by-project basis.  In fact,  while Plaintiff was classified as an independent contractor, he was regularly on call for Halliburton  and/or its clients and was expected to drop everything and work whenever needed.    All of the Putative Class Members perform the same or similar job duties and are  subjected to the same or similar policies and procedures which dictate the day-to-day activities  performed by each person.    The Putative Class Members also worked similar hours and were denied overtime as  a result of the same illegal pay practice. The Putative Class Members all worked in excess of 40  hours each week and were often scheduled for 12 hour shifts for weeks at a time. Instead of paying  them overtime, Halliburton paid the Putative Class Members a day-rate. Halliburton denied the  Putative Class Members overtime for any and all hours worked in excess of 40 hours in a single  workweek.     Halliburton’s policy of failing to pay its independent contractors, including Plaintiff,  overtime violates the FLSA because these workers are, for all purposes, employees performing non- exempt job duties.    It is undisputed that the Putative Class Members are maintaining and working with  oilfield machinery, performing manual labor, and working long hours out in the field.    Halliburton’s day-rate system violates the FLSA because Plaintiff and the other day- rate workers classified as independent contractors did not receive any pay for hours worked over 40  hours each week.  VI.   Plaintiff incorporates all previous paragraphs and alleges that the illegal pay practices  Defendant imposed on Plaintiff were likewise imposed on the members of the Class.    Numerous individuals were victimized by this pattern, practice, and policy which is  in willful violation of the FLSA.    Based on his experiences and tenure with Defendant, Plaintiff is aware that  Defendant’s illegal practices were imposed on the members of the Class.      The members of the Class were all improperly classified as independent contractors  and not afforded the overtime compensation when they worked in excess of 40 hours per week.    Defendant’s failure to pay wages and overtime compensation at the rates required by  federal law result from generally applicable, systematic policies, and practices which are not  dependent on the personal circumstances of the members of the Class.     Plaintiff’s experiences are therefore typical of the experiences of the members of the  Class.    The specific job titles or precise job locations of the various members of the Class  do not prevent class or collective treatment.      Plaintiff has no interests contrary to, or in conflict with, the members of the Class.  Like each member of the Class, Plaintiff has an interest in obtaining the unpaid overtime wages  owed under state and/or federal law.    A class and collective action, such as the instant one, is superior to other available  means for fair and efficient adjudication of the lawsuit.     Absent this Action, many members of the Class likely will not obtain redress of their  injuries and Defendant will reap the unjust benefits of violating the FLSA.    Furthermore, even if some of the members of the Class could afford individual  litigation against Defendant, it would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system.    The questions of law and fact common to each of the members of the Class  predominate over any questions affecting solely the individual members. Among the common  questions of law and fact are:  a.  Whether Defendant employed the members of the Class within the meaning  of the FLSA;  b.  Whether the members of the Class were improperly misclassified as  independent contractors;  c.  Whether Defendant’s decision to classify the members of the Class as  independent contractors was made in good faith;   d.  Whether Defendant’s decision to not pay time and a half for overtime to the  members of the Class was made in good faith;   e.  Whether Defendant’s violation of the FLSA was willful; and   f.  Whether Defendant’s illegal pay practices were applied uniformly across the  nation to all members of the Class.    Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the Class. Plaintiff and  the members of the Class sustained damages arising out of Defendant’s illegal and uniform  employment policy.     Plaintiff knows of no difficulty that will be encountered in the management of this  litigation that would preclude its ability to go forward as a collective action.    Although the issue of damages may be somewhat individual in character, there is no  detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts. Therefore, this issue does not preclude  collective action treatment.  X. ",win,1
4181592,lose," California Copyright Law    The facts in support of this action are based on Plaintiff’s review of publicly- available information. Based on a review of these documents, and as described in greater detail  herein, Plaintiff believes that discovery will result in the production of many more inculpatory  documents within Defendants’ sole possession, custody, or control.  A.  State Copyright Law Regulates Pre-1972 Recordings    Under the 1972 Amendments of the United States Copyright Act, Congress  provided that sound recordings “fixed” (i.e., recorded) before February 15, 1972 are within the  exclusive province of state law. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(c). Thus, state common and statutory law  applies to these Pre-1972 Recordings.    Plaintiff asserts claims under California, New York, and Florida law. Each of  these state’s protections for Pre-1972 Recordings is discussed in greater detail below.    The music industry is synonymous with California. The making and exploitation  of sound recordings in California employs tens of thousands of Californians and contributes  millions upon millions of dollars to the state and local economies. California, in turn, has  Case3:15-cv-00703-JCS   Document1   Filed02/13/15   Page4 of 18  This lawsuit is brought on behalf of Plaintiff individually and on behalf of all  those similarly situated under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a), (b)(2), and (b)(3). Plaintiff  seeks relief on behalf of itself and members of a Class defined as follows:  All owners of sound recordings or musical performances that were  initially “fixed” on a physical medium (i.e., recorded) prior to  February 15, 1972 and whose sound recordings were reproduced,  performed, distributed, or otherwise exploited by Sony in the  States of California, New York and Florida through its Music  Unlimited and for which Sony had not received authorization or  license to reproduce, perform, distribute, or otherwise exploit.    Excluded from the Class are Defendants; any affiliate, parent, or subsidiary of  Case3:15-cv-00703-JCS   Document1   Filed02/13/15   Page8 of 18  Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference, as though fully set forth  here, all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.    Plaintiff brings this cause of action individually and on behalf of the Class.    Under California Civil Code § 980(a)(2), Plaintiff and members of the Class  possess exclusive ownership interests in and to the Pre-1972 Recordings, including the  performances embodied in those recordings.    Defendants, without authorization or license, reproduced, performed, distributed,  or otherwise exploited Pre-1972 Recordings, including Plaintiff’s Recordings, through its Music  Case3:15-cv-00703-JCS   Document1   Filed02/13/15   Page10 of 18  Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference, as though fully set forth  here, all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.    Plaintiff brings this cause of action individually and on behalf of the Class.    California Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq. prohibits acts of  unfair competition, which mean and include any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business  practices.    Fair dealings with artists are matters of great public concern in California and  elsewhere. As a society, we value creative expression, and accordingly foster and protect such  expression through copyright, trademark and other intellectual property laws. Specifically  applicable here is Senate Bill No. 1034, where the California Legislature determined that “the  recording industry is an important industry to the State of California,” and that “artistic labor is  an important resource to the people of California that is vital to maintaining a healthy and vibrant  recording industry.”    As alleged herein, Defendants, without authorization or license, reproduced,  performed, distributed, or otherwise exploited Pre-1972 Recordings, including Plaintiff’s  Recordings, through its Music Unlimited. As such, Defendants have infringed Plaintiff’s and  Case3:15-cv-00703-JCS   Document1   Filed02/13/15   Page11 of 18  Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference, as though fully set forth  here, all preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.    Plaintiff brings this cause of action individually and on behalf of the Class.    Under California, New York and Florida law, Plaintiff and the members of the  Class possess exclusive ownerships in and to the Pre-1972 Recordings, including the artistic  performances embodied in those recordings.    Plaintiff and the members of the Class (or their predecessors in interest) invested  substantial time and money in developing the Pre-1972 Recordings that Defendants reproduced,  performed, distributed, or otherwise exploited on Music Unlimited.    Because Defendants did not obtain licenses to the Pre-1972 Recordings, they did  not incur any of the costs that a licensee would otherwise be obligated to pay in order to  reproduce, perform, distribute, or otherwise exploit these recordings.    Defendants have and continue to misappropriate for its commercial benefit the  Pre-1972 Recordings through its Music Unlimited.    As a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ misappropriation, Defendants  have received and retained money and value that rightfully belongs to Plaintiff and the Class.    As a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ violation of California, New York  and Florida law, Plaintiff and the Class have been damaged in an amount to be determined at  trial, but which is likely to be tens of millions of dollars.    Defendants acted with oppression, fraud, or malice. Defendants’ conduct was  undertaken in conscious disregard of Plaintiff and other members of the Class’s rights to the Pre- 1972 Recordings. Accordingly, Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to punitive damages against  Case3:15-cv-00703-JCS   Document1   Filed02/13/15   Page13 of 18 Misappropriation Under California, New York And Florida Law   Unlawful and Unfair Business Acts and Practices in Violation of  California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq.   Violation of California Civil Code § 980(a)(2)  ",lose,3
4196477,lose," However, Defendant does not solicit individuals and businesses for their  permission to list their information in its online directories. Instead, Defendant collects contact  information from several data aggregation and collection companies, such as Acxiom and  Infogroup.    As such, Defendant publishes the information without the listed individuals or  companies verifying the accuracy of the information.      Nevertheless, once Defendant has collected and published the acquired  information, it places marketing calls to the phone numbers listed. Defendant makes these calls  in an attempt to sell to the recipient upgraded, paid-for directory offers (e.g., enhanced or  prioritized business listings).     These marketing calls primarily come from 913 area codes, which covers the  Overland Park, Kansas area, which is home to Defendant’s $20 million call center.1 The phone  numbers used by Defendant include, but are not limited to, (913) 725-7588, (913) 725-7773,  (913) 725-7738, (913) 725-7971, and (913) 725-7784.    Recipients of these marketing phone calls, like Plaintiff and the putative Class,  did not request or desire to be called by Defendant, and did not provide any form of consent to  receive such calls.    Plaintiff registered his landline telephone number with the National Do Not Call  Registry on January 20, 2011 for the express purpose of preventing unwanted telemarketing  calls.       As Plaintiff did not recognize the numbers the calls were coming from, he did not  answer them. However, on at least one occasion, Defendant’s telemarketer left a message on  Plaintiff’s voicemail. The message indicated that it was Defendant Dex Media calling and that  the telemarketer wanted to speak with Plaintiff about opportunities related to his “listings.”         Plaintiff had no knowledge of any of the listings mentioned by the telemarketer,  and he had not created any listing on SuperPages or DexPages.      Upon investigation, Plaintiff viewed that Defendant had published his full name  and residential landline number (as well as his city and state) on its business directory websites  under the category “Psychologists.”       Plaintiff is not, and never has been, a psychologist. Plaintiff’s wife, on the other  hand, is a licensed psychologist but does not currently practice and has not for several years.  Nevertheless, neither Plaintiff nor his wife has ever used their residential landline telephone  number for any purpose related to a psychologist practice. Likewise, neither Plaintiff nor his wife  ever requested or desired that anything related to any psychologist practice be placed on  Defendant’s business websites.      Defendant is and was aware that the unsolicited phone calls at issue were (and are  continuing to be) made, and that the calls were being made to consumers and entities that had not  consented to receive them.     Plaintiff Stephen Dierks brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil  Procedure 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated individuals  and entities defined as follows (the “Class”):  All individuals in the United States (1) who had his or her telephone number(s) registered  with the National Do Not Call Registry for at least thirty days; (2) to whom Defendant  Dex Media, Inc. initiated more than one telephone call promoting Defendant’s products  or services; (3) within a 12-month period; and (4) for whom Defendant has no current  record of consent to place such calls to him or her.  The following persons are excluded from the Class: (1) any Judge or Magistrate presiding over  this action and members of their families, (2) Defendant, Defendant’s subsidiaries, parents,  successors, predecessors, and any entity in which the Defendant or its parents have a controlling  interest and their current or former employees, officers and directors, (3) persons who properly  execute and file a timely request for exclusion from the Class, (4) persons who have had their  claims in this matter finally adjudicated and/or otherwise released, (5) the legal representatives,  successors, or assigns of any such excluded persons, and (6) Plaintiff’s counsel and Defendant’s  counsel.     Commonality and Predominance: There are many questions of law and fact  common to the claims of Plaintiff and the Class, and those questions predominate over any  questions that may affect individual members of the Class. Common and predominant questions  for the Class include, but are not necessarily limited to, the following:  (a)  Whether Defendant’s conduct constitutes a violation of the TCPA;   (b)  Whether Defendant and/or its agents systematically made telephone calls  to members of the Class who Defendant and/or its agents did not have a  current record of consent to make such telephone calls;  (c)  Whether Defendant and/or its agents systematically made telephone calls  to members of the Class whose telephone numbers were registered with  the National Do Not Call Registry; and  (d)   Whether members of the Class are entitled to treble damages based on the  willfulness of Defendant’s conduct.    Typicality: Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the  Class in that Plaintiff and the members of the Class sustained damages arising out of Defendant’s  uniform wrongful conduct and making of unsolicited telephone calls.    Policies Generally Applicable to the Class: This class action is appropriate for  certification because Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the  Class as a whole, thereby requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure compatible  standards of conduct toward the members of the Class, and making final injunctive relief  appropriate with respect to the Class as a whole. Defendant’s policies challenged herein apply  and affect members of the Class uniformly and Plaintiff’s challenge of these policies hinges on  Defendant’s conduct with respect to the Class as a whole, not on facts or law applicable only to  Plaintiff. Defendant has acted and failed to act on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff and  the other members of the Class, requiring the Court’s imposition of uniform relief to ensure  compatible standards of conduct toward members of the Class. The factual and legal bases of  Defendant’s liability to Plaintiff and to the other members of the Class are the same, resulting in  injury to the Plaintiff and to all of the other members of the Class. Plaintiff and the members of  the Class have suffered harm and damages as a result of Defendant’s unlawful and wrongful  conduct.    Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.    47 U.S.C. §227(c) provides that any “person who has received more than one  telephone call within any 12-month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the  regulations prescribed under this subsection may” bring a private action based on a violation of  said regulations, which were promulgated to protect telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to  avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object.    The TCPA’s implementing regulation, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c), provides that “No  person or entity shall initiate any telephone solicitation” to “[a] residential telephone subscriber  who has registered his or her telephone number on the national do-not-call registry of persons  who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is maintained by the federal government.”    Defendant violated § 64.1200 (c) by initiating, or causing to be initiated,  telephone solicitations to wireless and residential telephone subscribers such as Plaintiff and the  Class members who registered their respective telephone numbers on the National Do Not Call  Registry, a listing of persons who do not wish to receive telephone solicitations that is  maintained by the federal government. These individuals requested to not receive calls from  Defendant or its agents, as set forth in § 64.1200 (d)(3).     Defendant and/or its agents made more than one unsolicited telephone call to  Plaintiff and members of the Class within a 12-month period without their prior express consent  to receive such calls. Plaintiff and members of the Class never provided any form of consent to  receive telephone calls from Defendant (or its agents) and/or Defendant (and/or its agents) does  not have a current record of consent to place telemarketing calls to them.     Defendant violated § 64.1200 (d) by initiating calls for telemarketing purposes to  residential and wireless telephone subscribers, such as Plaintiff and the Class, without instituting  procedures that comply with the regulatory minimum standards for maintaining a list of persons  who request not to receive telemarketing calls from them.    To the extent Defendant’s misconduct is determined to be willful and knowing,  the Court should, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), treble the amount of statutory damages  recoverable by the members of the Class.  200.   Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227  (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)  ",win,3
14904844,win," As joint employers, Defendants provide home health care services to elderly  and/or infirm individuals through home health care aides such as Plaintiff.    Defendants serve clients in Connecticut.    Defendants employ individuals as home health care aides within their clients'  homes.  The specific work assignments and hours of operation are determined by Defendants.    Defendants assign the home health care aides employed by them to work fixed  schedules based upon the needs of Defendants’ clients.    Defendants require the home health care employed by them to obtain Defendants’  approval in advance of any change to their schedule, including for vacation, personal days or  sick days.      Defendants require the home health care aides employed by them to record their  hours spent at each client’s residence.       Defendants require the home health care aides employed by them to address to  Defendants any concerns, complaints, requests or other issues that arise in connection with the  provision of services to Defendants’ clients; Defendants specifically prohibit the home health  care aides employed by them from bringing such matters directly to the attention of Defendants’  clients.       Defendants do not require that the home health care aides employed by them  provide any financial investment in the operation of Defendants’ business.      Defendants market their service through various forms of advertising, license and  insure their home health care aides in the performance of service for Defendants’ clients,  coordinate the placement of their home health care aides with specific clients, arrange for  coverage of services to clients when Defendants’ home health care aides request time off and  handle all billing and collection for home health care services performed by their home health  care aides.     During her employment with Defendants, Plaintiff Scott was not entitled to earn  any incentive, bonus, commission or profit share other than the compensation paid to her by  Defendants as wages for hours worked.     Upon information and belief, Defendants have never paid any other individual  employed by them as a home health care aid any incentive, bonus, commission or profit share  other than the compensation paid to them as wages for hours worked.    Upon information and belief, Defendants are compensated by various payors,  including Medicaid, Medicare, private insurance companies, and directly by their clients.  The  payors are billed hourly based on the amount of time Defendants’ aides spend within the clients'  homes.   For purposes of the FLSA collective action, the collective is defined as:  All home  health care aides employed by Defendants on and after three years from the date this action is  commenced who were not paid overtime for hours worked over forty in a workweek.    Similarly situated former and current employees are readily identifiable through  Defendants' records.  These similarly situated employees can be located and should be notified of  and allowed to opt-in to this action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b).     Plaintiff seeks certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure  of a class of employees who were and are employed as home health aides by Defendants from  April 7, 2011 through the present day and who were not properly paid overtime pay and/or had  unlawful deductions taken from their wages pursuant to the CGS for the period March 12, 2017.    Common questions of fact exist as to all of the members of the proposed class and  predominate over the questions affecting only individual members -- namely, whether  Defendants did not pay overtime wages to and/or made unlawful wage deductions from their  employees who were and are home health care aides.    Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the members of the proposed class,  as Plaintiff and the other members' sustained damages arising out of the same wrongful conduct  of Defendants in failing to pay overtime wages and making unlawful wage deductions.    Plaintiff is represented by [local counsel] and Charny & Wheeler P.C. which has  the resources, expertise and experience necessary to prosecute this class action and their  attorneys do not have knowledge of any conflicts among the potential members of the class or  their respective counsel.     A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient  adjudication of the controversy raised in this lawsuit because:  (1) the prosecution of separate  actions would be inefficient and wasteful of judicial resources; (2) the members of the proposed  class are likely located throughout the Northeast Region and are not likely to be able to vindicate  and enforce their claims unless this action is maintained as a class action; (3) the issues raised  can be more fairly and efficiently resolved in the context of a single action rather than piecemeal  litigation in separate actions; (4) the resolution of litigation in a single forum will avoid the risk  of confusion and possible inconsistent determinations; (5) the prosecution of separate actions  would create the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individuals  pursuing claims against the defendants which would establish incompatible standards of conduct;  (6) the defendants have acted on grounds applicable to all class members, making final  declaratory relief on behalf of all members necessary and appropriate; and (7) questions of law  and fact common to members of the class on issues of liability predominate over any questions,  such as those of individual damages, that will affect individual class members.    Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the preceding allegations.    Defendants employed Plaintiff and those similarly situated for workweeks longer  than 40 hours and willfully failed to compensate Plaintiff and other employees similarly situated   for the time worked in excess of 40 hours per week, at a rate of at least one and one-half times  the regular hourly rate, in violation of the requirements of the FLSA.    As a consequence of the willful underpayment of wages, Plaintiff and those  employees similarly situated have incurred damages and Defendants are indebted to them in the  amount of the unpaid overtime compensation, together with interest, liquidated damages and  attorney's fees and costs, in an amount to be determined at trial.   Plaintiff repeats and re-alleges the preceding allegations.    Defendants employed Plaintiff and those similarly situated for workweeks longer  than 40 hours and willfully failed to compensate Plaintiff for the time worked in excess of 40  hours per week, at a rate of at least one and one-half times the regular hourly rate, in violation of  the requirements of the CGS.    Plaintiff repeats and realleges the preceding allegations.    During the term of her employment with Defendants, Defendants deducted a  meals credit from the wages of Plaintiff and other employees similarly situated.    Defendants represented that the basis for such deductions was the existence of an  arrangement by which their client would provide meals to Plaintiff and others similarly situated  at a value equivalent to the amount of such deduction.      By way of their complaints, Defendants had actual and constructive notice that  Plaintiffs and other employees similarly situated did not receive the meals for which the meals  credit were intended to be deducted.    Notwithstanding such notice, Defendants deducted the meal credit from the wages  of Plaintiff and other employees similarly situated.        Defendants' deduction of the meals credit from the wages of Plaintiff and other  employees similarly situated constitutes an unlawful deduction within the meaning of CGS.     FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME IN VIOLATION OF THE FLSA  Collective Action   FAILURE TO PAY OVERTIME WAGES IN VIOLATION OF STATE LAW   Class Action   UNLAWFUL DEDUCTION OF WAGES IN VIOLATION OF CGS  Class Action  ",win,2
6174054,win,"(Class Action Alleging Violations of the PWMA)  A.  PMWA COVERAGE  119.  All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.  120.  The PMWA Class is defined as:  (Class Action Alleging Violations of the Ohio Acts)  A.  OHIO ACTS COVERAGE   (Collective Action Alleging FLSA Violations)  A.  FLSA COVERAGE    Rice Energy is an oil and natural gas company operating primarily in Pennsylvania  and Ohio in the Marcellus, Utica and Upper Devonian Shales.”3     To provide their services, Rice Energy employed numerous Completion  Consultants—including the individuals that make up the putative or potential class. While exact job  titles may differ, these employees were subjected to the same or similar illegal pay practices for  similar work in the oilfield.    Plaintiff Phillips has worked for Rice Energy as a Completion Consultant from  approximately March 2014 through the present.    Plaintiff Phillips has worked for Rice Energy in both Pennsylvania and Ohio.    Rice Energy paid Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members a day rate for each day  and all hours worked.     Specifically, Plaintiff Phillips was paid $1,100.00 per day worked in the field, but did  not receive overtime compensation at the required rate of time-and-one-half for all hours worked  over forty (40) each workweek.    Although it is well-known that blue-collar oilfield workers like Plaintiff and the  Putative Class Members are not exempt from overtime, Rice Energy did not pay Plaintiff and the  Putative Class Members the additional overtime premium required by the FLSA for hours worked in  excess of forty (40) in a workweek.    Upon information and belief, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members would  conduct their day-to-day activities within mandatory and designed parameters and in accordance  with pre-determined operational plans created by Rice Energy and/or its clients.    Upon further information and belief, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ daily  and weekly activities were routine and largely governed by standardized plans, procedures, and  checklists created by Rice Energy and/or its clients.     Virtually every job function was pre-determined by Rice Energy and/or its clients,  including the tools to use at a job site, the schedule of work, and related work duties. Plaintiff and  the Putative Class Members were prohibited from varying their job duties outside of the  predetermined parameters.     Moreover, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ job functions were primarily  routine and manual labor in nature, requiring little to no official training, much less a college  education or other advanced degree.    Indeed, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members are blue-collar workers. They rely  on their hands, physical skills, and energy to perform manual and routine labor in the oilfield.     Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ duties did not (and currently do not)  include managerial responsibilities or the exercise of independent discretion or judgment.    Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members did not (and currently do not) have the  authority to hire or fire other employees, and they were not (and currently are not) responsible for  making hiring or firing recommendations.    Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ duties did not (and currently do not)  concern work directly related to the management or general business operations of Rice Energy or  its customers.    Rice Energy determined the hours Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members worked.      Rice Energy set Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ pay and controlled the  number of days (and hours) they worked.    Rice Energy set all employment-related policies applicable to Plaintiff and the  Putative Class Members.     Rice Energy maintained control over pricing and marketing. Rice Energy also chose  equipment and product suppliers.    Rice Energy owned or controlled the equipment and supplies that Plaintiff and the  Putative Class Members used to perform their work.    Rice Energy had the power to hire and fire Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members.     Rice Energy made all personnel and payroll decisions with respect to Plaintiff and  the Putative Class Members, including but not limited to, the decision to pay Plaintiff and the  Putative Class Members an hourly wage with no overtime pay.     Rice Energy reimbursed Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members for expenses and  bought or provided tools and equipment that Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members used.     Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members did not employ their own workers.    Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members worked continuously for Rice Energy on a  permanent full-time basis.     Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members relied on Rice Energy for their work.  Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members did not market any business or services of their own.  Instead, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members worked the hours assigned by Rice Energy,  performed duties assigned by Rice Energy, worked on projects assigned by Rice Energy, and worked  for the benefit of Rice Energy and its customers.    Rice Energy paid Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members on a weekly basis.  Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members did not earn a profit based on any business investment of  their own. Rather, Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ only earning opportunity was based on  the number of days (and hours) they were allowed to work, which was controlled by Rice Energy  and/or its customers.    Rice Energy improperly classified Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members as  independent contractors. The classification was improper because Plaintiff and the Putative Class  Members were not in business for themselves. Instead, they were economically dependent upon  Rice Energy for their work.    Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members’ duties did not (and currently do not)  include managerial responsibilities or the exercise of independent discretion or judgment.    The FLSA, the Ohio Acts and the PMWA mandate that overtime be paid at one and  one-half times an employee’s regular rate of pay.     Under the Ohio Acts overtime shall be paid in the manner and methods provided in  and subject to the exemptions of section 7 and section 13 of the FLSA. O.R.C. § 4111.03(A).    Rice Energy denied Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members overtime pay as a result  of a widely applicable, illegal pay practice. Plaintiff and the Putative Class Members regularly worked  in excess of forty (40) hours per week but never received overtime compensation.    Rice Energy applied this pay practice despite clear and controlling law that states that  the manual labor/technical, routine duties which were performed by Plaintiff and the Putative Class  Members consisted of non-exempt work.    Accordingly, Rice Energy’s pay policies and practices blatantly violated (and continue  to violate) the FLSA, the Ohio Acts and the PMWA.  V.   All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.    The FLSA Collective is defined as:   All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.    Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), this collective claim is made on behalf of all those  who are (or were) similarly situated to Plaintiff.    Other similarly situated employees have been victimized by Rice Energy’s patterns,  practices, and policies, which are in willful violation of the FLSA.    The FLSA Collective Members are defined in Paragraph 59.    Rice Energy’s failure to pay any overtime compensation results from generally  applicable policies and practices, and does not depend on the personal circumstances of the  individual FLSA Collective Members.    Thus, Plaintiff’s experiences are typical of the experiences of the FLSA Collective  Members.    The specific job titles or precise job requirements of the various FLSA Collective  Members does not prevent collective treatment.    All of the FLSA Collective Members—regardless of their specific job titles, precise  job requirements, rates of pay, or job locations—are entitled to be properly compensated for all  hours worked in excess of forty (40) hours per workweek.    Rice Energy employed a substantial number of similarly situated workers since  August 31, 2014. Upon information and belief, these workers are geographically dispersed, residing  and working in locations across the United States. Because these workers do not have fixed work  locations, they may work in different states across the country in the course of a given year.    Absent a collective action, many members of the proposed FLSA collective likely  will not obtain redress of their injuries and Rice Energy will retain the proceeds of its rampant  violations.    Moreover, individual litigation would be unduly burdensome to the judicial system.  Concentrating the litigation in one forum will promote judicial economy and parity among the  claims of the individual members of the classes and provide for judicial consistency.    Accordingly, the FLSA collective of similarly situated plaintiffs should be certified as  defined as in Paragraph 59 and notice should be promptly sent.    All previous paragraphs are incorporated as though fully set forth herein.    The Ohio Acts Class is defined as: ",win,4
6260643,lose," The name of the original creditor to whom the account is owed:    The Complaint contained the numerical code ""1564980,, in the footer.  See id.    The Clerk of the Court issued a Summons on December 3, 2015. See  Exhibit No. 2. RMC prepared the Summons. The Summons contained the  numerical code ""1564980"" in the footer. See id.    The Complaint was accompanied by an ""Affidavit and Assignment of  Account"" which contained the numerical code ""R-1564980"" in the footer. See  Exhibit No. 3.    RMC served the Complaint, Affidavit and Summons on the Plaintiff.   15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq.)    The ""Information and Instructions,, stated:  l~PORMATION AND INSTRUCTIONS  156t910  crv. 1Tcv-1c:zz3'7t'J  A lawsuit has been filed again.t you. The relief demanded i• stated in the  attached coaiplaint. Within 30 days after aervice of the 8WllllOn8 on you (not  counting the day you received it) or 60 d&ya if you are incarcarated in  any jail, penitentiary, or other correctional facility in Arkan8aa-you  11Uat file with the clerk of this court a written anawer to the COlllplaint  or a 1110tion under Rule 12 of the Arltanaaa Rules of Civil Procedure.  Below, pl-•• find an a~r form to fill out and return to the Court.  You are alao required to mail a copy of the an.ewer to the Plaintiff.  Ple&M ~  a copy of this foni for your records.  :.;.  IMPORTAJIT: IP YOO PAIL TO PILlt A MR:ITTD NISWD WITHill THS TDG ~;  ALLOWSD, A DSPAULT JUDGMINT WILL BB BNTSUD .MU.INST YOU POR THB AMOt4f'r  OP THI CLAIM PILED, PLUS COURT COSTS, ATTORllBY nu. SBJtVICB nss ~  ,·  INTD&S'l'. IP THIS OCCtJRS, YOUR WAGES MY BB QMUIJ:SDD OR YOOR ~-.  PROPBRTY MAY Bl TAKBll AND SOLD TO PAY THB JUDGMBRT.  ~~- ~~  ~   Plaintiffbrings this Action as a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal  Rules of Civil Procedure.    Plaintiff sues on her own behalf and for the following class:  All consumers residing in Arkansas who, commencing one year  before the date of filing this Complaint, were served by RMC  ""Information and Instructions,,, in an attempt to collect a debt  for personal, family or household purposes, to the date of  certification. (the ""Class"").    Plaintiff is a member of the Class.    Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of all Class members in that  all putative Class members were served ""Information and Instructions,,, forms by  3001 W ROOSEVELT  LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS 72004    Plaintiff incorporates all paragraphs by reference.    Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to recover statutory damages under  15 U.S.C. §1692k, reasonable attorney's fees and costs.   NATURE AND AMOUNT OF RELIEF CLAIMED: THAT THE DEFENDANT  ONE METHOD TO PREVENT THE PLAINTIFF FROM SEEKING JUDGMENT  IS TO PAY THE PRINCIPAL, COURT COSTS, ATTORNEY FEES AND  SERVICE FEES WITHIN 30 DAYS FROM THE DATE YOU RECEIVE THIS  OR 60 DAYS IF YOU ARE INCARCERATED IN ANY JAIL, PENITENTIARY,  OR OTHER CORRECTIONAL FACILITY IN ARKANSAS - YOU MUST FILE WITH  OWED BY THE DEFENDANT.   PLAINTIFF:  RMC OF AMERICA  vs.  civ: eccv-1s--c~10  RMC OF AMERICA  vs.  PLAINTIFF  CIV: fC.CV-15-2~70  The undersigned authorized representative of the Creditor herein,  being first duly sworn and deposed do hereby state on oath as follows:  ",lose,5
13247414,lose," Plaintiff seek to represent a class of individuals (“the Class”) defined as follows:  All persons in the United States, from four years prior to the filing of the instant  Complaint through the date of the filing of the instant Complaint, to whom Defendant,  using the Autodialer or another device with identical characteristics, made text message  telephone calls to the persons’ cellular telephone, that are identical or substantially  similar to the text message telephone calls Defendant made to Plaintiff on or about  September 11, 2015.     Numerosity: The Class is so numerous that joinder of all individual members in  one action would be impracticable. The disposition of the individual claims of the Class’s  members through this class action will benefit both the parties and this Court.     Upon information and belief the Class contains at a minimum thousands of  members.    Upon information and belief, the Class’s size and the identities of the individual  members thereof are ascertainable through Defendant’s records, including, but not limited to  Defendant’s call records.     Members of the Class may be notified of the pendency of this action by  techniques and forms commonly used in class actions, such as by published notice, e-mail notice,  website notice, fax notice, first class mail, or combinations thereof, or by other methods suitable  to the Class and deemed necessary and/or appropriate by the Court.     Typicality:  Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the  Class.  The claims of the Plaintiff and members of the Class are based on the same legal theories  and arise from the same unlawful conduct.    Common Questions of Fact and Law:  There is a well-defined community of  common questions of fact and law affecting the Plaintiff and members of the Class.    The questions of fact and law common to Plaintiff and Class predominate over  questions which may affect individual members and include the following:  (a) Whether Defendant’s making text message calls to Plaintiff’s and the members of  Class’s cellular telephones, which text message was identical or substantially similar to  the text message Defendant sent to Plaintiff on September 11, 2015, using the Autodialer  or another device with identical characteristics, violated the TCPA?  (b) Whether Plaintiff and the members of the Class provided Defendant with prior  express consent to the above-described text message calls?  (c) Whether Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to statutory damages from  Defendant under the TCPA?  (d)  Whether Defendant’s violations of the TCPA were willful or knowing?  (e) Whether Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to up to triple statutory  damages under the TCPA from Defendant for Defendant’s willful and knowing  violations of the TCPA?  (f) Whether Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to a permanent injunction  under the TCPA enjoining Defendant from continuing to engage in its unlawful conduct?       Superiority:  A class action is superior to other available means for the fair and  efficient adjudication of the claims of the Class. While the aggregate damages which may be  awarded to the members of the Class are likely to be substantial, the damages suffered by  individual members of the Class are relatively small. As a result, the expense and burden of  individual litigation makes it economically infeasible and procedurally impracticable for each  member of the Class to individually seek redress for the wrongs done to them. Plaintiff does not  know of any other litigation concerning this controversy already commenced against Defendant  by any member of the Class. The likelihood of the individual members of the Class prosecuting  separate claims is remote. Individualized litigation would also present the potential for varying,  inconsistent or contradictory judgments, and would increase the delay and expense to all parties  and the court system resulting from multiple trials of the same factual issues. In contrast, the  conduct of this matter as a class action presents fewer management difficulties, conserves the  resources of the parties and the court system, and would protect the rights of each member of the  Class. Plaintiff knows of no difficulty to be encountered in the management of this action that  would preclude its maintenance as a class action.    Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in all of the above  paragraphs and incorporates such allegations by reference.    By Defendant's above-described conduct, Defendant committed more than 10,000  violations of the TCPA against Plaintiff and the members of the Class.    Accordingly, Plaintiff and the members of the Class are entitled to statutory  damages from Defendant under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) of greater than $5,000,000 and an  injunction against Defendant ordering them to cease their violations of the TCPA.    If it is found that Defendant willfully and/or knowingly violated the TCPA  through its calls to Plaintiff and the members of the Class, Plaintiff and the members of the Class  request an increase by the Court of the damage award against Defendant, described in the  preceding paragraph, to three times the amount available under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), as  authorized by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) for willful or knowing violations, which amounts to greater  than $15,000,000. ",lose,3
6454460,win,"(Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq. – Telephone Consumer Protection Act)  (on behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)    In an effort to solicit more clients on behalf of third parties, Defendants sent  unsolicited text messages, without consent, to cellular telephones while using automatic  telephone dialing equipment having the capacity to store and dial telephone numbers, en masse.  As a result, Defendants has repeatedly violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47  U.S.C. § 227 (the “TCPA”).    Given the relatively low cost associated with sending bulk text messages, many  marketers have turned to disseminating advertisements or promotions through mass text  message campaigns.    Seeking to market the services of third parties to consumers and, in turn, grow  their customer bases, Defendants engaged in this especially invasive form of advertising.    Defendants sent unauthorized text messages to the phones of thousands of  consumers.     In fact, the promotional text message calls alleged herein were exclusively made  by Defendants and not by any consumer. Defendants made the same (or substantially the same)  text message calls en masse to thousands of cellular telephone numbers.    While Defendants sent these unauthorized text messages to consumers to market  its services, it never obtained recipients' express consent to do so.    Through its conduct, Defendants caused consumers actual harm by sending  unauthorized text message calls at issue. Plaintiff and members of the Class were not only  subjected to the aggregation that necessarily accompanies the receipt of unauthorized text  messages, but also because consumers frequently have to pay their cell phone service providers  for the receipt of such unauthorized text messages.    Defendants sent a text message call from an SMS-enabled land-line phone  number, 504-608-2546, to Plaintiff’s telephone number.     The software and/or hardware used by Defendants to enable texting on the  landline also had the capacity to store, produce, and dial random and sequential numbers, and/or  receive and store lists of telephone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse, in an  automated fashion without human intervention.     The message was an advertisement written in an impersonal manner and Plaintiff  had no other reason to be in contact with Defendants.      Plaintiff did not provide prior express written consent to receive text messages  from Defendants.    Defendants' intrusive text messages adversely affected Plaintiff’s right to  privacy.    Defendants were and are aware that the above-described text message calls were  being made on a widespread basis, and that the text message calls were being made to  consumers who had not consented to receive them.   Numerosity: The exact number of Class members is unknown and not available  to Plaintiff at this time, but it is clear that individual joinder is impracticable. On information  and belief, Defendants have sent promotional text messages to thousands of consumers who fall  into the definition of the Class. Class members can be identified through Defendants' records.    Typicality: Plaintiffs claims are typical of the claims of other members of the  Class in that Plaintiff and the Class members sustained damages arising out of Defendants'  uniform wrongful conduct and unsolicited text message calls.    Adequate Representation: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and  protect the interests of the Class, and has retained counsel competent and experienced in  complex litigation and class actions. Plaintiff’s claims are representative of the claims of the  other members of the Class. That is, Plaintiff and the Class members sustained damages as a  result of Defendants’ conduct and received substantially the same text messages. Plaintiff also  has no interests antagonistic to those of the Class, and Defendants have no defenses unique to  Plaintiff. Plaintiff and her counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf  of the members of the Class, and have the financial resources to do so. Neither Plaintiff nor her  counsel has any interest adverse to the Class.    Plaintiff reserves the right to revise the foregoing ""Class Allegations"" and ""Class  Definition"" based on facts learned through additional investigation and in discovery.   Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.    In an effort to obtain clients, Defendants made unsolicited and unwanted text  message calls to Plaintiff and the Class' cellular telephones without their prior express consent.    Defendants sent the promotional text messages to Plaintiff and the Class's  cellular telephone numbers using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce telephone  numbers to be called using a random or sequential number generator, and/or receive and store  lists of phone numbers, and to dial such numbers en masse.    Defendants utilized equipment that sent the promotional text messages to  Plaintiff and other members of the putative Class simultaneously and without human  intervention.    By sending the promotional text messages to Plaintiffs and members of the  Class's cellular telephones without prior express consent, and by utilizing an ATDS, Defendants  violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(I)(A)(iii).    Because Defendants' misconduct was willful and knowing, the Court should,  pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by the  Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class.     Additionally, as a result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the other  members of the Class are entitled to an injunction under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A) to ensure that  Defendants’ violations of the TCPA do not continue into the future.   As a result of the foregoing and as per applicable law including, but not  limited to, the doctrines of respondeat superior, franchisor and franchisee, as well as principal  and agent, INTELIQUENT, INC. has been named herein as a party-defendant, and to whom  liability for the negligent and/or willful violations of the TCPA committed by Defendant ",win,3
