`  ===An arbitrary break=== Liebe Damen und Heeren, these types of discussion are, in my opinion, simply not useful. Walls of text with lists of unsourced general assertions will not be read by many editors following these discussions. The issues are complex and do not lend themselves to bullet points.   As a single example, yes, the British in general did support the notion that resistance forces should avoid direct confrontation in order to spare their forces until the time was ripe, but M. wound up being an exception to this as M. misrepresented his activities to both the British and YGE in order to gain arms and ammunition that he might fight the Partisans. These actions led to Hudson to stop supply drops since the arms were being used not in resistance activities but rather as part of a civil conflict against the Partisans. (roberts, p 35) Both the YGE and British latched onto him as a propaganda tool, due to what Roberts calls his ``supposed activities against the Germans`` and this view spread to the US, where the press lauded his attacks on the German at a time when he was ``completely inactive`` and when a German report characterized him as a potential but not acute danger as M. was engaging the Partisans and not the Germans.  (Roberts, p 38-39) M. cut off Hudson from communications with the British until April of  1942 to control the flow of information (Roberts, p. 53-54) Roberts discusses the issue of the British policy of resistance strategy on pages 72-75, noting that while the British did not have a different policy for Yugoslavia, the YGE had ``...``decided to claim that the Cetniks had risen against the occupier. It asked the British for arms and supply drops to Mihailovic. When the British found out that the arms were not used for sabotage but for civil war purposes, a crisis of confidence developed which was to plague British-Cetnik relations for the rest of the war``, and that the YGE had attributed Partisan resistance actions against the Axis to M. and his forces. By 1943, support had begun to shift from M. to Tito, and M. was reported by Time in the article ``Mihailovic Eclipsed`` as being inactive and in collaboration with the Italians.(Roberts, p. 75). Bailey reports in early 1943 that M. was ``...stubborn and conceited regarding his diplomatic powers of deceiving us``,(Roberts, pp. 88-89) and soon after the British Foreign Office ``...was persuaded of Mihailovic's collaboration, at least with the Italians.`` (Roberts, p. 93) In summary, yes, British policy was that resistance forces avoid direct engagement of enemy troops, M. claimed he was was directly engaging the Germans when he was actually engaging the Partisans, deceived British intelligence and the YGE in order to further those ends, and wound up in the unfortunate circumstance of having been found out at a time when the Partisans were active and effective in resisting the Axis forces.  I'm sorry to have gone on so long on that one point, but it's important that we do not attempt to characterize complexity with oversimplification, and that we deal with sources in their entirety rather than relying on what is available in snippets or limited previews, as to do so will surely lead to POV and OR violations.   `