` June 2009 (UTC)  ::::: Right! Turing explicitly isn't making the ``strong claim``. This strong claim is Searle's Strong AI. Turing is primarily interested in whether machines can be intelligent (which can be defined by behavior) but not what it ``feels like`` to be an intelligent human being.  He's not talking about things like consciousness (i.e., the way human beings experience perceiving and thinking as being part of a ``stream`` of qualia, mental imagery and inner speech, or the way the human mechanism of attention provides a kind of ``clearing`` in which our thoughts and experiences take place.) For Turing, this doesn't have to count as part of ``thinking``. As you say, Turing ``would not require this``.  ::::: There are two questions here: ``Can a machine be intelligent?`` and ``Can a machine have a mind in the same sense that people have minds?`` Only the second question is Strong AI. Turing (and the rest of AI research) are interested in the first question.  Philosophers and neuroscientists are interested in the second question. I think most of the confusion about the Chinese Room has to do with a failure to appreciate this distinction.   ::::: (To complicate matters, Searle is actually talking about ``intentionality``, not consciousness. However, for Searle, intentionality is a specific aspect of the way human brains work, as is consciousness, so many of the same arguments that work for consciousness work for Searle's intentionality as well. Intentionality is even less well defined than consciousness, for me anyway, since I can't relate it to neurology in a way that makes sense to me.)    08:18, 23`