16199405,win," On or about September 15, 2015, Defendant sent an unsolicited facsimile to  Plaintiff using a telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device.  See Exhibit A.    The Fax advertises the commercial availability and quality of Defendant’s new  Musculoskeletal Newsletter. On that basis, the Fax is an advertisement under the TCPA and  regulations implementing the TCPA.    Defendant provides managed healthcare services.  See Internet Google result:  eviCore healthcare  Organization  CareCore National, LLC, doing business as eviCore healthcare, provides managed healthcare services.  The Company offers radiology, radiation therapy, cardiology, medical oncology, lab management, and  health plan, as well as other specialty solutions.  Additionally, see from Defendant’s website, www.evicore.com:  ABOUT EVICORE: Empowering the Improvement of Care  Specifically designed with the size and scale to address the complexity of today’s and  tomorrow’s healthcare system, eviCore is a company committed to advancing healthcare  management through intelligent care – and enabling better outcomes for patients, providers, and  health plans.  Ours is an evidence-based approach that leverages our exceptional capabilities, powerful  analytics, and acute sensitivity to the challenges and needs of everyone involved across the  healthcare continuum. By applying proven talent and leading-edge technology, we harness  healthcare’s evolving demand and inherent change to realize healthcare innovation and deliver  improved results and a positive experience for everyone.  Who We Empower  eviCore empowers the improvement of care by connecting patients, providers, and health plans  with intelligent, evidence-based solutions to enable better outcomes.    Plaintiff did not give “prior express invitation or permission” to Defendant to send  the Fax.     On information and belief, Defendant faxed the same and other unsolicited  facsimile advertisements without compliant opt-out language to Plaintiff and at least 40 other  recipients.     There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other class member) to avoid  receiving unauthorized fax advertisements. Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the  urgent communications their owners desire to receive.     Defendant’s facsimile attached as Exhibit A does not display a proper opt-out  notice as required by 47 C.F.R. § 227(b)(1)(C) and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4).   Class Size (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiff is informed and believes, and upon  such information and belief avers, that the number of persons and entities of the Plaintiff Class is  numerous and joinder of all members is impracticable. Plaintiff is informed and believes, and  upon such information and belief avers, that the number of class members is at least forty.    Typicality (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3)):  Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of  all class members. Plaintiff received the same or similar faxes as the faxes sent by or on behalf of  Defendant advertising the availability or quality of Defendant’s property, goods or services of  during the Class Period.  Plaintiff is making the same claims and seeking the same relief for  himself and all class members based upon the same federal statute.  Defendant has acted in the  same or in a similar manner with respect to Plaintiff and all the class members by sending  Plaintiff and each member of the class the same or similar fax or faxes which did not contain the  proper opt-out language or were sent without prior express invitation or permission.    Fair and Adequate Representation (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)):   Plaintiff will fairly  and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff is interested in this  matter, has no conflicts, and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the class.    The TCPA defines “unsolicited advertisement” as “any material advertising the  commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any  person without that person's prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise.”  47 U.S.C. § 227 (a) (5).    The Fax. On or about September 15, 2015, Defendant sent the Fax via facsimile  transmission from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to the telephone  lines and facsimile machines of Plaintiff and members of the Plaintiff Class. The Fax constituted  an advertisement under the Act and the regulations implementing the Act. Defendant failed to  comply with the Opt-Out Requirements in connection with the Fax. The Fax was transmitted to  persons or entities without their prior express invitation or permission and Defendant is  precluded from sustaining the EBR safe harbor with Plaintiff and other members of the class,  because of the failure to comply with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements. By virtue thereof,  Defendant violated the TCPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder by sending the Fax via  facsimile transmission to Plaintiff and members of the Class.  Plaintiff seeks to certify a class  which includes this Fax and all others sent during the four years prior to the filing of this case  through the present.    The TCPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf of  Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class to redress Defendant’s violations of the Act, and provides for  statutory damages. 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The Act also provides that injunctive relief is  appropriate. Id.    The TCPA is a strict liability statute, so Defendant is liable to Plaintiff and the  other class members even if their actions were only negligent.    Defendant knew or should have known that (a) Plaintiff and the other class  members had not given prior express invitation or permission for Defendant or anybody else to  fax advertisements about the availability or quality of Defendant’s property, goods or services;  (b) Defendant transmitted advertisements; (c) the Fax did not contain the required Opt-Out  Notice; and (d) Defendant’s transmission of unsolicited advertisements that did not contain the  required opt-out notice was unlawful.  ",win,2
6683637,win,"(FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938)   (NEW JERSEY WAGE AND HOUR LAW)   (NEW JERSEY WAGE PAYMENT LAW)    Plaintiff and all Collective Group/Class Members have been employed by  Defendant and worked as Laborers and/or Operators out of Defendant’s office/facility in the State  of New Jersey.    Defendant has failed to pay Plaintiff and the Collective Group/Class Members for  their time spent traveling to and from Defendant’s office/facility to customer locations and  performing physical tasks after beginning their work day as required by the FLSA and NJWHL.    At the Defendant’s office/facility, Plaintiff and the Collective Group/Class  Members were required to pick-up the keys to their work vehicles, load their work vehicles with  the equipment needed for the day’s work and, at times, repair equipment that needed to be so  repaired.       At the end of the workday, unless they were staying overnight at local lodging, the  Plaintiff and the Collective Group/Class Members were required to return back to the Defendant’s  office/facility and turn-in the keys to their work vehicles and, at times, unload the equipment from  their work vehicles.    Defendant took unlawful deductions from Plaintiff and the Collective  Groups’/Class Members’ pay in violation of the NJWPL in the form of charging them “company  benefit costs” which were costs for gloves, ear plugs, Tyvek suits and other similar items that were  required to perform work for the Defendant.    Defendant’s failure to pay the Collective Group/Class Members for all time  worked, including time spent traveling for Defendant’s purposes to and from its offices, to and  from the customer locations resulted in the Collective Group/Class Members being denied legally  required compensation.    When factoring in the additional hours described above, Defendant also failed to  pay Plaintiff and the Collective Group/Class Members 1.5 times their hourly rate for all hours they  worked in excess of forty (40) hours per week as required by the NJWHL.    Defendant’s unlawful deductions from the Collective Groups’/Class Members’ pay  denied them compensation to which they were legally entitled to receive.    Plaintiff brings count one set forth below as a collective action pursuant to 29  U.S.C. § 216(b) on behalf of himself and all other individuals who, any time after April 2015,  worked as Laborers and/or Operators out of the Defendant’s New Jersey office/facility.    Plaintiff and all individuals who, any time after April 2015, worked as Laborers  and/or Operators out of the Defendant’s New Jersey office/facility are similarly situated in that  they have all been subject to the Defendant’s common wage payment practices.    Upon information and belief, Defendant knew that the Plaintiff and all similarly  situated individuals performed work that required payment.    As a result, Defendant’s conduct was willful.    Count one of this Complaint for violations of the FLSA may be brought and  maintained as an “opt-in” collective action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) because the Plaintiff’s  claim is similar to the claims of all Laborers and/or Operators who worked out of the Defendant’s  New Jersey office/facility.    Defendant is liable under the FLSA for failing to properly compensate Plaintiff and  Collective Group members, and notice of this lawsuit should be sent to them. Those similarly  situated individuals are known to the Defendant and are readily identifiable through Defendant’s  payroll records.   Class action treatment is appropriate because, as summarized in Paragraphs 28-34  below, all of Rule 23’s requirements are satisfied.    The class is so numerous that joinder of all class members is impracticable.    Plaintiff is a Class Member, his claims are typical of the claims of other Class  Members and he has no interests that are antagonistic to or in conflict with the interests of other  Class Members.    Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the Class Members and their interests,  and he has retained competent and experienced counsel who will effectively represent the Class  Members’ interests.    Questions of law and fact are common to all Class Members.    A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient  adjudication of this litigation.         The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would run  the risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications. Prosecution as a class action will also eliminate  the possibility of repetitious litigation.   Plaintiff reasserts Paragraphs 1-34 as if set forth at length herein.    Defendant’s conduct against Plaintiff and the Collective Group Members violates  the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 to 219.    As a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the Collective Group  Members have endured significant economic damages.     Plaintiff reasserts Paragraphs 1-37 as if set forth at length herein.    Defendant’s conduct against Plaintiff and the Class Members violates the New  Jersey Wage and Hour Law, N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a to -56a38.    As a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the Class Members have  endured significant economic damages.     Defendant’s conduct against Plaintiff and the Class Members violates the New  Jersey Wage Payment Law, N.J.S.A. 34:11-4.1 to -4.14, by reducing the payments made to  Plaintiff and the Class Members to account for various deductions, charges and/or expenses that  do not benefit Plaintiff or other Class Members.     As a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the Class Members have  endured significant economic damages.   ",lose,2
4311662,win," Named Plaintiffs bring this action for violations of the FLSA as a collective  action pursuant to Section 16(b) of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), on behalf of all persons  presently and formerly employed by Defendants who were non-exempt employees, who were  subject to Defendants’ unlawful pay practices and policies discussed herein, and who worked for  Defendants at any point in the three years preceding the date the instant action was initiated (the  members of this putative class are referred to as “Collective Plaintiffs”).    Named Plaintiffs and Collective Plaintiffs are similarly situated, have  substantially similar job duties, have substantially similar pay provisions, and are all subject to  Defendants’ unlawful policies and practices as discussed herein.    There are numerous similarly situated current and former employees of  Defendants who were compensated improperly for overtime work in violation of the FLSA and  who would benefit from the issuance of a Court Supervised Notice of the instant lawsuit and the  opportunity to join in the present lawsuit.     There are numerous similarly situated current and former employees of  Defendants who Defendants failed to pay an overtime premium for hours worked in excess of  forty (40) per workweek, all of whom would benefit from the issuance of a Court Supervised  Notice of the instant lawsuit and the opportunity to join in the present lawsuit.     Similarly situated employees are known to Defendants, are readily identifiable by  Defendants, and can be located through Defendants’ records.     Therefore, Named Plaintiffs should be permitted to bring this action as a  collective action for and on behalf of themselves and those employees similarly situated (i.e.,  “Collective Plaintiffs”), pursuant to the “opt-in” provisions of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).   The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set forth in full.    Named Plaintiffs were hourly employees of Defendant East Coast, who within the  last three years were employed by Defendant East Coast.      Collective Plaintiffs were/are hourly employees of Defendant East Coast, who  within the last three years were employed by Defendant East Coast.      Upon information and belief, each paycheck issued to Collective Plaintiffs  provides that they were hourly employees and were paid an hourly wage.    Defendants did not designate Named Plaintiffs as exempt employees under  federal or state law.    Defendants did not designate Collective Plaintiffs as exempt employees under  federal or state law.    Upon information and belief, Defendants have maintained an unlawful wage  payment system for at least the last three years and have enforced such unlawful policies.   At all times relevant herein, Defendants have and continue to be employers within  the meaning of the FLSA.    At all times relevant herein, Defendants were responsible for paying wages to  Named Plaintiffs and Collective Plaintiffs.    At all times relevant herein, Named Plaintiffs and Collective Plaintiffs were  employed with Defendants as “non-exempt employees” within the meaning of the FLSA.    Under the FLSA, an employer must pay a non-exempt employee at least one and  one half times his or her regular rate for each hour worked in excess of forty (40) hours per  workweek.    Defendants’ violations of the FLSA include, but are not limited to, not paying  Named Plaintiffs and Collective Plaintiffs proper overtime compensation for hours worked in  excess of forty (40) per workweek and issuing paychecks designed to hide Defendants’ unlawful  conduct.    Defendants’ conduct in failing to pay Named Plaintiffs and Collective Plaintiffs  properly is willful and not based upon any reasonable interpretation of the law.    As a result of Defendants’ unlawful conduct, Named Plaintiffs and Collective  Plaintiffs have suffered damages as set forth herein.   The foregoing paragraphs are incorporated herein as if set forth in full.    At all times relevant herein, Defendants were responsible for paying wages to  Named Plaintiffs.    At all times relevant herein, Named Plaintiffs were employed with Defendants as  “non-exempt employees” within the meaning of the New Jersey Wage Laws.    Under the New Jersey Wage Laws, an employer must pay a non-exempt  employee at least one and one half times his or his regular rate for each hour worked in excess of  forty (40) hours per workweek.    Defendants’ violations of the New Jersey Wage Laws include, but are not limited  to, not paying Named Plaintiffs proper overtime compensation for time worked in excess of forty  (40) hours per workweek and issuing paychecks designed to hide Defendants’ unlawful conduct.    Defendants’ conduct in failing to pay Named Plaintiffs properly was willful and  not based upon any reasonable interpretation of the law.   Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)  (Failure to pay Overtime Compensation)  (Named Plaintiffs and Collective Plaintiffs v. Defendants)   New Jersey Wage Laws  (Failure to pay Overtime Compensation)  (Named Plaintiffs v. Defendants)  ",lose,3
59817043,win," Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.  P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3).    The Class consists of:   a. all individuals with addresses in the State of New York;  b. that have received collection attempts from Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC,  for debts originating with Synchrony Bank, while said consumers were in  Disaster Areas as designated by FEMA or State Governments for debts incurred  for personal, familial, or household use,   c. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this  action and on or before a date twenty-one (2l) days after the filing of this action.    The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of  Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or  have purchased debts.    Excluded from the Plaintiff Classes are the Defendants and all officer, members,  partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate  families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate  families.     There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Classes, which common  issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue  is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as  Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e, 1692f.    The Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same  facts and legal theories. The Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the  Plaintiff Classes defined in this complaint. The Plaintiffs have retained counsel with experience  in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiffs  nor their attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this  action.    This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action  pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a  well-defined community interest in the litigation:  a. Numerosity: The Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on that basis allege,  that the Plaintiff Classes defined above are so numerous that joinder of all  members would be impractical.  b. Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as  to all members of the Plaintiff Classes and those questions predominance over  any questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal  issue is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the  forms attached as Exhibit A violate 15 USC §§ l692e,1692f.  c. Typicality: The Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the class members.  The Plaintiffs and all members of the Plaintiff Classes have claims arising out of  the Defendants' common uniform course of conduct complained of herein.  d. Adequacy: The Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the  class members insofar as Plaintiffs have no interests that are adverse to the absent  class members. The Plaintiffs are committed to vigorously litigating this matter.  Plaintiffs have also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits,  complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor his counsel have  any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class  action lawsuit.  e. Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair  and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all  members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large  number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single  forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that  individual actions would engender.    Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure  is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff  Classes predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is  superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.    Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiffs may, at  the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues  pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).   Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length  herein.    Some time prior to April 14, 2020, an obligation was allegedly incurred to Synchrony  Bank by the Plaintiff.    The Synchrony Bank obligation arose out of credit card transactions in which money,  property, insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, were primarily for  personal, family or household purposes.    The alleged Synchrony Bank obligation is a ""debt"" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§  1692a(5).    Sometime thereafter, Defendant PRA purportedly purchased the alleged debt and is  collecting the alleged debt.    Defendant PRA collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have  been incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United  States Postal Services, telephone and internet.  Violation  – April 14, 2020 Collection Letter    On or about April 14, 2020, Defendant sent the Plaintiff a collection letter (the  “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt owed to PRA.  See Letter attached as Exhibit A.    Upon information and belief, PRA purchased Plaintiff’s alleged debt from  Synchrony Bank and the sale of this alleged debt is subject to relevant conditions that Synchrony  Bank imposes on its debt purchasers.    Synchrony Bank contracts of sale (a/k/a Forward Flow Agreements) for defaulted  debt provide specific limitation on the ability of its debt purchasers to make any collection  attempts while alleged debtors are in disaster areas as determined by FEMA or any other  appropriate government entity.    Accordingly, upon information and belief, PRA purchased Plaintiff’s alleged debt  from Synchrony Bank and the Forward Flow Agreements evidencing proof of sale, prohibits  PRA from seeking to collect against Plaintiff’s alleged debt, while Plaintiff resides in a disaster  area.    The state of affairs in New York, and frankly the whole world, is well known. The  Covid-19 pandemic has wreaked havoc across the world, the United States, and New York.    On March 7, 2020, Governor Cuomo declared a State of Emergency across the entire  State.    On March 13, 2020, President Donald Trump declared a nationwide emergency,  including for the State of New York, as recognized by the Federal Register.    Despite the fact that Plaintiff clearly resided in a disaster area in April 2020, PRA  pursued collection activities by sending collection letters to Plaintiff.    Given the express conditions of sale, PRA misrepresented its ability to collect  Plaintiff’s debt by sending collection letters in April 2020. Accordingly, PRA has violated the   Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-36 of this Complaint as though fully  stated herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein.    Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff  violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, e(2),  e(5), e(10), and f.    By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's  conduct violated Section 1692e, et seq. of the FDCPA and is entitled to actual damages, statutory  damages, costs and attorneys’ fees.  VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT   15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.  ",lose,3
6230462,lose," As background, it is generally accepted that female mammals (including humans)  are born with a fixed amount or supply of eggs.  As those eggs age, they lose energy.  Energy is  stored in mitochondria, so the loss of energy relates to the decline in mitochondrial function.   One often used analogy is to that of a flashlight:  if an egg is seen as a flashlight and it has been  sitting on the shelf for 38 years, it may still function, but will require new batteries (or  mitochondria).      Studies have been conducted using the mitochondria from younger donor eggs  and inserting it into “older eggs.”  However, this was not a permissible procedure because it  involved three persons: the father (sperm), the mother (egg), and a donor (younger  mitochondria).      One of OvaScience’s founders, Jonathan Tilly, Ph.D. (“Tilly”), was involved in  the discovery of EggPCs and began to study whether the mitochondria from those EggPCs in the  lining of the ovaries could be injected into eggs, thereby using the same woman’s mitochondria  and eggs.  This is the basis of the AUGMENT treatment whereby mitochondria are co-injected  with the sperm during an IVF procedure.    Therefore, the procedure is a traditional IVF process with the addition of the first  extraction surgery and the injection of the mitochondria with the sperm.    The IVF market has grown dramatically over the past twenty years and is highly  lucrative.  In 2012, IVF market revenue was approximately $9.3 billion, and that number is  expected to grow up to $21.6 billion by 2020.4  Another analyst has projected that by 2022, the  global IVF market will reach $27 billion.5    As women opt to have children later and later in life, and as infertility rates  continue to rise, the IVF market is only expected to continue to rapidly grow moving forward.   Due to the personal and time-sensitive nature of the market, it can be described as frantic or  reactive.      However, on September 10, 2013, in a press release entitled “OvaScience  Provides Update on AUGMENT,” filed on Form 8-K with the SEC, the Company announced  that it “has chosen to suspend enrollment of AUGMENT in the U.S. while moving forward with  its plans for enrollment outside of the U.S.”  The Company previously had a number of  communications with the FDA, who advised that the Company should file an Investigational  New Drug (“IND”) application.  The IND application would mean the trial would need to meet  much more stringent and costly approval standards.  Instead of conforming to the more stringent  and costly standards for approval, OvaScience took its IVF clinics outside of the U.S.    In 2014, the Company launched a trial in Turkey at the Gen-art IVF clinic in  Ankara, overseen by Kutlul Oktay, M.D., F.A.C.O.G., involving eight women who had  previously failed three or more IVF cycles.  Of the eight, only two women reported a clinical  pregnancy, although only one resulted in an ongoing pregnancy, meaning an actual success rate  of just one in eight, or 12.5%.  The women in the Turkish trial ranged in age from 27 to 41.    Also in 2014, OvaScience launched a clinic in Toronto, Canada involving 26  women who had previously failed one to three IVF cycles.  This clinic was overseen by Robert  F. Casper, M.D., F.R.C.S.(C), Medical Director of TCART Fertility Partners of Toronto,  Canada.  The average age of the pregnant women in the Canadian study was 33, which is very  young for IVF.  Nine of the women in the study became pregnant with seven ongoing  pregnancies, or a success rate of 26.9% (7/26).  OvaScience is likewise attempting studies at the  Fakih IVF clinic in Dubai, United Arab Emirates.    II.  For Violations of §15 of the Securities Act   Against the Individual Defendants  171.  Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation contained above as if  fully set forth herein.  172.  The Individual Defendants were controlling persons of the Company within the  meaning of §15 of the Securities Act.  By reason of their ownership interest in, senior  management positions at, and/or directorships held at the Company, as alleged above, these  Defendants invest in, individually and collectively, had the power to influence, and exercised the  same, over the Company to cause it to engage in the conduct complained of herein.   173.  By reason of such wrongful conduct, the Individual Defendants are liable  pursuant to §15 of the Securities Act.  As a direct and proximate result of the wrongful conduct,  Class members suffered damages in connection with their purchases of the Company’s shares.  I.  OVASCIENCE AND THE AUGMENT FERTILITY TREATMENT   RETIREMENT SYSTEM, On Behalf of  Themselves and All Others Similarly Situated,  Plaintiff,  v. ",lose,1
4182861,win," Defendant is one of the nationwide credit reporting companies in the United States. 1    Defendant sells consumer Credit Reports to millions of American consumers  annually.    Defendant is a consumer reporting agency (“CRA”) that compiles and maintains  files on consumers on a nationwide basis and, as such, is regulated by the FCRA. See 15 U.S.C. §  1681a(f), (p).    One purpose of the FCRA is to require consumer reporting agencies to “adopt  reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel,  insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer.” 15  U.S.C. § 1681(b).    In furtherance of this goal, the FCRA mandates that Defendant, upon request, shall  clearly and accurately provide to a consumer all information in the consumer’s file at the time of  the request. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(1). In addition, when the request is made through the FCRA’s  Centralized Source, Defendant is required provide a consumer with a free copy of their Credit  Report each year. 15 U.S.C. § 1681j(a)(1)(A).     The only requirement for a consumer to obtain his or her file disclosure or free  report is that the consumer provide “proper identification.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(a)(1).    Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in the paragraphs above and  incorporates such allegations by reference herein.    Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n and 1681o of the FCRA, Defendant is liable for  willfully and negligently failing to provide consumers such as Plaintiff with a disclosure of all  information in their consumer files at the time of the request, following the furnishing of proper  identification, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a). Specifically, Plaintiff and the Class members  provided proper identification as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(a)(1), but were denied the  information in their file.    As a result of Defendant’s practices, Plaintiff and the Class members have suffered  damages in the form of payment of the fees described above.    Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in the paragraphs above and  incorporates such allegations by reference herein.    Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n and 1681o of the FCRA, Defendant is liable for  willfully and negligently failing to provide consumers such as Plaintiff with their free annual credit  reports and file disclosures free of charge following the furnishing of proper identification through  Centralized Source, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681j. Specifically, Plaintiff and the Class members  provided proper identification as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(a)(1), but were denied their free  reports and instead required to pay for reports that should have been free of charge.    As a result of Defendant’s practices, Plaintiff and the Class members have suffered  damages in the form of payment of the fees described above.    As a result of Defendant’s acts and practices as alleged in this Class Action  Complaint, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all Class members, seeks actual, statutory, and  punitive damages, in an amount to be proven at trial. Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and all Class  members, additionally seeks costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.     THEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as set forth below.   Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in the paragraphs above and  incorporates such allegations by reference herein.    Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in the paragraphs above and  incorporates such allegations by reference herein.    This cause of action is brought pursuant to the CLRA, seeking injunctive and  monetary damages.    Defendant’s actions, representations, and conduct have violated, and continue to  violate, the CLRA because they extend to transactions that are intended to result, or which have  resulted, in the sale or lease of goods or services to consumers.    Plaintiff and the Class members are “consumers” as that term is defined by the  CLRA. See CIV. CODE § 1761(d).    Plaintiff repeats each and every allegation contained in the paragraphs above and  incorporates such allegations by reference herein.    Plaintiff brings this claim for violation of the CCCRAA individually and on behalf  of the California Subclass.    Defendant is a “consumer credit reporting agency” as defined by the CCCRAA.  See CIV. CODE § 1785.3(d).    Plaintiff and the California Subclass members are “consumer[s]” as defined by the  CCCRAA. See id. § 1785.3(b).    The above-referenced Credit Reports are “consumer credit reports” as defined by  the CCCRAA. See id. § 1785.3(c).   A.  Defendant Is Required to Provide a Free Credit Report to   Plaintiff and the Members of the Class   Unfair and Unlawful Business Acts and Practices,  In Violation of Business and Professions Code Section 17200 et seq.  On Behalf of the Class   Violation of the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act,  CIV. CODE § 1785.1 et seq.  On Behalf of the California Subclass   Violation of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act – CIV. CODE § 1750 et seq.  On Behalf of the Class   Violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act – 15 U.S.C. § 1681j  On Behalf of the Class   Violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act – 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)  On Behalf of the Class  ",win,2
4133501,win," The Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class are (or were) cashiers at various Factor Sales’ owned grocery stores located in southwestern Arizona.  By way of example: A. Plaintiff Juvera worked as a cashier for Factor Sales at the time of his termination in August, 2011; B. Plaintiff Nunez worked as a cashier for Factor Sales from December, 2008 until she resigned her employment in October, 2011; C. Plaintiff Romero has worked as a cashier for Factor Sales from July, 2010 through the present date; and D. Plaintiff Vazquez has worked as a cashier for Factor Sales from June, 2011 through the present date.   On occasion, the cash till for the Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class does not add up correctly.  When that happens, the Defendants require the Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class to reimburse Factor Sales for any such shortage.   When the error is of the sort that the Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class collect too much money, the Defendants do not permit the Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class to keep the overage nor do they permit them to credit such overages against shortages they may have incurred on other days.   The Defendants maintain detailed logs setting forth how much each employee purportedly “owes” the Defendants.  Attached hereto as Exhibit A is an example of one such log, dated August 18, 2011, involving, inter alia, Plaintiff Vazquez.  On these forms, the “Saldo” column sets forth the balance “owed” by each employee, the “Abono” column sets forth the amounts of payments made by each employee, and the “Fecha” column sets forth the date each payment was made.  Once the employees pay back their “debt” to Factor Sales, they receive a note stating “FELICIDADES!!!”, which in Spanish means “Congratulations!!!”   When a Plaintiff and member of the proposed class receive their paycheck and they “owe” money to Factor Sales for the reasons set forth in ¶24, supra, and ¶32, infra, they are required to make a payment to Factor Sales from their earnings.  Upon information and belief, the dates of all of these payments are recorded on receipts such as the one attached hereto as Exhibit C.  Exhibit C, in fact, memorializes Plaintiff Vazquez’s $16.69 payment to Factor Sales or on or about August 18, 2011 for “Pago Faltantes”, which in Spanish means “missing payment”.   As errors of this sort seem to be commonplace at Factor Sales, the cycle set forth in ¶¶ 24 through 28, supra, repeats itself over and over.  By way of example, no sooner did Plaintiff Vazquez pay the $16.69 referenced in ¶27, supra, when she was informed that she now “owed” an additional $70.36 as set forth on attached Exhibit D.   The legal problem is, however, that once these payments are made to Factor Sales, the Plaintiffs and member of the proposed class are making less than minimum wage.  To illustrate the point, the illegality of this arrangement becomes obvious when one compares attached Exhibits B and C.   To make matters worse, the Defendants also charge the Plaintiffs and member of the proposed class twelve dollars ($12.00) for the cost of a second (or more) uniform and five dollars ($5.00) for security badges.  In select payroll periods involving particular cashiers, these charges also have the effect of making the employees work below the minimum wage.   Under a long line of established legal authority, “it is unlawful for an employer to deduct the cost of a uniform ... from an employee’s wages when the deduction reduces the wages of that employee below the minimum.”  Id. at §9.VI.F at 9-57 to 9-59.   In addition to the legal problems set forth in ¶¶30 and 32, supra, the Defendants’ policy of demanding and collecting payments from its employees as a term and condition of their employment also violates, inter alia, A.R.S. §§23-202 and 203.   Defendants have willfully failed to pay wages due the Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class in violation of the federal minimum wage law, 29 U.S.C. §206(a).  As such, the Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class are entitled to recover all unpaid wages and liquidated damages pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §216(b).  Defendants have willfully failed to pay wages at the rate of the Arizona Minimum Wage, in violation of the Arizona Minimum Wage Act, codified at A.R.S. §23-363(A).  The Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class are entitled to recover the balance of the wages owed, including interest thereon, and an additional amount equal to twice the underpaid wages pursuant to A.R.S. §23-364(G).  Defendants have willfully failed to pay wages to the Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class for labor performed as required pursuant to A.R.S. §23-351[c].   As this Court has concluded previously, the treble damages provision set forth in A.R.S. §23-355(A) may be applied to treble a liquidated damages award received under the FLSA pursuant to this Court’s supplemental jurisdiction.  Davis v. Jobs for Progress, 427 F.Supp. 479, 483 (D. Ariz. 1976). Violation of FLSA Minimum Wage Standard  Violation of Arizona Wage Law  Violation of Arizona Minimum Wage Act ",win,3
6789207,lose," Plaintiffs bring this action pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules  of Civil Procedure, on behalf of the class defined as follows: all past and current  employees of defendant FCA who were dues paying members of the UAW  impacted by the illegal, improper, and collusive conduct of FCA and the UAW  in violation of the LMRA.    The members of the class are so numerous that joinder is  impractical, if not impossible.    The members of the class can be identified easily through a review  of the business records of FCA and the UAW.    There are common questions of fact and law affecting all class  members that arise as a result of the allegations in this complaint.    Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the  proposed class as they are injured employees of FCA and injured members of  the UAW.     A class action is a superior method of resolution to the other  available methods for a fair, efficient, and just resolution of this controversy.    The expense and burden of individual litigation are impediments to  class members’ seeking relief for the wrongful conduct alleged.    This action is maintainable under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules  of Civil Procedure because common questions of fact and law predominate over  questions affecting only individual class members (individual questions focus  almost exclusively on the amount of damages owed in the form of dues paid by  the class members, and other compensation, including compensatory damages,  punitive damages, and interest).    The amount in controversy with respect to each individual member  of the class is relatively modest when compared to the costly prosecution of  separate actions.    Plaintiffs incorporate the preceding paragraphs by reference.    FCA unlawfully paid bribes to executives of the UAW to take FCA- friendly positions during collecting bargaining negotiations, including those in  2011 and 2015.    FCA, through the acts of its designated agents, who included  officers, directors, senior managers, and executives, knowingly and voluntarily  joined the conspiracy.    Members of the conspiracy made prohibited payments with the  intention of impermissibly influencing the collective bargaining process.    The prohibited payments did impermissibly influence the collective  bargaining process by allowing FCA to obtain company-friendly concessions  from the UAW during the collective bargaining process.    The prohibited payments caused at least one designated agent of the  UAW, a co-conspirator with FCA, to direct and/or impermissibly influence the  decision of the UAW Executive Board to expend billions of dollars in the non- arm’s length purchase of an equity interest in FCA.    As a result of FCA’s violation of the LMRA, plaintiffs and other  class members have been harmed in that potentially hundreds of millions of  dollars of their dues paid to the UAW for the purposes of good-faith negotiations  have instead been spent on tainted and/or illegal collective bargaining  negotiations.    Plaintiffs incorporate the preceding paragraphs by reference.    The UAW engaged in willfully requesting, receiving, accepting, and  agreeing to receive and accept, money and things of value from persons acting  in the interest of FCA.    The UAW gave authority to its designated agents, including  Holiefield and King, among others, to represent its members who were  employees of FCA.    The UAW had an obligation to serve the interests of all members  without favoritism to the company, and/or without favoritism or hostility to any  members, to exercise its representational discretion with complete good faith  and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct.    The UAW breached its duty to its membership, by acting based  upon the improper motivation of FCA’s bribery, and the UAW’s requesting and  receiving prohibited payments and things of value.    The UAW’s representation of its membership was arbitrary,  perfunctory, or inexcusably neglectful.    By its involvement in the FCA/UAW conspiracy, the UAW,  through its designated agents, lacked a rational basis for decision-making when  it chose to expend millions of dollars of its members’ dues in the tainted  bargaining process.    By its involvement in the conspiracy, the UAW, through its  designated agents, lacked a rational basis for decision making and acted  egregiously neglectful when it expended billions of dollars of its membership’s  dues on a non-arm’s length purchase of an equity interest in FCA.    By the multiple UAW actors in the FCA conspiracy, the UAW  failed in its duty to investigate the actions of its designated agents, to the  detriment of its members’ rights, and to the expense of its membership through  hundreds of millions of dollars of dues having been wasted on tainted  bargaining.   BREACH OF THE DUTY OF   FAIR REPRESENTATION UNDER THE LMRA    VIOLATION OF THE   LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT   ",win,5
6155506,lose,"(as to Donor No. 1’s claims)    For the First Amendment claim, Donor No. 1 proposes to certify a  class of all United States citizens who made anonymous donations to the Free Barrett  Brown campaign.    For the Stored Communications Act claim, Donor No. 1 proposes to  certify a class of all United States citizens who made donations to the Free Barrett Brown  campaign.    For the California constitutional right to privacy claim, Donor No. 1  proposes to certify a class of all California citizens who made anonymous donations to the  Free Barret Brown campaign.    Excluded from the classes are: Ms. Heath and Agent Smith, and each  of their agents and legal representatives.  Also excluded are the judge and staff to whom  this case is assigned, and the judge’s immediate family.    Donor No. 1 incorporates each of the allegations set forth above into  this claim for relief.    Defendants acted under color of law by serving the WePay Subpoena.   The WePay Subpoena’s bald assertion that the information it requested would be used at  Mr. Brown’s trial, without any indication or evidence of a connection to the crimes Mr.  Brown was charged with, demonstrates the complete lack of relevance of the information  requested.  The WePay Subpoena’s true purpose was to gather information regarding the  donors.  When WePay produced documents in response, the violation was complete.   Because Defendants had no cause to suspect wrongdoing by the donors, and thus could not  otherwise obtain information about the donors legally, they used the trial of Mr. Brown,  and the WePay Subpoena, as an illegal work-around.    The donations were acts of political expression, showing the donors’  frustrations with what they perceived to be government bullying and prosecutorial  overreach.  Donations made in support of litigation are protected by the First Amendment.   The donors violated no law by sending money to support Mr. Brown’s legal defense, and  instead were exercising their constitutionally protected rights.  Thus, Defendants’  surveillance of the donors was unlawful.    Plaintiffs incorporate each of the allegations set forth above into this  claim for relief.    The Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) provides that government  entities must obtain a warrant to compel the disclosure of the contents of electronic  communications that are less than 180 days old from electronic communication service  providers.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).      Government entities may require the disclosure of contents of  electronic communications that are more than 180 days old with a subpoena only if prior  notice is given to the customer or subscriber.  18 U.S.C. § 2703(b).    An “electronic communication” is “any transfer of signs, signals,  writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part  by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic, or photooptical system that affects  interstate or foreign commerce[.]”  18 U.S.C. § 2510(12).    The “contents” of “electronic communications” include “any  information concerning the substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.”  18   The surveillance program also violated Donor No. 1’s right of privacy  set out in Article 1, Section 1 of the California Constitution.  Donor No. 1 brings this claim  on behalf of a subclass of donors who are California citizens.  If discovery demonstrates  that donors from other states with constitutional privacy protections were ensnared in  Defendants’ surveillance program, Donor No. 1 will seek leave to amend his complaint to  bring claims on their behalf as well.  States with applicable constitutional privacy  protections include, without limitation, Alaska (Art. I, § 22), Arizona (Art. II, § 8), Florida  (Art. I, § 23), Hawaii (Art. I, § 6), Illinois (Art. I, §6), Louisiana (Art. I, § 5), Montana  (Art. II, § 10), South Carolina (Art. I, § 10), and Washington (Art. I, § 7).   A.  Declaring that the conduct alleged above violated the California  constitutional right to privacy;   B.  Awarding Donor No. 1 and the subclass damages according to proof at trial;   C.  Awarding Donor No. 1 the costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees,  associated with bringing this action; and  D.  Any other relief the Court deems proper.  A.  Declaring that the conduct alleged above violated the First Amendment  rights of Donor No. 1 and the class;  B.  Directing the FBI, DOJ, and other agencies or entities that received donors’  private, sensitive information to destroy such information;  C.  Enjoining Defendants from engaging in similar unlawful surveillance in the  future;   D.  Awarding Donor No. 1 the costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees,  associated with bringing this action; and  E.  Any other relief the Court deems proper.  OF THE UNITED STATES  CONSTITUTION; THE STORED  COMMUNICATIONS ACT; AND THE  RIGHT TO SPEAK AND ASSOCIATE ANONYMOUSLY  (Donor No. 1 and the Class Against Defendants Heath and Smith)   THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT  (Kevin Gallagher, Donor No. 1, and the Class Against the United States)   UNDER THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION  (Donor No. 1 And Subclass Against All Defendants)  ",lose,2
