`===Canada===  In Canada, following consultation with all major religious groups, the Divorce Act was amended in 1985 to add Section 21.1 to give the courts have the power to dismiss any application, and strike out any pleadings and affidavits filed by a spouse who has failed to remove religious barriers to the remarriage of the other spouse. The legislature intended to: *place spouses on a more equal footing in civil divorce actions; *encourage women in particular to exercise fully their rights under the law; and *maintain the integrity of the Divorce Act 1985 by helping to ensure that refusing to accept or to give a religious divorce was not used as a bargaining tool to gain unfair concessions on child custody and access, or monetary support.  This reflects a general strong response at a federal level to any elements of duress or undue influence within the civil law system.  ====Bruker v. Marcovitz====  The justiciability of a civil contract with religious overtonese is now being tested in the Supreme Court Case of Bruker v. Marcovitz. See Canadian Civil Liberties Association. http://www.ccla.org/pos/legal/  In 1969, the parties married in an orthodox ceremony.  During the next 11 years they adopted two children after Ms. Bruker was unable to conceive.  In April of 1980, Ms. Bruker initiated divorce proceedings.   A link to the decision database is http://www.jugements.qc.ca/ and the full decision can be found with a text search for “Bruker” under “Cour d’appel”  In 1980, Mr. Marcovitz agreed upon a consent judgment for the divorce to appear immediately before Rabbinical authorities for the purpose of granting the religious Get.  Shortly, after the civil divorce, Ms Bruker, personally and through various attorneys and Rabbis, asked Mr. Marcovitz to provide the get, but Mr. Marcovitz refused. Mr. Marcovitz opined that he refused to comply because he viewed Ms. Bruker's behavior since the divorce as harassment and an attempt by her to alienate him from his children.    Ms Bruker sued Mr. Marcovitz in 1989, seeking damages in the amount of $500,000 ``for having been restrained from going on with her life since de Decree Nisi [...], for having been restrained to remarry according to the Jewish faith [and] for having been restricted of having children``.  Marcovitz vs. Bruker (500-09-013353-032; September 20, 2005)  In 1995, a certificate of divorce was issued by the Rabbinical Court of Montreal with Mr. Marcovitz's consent and participation to the get.  Despite receiving the get, Ms Bruker amended her action to increase the amount of the damages claimed to $1,350,000 and to include damages ``for the loss of consortium.``   Since Mr. Marcovitz was in breach of a judgment of the civil court, the lower court found that the matter could be argued before the civil courts and that Mr. Marcovitz had breached his contractual obligation to ``appear before Rabbinical Authorities.  He awarded Ms. Bruker $47, 500 in damages.  On appeal, Justice Hilton, writing for the three member court, overturned the lower court judgement.  The appellate court ruled that the obligation was religious in nature and so could not be judged by the civil courts.   ``It matters not that the obligation was stated in the Consent that the Superior Court ratified, since the Superior Court could never have entertained an application for corollary relief under section 17 of the Divorce Act to require the issuance of a ghet. It is not at all unusual to see the parties in an agreement on corollary relief undertake to perform a variety of obligations that are not, strictly speaking, obtainable independently, but which are desirable nevertheless to the extent that they promote an amicable post-divorce environment.``   ``While I recognize the usefulness of the inclusion of obligations of this nature in divorce agreements, it does not follow that they all automatically become subject to curial supervision and control, whether for specific performance or damages in the event of a breach. In my view, in order for such clauses to be enforceable, they must be directly related to one of the subject matters on which courts issue or vary orders of corollary relief, and otherwise be justiciable. - Justice Hilton, Quebec Court of Appeals  Arguments were heard in the Supreme Court of Canada on December 5, 2006. A decision on the case is pending.`` On December 27 2006 the Supreme Court received the final transcript of the proceedings. The decision is pending.``   ===United States=== In New York State, the court cannot enter a judgment of annulment or divorce unless any barriers to religious remarriage by a spouse, the removal of which are within the control of the other spouse, have been removed. Section 253 of the Domestic Relations Law (the so-called ``First New York Get Law``) provides that, in a contested divorce, any applicant whose marriage was solemnised by a religious celebrant must file a statement that: :he or she has taken, or will take, all steps within his or her power to remove all barriers to the other spouse’s remarriage; or :the other spouse has waived in writing the applicant’s obligation to file the statement. In an uncontested divorce both parties must file such a statement or waive the obligation of the other party to do so. The court cannot enter a final judgment of divorce or annulment unless it receives the statements and, even then, final judgment cannot be entered if the person who solemnised the marriage swears that, to his or her knowledge, the applicant has failed to take all steps within his or her power to remove all barriers to the other party’s religious remarriage. See Becher v Becher,245 A.D.2d 408, 667 N.Y.S.2d 50 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997), 97-03205. Dated December 15, 1997 where the lower court should not have entertained the constitutionality of the statute (Get Law) as moot. See also Koeppel v. Koeppel. 138 NYS2d 366 (S.Ct. Queens County, 1954)where the ruling was that it was not unconstitutional to force defendant force defendant to fulfill an earlier agreement to appear before a rabbinical court. See also Rubin v. Rubin, 348 NYS2d 61, 75 Misc2d 776 (Fam. Ct. Bronx County, 1973)where the Court would not enforce payment of agreed upon alimony if wife refused to accept get that she had agreed to accept in same agreement containing alimony. The conflict between religious law and secular law is illustrated with two cases - Pal v. Pal 356 NYS2d 672, 45 AD2d 738 (App. Div., 1974)where the Court ruled it had no authority to convene a Rabbinical tribunal to prepare get;  Avitzur v. Avitzur, 449 NYS2d 83, 86 AD2d 133 (App. Div., 1982)where the Court could not enforce liturgical agreement not incorporated into already granted civil divorce and that the Ketubah,`` a marriage contract written in Hebrew`` by its own language, shows itself to be a religious document. For further cites on jewish law vs secular law in marriage and divorce see http://www.jlaw.com/Summary/divorce.html  ===Australia===  In the case of In the Marriage of Gwiazda,[26] Emery SJ ordered a wife to appear before the relevant tribunal to accept a Jewish gett. Both of these decisions were also accepted in the case of In the Marriage of Frey,[27] where it was also noted that ‘provided the need can be shown for the Court to intervene, in order to exercise effectively its jurisdiction in respect of matrimonial causes, it is no objection that the granting of a gett involves proceeding before a religious tribunal’.[28] In the case of In the Marriage of Steinmetz,[29] a lump sum maintenance payment was imposed upon a husband in the event that he continued to refuse to grant a gett. In the event that the gett was given, the sum was to be reduced. The court referred to the earlier case of Brett v Brett,[30] where it was held that if a spouse’s conduct related to the financial resources of the other spouse, it could be taken into consideration when making certain orders. This was applied in Steinmetz[31] as a relevant consideration of the court in awarding maintenance payments under s 75(2)(o) of the Family Law Act. As it was within the husband’s power to prevent the wife from remarrying (and 