4182750,lose," Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding  paragraphs of this complaint.    Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the proposed Class against  Vigo.    Vigo, as the designer, manufacturer, marketer, distributor, and/or seller, expressly  warranted that its Octopus Products contained octopus.      In fact, the Octopus Products contain squid instead of octopus and Vigo’s express  warranties that the Octopus Products contained octopus are therefore false.      As a direct and proximate cause of Vigo’s breach of express warranty, Plaintiff and  Class members have been injured and harmed because:  (a) they would not have purchased the  Octopus Products on the same terms if they had known the true facts that the Octopus Products  contained squid instead of octopus; (b) they paid a price premium for the Octopus Products due to  Vigo’s  promises that it contained octopus; and (c) Vigo’s Octopus Products did not have the  characteristics, ingredients, uses or benefits, as promised.   Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding  paragraphs of this complaint.    Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding  paragraphs of this complaint.    Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the proposed Class against  Vigo.    Plaintiff and Class members conferred benefits on Vigo by purchasing the Octopus  Products.      Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding  paragraphs of this complaint.    Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the proposed Subclass  against Vigo.    California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a)(5), prohibits  “[r]epresenting that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses,  benefits, or quantities which they do not have or that a person has a sponsorship, approval, status,  affiliation, or connection which he or she does not have.”    California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a)(9), prohibits  “[a]dvertising goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised.”    Vigo violated this provision by misrepresenting that its Octopus Products contained  octopus when in fact they contained squid.    Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding  paragraphs of this complaint.    Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the proposed Subclass  against Vigo.    Vigo is subject to California’s Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code  §§ 17200, et seq.  The UCL provides, in pertinent part: “Unfair competition shall mean and include  unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practices and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading  advertising ….”    Vigo’s  misrepresentations and other conduct, described herein, violated the  “unlawful” prong of the UCL by violating the CLRA as described herein; the FAL as described  herein; and Cal. Com. Code § 2607.    Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding  paragraphs of this complaint.    Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the proposed Subclass  against Vigo.    California’s False Advertising Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17500, et seq.,  makes it “unlawful for any person to make or disseminate or cause to be made or disseminated  before the public in this state, ... in any advertising device ... or in any other manner or means  whatever, including over the Internet, any statement, concerning ... personal property or services,  professional or otherwise, or performance or disposition thereof, which is untrue or misleading and  which is known, or which by the exercise of reasonable care should be known, to be untrue or  misleading.”    Vigo committed acts of false advertising, as defined by §17500, by misrepresenting  that its Octopus Products contained octopus when in fact they contained squid.    Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding  paragraphs of this complaint.    Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the proposed Class against  Vigo.    As discussed above, Vigo misrepresented that the Octopus Products contained  octopus when in fact they contained squid.  Vigo had a duty to disclose this information.    At the time Vigo made these representations, Vigo knew or should have known that  these representations were false or made them without knowledge of their truth or veracity.    At an absolute minimum, Vigo negligently misrepresented and/or negligently  omitted material facts about the Octopus Products.    The negligent misrepresentations and omissions made by Vigo, upon which Plaintiff  and Class members reasonably and justifiably relied, were intended to induce and actually induced  Plaintiff and Class members to purchase the Octopus Products.    Plaintiff and Class members would not have purchased the Octopus Products if the  true facts had been known.    Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in all preceding  paragraphs of this complaint.    Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the proposed Class against  Vigo.    As discussed above, Vigo provided Plaintiff and Class members with false or  misleading material information and failed to disclose material facts about its Octopus Products,  including but not limited to the fact that it contained squid when the product was represented to  contain octopus.  These misrepresentations and omissions were made with knowledge of their  falsehood.    The misrepresentations and omissions made by Vigo, upon which Plaintiff and  Class members reasonably and justifiably relied, were intended to induce and actually induced  Plaintiff and Class members to purchase the Octopus Products.    Vigo’s fraudulent actions caused damage to Plaintiff and Class members, who are  entitled to damages and other legal and equitable relief as a result.  Breach of the Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose   Breach of Express Warranty   Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability   Fraud   Negligent Misrepresentation   Unjust Enrichment   Violation of California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act,  California Civil Code §§ 1750, et seq.  (Injunctive Relief Only)   Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law,  California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq.   Violation of California’s False Advertising Law,  California Business & Professions Code §§ 17500, et seq.  ",win,2
59892367,lose," Defendant alleges Plaintiff owes a debt (“the alleged Debt”).    The alleged Debt is an alleged obligation of Plaintiff to pay money arising out of a  transaction in which the money, property, insurance, or services which are the subject of the  transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.    The alleged Debt does not arise from any business enterprise of Plaintiff.    The alleged Debt is a “debt” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).    At an exact time known only to Defendant, the alleged Debt was assigned or  otherwise transferred to Defendant for collection.     At the time the alleged Debt was assigned or otherwise transferred to Defendant for  collection, the alleged Debt was in default.    In its efforts to collect the alleged Debt, Defendant decided to contact Plaintiff by  written correspondence.    Rather than preparing and mailing such written correspondence to Plaintiff on its  own, Defendant decided to utilize a third-party vendor to perform such activities on its behalf.    As part of its utilization of the third-party vendor, Defendant conveyed information  regarding the alleged Debt to the third-party vendor.    The information conveyed by Defendant to the third-party vendor included  Plaintiff’s status as a debtor, the precise amount of the alleged Debt, the entity to which Plaintiff  allegedly owed the debt, among other things.     Defendant’s conveyance of the information regarding the alleged Debt to the third- party vendor is a “communication” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2).  4    The third-party vendor then populated some or all this information into a prewritten  template, printed, and mailed the letter to Plaintiff at Defendant’s direction.    That letter, dated June 11, 2020, was received and read by Plaintiff.  (A true and  accurate copy of that collection letter (the “Letter”) is annexed hereto as “Exhibit 1.”)    The Letter, which conveyed information about the alleged Debt, is a  “communication” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2).    15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) provides that, subject to several exceptions not applicable  here, “a debt collector may not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt,” with  anyone other than the consumer “without the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the  debt collector.”    The third-party vendor does not fall within any of the exceptions provided for in 15  U.S.C. § 1692c(b).    Plaintiff never consented to Defendant’s communication with the third-party  vendor concerning the alleged Debt.    Plaintiff never consented to Defendant’s communication with the third-party  vendor concerning Plaintiff’s personal and/or confidential information.    Plaintiff never consented to Defendant’s communication with anyone concerning  the alleged Debt or concerning Plaintiff’s personal and/or confidential information.    Upon information and belief, Defendant has utilized a third-party vendor for these  purposes thousands of times.    Defendant utilizes a third-party vendor in this regard for the sole purpose of  maximizing its profits.    Defendant utilizes a third-party vendor without regard to the propriety and privacy  5  of the information which it discloses to such third-party.   Defendant utilizes a third-party vendor with reckless disregard for the harm to Plaintiff and other consumers that could result from Defendant’s unauthorized disclosure of such  private and sensitive information.   Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) when it disclosed information about Plaintiff’s alleged Debt to the third-party vendor.   15 U.S.C. § 1692f provides that a debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.    The unauthorized disclosure of a consumer’s private and sensitive information is both unfair and unconscionable.   Defendant disclosed Plaintiff’s private and sensitive information to the third-party vendor.    Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) when it disclosed information about Plaintiff’s alleged Debt to the third-party vendor.   For the foregoing reasons, Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692c(b) and 1692f and is liable to Plaintiff therefor.  Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action on behalf of all consumers similarly situated in Suffolk County.   Plaintiff seeks to certify a class of: i. All consumers where Defendant sent information concerning the consumer’s debt to a third-party vendor without obtaining the prior  consent of the consumer, which disclosure was made on or after a date  one year prior to the filing of this action to the present.   This action seeks a finding that Defendant’s conduct violates the FDCPA and asks 6  that the Court award damages as authorized by 15 U.S.C. § 1692k.    The Class consists of more than thirty-five persons.    Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class.  Common questions of law  or fact raised by this action affect all members of the Class and predominate over any individual  issues.  Common relief is therefore sought on behalf of all members of the Class.  A class action is  superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy.    The prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would  create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to the individual members of the  Class, and a risk that any adjudications with respect to individual members of the Class would, as  a practical matter, either be dispositive of the interests of other members of the Class not party to  the adjudication, or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests.  Defendant  has acted in a manner applicable to the Class as a whole such that declaratory relief is warranted.    Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect and represent the interests of the Class.  The management of the class is not extraordinarily difficult, and the factual and legal issues raised  by this action will not require extended contact with the members of the Class, because Defendant’s  conduct was perpetrated on all members of the Class and will be established by common proof.   Moreover, Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in actions brought under consumer protection  laws. ",win,3
8491055,lose,"   Defendant owns, manages and/or operates the Hotel.      As part of its operations, Defendant provides its customers and the public  reservations services, including, but not limited to, the ability to reserve rooms online via  the Website.      Within the applicable limitations period, Plaintiff visited the Website to identify  the accessible features of the Hotel and its guest rooms to determine whether it met her  accessibility needs.       Plaintiff was unable to independently ascertain the accessible features of the Hotel  and its guest rooms by reference to the Website as required by the ADA.  42 U.S.C. §  12182 et seq. and 28 C.F.R. §   36.302(e)(1) et seq. (“ADA Accessibility Standards”).     An investigation performed on Plaintiff’s behalf confirmed the allegations made  by Plaintiff in paragraphs 16 through 17.     The barriers to access on the Website, all encountered by Plaintiff, include but are  not limited to, the following:   a)  The Website fails to disclose the physical barriers to access identified in  the preceding section.  These physical access barriers represent material  elements of the Hotel that do not comply with applicable ADA Standards.   Defendant’s failure to identify them prevents Plaintiff and other  individuals with disabilities from independently determining if the Hotel  meets his or her accessibility needs.  b)  On the homepage of www.choicehotels.com/ohio/cleveland/comfort-inn- hotels/oh167?source=gyxt, there is a general description of the Hotel's  location and features; however, none of the information provided relates to  accessibility as required by Disability Access Laws.  c)  On the homepage there is a section labeled ""Amenities"" which offers a list  of various amenities that the Hotel provides; however, none of the  information provided relates to accessibility as required by Disability  Access Laws.  d)  On the homepage there is a section labeled ""Policies"" that offers a list of  the Hotel's various policies; however, there was no information pertaining  to accessibility as required by Disability Access Laws.  e)  Remaining links from the homepage do not contain information regarding  accessibility as required by Disability Access Laws.  e)       When attempting to make a reservation, Plaintiff was unable to book a  room because she was unable to find any information or room option  pertaining to accessibility as required by Disability Access Laws.     Defendant’s failure to modify its policies, practices and procedures to ensure that  individuals with disabilities can make reservations for accessible guest rooms during the  same hours and in the same manner as individuals who do not need accessible rooms is  discriminatory and violates ADA Accessibility Standards.     Plaintiff is a tester in this litigation and a consumer who wishes to access  Defendant’s good and services at the Hotel.  Plaintiff is being deterred from patronizing  the Hotel on particular occasions but intends to return to the Hotel and the Website for  the dual purpose of availing herself of the goods and services offered to the public by the  Hotel and to ensure that Defendant ceases evading its responsibilities under federal law.     However, the lack of accessible reservations services has deterred Plaintiff from  staying at the Hotel.     Plaintiff has been, and in the absence of an injunction will continue to be, injured  by Defendant’s policy and practice of failing to provide accessible reservations services  to persons with disabilities.     Plaintiff brings this action under Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) of the federal rules of civil  procedure and on behalf of herself and the following class: “All individuals with  disabilities who have been, or in the future will be, denied the full and equal enjoyment of  reservations services offered to guests at the Hotel because of the lack of accessible  reservations services through the Website.”     Numerosity: The class described above is so numerous that joinder of all  individual members in one action would be impracticable. The disposition of the  individual claims of the respective class members through this class action will benefit  both the parties and the Court and will facilitate judicial economy.     Typicality:  Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the members of the  class. The claims of Plaintiff and members of the class are based on the same legal  theories and arise from the same unlawful conduct.     Common Questions of Fact and Law:  There is a well-defined community of  interest and common questions of fact and law affecting members of the class in that they  all have been and/or are being denied their civil rights to full and equal access to, and use  and enjoyment of, Defendant’s goods, services and facilities due to the policies and  practices described above.     Adequacy of Representation:  Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the class  because her interests do not conflict with the interests of the members of the class.  Plaintiff will fairly, adequately, and vigorously represent and protect the interests of the  members of the class and has no interests antagonistic to the members of the class.  Plaintiff has retained counsel who are competent and experienced in the prosecution of  class action litigation, generally, and who possess specific expertise in the context of  litigation under the ADA.     Class certification is appropriate pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) because  Defendant has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class,  making appropriate both declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff and the  class as a whole.    Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations stated in paragraphs “1” through  “29” of this complaint as if fully stated herein.      Plaintiff brings this claim individually and on behalf of the class.     Plaintiff is an individual with a disability under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. §  Violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181, et seq.  ",win,4
6125070,win,"(Violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act)   (Violations	of	29	CFR	516)	   Plaintiff KRISTY REYES, files this case as an “opt in” collective action, as it  is specifically allowed by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).    The class that Plaintiff KRISTY REYES, seeks to represent may be described  as follows:  All current and former employees of Defendant who worked as  “Care Givers” and/or “Cooks”, and was not compensated at  time and a half for hours worked above forty each  workweek and who were not compensated for off-the- clock work performed, in violation of 29 U.S.C. 201 et. seq.    Plaintiff, KRISTY REYES, seeks to represent only those members of the  above-described group who, after appropriate notice of their ability to opt into this action, have  provided consent in writing to be represented by counsel for Plaintiff KRISTY REYES, as  required by 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).    Those persons who choose to opt in, referred to as the “Putative class  members”, will be listed on subsequent pleadings and copies of their written consents to sue  will be filed with the Court.    Plaintiff KRISTY REYES contends that this action is appropriate for  collective action status because Defendant herein has acted in the same manner with regard to all  members of the putative class.   For purposes of this action, the “relevant period” is defined as such period  commencing on the date that is three years prior to the filing of this action, and continuing  thereafter.    Defendant employed Plaintiff KRISTY REYES from approximately June 19  2015 to January 18, 2016.  Plaintiff worked as a Care Giver whose job was to care for the elderly.    During her employment and in the routine performance of day-to-day job duties,  Plaintiff has performed non-exempt work, during a significant period of most days, as classified  by the Act, because the performance of Plaintiff’s job required it and because Defendant’s  management required the performance of those non-exempted job duties, as a condition of her  continued employment.     During Plaintiff KRISTY REYES’S employment, she and similarly situated  employees wore a uniform and were given instructions by Defendant as to their day-to-day job  duties and responsibilities.    Defendant supervised Plaintiff and similarly situated employees.     Plaintiff was not an independent contractor.    Plaintiff was paid an hourly rate and was therefore not a salaried employee.    Plaintiff was a non-exempt employee, as no lawful exemption excused  defendant from paying her at a rate of time and a half for all hours worked above forty in a  given week.    Plaintiff’s regular workweek schedule was 6:00AM to and 6:00PM Monday  through Sunday.     Although Plaintiff worked 84 hours per week, her overtime pay would not  begin until she had worked fifty-six (56) hours.    Plaintiff was required to work the first sixteen (16) hours above forty (40) hours  each week at her regular rate of $9.17 per hour instead of the overtime rate of $13. 75 per hour.    Plaintiff was denied sixteen (16) hours of overtime pay for the duration of her  employment with defendant.     Further, during these hours worked, Plaintiff performed the function of her job,  which included the performance duties typically performed by “hourly” paid non-exempt  employees because the job required it and the Defendant’s management required it, as a condition  of Plaintiff’s continued employment.    Defendant required Plaintiff and all others similarly situated to perform all  necessary work to include the performance of those duties otherwise typically performed  by “hourly” employees which routinely required Plaintiff and other similarly situated  employees to work “overtime” and “off-the-clock” hours as defined by 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.,  for which they failed to receive overtime compensation as required by the Act.    Defendant failed to pay statutory overtime as required by 29 U.S.C. § 201 et  seq.    Each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs is re-alleged  as if fully written herein.    Plaintiff KRISTY REYES and all others similarly situated are entitled to receive  overtime pay for all hours they have worked in excess of 40 during each seven-day workweek  and minimum wage for off-the-clock hours worked.    Defendant failed to compensate Plaintiff and all others similarly situated,  their entitled pay (including overtime pay) for those hours they worked in excess of 40 per  week.    Defendant failed to compensate Plaintiff and all others similarly situated, their  entitled pay (including overtime pay) for those hours worked in excess of forty (40) per week  and for off-the-clock work performed.     Defendant has violated 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. by failing to compensate the  Plaintiff and all other similarly situated employees “overtime” pay for all hours worked in excess  of 40 hours per week.  Defendant failed to Compensate Plaintiff for overtime hours worked both  on and off the clock and failed to compensate Plaintiff and similarly situated employees at  minimum wage for off-the-clock hours worked.     Defendant failed to keep or record accurate time records reflecting the hours  employees, such as the Plaintiff and those similarly situated actually worked.       The Defendant’s conduct was willful within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. § 255(a).    No lawful exemption excused the Defendant from compensating Plaintiff and  all others similarly situated, overtime pay for hours worked over forty per week or for time  worked off the clock.    Defendants knowingly, willfully, or with reckless disregard carried out an  illegal pattern and practice of deceptive and fraudulent accounting practices regarding  overtime a n d  o f f - t h e - c l o c k  compensation due to Plaintiff and to all others  similarly situated.    Plaintiff and all others similarly situated seek an amount of back-pay equal to  the unpaid overtime compensation from the date they commenced employment for the  Defendant until the date of trial.    Plaintiff and all others similarly situated further seek an additional equal amount  as liquidated damages, as well as reasonable attorney’s fees and costs as provided by 29  U.S.C. § 216(b), along with post-judgment interest at the highest rate allowed by law.   Each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs is re-alleged as if  fully written herein.    Other employees have been victimized by the above referenced pattern,  practice, and policy of Defendants in violation of the FLSA.    Thus, from personal knowledge, Plaintiff is aware that the illegal practices  and policies of Defendant have been imposed on other workers.    Other, similarly situated employees are being denied their lawful wages.    Plaintiff KRISTY REYES experiences are typical experiences of the putative class  as it pertains to compensation.    The specific job titles or job requirements of the various members of the class do  not prevent collective treatment.    All employees, regardless of their job requirements or rates of pay, who are  denied overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 per week and not paid for off- the-clock work performed, are similarly situated.    Although the issue of damages may be individual in character, there is no  detraction from the common nucleus of liability facts.    All current and former employees who worked as “Caregivers” or “Cooks” who  at any time during the three years prior to the date of filing of this action to the date of judgment  were denied overtime pay for hours worked in excess of forty (40) and not compensated for  off-the-clock work in any given workweek are properly included as members of the class. ",win,3
4411256,lose," Published reports indicate that Defendant is working to have four business  locations in Washington within a short period of time, and that Defendant will open at least four  to six new business locations every few years.       90.060.  This violation, per statute, is a per se violation of Washington’s Consumer  Protection Act, RCW 19.86.010, et seq.      Representative Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of herself and as a  representative of the following class of persons (the “National Class”) entitled to remedies under  federal law including, but not limited to, injunctive relief and damages:  All persons in the United States of America and its territories who  were sent, to their cellular telephone numbers, at least one  unsolicited text message by Defendant, or someone acting on  behalf of Defendant.    Representative Plaintiff also brings this class action on behalf of herself and as a  representative of the following persons (the “Washington Subclass”) who are entitled to  remedies under Washington State law including, but not limited to, damages:   All persons in Washington State who were sent, to their cellular  telephone numbers, at least one unsolicited text message by  Defendant, or someone acting on behalf of Defendant.    Plaintiffs’ class claims satisfy all of the requirements for class action certification  pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures, Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2), and  23(b)(3).    Satisfying all requisite numerosity requirements, numerous consumers in  Washington State and numerous consumers throughout the United States are believed to be  members of this class. Joinder of so many class members in to a single action is impracticable. In  fact, given the number of class members, the only way to deliver substantial justice to all  members of the class is by means of a single class action.      Plaintiffs reassert and re-allege the allegations set forth in the above paragraphs as  if the same were alleged herein this count.     At all times material herein, Plaintiffs have been entitled to the rights, protections,  and benefits provided under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227.    Negligently, recklessly, willfully, and/or intentionally, Defendant directly and/or  vicariously engaged in acts, omissions, and/or other conduct as referenced herein this complaint  that violates the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. Defendant directly and/or vicariously  created, designed, deployed, and otherwise used an ATDS which initiated numerous telephone  calls to Plaintiffs’ cellular telephone numbers. These telephone calls transmitted unsolicited  commercial text messages to the cellular telephones of Representative Plaintiff and the other  Plaintiffs as referenced in this complaint.    Plaintiffs are entitled to recover $500 in damages from the Defendant for each  violation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.    Additionally, Plaintiffs are entitled to all damages referenced herein and in accord  with proof, attorneys’ fees, costs, treble damages, and other remedies allowed by the Telephone  Consumer Protection Act or else otherwise permitted by law.     Plaintiffs reassert and re-allege the allegations set forth in the above paragraphs.    At all times material herein, Plaintiffs have been entitled to the rights, protections,  and benefits provided under the Washington Consumer Protection Act and related Washington  statutes.    Defendant’s practice of transmitting and/or assisting in the transmission of  electronic commercial text messages to Plaintiffs’ cellular phones is a violation of RCW    Defendant’s practice of transmitting and/or assisting in the transmission of  electronic commercial text messages to Plaintiffs’ cellular phones is conduct that vitally affects  the public interest and is an unfair or deceptive act in trade or commerce and an unfair method of  competition for the purpose of applying the Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86.010, et seq.      Defendant conducted these practices in the scope of its trade and in furtherance of  the development and preservation of such business services.    Defendant’s violations of the Consumer Protection Act are intentional, willful,  and subject to treble damages under RCW 19.86.010, et seq.    Plaintiffs have suffered injuries to their persons and property as a direct result of  Defendant’s numerous violations of RCW 19.86.010, et seq.     Defendant’s practices are emblematic of organizational policies and agreements  which have caused and, if unabated, will continue to cause incidents, occurrences, and conduct  which violate RCW 19.86.010, et seq., and RCW 19.190.010, et seq.    Plaintiffs are entitled to recover damages for each of the violations of RCW    Defendant and others acting on its behalf operate and market a profit-making  enterprise known as “Universal Men’s Clinic.”  Defendant advertises the business as a clinic  specializing in medication for erectile dysfunction and low testosterone.       Defendant previously conducted business as Hawaii Male Medical Clinic, from  multiple locations in Hawaii.  In early 2013, Defendant changed the business name in connection  with an aggressive growth business strategy.  Defendant re-branded the business “Universal  Men’s Clinic” and began working to generate revenue on the mainland United States.     Violations of the Washington Consumer Protection Act  (Representative Plaintiff and the Washington Subclass vs. Defendant)   Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act  (Representative Plaintiff and the National Class vs. Defendant)  ",lose,2
31101329,win," Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.  P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3).    The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of  Defendant and those companies and entities on whose behalf it attempts to collect debts and/or  has purchased debts.    Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendant and all officers, members,  partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendant and their respective immediate  families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate  families.     There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common  issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal  issue is whether the Defendant’s written communications to consumers, in the forms attached  as Exhibits A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e.    Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure  is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff  Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member and in that a class action  is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.    Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at  the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues  pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).   Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length  herein.    Some time prior to March 31, 2020, an obligation was allegedly incurred to  Citibank, N.A./Best Buy.    The alleged Citibank, N.A./Best Buy obligation is a ""debt"" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§  1692a(5).    Citibank, N.A./Best Buy is a ""creditor"" as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4).    Defendant Cavalry purportedly purchased the rights to collect the Citibank,  N.A./Best Buy debt who contracted with Defendant C&B to collect the alleged debt.    Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been  incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United  States Postal Services, telephone and internet.  Violation  – March 31, 2020 Collection Letter    On or about March 31, 2020, Defendant C& B sent the Plaintiff a collection letter  (the “Letter”) on behalf of the Defendant Cavalry regarding the alleged debt owed to Citibank,  N.A./Best Buy. A true and correct copy of the Letter is attached hereto as Exhibit A.    The Letter lists a balance of $3,347.65.    The letter offers various offers of settlement on the full balance.    The letter offers a “3 Month Payment Plan” and offers the following terms:  “Take $502.15 off the balance. Pay 3 equal monthly installments of $948.50.  First Payment due no later than 05/15/20 and every 30 days thereafter.  Your  account will be considered “Settled in Full” after we post your final payment.”    The letter states that the first payment is due no later than 05/15/20 and every 30  days thereafter.    The letter is confusing and deceptive by offering a settlement agreement with  unclear terms as to due date of the payments.      This could easily confuse and deceive the consumer as the Letter does not indicate  whether the payment is due on the 15th of each month or within 30 days of the last payment.     This language is false and deceptive as Plaintiff was unable to determine when the  settlement payments would be due.    Defendants’ collection efforts with respect to this alleged debt from Plaintiff caused  Plaintiff to suffer concrete and particularized harm because the FDCPA provides Plaintiff with  the legally protected right to be not to be misled or treated unfairly with respect to any action  for the collection of any consumer debt.    Defendants’ deceptive, misleading and unfair representations with respect to its  collection effort were material misrepresentations that affected and frustrated Plaintiff's ability  to intelligently respond to Defendants’ collection efforts because Plaintiff could not adequately  respond to the Defendants’ demand for payment of this debt.    Defendants’ actions created an appreciable risk to Plaintiff of being unable to  properly respond or handle Defendants’ debt collection.    Plaintiff was confused and misled to her detriment by the statements in the dunning  letter, and relied on the contents of the letter to her detriment.    Plaintiff would have pursued a different course of action were it not for the statutory  violation(s).    As a result of Defendants’ deceptive, misleading and unfair debt collection   practices, Plaintiff has been damaged.   Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein.    Defendants’ debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff  violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.    Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §  1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive,  or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.    Defendant violated § 1692e:   a. As the Letter it is open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one  of which is inaccurate.  b. By making a false and misleading representation in violation of §1692e(10).    By reason thereof, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's  conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, and Plaintiff is entitled to an award of  actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees. ",win,3
6859476,lose," Defendant has repeatedly placed calls using an ATDS and containing a prerecorded  and/or artificial voice to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone (336) XXX-8932.    Plaintiff’s number was and is assigned to a cellular telephone service as specified in  47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).      AMEX calls Plaintiff from telephone numbers 866-884-0976, 801-945-9064 and  800-528-4800.    AMEX has inserted Plaintiff’s telephone number in an automated calling campaign  to further its efforts to contact “Jessica,” a person who Plaintiff does not have any relationship with  and does not know.     AMEX has bombarded the Plaintiff with multiple daily automated and prerecorded  message calls throughout January 2018 regarding “Jessica.”     Nevertheless, the calls to Plaintiff at the -8932 number have persisted and  continued.      At all times mentioned herein, AMEX called Plaintiff’s cellular telephone using  an “automatic telephone dialing system” (“autodialer”) as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1).   When Plaintiff answered calls from AMEX, he heard a prerecorded greeting from AMEX before  the call would be routed to a live agent.  This is indicative of AMEX’s use of a “predictive  dialer.”     The Federal Communications Commission has defined ATDS under the TCPA to  include “predictive dialers.”  See In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the  Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 23 F.C.C.R. 559, at ¶ 12, 2008 WL 65485 (F.C.C.)  (2008).    In addition, upon information and belief the hardware and software combination  utilized by AMEX has the capacity to store and dial sequentially generated numbers, randomly  generated numbers or numbers from a database of numbers.     Defendant uses prerecorded and artificial messages when it calls the Plaintiff’s  cellular telephone.  As noted, when Plaintiff answers AMEX’s calls, he heard an artificial and/or  prerecorded voice stating the call was from AMEX and the call may be recorded.     The same message has been used by the Defendant on multiple occasions.     Defendant did not have Plaintiff’s prior express consent to place automated calls to  Plaintiff on her cellular telephone.    Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 on behalf  of herself and all others similarly situated.    Plaintiff represents, and is a member of the following two classes:    Class A   All persons within the United States to whom AMEX or its agent/s and/or  employee/s called said person’s cellular telephone through the use of any  automatic telephone dialing system within the four years prior to the filing of  the Complaint where such person was not a customer of AMEX.  Class B  All persons within the United States to whom AMEX or its agent/s and/or  employee/s called said person’s cellular telephone with an artificial or  prerecorded voice within the four years prior to the filing of the Complaint  where such person was not a customer of AMEX.    Defendant and its employees or agents are excluded from the Classes. Plaintiff  does not know the number of members in the Classes, but believes the class members number in  the several thousands, if not more. Thus, this matter should be certified as a class action to assist  in the expeditious litigation of this matter.  B. Numerosity    Upon information and belief, Defendant has placed automated and/or prerecorded  message calls to cellular telephone numbers belonging to thousands of consumers, after being  informed it was calling the wrong party, throughout the United States.  The members of the  Classes, therefore, are believed to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.    There are questions of law and fact common to the Classes that predominate over  any questions affecting only individual Class members.  These questions include:  a. Whether Defendant made calls to Plaintiff and Class members’ cellular  telephones using an ATDS;  b. Whether Defendant made calls to Plaintiff and Class members’ cellular  telephones using an artificial or prerecorded voice;  c. Whether Defendant can meet its burden of showing it obtained prior express  consent to make each call;  d. Whether Defendant’s conduct was knowing willful, and/or negligent;  e. Whether Defendant is liable for damages, and the amount of such damages;  and  f. Whether Defendant should be enjoined from such conduct in the future.    The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers.  If  Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant routinely places automated and prerecorded calls to telephone  numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will  have identical claims capable of being efficiently adjudicated and administered in this case.   D. Typicality     Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members, as they are all  based on the same factual and legal theories.  E. Protecting the Interests of the Class Members     A class action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this  controversy.  The interest of Class members in individually controlling the prosecutions of  separate claims against AMEX is small because it is not economically feasible for Class  members to bring individual actions.    Management of this class action is unlikely to present any difficulties.  Several  courts have certified classes in TCPA actions.  These cases include, but are not limited to:  Mitchem v. Ill. Collection Serv., 271 F.R.D. 617 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Sadowski v. Med1 Online, LLC,  2008 WL 2224892 (N.D. Ill., May 27, 2008); CE Design Ltd. V. Cy’s Crabhouse North, Inc.,  259 F.R.D. 135 (N.D. Ill. 2009); Lo v. Oxnard European Motors, LLC, 2012 WL 1932283 (S.D.  Cal., May 29, 2012).   Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and  incorporates them herein by reference.    Defendant negligently placed multiple automated and prerecorded/artificial voice  calls to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other members of the Classes without  their prior express consent.    Each of the aforementioned calls by Defendant constitutes a negligent violation of  the TCPA.    Additionally, Plaintiff and the Classes are entitled to and seek injunctive relief  prohibiting such conduct by Defendant in the future.    Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and do seek a declaration that:  a. Defendant violated the TCPA;  b. Defendant utilized an ATDS to call Plaintiff and the Classes;   c. Defendant placed artificial and prerecorded voice calls to Plaintiff and the  Classes;   d. Defendant placed automated and artificial and prerecorded voice calls to the  Plaintiff and the Classes without prior express consent.    Plaintiff repeats and realleges the above paragraphs of this Complaint and  incorporates them herein by reference.    Defendant knowingly and/or willfully placed multiple automated and  prerecorded/artificial voice calls to cellular numbers belonging to Plaintiff and the other  members of the Classes without their prior express consent.    Each of the aforementioned calls by Defendant constitutes a knowing and/or  willful violation of the TCPA.    As a result of Defendant’s knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA,  Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of treble damages up to $1,500.00 for each call in  violation of the TCPA pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C).    Plaintiff and the Classes are also entitled to and do seek a declaration that:  a. Defendant knowingly and/or willfully violated the TCPA;  b. Defendant knowingly and/or willfully used an ATDS to call Plaintiff and the  Classes;   c. Defendant knowingly and/or willfully placed artificial and prerecorded voice  calls to Plaintiff and the Classes;  d. Defendant willfully placed artificial and prerecorded voice calls to non- customers such as Plaintiff and the Classes, knowing it did not have prior  express consent to do so; and  e. It  is  Defendant’s  practice  and  history  to  place  automated  and  artificial/prerecorded voice calls to non-customers without their prior express  consent.   A. The Class   Knowing and/or Willful Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act,   47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq.   Negligent Violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act,   47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq.  ",win,3
6386854,lose," The 2015 FCC Order also clarified that telephone calls and text messages have  the same protections under FCC rules, and that text messages are “calls” for purposes of the   Plaintiff brings this action as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) &  (b)(3) on behalf of herself, on behalf of all others similarly situated, and as a member of the  “Class,” defined as follows:  All persons in the United States of America to whom Defendant has  placed any automated phone calls or sent any automated commercial text  message for whom Defendant has no record of prior express consent  and/or for whom Defendant has no record of providing the required  disclosures between October 16, 2013 and the date of class certification of  this action.    Excluded from the Class are: (i) Defendant, its assigns, successors, and legal  representatives; (ii) any entities in which Defendant has controlling interests; (iii) federal, state,  and/or local governments, including, but not limited to, their departments, agencies, divisions,  bureaus, boards, sections, groups, counsels, and/or subdivisions; (iv) all persons presently in  bankruptcy proceedings or who obtained a bankruptcy discharge in the last three years; and  (v) any judicial officer presiding over this matter and person within the third degree of  consanguinity to such judicial officer.    Plaintiff reserves the right to amend or otherwise alter the class definition  presented to the Court at the appropriate time, or to propose or eliminate sub-classes, in response  to facts learned through discovery, legal arguments advanced by Defendant, or otherwise.    Numerosity: Members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members  is impracticable. While the exact number of Class members is presently unknown, and can only  be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff believes that Class members number in  the thousands of persons, if not more.    This action is properly maintainable as a class action for the reasons set forth  herein.    Adequacy: Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Class she seeks to  represent because her interests do not conflict with the interests of the absent Class Members.  Plaintiff has retained highly competent counsel experienced in complex class action litigation,  and Plaintiff intends to prosecute this action vigorously. Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel have the  necessary financial resources to adequately and vigorously litigate this class action, and the  interests of members of the Class will be fairly and adequately protected by Plaintiff and her  counsel.    Superiority and Substantial Benefit: The class action is superior to other  available means for the fair and efficient adjudication of Plaintiff’s and the Class members’  claims. The damages suffered by each individual Class are limited and prescribed by law.  Damages of such magnitude are small given the burden and expense of individual prosecution of  the complex and extensive litigation necessitated by Defendant’s conduct. Further, it would be  virtually impossible for the Class members to redress the wrongs done to them on an individual  basis. Even if members of the Class themselves could afford such individual litigation, the court  system could not. Individualized litigation increases the delay and expense to all parties and the  court system, due to the complex legal and factual issues of the case. By contrast, the class- action device presents far fewer management difficulties, and provides the benefit of single  adjudication, economy of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court.    Certification of Plaintiff’s claims for class-wide treatment is also appropriate  because Plaintiff can prove the elements of her claims on a class-wide basis using the same  evidence as would be used to prove those elements in individual actions alleging the same  claims.    Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s counsel are unaware of any difficulties that are likely to be  encountered in the management of this action that would preclude its maintenance as a class  action.   Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the  preceding paragraphs of this complaint, as though fully set forth herein.    Defendant sent commercial text messages (“calls” in FCC parlance) to the mobile  cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the Class.    On information and belief, Defendant used an ATDS to place commercial phone  calls and send commercial text messages to the mobile cellular telephones of Plaintiff and the  Class.    Defendant did not obtain express written consent prior to placing commercial  phone calls or sending commercial text messages to Plaintiff or the Class.    Defendant did not provide to Plaintiff or the Class the disclosures required by the  FCC concerning the use of an ATDS.    Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to, and seek, awards of $1,500.00 in statutory  damages for each and every violation because Plaintiff alleges Defendant’s conduct was and is  willful, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C).    Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to, and seek, injunctive relief prohibiting such  conduct in the future.    Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to recover reasonable attorneys’ fees and  costs.   The purpose of the TCPA is to protect consumers from unwanted calls and text  messages, such as those that Defendant placed and sent to Plaintiff.    Under the FCC’s July 10, 2015 Order (the “2015 FCC Order”), Rules and  Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991; American  Association of Healthcare Administrative Management, Petition for Expedited Declaratory  Ruling and Exemption; et al, Federal Communications Commission, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961 (July 10,  2015), companies wishing to place certain call or text messages must obtain prior express written  consent.   Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 227, et seq.  On behalf of Plaintiff and the Putative Class   The TCPA  ",win,1
14540138,win," Plaintiff Abante is the owner and customary user of a cellphone number ending in  5154.     At no time did Abante provide its cellphone number to Defendant or provide  Defendant, or any of Defendant’s agents, with prior express consent to call.     At all times relevant hereto, and for a period of at least thirty (30) days prior to the  relevant period of time, Plaintiff’s cellphone number was and remains registered on the DNC  Registry.     Plaintiff brings this action in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure  23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3) on behalf of himself and two Classes defined as follows:  Autodialed Class: All persons in the United States who (1) from the date four years  prior to the filing of this Complaint through the date notice is sent to the Class; (2)  Defendant caused to be called; (3) on the person’s cellphone; (4) for the same  purpose as Defendant called Plaintiff; (5) using the same equipment that was used  to call the Plaintiff, and (6) for whom Defendant claims it obtained prior express  consent in the same manner as Defendant claims it obtained prior express consent  to call the Plaintiff.  Stop Class: All persons in the United States (1) who were called by Defendant; (2)  who requested that Defendant not call them again; and (3) who, despite asking not  to be called, received at least one additional call from Defendant using the same  equipment that was used to call the Plaintiff.    Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.    Defendant made or caused to be made calls to Plaintiff’s and the other Autodialed  Class Members’ cellphones.     These calls were made using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce  telephone numbers using a random or sequential number generator, to receive and store lists of  phone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse, without human intervention. The telephone  dialing equipment utilized by Defendant, also known as a predictive dialer, dialed numbers from a  list, or dialed numbers from a database of telephone numbers, in an automatic and systematic  manner. Defendant’s autodialer disseminated information en masse to Plaintiff and other  consumers and is an ATDS under the TCPA.    The calls were for telemarketing purposes, specifically to apprise Plaintiff and  others of the availability of Harbortouch’s credit/debit card processing services.    Neither Plaintiff nor any other consumer ever provided prior express consent under  the TCPA to be called by or on behalf of Harbortouch.     As a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the other members of  the Autodialed Class suffered actual damages and, under section 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), Plaintiff  and each member of the Autodialed Class are each entitled to receive up to $500 in damages for  each violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200.     Should the Court determine that Defendant’s conduct was willful and knowing, the  Court may, pursuant to Section 227(c)(5), treble the amount of statutory damages recoverable by  Plaintiff and the other members of the Autodialed Class.    Plaintiff incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth herein.    Plaintiff and other members of the Stop Class expressly requested that Defendant  no longer place calls to them.    Rather than honor these requests or place Plaintiff and the members of the Stop  Class on its internal do not call list, if any, Defendant Harbortouch continued to call Plaintiff and  others who asked not to be called.     No consent was ever provided, and any consent that was ever hypothetically  provided had been revoked. Despite this, Harbortouch continued to make calls, or to cause calls to  be made, to Plaintiff and other members of the Stop Class.     The calls were made using equipment that had the capacity to store or produce  telephone numbers using a random or sequential number generator, to receive and store lists of  phone numbers, and to dial such numbers, en masse, without human intervention. The telephone  dialing equipment utilized by Defendant, also known as a predictive dialer, dialed numbers from a  list, or dialed numbers from a database of telephone numbers, in an automatic and systematic  manner. Defendant’s autodialer disseminated information en masse to Plaintiff and other  consumers and is an ATDS under the TCPA.    As a result of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiff and the Stop Class suffered  actual damages and, under section 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(5), Plaintiff and each member of the Stop  Class are entitled to receive up to $500 in damages for each violation of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200.    In the event the Court determines that Defendant’s conduct was willful and  knowing, the Court may, pursuant to Section 227(c)(5), treble the amount of statutory damages  recoverable by Plaintiff and the other members of the DNC Stop Class.    Defendant Harbortouch is a merchant processing company that contracts with  businesses to provide credit card and debit card processing services, including point of sale card  readers and related equipment.    Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq.  (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Autodialed Class)   Violation of 47 U.S.C. § 227, et seq.  (On behalf of Plaintiff and the Stop Class)  ",win,3
6251435,lose,"Paragraphs 1-102 are incorporated in this count.  104. Honeywell promised Honeywell-sponsored healthcare until age 65 for  Pacheco, Hansen, and other class members who retired under the Honeywell- sponsored pension plan and the 2007 CBA or the 2010 CBA.   105. Honeywell-sponsored healthcare for plaintiffs Pacheco, Hansen, and  other class members vested at the retirement of each class member who retired  under age 65 under the Honeywell-sponsored pension plan and the 2007 CBA or  the 2010 CBA.  The Honeywell-sponsored healthcare began for each employee  under age 65 at the time of retirement and is to continue until that retiree turns age   Paragraphs 1-113 are incorporated in this count.  115. Honeywell’s collectively-bargained promises of healthcare for retirees  and their families constitute an employee welfare benefit plan (“plan”) within the  meaning of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §1002(1).  116. Honeywell is the plan sponsor and plan administrator within the  meaning of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§1002(16)(A) and (B).  117. Pacheco, Hansen, and other class members are participants in, or  beneficiaries of, the plan within the meaning of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§1002(7) and  (8).  30  118. The plan entitles Pacheco, Hansen, and other retirees to Honeywell- sponsored healthcare beginning at retirement.  The healthcare is to continue for  each retiree, spouse, and surviving spouse until age 65 and for each retiree’s  dependent child until age 26.  119. Under the plan, each retiree’s right to Honeywell-sponsored healthcare  vested at the time of retirement, with healthcare to begin at retirement and to  continue for each retiree until that retiree turns age 65.   120. Under the plan, each retiree’s spouse’s or surviving spouse’s and  dependent child’s right to Honeywell-sponsored healthcare vested at the time of the  retiree’s retirement and is to continue until the spouse or surviving spouse turns age  65 and the dependent child turns age 26.  121. Honeywell’s planned or actual termination of retiree healthcare is  wrongful and violates the plan and ERISA, and is actionable under ERISA, 29  U.S.C. §§1132(a)(1)(B) and (a)(3), which entitle participants or beneficiaries to  bring federal civil actions to enforce ERISA rights.  122. Honeywell’s planned or actual termination of retiree healthcare  breaches Honeywell’s ERISA and plan obligations and has caused, and will  continue to cause, damage and harm to Pacheco, Hansen, and other class members.   31  123. Honeywell is liable to Pacheco, Hansen, and other class members  under ERISA and the plan for the consequences, damage, and harm caused by  Honeywell’s planned or actual termination of healthcare and for plan breaches.   Paragraphs 1-123 are incorporated in this count.   125. Honeywell is the sponsor and plan administrator of the plan providing  healthcare for the retirees and their families.   126. Honeywell is a plan fiduciary.   127. As a plan fiduciary, Honeywell has the duty to act in the interests of  plan participants and beneficiaries.  128. As a plan fiduciary, Honeywell has the duty of fairness, accuracy, and  honesty, and the duty to not mislead plan participants and beneficiaries, by  expression, implication, or omission, regarding the nature or duration of the  participants’ and beneficiaries’ healthcare and rights under the plan and ERISA.   129. Under ERISA, Honeywell has a duty to disclose to participants and  beneficiaries—and to not mislead participants and beneficiaries, by expression,  implication, or omission—about circumstances which may result in loss of  coverage.  130. Under ERISA, Honeywell has a duty to make disclosures to  participants and beneficiaries about the circumstances which may result in loss of  32  coverage in a manner which may be understood by the average participant and  beneficiary.   131. Honeywell communicated to employees taking early retirement under  the Honeywell-sponsored pension plan and the 2007 CBA or the 2010 CBA, to the  employees collectively and individually, and to the employees collectively through  Teamsters, that each employee would receive Honeywell-sponsored healthcare  starting at retirement and continuing until age 65 for each retiree and each retiree’s  spouse and surviving spouse and up to age 26 for each retiree’s dependent child.  132. Honeywell communicated to employees taking retirement under the  Honeywell-sponsored pension plan and the 2007 CBA or the 2010 CBA that their  healthcare began at retirement and that they were guaranteed continued healthcare  until age 65.   133. Honeywell action, omissions, and representations about retiree  healthcare, encouraged and induced employees to end their Honeywell employment  and retire early with reduced pension benefits.  134. Honeywell’s representations about Honeywell-sponsored retiree  healthcare had the purpose and effect of encouraging employees to take early  retirement and give up their Honeywell jobs to ensure Honeywell-sponsored  healthcare after retirement for employees and their families.  But Honeywell now  33  plans, and asserts authority, to terminate all retiree healthcare, including for retirees  and retirees’ spouses and surviving spouses and dependents.  135. Honeywell never told employees, participants, or beneficiaries, until  March 27, 2017, when it sent its letter, Ex. 12, to retirees and spouses, that  Honeywell believed it had the unilateral authority to terminate Honeywell- sponsored post-retirement healthcare regardless of a retiree’s or spouse’s or   surviving spouse’s or dependent child’s age.   136. Honeywell never told employees, participants, or beneficiaries that  Honeywell believed that it was obligated to continue retiree healthcare only for the  duration of the 2007 CBA or for the duration of the 2010 CBA.   137. Pacheco, Hansen, and other retirees in the class would not have taken  early retirement and given up their Honeywell jobs had Honeywell communicated  to them that Honeywell believed it could terminate healthcare regardless of a  retiree’s or spouse’s or dependent child’s age.  138. Honeywell’s representations, misrepresentations, actions, omissions,  and failures to disclose breach Honeywell’s fiduciary duties and have caused, and  continue to cause, damage and harm to Pacheco, Hansen, and other class members.   139. Honeywell breached its fiduciary duties and is liable under ERISA to  Pacheco, Hansen, and other class members for the consequences, damage, and harm  caused by Honeywell fiduciary breaches.  34   106. The CBAs entitle Pacheco, Hansen, and other retirees, and retirees’  spouses, surviving spouses, and dependents to Honeywell-sponsored healthcare  beginning at each retiree’s retirement.  The healthcare is to continue for each  28  retiree, spouse, and surviving spouse until age 65 and for each retiree’s dependent  child until age 26.  107. Under the CBAs, each retiree’s right to Honeywell-sponsored  healthcare vested at the time of retirement, with healthcare beginning at retirement  to continue for each retiree until that retiree turns age 65.   108. Under the CBAs, each retiree’s spouse’s or surviving spouse’s and  dependent child’s right to Honeywell-sponsored healthcare vested at the time of the  retiree’s retirement and is to continue until the spouse or surviving spouse turns age  65 and up to age 26 for each dependent child.  109. Employees who retired under age 65 before May 1, 2007—during the  2007 CBA—are entitled to Honeywell-sponsored healthcare until age 65, subject to  retiree-paid monthly premium contributions.    110. Employees who retired under age 65 between May 1, 2007 and April  30, 2010—during the 2007 CBA or during the first three months of the 2010  CBA—are entitled to Honeywell-sponsored healthcare until age 65, subject to  retiree-paid monthly premium contributions and subject to the dollar limits on  Honeywell’s annual healthcare contributions set at $20,304 for single coverage and  $40,608 for family coverage.   111. Employees who retired under age 65 during the 2010 CBA on May 1,  2010 or later are entitled to Honeywell-sponsored retiree healthcare, subject to  29  retiree-paid monthly premium contributions.  The dollar limits on Honeywell’s  annual healthcare contributions do not apply to the retirees who retired under the  2010 CBA on or after May 1, 2010.  112. Honeywell’s planned or actual termination of retiree healthcare  breaches Honeywell’s promises and the CBAs and has caused, and will continue to  cause, damage and harm to Pacheco, Hansen, and other class members.   113. Honeywell is liable to Pacheco, Hansen, and other class members for  the consequences, damage, and harm caused by Honeywell’s planned or actual  termination of retiree healthcare and contract breaches.  ",win,5
59764598,win," Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.  P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3).    The Class consists of:   a. all individuals with addresses in the State of Texas;  b.  to whom Defendant ERC sent a collection letter attempting to collect a consumer  debt;  c. containing deceptively worded settlement offers;   d. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this  action and on or before a date twenty-one (2l) days after the filing of this action.    The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of  Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or  have purchased debts.    Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members,  partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate  families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate  families.     There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common  issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue  is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as  Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e.    The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same  facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the  Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in  handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff  nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this  action.    This action has been brought, and may properly be maintained, as a class action  pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there is a  well-defined community interest in the litigation:  a. Numerosity: The Plaintiff is informed and believes, and on that basis alleges,  that the Plaintiff Class defined above is so numerous that joinder of all members  would be impractical.  b. Common Questions Predominate: Common questions of law and fact exist as  to all members of the Plaintiff Class and those questions predominance over any  questions or issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue  is whether the Defendants’ written communications to consumers, in the forms  attached as Exhibit A violate 15 USC §l692e.  c. Typicality: The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the class members.  The Plaintiffs and all members of the Plaintiff Class have claims arising out of  the Defendants' common uniform course of conduct complained of herein.  d. Adequacy: The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the  class members insofar as Plaintiff have no interests that are adverse to the absent  class members. The Plaintiff is committed to vigorously litigating this matter.  Plaintiff has also retained counsel experienced in handling consumer lawsuits,  complex legal issues, and class actions. Neither the Plaintiff nor her counsel have  any interests which might cause them not to vigorously pursue the instant class  action lawsuit.  e. Superiority: A class action is superior to the other available means for the fair  and efficient adjudication of this controversy because individual joinder of all  members would be impracticable. Class action treatment will permit a large  number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single  forum efficiently and without unnecessary duplication of effort and expense that  individual actions would engender.    Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure  is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff  Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is  superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.    Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at  the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues  pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).   Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length  herein.    Some time prior to March 5, 2021, an obligation was allegedly incurred to Sprint,  subsidiary of T-Mobile by the Plaintiff.    The Sprint, subsidiary of T-Mobile obligation arose out of transactions in which  money, property, insurance or services which are the subject of the transactions were primarily  for personal, family or household purposes, specifically telecommunication services.    The alleged Sprint, subsidiary of T-Mobile obligation is a “debt” as defined by 15  U.S.C. §1692a(5).    Sprint, subsidiary of T-Mobile is a “creditor” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(4).    Defendant ERC, a debt collector, was contracted by Sprint, subsidiary of T-Mobile  to collect the alleged debt which originated with Sprint, subsidiary of T-Mobile.    Defendants collect and attempt to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been  incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United  States Postal Services, telephone and internet.  Violation I – March 5, 2021 Collection Letter    On or about March 5, 2021, Defendant ERC sent Plaintiff a collection letter (the  “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt currently owed to T-Mobile See Exhibit A.    The letter states an original balance of $1,213.49    The collection letter states: “Our records indicate that your balance with Sprint, now  part of the T-Mobile Network, remains unpaid; therefore, your account has been placed with  ERC for collection efforts.  We are authorized to settle your account for less than the full original  balance in the amount of $667.42.  Upon completion of the settlement agreement, all future  collection efforts will cease, and the residual balance will remain with Sprint.”    The letter is deceptive because it implies that in exchange for payment of less than  the full balance the consumer will achieve some form of settlement, when in actuality it is  unclear what form of settlement the letter is offering.    This is especially deceptive because the letter actually uses the term “settlement  agreement.”    The letter states that Sprint will cease all collection activity but does not clarify what  will occur with the rest of the balance and whether the rest of the balance would be collected by  another collection company in the future.    Nor does the letter clearly state that the account will be reinstated upon payment of  part of the balance.    The letter deceives and misleads the consumer by implying that paying “the  settlement” amount would achieve results akin to a settlement offer, when in reality the  Defendant’s offer contains no significant benefits and is unclear to what the benefits of the  “settlement agreement” would actually be.    As a result of Defendant’s deceptive, misleading and false debt collection practices,  Plaintiff has been damaged.   Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein.    Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff  violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.    Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or  misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.    Defendant violated said section by:   a. Making a false and misleading representation in violation of but not limited to  §1692e (10).    By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's  conduct violated Section 1692e, et seq. of the FDCPA and is entitled to actual damages, statutory  damages, costs and attorneys’ fees.  VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT   15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.  ",win,3
4274807,lose," On or about March 10, 2010, Defendants transmitted by telephone facsimile  machine an unsolicited fax to Plaintiff.  A copy of the facsimile is attached hereto as Exhibit A.    Defendants created or made Exhibit A which Defendants knew or should have  known is a good or product which Defendants intended to and did in fact distribute to Plaintiff  and the other members of the class.    Exhibit A is part of Defendants’ work or operations to market Defendants’ goods  or services which were performed by Defendants and on behalf of Defendants.  Therefore,  Exhibit A constitutes material furnished in connection with Defendants’ work or operations.    On information and belief, Defendants faxed the same and similar unsolicited  facsimiles to Plaintiff and more than 40 other recipients without first receiving the recipients’  express permission or invitation.      There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other class member) to avoid  receiving unauthorized faxes.  Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the urgent  communications their owners desire to receive.     Defendants’ facsimiles did not display a proper opt-out notice as required by 47   In accordance with F. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1), (b)(2) and (b)(3), Plaintiff brings this  class action pursuant to the JFPA, on behalf of the following class of persons:  All persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this  action, (2) were sent telephone facsimile messages of material  advertising the commercial availability of any property, goods, or  services by or on behalf of Defendants, (3) from whom Defendants  did not obtain prior express permission or invitation to send those  faxes, (4) with whom Defendants did not have an established  business relationship, and (5) did not display a proper opt-out  notice.    Excluded from the Class are the Defendants, their employees, agents and members of the  Judiciary.  Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the class definition upon completion of class  certification discovery.    a statement that the sender must honor a recipient’s opt-out request within  30 days and the sender’s failure to do so is unlawful – thereby encouraging  recipients to opt-out, if they did not want future faxes, by advising them that their  opt-out requests will have legal “teeth”;    Typicality (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (3)):   The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the  claims of all class members. The Plaintiff received faxes sent by or on behalf of the Defendants  advertising goods and services of the Defendants during the Class Period. The Plaintiff is making  the same claims and seeking the same relief for itself and all class members based upon the same  federal statute. The Defendants have acted the same or in a similar manner with respect to the  Plaintiff and all the class members.     Fair and Adequate Representation (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (a) (4)):   The Plaintiff will  fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class. It is interested in this matter,  has no conflicts and has retained experienced class counsel to represent the class.    Need for Consistent Standards and Practical Effect of Adjudication (F. R. Civ. P.  23 (b) (1)):   Class certification is appropriate because the prosecution of individual actions by  class members would: (a) create the risk of inconsistent adjudications that could establish  incompatible standards of conduct for the Defendants, and/or (b) as a practical matter,  adjudication of the Plaintiff's claims will be dispositive of the interests of class members who are  not parties.    Common Conduct (F. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (2)):   Class certification is also  appropriate because the Defendants have acted and refused to act in the same or similar manner  with respect to all class members thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate.  The Plaintiff demands such relief as authorized by 47 U.S.C. §227.    Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class reassert and incorporate herein by reference the  averments set for in paragraphs 1-25 above.    The JFPA makes unlawful for any person to ""use any telephone facsimile  machine, computer or other device to send, to a telephone facsimile machine, an unsolicited  advertisement …"" 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C).    The JFPA defines ""unsolicited advertisement"" as ""any material advertising the  commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services which is transmitted to any  person without that person's prior express invitation or permission, in writing or otherwise."" 47  U.S.C. § 227 (a) (5).    Opt-Out Notice Requirements.  The JFPA strengthened the prohibitions against  the sending of unsolicited advertisements by requiring, in §(b)(1)(C)(iii) of the Act, that senders  of faxed advertisements place a clear and conspicuous notice on the first page of the transmission  that contains the following among other things (hereinafter collectively the “Opt-Out Notice  Requirements”):    a statement advising the recipient that he or she may opt-out with respect  to all of his or her facsimile telephone numbers and not just the ones that receive a  faxed advertisement from the sender – thereby instructing a recipient on how to  make a valid opt-out request for all of his or her fax machines;   The requirement of (1) above is incorporated from § (b)(D)(ii) of the Act.  The  requirement of (2) above is incorporated from § (b)(D)(ii) of the Act and the rules and  regulations of the Federal Communications Commission (the “FCC”) in ¶31 of its 2006 Report  and Order (In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer  Protection Act, Junk Prevention Act of 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 3787, 2006 WL 901720, which rules  and regulations took effect on August 1, 2006).  The requirements of (3) above are contained in §  (b)(2)(E) of the Act and incorporated into the Opt-Out Notice Requirements via § (b)(2)(D)(ii).   Compliance with the Opt-Out Notice Requirements is neither difficult nor costly.  The Opt-Out  Notice Requirements are important consumer protections bestowed by Congress upon the  owners of fax machines giving them the right, and means, to stop unwanted faxed  advertisements.     The Fax.  Defendant sent the March 10, 2010 Fax via facsimile transmission  from telephone facsimile machines, computers, or other devices to the telephone facsimile  machines of Plaintiff and members of the Plaintiff Class.  The Fax constituted advertisements  under the Act.  Defendants failed to comply with the Opt-Out Requirements in connection with  the Fax, which contained no Opt-Out notice whatsoever.  The Faxes were transmitted to persons  or entities without their prior express permission or invitation and/or Defendants are precluded  from asserting any prior express permission or invitation because of the failure to comply with  the Opt-Out Notice Requirements.  By virtue thereof, Defendants violated the JFPA and the  regulations promulgated thereunder by sending the Faxes via facsimile transmission to Plaintiff  and members of the Class.    The TCPA/JFPA provides a private right of action to bring this action on behalf  of Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class to redress Defendants’ violations of the Act, and provides for  statutory damages.  47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). The Act also provides that injunctive relief is  appropriate.  Id.    The JFPA is a strict liability statute, so the Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff  and the other class members even if their actions were only negligent.    The Defendants knew or should have known that (a) the Plaintiff and the other  class members had not given express invitation or permission for the Defendants or anybody else  to fax advertisements about the Defendants’ goods or services; (b) the Plaintiff and the other  class members did not have an established business relationship; (c) Defendants transmitted an  advertisement; and (d) the Fax did not contain the required Opt-Out Notice.   Claim for Relief for Violation of the JFPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq.  ",win,2
6182029,win," Requiring SCS to hire a Court-approved, independent auditing  company to (a) investigate all allegations of TCPA violations, and  (b) audit no less than 10% of SCS’s outbound calls to ensure that  SCS had consent and that the consumer had not previously asked  that calls stop, and (c) report the results of the above investigations  to the Court and Plaintiff’s counsel on a quarterly basis.  D.   Damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), for each and every  nonconsensual call to each and every class member;  E.  Treble damages pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3), as to each  violation;  F.  Attorneys’ fees and costs, as permitted by law; and  G.  Such other or further relief as the Court deems just and proper.  8   In response to Defendant’s phone calls, Plaintiff consulted with the attorneys at  Community Lawyers Group, Ltd., who, on July 19, 2017 sent a letter to SCS demanding that it  cease communication with Plaintiff and direct all calls to Plaintiff’s attorney.    SCS received Plaintiff’s letter on July 19, 2017.    Yet SCS continued calling Plaintiff, and on August 22, 2017, left a pre-recorded  voice message on Defendant’s cellular telephone, without her permission.    During Defendant’s calls, pre-recorded voice messages were left asking Plaintiff  to press a number depending on her identity, which is the result of a dialer calling and no  operator or representative of Defendant being immediately available to speak.    Therefore SCS used software which has the capacity to predictively dial in its  telephone calls to Defendant.     SCS’s business model is to knowingly use an auto-dialer to call cellular  telephones it knows it does not have consent to call, and to hide behind an arbitration clause  when challenged in court.    Many of the numbers SCS calls to collect a debt are obtained by “skip-tracing,”  an investigative method used to obtain consumer phone numbers from online databases and  credit reports, rather than from consumers themselves.    As a result, many of these numbers are called without express consent of the  consumer, who did not provide the number in the first place.    Many of the numbers SCS calls are obtained when consumers seek medical  services, even though those consumers do not give their consent to be called by SCS’ autodialer.  4    Upon information and belief, SCS already keeps records and data from which it  can determine which autodialed calls it made without consent, but has elected not to engage such  to prevent TCPA violations for business reasons.    Defendant knew about the TCPA before making the calls to plaintiff and the  class, but made these autodialed calls to cellular phones in spite of such knowledge.     Defendant also knew that they did not have “prior express consent” to call phone  numbers that had been obtained through skip trace or any means other than directly from the  called party, or that any such consent had been revoked.    On information and belief, SCS has used an Aspect Software, Inc. brand  autodialer for some of the calls.     On information and belief, SCS also used third party vendors to make calls,  including Livevox and others.     Documents in SCS’s possession will show that she never gave her consent to  receive calls to her cellular telephone.    Those documents will also confirm that Plaintiff notified SCS to stop calling her  cellular telephone.     SCS’s records will show that it logged Plaintiff’s withdrawal of any apparent  consent in its computer.    The telephone calls were annoying to Plaintiff, invaded Plaintiff’s privacy  interests, and temporarily blocked use of her cellular telephone line for other potential callers.    The telephone calls were intentionally, willfully and knowingly initiated.     The telephone calls were not initiated by accident or mistake.   Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of a class consisting of:  All persons in the United States whose cellular telephone number, on or  after four years prior to the filing of this action, SCS called using the same  or similar dialing system used to call Plaintiff, where such calling occurred  without the person’s permission.    Plaintiff additionally brings this action on behalf of a subclass consisting of:  All persons in the United States whose cellular telephone number, on or  after four years prior to the filing of this action, SCS called using the same  or similar dialing system used to call Plaintiff, where the person or their  representative revoked any prior consents to be called.    Upon information and belief, in the four years prior to the filing of this action,  there were more than 100 persons whose cell phone number SCS called without permission  using the same equipment used to call Plaintiff.    Common questions of law or fact exist as to all members of the class, which  predominate over any questions solely affecting any individual member, including Plaintiff.  Such questions common to the class include but are not limited to:  a. Whether the calls to Plaintiff and the class were made using an “automatic  telephone dialing system” as such term is defined or understood under the TCPA  and applicable FCC regulations and orders;  b. Whether the calls to Plaintiff and the class were made using a prerecorded  message as such term is defined or understood under the TCPA and applicable  FCC regulations and orders;  c. Whether SCS had prior express consent to the cell phone numbers of Plaintiff and  the other members of the class; and  6  d. Damages, including whether any violations were performed willfully or  knowingly such that Plaintiff and the other members of the class are entitled to  treble damages under 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3).    Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the class. The  factual and legal bases of SCS’s liability to Plaintiff and the other members of the class are the  same: SCS violated the TCPA by causing automated calls to be made to the cellular telephone  number of each member of the class, without permission.    Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Plaintiff has  no interests that might conflict with the interests of the class. Plaintiff is interested in pursuing  her claims vigorously, and she has retained counsel competent and experienced in class and  complex litigation.    Class action treatment is superior to the alternatives for the fair and efficient  adjudication of the controversy alleged herein. Such treatment will permit a large number of  similarly situated persons to prosecute their common claims in a single forum simultaneously,  efficiently, and without the duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual action  would entail. There are, on information and belief, thousands of class members, such that joinder  of all members is impracticable.    No difficulties are likely to be encountered in the management of this action that  would preclude its maintenance as a class action, and no superior alternative exists for the fair  and efficient adjudication of this controversy.    Defendant has acted and failed to act on grounds generally applicable to Plaintiff  and the other members of the class, thereby making relief appropriate with respect to the class as  a whole. Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the class, should they even  7  realize that their rights have been violated, would likely create the risk of inconsistent or varying  adjudications with respect to individual members of the class that would establish incompatible  standards of conduct.    The identity of the class is, on information and belief, readily identifiable from  Defendant’s records.  WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Kathleen Taylor, individually and on behalf of the class,  respectfully requests that the Court enter judgment against Defendant for:  A.  Certification of the class and subclass as alleged herein;  B.   A declaration that SCS violated the TCPA as to Plaintiff and each class;  C.   Injunctive relief aimed at ensuring the prevention of SCS from violating  the TCPA in the future, including:   5    Plaintiff has received multiple calls to her cellular telephone from Defendant.  Most of these calls are believed to have happened in March through August 2017, although there  very well may have been calls before and after that period.    Calls made to Plaintiff were unanswered but left pre-recorded voice messages  directed to Plaintiff.  3  ",win,2
18639555,win," Each of the Plaintiffs are, and at all times mentioned herein were, a “person” as  defined by 47 U.S.C. § 153(39).    Plaintiff Antista has possessed her current cellular telephone number for  approximately 14 years.    Plaintiff Antista received telephone calls on her cellular telephone on November  15, 2016, from telephone number 480-448-3778; on January 3 and January 4, 2017, from  telephone number 602-362-4190.     Each and all of these telephone calls were not for Plaintiff Antista. A MCM  representative informed Plaintiff Antista that the calls were regarding her husband and her  husband’s Capital One account.    Plaintiff Antista told MCM to stop calling but MCM continued to call.    Plaintiff Toft has possessed her current cellular telephone number since August 2,  2011.    Plaintiff Toft received telephone calls on her cellular telephone on January 6 and  January 11, 2017, from telephone number 248-216-1545; on January 16, 2017, from telephone  number 947-333-9327; on February 20, 2017, from telephone number 248-216-1550; on  November 21, 2017, from telephone number 800-416-6433; on December 23 and December 29,  2017 from telephone number 248-216-1545.    Plaintiff Toft received a call from MCM around April 2017 and told the female  representative not to call her anymore. Yet, Plaintiff Toft received at least three additional calls.    Plaintiff Toft never provided MCM or the original creditor, CitiFinancial Services,  Inc. (“CitiFinancial”) her current cellular telephone number.    Plaintiff Toft opened a CitiFinancial account on August 20, 2008 and defaulted on  the account sometime in June 2010.    Defendants are, and at all times mentioned herein were, each a “person” as defined  pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 153(39).    The telephone numbers at which Plaintiffs were contacted on, utilizing an  “artificial or prerecorded voice” or placed by an “automatic telephone dialing system,” were each  assigned to a cellular telephone service as specified in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).    Moreover, Defendant’s calls placed to Plaintiffs’ cellular telephone number were  not made “for emergency purposes” as described in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A).    Defendant’s calls to Plaintiffs’ cellular telephone numbers utilizing an “artificial  or prerecorded voice” or placed by an “automatic telephone dialing system,” made for non- emergency purposes and in the absence of Plaintiffs’ prior express consent violated 47 U.S.C.  § 227(b)(1)(A).    Pursuant to the TCPA and the FCC’s January 2008 Declaratory Ruling, it is  Defendant’s burden to demonstrate that Plaintiffs provided Defendant with “prior express  consent” within the meaning of the Statute.7  VI.   Plaintiffs bring this action on behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly  situated (hereinafter referred to as the “Class”).    Plaintiffs propose the following Class definition, subject to amendment as  appropriate:  All persons in the United States who, at any time on or after November 14,  2016, received one (1) or more non-emergency telephone call(s) from  Midland Credit Management, Inc., to a cellular telephone through the use  of an automatic telephone dialing system and/or an artificial or prerecorded  voice, but had not provided prior express consent to receive such calls  and/or had requested to stop calling.    Plaintiffs are unaware of the exact number of the Class Members, but reasonably  believes that Class Members number, at a minimum, is in the thousands.    Plaintiffs and all Class Members have been harmed by Defendant’s acts because  their privacy has been violated; they were subject to annoying and harassing telephone calls that  constitute a nuisance; and they were charged for Defendant’s incoming telephone calls.    The subject Class Action Complaint seeks injunctive relief and money damages.    Joinder of all Class Members is impracticable due to both the large Class size and  relatively modest value of each individual claim. The claims’ disposition as a Class Action suit  will provide substantial benefit to the parties and to the Court, avoiding multiplicity of identical  suits. The Class can easily be identified by way of records maintained by Defendant and/or by the  creditors on whose behalf Defendant placed the subject telephone calls.    As a person who received telephone calls via “artificial or prerecorded voice” or  placed by an “automatic telephone dialing system,” without their “prior express consent” within  the meaning of the TCPA and FCC Rules, Plaintiffs assert claims that are typical of each and all  Class Members. Plaintiffs have no interest that is antagonistic to the interest of any other Class  Member, and they will fairly and adequately represent and protect the Class’ interests.    Plaintiffs has retained counsel experienced in handling Class Action claims that  involve federal and state consumer protection statute violations, including claims made pursuant  to the TCPA.    A Class Action is the superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of this  controversy. Class-wide relief is essential for compelling Defendant to comply with the TCPA.  Each Class Member’s interest in individually controlling the prosecution of a separate claim  against Defendant is minute because an individual action’s statutory damages for TCPA violation  is small. Management of these claims is likely to be significantly less difficult than management  of many other Class claims, as all of the telephone calls at issue are automated and the Class  Members did not provide the statutorily required “prior express consent” to authorize the calls  placed to their cellular telephone numbers.    Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making  appropriate the overall Class’ final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief. Plaintiffs  additionally allege, upon information and belief, that the TCPA violations complained of herein  are substantially likely to continue in the future if an injunction is not entered.   Congress found that “automated or pre-recorded calls are a nuisance and an  invasion of privacy, regardless of the type of call” and decided that “banning” such calls made  without consent was “the only effective means of protecting telephone consumers from this  nuisance and privacy invasion.”  Pub. L. No. 102-243, §§ 2(10-13) (Dec. 20, 1991), codified at 47  U.S.C. § 227; see also Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 371 (2012) (“The Act bans  certain practices invasive of privacy[.]”).      By effectuating these unlawful phone calls, Defendant caused Plaintiffs the very  harm that Congress sought to prevent—namely, a “nuisance and invasion of privacy.”    Defendant’s aggravating and annoying phone calls trespassed upon and interfered  with Plaintiffs’ rights and interests in their cellular telephone and cellular telephone line, and  intruded upon Plaintiffs’ seclusion.    Defendant’s phone calls harmed Plaintiffs by wasting their time, trespassing on  their phone, invading their privacy as well as causing aggravation and inconvenience.      Defendant’s foregoing acts and omissions constitute multiple violations of the  TCPA; including, but not limited to, each and all of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227  et seq.    Due to Defendant’s violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq., Plaintiffs and each Class  Member are entitled, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B), to an award of $500.00 in statutory  damages for each and every telephone call that constitutes a statutory violation.    Plaintiffs and all Class Members are also entitled to, and do seek, injunctive relief  to prohibit Defendant from engaging in future conduct that will violate the TCPA.  VIOLATIONS OF THE  TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq.  ",win,1
4572653,win," On or about December 15, 2014, Ms. Connolly applied for employment with  Umpqua in Seattle, Washington.     As part of the application process, Ms. Connolly was directed to sign a  document that purported to be a combination disclosure and authorization to procure a  background check on Ms. Connolly. A copy of this form is attached as Exhibit A. The  document states that the background investigation may include criminal convictions, motor  vehicle and other reports, as well as records relating to credit, and information relating to  character, work habits, and employment.    Ms. Connolly brings these claims on behalf of a class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.  P. 23.    The class consists of: (a) all individuals; (b) who applied for employment with  Umpqua, or were employed by Umpqua; (c) about whom Umpqua obtained a consumer report  for employment purposes during the Class Period; (d) who completed a disclosure and  authorization form that was not a stand alone document, and was not clear and conspicuous.     By including additional language, questions, blanks, and disclaimers in its  consumer report disclosure and authorization form that Plaintiff and other class members were  required to execute, Umpqua violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) of the FCRA.    Umpqua’s disclosure and authorization form was not “clear and conspicuous”  and it did not consist solely of the disclosure that a consumer report may be obtained for  employment purposes, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(i) of the FCRA.    Umpqua’s actions were willful. Umpqua knew or should have known that its  disclosure form should consist solely of the disclosure, and not include extraneous information  or questions.     Ms. Connolly and class members are entitled to statutory damages of not less  than $100, and not more than $1,000 for each violation of the FCRA, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §  1681n(a)(1)(A).    Ms. Connolly and class members also seek punitive damages, attorneys’ fees  and costs, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(2).    Umpqua violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii) by procuring consumer reports  for employment purposes without first obtaining valid authorizations from Ms. Connolly and  class members.    Umpqua’s violations of the FCRA in this regard were willful. Umpqua knew or  should have known that its authorization form was not valid.    Umpqua violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a)(2), (3) by failing to provide subclass  members with the name, address, and telephone number of the entity that provided the  consumer report to them, and to provide a numerical credit score.     Umpqua’s actions were willful. Umpqua knew or should have known that it did  not provide a copy of the disclosures required after taking adverse action.     Ms. Connolly and members of the subclass seek statutory damages of not less  than $100 and not more than $1,000 for each such violation, pursuant to 15 U.S.C.  § 1681n(a)(1)(A).     Ms. Connolly and members of the subclass also seek punitive damages,  attorneys’ fees and costs for this violation, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)(2).    Sterling violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(3) by failing to notify job applicants  prior to its taking adverse action based in whole or in part on information contained in their  consumer report.     Sterling violated 1681m(a) by failing to provide subclass members with adverse  action notices after it took adverse action against them.    FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADVERSE ACTION DISCLOSURES ON BEHALF OF  STERLING ADVERSE ACTION SUBCLASS  15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b(b)(3); 1681m(a)(2), (3)   FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADVERSE ACTION DISCLOSURES ON BEHALF OF  UMPQUA ADVERSE ACTION SUBCLASS  15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a)(2), (3)   FAILURE TO OBTAIN PROPER AUTHORIZATION BEFORE PROCURING A  CREDIT REPORT IN VIOLATION OF 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(II)   FAILURE TO PROVIDE A CLEAR, CONSPICUOUS, AND STAND-ALONE  DISCLOSURE IN VIOLATION OF   15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(I)  ",lose,1
59938973,lose," Plaintiff, repeats and re-alleges Paragraphs 1-41 as though fully set forth herein.    Section 1692c(b) with certain inapplicable exceptions, prohibits debt collectors  from communicating consumers’ personal information to third parties “in connection with the  collection of any debt.”     As discussed above and below, Defendant violated Section 1692c(b) when it used  a third-party vendor to mail the October 24, 2020 collection letter to Plaintiff.    Defendant violated Section 1692c(b) when it used a third-party vendor to mail the  October 24, 2020 collection letter to Plaintiff because by using a third-party vendor to mail out the  letters, Defendant disclosed Plaintiff’s personal contact information and information identifying  the Subject Debt to Defendant’s letter vendor.    ARS’s transmittal of Plaintiff’s personal information, Plaintiff’s purported status as  a debtor relative to a debt allegedly owed to JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., and the amount of the  9  Subject Debt to Defendant’s letter vendor constitutes a ""communication"" within the meaning of  Section 1692a(2) which defines “communication” as ""the conveying of information regarding a  debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium."" 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2).    Defendant’s use of a third-party letter vendor to merge Plaintiff’s demographic data  and status as a debtor into Defendant’s form collection letters for the purpose of printing and  mailing the October 24, 2020 collection letter to Plaintiff violated Section 1692c(b).    ARS’s disclosure of Plaintiff’s personal information and her status as a purported  debtor posed a material risk of harm to the privacy interests protected by the FDCPA.    ARS’s disclosures of Plaintiff’s personal information and status as a purported  debtor to its third-party letter vendor violated Plaintiff’s rights privacy that was recognized by  Congress when it enacted the FDCPA.    ARS’s transmittal of Plaintiff’s personal information and information identifying  the Subject Debt to its letter vendor was not done in an attempt to comply with Section 1692b.    ARS’s disclosure to its letter vendor of Plaintiff’s personal information and her  purported status as a person owing the Subject Debt violated Section 1692c(b)’s prohibition on  disclosure of debtor information to third-parties    Section 1692c(b) bears a close relationship to a privacy invasion that American  courts have long recognized as cognizable.      Congress's judgment indicates that violations of Section 1692c(b) constitute a  concrete injury.    As set forth above, ARS’s disclosures to its third-party letter vendor (of Plaintiff’s  personal information and status as a purported debtor) caused Plaintiff to suffer from  embarrassment, aggravation and emotional distress.   10    Accordingly, Plaintiff has standing to sue ARS for its improper and unlawful  disclosure of Plaintiff’s personal information and status as a debtor to third-party letter vendors.    The claims asserted in this Count satisfy the elements of FRCP 23(a)(1)-(4) and  FRCP 23(b)(3).    The proposed class encompasses:   (a) all consumers with addresses in the State of Texas;   (b) where Defendant utilized form collection letters for the purposes of  attempting to collect to a consumer based debt allegedly owed to to  JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A;   (c) where Defendant used a third-party letter vendor to transmit the  collection letters; and  (d) Defendant’s use of a third-party letter vendor resulted in Defendant  sending the demographic information of the subject consumers as well as  their status as alleged debtors to the letter vendor in violation of Section  1692c(b) of the FDCPA.     Defendant is not entitled to invoke arbitration, because upon information and belief,  the Subject Debt is not governed by an arbitration clause.  WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Honorable Court enter judgment in  her favor and against Defendant ARS as follows:  a. Declaring that the practices complained of herein are unlawful;   b. Awarding Plaintiff and class members statutory damages of $1,000.00  as provided under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692k(a)(2)(A) and 1692k(a)(2)(B);  c. Awarding Plaintiff actual damages as provided by 15 U.S.C.  §1692k(a)(1));  d. Awarding Plaintiff costs and reasonable attorney’s fees as provided  under 15 U.S.C. §1692k(a)(3); and  e. Awarding any other relief as this Honorable Court deems just and  appropriate.  11  Class Action Violations of § 1692c(b) of the FDCPA Resulting From Defendant’s   Sharing of Plaintiff’s Personal Information and her Status as a Debtor   ",win,1
6454318,win,"Sometime before May 15, 2017, Plaintiff is alleged to have incurred certain  financial obligations to the City of Tempe Utilities.   These financial obligations were primarily for personal, family or household  purposes and are therefore a “debt” as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C.  §1692a(5).   Sometime thereafter, but before May 15, 2017, Plaintiff allegedly fell behind  and defaulted on the payments allegedly owed on the alleged debt.   Subsequently, but before May 15, 2017, City of Tempe assigned, placed, or  otherwise transferred the alleged debt to VCS for collection.   On or about May 15, 2017, Defendant sent Plaintiff a letter attempting to  collect the alleged debt.   In Defendant’s May 15, 2017 letter to Plaintiff, the language of which  overshadowed, weakened, and failed to comply with, the notice required by  15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a), because it attempted to limit the rights available to  Plaintiff in a manner that creates a contradiction would confuse the least  sophisticated consumer into disregarding his or her rights pursuant to the  validation notice required in 15 U.S.C. § 1692g by stating:  The above account has been assigned to this office for  collection. Please remit payment in full of the current balance to  this office in resolution of this matter. If this debt is not paid  within 30 days from your receipt of this notice, we may  exercise various options to enforce collection activity, including  the reporting of this debt to credit reporting agencies…   The deadline imposed by Defendant as well as their threat enforce collection  activity are misleading as it does not account for Plaintiff’s ability to dispute  the debt and to request verification and/or validation pursuant to 1692g,  which would halt all collection activity pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b).    The purpose for this confusing language was to limit the rights available to  Plaintiff in a manner that creates a contradiction that would confuse the least  sophisticated consumer into disregarding his or her rights pursuant to the  validation notice required in 15 U.S.C. § 1692g.   This conduct was a false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in  connection with the collection of the alleged debt.  As such, this action by  Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e and 1692e(10).   Through this conduct, Defendant used an unfair or unconscionable means to  collect or attempt to collect any debt.  Consequently, Defendant violated 15  U.S.C. § 1692f.  Plaintiff bring this action on her own behalf, and on behalf of all others  similarly situated.   This action pleads the following class action allegations.  Plaintiff defines “The Class” as (i) all persons with addresses  within the state of Arizona; (ii) who were sent an initial  collection letter, which was similar or identical to Defendant’s  May 15, 2017 to Plaintiff; (iii) to recover a consumer debt; (iv)  which were not returned undelivered by the United States  Postal Service. The class period is one year prior to the filing of  this Complaint.   For purposes of the FDCPA Claim, the class period is one year prior to the  filing of the original Complaint.   There are more than 40 members of the class, and the class members are so  numerous that joinder is impracticable.   The individual identities of the individual members are ascertainable through  Defendants’ records or by public notice.   There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact  involved affecting the members of the Class.  The questions of law and fact  common to the Class predominate over questions affecting only individual  class members, and include, but are not limited to, the following:  A) Whether Defendants violated the FDCPA;  B) Whether members of the Class are entitled to the remedies under the  Plaintiff repeats, re-alleges, and incorporates by reference, all other  paragraphs.   The foregoing acts and omissions constitute numerous and multiple violations  of the FDCPA, including but not limited to each and every one of the above- cited provisions of the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq.   As a result of each and every violation of the FDCPA, Plaintiff is entitled to  any actual damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1); statutory damages in  an amount up to $1,000.00 pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A); and,  reasonable attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) from  Defendant.  FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT (FDCPA)  15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 ET SEQ.  ",lose,2
15763201,win," On or about November 26, 2018, Defendant called Plaintiff’s cellular telephone number  ending in 9978 (“9978 Number”) with a pre-recorded message.     Upon Plaintiff answering the phone, a pre-recorded message asked Plaintiff to press 1  if she was interested in a vacation promotion.    After Plaintiff pressed 1, she was connected to a live representative who notified  Plaintiff that he was an employee of Defendant and that he wanted to sell Plaintiff insurance.      The employee represented that Defendant had obtained Plaintiff’s number from  Facebook.  Plaintiff does not list her phone number on Facebook.     Plaintiff is the subscriber and sole user of the 9978 Number.    Defendant called Plaintiff from 305-514-0228, a number which upon information and  belief, Defendant owned and/or operated.     Plaintiff received the subject calls within this judicial district and, therefore, Defendant’s  violation of the TCPA occurred within this district.      Upon information and belief, Defendant caused similar calls to be sent to individuals  residing within this judicial district.      At no point in time did Plaintiff provide Defendant with written express consent to be  contacted using a pre-recorded message.      Defendant’s unsolicited calls caused Plaintiff actual harm, including invasion of her  privacy, aggravation, annoyance, intrusion on seclusion, trespass, and conversion.  Defendant’s calls  also inconvenienced Plaintiff and caused disruption to her daily life.     Plaintiff brings this case as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23, on behalf of  herself and all others similarly situated.    Plaintiff brings this case on behalf of the below defined Class:  All persons within the United States who, within the four years  prior to the filing of this Complaint, were sent a pre-recorded call,  from Defendant or anyone on Defendant’s behalf, to said person’s  cellular telephone number, without their prior express written  consent.      Defendant and their employees or agents are excluded from the Class. Plaintiff does not  know the number of members in the Class but believes the Class members number in the several  thousands, if not more.   The common questions in this case are capable of having common answers. If Plaintiff’s  claim that Defendants routinely calls telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephone services is  accurate, Plaintiff and the Class members will have identical claims capable of being efficiently  adjudicated and administered in this case.   Plaintiff re-alleges and incorporates the foregoing allegations as if fully set forth  herein.     It is a violation of the TCPA to make “any call (other than a call made for  emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using any  automatic telephone dialing system or prerecorded or artificial voice… to any telephone number  assigned to a … cellular telephone service ….” 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).     Defendant – or third parties directed by Defendant – used pre-recorded calls to  make non-emergency marketing telephone calls to the cellular telephones of Plaintiff and other  members of the Class.    Defendant violated § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the TCPA by using a pre-recorded  message to make non-emergency telephone calls to the cell phones of Plaintiff and the other  members of the putative Class without their prior express consent.     As a result of Defendant’s conduct and pursuant to § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA,  Plaintiff and the other members of the putative Class were harmed and are each entitled to a  minimum of $500.00 in damages for each violation. Plaintiff and the class are also entitled to an  injunction against future calls.   WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, Isabel Gutierrez, on behalf of herself and the other members of  the Class, prays for the following relief:   a.  A declaration that Defendant’s practices described herein violate the Telephone  Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227;   b.  A declaration that Defendant’s violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection  Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227, were willful and knowing;  c.  An injunction prohibiting Defendant from using pre-recorded messages to call  telephone numbers assigned to cellular telephones without the prior express consent of the called  party;   d.  An award of actual, statutory damages, and/or trebled statutory damages; and   e.  Such further and other relief the Court deems reasonable and just.  Violations of the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)  (On Behalf of Plaintiff and the Class)  ",win,2
5302405,win," Throughout Plaintiff’s employment with Belk, Plaintiff consistently worked more  than 40 hours per workweek.    Belk failed to keep accurate records of all hours worked by Plaintiff.    Although Belk failed to keep accurate records of Plaintiff’s hours worked, Belk  required, suffered, or permitted Plaintiff to work in excess of 40 hours per week.    Belk was aware that Plaintiff worked more than 40 hours per workweek, yet Belk  failed to pay Plaintiff any overtime compensation for any of the hours worked over 40 in a  workweek.    Defendant classified Plaintiff as exempt from coverage of the overtime provisions  of the FLSA.    Upon information and belief, Belk did not perform an individual analysis of  Plaintiff’s job duties when making the decision to classify Plaintiff as exempt from the overtime  protections of the FLSA.    Plaintiff’s primary duties were non-exempt.     The tasks that Plaintiff regularly performed included but were not limited to:  a.  restocking products;   b.  marking down sale items;  c.  keeping clothes organized;  d.  operating the register;   e.  selling merchandise;  f.  working the sales floor; and  g.  performing other general customer service related duties.    Plaintiff’s primary job duties did not include:  5  a.  hiring, firing, promoting, or disciplining other employees;  b.  implementing management policies, practices, and procedures;  c.  committing Belk in matters having significant financial impact;   d.  setting employees’ wages; or   e.  determining how many labor hours could be allocated to Plaintiff’s  store.    The performance of non-exempt duties occupied the vast majority of Plaintiff’s  working hours.    Plaintiff’s primary duties did not differ substantially from the duties of non-exempt  hourly paid employees.    Plaintiff did not exercise a meaningful degree of independent discretion with respect  to the exercise of Plaintiff’s duties.     Plaintiff did not have the discretion or authority to make any decisions with  respect to matters of significance and was required to follow the policies, practices, and  procedures set by Belk.  Plaintiff did not have any independent authority to deviate from these  policies, practices, and procedures.    Store managers and district managers were responsible for the overall performance  of the store, not Plaintiff.    Belk has intentionally, willfully, and regularly violated the FLSA with respect to  Plaintiff by:  a.  willfully failing to record all of the time the Plaintiff worked for the  benefit of Belk;  b.  willfully failing to keep accurate time records as required by the FLSA;  c.  willfully failing to credit Plaintiff for all hours worked including overtime  hours, consistent with the requirements of the FLSA;  d.  willfully failing to pay Plaintiff wages for all hours worked including  overtime wages for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek;  6  e.  willfully classifying Plaintiff as exempt despite Plaintiff’s primary duties  being non-exempt in nature; and  f.  failing to provide sufficient resources in the labor budgets for non-exempt  employees to complete all of the non-exempt tasks at Plaintiff’s location  of employment, knowing or recklessly disregarding the fact that doing so  resulted in Plaintiff  having to work more than 40 hours in a workweek  primarily performing non-exempt duties during Plaintiff’s workweeks  without receiving overtime compensation—which allowed Defendant to  avoid paying additional wages (including overtime) to the non-exempt  employees.    As a sophisticated employer operating hundreds of locations throughout the  country, Defendant was aware or recklessly disregarded the fact that Plaintiff primarily  performed non-exempt duties and did not perform activities sufficient to satisfy the requirements  for any FLSA exemption.  Inasmuch as Defendant is a substantial corporate entity aware of its  obligations under the FLSA, Defendant acted willfully or recklessly in failing to classify Plaintiff  as a non-exempt employee.  V.   Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations in the preceding  Paragraphs as if they have been set forth herein.    The overtime wage provisions set forth in §§ 201 et seq. of the FLSA apply to  Belk.     Belk violated the FLSA, as described in this Complaint.    Belk failed to pay Plaintiff the overtime wages to which Plaintiff is entitled under  the FLSA.     Belk’s violations of the FLSA, as described in this Complaint, were willful and  intentional.  Belk failed to make a good faith effort to comply with the FLSA with respect to its  compensation of Plaintiff.    Because Belk willfully violated the FLSA, a three-year statute of limitations  applies, pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255.  7    As a result of Belk’s willful violations of the FLSA, Plaintiff suffered damages by  being denied overtime wages in accordance with 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq.     As a result of Belk’s unlawful acts, Plaintiff has been deprived of overtime  compensation and other wages in amounts to be determined at trial, and is entitled to recovery of  such amounts, liquidated damages, prejudgment interest, attorneys’ fees, costs and other  compensation pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).  VI.  Count One – Unpaid Overtime Compensation In Violation of the FLSA  ",win,2
18467886,win," Plaintiffs re-allege and re-aver each and every allegation and statement  contained in paragraphs above of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.    At all relevant times, upon information and belief, Defendants were and  continue to be an employer engaged in interstate commerce and/or the production of goods for  commerce within the meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a). Further, Plaintiffs  and the Proposed FLSA Collective members are covered individuals within the meaning of the   Plaintiffs re-allege and re-aver each and every allegation and statement  contained in paragraphs above of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.    Defendants employed Plaintiffs within the meaning of New York Labor  Law §§ 2 and 651.    Defendants knowingly and willfully violated the rights of by failing to pay  Plaintiffs the applicable minimum wage for all straight time hours worked and required  overtime compensation at the rate of time and one-half for each hour worked in excess of forty  (40) hours in a workweek.    Employers are required to pay a ""spread of hours"" premium of one (1)  additional hour' s pay at the statutory minimum hourly wage rate for each day where the  spread of hours in an employee's workday exceeds ten (10) hours. New York State Department  of Labor Regulations § 146-1.6.    Defendants failed to furnish Plaintiffs with a statement with every payment  of wages listing gross wages, deductions and net wages, in contravention of New York Labor  Law § 195(3) and New York State Department of Labor Regulations § 146-2.3.    Defendants failed to keep true and accurate records of hours worked by each  employee covered by an hourly minimum wage rate, the wages paid to all employees, and other  similar information in contravention of New York Labor Law § 661.    Defendants failed to establish, maintain, and preserve for not less than six  (6) years payroll records showing the hours worked, gross wages, deductions, and net wages  for each employee, in contravention of the New York Labor Law § 194(4), and New York  State Department of Labor Regulations § 146-2.1.    At the time of their hiring, Defendants failed to notify Plaintiffs of their  rates of pay and their regularly designated payday, in contravention of New York Labor Law  § 195(1).    Due to the Defendants' New York Labor Law violations, Plaintiffs are entitled  to recover from Defendants the difference between their actual wages and the amounts that  were owed under the New York Labor law. The deficiency accounts for minimum wage for all  straight time hours, overtime compensation for all overtime hours, ""spread of hours"" premium,  reasonable attorneys' fees, and costs and disbursements of this action, pursuant to New York  Labor Law§§ 663(1), 198.    Plaintiffs are also entitled to liquidated damages pursuant to New York Labor  Law§ 663(1), as well as civil penalties and/or liquidated damages pursuant to the New York  State Wage Theft Prevention Act.   Plaintiffs re-allege and re-aver each and every allegation and statement  contained in paragraphs above of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.    Defendants have willfully failed to supply Plaintiffs with wage notices, as  required by NYLL, Article 6, § 195(1), in English or in the language identified by Plaintiffs as  their primary language, containing Plaintiffs’ rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether  paid by the hour, shift, day, week, salary, piece, commission, or other; hourly rate or rates of  pay and overtime rate or rates of pay if applicable; the regular pay day designated by the  employer in accordance with NYLL, Article 6, § 191; the name of the employer; any ""doing  business as"" names used by the employer; the physical address of the employer's main office or  principal place of business, and a mailing address if different; the telephone number of the  employer; plus such other information as the commissioner deems material and necessary.    Through their knowing or intentional failure to provide Plaintiffs with the  wage notices required by the NYLL, Defendants have willfully violated NYLL, Article 6, §§  190 et seq., and the supporting New York State Department of Labor Regulations.    Defendants have willfully failed to supply Plaintiffs with accurate statements  of wages as required by NYLL, Article 6, § 195(3), containing the dates of work covered by  that payment of wages; name of employee; name of employer; address and phone number of  employer; rate or rates of pay and basis thereof, whether paid by the hour, shift, day, week,  salary, piece, commission, or other; gross wages; hourly rate or rates of pay and overtime rate  or rates of pay if applicable; the number of hours worked, including overtime hours worked if  applicable; deductions; and net wages.    Due to Defendants' willful violations of NYLL, Article 6, § 195(1), are  entitled to statutory penalties of fifty dollars each day that Defendants failed to provide  Plaintiffs with wage notices, or a total of five thousand dollars each, reasonable attorneys' fees,  costs, and injunctive and declaratory relief, as provided for by NYLL, Article 6, § 198(1-b).    Due to Defendants’ willful violations of NYLL, Article 6, § 195(3), Plaintiffs  are entitled to statutory penalties of two hundred fifty dollars for each workweek that  Defendants failed to provide Plaintiffs with accurate wage statements, or a total of five  thousand dollars each, reasonable attorneys' fees, costs, and injunctive and declaratory relief, as  provided for by NYLL, Article 6, § 198(1-d). ",win,1
6302733,lose," In the last line of the Collection Letter, in much smaller print, Defendant states, ""The law  limits how long a debt can appear on your credit report. Due to the age of this debt, we will not  report payment or non-payment of it to a credit bureau.""    Nor did the letter inform Plaintiff that a partial payment on the debt would restart the  running of the statute of limitations. In fact, had Plaintiff chosen a payment plan option, and  advised Defendant of this in writing, the partial payment would revive the statute of limitations  rendering the Plaintiff worse off than if she had rejected the offer.    It is the position of the Federal Trade Commission, the Consumer Financial Protection  Bureau, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Office of  the Comptroller of the Currency that when ""collecting on a time barred debt a debt collector  [Defendant] must inform the consumer [Plaintiff] that (1) the collector cannot sue to collect the  debt and (2) providing a partial payment would revive the collector's [Defendant's] ability to sue  to collect the balance."" McMahon v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 774 F.3d 1010, 1015 (7th Cir. 2014); see  White v. First Step Grp. LLC, 2017 LEXIS 153569 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2017).    The Defendant engaged in misleading, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices in  violation of the FDCP A by its Collection Letter to the Plaintiff.   Plaintiff brings this as a class action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.    Plaintiff seeks certification of the following classes, initially defined as follows:  Class: All consumers with a Pennsylvania address that have received collection letters similar  to Exhibit A from Defendant concerning debts for GE Capital Retail Bank used primarily  for personal, household, or family purposes within one year prior to the filing of this  complaint.    Upon information and belief, Defendant has sent collections letters in attempt to collect a  debt to hundreds if not thousands of consumers Pennsylvania, each of which violates the FDCP A.  The members of the Class, therefore, are believed to be so numerous thatjoinder of all members is  impracticable.    The letters sent by Defendant, and received by the Class, are to be evaluated by the objective  standard of the hypothetical ""least sophisticated consumer.""    The exact number and identities of the Class members are unknown at this time and can  only be ascertained through discovery. Identification of the Class members is a matter capable of  ministerial determination from Defendant's records.  Common Questions of Law and Fact    There are questions of law and fact common to the class that predominates over any  questions affecting only individual Class members. These common questions of law and fact  include, without limitation: (i) whether Defendant violated various provisions of the FDCP A; (ii)  whether the Plaintiff and the Class have been injured by the conduct of Defendant; (iii) whether  the Plaintiff and the Class have sustained damages and are entitled to restitution as a result of  Defendants wrongdoing and, if so, what is the proper measure and appropriate statutory formula to  be applied in determining such damages and restitution; and (iv) whether the Plaintiff and the Class  are entitled to declaratory and/or injunctive relief.  Typicality    Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the Class members' interests, in that the  Plaintiffs counsel is experienced and, further, anticipates no impediments in the pursuit and  maintenance of the class action as sought herein.    Neither the Plaintiff nor his counsel have any interests, which might cause them not to  vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit.  Proceeding Via Class Action is Superior and Advisable    A class action is superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the  claims herein asserted, this being specifically envisioned by Congress as a principal means of  enforcing the FDCPA, as codified by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692(k).    The members of the Class are generally unsophisticated individuals, whose rights will not  be vindicated in the absence of a class action.    Prosecution of separate actions by individual members of the Class would create the risk of  inconsistent or varying adjudications resulting in the establishment of inconsistent or varying  standards for the parties.    Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is also  appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiffs Class  predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is superior to  other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.    A class action will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute their  common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the duplication of effort  and expense that numerous individual actions would engender. Class treatment also will permit the  adjudication of relatively small claims by many Class members who could not otherwise afford to  seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein.    Absent a class action, the Class members will continue to suffer losses borne from  Defendant's breaches of Class members' statutorily protected rights as well as monetary damages,  thus allowing and enabling: (a) Defendant's conduct to proceed and; (b) Defendant to further enjoy  the benefit of its ill-gotten gains.    Defendant has acted, and will act, on grounds generally applicable to the entire Class,  thereby making appropriate a final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect  to the Class as a whole.   Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the above paragraphs and incorporates them as  if specifically set forth at length herein.    Defendant's Collection Letter is false, deceptive, and misleading, and violates the below  provisions of the FDCP A.    On a date better known by Defendant, Plaintiff incurred a debt from the use of a credit  card to purchase goods used for personal, family, and household purposes.    On a date better known by Defendant, Defendant began attempting to collect on said debt  allegedly owed by the Plaintiff.    On or about January 11, 201 7, Defendant sent Plaintiff the letter attached as Exhibit A,  presenting the ""current balance"" as $470.52, for a personal debt originating with GE Capital  Retail Bank and Old Navy.    The Collection Letter offered three available payment options. Option one (1) was for a  payment due by February 10, 2017 for 40% off. Option two (2) was for 20% off with payments  over 3 months. Option three (3) was for ""monthly payments as low as $50 per month."" See  Exhibit A. Therefore, Options 2 and 3 clearly offered payments over time.   The Class   VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT  15 U.S.C. §1692 et seq.  ",win,2
18614068,lose," Plaintiffs bring this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.  P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3).    The Class consists of:   a. all individuals with addresses in the State of New York;  b. to whom PCB sent a collection letter attempting to collect a consumer debt;  c. while the consumer was in an active bankruptcy case;  d. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this  action and on or before a date twenty-one (2l) days after the filing of this action.    The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of  Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or  have purchased debts.    Excluded from the Plaintiff Classes are the Defendants and all officer, members,  partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate  families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate  families.     The Plaintiffs' claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same  facts and legal theories. The Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the  Plaintiff Classes defined in this complaint. The Plaintiffs have retained counsel with experience  in handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiffs  nor their attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this  action.    Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure  is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff  Classes predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is  superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.    Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiffs may, at  the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues  pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).   Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length  herein.    On a date better known to the original creditors Northwell Heath Leonx Hill Hospital  (“Northwell”), the Plaintiff incurred an obligation.    The Northwell obligation arose out of transactions in which money, property,  insurance or services, which are the subject of the transaction, are primarily for personal, family  or household purposes.    The Northwell obligation is a ""debt"" as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(5).    Northwell is a ""creditor"" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(4).    Northwell or a subsequent owner of the debt contracted the Defendant to collect the  alleged debt.    Defendant collects and attempts to collect debts incurred or alleged to have been  incurred for personal, family or household purposes on behalf of creditors using the United  States Postal Services, telephone and internet.  Violation I – November 8, 2019 Collection Letter    On or around September 4, 2019 the Plaintiff filed for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy.    Within the bankruptcy petition the Plaintiff listed all his creditors including the  original creditor Northwell.    Upon the filing of the Bankruptcy Petition the Court sends out notices of filing to  each listed creditors and debt collector notifying them of the filed bankruptcy.    Despite the Plaintiff filing his Bankruptcy and receiving an automatice stay form the  collection of any debt, the original creditor Northwell contracted the account to Defendant PCB  to collect.    Defendant PCB failed to perform a proper bankruptcy check and sent collection  notices to the Plaintiff.    The collection notice specifically demanded payment for a debt that was included in  Plaintiff’s bankruptcy and was stayed from collecting.    The Defendant should have had systems in place to detect if this account has been  included in a bankruptcy filing.    Defendant’s attempt to collect a debt from the Plaintiff, was an illegal practice.    Defendant’s attempt to collect a debt from the Plaintiff, constitute the threat to take  an action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken because Defendant  cannot collect a debt included in bankruptcy.    Defendant’s attempt to collect a debt from the Plaintiff, constitutes harassment and  the unfair and unconscionable means to collect a debt.    Defendant’s attempt to collect a debt from Plaintiff, were deceptive and misleading  and caused the Plaintiff to be upset and confused about the status of the debt.    As a result of Defendant's deceptive, misleading and unfair debt collection practices,  Plaintiff has been damaged.   Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff  violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.    Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or  misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.    Defendant violated §1692e :   a. As the Letter was attempt collection a debt stayed from being collected in  violation of §1692e(2), and §1692e(5).  b. By making a false and misleading representation in violation of §1692e(10).    By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's  conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs  and attorneys’ fees.   Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein.    Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff  violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f.    Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692f, a debt collector may not use any unfair or  unconscionable means in connection with the collection of any debt.    By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's  conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA, actual damages, statutory damages, costs  and attorneys’ fees.  VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C.  §1692f et seq.   VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e  et seq.  ",win,3
4181279,lose,"(Business & Professions Code §§ 17500, et seq. ‐  Untrue or Misleading Advertising)   (Unjust Enrichment)   (Violation of State Consumer Protection Statutes)    Throughout the Class Periods (as defined below), Bayer engaged in a  widespread marketing campaign to mislead consumers about the nature, composition,  and nutritional and health benefits of its One A Day multivitamins in order to make  these multivitamins more desirable to consumers, increase sales, and gain market share.    Each type of Bayer One A Day multivitamin is substantially similar to the  multivitamin purchased by Plaintiffs because each multivitamin prominently bears the  One A Day logo, makes one or more of the unlawful Disease Prevention and Energy  Claims, and provides a substantially similar combination of vitamins.     Bayer deceptively markets its One A Day multivitamins using the  following unlawful claims:  11 Bayer AG, 2013 Annual Report 110 (2014).  Case3:14-cv-04601-WHO   Document1   Filed10/15/14   Page6 of 26 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  ‐ 6‐ Case No. 14‐cv‐04601  Plaintiffs bring this action as a class action pursuant to Rule 23(a), (b)(2),  and (b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Plaintiffs seek to represent the  following classes:  National:  All persons in the United States who purchased Bayer One A  Day multivitamins containing one or more Disease Prevention and Energy  Claim at any time during the applicable limitations period (the “National  Class Period”).  Excluded from the Class are Defendants’ officers and  directors and the immediate families of Defendants’ officers and directors.   Also excluded from the Class are the Defendants and their subsidiaries,  parents, affiliates, joint venturers, and any entity in which Defendants have  or have had a controlling interest.   California:  All persons in California who purchased Bayer One A Day  multivitamins containing one or more Disease Prevention and Energy  Claim between October 15, 2010 and the date of filing (the “California  25 One A Day website, One A Day Energy, http://oneaday.com/energy.html (last visited  Aug. 14, 2014) (emphasis added).  Case3:14-cv-04601-WHO   Document1   Filed10/15/14   Page15 of 26 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  ‐ 15‐ Case No. 14‐cv‐04601  Plaintiffs incorporate and re‐allege the unlawful business acts and  practices of Bayer as set forth in paragraphs 1 through 68 above.    Plaintiffs and Class Members are consumers who purchased Bayer One A  Day multivitamins for personal, family, or household purposes.    Bayer had a statutory duty to refrain from unfair or deceptive acts and  practices in the manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling of One A Day  multivitamins.    Bayer violated this duty through its misleading and deceptive marketing  and labeling practices with respect to its One A Day multivitamins.     Plaintiffs and Class Members were misled or deceived by Bayer’s  misleading and deceptive marketing and labeling practices with respect to its One A  Day multivitamins.     As a result of Bayer’s misleading and deceptive marketing and labeling  practices with respect to its One A Day multivitamins, Plaintiffs and Class Members  Case3:14-cv-04601-WHO   Document1   Filed10/15/14   Page18 of 26 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  ‐ 18‐ Case No. 14‐cv‐04601  Plaintiffs incorporate and re‐allege Bayer’s deceptive marketing and  labeling practices as set forth in paragraphs 1 through 68 above.     As a result of Bayer’s deceptive marketing and labeling of its One A Day  multivitamins, as described above, Bayer was enriched, at the expense of Plaintiffs and  those similarly situated, through the payment of the purchase price for One A Day  multivitamins.     Under the circumstances, it would be against equity and good conscience  to permit Bayer to retain the ill‐gotten benefits that it received from Plaintiffs and those  similarly situated, in light of the fact that the One A Day multivitamins purchased by the  Plaintiffs, and those similarly situated were not what Bayer purported them to be.  Thus,  it would be unjust or inequitable for Bayer to retain the benefit without restitution to  Case3:14-cv-04601-WHO   Document1   Filed10/15/14   Page22 of 26 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  ‐ 22‐ Case No. 14‐cv‐04601  Plaintiffs incorporate and re‐allege the untrue or misleading advertising  practices of Bayer as set forth in paragraphs 1 through 68 above, each of which  constitutes untrue or misleading advertising under California Business and Professions  Code §§ 17500, et seq.    At all material times, Bayer engaged in a scheme of offering its One A Day  multivitamin varieties for sale to Plaintiffs and other members of the Class by way of,  inter alia, commercial marketing.  These marketing materials misrepresented or omitted  the true results of taking these multivitamins.  Said advertisements and inducements  were made within the State of California and come within the definition of advertising  as contained in Business and Professions Code §§ 17500, et seq. in that such marketing  materials were intended as inducements to purchase One A Day multivitamins and are  statements disseminated by Bayer to Plaintiffs and the Class and were intended to reach  members of the Class.  Bayer knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have  known, that these statements were untrue or misleading.     In furtherance of this plan and scheme, Bayer has prepared and distributed  within the State of California via commercial marketing, statements that deceptively  represent the ingredients contained in, and the nature and quality of, One A Day  multivitamins.  Consumers, including Plaintiffs and Class Members, necessarily and  reasonably relied on these materials concerning One A Day multivitamins.  Consumers,  including Plaintiffs and the Class, were among the intended targets of such  representations and would reasonably be deceived by such materials.     The above acts of Bayer, in disseminating said deceptive and untrue  statements throughout the State of California to consumers, including Plaintiffs and  members of the Class, were and are likely to deceive reasonable consumers, including  Case3:14-cv-04601-WHO   Document1   Filed10/15/14   Page23 of 26 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  ‐ 23‐ Case No. 14‐cv‐04601",lose,3
7469050,win," Plaintiff was hired by Defendants in May 2016 as a Client Service  Manager Senior.  Plaintiff’s employment agreement was entered into with AJG “on  behalf of itself and its subsidiaries, divisions and affiliated and related companies”.  A  true and correct copy of Plaintiff’s “Employee Agreement” and Employment Offer  Letter are attached as Exhibits A and B respectively.    Plaintiff’s payslips list “Arthur J. Gallagher Service Company” as the  “Business Group” and list the “Employer name” as “47615 GGB US – White & Co.  Commercial.”  GGB US is believed to stand for Gallagher Global Brokerage US, which  is believed to be a division of Arthur J. Gallagher & Co.  Arthur J. Gallagher & Co.  acquired White & Company Insurance, Inc. in or around February 2016, prior to the  beginning of Plaintiff’s employment.  True and correct exemplar copies of Plaintiff’s  payslips are attached as Exhibit C (with personal information redacted).    Plaintiff has also received a document from the Employment Development  Department of the State of California which lists here employer as “Arthur J. Gallagher  Service Company LLC.”  A true and correct copy of that document is attached as  Exhibit D (with personal information redacted).    As evidenced in Plaintiff’s Employment Offer Letter, dated May 19, 2016,  Defendants falsely represented to Plaintiff that her position, Client Service Manager  Senior, was exempt.  See Exh. B, p. 1.  As such, Plaintiff received an annual salary paid  in twenty-four equal installments on a semi-monthly basis for 37.5 hours per week  without overtime compensation.    Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23  on behalf of the following Class:  a)  All persons who are or were previously employed by Defendants as  Client Service Managers in California and were classified as exempt  from overtime wages.  b)  With respect to the UCL claim, the class period is four (4) years  prior to the filing of this Complaint (the “UCL Class Period”).    c)  With respect to all other claims, the class period is three (3) years  prior to the filing of this Complaint (the “Labor Code Class Period”).  Plaintiff reserves the right to amend the class definition and class period(s).    Excluded from the proposed Class are any person(s) employed by  Plaintiff’s counsel and any judicial officers assigned to this case, as well as their staff.    Numerosity:  While the exact number of Class Members can only be  determined by appropriate discovery, membership in the Class is ascertainable based  upon the employment and payroll records maintained by Defendants.  At this time,  Plaintiff is informed and believes that the Class includes hundreds of Clients Service  Managers in California.  Therefore, the Class is sufficiently numerous that joinder of all  members of the Class in a single action is impracticable under Federal Rule of Civil  Procedure Rule 23(a)(1), and the resolution of their claims through a class action will be  of benefit to the parties and the Court.    Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the putative Class, realleges  Paragraphs 1 through37 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.    Defendants routinely require Plaintiff and the Class Members to work in  excess of eight (8) hours per workday and/or in excess of forty (40) hours per  workweek.  Defendants, however, failed to pay overtime wages to Plaintiff and the  Class.  Defendants instead improperly classified Plaintiff and the Class Members as  exempt to avoid paying them overtime wages.      California Labor Code § 510 and Wage Order 4-2001 require that an  employer compensate non-exempt employees for all work performed in excess of eight  (8) hours per workday and forty (40) hours per workweek, at the rate of 1½ times the  employee’s regular rate of pay.     Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the putative Class, realleges  Paragraphs 1 through 43 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.     California Labor Code § 512(a) provides, in relevant part, that “an  employer may not employ an employee for a work period of more than five hours per  day without providing the employee with a meal period of not less than 30 minutes” and  that “[a]n employer may not employ an employee for a work period of more than 10  hours per day without providing the employee with a second meal period of not less  than 30 minutes . . . .”    Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the putative Class, realleges  Paragraphs 1 through 50 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.    California Labor Code § 226 provides, in relevant part, that every  employer must furnish each employee with an itemized wage statement that shows the  total number of hours worked each pay period, gross wages, net wages, all deductions,  all applicable hourly rates of pay, the name and address of the legal entity that is the  employer, the last four digits (only) of the employee’s social security number and other  information.    Plaintiff, on behalf of the putative Class, realleges Paragraphs 1 through 57  of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein.    Gallagher performs insurance brokerage services.  Clients retain  Gallagher’s experts, called Producers, to consult and develop suitable risk  management programs tailored to the individual client’s needs and requirements.   Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of the putative Class, realleges  Paragraphs 1 through 63 of this Complaint as if fully set forth herein   For Failure to Provide Accurate Wage Statements  [Cal. Lab. Code § 226]  (By Plaintiff and the Class Against All Defendants)   For Failure to Pay Wages Due At Termination   [Cal. Lab. Code §§ 201, 202 and 203]  (By Plaintiff on Behalf of the Class Against All Defendants)   For Failure to Provide Off-Duty Meal Periods  [Cal. Lab. Code §§ 512 and 226.7 and Wage Order 4-2001]  (By Plaintiff and the Class Against All Defendants)   For Failure To Pay Overtime Compensation  [Cal. Lab. Code §§ 510, 1194, et seq. and Wage Order 4-2001]  (By Plaintiff and the Class Against All Defendants)   Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law  [Cal. Bus. And Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.]  (By Plaintiff and the Class Against All Defendants)  ",win,1
4556664,win," Defendants treated Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs similarly in that Plaintiff and  all FLSA Plaintiffs: (1) performed similar tasks, as described in the “Background Facts” section  below; (2) were subject to the same laws and regulations; (3) were paid in the same or similar  manner; (4) were required to work in excess of forty hours in a workweek; and (5) were not paid  the required one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay for all hours worked per  workweek in excess of forty.    At all relevant times, Defendants are and have been aware of the requirements to  pay Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs at an amount equal to the rate of one and one-half times their  respective regular rates of pay for all hours worked each workweek above forty, yet they  purposefully and willfully chose, and choose, not to do so.    Thus, all FLSA Plaintiffs are victims of Defendants’ pervasive practice of willfully  refusing to pay their employees overtime compensation for all hours worked per workweek above  forty, in violation of the FLSA.   In November 2009, Defendant Tom Rohlman, on behalf of Pine Management, hired  Plaintiff to work for Defendants as a maintenance worker, porter, and superintendent.  Plaintiff  worked for Defendants in that capacity until his employment ended on August 12, 2015.    At all times during Plaintiff’s employment with the Defendants, Pine  Management’s vice-presidents, brothers Daniel and Jason Rohlman, oversaw and controlled  Plaintiff’s work assignments, work hours, and the calculation and payment of his wages.    5 hours of that work per week.    Plaintiff’s duties as a maintenance worker consisted of plastering, painting, garbage  removal, cleaning windows, mopping, sweeping, and repairing apartment units and common areas  within Defendants’ buildings.     During the entire period of Plaintiff’s employment, the Defendants required  Plaintiff to reside, and Plaintiff did reside, in Defendants’ building located at 211 West 80th Street,  Apt. 1-C, New York, New York.  Plaintiff performed work for the Defendants in that building, as  well as in Defendants’ buildings located at 205, 207 and 209 West 80th Street, New York, New  York.    During the calendar years 2013-2015, up until and including August 12, 2015, the  Defendants required Plaintiff to perform his regular maintenance work duties five days per week,  Monday through Friday, from 8:00 a.m. until 4:30 p.m., without being permitted a scheduled or  uninterrupted break each day, totaling 42.5 hours per week.      Additionally, on the weekends, Defendants required Plaintiff to spend additional  hours working as a porter and superintendent at the four buildings.    In total, in addition to his 42.5 hours per week spent as a maintenance worker,  Plaintiff worked between 19.25 hours and twenty-five hours per week in his role as a porter and  superintendent.    Thus, throughout his employment, Defendants required Plaintiff to work, and  Plaintiff did work, a total of at least 61.75 hours per week and sometimes as many as 67.5 hours  per week.       During at least the three-year period pre-dating the commencement of this action  up until his last day of work, Defendants paid Plaintiff an hourly rate, for all hours that he spent  fulfilling his maintenance worker responsibilities as follows: $15.00 per hour through December  2014; and $16.00 per hour from January 2015 through the end of his employment on August 12,  2015.  During that same time period, Defendants paid Plaintiff an additional $300 per week to  cover his superintendent/porter responsibilities, which at his hourly rate of $16, operated to cover    By way of example only, during the workweek of January 26 through February 2,  2015, Plaintiff worked the following regular schedule as a maintenance worker:   Monday, January 26, 2015: 8:00 a.m. until 4:30 p.m.   Tuesday, January 27, 2015: 8:00 a.m. until 4:30 p.m.  Wednesday, January 28, 2015: 8:00 a.m. until 4:30 p.m.   Thursday, January 29, 2015: 8:00 a.m. until 4:30 p.m.  Friday, January 30, 2015: 8:00 a.m. until 4:30 p.m.  Saturday, January 31, 2015: off  Sunday, February 2, 2015: off  Plaintiff also, during that same week, worked a total of 19.25 hours performing his porter and  superintendent duties, which consisted of 2.25 hours of work on each weekday and four hours of  work on each weekend day.  Thus, adding up the hours for this representative workweek, Plaintiff  worked 61.75 hours for the week.  During this week, Defendant paid Plaintiff at the rate of $16.00  per hour for 61.25 hours worked and nothing for .5 hours of work, and thus not at the rate of time  and one-half his straight-time rate, or $24 per hour, for all hours that Plaintiff worked in excess of  forty.    Defendants employed several FLSA Plaintiffs at their various buildings throughout  Manhattan and Brooklyn, and treated Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs in the manner described  herein.    Defendants acted in the manner described herein so as to maximize their profits  while minimizing their labor costs and overhead.    Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate, and re-allege each and every  allegation set forth above with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein.    29 U.S.C. § 207(a) requires employers to compensate their employees at a rate not  less than one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked exceeding forty in a  workweek.      As described above, Defendants are employers within the meaning of the FLSA,  while Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs are employees within the meaning of the FLSA.    As also described above, Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs worked in excess of forty  hours per week, yet Defendants failed to compensate Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs in accordance  with the FLSA’s overtime provisions.     Defendants willfully violated the FLSA.    Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs are entitled to overtime pay for all hours worked per  week in excess of forty at the rate of one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay.     Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs are also entitled to liquidated damages and attorneys’  fees for Defendants’ violation of the FLSA’s overtime provisions.  Unpaid Overtime under the FLSA  ",win,4
4607681,lose," Fitbit is manufacturer of activity trackers founded in 2007 and headquartered in  San Francisco, California.  Its products’ functions have included, among other things, step  counting, distance calculating, calorie calculating, and sleep monitoring.      In October 2014, Fitbit announced a new feature: wrist-based heart rate  monitoring.  The two products equipped with this technology, dubbed PurePulse, are the Charge  HR and the Surge, which typically retail at approximately $1505 and $250 respectively.  Those  products are shown below:  I.  Fitbit Falsely Claims the PurePulse Trackers Consistently Record Accurate Heart  Rate.    Plaintiffs bring this lawsuit as a class action on their own behalf and on behalf of  all other persons similarly situated as members of the proposed Class, pursuant to Federal Rules  of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3), and/or (b)(1), (b)(2), and/or (c)(4).  This action satisfies the  numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority requirements of  those provisions.      Because this Complaint is brought in California, California’s choice of law  regime governs the state law allegations in this Complaint.     Under California’s governmental interest/comparative impairment choice of law  rules, California law applies to the claims of all Class members, regardless of their state of  residence or state of purchase.      Because Fitbit is headquartered—and made all decisions relevant to these  claims—in California, California has a substantial connection to, and materially greater interest  in, this the rights, interests, and policies involved in this action than any other state.      Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the  preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.    This claim is brought on behalf of the Nationwide Class and California Subclass  to seek injunctive  relief as well as monetary damages against Fitbit under California’s  Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, et seq.    Fitbit is a “person” as defined by the CLRA.  Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(c).    Plaintiffs and Class members are “consumers” within the meaning of the CLRA,  as defined by Cal. Civ. Code § 1761(d), who purchased one or more PurePulse Trackers.    The CLRA prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices undertaken by any  person in a transaction intended to result or which results in the sale or lease of goods or services  to any consumer[.]”  Cal. Civ. Code § 1770(a).      Fitbit engaged in unfair or deceptive trade practices that violated Cal. Civ. Code §  1770(a), as described above and below, by, among other things, failing to disclose the defective  nature of the PurePulse Trackers, representing that the PurePulse Trackers had characteristics  and benefits that they do not have (e.g., the ability to consistently record accurate heart rates,  even during high-intensity exercise), representing that the PurePulse Trackers were of a  particular standard, quality, or grade when they were of another, and advertising PurePulse  Trackers with the intent not to sell them as advertised.  See Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1770(a)(5), (a)(7),  (a)(9).     Fitbit knew, should have known, or was reckless in not knowing that its products  did not have the qualities, characteristics, and functions it represented, warranted, and advertised  them to have.      Plaintiffs hereby incorporate by reference the allegations contained in the  preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.    Plaintiffs bring this cause of action for themselves and on behalf of the  Nationwide Class and California Subclass.    California Business & Professions Code § 17200 prohibits acts of “unfair  competition,” including any “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice” and “unfair,  deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.”  Fitbit’s conduct related to the Heart Rate Defect  violated each of this statute’s three prongs.    Fitbit committed an unlawful business act or practice in violation of Cal. Bus. &  Prof. Code § 17200, et seq., by their violations of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act, Cal. Civ.  Code § 1750, et seq., as set forth above, by the acts and practices set forth in this Complaint.   CHOICE OF LAW ALLEGATIONS ............................................................................................ 19  CLAIMS FOR RELIEF ................................................................................................................. 20  PRAYER FOR RELIEF ................................................................................................................. 38  I.  Fitbit Falsely Claims the PurePulse Trackers Consistently Record Accurate  Heart Rate. ........................................................................................................................ 6  II.  The PurePulse Trackers Fail to Consistently Record Accurate Heart Rate As  Promised and Warranted. ............................................................................................... 11  III. Fitbit Attempted to Keep Class Members Out of Court Through An  Unconscionable Post-Purchase Agreement, Which Class Members Were  Required to Accept in Order to Render Operational the PurePulse Trackers They  Already Purchased. ......................................................................................................... 13  Violation of California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”),   Cal. Civ. Code § 1750, et seq.   Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law,  Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq. – Based On the Heart Rate Defect   Violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law,  Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, et seq. – Based On the Post-Purchase “Terms of Service”  ",lose,3
4520234,lose,"(Violations of the FDCPA)    Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in  paragraphs numbered “1” through “20” herein with the same force and effect as if the  same were set forth at length herein.    Upon information and belief, Defendant, on behalf of itself or a third-party,  began efforts to collect an alleged consumer debt from the Plaintiff.     Upon information and belief, and better known to the Defendant,  Defendant commenced its campaign of communications with Plaintiff by sending  Plaintiff two (2) mass-produced form letters in the mail both dated December 11, 2013.    One letter was a collection letter (hereinafter referred to as “Defendant’s  Collection Letter”) which bore Defendant’s letterhead with company name identifying  Defendant as “Law Office” (attached hereto as Exhibit “A”).      Defendant’s Collection Letter began: “The above creditor has turned over  to us for collection your account in the sum of $____. Beneath this was a heading in  large type, upper case letters centered on the page: “VALIDATION NOTICE.”    Said “validation notice” consisted of: “The amount shown is the amount  owed to the Creditor.” Immediately after this sentence begins Defendant’s required 30- day dispute language regarding consumer rights.     Thereafter, with no space to separate it from the preceding text,  Defendant stated: “At this time no attorney with this firm has personally reviewed the  particular circumstances of your account.”    Thereafter, with no space to separate it from the preceding text,  Defendant provided required FDCPA disclosures in all uppercase letters. Thereafter  Defendant informed the consumer that if they did not dispute the alleged debt or require  further information offered in the 30-day disclosure language and “wish to pay this  claim,” that they should contact Defendant’s office.    Defendant’s Collection Letter was signed:   BY:___[Script initials “JS”]___  [Defendant’s company name]   Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in  paragraphs numbered “1” through “33” herein with the same force and effect as if the  same were set forth at length herein.     15 USC §1692e – preface prohibits a debt collector from using any false,  misleading or deceptive representations in connection with the collection of a debt.     The Defendant violated 15 USC §1692e – preface by creating a mass- produced form letter for dissemination to consumers as exemplified by Defendant’s  Collection Letter (Plaintiff’s Exhibit “A”) which uses deception throughout. Defendant’s  letter states that “The above creditor has turned over to us for collection your account,”  with no indication of whether “us” means attorneys but implying that it does by the  inclusion of “Law Office” above the company name in the masthead. Equally deceptive  is Defendant including a heading above the body of its letter in large, bold, upper case  type centered on the page: “VALIDATION NOTICE,” after which Defendant states “The  amount shown is the amount owed to the Creditor,” and then immediately continues,  “Unless you notify us with thirty days,” etc. stating the required 30-day disclosure  language in the same paragraph as the so-called “Validation Notice.”  Defendant has  deliberately designed the aforementioned letter so that all of the text following the  heading, in fact the entire letter, can be easily misconstrued as “validation” of the  consumer’s debt, which is clearly not the case. Further down, Defendant deceptively  squeezes the statement, “At this time no attorney with this firm has personally reviewed  the particular circumstances of your account,” with no space to separate the paragraph  from the preceding or following text. In clear contradiction of this statement, Defendant’s  Collection Letter was signed by John J. Sheerin, an attorney with Defendant’s firm, who  deceptively did not identify himself as an attorney, but beneath his signature printed the  name of his firm and a direction to “refer to” a “J. Kennedy” and a telephone number.  Evidence that Attorney Sheerin signed said letter is provided by Defendant’s Legal  Letter (Plaintiff’s Exhibit “B”) where Attorney Sheerin includes his name beneath his  signature. A comparison of Attorney Sheerin’s signatures in Plaintiff’s Exhibits “A” and  “B” evidence that they are identical.   Defendant dates two letters on the same day, falsely informing the Plaintiff  that they are debt collectors and no attorney has personally reviewed particular  circumstances of his account and at the same time that they have been retained as  attorneys for the creditor and enclose an executed Consent to Change Attorneys which  they claim has been sent to “the Court” for filing. Defendant’s Collection Letter  deliberately and deceptively prints, “Refer to: J. Kennedy” directly beneath Mr. Sheerin’s  signature and firm name, with no indication of “J. Kennedy’s” title. In Defendant’s Legal  Letter, J. Kennedy is identified as “Collection Manager” and Mr. Sheerin is not identified  as an attorney. Both letters conclude by asking the consumer to contact Defendant to  make a settlement. Taken together, Defendant letters clearly illustrate Defendant’s  deceitful and reprehensible attempts to imply legal action is imminent as a means to  compel Plaintiff and the consumer to cooperate with Defendant’s debt collection  objectives.    15 USC §1692 f –preface prohibits a debt collector from using any unfair  or unconscionable actions in connection with the collection of a debt.               38.  The Defendant violated 15 USC §1692 f – preface by unfairly and  unconscionably mass-producing and sending letters, exemplified by Defendant’s  Collection Letter sent to Plaintiff, designed to convince consumer recipients that they  are being contacted regarding a debt with all the implications associated with a pending  legal procedure. Defendant prints a letter on letterhead indicating “Law Office” above  the company name, states that “The above creditor has turned over to us for collection  your account” without stating who “us” entails in order to encourage the belief that “us”  means attorneys. Moreover, by centering the large upper case, bold typed heading,  “VALIDATION NOTICE,” above the body of its letter, Defendant unfairly attempts to give  the impression that what follows is a validation of the consumer’s debt when said  “validation” consists of the words: “The amount shown is the amount owed to the  Creditor.”  Further, Defendant deliberately squeezes the language that no attorney has  reviewed the particular circumstances of the consumer’s account between required  dispute notification language and above the all upper case disclosure language that  “THIS COMMUNICATION IS AN ATTEMPT TO COLLECT A DEBT,” etc.  Further  Defendant unfairly includes a signature of two initials, difficult to decipher, with no  identity of the individual who sent the letter so as to encourage the consumer to assume  it is from an attorney. By Defendant’s use of stationery with a legal masthead  designated “Law Office,” it’s illusive signature and failure to identify the signatory or the  individual, “J. Kennedy” whom the consumer is directed to “refer to,” and it’s misleading  design and placement of information, Defendant intends to unfairly intimidate and  unsettle consumers and convince them that legal action against them is imminent,  thereby provoking the consumer into contacting Defendant in furtherance of  Defendant’s debt collection objectives.     As a result of Defendant’s violations of the FDCPA, Plaintiff has been  damaged and is entitled to damages in accordance with the FDCPA.   Plaintiff brings this action as a class action, pursuant to Federal Rules of  Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) Rule 23, on behalf of himself and all persons/consumers,  along with their successors-in-interest, who have received similar debt collection notices  and/or letters/communications from Defendant which, as alleged herein, are in violation  of the FDCPA, as of the date of Plaintiff’s Complaint (the “Class”).  Excluded from the  Class is Defendant herein, and any person, firm, trust, corporation, or other entity  related to or affiliated with the defendant, including, without limitation, persons who are  officers, directors, employees, associates or partners of Defendant is impracticable.  Upon information and belief, hundreds of persons have received debt collection notices  and/or letters/communications from Defendant, which violate various provisions of the ",win,3
6274448,win,"At all times relevant, Plaintiff was a citizen of the State of California.  Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47  Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all others  similarly situated (“the Class”).   Plaintiff represents, and is a member of, the Class, consisting of:   a.All persons within the United States who had or have a number  assigned to a cellular telephone service, who received at least one call  using an ATDS and/or an artificial prerecorded voice from Defendants  InboundProspect, Inc., d/b/a Senior Mobility Care, between the date of  filing this action and the four years preceding, where such calls were  placed for the marketing purposes, to non-customers of  InboundProspect, Inc., d/b/a Senior Mobility Care, at the time of the  calls.   Defendants and their employees or agents are excluded from the Class.  Plaintiff does not know the number of members in the Class, but believes the  Class members number in the thousands, if not more.  Thus, this matter  should be certified as a Class action to assist in the expeditious litigation of  this matter.   Plaintiff and members of the Class were harmed by the acts of Defendants in  at least the following ways: Defendants illegally contacted Plaintiff and the  Class members via their cellular telephones thereby causing Plaintiff and the  Class members to incur certain cellular telephone charges or reduce cellular  telephone time for which Plaintiff and the Class members previously paid, by  having to retrieve or administer  messages left by Defendants or their agents,  during those illegal calls, and invading the privacy of said Plaintiff and the  Class members.  Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby.   The joinder of the Class members is impractical and the disposition of their  claims in the Class action will provide substantial benefits both to the parties  and to the Court.  The Class can be identified through Defendants’ records  and/or Defendants’ agent’s records.   There is a well-defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact  involved affecting the parties to be represented.  The questions of law and fact  to the Class predominate over questions which may affect individual Class  members, including the following:  i. Whether, within the four years prior to the filing of the  Complaint, Defendants made any call(s) (other than a call made  for emergency purposes or made with the prior express consent  of the called party) to the Class members using any ATDS or an  artificial or prerecorded voice to any telephone number assigned  to a cellular telephone service;  ii.Whether Defendants called non-customers of Defendants for  marketing purposes;  iii.Whether Plaintiff and the Class members were damaged thereby,  and the extent of damages for such violation(s); and  iv.Whether Defendants should be enjoined from engaging in such  conduct in the future.   Plaintiff and the members of the Class have all suffered irreparable harm as a  result of the Defendants’ unlawful and wrongful conduct.  Absent a class  action, the Class will continue to face the potential for irreparable harm.  In  addition, these violations of law will be allowed to proceed without remedy  and Defendants will likely continue such illegal conduct.  The size of Class  member’s individual claims causes, few, if any, Class members to be able to  afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained of herein.   Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims and  claims involving violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.   A class action is a superior method for the fair and efficient adjudication of  this controversy.  Class-wide damages are essential to induce Defendants to  comply with federal and California law.  The interest of Class members in  individually controlling the prosecution of separate claims against Defendants  is small because the maximum statutory damages in an individual action for  violation of privacy are minimal.  Management of these claims is likely to  present significantly fewer difficulties than those that would be presented in  numerous individual claims.   Defendants have acted on grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby  making appropriate final injunctive relief and corresponding declaratory relief  with respect to the Class as a whole.  Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this  Complaint as though fully stated herein.   As a result of Defendants’ negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq.,  Plaintiff and the Class are entitled to an award of $500.00 in statutory  damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B).   Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief  prohibiting such conduct in the future.  Plaintiff incorporates by reference all of the above paragraphs of this  Complaint as though fully stated herein.   The foregoing acts and omissions of Defendants constitute numerous and  multiple knowing and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not  limited to each and every one of the above-cited provisions of 47 U.S.C. §  227 et seq.   As a result of Defendants’ knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. §  227 et seq., Plaintiff and each of the Class are entitled to treble damages, as  provided by statute, up to $1,500.00, for each and every violation, pursuant to  47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C).   Plaintiff and the Class are also entitled to and seek injunctive relief  prohibiting such conduct in the future.  As a result of Defendants’ negligent violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1),  Plaintiff  seeks  for  himself and each Class member $500.00 in statutory  damages, for each and every violation, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B).   Pursuant to 47  U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such  conduct in the future.   Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.  As a result of Defendants’ willful and/or knowing violations of 47 U.S.C. §  227(b)(1), Plaintiff seeks for himself and each Class member treble damages,  as provided by statute, up to $1,500.00 for each and every violation, pursuant  to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(B) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C).   Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(A), injunctive relief prohibiting such  conduct in the future.   Any other relief the Court may deem just and proper.  KNOWING AND/OR WILLFUL VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE  CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.   NEGLIGENT VIOLATIONS OF THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER  PROTECTION ACT 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.   VIOLATION  OF THE TCPA, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ET SEQ.  ",win,1
6122663,lose,"(Under NYTL § 1139 and 20 NYCRR §§ 534.2 and 534.8 for Violations of § 526.5(c)(4))   (Violations of GBL § 349)    As relevant here, Costco’s coupon booklets were distributed in two different  standard formats before the beginning of the Class Period: (i) the pre-August 8, 2013 format; and  (ii) the format effective on and after August 8, 2013 until the beginning of the Class Period.    Beginning with the coupon booklet valid October 3-27, 2013, an “Instant  Savings” notation in small print was again included for many of the coupons immediately above  the “$[X] OFF” and any applicable quantity limit for the pictured product. However, unlike the  pre-August, 2013 format, there was no asterisked message below the “Instant Savings” notation  stating “See inside cover for terms and conditions.” An “Instant Savings” notation was not added  for the limited number of coupons that included a blue arrow pointing at the price and stating  “Book Or App Required,” or the “ONLINE-ONLY OFFER” coupons.     No other changes were made to the format of the coupon booklets prior to the  beginning of the Class Period. As with the August 8-September 1, 2013 coupon booklet, the  coupon booklets did not include any reference to “Manufacturer’s coupon” for the coupons that  were not “ONLINE-ONLY OFFERS,” and the coupon booklets did not include any statement  that “[t]he instant savings in this booklet are Manufacturers’ savings” for the coupons that  included an “Instant Savings” notation. And the coupons themselves did not show that they were  “manufacturers’ coupons” and that the reduced price was the result of a “manufacturer’s  reimbursement” to Costco.  B.  Costco’s Coupon Booklets During the Class Period    The Costco receipt issued to customers for warehouse purchases is produced in a  standard, computer generated, structured data format. Generally, for each item purchased, the  receipt includes a line that lists the assigned identifying item number, a brief textual description  of the product such as a name abbreviation, and the full price.    For taxable items, the receipt includes a letter code to the right of the price which  depends on the rate at which the Sales Tax is charged. For example, an “A” to the right of the  price indicates that Sales Tax is charged at the full rate imposed by New York—for items  including but not limited to household cleaning and paper products, home goods like sheets and  towels, and taxable beverages like beer and soft drinks. An “F” to the right of the price is  assigned to items of clothing, which if priced at less than $110 per item, are exempt from New  York State Sales Tax but may still be subject to county sales tax.    For items purchased involving coupon price reductions, the coupon number,  generally the notation “CPN/[Item number]” and the amount of the coupon’s price reduction are  listed on a line immediately below the line for the item whose price is reduced by that coupon.    Only by manually totaling the full price of all “A” taxable items on the receipt  and applying the stated sales tax rate shown on the receipt can customers determine that Costco  has charged Sales Tax on the full price rather than the reduced price of purchased items  involving the coupons. And even then, the customers would have to subtract the total coupon- related price reductions for all “A” taxable items to calculate the amount of Costco’s Sales Tax  liability that Costco has illegally charged the customers on the full price rather than the reduced  price of their coupon-related warehouse purchases subject to Sales Tax, and Costco’s liability for  Sales Tax under § 526.5(c)(4) that it has illegally shifted its to its New York customers. By  contrast, all of this information and the related computations for all New York customers can be  derived from the structured data that resides and is maintained in Costco’s computer systems.   Plaintiff brings this action, individually and as a class action under Fed. R. Civ. P.  23(a) and (b)(3), on behalf of the following class:  All Costco customers who, for the period beginning three years prior to the  commencement of this action and continuing up to and including the present (the  “Class Period”), paid New York State Sales Tax to Costco for their purchases at  Costco’s New York warehouses on the full price rather than the reduced price of  taxable items when the price reduction was based on a coupon issued by Costco in  its monthly coupon booklet (the “Class”). Excluded from the Class are Costco and  Costco’s directors, officers, parents, affiliates, subsidiaries and successors.    Plaintiff and the Class satisfy the requirements for class certification under Fed.  R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3).    The members of the Class are so numerous that joinder of all members is  impracticable, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). Although the number of members of the  Class is not precisely known to Plaintiff at this time and can be determined only from appropriate  discovery, it is reasonably estimated based on the 18 Costco warehouses in New York State and  the average number of members and cardholders per warehouse worldwide as disclosed in  Costco’s Form 10-K that the Class includes many hundreds of thousands and probably in excess  of one million members.     Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class,  as required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to or in conflict  with the Class, and Plaintiff has retained competent counsel with extensive experience in  consumer and other types of class actions involving, among other things, deceptive consumer  acts and practices regarding taxes under the New York Tax Law, to further ensure the protection  of those interests and who intends to prosecute this action vigorously.    Plaintiff realleges and reincorporates each and every allegation in the preceding  paragraphs of this Complaint as if set forth verbatim.    Costco has violated § 526.5(c)(4) by charging and collecting from Plaintiff and  the Class Sales Tax for their purchases at Costco’s New York warehouses on the full price rather  than the reduced price of taxable items when the price reduction was based on a coupon issued  by Costco in its monthly coupon booklet, thereby illegally shifting its liability for Sales Tax on  the difference between the full price and the reduced price to Plaintiff and the Class.    Plaintiff and the Class have been injured by Costco’s illegal Sales Tax practices.    Costco is liable for, and should be required to repay to Plaintiff and the Class, the  Sales Tax that Costco has illegally shifted to and collected from them, in an amount to be  determined at trial.   Plaintiff realleges and reincorporates each and every allegation in the preceding  paragraphs of this Complaint as if set forth verbatim.    In determining what types of conduct may be deceptive practices under GBL §  349, the courts of New York have applied an objective standard which asks whether the  “representation or omission [is] likely to mislead a reasonable consumer acting reasonably under  the circumstances,” while taking into account not only the impact on the “average consumer” but  also on “the vast multitude which the statutes were enacted to safeguard ... including the  ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous who, in making purchases, do not stop to analyze but  are governed by appearances and general impressions.”    Costco’s Sales Tax practices described in this Complaint constitute deceptive acts  or practices in the conduct of business, trade or commerce or in the furnishing of services in this  State which affects the public interest under GBL § 349.    Plaintiff and the Class have been injured by Costco’s conduct.    Additionally, because Costco has willfully or knowingly violated § 349, Plaintiff  and the Class each are entitled to recover an amount not to exceed three times their actual  damages up to $1,000.  I.  Costco’s Monthly Coupon Booklets And Coupons During The Class Period Do Not  Indicate That The Coupons Are “Manufacturers’ Coupons,” And Do Not Disclose  That The Reduced Price Is The Result Of A “Manufacturer’s Reimbursement” To  Costco  ",win,4
4553998,win," Pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), Plaintiff seeks to prosecute his FLSA claims as a  collective action on behalf of all persons who are or were formerly employed by Defendants as  3  ASMs at any time from three years from December 15, 2013, to the entry of judgment in this  case (the “Collective Action Period”) (collectively, the “Collective Action Members”).    Defendants are liable under the FLSA for, inter alia, failing to properly  compensate Plaintiff and other ASMs.    There are many similarly-situated current and former ASMs who have been  underpaid in violation of the FLSA and who would benefit from the issuance of a court- supervised notice of this lawsuit and the opportunity to join it.  Thus, notice should be sent to  the Collective Action Members pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).    The similarly situated employees are known to Defendants, are readily- identifiable and can be located through Defendants’ records.   Defendants employed Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members as ASMs.    Defendants independently or jointly maintained control, oversight, and discretion  over the operation of all of its restaurants, including its employment practices with respect to the  ASMs.    Plaintiff’s and the ASMs’ work was performed in the normal course of  Defendants’ business and was integrated into it.    Consistent with the Defendants’ policy, pattern and/or practice, Plaintiff and  ASMs regularly worked in excess of 40 hours per workweek without being paid overtime  wages, in violation of the FLSA. Plaintiff worked an average of 55 hours per workweek.  Plaintiff sometimes worked 65-75 hours per workweek.    All of the work that the ASMs performed was assigned by Defendants, and/or  Defendants are aware of all of the work that they have performed.   4    The work that ASMs performed as part of their primary duty required little skill  and no capital investment.    The work that ASMs performed as part of their primary duty did not include  managerial responsibilities or the exercise of meaningful independent judgment and discretion.    Regardless of the store at which they worked, ASMs’ primary job duties included:  a.  preparing food;  b.  helping customers;  c.  bussing tables;  d.  cleaning the restaurant;  e.  checking to make sure that supplies were properly shelved; and  f.  checking inventory.    Regardless of the store at which they worked, ASMs’ primary job duties did not  include:  a.  hiring;  b.  firing;  c.  disciplining other employees;  d.  scheduling;  e.  supervising and delegating; or  f.  exercising meaningful independent judgment and discretion.     ASMs’ primary duties were manual in nature.  The performance of manual labor  duties occupied the majority of their working hours.    Pursuant to a centralized, company-wide policy, pattern and/or practice,  Defendants have classified all ASMs as exempt from coverage of the overtime provisions of the   At all relevant times, Defendants have been, and continue to be, employers  engaged in interstate commerce and/or the production of goods for commerce, within the  meaning of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206(a) and 207(a).    At all relevant times, Defendants employed Plaintiff, and employed or continues  to employ each of the Collective Action Members, within the meaning of the FLSA.    Defendants have engaged in a widespread pattern and practice of violating the  FLSA, as detailed in Collective Action Complaint.    Plaintiff consented in writing to be a party to this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C.  7  § 216(b).    The overtime wage provisions set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., apply to  Defendants.    At all relevant times and continuing to the present time, Defendants had a policy  and practice of refusing to pay overtime compensation to its ASMs and similarly-situated  employees in comparable positions but holding different titles, for hours worked in excess of 40  hours per workweek.    As a result of Defendants’ willful failure to compensate its employees, including  Plaintiff and the Collective Action members, at a rate not less than one and one-half times the  regular rate of pay for work performed in excess of 40 hours in a workweek, Defendants have  violated and continue to violate the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., including 29 U.S.C.  §§ 207(a)(1) and 215(a).    As a result of Defendants’ willful failure to record, report, credit and/or  compensate its employees, including Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members, Defendants  have failed to make, keep and preserve records with respect to each of its employees sufficient  to determine the wages, hours, and other conditions and practices of employment in violation of  the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., including 29 U.S.C. §§ 211(c) and 215(a).    As a result of Defendants’ policy and practice of minimizing labor costs by  underfunding the labor budgets for its restaurants, Defendants knew or recklessly disregarded  the fact that Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members were primarily performing manual  labor and non-exempt tasks.    Due to Defendants’ failure to provide enough labor budget funds, failure to take  into account the impact of the underfunded labor budgets on the job duties of Plaintiff and the  8  Collective Action Members, Defendants’ actual knowledge through its managerial  employees/agents that the primary duties of the Plaintiff and the Collective Action Members  was manual labor and included other non-exempt tasks, Defendants’ failure to perform a  person-by-person analysis of Plaintiff’s and the Collective Action Members’ job duties to  ensure that they were performing exempt job duties, Defendants’ instituting a policy and  practice that did not allow Plaintiff and Collective Action Members to record all hours worked,  and Defendants’ failure to post or keep posted a notice explaining the minimum wage and  overtime wage requirements, Defendants knew and/or showed reckless disregard that its  conduct was prohibited by the FLSA.  29 U.S.C. § 255(a).    As a result of Defendants’ FLSA violations, Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the  Collective Action Members, is entitled (a) to recover from Defendants unpaid overtime wages,  (b) to recover an additional, equal amount as liquidated damages for Defendants’ willful  violations of the FLSA, and (c) to recover their unreasonably delayed payment of wages,  reasonable attorneys’ fees, and costs and disbursements of this action, pursuant to 29 U.S.C.  § 216(b).    Because Defendants’ violations of the FLSA have been willful, a three-year  statute of limitations applies pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 255.  Fair Labor Standard Act – Unpaid Overtime Wages  On Behalf of Plaintiff PATRICK COYNE and the FLSA Collective  ",win,3
6351885,lose," During the call, Plaintiff was never informed that he may have his credit pulled,  nor was Plaintiff informed of any reason that Cox would be pulling his credit.     After learning of the pull, Plaintiff mailed Cox a letter stating that the inquiry was  not authorized and requesting that Cox have the inquiry removed. Cox took no action in  response to this letter, leaving Plaintiff with an unauthorized hard inquiry on each of his  three credit reports.     This is not the first time that Cox has made an unauthorized “hard inquiry.”      One consumer on FicoForums has written:   So a Cox communications salesman was coming door to door looking for  business. He offered me a great deal on internet service and I'm fed up with  my slow at&t dsl. I filled out no paperwork or application the guy just took  my info and went to his car to set up the install. Today I get the Fico alert  that I had an inquiry on 10/2 by cox communications. I'm assuming this is a  hp. Do I have any recourse? they never told me they were going to do a hp  and if they did I would have declined their offer.1    Plaintiff’s experience, along with the above publicly available information,  demonstrates that Cox has a habit of performing unauthorized inquiries on consumers’  credit reports.    Upon information and belief, Defendant instructs its agents to request  identification information from consumers prior to providing information about the  availability and pricing of services.     Defendant does not notify consumers that upon providing identifying information,  Defendant will perform a credit inquiry on his or her credit report.     Defendant’s practice causes real and concrete injury to consumers. Plaintiff and  other consumers had their personal, private financial information impermissibly accessed  in the absence of any written request for services, and without consent. The impermissible  access of private and confidential information contained within a consumer’s credit report  violates the privacy rights conveyed by Congress in enacting the FCRA.    Defendant’s interference with a consumer’s legally protected interest in ensuring  his or her credit is not impermissibly accessed and used constitutes injury in fact for  purposes of Article III standing. Here, Defendants’ action resulted in a concrete and  particularized harm – a hard inquiry and an attendant score drop.     Accordingly, Defendant impermissibly invaded Plaintiff and other consumers’  legally protected interest in ensuring their credit reports are only accessed and used for  legally permissible purposes, proximately causing cognizable injury.   Plaintiff seeks certification of the following classes, initially defined as follows:  Class 1 – Impermissible Access. All natural persons residing in the United States  or its territories, excluding the Court and staff, whose consumer reports display an  inquiry by Defendant, and for which Defendant has no open account or record of a  written request for an account.   Class 2 – Impermissible Use. All natural persons residing in the United States or  its territories, excluding the Court and staff, whose consumer reports are recorded  as received by Defendant, and for which there is a record of a review of that data in  Defendant’s possession.    Excluded from the Classes is Defendant herein, and any person, firm, trust,  corporation, or other entity related to or affiliated with the Defendant, including, without  limitation, persons who are officers, directors, employees, associates or partners of  Defendant.    Numerosity    Upon information and belief, Defendant has made impermissible credit pulls, and  impermissibly used credit information of hundreds of consumers throughout the United  States, each of which violates the FCRA. The members of the classes, therefore, are  believed to be so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.    The exact number and identities of the class members are unknown at this time and  can only be ascertained through discovery. Identification of the class members is a matter  capable of ministerial determination from Defendant’s records.   Common Questions of Law and Fact    The Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the class members.  Plaintiff and  all potential class members have claims arising out of the Defendant's common uniform  course of conduct complained of herein. Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the  Class, and Plaintiff has no interests adverse or antagonistic to the interests of other  members of the Class.  Protecting the Interests of the Class Members    Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent the class members' interests, in that  the Plaintiff's counsel is associated with experienced counsel and, further, anticipates no  impediments in the pursuit and maintenance of the class action as sought herein.     Neither the Plaintiff nor his counsel have any interests which might cause them not  to vigorously pursue the instant class action lawsuit.  Proceeding Via Class Action is Superior and Advisable    The members of the Class are generally unsophisticated individuals, whose rights  will not be vindicated in the absence of a class action.    Because Defendant has acted on grounds generally applicable to the proposed  classes, final injunctive and corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the classes as  a whole may be appropriate and as such, Plaintiff may seek certification under Fed. R.  Civ. P. 23(b)(2) or (b)(3). Without an injunction, Defendant’s violative business practices  are likely to continue.    Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at  the time of class certification motion, seek to certify one or more classes only as to  particular issues pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).    A class action will permit a large number of similarly situated persons to prosecute  their common claims in a single forum simultaneously, efficiently, and without the  duplication of effort and expense that numerous individual actions would engender. Class  treatment also will permit the adjudication of relatively small claims by many class  members who could not otherwise afford to seek legal redress for the wrongs complained  of herein.    Absent a class action, the class members will continue to suffer losses borne from  Defendant’s breaches of class members’ statutorily protected rights as well as monetary  damages, thus allowing and enabling: (a) Defendant's conduct to proceed and; (b)  Defendant to further enjoy the benefit of its ill-gotten gains.    Plaintiff repeats the allegations contained in the above paragraphs and incorporates  them as if specifically set forth at length herein.    Section 1681b of the FCRA limits access to consumer credit reports and requires  that specific requirements be met before a report is requested.     Defendant willfully violated 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(f) by obtaining consumer reports  without a permissible purpose.    Defendant maintained procedures and practices under which its agents, contractors  or employees obtained reports before the consumer signed up for telecom services, filled  out a credit application, or otherwise requested services.     Defendant maintained procedures and practices under which its agents, contractors  or employees misrepresented whether and under what circumstances Defendant would  access consumer reporting data.     Defendant represented to the credit reporting bureau(s) from which it obtained  consumer reports that it would request and use reports obtained from such bureau(s) only  for lawful purposes pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1681b.     Merely inquiring as to the availability of service in a certain area and simple rate  shopping does not invoke a business transaction initiated by the consumer, and thus,  Defendant did not have any of the permissible purposes set forth in 15 U.S.C. §  1681b(a)(3)(A-G) when it obtained Plaintiff’s and the proposed class members’ consumer  reports. There was no agreement to exchange goods or services for money as Plaintiff and  the proposed class members had not signed up for telecom services when Defendants  accessed their consumer reports.     Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681b, 1681n, and 1681q by obtaining Plaintiff’s  and the proposed class members’ consumer reports under false pretenses, without a  permissible purpose, and without consent. Defendant had no legitimate business need to  obtain these consumer reports since no business transactions had been initiated by these  consumers at the time that Defendant accessed those reports.     On or around July 18, 2016, Plaintiff contacted Cox by phone to learn about its  services and pricing.     After hearing about Cox’s offerings, Plaintiff chose not to proceed with the  services offered.    The Class   VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT  ",lose,2
6352146,win," OhDAP was initially established in 1990 under the Ryan White HIV/AIDS  Treatment Extension Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300ff, et seq. This federal legislation has been renewed  four times -- 1996, 2000, 2006 and 2009 -- and is now called the Ryan White Program within  Ohio and nationwide.     There are three main components within OhDAP. One component is for direct  drug provision for eligible uninsured individuals (i.e., individuals with HIV who are not eligible  for Medicaid due to income level or citizenship status). Another component is used to provide  premium assistance to eligible individuals (i.e., ACA, Medicare Part D, private health insurance  Case: 2:18-cv-00238-EAS-CMV Doc #: 1 Filed: 03/21/18 Page: 5 of 17  PAGEID #: 5 - 5 -  or the employee copayment or coinsurance portion of employer-based insurance). The last  component assists insured individuals with their co-pays for their life-saving HIV specialty  medications.     In March 2017, the Ohio Department of Health awarded an exclusive contract for  pharmaceutical provision services for OhDAP to CVS, effective July 2017. Under that contract,  CVS is to provide OhDAP-eligible clients with HIV medications and is responsible for  communications with participants relating to such medications.    Beginning in approximately late July or early August 2017, Defendants mailed a  letter containing membership cards and information about the CVS program and how persons  would access their HIV-related prescriptions. This letter was mailed to an estimated 6,000  participants in OhDAP, regardless of whether they were active pharmacy customers of CVS.    Even though the information contained in this letter contained the Personal Health  Information (“PHI”) of each individual, specifically information relating to their HIV-positive  status, the envelopes containing these mailings had two clear glassine windows. One, in the  upper left, contained the logo of “CVS/caremark,” the words “Ohio Department of Health,” and  an address for the Ohio Department of Health, and the envelope refers in big red letters to “new  prescription benefits,” thereby revealing that the mailing involved health-related information,  including information about prescription medications. A second window contained the  recipient’s name and address, with the designation “PM 6402 HIV” directly above the person’s  name. This reference to the recipient’s HIV status was plainly visible through the glassine  window. The designation “HIV” in the program identification number was not required by the  Ohio Department of Health, but rather was created by CVS. Defendants clearly made no advance  effort to test or review the disclosure of such information prior to disseminating the mailing,  Case: 2:18-cv-00238-EAS-CMV Doc #: 1 Filed: 03/21/18 Page: 6 of 17  PAGEID #: 6 - 6 -  since had they done so they would have seen that the identification number with “HIV” next to it  was prominently visible through the envelope, as shown by the following:    The Defendants’ combined use of a glassine windowed envelope, their design of  the letter containing the HIV status of the individual recipient such that it could be seen through  the envelope window instead of using an opaque envelope or a letter that was properly spaced  not to publicly reveal such information through the envelope window, and an identification  reference with the term “HIV,” resulted in the potential or actual disclosure of recipients’ HIV  status to numerous individuals, including their families, friends, roommates, landlords,  neighbors, mail carriers, and complete strangers.    The use of envelopes with transparent windows contravenes the standard practice  of the Ohio Department of Health, which is to send all mailings relating to HIV-related issues in  opaque, non-windowed envelopes.     Defendants either knew or reasonably should have known that this mailing was  disseminated in violation of both federal and state laws. Defendants also acted with a conscious  disregard for the rights and safety of other persons that has a great probability of causing  Case: 2:18-cv-00238-EAS-CMV Doc #: 1 Filed: 03/21/18 Page: 7 of 17  PAGEID #: 7 - 7 -  substantial harm. Defendants knew that it is unlawful and likely harmful to disclose patients’  HIV status to the public, and that any persons whose PHI was disclosed were to be separately  notified of that breach. CVS’s “Notice of Privacy Practices” states, “We are required by law to  protect the privacy of your PHI and to provide you with this Notice explaining our legal duties  and privacy practices regarding your [Protected Health Information]…. You have a right to be  notified in the event there is a breach of your unsecured PHI as defined by HIPAA.”  https://www.cvs.com/content/patient-privacy (accessed March 14, 2018). Fiserv advertises its  compliance as well: “From enrollment to payment, let Fiserv help you create, maintain and grow  member engagement while adhering to the strongest risk and compliance standards, including   This action is brought by the Plaintiffs both on behalf of themselves and on behalf  of all other similarly situated persons pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil  Procedure. The Plaintiffs seek to represent the following class (“Class”):   All participants in OhDAP to whom Defendants sent a mailing in or about July or  August 2017 in which the participant’s name and the letters “HIV” were visible  through the envelope window.    The precise number and identity of Class members are unknown to the Plaintiffs  but can be obtained from the records of Defendants. News reports have estimated the recipients  of the mailings to be more than 6,000 persons.    Common questions of law and fact predominate over any questions affecting  individual members of the Class. Such common legal and factual questions include the  following:  (a)  Whether Defendants’ conduct was tortious and violated the applicable  standard of care;  Case: 2:18-cv-00238-EAS-CMV Doc #: 1 Filed: 03/21/18 Page: 11 of 17  PAGEID #: 11 - 11 -  (b)  Whether Defendants’ conduct was unlawful, including in violation of the  state and federal statutes and regulations cited above;  (c)  Whether the Class members are entitled to damages and the extent of  those damages; and  (d)  Whether the Class members are entitled to injunctive or declaratory relief.    The Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the claims of the Class members because  similar mailings to those identified above were sent to Plaintiffs and every Class member.    The Plaintiffs are willing and prepared to serve the Court and the proposed Class  in a representative capacity. The Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and protect the  interests of the Class and have no interests adverse or antagonistic to or that materially and  irreconcilably conflict with the interests of the other members of the Class. Based on the facts  detailed above, the interests of the Plaintiffs are reasonably coextensive with those of absent  Class members.    The Plaintiffs have engaged the services of counsel who are experienced in  complex class litigation and the issues raised in this Complaint who will vigorously prosecute  this action, and who will assert and protect the rights of and otherwise adequately represent the  rights of the Plaintiffs and absent Class members.    Prosecuting separate actions by individual Class members would create a risk of  inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual Class members that would  establish incompatible standards of conduct for Defendants.    By sending similar mailings to thousands of people and later refusing to send  notification thereof Defendants have acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to  Case: 2:18-cv-00238-EAS-CMV Doc #: 1 Filed: 03/21/18 Page: 12 of 17  PAGEID #: 12 - 12 -  the Class, thereby making injunctive and declaratory relief appropriate respecting the Class as a  whole.    Because all Class members are seeking the same relief based on the same course  of conduct by Defendants, the questions of law or fact common to Class members as set forth in  this Complaint predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. Thus, a class  action is superior to other available group-wide methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating  this controversy, to the extent necessary in order to maintain this action on behalf of the Class.    Damages need not be proven for each Class member because Ohio law permits  the award of damages without individualized proof of the extent of emotional distress. But even  if damages must be proven individually, the Class can be certified for purposes of determining  whether the actions of Defendants were tortious and violated applicable Ohio law. ",win,2
4291985,lose," Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 21 of the Complaint as  though fully set forth herein.    Plaintiff, Angelia Ruffin has been employed as security guard with Defendant,  MotorCity Casino since on or about March 11, 2002.    Plaintiff, Constance Hudson has been employed as security guard with  Defendant, MotorCity Casino since December 2002.     Plaintiff, Pamela Girton-Hart has been employed as security guard with  Defendant, MotorCity Casino within the last three years.    Plaintiff, Sean Baldwin has been employed as security guard with Defendant,  MotorCity Casino within the last three years.    Plaintiff, Philip Tibbs has been employed as security guard with Defendant,  MotorCity Casino within the last three years.    Plaintiff, Alan Oden has been employed as security guard with Defendant,  MotorCity Casino since 1999.    Plaintiff, Gregory Mosley has been employed as security guard with Defendant,  MotorCity Casino since December 1999.     Plaintiff, Charles Moses has been employed as security guard with Defendant,  MotorCity Casino within the last three years.    Plaintiff, Michaele Jackson has been employed as security guard with Defendant,  MotorCity Casino within the last three years.  2:12-cv-11683-SJM-LJM   Doc # 1   Filed 04/16/12   Pg 3 of 8    Pg ID 3 4   Plaintiff, Raphael Cosby has been employed as security guard with Defendant,  MotorCity Casino within the last three years.    Plaintiff, Eugene Hickman has been employed as security guard with Defendant,  MotorCity Casino since on or about March 11, 2002.     Plaintiff, Cary Bryan has been employed as security guard with Defendant,  MotorCity Casino within the last three years.    Plaintiff, Robin White has been employed as security guard with Defendant,  MotorCity Casino within the last three years.    Plaintiff, Falikau Fofana has been employed as security guard with Defendant,  MotorCity Casino within the last three years.    Since 1999 Defendant, required Plaintiffs and all similarly situated current and  former security guards to arrive at Defendant’s premises fifteen (15) minutes prior to their shift  for roll call.    Since 1999 Defendant routinely disciplined security guards for failure to appear  at roll call, being late for roll call and/or any other alleged misconduct during roll call.    Defendant repeatedly and willfully refused to compensate Plaintiffs and all  similarly situated current and former security guards similarly situated in violation of Fair Labor  Standards Act 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. and of the Michigan Wages and Fringe Benefits Act  MCLA 408.471, et seq.   Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 39 of the Complaint as  though fully set forth herein.     Since 1999 Defendant, required Plaintiffs and all similarly situated current and  former security guards to arrive at Defendant’s premises fifteen (15) minutes prior to their shift  for roll call.  2:12-cv-11683-SJM-LJM   Doc # 1   Filed 04/16/12   Pg 4 of 8    Pg ID 4 5   Since 1999 Defendant routinely disciplined security guards for failure to appear  at roll call, being late for roll call and/or any other alleged misconduct during roll call.    The Fair Labor Standard Act 29 U.S.C. § 206 requires that Defendant pay to  each of its employees in an amount at least at the current minimum wage,    Defendant repeatedly and willfully refused to compensate Plaintiffs and all  similarly situated current and former security guards similarly situated in violation of Fair Labor  Standards Act 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. and specifically U.S.C. § 206.    As a direct and proximate cause of Defendant’s repeated and willful refusal to  compensate Plaintiffs and all similarly situated current and former security guards, Plaintiffs and  all similarly situated current and former security guards have sustained damages and are  entitled to the following relief:  a.  unpaid compensation;  b.  liquidated damages;  c.  civil penalties in the amount of $1,100 per violation; and   d.   costs and attorney fees.  WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request judgment in their favor and against  Defendant in an amount in excess of $100,000.00, plus exemplary damages, together with  costs, interest, attorney fees and punitive damages as allowed by statute and any other relief  this Honorable Court deems appropriate.   Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 45 of the Complaint as  though fully set forth herein.     Since 1999 Defendant, required Plaintiffs and all similarly situated current and  former security guards to arrive at Defendant’s premises fifteen (15) minutes prior to their shift  for roll call.  2:12-cv-11683-SJM-LJM   Doc # 1   Filed 04/16/12   Pg 5 of 8    Pg ID 5 6   Since 1999 Defendant routinely disciplined security guards for failure to appear  at roll call, being late for roll call and/or any other alleged misconduct during roll call.    The Michigan Wages and Fringe Benefits Act MCLA 408.471, et seq. requires  that Defendant pay to each of its employees in an amount at least at the current minimum wage,    Defendant repeatedly and willfully refused to compensate Plaintiffs and all  similarly situated current and former security guards similarly situated in violation of Michigan  Wages and Fringe Benefits Act MCLA 408.471, et seq.    As a direct and proximate cause of Defendant’s repeated and willful refusal to  compensate Plaintiffs and all similarly situated current and former security guards, Plaintiffs and  all similarly situated current and former security guards have sustained economic and non- economic damages.   WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request judgment in their favor and against  Defendant in an amount in excess of $100,000.00, plus exemplary damages, together with  costs, interest, attorney fees and punitive damages as allowed by statute and any other relief  this Honorable Court deems appropriate.   Plaintiffs incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 through 51 above as though  more fully set forth herein.    Defendant repeatedly and willfully refused to compensate Plaintiffs, Angelia  Ruffin, Philip Tibbs, Constance Hudson, Pamela Girton-Hart, Cary Bryan, Alan Oden, Charles  Moses, Michaele Jackson, Sean Baldwin, Raphael Cosby, Eugene Hickman, Gregory Mosley,  Robin White and Falikau Fofana and all similarly situated current and former security guards in  accordance with the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Michigan Wages and Fringe Benefits Act  which creates a class so numerous that joinder of all numbers is impractical. (FRCP 23A1).  2:12-cv-11683-SJM-LJM   Doc # 1   Filed 04/16/12   Pg 6 of 8    Pg ID 6 7   The question of whether the Defendant repeatedly and willfully refused to  compensate Plaintiffs, Angelia Ruffin, Philip Tibbs, Constance Hudson, Pamela Girton-Hart,  Cary Bryan, Alan Oden, Charles Moses, Michaele Jackson, Sean Baldwin, Raphael Cosby,  Eugene Hickman, Gregory Mosley, Robin White and Falikau Fofana and all similarly situated  current and former security guards involves questions of law or fact which are common to the  entire class.      The claims or defenses of the representative class parties are typical of the  claims or defenses of the entire class.    The prospective Plaintiffs class representatives, Angelia Ruffin, Philip Tibbs,  Constance Hudson, Pamela Girton-Hart, Cary Bryan, Alan Oden, Charles Moses, Michaele  Jackson, Sean Baldwin, Raphael Cosby, Eugene Hickman, Gregory Mosley, Robin White and  Falikau Fofana, will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the entire class.    Prosecuting the multitude of separate actions by or against individual class  members would create a risk of inconsistent or variant adjudications with respect to individual class  members and would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class.    The questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any  questions effecting only individual members and that a class action is superior to other available  methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.  CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS   VIOLATIONS OF THE MICHIGAN WAGES AND FRINGE  BENEFITS  ACT, MCLA 408.471, et seq.    VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq.  ",win,1
4384422,win," At all times relevant, Plaintiff was an individual residing in the State of  Tennessee. Plaintiff is, and at all times mentioned herein was, a “person” as defined by 47 U.S.C.  § 153(39).  2 The Bipartisan Budget Act of  2015 (114 P.L. 74, 129 Stat. 584, 2015 Enacted H.R. 1314, 114 Enacted H.R. 1314),  enacted into law on November 2, 2015, amends the Communications Act of 1934 to exempt calls made solely  pursuant to the collection of a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States.    3 Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, CG Docket No. 02-278,  Report and Order, 18 FCC Rcd 14014 (2003).  4 In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (“FCC  Declaratory Ruling”), 23 F.C.C.R. 559, 23 FCC Rcd. 559, 43 Communications Reg. (P&F) 877, 2008 WL 65485   Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all other persons  similarly situated (hereinafter referred to as “the Class”).    Plaintiff does not know the exact number of members in the Class, but based upon  the representations of Defendants as to their market share, Plaintiff reasonably believes that  Class members number at minimum in the thousands. This Class size includes consumers  holding loans owned or serviced by Defendants, persons who co-signed loans owned or serviced  by Defendants, and all other persons who Defendants (mis)dialed. This Class size also includes  consumers who received calls from other affiliates or subsidiaries of Defendants.     Plaintiff and all members of the Class have been harmed by the acts of  Defendants and/or of other affiliates or subsidiaries of Defendants.    This Class Action Complaint seeks money damages and injunctive relief.    There are well defined, nearly identical questions of law and fact affecting all  parties. The questions of law and fact involving the class claims predominate over questions  which may affect individual Class members. Those common questions of law and fact include,  but are not limited to, the following:  a.  Whether, beginning on December 21, 2011, Defendants and/or other  affiliates or subsidiaries of Defendants made non-emergency calls to  Plaintiff and Class members’ cellular telephones using an automatic  telephone dialing system or an artificial or prerecorded voice;  b.  Whether Defendants and/or other affiliates or subsidiaries of Defendants  can meet their burden of showing they obtained prior express consent (i.e.,  consent that is clearly and unmistakably stated) to make such calls;  c.  Whether the complained of conduct was knowing and/or willful;  d.  Whether Defendants are liable for damages, and if so the amount of such  damages; and  e.  Whether Defendants and/or other affiliates or subsidiaries of Defendants  should be enjoined from engaging in such conduct in the future.    As a person who received numerous and repeated telephone calls using an  automatic telephone dialing system, without his prior express consent within the meaning of the  TCPA, Plaintiff asserts claims that are typical of each Class member. Plaintiff will fairly and  adequately represent and protect the interests of the Class, and he has no interests which are  antagonistic to any member of the Class.    Plaintiff has retained counsel experienced in handling class action claims  involving violations of federal and state consumer protection statutes such as the TCPA.    Defendants and/or other affiliates or subsidiaries of Defendants have acted on  grounds generally applicable to the Class, thereby making final injunctive relief and  corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the Class as a whole appropriate. Moreover, on  information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that the TCPA violations complained of herein are  substantially likely to continue in the future if an injunction is not entered.   Plaintiff incorporates by reference the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint as  if fully stated herein.    The foregoing acts and omissions constitute numerous and multiple knowing  and/or willful violations of the TCPA, including but not limited to each of the above cited  provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227.    As a result of the alleged knowing and/or willful violations of 47 U.S.C. § 227,  Plaintiff and each member of the Class is entitled to treble damages of up to $1,500.00 for each  and every call in violation of the statute, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)(C).    Plaintiff and all Class members are also entitled to and do seek injunctive relief  prohibiting such conduct violating the TCPA in the future.    Plaintiff and Class members are also entitled to an award of attorney fees and  costs.  COUNT:  NEGLIGENT  VIOLATIONS  OF  THE  TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT  ",lose,2
4515019,lose," On or about July 25, 2016 Defendant sent an advertisement to Plaintiff in the  County of St. Louis, Missouri by facsimile transmission. A true and correct copy of the facsimile  is attached as Exhibit A, and incorporated herein by reference.  3    On or about August 16, 2016 Defendant sent an advertisement to Plaintiff in the  County of St. Louis, Missouri by facsimile transmission. A true and correct copy of the facsimile  is attached as Exhibit B, and incorporated herein by reference.    Defendant approved, authorized and participated in the scheme to broadcast faxes  by (a) directing a list to be purchased or assembled; (b) directing and supervising employees or  third parties to send the faxes; (c) creating and approving the form of fax to be sent; and (d)  determining the number and frequency of the facsimile transmissions.    Defendant created or made Exhibit A, as well as other advertisements, which  Defendant distributed to Plaintiff and the other members of the Class via facsimile transmission  (collectively “Subject Faxes”).    Defendant sent multiple advertising facsimiles to Plaintiff and members of the  proposed Class, all without an opt-out notice compliant with 47 C.F.R. §  64.1200, throughout the  time period covered by the class definition.    Defendant faxed the same and similar facsimiles, all without an opt-out notice  compliant with 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200, to the members of the proposed Class in Missouri and  throughout the United States.    The Subject Faxes are a part of Defendant’s work or operations to market  Defendant’s goods or services, to be performed by Defendant, and were sent on behalf of  Defendant.    The Subject Faxes constitute material furnished in connection with Defendant’s  work or operations.     The Subject Faxes constitute material advertising of the commercial availability of  property, goods, or services.  4    The transmissions of the Subject Faxes to Plaintiff and members of the proposed  Class did not contain a notice compliant with 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(iii) that informs the  recipient of the ability and means to avoid future fax advertisements.    The transmissions of the Subject Faxes to Plaintiff and members of the proposed  Class did not contain a notice compliant with 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(iii)(A) that is clear and  conspicuous.    The transmissions of the Subject Faxes to Plaintiff and members of the proposed  Class did not did not contain a notice compliant with 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(iii)(B) that states  that the recipient may make a request to the sender of the advertisement not to send any future  advertisements to a telephone facsimile machine or machines and stating that the sender’s failure  to comply within 30 days would be unlawful.    The transmissions of the Subject Faxes to Plaintiff and members of the proposed  Class did not did not contain a notice compliant with 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(iii)(C) that sets  forth the requirements listed under paragraph 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(3)(v).     The transmissions of the Subject Faxes to Plaintiff and members of the proposed  Class did not did not contain a notice compliant with 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(iii)(D)(1) that  includes a domestic contact telephone and facsimile machine number for the recipient to transmit  an opt-out request to the sender    The transmissions of the Subject Faxes to Plaintiff and members of the proposed  Class did not contain a notice that complied with the provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C), 47  U.S.C. §§227(b)(2)(D)(ii), (iii) and (vi), and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4).   5    The transmissions of the Subject Faxes to Plaintiff and members of the proposed  Class were required to contain a notice that complied with the provisions of 47 U.S.C. §  227(b)(1)(C), 47 U.S.C. §§227(b)(2)(D)(ii), (iii) and (vi), and 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4).    There is no reasonable means for Plaintiff (or any other Class member) to avoid  receiving unlawful faxes. Fax machines are left on and ready to receive the urgent communications  their owners desire to receive.    Defendant knew or should have known that the Subject Faxes were advertisements  and the Subject Faxes did not display an opt-out notice compliant with 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200.     The transmissions of Subject Faxes to Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class  caused destruction of the property of Plaintiff and each member of the proposed Class.    The transmissions of Subject Faxes to Plaintiff and members of the proposed Class  interfered with the exclusive use of the property of Plaintiff and each member of the proposed  Class.     The transmissions of Subject Faxes to Plaintiff interfered with the business and  personal communications of Plaintiff and the proposed Class.    Plaintiff brings Count I pursuant to the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47  U.S.C. § 227, on behalf of the following Class of persons:   All persons who (1) on or after four years prior to the filing of this action, (2) were  sent telephone facsimile messages of material advertising the commercial  availability of any property, goods, or services by or on behalf of Defendant, (3)  which did not display an opt-out notice compliant with 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200.    On information and belief, the Class includes more than forty persons and is so  numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.  6    There are numerous questions of law or fact are common to the members of the  Class, which predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and the answers  to which would drive class-wide resolution of this case, including:  a. Whether Defendant engaged in a pattern of sending fax advertisements;  b. Whether the Subject Faxes contains material advertising the commercial  availability of any property, goods or services;  c. Whether the Subject Faxes advertised the commercial availability of property,  goods, or services;  d. The manner and method Defendant used to compile or obtain the list of fax  numbers to which they sent the Subject Faxes and other faxed advertisements;  e. Whether Defendant violated the provisions of 47 USC § 227;  f. Whether Plaintiff and the other Class members are entitled to statutory  damages;  g. Whether Defendant should be enjoined from faxing advertisements in the  future;  h. Whether the Court should award trebled damages;  i. Whether the Subject Faxes displayed the proper opt-out notice required by 47  C.F.R. § 64.1200; and  j. Whether the Subject Faxes failed to include an opt-out notice compliant with   Plaintiff incorporates the preceding paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.    The TCPA, 47 U.S.C.§ 227, provides, in pertinent part:  (b)(3) Private right of action. A person may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or  rules of court of a state, bring in an appropriate court of that state:   (A) An action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations  prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation,   (B) An action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or  to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater, or  (C) Both such actions.   8    The Court, in its discretion, may treble the statutory damages if the violation was  knowing. 47 U.S.C. § 227.    The TCPA is a strict liability statute and the Defendant are liable to Plaintiff and  the other Class members even if their actions were only negligent.    Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. by transmitting the Subject Faxes to  Plaintiff and the other members of the Class by not displaying an opt-out notice compliant with 47  TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 47 U.S.C. § 227  ",win,1
6134485,lose," Plaintiff is an individual, employed as a real estate agent.     One aspect of Plaintiff’s job is that he must be constantly available via his cell  phone    Plaintiff frequently receives calls from numbers not saved in the contact list of  known callers on his phone. He feels obligated to answer all calls received, in order to ensure he  gives his clients and potential clients the best service possible. Likewise, he must ensure that his  voicemail box maintains sufficient capacity for incoming calls.    At all times relevant herein Plaintiff has owned and maintained a cell phone, and  subscribed to cellular telephone phone service associated with the number XXX-XXX-0714, for  which he was and is charged a monthly fee. He uses this cell phone for personal and professional  purposes.    At all times relevant herein, Plaintiff maintained exclusive custody and control over  the cellular telephone and number at issue.    Plaintiff maintains service for this cell phone via a “cellular telephone service” as  described in 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii).     Plaintiff is the subscriber of services that relate to the cellular service associated  with XXX-XXX-0714,    At some unknown time, ACI began to attempt to collect a debt associated with one  “John Carlson.”    Plaintiff has never heard of a “John Carlson.”    Plaintiff has no relationship to anyone named “John Carlson.”    Plaintiff does not have an “established business relationship” with ACI as that term  is defined in 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(2).    Plaintiff does not owe any money to ACI.     Plaintiff never gave ACI his cell phone number.     At no point did Plaintiff provide prior express consent for ACI to call his cell  phone.     None of the calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone were placed for an “emergency  purpose” or with “prior express consent of the called party” within the meaning of 47 U.S.C.  §227(b)(1)(A).    In early 2016, Plaintiff began receiving pre-recorded voice messages from ACI.  These calls referenced one “John Carlson,” reference number XXXX-881.     ACI used an ATDS to place these calls.     Plaintiff received no less than 30 calls from ACI to his cellular telephone that  utilized an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice beginning in or about early 2016.     After ACI began placing calls to Plaintiff, Plaintiff notified ACI that its calls for  “John Carlson” were not reaching their intended recipient. Plaintiff also notified ACI that he had  no relationship with ACI or “John Carlson.”     Plaintiff demanded that ACI stop calling his cell phone.     Notwithstanding receipt of Plaintiff’s requests that the calls stop, ACI continued to  place calls to Plaintiff using an ATDS and/or artificial or prerecorded voice.     These unauthorized calls harmed Plaintiff because they caused him to suffer a  nuisance and an invasion of privacy. Further, the calls wasted Plaintiff’s time and money, as they  required him to take time out of his schedule to deal with them, they trespassed on his use of the  phone for which he was charged a monthly fee, they used up space on his voicemail, and they  depleted the battery on his cellular telephone.   B.  Common Allegations    ACI used equipment that has or had the capacity to store or produce telephone  numbers to be called, using random or sequential number generator and to dial such numbers, to  place calls and/or text messages to the cellular telephone number belonging to Plaintiff, and thus  constituted an “automatic telephone dialing system,” as defined by 47 U.S.C. §227(a)(1).    ACI uses an ATDS and/or artificial or pre-recorded voice to contact large numbers  of persons in the process of debt collection     ACI does not use ATDS and/or artificial or pre-recorded voice for “emergency  purposes” as defined by 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A)(I).     ACI regularly contacts people who have not consented to be called by ACI using  both prerecorded messages and an ATDS.     ACI’s ATDS and customer service representative have the capacity to identify  those individuals who have been wrongly contacted by ACI concerning an account which is  associated with a different individual. However, ACI does not disassociate a wrong number from a  customer in its ATDS database.     Thus, wrongly targeted cell phone subscribers, whose names or cell phone numbers  are associated with particular debtors of ACI may expect to receive calls even after they have  complained asked ACI to stop the wrong number calls.     There is no exception or justification of the numerous violations of the TCPA by   Plaintiff and the putative class members have a legally protected privacy interest  arising out of the TCPA to be free from unwanted calls and prerecorded messages to their cellular  phones.    That protected interest bars ACI from intruding upon the Plaintiff’s and the  putative class members’ privacy. Specifically, the TCPA bars ACI from calling these individuals  on their cellular phones using restricted technology, unless ACI first obtained express consent.     Plaintiff and each putative class members received calls placed to their cell phones  by ACI.     Such harm was proximately caused by ACI’s violation of the TCPA all as more  particularly set forth herein.    Accordingly, the acts and misconduct of ACI have caused the Plaintiff and each  putative class member to have suffered injury in fact.    It is ACI’s policy and practice to place, in the course of business, to place calls  using an ATDS and/or artificial or pre-recorded voice to individuals who have not consented to  such calls, including those whose cellular telephone numbers are not assigned to a debtor’s  account.     Therefore, Plaintiff brings this class action on behalf of himself and on behalf of all  other persons similarly situated as members of the proposed class, pursuant to Federal Rule of  Civil Procedure 23. This action satisfied the numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy,  predominance, and superiority requirements of Rule 23.     The proposed ATDS Class consists of all persons in the United States excluding  the Court and its staff:  (a)  To whose cellular telephone ACI placed one or more nonemergency call  within four (4) years prior to the filing of this complaint;   (b)  To whom ACI used an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”);   (c)  Who did not provide their prior express consent for such calls; and   (d)  Who are not the actual account holders that ACI sought to contact in  relation to the call.    The members of the class are so numerous that joinder of all claims would be  impracticable. While the exact number of class members is unknown to Plaintiff at this time, that  number exceeds 40 persons.     There are questions of law and fact common to the class, which predominate over  any questions affecting individual class members. The predominant common questions include:  (a)  Whether ACI used an ATDS, or an artificial or prerecorded voice within the  meaning of the TCPA and applicable FCC regulations, to place calls to the  class;  (b)  Whether the class members gave consent to be called by ACI, since they  were not party to any agreement with ACI;  (c)  The means used by ACI to identify class members as potential targets for  calls concerning ACI’s borrowers; and  (d)  Damages, including whether the violations were negligent, willful or  knowing.    Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the other members of the class. ACI’s  conduct has caused Plaintiff and members of the class to sustain the same or substantially similar  injuries and damages. ACI’s conduct has caused each member of the class to suffer a nuisance or  invasion of privacy, intrusion upon their seclusion and use of the cell phones for which they paid a  subscriber fee. ACI has acted in a uniform manner with respect to Plaintiff and the other class  members. Plaintiff has no interests antagonistic to the interests of the other members of the class.    Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the  members of the class. Plaintiff is a member of the class and does not have any conflict of interest  with other class members. Plaintiff has retained and is represented by competent counsel who are  experienced in complex class action litigation and claims involving violations of the TCPA.   A.  ACI’s Calls to Plaintiff   ",win,3
6112025,win," Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC paid Plaintiff  Manolo Tayum straight time, not time and a half, for the hours he worked above forty  (40) during his employment with defendants.    Mr. Manolo Tayum’s job duties included delivering and setting up  furniture and performing manual labor for defendant.    The work performed by plaintiff is the primary type of work that the  company provides for its customers.    The work performed  by Plaintiff is an essential part of the services  provided for Defendant’s Customers.      Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC’s Drivers and  Manual Laborers rely on the companies for their work.      Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC determined  where its Drivers and Manual Laborers worked and how they performed their duties.    Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC sets Drivers and  Manual Laborer’s hours and requires them to report to work on time and leave at the end  of their scheduled shift.      Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC’s Drivers and  Manual Laborers work exclusively for Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4  Everyone LLC during their employment.  Since they work between 9 and 10 hours a day,  as a practical matter, they cannot work anywhere else.    Drivers and Manual Laborers are not permitted to hire other workers to  perform their jobs for them.    Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC provides all of  the machinery, equipment and supplies that its Drivers and Manual Laborers use to  perform their work.  While they are working, the Drivers and Manual Laborers use Clay  Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC’s equipment.  Clay Road Furniture  LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC’s investment in the machines and equipment used by  its Drivers and Manual Laborers far exceeds any investment by plaintiff and putative  class members.    Drivers and Manual Laborers do not provide any material portion of the  required equipment or any of the necessary products to perform their jobs.    Drivers and Manual Laborers are paid based upon the hours they work.   They cannot earn a “profit” by exercising managerial skill, and they are required to work  the hours required by Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC each day.   The Drivers and Manual Laborers cannot suffer a loss of capital investment.  Their only  earning opportunity was based on the number of hours they were told to work, which is  controlled exclusively by Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC.    Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC pays Drivers  and Manual Laborers in return for their labor.        Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC decided to treat  its Drivers and Manual Laborers as independent contractors.    Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC made large  capital investments in inventory, delivery trucks, equipment, tools and supplies in order  for it to sell furniture.  Its Drivers and Manual Laborers do not. Clay Road Furniture LLC  and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC incurs operating expenses like rent, payroll, marketing,  and insurance.  Its Drivers and Manual Laborers do not incur such operating expenses.    Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC keeps records of  the hours it instructed its Drivers and Manual Laborers to work.  It also keeps records of  the amount of pay plaintiffs and putative class members receive.  Plaintiff and putative  class members were paid directly via weekly pay check issued to them from Clay Road  Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC.     Despite knowing of the FLSA’s requirements and that plaintiff and  putative class members regularly worked more than 40 hours in a workweek, Defendant  paid them straight time instead of time and a half for the overtime hours that they  worked.    Plaintiff and putative class members seek unpaid overtime wages for the  three year period of time preceding the filing of this lawsuit.    In addition to Manolo Tayum, defendants employed other Drivers and  Manual Laborers who worked over forty hours per week, were paid straight time instead  of time and a half for overtime hours worked, and were misclassified as independent  contractors.  These FLSA Class Members performed the job duties described above and  they were subjected to the same unlawful policies.  The FLSA Class Members are  similarly situated to Manolo Tayum.    By failing to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Class Members overtime at one  and one-half times their regular rates, Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4  Everyone LLC violated the FLSA.    Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC owes Plaintiff  and the FLSA Class Members overtime wages equal to one-half their regular rates for  each overtime hour worked during the last three years.    Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC knew, or  showed reckless disregard for whether, its failure to pay overtime violated the FLSA.   Their failure to pay overtime to Plaintiffs and the FLSA Class Members is willful.    Clay Road Furniture LLC and Furniture 4 Everyone LLC owes Plaintiff  and the FLSA Class Members for an amount equal to all unpaid overtime wages as well  as liquidated damages.    Plaintiff and the FLSA Class Members are entitled to recover all  reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this action.   Manolo Tayum was an  employee of Clay Road Furniture LLC and  Furniture 4 Everyone LLC.    Manolo Tayum was not an independent contractor.  ",lose,2
7333332,win," Plaintiff answered the phone and was greeted by a prerecorded or artificial  voice noting that he could be eligible to save money on his home energy bills by getting  solar panels installed on his home and receive government credits to assist with the cost.    After the prerecorded or artificial voice finished, a woman who identified  herself as Leanna came on the line.      After Plaintiff inquired, Leanna indicated that she was calling from “Smart  Home Solar”.  Leanna then asked Plaintiff questions about his energy bills and his home.   She then told Plaintiff that he would likely qualify to have low or no cost solar panels  installed on his home.  After asking additional questions about Plaintiff’s finances and  credit, Leanna then offered to set up an appointment.    Plaintiff recalls having received other calls similar to the June 14, 2018,  Solar Call.    Upon information and belief, Defendants placed other Solar Calls to  Plaintiff during the preceding 12-month period.    Upon information and belief, Defendants used an ATDS, artificial voice, or  a prerecorded voice to place the Solar Calls to Plaintiff and other persons and entities.    In order to investigate who was behind this marketing scheme, Plaintiff  accepted Leanna’s offer, and set up an appointment.    On June 20, 2018, a male person driving a black Toyota Prius wrapped with  an advertisement for vivint.Solar arrived at Plaintiff’s home.  The male person indicated  that his name was Seth Bringhurst and said that he worked for Vivint Solar.  Mr, Bringhurst  was wearing a shirt with the name Vivint on it in orange lettering.  Mr. Bringhurst gave  Plaintiff a business card and a pamphlet that both contained the words “Vivint Solar.”     Plaintiff asked Mr. Bringhurst who “Smart Home Solar” was, as that was  the name of the company that was provided to him during the June 14, 2018, Solar Call.   Mr. Bringhurst responded that Smart Home Solar is a company that generates sales leads,  and that Mr. Bringhurst uses Smart Home Solar for that purpose.    Mr. Bringhurst conducted an inspection, asked Plaintiff questions, and  otherwise touted the products and services of Defendants.    Mr. Bringhurst told Plaintiff that he had been employed by Vivint Solar for  over ten years, and has worked for Vivint Solar in multiple cities.      Mr. Bringhurst provided Plaintiff with his business card that says  vivint.Solar on one side, and included the Vivint Solar website address, and Mr.  Bringhurst’s email address at vivintsolar.com.    Prior to leaving, Mr. Bringhurst asked Plaintiff to sign a form permitting  Defendant Vivint Solar Developer, LLC to obtain Plaintiff’s consumer credit report.    On June 20, 2018, Plaintiff received an email from “Vivint Solar Team”  noting that its sales representative had recently spoken with him, and asking that Plaintiff  confirm his email address.    Pursuant to the TCPA and its implementing regulations, calls placed using  an artificial voice, or a prerecorded voice, that include or introduce an advertisement or  constitute telemarketing may not be placed to persons or entities whose telephone numbers  have been assigned to a cellular telephone service or a residential line without obtaining  Prior Express Written Consent.    Pursuant to the TCPA and its implementing regulations, calls placed using  an ADTS that include or introduce an advertisement or constitute telemarketing may not  be placed to telephone numbers that have been assigned to a cellular telephone service  without obtaining Prior Express Written Consent.    Pursuant to the TCPA and its implementing regulations, 47 C.F.R.    However, Defendants placed the Solar Calls without obtaining the Prior  Express Written Consent of Plaintiff or the other putative class members.    Pursuant to the TCPA and its implementing regulations, telephone  solicitations may not be placed to persons and entities that are registered with the National  Do-Not-Call Registry at least 30 days prior to being called more than once within a 12- month period, and without obtaining prior express invitation or permission evidenced by a  signed, written agreement between the consumer and seller which states that the consumer  agrees to be contacted by this seller and includes the telephone number to which the calls  may be placed.    However, Defendants placed the Solar Calls despite the fact that Plaintiff’s  and other putative class members’ phone numbers were on the National Do-Not-Call  Registry, and without obtaining the Requisite Do-Not-Call Permission of Plaintiff or the  other putative class members.    Plaintiff brings this action as a class action, pursuant to Rule 23(a) and  23(b)(3), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for statutory damages on behalf of himself and  a class of all persons similarly situated.    Class Size (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)): Plaintiff avers that the proposed class  is in excess of 50 persons. The class size is so numerous that joinder of all members is  impracticable.      Fair and Adequate Representation (Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4)): The named  Plaintiff will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class members.   Plaintiff is committed to this cause, will litigate it vigorously, and is aware of the fiduciary  duties of a class representative.  Plaintiff’s interests are consistent with and not antagonistic  to the interests of the other class members.  Plaintiff has a strong personal interest in the  outcome of this action and has retained experienced class counsel to represent his and the  other class members.    Class Counsel is experienced in class action litigation and has successfully  litigated class claims.    Plaintiff reasserts and incorporates herein by reference the averments set  forth in paragraphs 1 through 40, above.    Plaintiff brings this action against the Defendants for sending Solar Calls to  himself and to members of the Plaintiff Class in violation of the TCPA and its  implementing regulations.    Defendants violated the TCPA and implementing regulations 47 C.F.R. §    Defendants violated the TCPA and implementing regulation 47 C.F.R. §    The named Plaintiff and members of the Plaintiff Class are entitled to  $1,500 for each violation of each of the Solar Calls that violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)  and $1,500 for each of the Solar Calls that violated 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c) that was placed  to them willfully or knowingly.   200(c), by initiating or authorizing the placement of the Solar Calls to the phone  numbers of Plaintiff and the members of the Plaintiff Class where such persons and entities  were registered with the National Do-Not-Call Registry at least 30 days prior to being  called by Defendants more than once within a 12-month period, and without obtaining  Requisite Do-Not-Call Permission from Plaintiff or members of the Plaintiff Class.   200(a), by initiating or authorizing the placement of the Solar Calls to the phone  numbers of Plaintiff and the members of the Plaintiff Class without receiving Prior Express  Written Consent.    On June 14, 2018, Defendants placed the June 14, 2018, Solar Call to  Plaintiff’s cell phone, while he was in the District of Columbia.  The call came from a  number with a 202 area code.   ",win,2
4312350,lose,"(Terms and Conditions of Hertz’ Gold Plus Rewards Program)   (Terms and Conditions for Use of Hertz’ Website)    Hertz allows consumers to use its website, www.hertz.com, to make reservations  for rental of cars and other motor vehicles.    On a web page entitled, “THE HERTZ CORPORATION WEBSITE GENERAL  TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF USE,” (“Hertz’ General Terms of Use”) Hertz provides notice  to consumers of terms and conditions to which they must agree in order to use Hertz’ website and  states that the terms and conditions constitute an “Agreement”:  “We offer this website, subject to  the following terms and conditions (“Agreement”). Please read this Agreement carefully before  using this website.  By using this website, you accept the terms and conditions set forth in this  Agreement.”4    Hertz’ General Terms of Use contains a New Jersey choice of law provision:   “Except to the extent expressly provided in the following paragraph, this Agreement (including  any of our policies referred to herein) shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the  laws of the State of New Jersey in the United States without regard to New Jersey’s conflict of law  provisions.”    Hertz’ General Terms of Use also states: “Except as otherwise required by law …,  price, rate and availability of products or services are subject to change without notice.” 5     This statement is shown in the screenshot below with the above language  highlighted:    Nowhere on this page does Hertz specify whether the provision that “price, rate and  availability of products or services are subject to change without notice” is or is not applicable to  reservations made using the Hertz website by New Jersey citizens or whether New Jersey is (or is  not) one of the places where the law requires “otherwise.”    This statement in shown in the screenshot below with the above language  highlighted:    Nowhere on this page does Hertz specify whether the provision that “not all  products or services discussed or referenced in this website are available to all persons or in all  geographic locations or jurisdictions. In addition, restrictions may apply to use of products or  services obtained in one jurisdiction in other jurisdictions” is or is not applicable to reservations  made using the Hertz website by New Jersey citizens or whether New Jersey is (or is not) one of  the places where there are restrictions applicable to “use of products or services.”    Hertz’ General Terms of Use states that it was last updated on April 30, 2013. 6      However, past versions of the same webpage containing provisions identical to  those referenced above can be found dating back to June 1, 2011.7    Accordingly, those terms and conditions have been in place, at a minimum, for  more than four years prior to the filing of this lawsuit.    Terms and Conditions of Hertz’ Gold Plus Rewards Program    The webpage containing Hertz’ Gold Plus Terms states, “Gold Plus Rewards offers  are void where prohibited by law.”9      The following screenshot shows the above statement as it appears on the Hertz  website with the statement in question highlighted:    Nowhere on this web page does Hertz specify whether such offers are or are not  void, unenforceable or inapplicable within the State of New Jersey or whether the State of New  Jersey is or is not one of the locations where such offers are prohibited by law.    Past versions of this page can be found dating back to June 8, 2012.10  On that date,  the page stated, as it does now, that Gold Plus Rewards offers are void where prohibited by law  without specifying whether the State of New Jersey is or is not one of the places where such offers  are void because they are prohibited by law.    This action is brought and may properly proceed as a class action, pursuant to Fed.  R. Civ. P. 23(a) and (b)(3).    The members of the Classes for whose benefit this action is brought are so  numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.      Plaintiff asserts claims that are typical of the claims of the members of the Classes  he seeks to represent, because all such claims arise out of the same, or similar, notices or contracts  used by Defendant in its transactions with Plaintiffs.    Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Classes.    Plaintiff does not have any interests which are incompatible or contrary to those of  the Classes.    The questions of law or fact common to the Class members, as detailed above,  predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.    A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient  adjudication of the claims of Plaintiffs and the putative Classes.    Specifically, the Classes are too numerous for individual actions and the economic  damages, statutorily required for Plaintiff and the putative Class members, are too small to warrant  individual actions when compared to the expense and burden of individual litigation.    The members of the Classes are readily identifiable from the records of Defendant.    Plaintiff has retained competent counsel who is experienced in the prosecution of  consumer class action litigation.  The proposed Class Counsel will fairly and adequately represent  the interests of the Class.  Proposed Class Counsel has identified and investigated the potential  claims in this action.  Proposed Class Counsel has extensive experience in handling class actions,  other complex litigation, and consumer claims of the type asserted in the instant action. Proposed  Class Counsel has knowledge of the applicable law for this action and will commit the necessary  resources to representing this Class.   Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Hertz Gold Plus Rewards Program Class re- asserts and incorporates by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding  paragraphs as though stated in full herein.    Plaintiff and the members of the Hertz Gold Plus Rewards Program Class are  “consumers” within the meaning of TCCWNA.    Hertz’ web page entitled “Gold Plus Rewards Reward Terms and Conditions” is a  consumer contract, notice, or sign within the meaning of TCCWNA, as set forth at N.J.S.A. 56:12- 15 and -16.    TCCWNA states, in relevant part:  No consumer contract, notice or sign shall state that any of its provisions  is or may be void, unenforceable or inapplicable in some jurisdictions  without specifying which provisions are or are not void, unenforceable or  inapplicable within the State of New Jersey[.]   Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and the Hertz Renters Class, re-asserts and  incorporates by reference each and every allegation set forth in the preceding paragraphs as though  stated at length herein.    Plaintiff and the members of the Hertz Renters Class are ""consumers"" within the  meaning of TCCWNA.    Hertz’ web page entitled, “THE HERTZ CORPORATION WEBSITE GENERAL  TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF USE” is a consumer contract, notice, or sign within the meaning  of TCCWNA.    TCCWNA states, in relevant part:  No consumer contract, notice or sign shall state that any of its provisions  is or may be void, unenforceable or inapplicable in some jurisdictions  without specifying which provisions are or are not void, unenforceable or  inapplicable within the State of New Jersey[.]  Terms and Conditions for Use of Hertz Website   Terms and Conditions for Use of Hertz’ Website ....................................................................... 3  Terms and Conditions of Hertz’ Gold Plus Rewards Program ................................................... 5  CLASS ALLEGATIONS ............................................................................................................... 6 ",win,1
6552355,win," Defendants treated Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs similarly in that Plaintiff and  all FLSA Plaintiffs: (1) performed similar tasks, as described in the “Background Facts” section  below; (2) were subject to the same laws and regulations; (3) were paid in the same or similar  manner; (4) were required to work in excess of forty hours in a workweek; and (5) were not paid  the required one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay for all hours worked per  workweek in excess of forty.    At all relevant times, Defendants are and have been aware of the requirements to  pay Plaintiff and all FLSA Plaintiffs at an amount equal to the rate of one and one-half times their  respective regular rates of pay for all hours worked each workweek above forty, yet they  purposefully and willfully chose and choose not to do so.    Thus, all FLSA Plaintiffs are victims of Defendants’ pervasive practice of willfully  refusing to pay their employees overtime compensation for all hours worked per workweek above  forty, in violation of the FLSA.   In addition, Plaintiff seeks to maintain this action as a class action pursuant to FRCP  23(b)(3), individually, on her own behalf, as well as on behalf of those who are similarly situated  who, during the applicable limitations period, were subjected to violations of the NYLL and the   On August 7, 2013, Kim Celic, SFS Director of Human Resources, hired Plaintiff  to work as a negotiator for one of SFS’s then-affiliated entities “Legal Helpers.”  In early July  2014, Defendant SFS reassigned Plaintiff to Defendant Pioneer, where Plaintiff continued working  as a negotiator until January 2015, with the exception of a four month period when Plaintiff was  on maternity leave from July 29, 2014 through October 2014.    Throughout her time working for Defendants as a negotiator, regardless of the  entity to which Defendants formally assigned her, Plaintiff’s duties consisted of assisting  Defendants’ attorney-employees by speaking with Defendants’ clients and their respective  creditors to communicate offers to settle the clients’ debts.      From the beginning of her employment through January 2015, Defendants required  Plaintiff to work five days a week, from Monday to Friday, for shifts of between nine and eleven  hours per day, with a one hour lunch break.  However, during many days, Defendants did not allow  Plaintiff to take her one-hour lunch break.  Thus, Defendants required that Plaintiff work between  forty-five and fifty hours each week.      For her pay each week, including the week described in the prior paragraph,  Defendants paid Plaintiff a flat salary of $33,500.00 that was meant to cover only her first forty  hours worked per week, and which amounts to a straight-time rate of $16.11 per hour.     Throughout her employment, Defendants paid her nothing for her time worked each  week in excess of forty hours, and thus failed to pay her at one and one-half her regular rate of  pay, or $24.17, for all hours worked over forty each week.    Defendants paid Plaintiff on a semi-monthly basis.    On each occasion when Defendants paid Plaintiff, Defendants intentionally failed  to provide Plaintiff with a wage statement that accurately listed her actual hours worked for that  week and/or her straight and overtime rates of pay for all hours worked.    Defendants also intentionally did not provide Plaintiff with a wage notice at the  time of her hire that accurately contained, inter alia, Plaintiff’s rates of pay as designated by  Defendants.    Defendants treated Plaintiff, FLSA Plaintiffs, and Rule 23 Plaintiffs in the manner  described above.    Each hour that Plaintiff, FLSA Plaintiffs, and Rule 23 Plaintiffs worked was for the  Defendants’ benefit.    Defendants acted in the manner described herein so as to maximize their profits  while minimizing labor costs and overhead.   29 U.S.C. § 207(a) requires employers to compensate their employees at a rate not  less than one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked exceeding forty in a  workweek.    As described above, Defendants are employers within the meaning of the FLSA  while Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs are employees within the meaning of the FLSA.    Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs worked in excess of forty hours per week, yet  Defendants failed to compensate Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs in accordance with the FLSA’s  overtime provisions.    Defendants willfully violated the FLSA.    Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs are entitled to overtime pay for all hours worked per  week in excess of forty at the rate of one and one-half times their respective regular rates of pay.    Plaintiff and FLSA Plaintiffs are also entitled to liquidated damages and attorneys’  fees for Defendants’ violation of the FLSA’s overtime provisions.   Plaintiff and Rule 23 Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate and re-allege each and every  allegation set forth above with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein.    N.Y. Lab. Law § 160 and 12 NYCCRR § 142-2.2 require employers to compensate  their employees at a rate not less than one and one-half times their regular rates of pay for any  hours worked exceeding forty in a workweek.    Defendants are employers within the meaning of the NYLL and the NYCCRR,  while Plaintiff and Rule 23 Plaintiffs are employees within the meaning of the NYLL and the   Plaintiff and Rule 23 Plaintiffs repeat, reiterate, and re-allege each and every  allegation set forth above with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein.    N.Y. Lab. Law § 195(3) requires that employers furnish employees with wage  statements containing accurate, specifically enumerated criteria on each occasion when the  employer pays wages to the employee.    Defendants are employers within the meaning of the NYLL, while Plaintiff and  Rule 23 Plaintiffs are employees within the meaning of the NYLL and the NYCCRR.    As described above, Defendants, on each payday, failed to furnish Plaintiff and  Rule 23 Plaintiffs with accurate wage statements containing the criteria required under the NYLL.    Prior to February 27, 2015, pursuant to N.Y. Lab. Law § 198(1-d), Defendants are  liable to Plaintiff and Rule 23 Plaintiffs in the amount of $100.00 for each workweek that the  violation occurred, up to a statutory cap of $2,500.00.   Failure to Furnish Proper Wage Statements in Violation of the NYLL   Unpaid Overtime under the FLSA   Unpaid Overtime under the NYLL and the NYCCRR  ",win,2
59899832,win," Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following case, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.  P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3).    The identities of all class members are readily ascertainable from the records of  Defendants and those companies and entities on whose behalf they attempt to collect and/or  have purchased debts.    Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members,  partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate  families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate  families.     There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common  issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue  is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as  Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e, 1692f.    The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same  facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the  Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in  handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff  nor his attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this action.    Certification of a class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure  is also appropriate in that the questions of law and fact common to members of the Plaintiff  Class predominate over any questions affecting an individual member, and a class action is  superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.    Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at  the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues  pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).   Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length  herein.    Some time prior to May 13, 2020 an obligation was allegedly incurred to a creditor.    The obligation arose out of transactions in which money, property, insurance or  services, which are the subject of the transactions, were primarily for personal, family or  household purposes.    The alleged obligation is a ""debt"" as defined by 15 U.S.C.§ 1692a(5).    Defendant Midland Credit purportedly purchased the alleged debt and is currently  collecting the alleged debt.    On or about March 13, 2020, Defendant Midland Credit sent Plaintiff a collection  letter (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt owed. See Exhibit A.    The letter states a total balance of $12,889.53.    The letter further provides a settlement offer of $10,319.62 which expires on  6/12/2020.    The letter further states in part: “A judgment could be awarded by the court before  the expiration of the discount offer listed in this letter.  A judgment may include costs and post- judgment interest which may increase the balance owed. If you pay the discount offer in this  letter by 06/12/2020, we will satisfy the judgment in full upon receipt of payment based on the  balance stated in this letter.”    The letter states that if the discount offer is paid by 6/12/2020, Defendant will satisfy  the judgment in full “based on the balance stated in this letter.”    This statement is confusing and deceptive because it implies that the payment will  only satisfy the judgment based on the balance stated in the letter, which is $12,889.53 and not  if the balance rises which Defendant’s letter indicates may happen (“A judgment may include  costs and post-judgment interest which may increase the balance owed.”)    Alternatively, the letter could be read to mean that payment of the discounted amount  will satisfy the debt entirely, whether or not the balance increases due to costs and post-judgment  interest.    In addition, the letter is misleading and deceptive by alluding to a possible judgment  without referencing any actual case and whether an actual lawsuit that could lead to a judgment  currently exists.     Furthermore, the letter discusses the judgment in extremely speculative terms, stating  that a judgment “could” be awarded and “may” include costs, when, upon information and  belief, the Defendant knows whether its legal counsel plan on filing for judgment and the  speculation is intended only to frighten and harass the Plaintiff to make an immediate payment.     Defendant's collection efforts with respect to this alleged debt from Plaintiff caused  Plaintiff to suffer concrete and particularized harm because the FDCPA provides Plaintiff with  the legally protected right to be not to be misled or treated unfairly with respect to any action  for the collection of any consumer debt.    Defendant's deceptive, misleading and unfair representations with respect to its  collection effort were material misrepresentations that affected and frustrated Plaintiff's ability  to intelligently respond to Defendant's collection efforts because Plaintiff could not adequately  respond to the Defendant's demand for payment of this debt.    Defendant’s actions created an appreciable risk to Plaintiff of being unable to  properly respond or handle Defendant’s debt collection.    Plaintiff was confused and misled to her detriment by the statements in the dunning  letter, and relied on the contents of the letter to her detriment.    Plaintiff would have pursued a different course of action were it not for the statutory  violation.    Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein.    Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff  violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.    Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §  1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or  misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.    Defendant violated § 1692e:   a. As the Letter it is open to more than one reasonable interpretation, at least one of  which is inaccurate.  b. By making a false and misleading representation in violation of §1692e(10).    By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's  conduct violated Section 1692e et seq. of the FDCPA, and Plaintiff is entitled to an award of  actual damages, statutory damages, costs and attorneys’ fees.   Plaintiff repeats the above paragraphs as if set forth here.    Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff  violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692f.    Defendant violated this section by   a. Using threatening and harassing language regarding the possible judgments.    By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's  conduct violated Section 1692f et seq. of the FDCPA and is entitled to actual damages, statutory  damages, costs and attorneys’ fees.  VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT 15 U.S.C. §1692e  et seq.   VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT   15 U.S.C. § 1692f et seq.  ",win,3
6129885,lose," Upon information and belief, Exhibit A is a form letter, generated by computer,  and with the information specific to Plaintiff inserted by computer.     Exhibit A was the first letter GCS sent to Plaintiff regarding this alleged debt.    Exhibit A includes the FDCPA debt validation notice. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a).    GCS’ letter as a whole is confusing and misleading to the unsophisticated  consumer.    Exhibit A states:  New Balance: $972.44  Minimum Payment Due: $972.44    Exhibit A, thus, informs the unsophisticated consumer that GCS is ""here to work  with [her] to find a mutually agreeable solution,"" while at the same time, stating that the  minimum payment she may make is the entirety of the balance.    Exhibit A is confusing to the unsophisticated consumer because there cannot be  other opportunities available if the minimum payment is in the amount of the entire balance.    Exhibit A also states:  * As of the date of this letter, you owe $972.44. Because of interest, late charges, and other charges  that may vary from day to day, the amount owed on the day you pay may be greater. Hence, if you  pay the amount shown above, an adjustment may be necessary after we receive your payment, in  which event we will inform you.    Exhibit A, thus, informs the unsophisticated consumer that additional charges  may be added after GCS receives payment of ""the amount shown above.""    Exhibit A is confusing to the unsophisticated consumer. Because the ""new  balance"" is equal to the ""minimum payment due,"" it is unclear whether the minimum payment  due is also subject to ""interest, late charges, and other charges that may vary from day to day,"" in  which case the unsophisticated consumer would not know whether the minimum payment at the  time was $972.44 or some other amount.    The ""New Balance"" and ""Minimum Payment Due"" amounts, read alongside the  note that the ""amount owed on the day you pay may be greater,"" render Exhibit A confusing to  the unsophisticated consumer, who would not be able to determine, or would be confused as to,  the actual minimum payment required.    Moreover, the alleged debt here is an unsecured credit card account and, upon  information and belief, GCS and DNSB would accept any payment of any amount at any time.    Plaintiff was confused by Exhibit A.    Plaintiff had to spend time and money investigating Exhibit A, and the  consequences of any potential responses to Exhibit A.    Plaintiff had to take time to obtain and meet with counsel, including traveling to  counsel’s office by car and its related expenses, including but not limited to the cost of gasoline  and mileage, to advise Plaintiff on the consequences of Exhibit A.  The FDCPA    15 U.S.C. § 1692e generally prohibits “any false, deceptive, or misleading  representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.”    15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(a) specifically prohibits the “false representation of the  character, amount, or legal status” of an alleged debt.    15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10) specifically prohibits the “use of any false representation  or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt.”    15 U.S.C. § 1692f generally prohibits “unfair or unconscionable means to collect  or attempt to collect any debt.”    15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) states, in part:  (b) Disputed debts   …  Any collection activities and communication during the 30-day period may not  overshadow or be inconsistent with the disclosure of the consumer’s right to  dispute the debt or request the name and address of the original creditor.    Moreover, Congress has explicitly described the FDCPA as regulating “abusive  practices” in debt collection. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692(a) – 1692(e). Any person who receives a debt  collection letter containing a violation of the FDCPA is a victim of abusive practices. See 15  U.S.C. §§ 1692(e) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to eliminate abusive debt collection  practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive  debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State  action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses”). For this reason, and to encourage  consumers to bring FDCPA actions, Congress authorized an award of statutory damages for  violations. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a).   Plaintiff incorporates by reference as if fully set forth herein the allegations  contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.    The unsophisticated consumer would be confused as to whether GCS was  authorized to approve a payment schedule that called for payments less than the ""minimum  payment due.""    The unsophisticated consumer would also be confused as to whether the  minimum payment due was subject to day-to-day increases as interest, late fees, and/or other  charges accrued.    GCS’ conduct violates 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692e(2)(a), 1692e(10), 1692(f) and  1692g(a)(1).   Plaintiff brings this action on behalf of a Class consisting of (a) all natural persons  in the State of Wisconsin, (b) who were sent an initial collection letter in the form represented by  Exhibit A to the complaint in this action, (c) seeking to collect a debt, incurred for personal,  family or household purposes (d) between July 28, 2016 and July 28, 2017, inclusive, (e) that  was not returned by the postal service.    The Class is so numerous that joinder is impracticable.  Upon information and  belief, there are more than 50 members of the Class.    There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the class, which  common questions predominate over any questions that affect only individual class members.   The predominant common question is whether Exhibit A violates the FDCPA.    Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the claims of the Class members.  All are based on  the same factual and legal theories.    A class action is superior to other alternative methods of adjudicating this dispute.    Individual cases are not economically feasible.   On or about June 25, 2017 mailed a debt collection letter to Plaintiff regarding an  alleged debt owed to “Department Stores National Bank"" (“DSNB”). A copy of this letter is  attached to this Complaint as Exhibit A.    The alleged debt referenced in Exhibit A was a credit card account, and the  alleged debt was incurred for personal, family or household purposes, including purchases of  clothing and other personal goods at Macy's.  ",win,3
59829440,win," Plaintiff brings this claim on behalf of the following class, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.  P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3).    The Class consists of:   a. all individuals with addresses in the State of New Jersey;  b.  to whom Defendant Convergent sent a collection letter attempting to collect a  consumer debt;  c. containing deceptively worded settlement offers;   d. which letter was sent on or after a date one (1) year prior to the filing of this  action and on or before a date twenty-one (2l) days after the filing of this action.    Excluded from the Plaintiff Class are the Defendants and all officer, members,  partners, managers, directors and employees of the Defendants and their respective immediate  families, and legal counsel for all parties to this action, and all members of their immediate  families.     There are questions of law and fact common to the Plaintiff Class, which common  issues predominate over any issues involving only individual class members. The principal issue  is whether the Defendants' written communications to consumers, in the forms attached as  Exhibit A, violate 15 U.S.C. §§ l692e.    The Plaintiff’s claims are typical of the class members, as all are based upon the same  facts and legal theories. The Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the  Plaintiff Class defined in this complaint. The Plaintiff has retained counsel with experience in  handling consumer lawsuits, complex legal issues, and class actions, and neither the Plaintiff  nor her attorneys have any interests, which might cause them not to vigorously pursue this  action.    Depending on the outcome of further investigation and discovery, Plaintiff may, at  the time of class certification motion, seek to certify a class(es) only as to particular issues  pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).   Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  numbered above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length  herein.    Some time prior to March 20, 2021, an obligation was allegedly incurred to T- Mobile, USA by the Plaintiff.    The T-Mobile, USA obligation arose out of transactions in which money, property,  insurance or services which are the subject of the transactions were primarily for personal,  family or household purposes, specifically telecommunication services.    The alleged T-Mobile, USA obligation is a “debt” as defined by 15 U.S.C.  §1692a(5).    T-Mobile, USA is a “creditor” as defined by 15 U.S.C. §1692a(4).    Defendant Convergent, a debt collector, was contracted by T-Mobile, USA to collect  the alleged debt which originated with T-Mobile, USA    On or about March 20, 2021, Defendant Convergent sent Plaintiff a collection letter  (the “Letter”) regarding the alleged debt currently owed to Defendant T-Mobile, USA See  Exhibit A.    The letter states a balance of $602.65.    The collection letter further states: “We have been authorized to accept payment of  50% of the total amount owed, which is $301.33, in exchange for which T-Mobile, USA will  recall your account and cease all collection activity. If you are interested in taking advantage of  this offer, call our office within 60 days of the date of this letter.  Please note that this is not an  offer to accept 50% of your debt as payment in full, but an offer for T-Mobile, USA to remove  your account from further collection efforts.  We are not obligated to renew this offer.”    The letter is deceptive because it implies that in exchange of 50% of the balance the  consumer will achieve some form of settlement, when in actuality it is unclear what form of  settlement the letter is offering.    The letter states that T-Mobile, USA will recall the account and cease all collection  activity but does not clarify what will occur with the rest of the balance and whether the rest of  the balance would be collected by another collection company in the future.    Nor does the letter clearly state that the account will be reinstated upon payment of  50% of the balance.    In addition, the letter contains a misleading heading stating “Reduced Balance  Opportunity.”    The letter states that Plaintiff can pay half of her balance, seemingly without reducing  the balance beyond the amount that the Plaintiff actually paid.    Paying half of the balance with a result of the other half of the balance still remaining  cannot be described as a “Reduced Balance Opportunity,” as the option of paying half of the  balance is always available as a means of reducing a balance.    Moreover, the letter implies that this offer is expiring which is deceptive because the  option of paying half of a balance never actually expires.    As a result of Defendant’s deceptive, misleading and false debt collection practices,  Plaintiff has been damaged.   Plaintiff repeats, reiterates and incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs  above herein with the same force and effect as if the same were set forth at length herein.    Defendant’s debt collection efforts attempted and/or directed towards the Plaintiff  violated various provisions of the FDCPA, including but not limited to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.    Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §1692e, a debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or  misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt.    By reason thereof, Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for judgment that Defendant's  conduct violated Section 1692e, et seq. of the FDCPA and is entitled to actual damages, statutory  damages, costs and attorneys’ fees.  VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT   15 U.S.C. §1692e et seq.  ",win,4
6175021,win," Chemmis Porter was an employee of RST Global Solutions Gulf of  Mexico LLC, at its location in Sugarland, Texas.      Chemmis Porter was not an independent contractor.    No exemption to the provisions of the FLSA excused defendants from its  obligation under the FLSA to pay Chemmis Porter time and a half for the hours worked  past forty (40) each week while employed by defendants.  4	   RST Global Solutions Gulf of Mexico LLC. paid Plaintiff Chemmis Porter  a day rate, not time and a half, for the hours he worked above forty (40) during his  employment with defendants.    Chemmis Porter was employed by Defendants as a Trainer and Instructor  from August 2015 to present throughout the course and scope of his employment,  Plaintiff trained oil and gas workers and performed manual labor.    The work performed by Plaintiff was the primary type of work that the  companies provide for their respective customers.    The work performed by Plaintiff is an essential part of the services  provided for Defendants’ Customers.       RST Global Solutions Gulf of Mexico LLC., Trainers and Instructors  relied on Defendants for their work.      RST Global Solutions Gulf of Mexico LLC., determined where its  Trainers and Instructors worked and how they performed their duties.    RST Global Solutions Gulf of Mexico LLC., set Trainers’ and Instructors’  hours and requires them to report to work on time and leave at the end of their scheduled  hours.      RST Global Solutions Gulf of Mexico LLC., Trainers’ and Instructors’ at  all locations work exclusively for RST Global Solutions Gulf of Mexico LLC., since they  work at least 12 hours a day, as a practical matter, they cannot work anywhere else.    Trainers and Instructors are not permitted to hire other workers to perform  their jobs for them.    The Trainers and Instructors do not employ staff, nor do they maintain  independent places of business.  5	   Trainers and Instructors employed by defendants are paid based upon the  hours they work.  They cannot earn a “profit” by exercising managerial skill, and they are  required to work the hours required by RST Global Solutions Gulf of Mexico LLC each  day.      The Trainers and Instructors employed by Defendants cannot suffer a loss  of capital investment.  Their only earning opportunity is based on the number of hours  they were told to work, which is controlled exclusively by RST Global Solutions Gulf of  Mexico LLC.    RST Global Solutions Gulf of Mexico LLC pays Trainers and Instructors  in return for their labor.        RST Global Solutions Gulf of Mexico LLC deducted taxes from the  paychecks of Plaintiff and similarly situated employees.    RST Global Solutions Gulf of Mexico LLC. keeps records of the hours it  instructed its Trainers and Instructors to work.  It also keeps records of the amount of pay  plaintiffs and putative class members receive.  Plaintiffs and putative class members were  paid directly via bi-weekly paycheck.      Despite knowing of the FLSA’s requirements and that Plaintiff and  putative class members regularly worked more than 40 hours in a workweek, Defendant  paid them straight time instead of time and a half for the overtime hours that they  worked.    Plaintiff and putative class members seek unpaid overtime wages for the  three year period of time preceding the filing of this lawsuit.    In addition to Chemmis Porter, defendants employed dozens of other  Trainers and Instructors at the location where Plaintiff worked and at other locations.  6	 These employees worked over forty hours per week and were paid a day rate instead of  time and a half for overtime hours worked.  These FLSA Class Members performed  similar job duties and they were subjected to the same unlawful policies.  The FLSA  Class Members are similarly situated to Chemmis Porter.    The FLSA Class Members should be notified of this action and given the  chance to join pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).  Therefore, the class is properly defined as:  All Trainers and Instructors hired and employed by RST Global  Solutions Gulf of Mexico LLC. at all of its locations throughout the  United States while receiving a day rate instead of time and a half  for overtime hours worked in the last three years.   By failing to pay Plaintiff and the FLSA Class Members overtime at one  and one-half times their regular rates, RST Global Solutions Gulf of Mexico LLC.  violated the FLSA.     RST Global Solutions Gulf of Mexico LLC.  owes Plaintiff and the FLSA  Class Members overtime wages equal to one-half their regular rates for each overtime  hour worked during the last three years.    RST Global Solutions Gulf of Mexico LLC. knew, or showed reckless  disregard for whether, its failure to pay overtime violated the FLSA.  Its failure to pay  overtime to Plaintiff and the FLSA Class Members is willful.    RST Global Solutions Gulf of Mexico LLC owes Plaintiff and the FLSA  Class Members for an amount equal to all unpaid overtime wages as well as liquidated  damages.    Plaintiff and the FLSA Class Members are entitled to recover all  reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in this action. ",win,1
59909458,win," Plaintiff, repeats and re-alleges Paragraphs 1-38 as though fully set forth herein.    Section 1692c(b) with certain inapplicable exceptions, prohibits debt collectors  from communicating consumers’ personal information to third parties “in connection with the  collection of any debt.”     As discussed above and below, Defendant violated Section 1692c(b) when they  disclosed Plaintiff’s personal contact information and information identifying the Subject Debt to  CBHV’s Letter Vendor.    CBHV’s transmittal of Plaintiff’s personal information, Plaintiff’s purported status  as a debtor relative to a debt allegedly owed to Midnight Velvet, and the amount of the Subject  Debt to Defendant’s letter vendor constitutes a ""communication"" within the meaning of Section  1692a(2) which defines “communication” as ""the conveying of information regarding a debt  directly or indirectly to any person through any medium."" 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2).    Defendant’s use of a third-party letter vendor to merge Plaintiff’s demographic data  and status as a debtor into Defendant’s form collection letters for the purpose of printing and  mailing the May 14, 2020 collection letter to Plaintiff violated Section 1692c(b).    CBHV’s disclosure of Plaintiff’s personal information and her status as a purported  debtor posed a material risk of harm to the privacy interests protected by the FDCPA.    CBHV’s disclosures of Plaintiff’s personal information and status as a purported  debtor to its third-party letter vendor violated Plaintiff’s rights privacy that was recognized by  Congress when it enacted the FDCPA.    CBHV’s disclosure to its Letter Vendor of Plaintiff’s personal information and her  purported status as a person owing the Subject Debt violated Section 1692c(b)’s prohibition on  disclosure of debtor information to third-parties    Section 1692c(b) bears a close relationship to a privacy invasion that American  courts have long recognized as cognizable.      Congress's judgment indicates that violations of Section 1692c(b) constitute a  concrete injury.    As set forth above, CBHV’s disclosures to its third-party letter vendor (of Plaintiff’s  personal information and status as a purported debtor) caused Plaintiff to suffer from  embarrassment, aggravation and emotional distress.     Accordingly, Plaintiff has standing to sue CBHV for its improper and unlawful  disclosure of Plaintiff’s personal information and status as a debtor to third-party letter vendors.    The claims asserted in this Count satisfy the elements of FRCP 23(a)(1)-(4) and  FRCP 23(b)(3).    The proposed Midnight Velvet class encompasses:  (a) all consumers with addresses in the State of California;   (b) who originally owed debts to Midnight Velvet;   (c) where Defendant caused form collection letters to be mailed to be sent  for the purposes of attempting to collect to a consumer based debt allegedly  owed to Midnight Velvet; and   (d) Defendant used a letter vendor to transmit the letters which resulted in  the vendor being sent the demographic information of the consumers as well  as their status as alleged debtors.    The above classes are limited to one year prior to the filing of the Complaint until such time as Defendant ceases the offending conduct.  WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Honorable Court enter judgment in  her favor and against Defendant CBHV as follows:  a. Declaring that the practices complained of herein are unlawful; b. Awarding Plaintiff and class members statutory damages of $1,000.00 as provided under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692k(a)(2)(A) and 1692k(a)(2)(B); c. Awarding Plaintiff actual damages as provided by 15 U.S.C. §1692k(a)(1)); d. Awarding Plaintiff costs and reasonable attorney’s fees as provided under 15 U.S.C. §1692k(a)(3); and e. Awarding any other relief as this Honorable Court deems just and appropriate. Plaintiff, repeats and re-alleges Paragraphs 1-38 as though fully set forth herein.  California Civil Code § 1788.17 provides: Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, every debt collector collecting or attempting to collect a consumer debt shall comply with the provisions of Section 1692b to 1692j, inclusive, of, and shall be subject to the remedies in Section 1692k of, Title 15 of the United States Code.  As alleged, above, CBHV violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) of the FDCPA.  In violating Section 1692c(b), Defendant violated Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.17.  Individual Based Violations of the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act   (Cal. Civ. Code § 1788 et seq.)  ",lose,2